By Jeffrey T. Richelson Weather or Not

eather has always In March 1945, US airmen began fly- been a key consider- ing B-24L aircraft over Japan to gather ation in war. Sun Tzu, weather data in support of B-29 bombing writing more than 2,000 missions. After the war’s end, some of years ago, said, “Know those B-29s became WB-29s, employed the ground, know the weather; your for weather reconnaissance as well as Wvictory will then be total.” He also sniffing the air for evidence that Russia identified “the heavens”—referring had detonated a nuclear device. They to day and night, cold and heat, and found that evidence during a Sept. 3, 1949 times and seasons—as one of the five flight directed by various elements of the constant factors of war. Severe winter US government and where beneficiaries weather helped Russia defeat Napoleon included a secret Special Projects Section and Hitler both. of the US Weather Bureau. The weather The lesson hasn’t been lost on the US spies also gathered data on the nature of and its adversaries. During the Cold War the device and where it was detonated. and beyond, the importance of intelligence Over time, the units and airplanes about weather conditions has been under- involved in weather intelligence changed, scored in conflicts hot and cold with the but the need for the mission remained Soviet Union, North Vietnam, and Iraq. constant. The information required, how- In 2011, weather played a crucial ever, exceeded what any air fleet could role in the raid that killed Osama bin provide. Weather data would be needed Laden. Higher-than-expected tempera- from inside the Soviet Union—not only tures (along with the weight of the stealth for possible wartime operations but also equipment onboard) contributed to the to assist US reconnaissance satellites crash of a special helicopter that carried photographing the Soviet interior. Navy SEALs to the compound in Abbot- In 1951, RAND Corp. scientists ex- tabad, Pakistan. The mission was still a plored the feasibility and utility of a success, however. weather satellite—including the ability For the night of Feb. 14, 1991, Stephen of such a craft to provide information Rose, the staff weather officer for the on clouds, temperature, pressure, mois- 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) ture, and precipitation. They noted that predicted “overcast skies with 1,000-foot a weather satellite could identify cloud ceilings, quarter-mile visibility, winds cover which could prevent photographic from the south at 12, gusting to 18 knots” reconnaissance satellites capturing im- for Iraq. The forecast proved out, and those ages of their targets. At the time, though, winds blew smoke onto the Iraqi forces an operational reconnaissance satellite that had just set their oil fields afire. The was almost a decade away. Iraqis soon discovered the hard way that By late 1960 the US had succeeded the Russian optics on their weapon sys- in photographing the Soviet Union from tems couldn’t penetrate smoke and haze. space. A November 1960 presentation The US has gathered information on to the Air Force Ballistic Missile Divi- foreign weather and forecasting proce- sion on weather support to the SAMOS dures for decades. Part of that effort has recce satellite program indicated the been conducted openly, including Air requirement hadn’t been forgotten. The Force interception of weather broadcasts. following April, NASA was assigned Other collection activities—whether in responsibility for developing the National space or on the ground—have been Operational Meteorological Satellite conducted in secret by the Central Intel- System for both civil and military users. ligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Joseph V. Charyk, undersecretary of Office, and National Security Agency. But the Air Force and head of the National collecting weather data hasn’t been the Reconnaissance Office, was skeptical of only challenge; part of the art is deciding the effort, however. He was convinced if intercepted weather reports are accurate that NASA’s weather satellite wouldn’t or intended to deceive. arrive in orbit for at least two or three NRO photo 76 AIR FORCE Magazine / October 2013 Strategists have always known that the ability to predict the weather may mean Weather or Not winning—or losing—the battle.

A Hexagon photo reconnaissance satellite. Accurate weather prediction was criti- cal to the Hexagon program’s success.

AIR FORCE Magazine / October 2013 77 years, during which time opportunities ultimately, he was able to convince to photograph Soviet ICBM sites under the right people of the problem, construction could be lost. In May 1961, which eventually led NASA and NASA photo he received and approved a proposal for a the Navy to alter Apollo 11’s re- separate weather satellite. The program, entry and splashdown profile. Re- managed by Air Force Lt. Col. Thomas routing the entire carrier task force O. Haig, would be known by a variety that would recover the re-entry of designations during its classified capsule to the new splashdown existence—including Program II, P-35, site saved the astronauts’ lives. Program 417 (shortly after Aug. 23, The satellites developed under 1962), the Defense Systems Application Haig’s direction—and their suc- Program—and finally as the Defense Me- cessors—are the most advanced teorological Satellite Program (DMSP). method of weather collection, but After one failure, the NRO/Air Force the practice of monitoring foreign satellite—a 100-pound, spin-stabilized, weather forecasting procedures weather-sensing craft—arrived in a 391- and intercepting foreign—par- by-539-mile orbit in August 1962. Its ticularly Soviet Bloc—weather sensors captured video images of cloud reports did not abate. One early cover with about one-mile resolution, example of intelligence inter- transmitted to ground stations at Vanden- est in foreign prediction meth- berg AFB, Calif., and New Boston, N.H. ods is a 1953 CIA information By December, 3,820 useable pictures report, classified “Secret/Con- were received and incorporated into trol—US Officials Only” and the daily forecasts produced by the Air titled “Weather Forecasting in Force’s Global Weather Central—“in China.” The report focused on a direct support of satellite reconnaissance new forecasting method and its activities,” according to a late 1962 NRO success in predicting the weather assessment. An NRO history of the KH-9/ for different future time periods. Hexagon program (1971 to 1984) noted But more important than un- the importance of cloud-free imagery to derstanding how foreign nations the success of each KH-9 mission and produced forecasts was gathering the “accuracy of weather forecasts was raw data on foreign weather, and critical to Hexagon success.” satellite data collection was not enough. During the Vietnam War, the chief of US Saving Apollo 11 air operations, Gen. William W. Momyer, USAF photo In addition to providing weather im- while declaring the NRO’s weather satel- agery in support of intelligence and lites to be “the greatest innovation of the military operations, the secret satellites war,” still needed to rely on additional would play a key role in the very public methods of weather data collection. Such Apollo program of moon exploration. methods—including the monitoring of Weather reconnaissance helped prevent weather broadcasts—could provide even what would have been a huge disaster: the more timely data on very small areas loss of the Apollo 11 crew after its July necessary to support combat operations. 1969 success in the first moon landing. In June 1956, William M. McMur- Capt. Hank Brandli was working at ray, a staff member of the US Weather Hickam AFB, Hawaii, as a specialist in Bureau, had reported—in an unclassified weather tracking and prediction, employ- publication—on the intercept of Soviet ing data from Program 417 satellites weather reports. He noted that the ma- to support the Corona reconnaissance jority of reports from the Soviet Union satellite program. In mid-July, Brandli were received by radio teletypewriter was examining classified weather satellite via a multiple relay system. He also photos that showed that Neil Armstrong explained that the availability of the and fellow astronauts Buzz Aldrin and intercept teletypewriter source was made Michael Collins were scheduled to splash possible “through the cooperation of ... down right in the midst of violent thunder- US Air Force installations in Germany, storms with powerful high-altitude winds. Japan, and Arabia and a similar intercept Brandli has recalled that the storm “would station in Alaska operated by the Civil have ripped their parachutes to shreds” Aeronautics Administration.” and that “without parachutes, they’d have The overt nature of some of the weather crashed into the ocean with a force that intercept activity was evident almost would have killed them instantly.” three decades later when the Air Weather The secrecy attached to the program Service issued a 73-page unclassified limited Brandli’s ability to tell others of regulation, Global Weather Intercepts. It 3 the danger facing the Apollo 11 crew. But identified 11 different intercept stations 78 AIR FORCE Magazine / October 2013 distributed across the planet. In addition, Air Force monitoring employed a uni- there was a 46-page section listing the versal system of identifying themselves, frequencies and types (radio teletype, fax, the article noted that “on internal weather continuous wave) of weather broadcasts networks of some countries unique meth- from sites from Addis Ababa in Ethiopia ods are employed.” Those methods could to Yakutsk in the Soviet Union. On that include encryption of the data and the list were 27 separate sites in China and the weather station location—making them Soviet Union whose weather broadcasts a subject for NSA collection. (often involving multiple frequencies) The NRO history of Hexagon stated were of interest to the Air Force. Special that broadcasts from Soviet weather interest in the Soviet Union and China stations “were intercepted by Sigint was indicated by a requirement for more [signal intelligence] collection means” detailed reporting. While there was a and relayed to the Air Force’s Global general requirement for acquisition of Weather Central. surface weather data covering 62-mile segments every three hours, the regula- Keeping It to Ourselves tion specified that surface weather data From the mid-1960s into the first from Russia and China be collected every years of the next decade, NSA was hour for 19-mile segments. keenly interested in North Vietnam’s But overt Air Force weather inter- weather. During that period, the author cept stations weren’t the only source of another article in the NSA Technical of weather data. Some of the National Journal wrote that “precise knowledge Security Agency’s clandestine collection of the actual surface weather conditions operations were directed toward provid- existing at stations throughout North ing weather data. In 1958, a secret article Vietnam is of utmost importance in in the NSA Technical Journal noted that the conduct of offensive operations.” a weather unit had been included in the Not only did NSA’s weather intercept communications intelligence effort since operations target reporting of surface the early months of World War II and weather conditions, they also sought followed with a brief discussion of the data on the three-dimensional distri- 1 “NSA Weather Unit.” Some of it is still bution of atmospheric conditions in classified 55 years later. the troposphere—where clouds, other It reported that, while the civilian weather, and combat aircraft could be |1| The Apollo 11 crew and a Navy diver await pickup after splashdown. weather services of all nations main- found. It was challenging to find and Accurate weather prediction likely tain special channels solely for the validate these data. saved the lives of the astronauts. |2| A transmission of meteorological data, The value of keeping accurate screenshot from the Soviet daily news military services—particularly major weather data out of the wrong hands program “Vremya.” The Soviets inten- tionally broadcast inaccurate weather commands—“have special channels set is understood by both the US and its information to confuse adversaries. apart for the dissemination of weather adversaries. In December 1990, in the |3| The first launch of a Defense Me- data.” In addition, they “may, and very midst of Operation Desert Shield, the teorological Satellite Program satellite. often do, employ other nets (operational, Naval Technical Intelligence Center This launch, in May 1962, failed, but the administrative, etc.) for the same pur- (subsequently absorbed into the Office next one, in August, succeeded. pose.” While the stations designated for of Naval Intelligence) produced a secret report: Meteorological Satellites and the Iraq Crisis. The report, released with substantial redactions, charac- terized Iraq’s need for meteorological data, particularly that provided by the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration satellites, as “very urgent” and concluded that “if access to the US information is terminated, Iraq’s meteorological support [deleted, but probably “to its military”] should be downgraded.” During the Cold War and the war in Vietnam other nations tried to block the US from accumulating accurate weather data. In his 1983 portrait of Russia, journalist David K. Shipler said that “even the weather is considered a se- curity item with military implications,” 2 and that it wasn’t until the late ’70s that Soviet newspapers began publishing AIR FORCE Magazine / October 2013 79 reports originated by Hanoi were, to the surprise of NSA analysts, detected in the exchange of weather data between the Soviet Union and the US. Analysts were apparently able to compare those with the Vietnamese reports being intercepted by NSA and figure out a way to convert

USAF photo by SSgt. Jonathan Snyder the deceptive reports into accurate ones. Thus, the 1967 paper begins, “This paper describes some of the special security measures introduced in North Vietnamese

|1| SrA. Adam Chmielowski (l) and SSgt. Adam Gagne (r), both battlefield weather forecasters, observe climate conditions at Forward Operating Base Masum Ghar, Afghanistan. |2| The view from a WC-130J as it flies into Hur- ricane Sandy Oct. 29, 2012, over the Eastern coastline of the US. 1 weather maps. He recounted how, when an American reporter writing about a Soviet New Year’s celebration called the meteorological service to find out how much snow had fallen that day, he was told that if he wanted the information he would have to “write a letter to the protocol department.” USAF photo by SSgt. Jason Robertson

Red Herrings But even after Soviet newspapers began publishing weather maps, there was suspicion, at least among some analysts, that some internal weather sta- tions were broadcasting data intended to deceive those eavesdropping on the broadcasts about actual meteorologi- 2 cal conditions in the Soviet interior. Certainly, NSA’s experience during the Vietnam War in pursuit of data on ing the nature of the elements measured weather communications” and concludes atmospheric conditions led analysts and the character and behavior of the with: “Never before has a system such as to question if the intercepted reports upper air were violated.” Anomalies that described been observed in weather were accurate. included unreasonable wind shifts, traffic from any country. It is considered During most of 1965 NSA had a hard distorted temperature inversions, and an ingenious method of providing secu- time gathering intercepts on conditions impossible temperature/dew point tem- rity in weather communications; until over North Vietnam because upper-air perature readings. A number of benign the system was detected, the weather observations were rarely reported in explanations were offered, including analysts and forecasters were effectively that country’s communications, leav- poor intercepts, inexperienced North and unwittingly misled.” ing US forecasters with little data on Vietnamese weather observers, faulty Victims of a bad weather report may which to base their predictions. Then, equipment or data, or some peculiar al- wonder about the competency of the in September 1965, data from Hanoi teration of the basic international code. weatherman, but few will imagine they on wind speed, derived from unmanned Encryption was temporarily ruled out. were being deliberately misled. The US balloon-carried equipment, began to It’s unclear how NSA established that Intelligence Community, however, has appear regularly, along with surface the data were deceptive; a key part of the dealt for decades with the challenges weather reports. According to a 1967 solution remains classified. However, of collecting weather information on NSA paper, those data were passed it started with examining all sources of conditions inside unfriendly nations— on “with great delight and much sat- upper-air data, no matter how they were that definitely don’t want to provide an isfaction.” obtained. Upper-atmosphere weather accurate forecast. n It didn’t last long, however—the upper-air data soon became suspect. Jeffrey T. Richelson is a senior fellow and consultant of the National Security When the content of the intercepted Archive in Washington, D.C., and author of nine books on intelligence and military messages was plotted on upper-air topics. His most recent article for Air Force Magazine, “Eavesdroppers in Disguise,” charts, “the laws and principles govern- appeared in the August 2012 issue. 80 AIR FORCE Magazine / October 2013