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BEYOND ALLIANCE: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE

FORGING OF AN ATLANTIC COMMUNITY, 1947-1955

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate

School of The Ohio State University

By

Jozef Noel Marie Ostyn, B.A., M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University

1995

Dissertation Committee: Approved by

Michael J. Hogan

Carole K. Fink cviser Alan D. Beyerchen OMI Number: 9534044

Copyright 1995 by Ostyn, Jozef Noel Marie All rights reserved.

UMI Microform 9534044 Copyright 1995, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.

This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 Copyright by Jozef Noel Marie Ostyn 1995 A.M.D.G.

To my parents

and to Elizabeth for their love and support

1 1 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank all those who helped me in writing this dissertation. My adviser, Professor Michael J.

Hogan, guided me throughout my graduate student career and provided the necessary encouragement, support, advice, and criticism to help me complete and improve this dissertation.

Professors Carole K. Fink, Alan D. Beyerchen, and Peter L.

Hahn gave generously of their time to read the dissertation and provide helpful comments. Thanks also go to my fellow graduate students, especially Glenn Dorn, Darryl Fox, Paul

Pierpaoli, and Paul Wittekind, who read parts of the dissertation and often provided invaluable comments. I also want to thank Professors Lawrence S. Kaplan and S. Victor

Papacosma of the Lyman L. Lemnitzer Center for NATO Studies at Kent State University who were very helpful in locating important archival sources.

This dissertation could not have been completed without the generous financial support provided by the

Department of History and the Graduate School of The Ohio

State University. My sincere thanks also go to the Streit family, for permission to use the Clarence K. Streit Papers.

I also want to thank the staff of the Manuscript Division of

iii the Library of Congress; the Diplomatic Branch of the

National Archives; the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library;

the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library; the Seeley G.

Mudd Manuscript Library of Princeton University; and the

Atlantic Council of the United States, for their assistance

during my research.

I must also thank the many teachers who contributed to

my graduate education and training at The Ohio State

University: Professors Marvin R. Zahniser, K. Austin Kerr,

John S. Hill, William R. Childs, and Susan M. Hartmann.

Sincere thanks also go to those who encouraged me to continue my studies in the U.S. and who helped to get me there:

Professors Romain Van Eenoo, Jan Art, and Luc Francois of the

University of Ghent; and the Commission for Educational

Exchange between the United States of America, Belgium and

Luxembourg.

Last, but certainly not least, I want to thank my

family, for their support and encouragement, and my wife

Elizabeth, for her love and understanding.

IV VITA

8 October 1966...... born in Ghent, Belgium

198 9 ...... B.A. in History,

University of Ghent

1989-95...... Graduate Teaching Associate,

Department of History, The

Ohio State University,

Columbus, OH

199 0 ...... M.A. in History, The Ohio

State University

PUBLICATIONS

Peter L. Hahn, Michael J. Hogan, and Jozef Ostyn, eds.,

"Woodrow Wilson and the Russian Revolution," in

Retrieving the American Past; Readings from The

Ohio State University Electronic Bookshelf (Needham

Heights, MA: Simon & Schuster, 1995).

Jozef Ostyn, "The Neutrality Acts," in Garland's Encyclopedia

of the Second World War in Europe (New York: Garland,

1995). FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: History

areas of specialization:

U.S. Diplomatic History

Examining Faculty: Professor Michael J. Hogan

Professor Marvin R. Zahniser

Professor Peter L. Hahn

European International History

Examining Faculty: Professor Carole K. Fink

Professor Alan D. Beyerchen

Professor John S. Hill

Recent U.S. History

Examining Faculty; Professor K. Austin Kerr

VI TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION...... ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... iii

VITA...... V

INTRODUCTION...... 1

CHAPTER I. FROM ATLANTIC CIVILIZATION TO ATLANTIC UNION; THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY CONCEPT, 1900-1945...... 14

CHAPTER II. ATOMS AND THE IRON CURTAIN: THE RESURGENCE OF WORLD AND REGIONAL FEDERALISM, 1945-47...... 51

CHAPTER III: EUROPEAN RECOVERY AND ATLANTIC SECURITY, DECEMBER 1947-JUNE 1948...... 98

CHAPTER IV: LAYING THE CORNERSTONE: THE GENESIS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, JULY 1948-JULY 1949...... 143

CHAPTER V: THE NEW FEDERALISTS: THE ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR A FEDERAL CONVENTION OF THE ATLANTIC DEMOCRACIES, JANUARY 1949-FEBRUARY 1950...185

CHAPTER VI: SEARCHING FOR COMMON GROUND: THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE ATLANTIC UNION MOVEMENT, FEBRUARY 1950- DECEMBER 1951...... 221

CHAPTER VII: FROM CONSTITUTIONAL UNION TO FUNCTIONAL COMMUNITY: THE EMERGENCE OF THE NATO CITIZENS' MOVEMENT, JANUARY 1952-FEBRUARY 1953...... 281

CHAPTER VIII: FORGING THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY: JOHN FOSTER DULLES, THE STATE DEPARTMENT, AND THE AMERICAN COUNCIL ON NATO, FEBRUARY 1953-DECEMBER 1955...... 334

CHAPTER IX: EPILOGUE: THE ATLANTIC UNION MOVEMENT AND THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY, 1956-1962...... 371

V I 1 CONCLUSION...... 384

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 393

Vlll INTRODUCTION

This dissertation aims to analyze the postwar development of the Atlantic Community concept and its influence on U.S. policy toward Western Europe during the early Cold War. The concept of an Atlantic Community, binding together the peoples of the North Atlantic area on the basis of shared values and traditions, developed long before the onset of the Cold War. And a private Atlantic

Union movement emerged in the U.S. during the late 1930's.i

But it was during the Cold War, between 1947 and 1955, that the forging of a cohesive Atlantic Community for the first time became an integral part of U.S. foreign policy. The emergence, in the Soviet Union, of what was perceived as another challenge to Western civilization, so soon after the devastating conflict between the Atlantic democracies and

Nazi totalitarianism, invigorated the search, both within and outside government, for ways to strengthen Western unity.

This search led American policymakers and private internationalist groups to propose new initiatives, designed to forge stronger and more permanent links between the United

States and Western Europe. And it is this American quest for an institutionalized Atlantic Community that is the subject

of this dissertation.

During World War II, U.S. planning for the postwar

world, heavily influenced by traditional Wilsonian

internationalism, had focused on the need for continued

cooperation among the great powers, within the framework of the United Nations. But the onset of the Cold War, as well

as the precipitous decline of the Western European powers, destroyed any prospect for such global cooperation. The escalating rivalry with the Soviet Union rendered the United

Nations useless as a forum for international cooperation. At the same time, the power vacuum in Europe, combined with the perceived Soviet challenge, threatened America's long-term economic and geopolitical interests. This left U.S. policymakers grappling with the problems of redefining

American foreign policy to create a new international framework within which the Western European democracies would be able to regain their economic strength and political stability and meet the Soviet challenge. The Marshall Plan was the first step in that direction, with its emphasis on

Western European economic recovery and integration. The next step was the creation of NATO, designed to strengthen

Europe's military defenses. This dissertation will not attempt to reexamine the particulars of these and subsequent

U.S. initiatives in the fields of economic aid and military security. Rather, it will focus on the evolution of the

"grand thinking" about America's relationship with Western

Europe that lay behind these initiatives.

U.S. Cold War foreign policy at first envisaged the

development of a united, strong, and independent Western

Europe as a "third force" in world politics. Such a united

Europe would of course retain strong trade links with North

America, and would be allied with the United States, in one

form or another, in the global struggle against the Soviet

Union. But it would not be permanently dependent on U.S.

economic aid and military protection. Gradually, however,

this focus on European integration was supplemented with a

more "atlanticist" policy that envisaged the creation of

permanent and institutionalized transatlantic links.2 The

impetus for this came, at least in part, from the Europeans

themselves. But in the U.S. too, policymakers and private

groups argued that there was a need to forge strong and permanent ties between North America and Western Europe, that went beyond traditional trade relations or a military

alliance. Their aim was to create an institutionalized

Atlantic Community that would be able to guarantee the peace and prosperity of the Western democracies, not just in the

face of the immediate Soviet threat, but in perpetuity. How this Atlantic Community should be constructed and what should be its ultimate shape became the subjects of a prolonged debate and policymaking process, both within and outside the administration. Some private groups pressed for a

"federalist" or "constitutional" strategy, leading to a federal Atlantic Union modelled on the United States of

America. Others, especially the more cautious State

Department officials and their allies in the private foreign policy establishment, opted for a "functional" approach, creating limited transatlantic institutions providing for collaboration in specific areas of common interest. And both the proponents of a federal Atlantic Union and the advocates of a functional Atlantic Community had to fight those who gave priority to European integration, which remained the prime focus of U.S. policy toward Europe throughout most of the 1947-1955 period.

The clash between these competing visions of the

Atlantic Community, and of America's long-term relationship with Western Europe, generated a debate, within the administration, in Congress, within and between various private groups, and in the media, on the course of U.S. foreign policy. It is this debate, and the policymaking process that resulted from it, which is the main focus of this dissertation. Chronologically, the focus is on the period 1947-1955, starting with the Marshall Plan and the

Truman Administration's first steps toward the creation of the North Atlantic alliance, and ending with the Eisenhower

Administration's "new line" on NATO, which envisaged the further development of a non-military Atlantic Community centered around the alliance. This period was also the high

tide of various private groups, such as the Atlantic Union

Committee and the Atlantic Citizens Congress, who lobbied

both the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations for U.S.

support for the creation of either a federal Atlantic Union

or a functional Atlantic Community. The main aim of this dissertation is to document and analyze the interaction and cooperation between these private groups and the administration. The main thesis is that both sides influenced each other. The interaction with groups like the

Atlantic Union Committee and the Atlantic Citizens Congress influenced the evolution of official U.S. policy toward the

Atlantic alliance. It was a crucial factor in the emergence of an "atlanticist" U.S. policy toward Western Europe, that ultimately tried to move beyond a traditional military alliance toward a more permanent and broader relationship.

At the same time the cooperation with the administration forced most of the private atlanticist groups to abandon their radical federalist approach in favor of the functional strategy of their counterparts in the State Department. The end result was the coming together of both public officials and private activists in a joint effort to forge a functional

Atlantic Community, inspired in large part by the vision of the private Atlantic Union movement, but driven by the functional imperatives of U.S. Cold War foreign policy. There already exists, of course, a very large body of

secondary literature concerning U.S. postwar policy toward

Western Europe, and there are also a handful of works on the

Atlantic Union movement and other supranationalist pressure

groups. But so far no study has combined both of these

elements to explore the development of both the Atlantic

Community concept and the Atlantic Union movement, and their

influence on U.S. Cold War foreign policy. Such an approach

sheds new light on the origins and evolution of U.S. policy

toward Western Europe in the postwar period. And it also

helps to illustrate the emergence of an informal sphere of

public-private cooperation in 20th-century U.S. foreign

policy, a concept pioneered by diplomatic historians of the

corporatist school.3

It is of course not easy to document the influence of

private groups and activists on government policy. As will

become clear from what follows, there is ample documentation

of the interaction between private atlanticist groups and

State Department policymakers. But this interaction was of course always informal in nature. And its impact on policymaking was indirect and muted. Furthermore, the

Atlantic Union movement was only one of many private pressure groups all trying to pull the administration and Congress in different directions. What complicates the study of the interaction between the administration and the Atlantic Union movement even more is the fact that their relationship was always an ambiguous one. While they stood shoulder to

shoulder against isolationist and McCarthyite forces, they

were never entirely comfortable with each other. The

Atlantic Union movement was at times openly critical of

administration policy, and deeply resented the State

Department's stalling techniques. The administration, for

its part, at times became exasperated with the uncompromising

attitude of the radical Atlantic federalists, and feared that

they might do the cause of American internationalism more

harm than good. Nevertheless, I believe that there is clear evidence to show that at least some of the ideas and

arguments of the atlanticist activists were taken over by

influential policymakers who, in turn, helped steer U.S.

foreign policy in a more atlanticist direction. Even more obvious is the important influence the State Department atlanticists had on the evolution of the Atlantic Union movement, gradually transforming it into a significant and helpful base of support for U.S. policy toward Western

Europe. And while the radicals in the Atlantic Union movement never succeeded in entering the mainstream of

American foreign policymaking, they did play an important pioneering role and helped pave the way for the more moderate atlanticist initiatives of the 1950's.

The most important private group favoring the federalist approach was the Atlantic Union Committee (AUC), 8

which was founded in January 1949 and dissolved in 1961. The

Atlantic Union Committee called on the administration to

organize a convention of delegates from the democracies of

the North Atlantic region. This convention, modelled on the

1787 Philadelphia convention, would draw up a constitution

for a federal union of the North Atlantic democracies, based

on the blueprint provided in Clarence Streit's Union Now.

Streit, the driving force behind the AUC, had started the

Atlantic Union movement in the United States in 1938. But during the Second World War his movement was eclipsed by the campaign for the United Nations. The onset of the Cold War, and the fading of the United Nations, allowed Streit to relaunch his campaign for a federal Atlantic Union. Between

1949 and 1952 the AUC proved very successful in getting attention for Streit's program. A major reason for the AUC's initial success was that it promoted Atlantic Union as the only way the West could win the Cold War. This attracted several prominent figures, such as former Supreme Court

Justice Owen J. Roberts, former Secretary of War Robert P.

Patterson, and former Under Secretaries of State William L.

Clayton, William Phillips, and Joseph C. Grew, who joined the

AUC's leadership. Their easy access to administration officials and congressional leaders greatly aided the AUC's lobbying efforts, while their many contacts in the business world gave the AUC the necessary financial support to conduct an impressive media campaign. But in spite of the AUC's impressive lobbying and

publicity campaigns the administration, and especially the

State Department, remained weary of the federalist program.

Many foreign policy experts were still very apprehensive of a

resurgence of American isolationism, and believed that a

gradual and "functional" approach would be more palatable to

the American public. Most State Department officers saw the

vision of a federal Atlantic Union as unrealistic and

dangerous. They too, favored greater unity among the North

Atlantic nations, but they feared that the AUC's federalist

proposals might provoke an isolationist backlash, and

therefore sought to stall them. Furthermore, most

policymakers in the top echelons of the State Department

doubted the merits of the AUC's fascination with federalism.

Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and his closest associates,

felt that the federalists were putting form ahead of

substance and failed to deal in a practical way with the

urgent issues confronting American foreign policy.

Nevertheless, the administration never took an unequivocal stand against Atlantic Union. Several important

State Department planners, especially in the Bureau of

European Affairs, actively supported the idea of a progressively closer association of the North Atlantic nations and wanted to seek common ground with federalist groups like the AUC. This stemmed in part from the genuine sympathy they felt for the ideas of their friends and former 10

colleagues in the Atlantic Union movement. But they also

argued that, if adroitly managed, the Atlantic Union movement

could provide valuable support for the administration's own

initiatives, such as the strengthening of NATO. The

federalist AUC and the functionalist State Department

differed in their ultimate visions of the Atlantic Community.

But they often found themselves as allies against both isolationists and world federalists. In effect, they shared the same basic Cold War world view. And after a bruising confrontation in Congress in 1950, the AUC and the State

Department gradually began to move closer to each other. The administration, particularly after the "Great Debate" of

1951, perceived an urgent need to strengthen and deepen its ties with Western Europe through the development of a broader

Atlantic Community that would go beyond the NATO military alliance. And in its search for ways to create such a broader Atlantic Community it looked to the various private atlanticist pressure groups for inspiration. And while the

State Department became more atlanticist, the Atlantic Union movement became less federalist. Having failed to push through their plans for an immediate federal union many

"moderates" within the AUC began to look for more limited, intermediate steps on the road to Atlantic Union. The question of compromise and support for the administration's more limited initiatives aroused considerable debate within the AUC and ultimately split the Atlantic Union movement. By 11

1952 the State Department succeeded in coopting the moderates

within the movement. Between 1952 and 1955 these moderates,

in close cooperation with the more atlanticist officers of

the State Department, organized various citizens' groups,

such as the Atlantic Citizens Congress, the Declaration of

Atlantic Unity group, and the American Council on NATO, that

abandoned the AUC's federalist vision in favor of a more

gradual and limited approach to greater North Atlantic unity.

These new private groups quickly eclipsed the AUC and came to

embody the new atlanticism resulting from the compromise

between the Atlantic Union ideal and the functionalist

realpolitik of the State Department. And as the early Cold

War gave way to the first period of East-West detente, the

Eisenhower Administration increasingly called upon this new

atlanticism to cement the U.S.-West European relationship.

What follows, then, is an analysis of the development of the Atlantic Community concept, a history of the Atlantic

Union movement, and a study of their impact on U.S. Cold War

foreign policy. The first chapter traces the evolution of the Atlantic Community concept from the turn of the century through World War II. Chapter 2 analyzes the immediate postwar climate that gave rise to the Cold War Atlantic Union movement. Chapters 3 and 4 provide a detailed account of how the moderate atlanticists within the State Department seized the opportunity offered by the early Cold War crisis 12 atmosphere to lay the groundwork for the development of a functional Atlantic Community. The fifth chapter examines the Atlantic Union Committee's unsuccessful campaign for a federal convention of the North Atlantic democracies.

Chapter 6 traces the gradual process by which the moderates within the Atlantic Union movement and the atlanticists within the State Department found common ground. Chapter 7 details the transition of most of the Atlantic Union movement from a constitutional approach to a functional one. Chapter

8 analyzes the final consummation of that functional approach under the new Eisenhower Administration. The final chapter provides a brief epilogue on the post-1955 history of the

American atlanticist movement. 13

1. The term "Atlantic Union movement" will be used throughout to encompass all the various private groups and activists that sought to promote greater Atlantic unity, irrespective of the form of integration they espoused.

2. The term "atlanticist" will be used throughout to refer to all persons, groups, initiatives, and policies, that emphasized the need for transatlantic integration. Although many atlanticists also favored European integration, they generally saw the latter process as an integral part of the broader transatlemtic integration process.

3. See Michael J. Hogan, "Corporatism," in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds. (New York, 1991), 226-36. CHAPTER I

FROM ATLANTIC CIVILIZATION TO ATLANTIC UNION:

THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE ATLANTIC

COMMUNITY CONCEPT, 1900-1945

The creation and strengthening of an institutionalized

Atlantic Community became part of American foreign policy

during the Cold War. But the concept of an Atlantic

Community, binding together the peoples of the North Atlantic

area on the basis of their shared values and traditions,

emerged much earlier. Already in the eighteenth and

nineteenth centuries, writers, both in Western Europe and

North America, pointed to the emergence of a North Atlantic civilization, growing out of the continuous flow of people,

commerce, and ideas between both sides of the North Atlantic.

This consciousness of a shared civilization laid the

groundwork for the development, during the twentieth century, of the modern Atlantic Community concept.i

The term "Atlantic Community" was coined by the

journalist and writer Walter Lippmann, in a February 1917 article that appeared in the New Republic. In this article,

14 15

Lippmann argued that "on the two shores of the Atlantic Ocean

there has grown up a profound web of interest which joins

together the western world. Britain, France, Italy, even

Spain, Belgium, Holland, the Scandinavian nations, and Pan-

America are in the main one community in their deepest needs and their deepest purposes." Now, at the height of the

First World War, the time had come, Lippmann believed, for

America to assume its rightful place as the leader of this

Atlantic Community by entering the war on the side of the

Western allies.2

Lippmann's wartime article was symptomatic of the fact that the twentieth-century development of the Atlantic

Community concept went hand in hand with the emergence of the

United States as the predominant world power, and the gradual decline of the Western European powers, especially Great

Britain and France. The realization of this shift in world power led several American writers to redefine the transatlantic relationship between North America and Western

Europe. Whereas their predecessors had written in vague terms about a common unit of civilization, these twentieth- century writers developed the idea of a much closer transatlantic relationship involving an economic, ideological, and geopolitical partnership. By the beginning of the Second World War, this idea would blossom into the concept of an Atlantic Union that sought to combine the economic, military, and political power of the Western world 16

in the struggle against "Eastern" autocracy and

totalitarianism.

The historian and writer Henry Adams was one of the

first Americans to realize that the United States was taking over Britain's role as the predominant power in the North

Atlantic area. Adams was also one of the first American writers in the twentieth century to call for greater transatlantic unity. He argued that America's future was linked to the continued cohesion, and strengthening, of what he called "the Atlantic system." He saw this system as a cultural and economic unit, stretching from the American west to the river Elbe. It bound together North America and

Western Europe (including, significantly, what would later become West Germany). By the turn of the century, the economic center within the Atlantic system was shifting from

Western Europe, especially from Great Britain, to the United

States. Britain, which had served as the linchpin of the

Atlantic system in the nineteenth century, was no longer strong enough to maintain its cohesion. That would henceforth be America's responsibility. And the need for the

United States to take up this task was urgent, Adams argued in the first years of the twentieth century. The integrity of the Atlantic system was threatened by the expanding influence in Europe of the Eastern autocratic and militaristic powers, Prussian-dominated Germany and Tsarist 17

Russia. Unified under Prussian rule, the aggressive German

Empire had clearly outgrown Britain's capacity to contain it,

and might soon dominate Western Europe. Unless the United

States committed itself wholeheartedly to sustaining Great

Britain and France, they would have no alternative but to

seek Russian help. This would open up the possibility of

increased Russian influence in Europe, a prospect scarcely more palatable than Prussian hegemony. If either Germemy or

Russia came to dominate Western Europe the Atlantic system would collapse and be replaced by a continental system that would be closed and hostile to the United States.3

Adams's atlanticism fit in well with the reigning

Anglophile tendency of the American East Coast elite around the turn of the r ?''tury. This was an era of rapprochement between the United States and Great Britain, and the idea of a common Anglo-Saxon destiny was a popular one, both among

American and British elites.4 But Adams's larger vision, which encompassed an active partnership between the United

States, the British Empire, and Western Europe, failed to gain a substantial following in the United States, even among

America's Anglophile elite. And during Adams's lifetime his

Atlantic system remained an essentially intellectual idea without any real impact on American foreign policy.

The first organized atlanticist constituency emerged, not in the United States, but in Great Britain. Adams's argument that Britain was no longer economically strong 18 enough to be the sole leader of the Western world was mirrored in the writings of British neo-imperialists associated with a group known as the Round Table. The youngest and most active leaders of this influential group,

Lionel Curtis and Philip Kerr (later Lord Lothian), dreamed of turning the British Empire into a federation of self- governing dominions, and were the intellectual godfathers of what later would become the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Although these early British atlanticists shared Adams's belief in the basic unity of Western civilization, they were more suspicious of the continental Western powers, especially

France. As a result, they envisaged an Atlantic Community limited to the Anglo-Saxon nations. This community would reunite the United States with the British Empire, forming an

Anglo-Saxon federation that would be strong enough to hold its own against "Eastern" autocracy. Just as England had done in the preceding centuries, this new Atlantic Community would safeguard the balance of Western civilization without actually being drawn into the vortex of continental European rivalries. To promote its goals the Round Table group formed an informal network with like-minded groups and individuals in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. The

British atlanticists also looked for American support, but their contacts in the United States remained limited to a few sympathetic individuals, most notably the historian George

Louis Beer.5 Before 1914, this nascent atlanticism, both in 19

its narrow Anglo-Seocon vêiriety and in the more expanded

perspective of Adams's Atlantic system, failed to develop a

significant American constituency.

The First World War was a pivotal event in the

development of the Atlantic Community concept in the United

States. It demonstrated conclusively that the United States

could not but be affected by a major European conflict. And

it exposed the growing weakness of the traditional Western

European powers. Great Britain and France, while

simultaneously highlighting the increasing strength and

importance of the United States. This had a profound and

lasting impact on foreign policy thinking in the United

States. For those, like Henry Adams and Theodore Roosevelt,

who had been advocating a more assertive American foreign

policy for years, the First World War and its effects only

confirmed the need for the United States to assume its

rightful place as the leader of the Western world. But the

war had a much more profound impact on a younger generation

of Americans who, for the first time, espoused an atlanticist

perspective. Over the next thirty years this group of

Americans would come to constitute what is generally referred

to as the American foreign policy establishment. The wartime

experience convinced this elite group of bankers, lawyers,

industrialists, academics, and journalists that the fates of

Western Europe and North America were inextricably linked to

each other. And in order to safeguard this common future. 20

they wanted the United States to forge closer transatlantic

links and become a full player in European affairs.®

The most articulate of this new generation of

atlanticists was the journalist and writer Walter Lippmann.

Despite his youth (he was only 25 when the First World War

broke out) Lippmann was already something of a celebrity

among Americcin Progressives. But like most of his colleagues on the editorial staff of the New Republic, and like most

American Progressives in general, Lippmann had not paid much attention to foreign policy before the outbreak of the First

World War. The war caught Lippmann, who was at the time travelling in Europe, totally off-guard and kindled in him a life-long interest in foreign affairs.?

From the start of the war Lippmann's personal sympathies clearly lay with the allies, and especially with

Great Britain. As a Liberal and Progressive, he had an instinctive dislike for German militarism. In his editorials

Lippmann never hid his aversion to Germany's aggressive policies, like its unrestricted submarine warfare in the

North Atlantic, and he publicly supported building up

America's military strength. During the first year of the war, however, Lippmann continued to argue for American non­ involvement. Yet instinctively he felt that the United

States could not continue to sit on the sidelines. Satisfied with neither his own non-involvement prescription, which was also the Wilson Administration's official policy, nor with 21

the emotional Anglophile and anti-German attitude of the pro-

Allied press and the bellicose nationalism of Theodore

Roosevelt and the preparedness movement, Lippmann set out to

reformulate his own ideas on the war and on foreign affairs

in general. In doing so he developed, between 1915 and 1917,

a new atlanticist vision.s

In the summer of 1915 Lippmann wrote his third book.

The Stakes of Diplomacy. In this book, he argued that the real cause of international conflict was not the lack of respect for international law or the occasional breakdown of the balance of power among nations. It was to be found in the struggle among the great powers to control the development of the world's backward areas. International arbitration and world courts, the favorite prescriptions of

American pacifists, and grand diplomacy and balance-of-power politics, the favorite tools of nationalist interventionists, were equally unsuitable long-term solutions to this problem.

The way to end the struggle over the development of the world's backward areas, Lippmann argued, was to make this issue the subject of a democratic transnational political debate, rather than of unending nationalist rivalries. Such a political debate, unfettered by emotional nationalism, could only take place within the context of some kind of international liberal-democratic union of states. The creation of such a liberal-democratic union of states,

Lippmann concluded, should be the goal of all Progressive 22

forces in the world, and of the United States in particular.

And this goal, rather than questions about moral

responsibilty for the First World War or the issue of neutral

rights, should be the guiding star of America's policy toward

the belligerents.9

Over the next eighteen months, Lippmann further

developed his new vision of American foreign policy. He now

used the pages of the New Republic as a forum from which he

incessantly argued in favor of all-out support for the Allies

(though not necessarily American entry in the war). Only by

throwing in its weight on the side of the Western Allies could the United States ensure that an Allied victory in the war would lead to the creation of the international liberal- democratic order that Lippmann envisaged in The Stakes of

Diplomacy. At first sight Lippmann's proposal for a liberal- democratic union of states looked little different from the proposals for a League of Nations, which were supported by a wide variety of American internationalists and pacifists.

Lippmann himself often referred to his proposed union as a

"League of Peace" or a "League of Nations." But it quickly became clear that Lippmann's union was not the universal

League of Nations envisaged by the League to Enforce Peace and other internationalist organizations, but a much more restricted community of culturally and ideologically homogenous states centered around the Atlantic. 23

Like Henry Adams, Lippmann believed that North

America, the British Isles, Western Europe (including western

Germany), and the Scandinavian countries formed a single

cultural and economic unit. But Lippmann went beyond Adams

in describing the Atlantic Community as a united ideological

force. To him the Atlantic Community was synonymous with the

community of liberal-democratic states. And it was this

community that Lippmann saw as the cornerstone of a new

international liberal-democratic order, the defender of world

peace, and the ideological core of what might later become a

more universal League of Nations. Now that he had defined

the Atlantic Community as an ideological unit, Lippmann also

redefined the First World War in ideological terms. To him

the war now appeared as a struggle between the liberal-

democracy of the Atlantic Community, defended by Britain and

France, and Eastern autocracy and despotism, most powerfully

represented by Prussian militarism. In such a struggle the

United States could not be neutral.

Starting in December 1915, Lippmann published a series

of editorials calling for "a closer political union" or "a

political alliance" with Great Britain and the British

Empire, culminating in "The Defense of the Atlantic World," which he published in mid-February 1917. He saw this Anglo-

American union or alliance as the vital axis around which the

Atlantic Community could solidify. And by February 1917

Lippmann had become convinced that such an axis could only be 24

formed by American entry in the war. American intervention

was necessary, not just to prevent a possible German victory,

but also to prevent Britain and France from becoming too

dependent on their Eastern allies, Russia and Japan. The

growing influence of these two Eastern autocratic powers on

the Western allies was just as dangerous as a German victory,

because it would inevitably draw them away from the Atlantic

Community, thereby preventing the creation of the

international liberal-democratic order Lippmann envisaged.

This, Lippmann argued, the United States could not allow.

The integrity of the Atlantic Community was something for which the United States should fight.n

Lippmann's was one of many voices urging President

Wilson to come to the aid of the Allies, under pressure from

his cabinet the president had broken off relations with

Germany in early February 1917 to protest Germany's

resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare on the Atlantic

Ocean. Lippmann's editorial on "The Defense of the Atlantic

World," published on 17 February, was clearly an attempt to convince Wilson to take the next logical step and bring the

United States into the war. But pacifist sentiments, coupled with Wilson's own hesitancy and doubts, delayed this decision. Finally, on 2 April 1917, after the March

Revolution in Russia, which seemed to give a more liberal- democratic character to the anti-German alliance, and after the publication of the Zimmermann telegram, which seemed to 25

prove German hostility to the United States, Wilson asked

Congress for a declaration of war against Germany. Four days

later the United States officially entered the First World

War. 12

Long before he took the United States into the First

World War, Wilson had publicly committed himself to the creation of an international organization of nations to safeguard world peace. On 27 May 1916, in an important address to the delegates at the first annual meeting of the

League to Enforce Peace, the president endorsed their vision of a world-wide league of nations. Once the United States entered the war, Wilson made the creation of such a league his primary war aim. Between April 1917 and the opening of the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919, Wilson developed his own outline for the future League of Nations. It went far beyond what Lippmann and most other American and British atlanticists and internationalists had envisaged. Rather than the Atlantic Community envisaged by Lippmann, or the

"protective union of the democracies" called for by the

British atlanticist Norman Angell, Wilson's League of Nations was a strong universal organization of nations, encompassing the whole globe. Although most American atlanticists and internationalists, including Lippmann, had serious doubts about such a universalist concept, they gave their full support to Wilson's program in the hope that his global 26

league would still have a concert of Western liberal-

democratic states as its dominant core.

The atlanticists were well represented at the Paris

Peace Conference. Both Lippmann and George Louis Beer, the main Round Table contact person in the United States, were in

Paris as members of the Inquiry, the study and research group

set up by Colonel Edward House to assist the American peace commissioners. Lionel Curtis and Philip Kerr attended the peace conference as advisers to the British government. Both the American and British atlanticists discovered quickly, however, that their influence on their respective government representatives, and their input in the make-up of the final peace settlement and the new League of Nations, was minimal.

To compensate for this they decided to set up a common organization, independent of their governments, to foster closer transatlantic cooperation in the postwar world. On 30

May 1919 a group of Americans, including George Louis Beer, met with a group of British atlanticists, including Lionel

Curtis. At the initiative of Curtis, the two groups agreed to set up an Anglo-American research and study organization, the Institute of International Affairs, with branches in

London and New York. It would try to keep alive the wartime spirit of Anglo-American cooperation, and to influence public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic in favor of greater transatlantic unity. A six-man joint committee was set up to organize the new institute.i* 27

Building on the already existing Round Table network,

the British atlanticists quickly established the Royal

Institute of International Affairs (known more informally as

Chatham House) as the British branch of the new transatlantic

institute. The American group faltered, however, largely as

a result of the protracted and agonizing debate within the

United States over the Versailles Treaty and the League of

Nations. The Treaty fight threatened to rip apart the internationalist movement in the United States. Many internationalists continued to support Wilson eind argued that the League of Nations was the best that could be achieved given the circumstances. Like the president, they hoped that the very existence of the League would form the basis for the further development of a new international order. But many

Progressive internationalists, including Lippmann, denounced the Versailles Treaty. They argued that this treaty, designed to satisfy the nationalistic and imperialistic programs of the European victors, could never form the basis for a liberal-democratic world order. Because of this division among the internationalists, and the implaccable opposition of the "irreconcilable" isolationists, the

Versailles Treaty failed to pass the U.S. Senate. An attempt by Senator Philander C. Knox (R-PA) to salvage an American security guarantee to the European allies, by separating this guarantee from the Versailles Treaty and the League of

Nations, failed also. In March 1920 the Senate definitively 28

rejected the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations,

thereby clearly signalling America's disillusionment with the

outcome of the war effort and its unwillingness to accept

global or transatlantic commitments. is

The definitive rejection of the Wilsonian League of

Nations, confirmed by the Republican victory in the 1920

election, allowed the internationalists in the United States

to regroup. In January 1923 over 700 prominent

internationalists founded the League of Nations Non-Partisan

Association. During the interwar period this association continued the fight of the earlier League to Enforce Peace, trying to convince the American public of the need for the

United States to join the League of Nations.i® In the meantime, in July 1921, the original American members of the stillborn Anglo-American Institute of International Affairs merged with a discussion group led by ex-Secretary of State

Elihu Root to form the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).

Whereas the League of Nations Non-Partisan Association

(usually referred to as the League of Nations Association) focused on the need for international organization and

America's role therein, the CFR mainly focused on the need for transatlantic cooperation and on America's role in the political and economic stabilization of Europe. i?

The League of Nations Association and the CFR quickly grew into significant organizations, and together with other groups, like the Foreign Policy Association, began to form a 29

permanent organizational network of internationalists. These

interwar internationalists formed a fairly homogeneous group.

Most of them were bankers, lawyers, academics, journalists,

or clergymen, and they generally belonged to the Northeastern

Anglophile elite. Their internationalism was largely limited

to the North Atlantic area, and for most of the interwar years they remained the sole American carriers of the atlanticist vision enunciated by Lippmann in 1917. Although disillusioned by the outcome of the First World War they maintained their conviction, formed during the war, that the

United States and Western Europe were inextricably bound together through cultural, economic, and ideological ties.

But at no time during the interwar years were they able to resurrect the transatlantic political partnership of the

First World war. For most of the 1920's the East Coast internationalists, primarily the bankers among them, did manage to convince successive Republican Administrations of the need for transatlantic economic and financial cooperation in order to stabilize Europe. But with the onset of the

Great Depression even this economic cooperation was suspended, is

For most of the 1930's the East Coast internationalist establishment, represented by the CFR, the League of Nations

Association, and the Foreign Policy Association, remained on the defensive. During 1934 and 1935 several sensational books, as well as the findings of a special senate committee 30

investigating the munitions industry, seemed to point to the

conclusion that America's entry in the First World War had

been a tragic mistake, forced upon the American people by

unscrupulous East Coast bankers, munitions manufacturers, and

pro-Allied propagandists. This was nothing short of an

indictment of the East Coast internationalists. The

internationalist cause was further hurt by the failure of the

League of Nations in the face of a series of crises in

Manchuria, Ethiopia, and Spain. With the internationalist

legacy discredited by the revisionist history of World War I

and the failure of the League of Nations, America took a headlong flight into isolationism. In 1935, 1936, and 1937,

Congress passed a succession of Neutrality Acts designed to prevent any transatlantic political or economic entanglements that might lead the United States into war.i» But at the same time the growing international crisis of the 1930's led to a renewal of American atlanticisism, which now took the form of the modern Atlantic Union movement.

In 1938 a little-known journalist, Clarence Kirschman

Streit, published the first edition of Union Now; A Proposal for a Federal Union of the Democracies of the North Atlantic, the book that would become the bible of the Atlantic Union movement in the united States. Streit did not belong to the

East Coast internationalist establishment. He was born the son of a farm machinery salesman in 1896 in the small town of

California, Missouri. From early on he wanted to become a 31

journalist and writer. After his family moved to Montana^ in

1911, he founded his high school newspaper and later, as a

journalism student at Montana State University, he joined the

editorial staff of his college newspaper. In the latter

position he supported the creation of a league of nations as

a safeguard against future wars. In June 1917, Streit volunteered in an engineering regiment and was despatched to

France. A year later he was transferred to the intelligence service and in December 1918 he was assigned to the staff of the American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. This position allowed Streit an inside look into the workings of the Peace Conference. What he saw at the conference was a victory of the old nationalist diplomacy over the new liberal internationalism. For Streit, as for Lippmann, the

Versailles Treaty was therefore a source of great disillusionment and he took no sides in the treaty fight of

1919-20.

In the spring of 1919 Streit left the Army and returned to his journalism career in the United States. In

1920 he was awarded a Rhodes scholarship and he spent most of the next twenty years in Europe, first as a Rhodes scholar at

Oxford and then as a reporter for the Philadelphia Public

Ledger and later for the New York Times. From 1929 to 1938

Streit was the New York Times' League of Nations correspondent, stationed in Geneva. From his vantage point in Geneva, he witnessed first-hand the failure of the League 32

of Nations, the collapse of the Ke1logg-Briemd Pact and the

Locarno Pact, and the inability of the leading European

democracies to stand up to the aggressive policies of the new totalitarian regimes in Italy and Germany. As the years passed Streit became more and more pessimistic. Western civilization seemed under threat from the totalitarian states and all the mechanisms designed to protect it seemed ineffective. 20

Between January 1934 and July 1938 Streit analyzed the international situation and developed his own solution to the problem of peace in five successive drafts of a book-length manuscript. He argued that both alliances and international organizations like the League of Nations were fundamentally flawed as instruments for keeping the peace. Throughout history they had failed in this task. The inability of the

League of Nations to react effectively to the open acts of aggression by Japan, Italy, and Germany, and the collapse of the Locarno Pact provided only the latest examples. Only real and lasting unity among the peaceloving democracies could give them the strength to enforce world peace.

Alliances and international organizations could never provide such unity because their members retained their full sovereignty and could therefore opt out whenever they chose to.

The answer to the problem of world peace, Streit argued, could be found in the history of the United States. 33

Comparing the League of Nations to the American government

under the Articles of Confederation, he pointed to the

example of the American Union, created in Philadelphia in

1787. The thirteen American states had abandoned the system

of alliances and leagues in favor of a federal union. The

American experiment in federalism had proved successful, making the United States one of the most powerful and

prosperous nations on Earth. The time had now come to apply

federalism worldwide, creating, as a first step, "a more perfect union" of the Atlantic democracies. The ultimate

goal was a federal union that would encompass all the nations of the world. But Streit argued that in 1938 only the

Western democracies (fifteen in all, including the United

States, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands,

Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Ireland, and the British Dominions Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and

South Africa) were culturally, economically, and ideologically homogeneous enough to form a real federal union.

United in a federal union along the American model, the Atlantic democracies would be economically and militarily so strong that they would be able to resist any aggression by the totalitarian powers. This strength would be the best guarantee for world peace. But an Atlantic federal union would do more than preserve the peace and the status quo.

Streit's federal union would not only provide for a common 34

defense, but also for common citizenship, a single currency,

a common postal and communications system, and a single

customs-free market. Such political and economic integration

would not only bring the democracies peace, but greater

economic prosperity as well. This increasing prosperity and

freedom would form a great attraction to the other nations of

the world, and would, in time, lead them to adopt Western democracy in order to join the union and share in its benefits. Ultimately, all nations would join, bringing peace, prosperity, and freedom to the whole world. Because federalism was an American concept, and because the United

States was the most powerful among the Atlantic democracies,

Streit called on President Franklin Roosevelt to take the initiative and to invite the other Atlantic democracies to send delegates to a Philadelphia-style convention that would draw up a constitution for an Atlantic federal union. The call for such a federal convention of the North Atlantic democracies would come to constitute the core of Streit's

Atlantic Union program. 21

Streit's Atlantic Union proposal clearly built on the foundations laid by Adams and Lippmann, in the United States, and by Lionel Curtis, in Great Britain. His emphasis on the cultural and economic ties between North America and Western

Europe, and on the need for American leadership in strengthening those ties, echoed Adams's ideas about the

"Atlantic system." Streit also took over Lippmann's concept 35

of the Atlantic Community as a liberal-democratic core around

which a future universal union of nations might develop. The

influence of the British Round Table group was clearly visible in the membership of Streit's Atlantic Union, which

included not only the North Atlantic democracies but also the

independent Dominions of the British Empire. In many ways, then, the Atlantic Union proposal was a fusion of Lippmann's

Progressive internationalism and the neo-imperialism of the

Round Table. This was particularly evident in Streit's proposal that control over the colonies and dependent areas of the United States and the Western European democracies be transferred to the new federal Atlantic Union. What differentiated Streit's ideas from those of his predecessors was the nature and scope of the Atlantic Union he envisaged.

His proposal for the creation of a true federal union among those nations went far beyond what either Lippmann or Curtis had envisaged. In his earlier writings Lippmann had occassionaly used terms like "federation" and "union" and he had argued that ultimately some form of "supra-national" organization would be required to maintain world peace. But neither he, nor any of the other East Coast atlanticists, had ever proposed any concrete initiatives that went beyond inter­ governmental cooperation. Similarly, when Curtis and the

Round Table group talked about an Anglo-Saxon or Atlantic

"federation" they had in mind some form of "organic" union, rather than Streit's rigid constitutional structure. 36

Strait's ideas were not only more radical, they were also

more distinctly American than those of Lippmann and other

American internationalists. Union Now was filled with

analogies to American constitutional and political history,

and in effect proposed to remake the Western world into the

image of the United States. It was precisely the radical

nature of Streit's proposal, and the unique leadership role

that it assigned to the United States, that made it at the

same time extremely difficult to sell as a realistic option

and very attractive to desperate American and European

internationalists during the worldwide turmoil of the late

1930's and early 1940's.

Initially, Streit was unable to find a publisher for

his book. So in August 1938 he had 300 copies of Union Now

printed at his own expense in a local print shop near Geneva.

These copies he sent to American and European politicians and

editors whom he had gotten to know as a correspondent at the

League of Nations. The timing was perfect. Within weeks the

Sudeten crisis and the Munich conference demonstrated again

the inability of the Western democracies to stop German

aggression. Streit's plan seemed to offer an innovative way

to stop the aggressors. Within a fortnight after the Munich conference Harpers in New York and Cape in London offered to publish Union N o w .22

Union Now appeared in mid-March 1939, shortly after

Hitler had swallowed up another large part of Czechoslovakia. 37

The book was an instant success and went through fifteen editions in less than a year. Sales would ultimately reach

300,000 worldwide. The book received favorable reviews in all the major newspapers and journals of opinion, and

Streit's Atlantic union plan was given widespread circulation through articles in Fortune. Life, and Reader's

Digest. Streit received an especially favorable reaction from the British atlanticists of the Round Table group. Both

Lionel Curtis and Philip Kerr, now Lord Lothian and British ambassador in Washington, strongly endorsed the book.

Several prominent American internationalists, including ex-

Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, also gave Streit private encouragement. 23

Streit had returned to the United States in late 1938 to work in the Washington office of the New York Times. But even before his book was published by Harper he began to devote more and more of his time to lecturing on his Atlantic

Union p l a n . 24 Encouraged by the success of Union Now. Streit gave up his job as a journalist and began to work full-time for the realization of his ideas. He tirelessly toured the country, speaking wherever someone was willing to give him a forum. In 1939 he founded the Inter-democracy Federal

Unionists, which in 1940 became Federal Union, Inc. Through this organization, Streit sought to educate the wider public about the virtues of federalism. He clearly also hoped that

Federal Union, Inc. would provide him with an organization 38

through which he could bring public pressure to bear on the

Roosevelt Administration to implement his proposals.25

During 1940 and 1941 Federal Union grew into a significant nationwide organization, with headquêirters in New

York City and local chapters in eighteen different states and the District of Columbia. The organization also had a very active youth wing. Student Federalists, and began publishing a monthly magazine. Union Now Bulletin (later renamed Federal

Union World). But most important to Streit was that he succeeded in attracting support from several prominent public and private personalities who could provide him with access to the media and to the administration. Perhaps not surprisingly, in view of his own background, Streit was particularly successfull in attracting support among prominent journalists and publishers. Roger Cowles, publisher of the Des Moines Register and Look magazine; Felix

Morley, editor of the Washington Post; Russell Davenport, managing editor of Fortune ; and Clare Booth Luce, wife of

Life publisher Henry Luce all joined Federal Union, Inc.

Such contacts were obviously very useful in helping Streit disseminate his ideas among the general public. Federal

Union, Inc. also attracted a small number of East Coast internationalist business leaders such as Henry H. Harriman, a former president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and

Percival Brundage, a senior partner of the leading New York law firm Price, Waterhouse, and Company. At the same time 39

Streit succeeded in gaining the support of several public

officials and prominent internationalists including Secretary

of the Interior Harold Ickes; Supreme Court Justice Owen

Roberts; and First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt. These people, he

hoped, would provide him with access to the Roosevelt

Administration. 26

After the outbreak of the Second World War in

September 1939 the tide began to turn in favor of a more

internationalist foreign policy. Streit hoped to profit from

this development and redoubled his efforts to convince the

Roosevelt Administration of the merits of his Atlantic Union

proposal. The administration, on the other hand, was more

interested in the immediate problem of modifying the

Neutrality Act so as to allow it to give all-out aid to the

Allies without involving the United States in the war. In

this effort the more traditional East Coast internationalist

establishment proved much more useful than Streit, who

refused to consider any intermediate policies and insisted on

the need for the immediate creation of an Atlantic federal

union. And although the administration began to cooperate

closely with a succession of traditional internationalist

citizens' groups in the fight against isolationism, it kept

Streit and his Federal Union, Inc. at arm's length. In

January 1940 Eleanor Roosevelt provided Streit with the opportunity to present his plan to the president at a White

House dinner party. But although the president gave Streit a 40

friendly reception, he refused to support Atlantic Union.

Approaches tc Secretary of State Cordell Hull proved equally

fruitless. 27

Undaunted by the lack of response from the Roosevelt

Administration, Streit tried to renew his campaign for an

Atlantic federal union after the collapse of France in the

Summer of 1940. A union with the defeated continental

democracies was now temporarily impossible and Streit

switched to a slightly different approach. In the fall of

1940 he developed a proposal for an immediate emergency union between the United States and the British Empire. Only such

a union would be able to defeat the Axis powers, Streit

argued. He provided a detailed blueprint in a new book.

Union Now with Britain, published in early 1941.28

Streit had probably hit upon the idea of an emergency union with Britain after meeting Jean Monnet, a French government official who had read Union Now and who had fled to the United States after the collapse of France. During the summer of 1940 Monnet had been involved in the drafting of a British government proposal to form a Franco-British union, as a last desperate attempt to prevent French capitulation to the Germans. Streit now wanted the United

States to take a similar initiative before Britain's position became hopeless. Between the fall of 1940 and the summer of

1941 Streit held a series of meetings with Monnet at the summer home of John Foster Dulles, a prominent New York 41 lawyer and internationalist. Dulles was a long-time friend of Monnet and Streit, and had been a supporter (though not a member) of Federal Union, Inc. since early 1940. Together,

Streit, Dulles, and Monnet drafted a constitution for an

Anglo-American Union, as well as a congressional resolution calling for the formation of such a u n i o n . 29 streit also tirelessly continued his lobbying campaign in Washington.

Taking his cue from other internationalist citizens' groups, like the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, he started to take out newspaper advertisements for his Anglo-

American Union proposal. He tried to enlist the support of several senators and congressmen for his proposed Atlantic

Union resolution. And in May 1941, at another White House dinner party, he again tried to get President Roosevelt's support. But the administration, as well as most of

Congress, continued to ignore Streit. Everywhere he went he received a friendly welcome, but nobody in executive or legislative authority offered to sponsor his program. 3°

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and America's subsequent entry into the war, heralded a period of sharp decline for Streit's Atlantic Union movement. At first

Streit tried to capitalize on America's entry into the war.

He argued that an Anglo-American Union would provide the ideal framework for conducting the war effort. But to most

Americans the Grand Alliance of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union seemed to offer a far greater assurance 42

for Allied success in the war, and for lasting peace

afterwards. A variety of traditional East Coast

internationalist groups, led by the Association for the

United Nations (the new name of the old League of Nations

Association) and the CFR, cooperated closely with the

administration to promote the emerging United Nations, a new world-wide organization of sovereign states.3i This resurgence of Wilsonian internationalism quickly eclipsed

Streit's Atlantic Union movement. The Roosevelt

Administration, and its allies in the traditional internationalist groups, tirelessly and successfully worked to forge a broad consensus, both within the Congress and among the general public, in favor of the United Nations.

Streit's radical federalism, as well as the strong anti-communism that kept him from endorsing a full partnership with the Soviet Union, prevented Federal Union,

Inc. from finding common ground with the Roosevelt

Administration and the American internationalist establishment. As a result the Atlantic Union movement was hurt, rather than helped, by the wartime internationalist tide. At the same time many of Streit's own federalist supporters abandoned him to join new groups that argued that only a world-wide federal union, including the Soviet Union, would be able to safeguard world peace. Soon Streit's

Atlantic Union plan was only one among several dozen international federalist proposals that claimed to provide 43 the key to lasting peace and prosperity. Shunned by the pro-

United Nations East Coast establishment, and deserted by the world federalists, the Atlantic Union movement quickly began to decline in importance. By the end of the war Federal

Union, Inc. was an empty shell and it had lost its most energetic wing, Student Federalists, which bolted from

Streit's organization as a group in order to campaign for a more inclusive world-wide federal union. Only by heavy infusions of his own money could Streit manage to keep his movement alive, in 1945 the Atlantic Union movement seemed to face extinction.32 But by the end of that year the new threat of atomic warfare and the rising East-West tensions combined to give Streit's ideas a second lease on life.

Between 1900 and 1945 the relationship between the

United States and Western Europe had changed markedly. The

European powers that had dominated the international scene in

1900 now lay in ruins. Their decline had been both staggering and rapid. The totalitarian threat, on the other hand, had only grown and now manifested itself in the form of the militarily powerful Soviet Union and the fast-growing political influence of the communist parties in Western

Europe. Western Europe in 1945, then, appeared exhausted and helpless. On the other side of the North Atlantic, over the same period, the United States had not only developed into the predominant world power but had also grown to accept the 44

leadership role that came with that position. The result was

a new transatlantic relationship in which Western Europe

needed America's help more than ever, and the U.S. was more

willing than ever to meet that need.

During the same time period American atlanticists

developed a new rationale for this evolving transatlantic

relationship. This rationale no longer relied exclusively on

the cultural and economic ties that bound North America and

Western Europe, but increasingly emphasized ideological

affinity and geopolitical imperatives. This rationale became

the Atlantic Community concept, articulated most forcefully

by the Atlantic Union movement. Up to 1945, however, the

atlanticist arguments for stronger institutional ties among

the Atlantic democracies were overshadowed by the

universalist aspirations of traditional Wilsonian

internationalism. But once the growing confrontation with

the Soviet Union began to undermine the American faith in universal international organizations like the United

Nations, the Atlantic Union movement stood ready to provide an internationalist alternative attuned to the Cold War. 45

1. For an overview of the early history of the Atlantic Community concept, see Diane K. Pfaltzgraff, "The Atlantic Community - A Conceptual History," in Walter F. Hahn and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., Atlantic Communitv in Crisis/ A Redefinition of the Transatlantic Relationship (New York, 1979), 3-29; Robert Strausz-Hupe, James E. Dougherty, and William R. Kinter, Building the Atlantic World (New York, 1963), 1-33; and Istvan Szent-Miklosy, The Atlantic Union Movement; Its Significance in World Affairs (New York, 1965), 20-25. For a more detailed overview of the 18th- and 19th- century development of the idea of a North Atlantic civilization, see Michael Kraus, The Atlantic Civilization - Eighteenth Century Origins (Ithaca, NY, 1949), and idem. The North Atlantic Civilization (Princeton, 1957).

2. Walter Lippmann, "The Defense of the Atlantic World," in Walter Lippmann, Early Writings, edited by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (New York, 1970), 69-75.

3. Adams to Worthington Chauncey Ford, 26 November 1898; Adams to Ford, 2 February 1899; Adams to Elizabeth Cameron, 26 March 1900; Adams to John Hay, 5 October 1900; Adams to Cameron, 10 September 1901; Adams to Hay, 3 May 1905; and Adams to Cameron, 27 August 1905, in Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed. Letters of Henrv Adams. 1892-1918. Vol. 2 (Boston, 1938), 194-95, 212-13, 276, 297-98, 352, 447-48, 461. See also William H. Jordy, Henry Adams; Scientific Historian (New Haven, 1952), 160.

4. For an overview of this late nineteenth-century Anglo- American rapprochement, see H. C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States; A History of Anglo-American Relations. 1783-1952 (New York, 1955); Charles S. Campbell, From Revolution to Rapprochement; The United States and Great Britain. 1783-1900 (New York, 1974); David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, An Ocean Apart; The Relationship Between Britain and America in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1988), especially 28-49; Bradford Perkins, The Great Rapprochement; Britain and the United States. 1895-1914 (New York, 1968); and D. Cameron Watt, Succeeding John Bull; America in Britain's Place. 1900-1975 (Cambridge, England, 1984), especially 24-30.

5. John E. Kendle, The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union (Toronto, 1975), 59-129; and Carroll Quigley, The Anglo- American Establishment; From Rhodes to Cliveden (New York, 1981), 117-39.

6. Priscilla Roberts, " 'All the Right People'; The Historiography of the American Foreign Policy Establishment," Journal of American Studies 26 (Summer 1992), 409-34. 46

7. Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy; Shield of the Republic (Boston, 1943), X-XII. See also Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century (New York, 1981), 58- 73.

8. Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century. 88-115; and Anwcir Hussain Syed, Walter Lippmann's Philosophy of International Politics (Philadelphia, 1963), 204-8.

9. Walter Lippmann, The Stakes of Diplomacy (New York, 1915).

10. Warren F. Kuehl, Seeking World Order; The United States and International Organization to 1920 (Nashville, 1969), 172- 231; Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century. 92-111.

11. Walter Lippmann, "Are We Pro-German?," "An appeal to the President," "British-American Irritation," "The Will to Believe," and "The Defense of the Atlantic World," in Lippmann, Early Writings. 23-25, 31-36, 50-53, 58-62, and 69- 75. See also Lippmann's address to the American Academy of Political and Social Science in 1916: "What Program Shall the United States Stand for in International Relations?" in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 66 (July 1916), 64-70. George Louis Beer used the same forum to make essentially the same case. See Beer, "America's International Responsibilities and Foreign Policy," in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 66 (July 1916), 71-91. See also Beer, "The War, the British Empire, and America," The Forum 53 (May 1915), 565-66; and idem, "America's Part among Nations," New Republic 5 (November 1915), 62-64. Beer took up the campaign for an Anglo-American-led Atlantic Community well before Lippmann, but the latter was undoubtedly the stronger advocate.

12. Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during World War I (Wilmington, DE, 1991), 81-87; Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson: Revolution. War, and Peace (Arlington Heights, IL, 1979), 64-71; Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century. 111-13.

13. Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft. 70-81, 125-32; idem, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (Cambridge, MA, 1987), 15-50; Kuehl, Seeking World Order. 224-27, 254-66; Link, Woodrow Wilson. 72-77; Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century, 113-15. For Norman Angell's ideas, which ran parallel to Lippmann's, see Norman Angell, The Political 47

Conditions of Allied Success; A Plea for the Protective Union of the Democracies (New York, 1918). Angell later became one of the heroes of the Atlemtic Union movement.

14. Quigley, The Analo-American Establishment. 182-83; Robert D. Schulzinger, The wise Men of Foreign Affairs; The History of the Council on Foreign Relations (New York, 1984), 1-5; and Laurence H. Shoup and William Minter, imperial Brain Trust; The Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy (New York, 1977), 11-14. For an account by one of the American participants in these talks, see James T. Shotwell, At The Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1937).

15. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition. 136-250; Kuehl, Seeking World Order. 298-331; Quigley, The Anglo-American Establishment. 182-97; Schulzinger, The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs. 5; Shoup and Minter, Imperial Brain Trust. 14; Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century. 155-66.

16. Robert A. Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II (New York, 1967), 6-18.

17. Schulzinger, The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs. 5-23; Shoup and Minter, Imperial Brain Trust. 14-20. For an account of the CFR's early history by one of its founders, see Whitney H. Shepardson, Early History of the Council on Foreign Relations (Stamford, CT, 1960).

18. Divine, Second Chance. 18-23. For the development of American foreign policy toward Europe during the interwar years, see Selig Adler, The Uncertain Giant. 1921-1941: American Foreign Policy Between the Wars (New York, 1969); Frank Costigliola, Awkward Dominion: American Political. Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe. 1919-1933 (Ithaca, 1984); Michael J. Hogan, Informal Entente: The Private Structure of Cooperation in Anglo-American Economic Diplomacv. 1918-1928 (Columbia, MO, 1977); and Melvyn P. Leff1er, The Elusive Guest: America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Securitv (Chapel Hill, 1979). For a look at the interwar decline of atlanticism from the British perspective, see Michael G. Fry, Illusions of Securitv: North Atlantic Diplomacv. 1918-1922 (Toronto, 1972).

19. Adler, The Uncertain Giant. 150-83; Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy. 1932-1945 (New York, 1979); Robert A. Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent: American Entrv into World War II 2nd ed. (New York, 1979), 14-41; idem. Second Chance. 23-28; Walter Johnson, The Battle Against Isolation (Chicago, 1944), 11-30. 48

20. Clarence K. Streit, Union Now; A Proposal for a Federal Union of the Democracies of the North Atlantic (New York, 1939), 288-304; Wesley T. Wooley, Alternatives to Anarchy; American Supranationalism since World War II (Bloomington, 1988), 90-91. See also the profile of Streit in Time (27 March 1950), 13.

21. Streit, Union Now, passim. For the story of the writing of Union Now, see Freedom & Union (Summer 1978), 4-6; Divine, Second Chance. 38-39; James W. Lantrip, Jr., "A Study of the Atlantic Union Movement, 1949-1960" (Ph.D. diss., University of Tennessee, 1985), 7-9; and Wooley, Alternatives to Anarchy. 91.

22. Freedom & Union (Summer 1978), 5.

23. Kendle, The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union. 293; Lantrip, "A Study of the Atlantic Union Movement," 10-11; and Wooley, Alternatives to Anarchy. 91-92. See also Streit to Stimson, 27 March 1939, Clarence K. Streit Papers, Box 34, Folder "Stimson, Henry L.," Library of Congress, Washington, DC (hereafter Streit Papers with filing information). For the major reviews of Union Now, see American Sociological Review 4 (October 1939): 744; the Atlantic (May 1939); Canadian Forum 19 (May 1939): 62; Christian Century 56 (3 May 1939): 574; Christian Science Monitor (21 March 1939): 20; ibid. (6 May 1939): 7; Foreign Affairs 17 (April 1939): 628; Forum 101 (June 1939): 289; International Affairs 18 (May- June 1939): 396-97; the Nation 148 (22 April 1939): 474; the New Republic 98 (29 March 1939): 225; the New Statesman & Nation 17 (18 March 1939): 434; the New York Times (19 February 1939): 1; the New Yorker 15 (4 March 1939): 80; Round Table 19 (May 1939): 476-88; Saturdav Review of Literature 19 (25 March 1939): 18: ibid. 21 (10 February 1940): 12; Spectator 162 (10 March 1939): 412; and the Times Literary Supplement (11 March 1939): 142. For another favorable reaction by a British atlanticist, see George Catlin, Analo-Saxony and its Tradition (New York, 1939), 50. Catlin, like Curtis and most other British atlanticists, was really an advocate of an Anglo-Saxon union, rather than an Atlantic Union that would encompass the European continental democracies. They remained nevertheless strong supporters of Streit's Atlantic Union movement. Although Streit received a lot of support from traditional American internationalists, there were others who rejected his ideas. See for example the diplomatic historian Ruhl Bartlett, in the journal of the League of Nations Association, New World 12 (February 1940), 8. Lippmann also felt that Streit's analogy between the American federal union and a potential Atlantic Union were false. See Lippmann to Stringfellow Barr (president of St. 49

John's College in Annapolis and an early supporter of Streit), 9 December 1941, in Public Philosopher; Selected Letters of Walter Lippmann. John Morton Blum, ed. (New York, 1985), 411-12.

24. For accounts of Streit's speaking tours, see New York Times (13 February 1939):10; ibid. (17 February 1939): 9; ibid. (10 March 1939): 18.

25. Divine, Second Chance. 39; Lantrip, "A Study of the Atlantic Union Movement," 11-17; Emmett E. Panzella, "The Atlantic Union Committee: A Study of a Pressure Group in Foreign Policy," (Ph.D. diss., Kent State University, 1969), 7; Wooley, Alternatives to Anarchy. 91. In 1940 Streit also published a condensed version of his proposal. The Essence of Union Now: The Proposal for Inter-democracv Federal Union (New York, 1940). Overseas symphatizers set up organizations of their own, such as Federal Union in London, the Comite d'Action pour 1'Union Federale des Peuples Libres in Paris, and the Canadian Association for Federal Union in Toronto. But no international organization was set up to coordinate their activities.

26. For an account of the early history of Federal Union, Inc., see Freedom & Union (November 1959): 7, 9; Divine, Second Chance. 39-40; and Lantrip, "A Study of the Atlantic Union Movement," 14-20.

27. Lantrip, "A Study of the Atlantic Union Movement," 15-16; and memorandum by Streit on his White House dinner, 7 January 1940, Streit Papers, Box 33, Folder "Roosevelt, Franklin D., General, 1939-44"; Hull to Streit, 19 February 1940, ibid.. Box 23, Folder "Hull, Cordell, 1940-44." For the Roosevelt Administration's cooperation with several more traditional internationalist groups, see Johnson, The Battle Against Isolation. 31-228.

28. Clarence K. Streit, Union Now with Britain (New York, 1941). Like Streit's first book. Union Now with Britain received widespread attention in the press. For the major reviews see, American Political Science Review 37 (June 1941): 577; Christian Science Monitor 8 March 1941; Foreign Affairs 19 (July 1941): 875; Nation 152 (29 March 1941): 383; New Republic 104 (26 May 1941): 737; New Statesman & Nation 22 (2 August 1941): 119; New York Times 16 March 1941; New Yorker 17 (8 March 1941): 75; Saturdav Review of Literature 23 (5 April 1941): 9; Spectator 166 (6 June 1941): 611; Times Litterarv Supplement 7 June 1941. See also George Catlin, One Anglo-American Nation: The Foundations of Analo-Saxonv as Basis of World Federation, a British Response to Streit (Toronto, 1941). 50

29. Dulles to Streit, 7 October 1940, with enclosed draft resolution, Streit Papers, Box 19, Folder "Dulles, John Foster, General, 1940"; Streit to Dulles, 13 October 1940, ibid.; Dulles to Streit, 15 October 1940, ibid.; draft memo by Streit, 16 October 1940, ibid.; Dulles to Streit, 21 October 1940, with enclosed draft resolution, ibid.; Dulles to Streit, 4 November 1940, with enclosed draft resolution, ibid.; Dulles to Streit, 8 November 1940, ibid.; Dulles to Streit, 26 February 1941, with enclosed draft resolution, ibid.. Box 20, Folder "Dulles, John Foster, General, 1941"; Dulles to Streit, 28 April 1941, with enclosed draft resolution, ibid. For an account of the British government proposal for a Franco-British Union and Monnet's role therein, see Jean Monnet, Mémoires (Paris, 1976), 13-36; and Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War. Vol. 2; Their Finest Hour (Boston, 1949), 177-98.

30. Lantrip, "A Study of the Atlantic Union Movement," 17-19; Streit to Roosevelt, 5 May 1941, Streit Papers, Box 33, Folder "Roosevelt, Franklin D., General, 1939-44". The absence of administration support for Streit's program did not prevent his isolationist critics from attaching great significance to these White House meetings. Senator Rush D. Holt (D-WV) denounced these contacts on the Senate floor. Like other isolationists, most notably Colonel Robert R. McCormick of the Chicago Tribune. Holt portrayed Streit as one of the main leaders of a giant conspiracy by Rhodes Scholars and British imperialists to tie the United States to British interests.

31. For an account of the close cooperation between the State Department and the CFR in the planning of U.S. postwar foreign policy, see U.S. Department of State, Postwar Foreign Policv Preparation. 1939-1945 (Washington, 1950); Schulzinger, The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs. 81-112; and Shoup and Minter, Imperial Brain Trust. 117-76.

32. Divine, Second Chance. 39, 163; Lantrip, "A Study of the Atlantic Union Movement," 19-22, 41-48; and Wooley, Alternatives to Anarchv. 34-39, 91-92. For a contemporary overview of the large variety of federalist peace plans and world government proposals see Edith Wynner and Georgia Lloyd, eds., Searchlight on Peace Plans; Choose Your Road to World Government (New York, 1944). CHAPTER II

ATOMS AND THE IRON CURTAIN: THE RESURGENCE OF WORLD

AND REGIONAL FEDERALISM, 1945-47

In 1945 Wilsonian internationalism emerged victorious

from the Second World War. During the war the U.S.

Department of State, in close cooperation with the CFR and

other traditional internationalist groups, devoted years of

study and preparation to drawing up a new and improved League

of Nations. President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull,

as well as their respective successors Harry Truman and

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., worked very hard to get both

America's major allies and American domestic opinion to sign on to this new organization. These efforts culminated in the

United Nations Conference on International Organization at

San Francisco (25 April-26 June 1945), where the United

Nations Organization was born. The triumph of American

Wilsonian internationalism was complete on 28 July 1945, when the U.S. Senate voted by an overwhelming margin (89-2) to ratify the UN charter.i The UN became the focus of great enthusiasm and optimism, both within the American

51 52

administration and among the American public. Former

Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long, a veteran of

both the World War I and World War II State Departments,

expressed the view of many when he wrote of the Senate vote

on 28 July: "The faith of Woodrow Wilson has been vindicated.

The record of the United States of 1920 has been expunged.

Civilization has a better chance to survive." Nine days

later the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima.2

Over the next few years, the growing fear and uncertainty brought on by the sudden advent of the nuclear age, and the rising Cold War tension between the Soviet Union and the Western powers resulted in a radical shift in the attitude of the American government and public opinion toward the UN. During 1946 and 1947 both the administration and the

American public lost their confidence in the UN as the guarantor of world peace. The advocates of supranational federalism and regionalism, who had been eclipsed by

Wilsonian internationalism and pro-UN groups during 1944 and

1945, were quick to take advantage of this shift in public opinion. The widespread fear of nuclear war, on the one hand, reinforced the public appeal of various world federalist groups who argued that the UN, as a mere organization of sovereign states, was not strong enough to keep a lid on the Pandora's box of atomic energy opened by the Second World War. On the other hand, the advent of the

Cold War resulted in renewed interest in various more 53

limited, regional approaches to peace and security. The net

result was a tug of war, within the United States, between

those who wanted to strengthen the UN and the advocates of

closer regional cooperation within the Western community of

liberal-democratic nations. As the Cold War intensified that

struggle was resolved in favor of the advocates of a Western

regional approach. By 1947 both the administration.

Congress, and the American public were ready to embark on a

long-term policy of transatlantic regional cooperation. This

shift in U.S. foreign policy, away from the universalist UN

and toward Western regionalism, was paralleled by a

resurgence of the Atlantic Union movement. Together, these

trends laid the groundwork for the emergence of an

atlanticist foreign policy.

The news of the atomic bomb overshadowed everything

else on 6 August 1945. The president's official

announcement, released in Washington while Truman was on the way back from the Potsdam conference, as well as the initial

scraps of information provided by the War Department and by

the crew of the B-29 that had bombed Hiroshima, made clear

that the atomic bomb was a weapon unlike any other.3 The

general reaction was one of awe, mixed with fear. Almost

immediately commentators began discussing the terrible dangers brought on by the development of such a powerful and destructive weapon. Their concern increased as more details 54

about the destruction wrought by the atomic bomb in

Hiroshima, and three days later in Nagasaki, became

available. The announcement, on 14 August, of Japan's

surrender led to a spontaneous outpouring of joy. But, as

Time observed in its first postwar issue, "The knowledge of

victory was as charged with sorrow and doubt as with joy and

gratitude." Press commentators and world leaders alike

struggled to make sense out of this momentous event. A

flurry of editorials, articles, and books descended on an

American public that was increasingly worried about what

atomic bombs might do to U.S. cities. This fear was fueled

by the continued exposure to gruesome details about the fates

of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and by the increasingly alarmist

statements of the very creators of the atomic bomb, in

October 1945, J. Robert Oppenheimer, who had been the

scientist in charge of the final development of the atomic

bomb, testified that a one-night atomic raid on the United

States could kill forty million people.4 And in January 1946

Harold Urey, another prominent atomic scientist, opened an

article in Collier's by telling his readers: "I write this to

frighten you. I'm a frightened man myself. All the

scientists are frightened - frightened for their lives - and

frightened for your life."s

While the atomic scientists whipped up public fears,

they also tried to steer the Truman Administration toward a constructive policy that would put international controls on 55 the use of atomic energy. Already during the war several of the scientists working on the atomic bomb project had voiced their fears about the impact of nuclear weapons. The threat of a German or Japanese victory had kept up their support for the American nuclear program.s But the examples of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the end of the war, brought their fears about atomic warfare or a nuclear arms race again to the fore. By September 1945 Oppenheimer and other prominent scientists had succeeded in convincing Secretary of War Henry

Stimson, as well as several other administration officials, that the atomic bomb could not, and should not, be used as an ordinary military or diplomatic weapon, and that some form of international control over atomic energy was essential. But almost immediately the issue of international atomic energy control was overshadowed by the growing differences between the United States and the Soviet Union.?

Stimson, backed by Robert Patterson, his designated successor at the War Department, and by the scientists, argued that the most important and most urgent step toward international control was a direct approach to the Soviets.

But hard-line cabinet members, like Navy Secretary James

Forrestal, backed by most of Congress and the press, balked at the idea of "giving away" America's atomic secrets to the

Soviets. And as his early statements on the atomic bomb had shown. President Truman was inclined to regard it as an

American trust, not to be shared lightly with other. 56

potentialy hostile, powers. Yet the president too, felt the

need for some form of international control to prevent the

horror of a future nuclear confrontation. Like his cabinet,

the president was torn between his concerns about the atomic

bomb and his suspicion of the Soviets.s

The way out of this dilemma was to shift the focus

from direct cooperation among the major powers to

international control within the framework of the United

Nations. In late 1945 Truman's new secretary of state, James

Byrnes, convinced both Britain and the Soviet Union to agree to a UN Atomic Energy Commission, that would be charged with working out a suitable international control mechanism for atomic energy.» In anticipation of the first meeting of this

UN commission, the Truman Administration developed its own proposal for international atomic energy control. Between

January and March 1946 a special committee, chaired by Under

Secretary of State Dean Acheson, worked out an American proposal for a UN Atomic Development Authority. This UN

Authority would have worldwide control over the essential materials for atomic weapons. This idea, largely inspired by

Oppenheimer who served as scientific advisor to the Acheson committee, seemed to hold out the promise of a world made safe for the peaceful use of atomic energy.lo

To take the issue of international atomic energy control to the UN seemed like a logical step in late 1945.

Within the administration, in Congress, and among the general 57

public there was still great hope that the new world body

would be an effective mechanism for international

cooperation. But the UN quickly proved not to be immune from

the rising Cold War tensions. And by mid-March 1946, when

the Acheson committee delivered its report to Secretary of

State Byrnes, the gulf of mistrust between the United States

and the Soviet Union had already grown too wide to allow for

any meaningful supranational cooperation within the UN. This mutual distrust was evident in the attitude of both the

American and Soviet representatives on the UN Atomic Energy

Commission. When the American representative, Bernard

Baruch, officially presented the American proposal for an

Atomic Development Authority, in June 1946, he called for strict enforcement provisions and insisted that the

Authority's decisions should not be subject to a veto by one of the permanent UN Security Council members. The Soviet representative, Andrey Gromyko, immediately rejected the

American proposal. The Soviet Union refused to give up the veto, and saw in the Baruch proposal an attempt to safeguard

U.S. superiority in atomic weapons while ensuring that an

American-dominated UN would block any Soviet advance in atomic energy development. The Americans, for their part, argued that the refusal to give up the veto demonstrated that the Soviets negotiated in bad faith and could not be trusted to abide by any agreement. The increasingly acrimonuous discussions in the UN Atomic Energy Commission went on 58

throughout 1946 without producing any result. By early 1947

it was clear that the attempt to achieve international atomic

energy control through the UN had failed.n

The UN failure came as no surprise to advocates of

regional and world federalism, like Clarence Streit. Their

long-standing doubts about the usefulness of an international

organization like the UN were only reinforced by the advent

of the nuclear age. During the war many international

federalists had abandoned Streit's regional approach in favor

of world federalism, only to be promptly swept aside by the

Roosevelt Administration's determined push in favor of the

United Nations. But the shock of Hiroshima seemed to provide

them with a second chance to make their case for world

federalism.

The world federalists lost no time. On 18 August 1945

Norman Cousins gave his assessment of the impact of the atomic bomb in an editorial in the Saturdav Review of

Literature. In "Modern Man Is Obsolete," Cousins argued that science and technology had outrun the capacity of mankind's institutions to control them. Only through world government would humanity be able to regain control over its destiny.

Like Streit had done earlier. Cousins looked for inspiration to the framers of the U.S. Constitution and advocated the creation of a federal world government along American lines.

An expanded version of his editorial was promptly published in book form and had an enormous impact. 12 This was only the 59 first in a long series of articles and books by world federalists that appeared between 1945 and 1949. The atomic scientists, especially those affiliated with the University of Chicago, quickly became important and vocal contributors to this campaign for world government. i3

But more important than the publication of numerous briefs for world government was the formation of a number of world federalist organizations. The first important meeting of world federalist leaders was held in Dublin, NH in October

1945. About fifty persons gathered at the summer home of

Grenville Clark, a prominent lawyer and internationalist with excellent contacts in Washington. The "Dublin Conference," as it became known, was an idea of Streit's, and one of his most prominent supporters, retired Supreme Court Justice Owen

Roberts, served as its president.

The participants in the Dublin Conference were a varied lot. With few exceptions, such as Streit and Roberts who obviously spoke for Federal Union, Inc., the participants represented nobody but themselves. They had been invited by

Clark and Roberts because of their prominence as writers, academics, politicians, or businessmen, and because they were avowed internationalists. In addition to Clark, Roberts, and

Streit, the participants included Senator Styles Bridges (R-

NH), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee;

Beardsley Ruml, chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New

York; Frank Altschul, a prominent New York banker and 60

director of the CFR; Thomas H. Mahony, a prominent Boston

lawyer and consultant to the American delegation at the San

Francisco Conference; and Thomas K. Finletter, a New York

lawyer and future Secretary of the Air Force in the Truman

Administration. There was also a large contingent of writers, editors, and academics, including Norman Cousins, editor of the Saturday Review of Literature; Charles W.

Ferguson, editor of Reader's Digest; John K. Jessup, editor of Life and Fortune ; Donovan Richardson, editor of the

Christian Science Monitor; and Professor Henry D. Smyth, a

Princeton University physicist who was the author of the government's official report on the atomic bomb. In addition to these prominent individuals, Clark had also invited a half dozen young World War II veterans whom he considered to be promising leaders for the future. Most of them, like Alan

Cranston and Cord Meyer, Jr., who would become respectively a

U.S. Senator and a top CIA official, had attracted Clark's attention by writing articles or books about the need for a new international order to ensure lasting peace. The realization of the urgent need for such a new order in the wake of Hiroshima was what united the disparate group of individuals that gathered in Dublin.

Although Streit had been the initial instigator of the

Dublin Conference, he never succeeded in controlling it or pushing it toward his own Atlantic Union program. Only a handful of the participants were members or supporters of 61

Federal Union, and at the conference itself Grenville Clark,

rather than Streit, emerged as the dominant figure. During a

heated debate on the merits of Atlantic vs. world federation,

Clark denounced Streit's program as racist. The Atlantic

Union proposal would not only create a separate Western club

of nations, but also envisaged continued Western control over

the colonial areas of Africa and Asia for the forseeable

future. This would in effect make the U.S. a participant in

European colonialism. Clark regarded this as a betrayal of

America's anti-colonial tradition and of the anti-imperialist

goals the U.S. had fought for in World War II. He argued

that the U.S. should remain true to those goals and fight for

a world government that would not only include all the world's races, but that would also liberate the colonial peoples and give them a voice in their own future. Strongly supported by the young veterans, Clark carried the day. The

Dublin Conference Declaration, which was printed in full in the New York Times, called for "a World Federal Government with limited but definite and adequate powers to prevent war, including power to control the atomic bomb." The Declaration went on to urge the Truman Administration to transform the

United Nations into such a world government.

In the wake of the Dublin Conference Grenville Clark and various other participants set up a number of organizations to realize their program. Together with Alan

Cranston, who now became his permanent assistant, Clark set 62

up the Dublin Conference Committee which set out to draw up a

constitution for the envisaged world federal government. is m

late October 1945 another participant in the Dublin

Conference, Tom Griessemer, organized World Federalists,

U.S.A. Griessemer was a former New York State director for

Federal Union. Like many others he had abandoned Streit's

organization to campaign for a worldwide federal union.

World Federalists, U.S.A. started as a small group in

Cleveland, Ohio but quickly developed into a nationwide

organization with 6,000 dues-paying members. It attracted

the support of several prominent world federalist writers

such as Carl Van Doren, Emery Reves, and Vernon Nash. By

February 1946 another organization, Americans United for

World Government, joined the world federalist crusade.

Americans United was led by Norman Cousins and its board of directors also included several participants in the Dublin

Conference. Other groups that joined the world federalist campaign were World Republic, Student Federalists, the

Massachusetts Committee for World Federation, and about a dozen other, smaller, organizations. Throughout 1946 these organizations continued the campaign, started at the Dublin

Conference, to win the American public over to the cause of world federalism. 16

It was the fear of the atomic bomb that had galvanized the world federalist movement in October 1945. And throughout 1945 and 1946 it continued to use the issue of 63

international atomic energy control as one of its most important arguments. This was facilitated by the stalemate over the atomic energy issue at the UN, and by the sympathy and support the world federalist movement received from the atomic scientists. Originally most atomic scientists had supported the Truman Administration's plan for international atomic energy control through the UN. But by mid-1946 many of the scientists realized that the UN was deadlocked over this issue. And although most scientists, especially the most prominent ones like Oppenheimer, remained weary of associating themselves directly with the world federalist movement, many of them thought the time was ripe to look for alternatives to the UN. Some, like Harold Urey, joined world federalists groups. Others set up their own, independent world government groups, like the World Government Committee of the Association of Oak Ridge Engineers and Scientists and the University of Chicago's Committee to Frame a World

Constitution. In addition, several of the periodicals started by the atomic scientists, such as the Bulletin of the

Atomic Scientists and Common Cause, became major forums for discussion of the various proposals for world government.

The growing support from the community of atomic scientists, the public's continued fear of atomic warfare, and the rising tension among the world's major powers combined to provide the world federalist movement with a considerable base of popular support. In November 1945 a 64

poll by the National Opinion Research Corporation found that

just over 50% of Americans believed that a world government

offered a better guarantee against atomic warfare than the

UN. And a Gallup poll in August 1946 showed that 54% of the

public felt that the UN should be strengthened and turned

into a world government. These poll results were a testament

to the world federalist movement's effective campaign at the

local level. But to realize their program the world

federalists needed to do more than gain public support.

Ultimately they would have to transform this public support

into a fundamental shift in U.S. foreign policy. By early

1947 most world federalist leaders therefore felt that the

time had come to shift from the educational campaign at the grass roots level to an intensive lobbying campaign in

Washington. 18

Greater unity was necessary if the world federalists were going to conduct an effective campaign at the federal level. In February 1947 representatives of fifteen world federalist groups, as well as several individual activists, gathered in Ashville, North Carolina to reconcile their differences and create a single, powerful world federalist organization. This conference resulted in the formation of the United World Federalists (UWF). Most participants in the

Dublin Conference, sixteen months earlier, joined the new organization, and Cord Meyer, Jr. became its president. With about 17,000 dues-paying members, fifteen state branches, and 65

several hundred active local chapters, the UWF seemed off to

a good start. During 1947 the UWF cooperated with Grenville

Clark and with several members of Congress to draw up

legislation that would force the Truman Administration to take steps to organize a new international conference to

amend the UN charter and turn the UN into a world government.

And it managed to get twelve state legislatures to pass resolutions favoring such a policy, is But by a supreme irony the three days of the UWF's founding conference (21-23

February 1947) coincided with three days of hectic discussions at the State Department during which Under

Secretary Acheson and the department's top planners laid the groundwork for a new foreign policy that largely abandoned the UN in favor of the creation of an American-led, anti­ communist, Western bloc.20

On 21 February 1947 the British government informed the State Department that it could no longer fulfill its commitments to Greece and Turkey. Since 1945 Britain had been shoring up the Western-oriented regimes in both countries against Soviet pressure and internal communist subversion. Britain's own economic difficulties now made it impossible for her to continue carrying this burden. There was no hesitation at the State Department. The time had come for the U.S. to take over Britain's leadership role in

Europe. As William L. Clayton, the Under Secretary for 66

Economie Affairs, put it: "The reins of world leadership are fast slipping from Britain's competent but now very weak hands. These reins will be picked up either by the United

States or by Russia. If by Russia, there will almost certainly be war in the next decade or so, with the odds against us. If by the United States, war can almost certainly be prevented." During the next fifteen weeks, from

21 February to the launching of the Marshall Plan on 5 June, the United States stepped boldly forward as the undisputed leader of the Western world. 21

In hindsight the bold American initiatives of February-

June 1947 were not surprising. They were the culmination of an evolution in U.S. foreign policy that had started a year earlier. Throughout 1945 the United States had favored continued great power cooperation and had steadfastly frowned upon the idea of a united Western bloc to contain the Soviet

Union. Britain, by far the weakest among the Big Three, was the main advocate of such a Western bloc, both under the wartime Churchill government and under the postwar Labour government. But initially the Truman Administration rebuffed

British proposals for continuation of the wartime Anglo-

American collaboration, and lent no support to Britain's attempt to create a Western European bloc centered around an

Anglo-French alliance.22 in February-March 1946, however, the

Truman Administration abruptly reversed course. 67

The historian Fraser Harbutt has dated this change in

course to a meeting between Truman and former British Prime

Minister Churchill on 10 February 1946.23 Churchill, a life­

long advocate of Anglo-American cooperation, was on a tour in

the United States and was scheduled to make a speech at

Westminster College in Fulton, MO on 5 March 1946. Churchill

told Truman that he planned to use this speech to warn the

American public about the danger of Soviet expansionism and

to call for a "fraternal association of the English-speaking

peoples" to meet this threat. Truman seized this opportunity

to redefine America's policy toward the Soviet Union. The new, more confrontational line immediately became evident in challenges to Soviet policies in Eastern Europe, the Near

East, and the Far East, and in a 28 February speech by

Secretary of State Byrnes. Speaking to the Overseas Press

Club, Byrnes made clear that the U.S. stood "united with other great states in defense of the [UN] Charter" and was ready to use its might against those powers that did not live up to it. When Churchill, in his "iron curtain" speech five days later, openly identified the Soviets as the main threat to world peace and, with Truman sitting behind him, called for Anglo-American unity, it was clear that the U.S. had abandoned its earlier hopes of great power cooperation and was ready to join a Western bloc designed to contain Soviet influence. 24 68

The Byrnes speech of 28 February, and Churchill's

Fulton speech, signalled a rapprochement between the United

States and Great Britain. During the remainder of 1946

British and American policies increasingly developed along

parallel lines. In the Balkans, Turkey, Iran, and Manchuria,

and at the United Nations, the Western powers began pursuing

similar, if not identical, policies. In July 1946 Britain

and the United States agreed to merge their respective

occupation zones in Germany, foreshadowing the creation of a

strong West Germany, securely tied to the Western bloc.

Together with Canada, Britain and the United States began to

cooperate closely in military matters, sharing bases,

conducting joint naval exercises in the Mediterranean, and

discussing arms standardization and joint strategic planning.

Meanwhile the Truman Administration shored up Britain's

economic position by pushing a $3.75 billion loan through

Congress. Gradually the United States came to replace

Britain as the chief proponent of a firm and united Western

stance against Soviet expansion. And in early 1947, when

Britain's economic resources were finally exhausted, London could safely pass the baton to Washington.25

Why did American policymakers reverse course in early

1946 and adopt a policy that would ultimately lead them to assume far greater and more direct commitments in Europe, and elsewhere, than they had ever envisaged? A comprehensive analysis of America's entry in the Cold War, for that is 69 really what this is about, falls outside the scope of this study. Historians have pointed to various possible explanations for the development of U.S. postwar foreign p o l i c y .26 But one important element in this evolving American policy needs to be highlighted here, because of its lasting impact on the development of the Atlantic Community concept in the U.S.

In his analysis of U.S. foreign policy during the

Truman years, historian Melvyn Leffler has pointed to the importance of the rising popularity of geopolitics in America during the Second World W a r . 27 Geopolitical studies in

America were at least as old as the late 19th-century writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan. But the belief, not uncommon during the 1930's and 1940's, that the strong and distinguished German school of geopolitical scientists were the real architects of Hitler's plans for world domination lent geopolitics an aura of vital and immediate importance.

During the war many colleges added courses in geopolitics to their curriculum, and prominent geopolitical scientists gained a wide audience.28

Geopolitics, like most other social sciences at the time, was heavily Eurocentric. Most academic writers on geopolitics, as well as many of the non-academic popularizers, continued to build on the "heartland" theory of the British geopolitical scientist Halford J. Mackinder.

Already in 1919, Mackinder had argued that any power that 70

controlled the heartland, which he identified with Central

and Eastern Europe and Russia, was poised to seize control

over the whole Eurasian landmass. And complete control over

the Eurasian landmass would allow that power to dominate the

world.29 During the 1940's American geopolitical scientists,

most notably Yale Professor Nicholas J. Spykman, modified

Mackinder's theory. Spykman agreed that control over the

Eurasian landmass meant world domination and he recognized

the crucial geographical position of the heartland. But

Spykman emphasized above all the importance of the Eurasian

"rimlands," notably Western Europe and Great Britain, the

Northern Tier and the Middle East, and Japan and Manchuria.

It was in these rimland areas that the vital industrial infrastructure and raw materials of Eurasia were concentrated.

The policy lessons that flowed from Mackinder's theory, and from the variations on that theory developed by

Spykman and other writers, were clear. In the long run, the

United States would be unable to withstand the pressure from a hostile power that dominated the whole Eurasian landmass.

A hemispheric defense system would be useless. Instead the

U.S., to ensure its own future, would have to engage itself in Europe, and along the "rimlands" of the Eurasian landmass, to prevent any hostile power from harnassing the full resources of the Eurasian landmass. These lessons were popularized in countless books and articles, not only by 71

prominent geopolitical scientists and international relations experts, but also by prominent writers like Walter Lippmann.

All of them pointed out that a strong and friendly Western

Europe was vital to America's long-term security. In two important books, U.S. Foreign Policv; Shield of the Republic and U.S. War Aims. Lippmann revived his dormant Atlantic

Community concept and called for a permanent Anglo-American alliance to cement the ties between North America and Western

Europe. And similar proposals were made in books by Spykman

fAmerica's Strategy in World PoliticsK Forrest Davis (The

Atlantic Svstem^. and John B. Brebner (North Atlantic

Triangle). This revived Atlantic Community concept was quite different from Lippmann's World War I ideas. In Lippmann's

World War II books the earlier references to the ideological and cultural affinity among the North Atlantic countries were replaced by geostrategic concepts, discussions of air power and strategic bases, and considerations of national security. 31

This geopolitical perspective was shared by many top policymakers in the American government. It permeated the military establishment, and it also clearly influenced the thinking of State Department planners like George F. K e n n a n . 3 2

And Churchill's appeal, in March 1946, for an Anglo-American

"fraternal association" looked like an endorsement of the

Atlantic Community concept evisaged in the writings of

Lippman and other geopolitical thinkers. But the 72 geopolitical ideas shared by Churchill and the Truman

Administration in early 1946 also differed in important respects from those developed during the Second World War.

Spykman, Lippmann, and other World War II writers had portrayed the Atlantic Community as an integral part of a stable global order in which other powers, like the Soviet

Union, would be full partners, not adversaries. In effect, they were looking at geopolitics through the prism of wartime cooperation among the Big Three and had argued for regional arrangements to strengthen, not divide or replace, the United

Nations. Churchill and his American supporters, on the other hand, approached geopolitics from a postwar perspective in which the Soviet Union became the incarnation of Mackinder's hostile power controlling the heartland and grasping for control of the rimlands and all of Eurasia. The Anglo-

American partnership and the Atlantic Community which they sought to develop were therefore not designed as building blocs for a global peace, but as defensive bulwarks against the perceived Soviet threat.

It took the Truman Administration, heir to the

American tradition of Wilsonian internationalism, longer than the British government to move from the wartime perspective of the Grand Alliance to the postwar geopolitical perspective of containment. Throughout 1945 the British tried, unsuccessfully, to convince the Americans of the need to develop a strong counterweight against Soviet expansion in 73

Europe. But by early 1946 the Truman Administration was

ready to reverse course and began cooperating with Britain to

develop a strong containment policy. Several factors

influenced this transformation of American geopolitical

thinking in a new, anti-Soviet mold. The physical

destruction and exhaustion of Europe at the end of the war

turned out to be more complete than most Americans had

anticipated. The center of Western civilization had turned

into a wasteland, the vital western European rimland into a

power vacuum. At the same time the Soviet Union, already in

control of most of Central and Eastern Europe seemed to be

probing along the Eurasian rimlands, in Turkey, Iran, and the

Far East. What was to prevent the Soviets from seizing

control over the whole Eurasian landmass, and thereby gaining

a dominant position in the postwar world? These fears were

fed, not only by the incessant British pleas for a common

Anglo-American front, but also by the analyses of the State

Department's own Soviet experts. George Kennan's "long

telegram" of 22 February 1946 seemed to confirm what

Churchill and the British had been saying all along: The

Soviets were bent on expansion and could only be stopped by a

strong Western bloc. And throughout 1946 the Truman

Administration laid the groundwork for such a policy.33

But initially Truman and his advisors had to move

cautiously. Although they had lagged behind the British in

developing an anti-Soviet containment policy, they were still 74 ahead of most of American public opinion. This became clear in the strong public reaction against Churchill's iron

Curtain speech. The speech was condemned by many as too war­ like and anti-Soviet. Churchill's critics included not only left-liberals, but also many moderates, like Walter Lippmann.

Lippmann was aghast at the prospect of turning the Atlantic

Community into an anti-Soviet alliance.In the wake of this widespread criticism, the Truman Administration quickly moved to publicly dissociate itself from the Fulton speech. But by

October 1946 Churchill could claim that what he had proposed at Fulton was becoming reality. The United States and Great

Britain were moving ever closer together, while the breach between them and the Soviet Union seemed to have become unbridgeable. 35

Nevertheless the Truman Administration continued to face a daunting public relations task if it was to take the lead in forming a strong Western anti-Soviet bloc. Opinion polls showed that a large majority of Americans disapproved of the Soviet Union's policies. But by January 1947 those favoring U.S.-Soviet cooperation still outnumbered those who wanted to give up on Russia. Similarly, UN supporters still outnumbered those who considered the new international organization a failure.36 At the same time, the Truman administration was faced with a Congress that, after the

November 1946 elections, was dominated by Republican fiscal 75 conservatives who were in no mood to pump vast sums of money into Western E u r o p e . 37

In February 1947, as they prepared to take over

Britain's commitments in Greece and Turkey, American policymakers were well aware of the widespread public and congressional weariness of assuming the leadership of a

Western bloc. Much like the atomic scientists and world federalists felt they had to scare the public to gain support for their world government proposals, the Truman

Administration realized it had to dramatize the Soviet threat to gain support for its program. In private meetings with congressional leaders, administration officials exaggerated the threat of war. And President Truman's speech to

Congress, on 12 March, turned the administration's policy into an ideological crusade for freedom and democracy. 38 This tactic was successful. Both the Senate and the House of

Representatives passed the administration's Greco-Turkish aid program with large m a r g i n s . 39 But opinion polls showed that the administration still faced a tough selling job. Most

Americans supported the Greco-Turkish aid program. 40 But majorities of more than 60% also supported continued cooperation with Russia and felt that the Greco-Turkish problem should be turned over to the UN.^i Clearly, the domestic struggle between the supporters of a stronger world organization and the proponents of a Western regional bloc 76 was not yet over. And in many ways the Truman Administration faced as daunting a public relations job as the newly-formed

United World Federalists.

It was at this point that Streit judged the time ripe to relaunch his Atlantic Union campaign. After the 1945

Dublin Conference Streit had kept himself, and the largely dormant Federal Union, on the sidelines of the growing world federalist movement. In spite of the growing popularity of world federalist ideas, also among his own followers, Streit steadfastly continued to argue in favor of regional,

Atlantic, federalism.42 This d i d not mean that Streit was inactive during 1946. While the various world federalist groups tried to gain a mass following at the grass roots level, Streit set out to recruit new supporters in the business and publishing world. This effort was a success, thanks in large part to the assistance of two early converts,

Percival Brundage of the prestigious New York law firm Price,

Waterhouse and Company, and Russel Davenport of Fortune magazine. Their backing allowed Streit to start a new monthly publication. Freedom & Union, in October 1946

(Federal Union's earlier publication. Federal Union World, had not survived the earlier decline of Streit's movement).

Streit's growing contacts in the business world provided

Freedom s Union with steady advertising revenues from major corporations like Goodyear, Heinz, Monsanto, Standard Oil of 77

New Jersey, and Time-Life.43 This in turn allowed him to turn

the magazine into a fairly impressive publication, with

frequent contributions by prominent congressional leaders,

academics, writers, and business leaders. Streit's ambition

was to turn Freedom & Union into a journal of opinion that would reach a wide audience, rather than a Federal union news

bulletin. On the other hand, the magazine clearly was an

integral part of Streit's campaign for an Atlantic Union and therefore reflected his views. Although the magazine printed

sharply differing opinions on issues like the UN and international atomic energy control, its editorial line was clearly anti-communist and in favor of close Anglo-American cooperation. And although Freedom & Union published several articles by world federalists and advocates of a stronger UN, its main thrust clearly was closer to the Truman

Administration's new policy of Western unity.44

Freedom & Union was key to the survival and resurgence of the Atlantic Union movement. Streit used it to adapt his

Union Now message to the realities of the postwar world and to rally new supporters. On the one hand, he sought to capitalize on the widespread fear that the destructive power of atomic energy had rendered national sovereignty obsolete.

This was the message that the world federalists had exploited so successfully, and Streit wanted to take advantage of the new openness toward supranational federalism which had thus been created. At the same time, Streit realized that most 78

American internationalists were strongly anti-communist and

considered a world government that included both the United

States and the Soviet Union unworkable. Freedom & Union was

aimed at this group, and designed to present Atlantic Union

as the perfect compromise between the supranationalism

required by the Atomic age and the anti-communism of the Cold

War.

As Streit had hoped. Freedom & Union quickly caught

the eye of the State Department, and of several important

policymakers in the Truman Administration. The State

Department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs

kept a file on both Federal Union and Freedom & Union, but

considered Streit's organization merely "the oldest of the

world government organizations."45 other administration

officials, however, quickly recognized that Streit's strong

anti-communism, and his emphasis on the need for Western

unity, made his views much more compatible with their own

ideological and geopolitical ideas than those of the various

world federalist groups.

In February 1947, shortly before the breaking of the

Greco-Turkish crisis. Under Secretary of State for Economic

Affairs William Clayton warmly praised Freedom & Union and

urged Streit to continue his work.46 Encouraged by this, and

by the administration's movement away from the United Nations

and toward a Western bloc, Streit tried to get interviews with all of the most important policymakers in the areas of 79

foreign affairs and national security. He emphasized that he

shared the administration's overall goals, and that his

Atlantic Union program was not an alternative to the

administration's policies, but rather a better and more

efficient way of implementing them. President Truman and

Army Chief of Staff General Dwight D. Eisenhower politely

declined to meet with Streit or discuss his proposals.47 But other top administration officials showed considerably more

interest. During the first two weeks of May, Streit met

successively with Secretary of Defense James Forrestal,

Secretary of State George Marshall, Secretary of Commerce

Averell Harriman, State Department Counselor Benjamin Cohen, and Policy Planning Staff Director George Kennan. All of them were very encouraging. They showed themselves especially appreciative of Freedom & Union's efforts overseas. The generous donations of private sponsors, as well as a lucrative advertising portfolio, allowed Streit to send gift subscriptions of Freedom & Union to many European policymakers, journalists, and members of parliament. The administration made it clear that it considered this a very healthy and useful form of propaganda. Freedom & Union's constant emphasis on the strength of a united Atlantic

Community seemed like the ideal antidote to any doubts among

European leaders about tying their fate to a U.S.-led Western bloc, and an effective way of combatting neutralist tendencies in certain European parliaments.4s streit and his 80

Federal Union movement were more than useful propaganda tools, however. Over the next few years the Atlantic Union movement would become a force that could not be ignored, and that helped push the Truman Administration toward a policy of progressively closer transatlantic integration.

In May 1947, while Streit was trying to push the

Truman Administration toward an Atlantic Union program, the administration was itself searching for a long-term policy toward Western Europe. When the administration accepted the

British plea to step into the breach in Greece and Turkey, it realized full well that this was only the first step in shoring up Western Europe. And American policymakers in early 1947 also recognized that in order for their policy of

European economic recovery to be effective, they would have to develop new and imaginative strategies. Throughout 1946 the Truman Administration had relied on bilateral loans and aid packages, as well as on UN-affiliated organizations like the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for

Reconstruction and Development, and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, to spur a quick economic recovery in Western Europe. But by 1947 this strategy, to which the U.S. had devoted over $9 billion during the previous year, seemed ineffective. Western European industrial and agricultural production still lagged behind prewar levels, and the disastrous winter of 1946-47 had 81

nearly wiped out the gains made during 1946. There was a

widespread fear of economic collapse and even starvation.

And in the context of the Cold War this was quickly

translated into fear of political instability and communist

gains. Clearly, if Europe was to remain a strong bulwark

against Soviet expansion, the United States needed to come up

with a new policy that provided a more effective answer to

the problem of European economic r e c o v e r y . 49 The task of

drawing up such a policy was entrusted to a special "ad-hoc"

committee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and to

the State Department's newly-created Policy Planning S t a f f . s o

Streit's answer to the problem of European recovery

was clear. Both during his meetings with administration

officials and in Freedom & Union he continued to sing the

praises of an Atlantic Union, pointing to Alexander

Hamilton's successful attempt to revitalize the economies of

the original thirteen states of the American U n i o n . si But the

administration planners were not ready for a policy of

transatlantic integration, much less an Atlantic Federal

Union. Instead, they turned to the ideas of some of the

junior officials in the State and Defense Departments, who

had been advocating a policy of European integration since

1946. By early 1947, this idea enjoyed growing popularity in the United States, not only among administration officials, but also in Congress and in the press. And it also had an 82 established base of support in the European countries themselves. 52

Several federalist groups were active in Europe, including the United Europe Committee, in which Churchill played a leading role; the European Union of Federalists, headed by the prominent Dutch federalist Hendrik Brugmans; the Independent League for European Cooperation, led by former Belgian Prime Minister Paul van Zeeland; and the Pan-

Europa Movement, led by the veteran European federalist Count

Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi .53 These groups and their ideas enjoyed considerable support in the United States. On 17

January 1947, John Foster Dulles, in a speech to the National

Publishers Association in New York, called for "some application of the Federal formula" to Europe's economic problems. This speech took on added importance, because as a prominent Republican Dulles was taken to be speaking not just for himself, but also for the leadership of his party in

C o n g r e s s . 54 Congressional Democrats too came out in support of European integration. On 22 March 1947, Senator J.

William Fulbright (D-AR) and Congressman Hale Boggs (D-LA) introduced concurrent resolutions in the Senate and the

House, calling for the economic and political federation of

E u r o p e . 55 Press commentators, including Walter Lippmann, quickly joined this c h o r u s . se By May virtually all of the

State Department's top officials, including Acheson, Clayton, 83 and Kennan, also had become convinced of the need for

European integration. This was reflected in the department's planning for a new initiative to promote European economic recovery.57 And when Secretary of State George Marshall announced this new initiative on 5 June 1947, in his famous commencement address at Harvard University, he emphasized the need for cooperation among the European nations and made clear that he favored some form of European federation. From this point on the Truman Administration committed itself to a long-term policy favoring European integration.ss

Under the Marshall Plan, as the new American initiative was quickly called, the United States called on the Europeans to develop their own, joint proposal for a

European recovery program. This, the Americans hoped, would encourage European integration. The Europeans reacted quickly. On 12 July 1947, sixteen European nations -

Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Greece,

Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,

Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey - met in Paris to develop a joint recovery program. They created the Committee of European Economic Cooperation (CEEC), which deliberated throughout the summer of 1947. After much delay, the CEEC presented its report on 22 September 1947. During negotiations in Washington in October and November, the State

Department and the CEEC refashioned this initial report for 84 presentation to Congress as the European Recovery Program

(ERP) .59

The initial announcement of the Marshall Plan, in June

1947, had been greeted warmly, not only in Europe, but also in the United States. Indeed, there was even something of a rush among policymakers and pundits to claim credit for suggesting such a program, so Public opinion reaction was also favorable.61 But by October, when the administration was trying to turn the ERP into a legislative program that would be acceptable to Congress, enthusiasm for the Marshall Plan seemed to have cooled considerably. 62 The administration therefore launched a major propaganda effort. It enlisted the support of various business groups, like the Business

Advisory Council, the Committee for Economic Development, and the National Planning Association. The administration could also count on the support of traditional internationalist allies, like the CFR. The pro-ERP campaign was coordinated, in close consultation with the administration, by a new citizens' committee, the Committee for the Marshall Plan to

Aid European Recovery (CMP), which was organized in late

October 1947. Its membership included about 340 prominent business and labor leaders, academics, former government officials, and private citizens. The CMP quickly launched an effective propaganda campaign, largely modelled after the successful campaigns of earlier citizens' committees like the

Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, which had 85

helped campaign for the Lend-Lease program in 1941.63 By

February 1948, a clear majority (57%) of American public

opinion supported the Marshall P l a n . 64 And on 2 April 1948

Congress passed the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, thereby

definitively launching the ERP. Later that month the

European recipients of Marshall Plan aid again met in Paris

and formed the Organization for European Economic Cooperation

(CEEC), the first in a series of European international

organizations. 65

The CMP's propaganda campaign was not the only, and

probably not the major, factor in securing passage of the

administration's program. More important was the evolving

world situation. The Truman Administration's initiatives

during 1947 had led to further tension between the Western

powers (primarily the United States and Great Britain) and

the Soviet Union. And by the end of 1947 these tensions

resulted in a complete breakdown of East-West relations,

symbolized by the failure of the London Conference of Foreign

Ministers in December.66

The increasing East-West tensions helped to rally public support for the policies of the Truman Administration.

It was this emerging Cold War consensus that allowed the

Truman Administration to implement its European policy. And the same consensus created the climate that would allow the administration to take its next, unprecedented, step: 86 engaging the United States in a long-term transatlantic military alliance.G?

During 1945-47 the prospects for the Atlantic Union movement had improved considerably. On the one hand the fear of nuclear destruction had made the American public more receptive to supranational solutions for the world's problems. The Cold War, on the other hand, had shattered the wartime faith in the United Nations. Both of these developments benefitted the Atlantic Union movement. The same supranationalism and anti-communism that had doomed the atlanticists during World War II, now turned out to be assets, and allowed Streit to broaden his base by appealing, through Freedom & Union. to the foreign policy establishment.

And the Truman Administration's shift, away from Wilsonian universalism and toward regionalism, seemed to offer increased chances for the Atlantic Union movement to expand its base even further and influence U.S. foreign policy. By

1948 the atlanticists were poised to do just that. And the negotiation, during 1948, of a new Atlantic security pact would offer them the opportunity to break into the mainstream of the U.S. foreign policy debate. 87

1. Divine, Second Chance. 29ff.; U.S. Department of State, Postwar Foreign Policv Preparation. 1939-1945. passim. See also Thomas M. Campbell and George C. Herring, eds., The Diaries of Edward R. Stettinius. Jr.. 1943-1946 (New York, 1975); and Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull vol. 2 (New York, 1948), 1625-1713.

2. Divine, Second Chance. 313-14.

3. "Statement by the President Announcing the Use of the A- Bomb at Hiroshima, 6 August 1945," in U.S. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman. 1945 (Washington, DC, 1961), 197-200. See also McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival; Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988), 130-31; Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 1; Year of Decision (Garden City, NY, 1955), 421-23; and Spencer R. Weart, Nuclear Fear; A History of Images (Cambridge, MA, 1988), 103-5.

4. Time. 20 Au^st 1945, 19. For comprehensive accounts of the immediate impact of the news of the atomic bomb, see Paul Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light; American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (New York, 1985), 3-32; Spencer R. Weart, Nuclear Fear. 105-11; Wooley, Alternatives to Anarchy. 3-13. Among the contemporary accounts of the destruction in Hiroshima the best known is John Hersey's Hiroshima (New York, 1946), which was originally published in the New Yorker and had a great impact.

5. Harold C. Urey, "I'm a Frightened Man," in Collier's. 5 January 1946, 19.

6. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival. 58-69, 113-26; Godfrey Hodgson, The Colonel: The Life and Wars of Henry Stimson. 1867-1950 (New York, 1990), 301-11, 317-20; Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed; The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York, 1977), 67-89.

7. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival. 136-38; Godfrey Hodgson, The Colonel: The Life and Wars of Henrv Stimson. 1867-1950 (New York, 1990), 342-43, 351-56; Henry L. Stimson, with McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, 1947), 634-55. See also Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., The New World. 1939/1946 (University Park, PA, 1962), 340-71; and editorial note in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1945 (Washington, DC, 1967), Vol. 2, 11-12 (hereafter FRUS with year and volume). 88

8. Memorandum, and accompanying letter, by Stimson to Truman, 11 September 1945, FRUS. 1945. Vol. 1, 40-44; memorandum by Dean Acheson (acting secretary of state) to Truman, 25 September 1945, ibid., 48-50; memorandum by Robert Patterson (acting secretary of war) to Truman, 26 September 1945, ibid., 54-55; minutes of a meeting of the secretaries of state, war, and navy, 10 October 1945, ibid., 55-57; minutes of a meeting of the secretaries of state, war, and navy, 16 October 1945, ibid., 59-61; minutes of a meeting of the secretaries of state, war, and navy, 23 October 1945, ibid., 61-62. See also Truman's "Special Message to the Congress on Atomic Energy," 3 October 1945, PPPUS. Truman. 1945. 362-66. See also Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation; My Years in the State Department (New York, 1969), 123-25; Bundy, Danger and Survival. 138-45; Hewlett and Anderson, The New World. 1939/1946. 408-27; Hodgson, The Colonel. 356-64.

9. Memorandum by Captain R. Gordon Arneson to Patterson (secretary of war), 17 April 1946, FRUS. 1945. Vol. 2, 63-69; memorandum by Vannevar Bush (director of the office of scientific research and development) to Byrnes, 5 November 1945, ibid., 69-73; Lord Halifax (British ambassador in Washington) to Byrnes, 29 November 1945, ibid., 77-78; Lester B. Pearson (Canadian ambassador in Washington) to Byrnes, 30 November 1945, ibid., 78-80; Byrnes to Halifax, 5 December 1945, ibid., 89-91; Byrnes to Pearson, 5 December 1945, ibid., 91-92; memorandum by an informal interdepartmental committee, 10 December 1945, ibid., 92-96; Forrestal to Byrnes, 11 December 1945, ibid., 96-97; Patterson to Byrnes, 11 December 1945, ibid., 97-98; memorandum by the U.S. delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, 18 December 1945, ibid., 663-66; U.S. delegation minutes, sixth formal session, Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, with attached memorandum by the Soviet delegation, 22 December 1945, ibid., 734-41; U.S. delegation minutes of an informal meeting, Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, 23 December 1945, ibid., 743-47; memorandum of conversation by the U.S. delegation to the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, 23 December 1945, ibid., 756; U.S. delegation minutes of an informal meeting, Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, 24 December 1945, ibid., 761-63, 769; communique of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, 27 December 1945, ibid., 822- 24; Acheson (acting secretary of state) to John G. Winant (U.S. ambassador in London), 29 December 1945, ibid., 98. See also Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation. 131-32; and Bundy, Danger and Survival. 145-58.

10. Minutes of the meeting of the secretaries of state, war, and navy, 24 January 1946, FRUS. 1946 (Washington, DC, 1972), Vol. 1, 736-38; memorandum by the joint chiefs of staff to the state-war-navy coordinating committee, 23 January 1946, 89

ibid., 738-49; memorandum by Oppenheimer, 2 February 1946, ibid., 749-54; report by the secretary of state's committee on atomic energy to the secretary of state, 17 March 1946, ibid., 761-64. See also Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation. 151-56; and Bundy, Dancer and Survival. 158-61.

11. The documentation regarding the continuing talks at the UN Atomic Energy Commission about international atomic energy control is in FRUS. 1946. Vol. 1, 767-1109. For the continuation of talks during 1947, see FRUS. 1947 (Washington, DC, 1973), vol. 1, 327-706. See also Acheson, Present at the Creation. 154-56; Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light. 53-56; Bundy, Dancer and Survival. 161-69; Hewlett and Anderson, The New World. 1939/1946. 576-619; and Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power; National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 114- 16.

12. Norman Cousins, "Editorial," Saturday Review of Literature (18 August 1945), 8; and idem.. Modern Man Is Obsolete (New York, 1945).

13. Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Licht. 7-8; 29-40; Weart, Nuclear Fear. 111-18; and Wooley, Alternatives to Anarchy. 14- 28. Among the most influential world federalist publications were Chester I. Barnard, "Security through the Sacrifice of Sovereignty," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (1 October 1946),30-31; Ely Culbertson, "Minutes on Our Destiny," Commonweal (21 June 1946), 230-34; Dexter Masters and Katherine Way, eds.. One World or None; A Report to the Public on the Full Meaning of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1946); Cord Meyer, Jr., Peace or Anarchy (Boston, 1947); Vernon Nash, The World Must Be Governed (New York, 1949); Emery Reves, The Anatomy of Peace (New York, 1945); Harold Urey, "Atomic Energy Control is Impossible without World Government," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (December 1948), 365-67; idem., "Atomic Energy and World Peace," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November 1946), 2-4; idem., "The Paramount Problem of 1949," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (October 1949), 283-88; Harris Wofford, Jr., "Straight Is the Gate: Considering Alternative Routes to One World," Common Cause (June 1948), 425-28; and idem., It's Up to Us: Federal World Government in Our Time (New York, 1946).

14. Summary of the Dublin Conference, 16 October 1945, Streit Papers, Box 51, Folder "Dublin, New Hampshire Conference, General"; New York Times. 17 October 1945, 21. See also Eleanor Fowle, Cranston: The Senator from California (San Rafael, CA, 1980), 78-80; and Wooley, Alternatives to Anarchy. 32-33. 90

15. Fowle, Cranston. 80-83; Wooley, Alternatives to Anarchy. 33.

16. Freedom s Union 2 (April 1947), 22-24; Wooley, Alternatives to Anarchy. 34-38.

17. Boyer, Bv the Bomb's Early Light. 49-81; Weart, Nuclear Fear. 111-18; Wooley, Alternatives to Anarchy. 38-44.

18. George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll; Public Opinion. 1935- 1971 vol. 2 (New York, 1972), 592-93; Wooley, Alternatives to Anarchy. 47-49.

19. Freedom & Union 2 (April 1947), 22-25; Wooley, Alternatives to Anarchy. 34, 38; Jon A. Yoder, "The United World Federalists: Liberals for Law and Order," in Charles Chatfield, ed.. Peace Movements in America (New York: 1973), 99-101. Not all the organizations represented at Ashville merged with the new UWF. Among those who didn't World Republic was the most significant. Federal union did not participate in the Ashville Conference, but its main voice Freedom & Union hailed this attempt to unify the federalist forces.

20. Acheson, Present at the Creation. 217-19.

21. Acheson, Present at the Creation. 217-35; Terry H. Anderson, The United States. Great Britain, and the Cold War. 1944-1947 (Columbia, MO, 1981), 144-75; John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War. 1941-1947 (New York, 1972), 346-52; Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Westport, CT, 1981), 23-37; Joseph Marion Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York, 1955), 3-286; Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. 142-64; David S. McLellan, Dean Acheson: The State Department Years (New York, 1976), 107-34; Charles L. Mee, Jr., The Marshall Plan: The Launching of the P ctx Americana (New York, 1984), 15-104.

22. Anderson, The United States. Great Britain, and the Cold War. 1944-1947. 52-103; Robert M. Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America. 1944-1947 (New York, 1981), 154-81, 208-229.

23. Fraser J. Harbutt, The Iron Curtain: Churchill. America, and the Origins of the Cold War (New York, 1986), 161-70.

24. Anderson, The United States. Great Britain, and the Cold War. 1944-1947. 103-17; Gaddis, The United States and the 91

Origins of the Cold War. 1941-1947. 304-15; Harbutt, The Iron Curtain. 151-208; Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. 100-10.

25. Anderson, The United States. Great Britain, and the Cold War. 1944-1947. 118-43; Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War. 1941-1947. 316-46; Harbutt, The Iron Curtain. 267-85; Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership. 249-75; Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. 100-40.

26. The list of studies on the origins of the Cold War has become virtually inexhaustible. Some of the best and most representative are: Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diolomacv: Hiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power (New York, 1965); Diane Shaver Clemens, Yalta (New York, 1970); Hugh DeSantis, The Diplomacy of Silence: The American Foreign Service, the Soviet Union and the Cold War. 1933-1947 (Chicago, 1979); Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War. 1945-1950 (New York, 1970); D.F. Fleming, The Cold War and its Origins. 1917-1960 2 vols. (Garden City, 1961); Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War. 1941-1947: Lloyd C. Gcurdner, Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy. 1941-1949 (Chicago, 1970); Lloyd C. Gardner, Arthur M. Schlesinger, and Hans J. Morgenthau, The Origins of the Cold War (Waltham, MA, 1970); James L. Gormly, The Collapse of the Grand Alliance. 1945- 1948 (Baton Rouge, 1987); idem. From Potsdam to the Cold War: Big Three Diolomacv. 1945-1947 (Wilmington, DE, 1990); Harbutt, The Iron Curtain; Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy. 1943-1945 (New York, 1968); Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policv. 1945-1954 (New York, 1972); Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran. Turkey, and Greece (Princeton, 1980); Walter LaFeber, America. Russia, and the Cold War. 1945-1990 7th ed. (New York, 1992); Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: Robert L. Messer, The End of an Alliance: James F. Bvrnes. Roosevelt. Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War (Chapel Hill, 1982); Thomas G, Paterson, On Every Front: The Making of the Cold War (New York, 1979); Adam B. Ulam, The Rivals: America and Russia since World War II (New York, 1971); and Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State rev. ed.(New York, 1990).

27. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. 10-15.

28. Robert Strausz-Hupe, "Geopolitics," Fortune 24 (November 1941), 110-19; cind Joseph J. Thorndike, Jr., "Geopolitics," Life (December 1942), 106-12. See also Fortune 22 (September 92

1940), 42-57; Reader's Digest 38 (June 1941), 23-28; and Time 39 (19 January 1942), 56.

29. Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality; A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction (New York, 1919). Reflecting the growing interest in geopolitics and Mackinder's theories, the book was reissued in 1942. See also Halford J. Mackinder, "The Round World and the Winning of the Peace," Foreign Affairs 21 (July 1943), 598-605.

30. Nicholas John Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics; The United States and the Balance of Power (New York, 1942); and idem. The Geography of the Peace (New York, 1944). See also Robert Strausz-Hupe, The Balance of Tomorrow: Power and Foreign Policy in the United States (New York, 1945); and idem. Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power (New York, 1942). Spykman died in June 1943. As one of the founders, and the first director, of the Yale Institute of International Studies, he had a major influence on the development of international relations studies in the U.S. during the 1930's and 1940's. Many of the most prominent American international relations experts of the 1940's and 1950's, including Frederick S. Dunn, William T. R. Fox, and Arnold Wolfers, had been his students or colleagues, and his influence on their thinking was pervasive.

31. John B. Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle (New Haven, 1945); Forrest Davis, The Atlantic System: The Story of Anglo- American Control of the Seas (New York, 1941); Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy; and idem, U.S. War Aims (Boston, 1944); and Spykman, America's Strategv in World Politics.

32. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. 11-13; David Mayers, George Kennan and the Dilemmas of U.S. Foreign Policv (New York, 1988), 119-22.

33. Anderson, The United States. Great Britain, and the Cold War. 1944-47. 118-43; Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War. 1941-1947. 282-352; Harbutt, The Iron Curtain. 151-82, 217-85; Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership. 250-75; Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. 100- 40; Mayers, George Kennan and the Dilemmas of U.S. Foreign Policy. 98-102; Wilson D. Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy. 1947-1950 (Princeton, 1992), 25-28.

34. A Gallup poll in mid-March 1946 found that about two thirds of the Americans who had heard about Churchill's speech disapproved of it, see Gallup, The Gallup Poll. 567. See also Harbutt, The Iron Curtain. 197-208. For Lippmann's 93

reaction, see Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century. 428-30.

35. Anderson, The United States. Great Britain, and the Cold War. 1944-1947. 121-43; Hathaway, Aitibicmous Partnership. 242- 75.

36. Gallup, The Gallup Poll. 567, 591, 617. See also Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. 106-7.

37. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. 140-6. See also Justus D. Doenecke, Not to the Swift: The Old Isolationists in the Cold War Era (Lewisburg, 1979), 58-69.

38. Acheson, Present at the Creation. 219-25; Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War. 1941-1947. 348- 51; Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. 144-46. For Truman's speech to Congress, see PPPUS. Truman. 1947 (Washington, DC, 1963), 176-80.

39. The vote in the Senate, on 22 April, was 67-23; the House approved the aid package on 8 May with a vote of 287-107. See Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. 146.

40. A poll taken a few days after the president's speech showed that 56% of those who had heard about the Greco- Turkish aid program supported it. See Gallup, The Gallup Poll. 636-37.

41. A poll in late March and early April showed that 63% of Americans wanted to turn the Greco-Turkish issue over to the UN. And in a poll in late April 62% of the respondents favored continued cooperation with Russia, while only 31% wanted the U.S. to join a Western bloc. See Gallup, The Gallup Poll. 639, 649.

42. Streit's most prominent supporter, retired Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts, joined him in refusing to sign the Dublin Conference Declaration because of its advocacy of world federation rather than Streit's Atlantic Union program. But during 1946 even Roberts was lured away by the growing world federalist movement. He joined World Federalists, the organization run by Tom Griessemer, who was an ex-Federal Union leader. Roberts nevertheless also continued to support Streit, both as an active member of, and important financial contributor to. Federal Union. See Lantrip, "A Study of the Atlantic Union Movement, 1949-1960," 20, 47-49; and Wooley, Alternatives to Anarchv. 33, 36.

43. The growing list of Streit's supporters in the business world included Donald Danforth, president of the Ralston- 94

Purina Co.; John Howard Ford, president of Union Iron Works; H.J. Heinz, Jr., president of H.J. Heinz Co.; Eric A. Johnston, president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce; Robert Lund, ex-president of the National Association of Manufacturers; Edgar M. Queeny, chairman of Monsanto Chemical Co.; Edgar Rand, director of International Shoe Co.; Philip D. Reed, chairman of General Electric Co.; and A.N. Williams, chairman of Western Union. Among Streit's supporters in the publishing world were Edwin Canham, editor of the Christian Science Monitor; W.E. Christensen, editor of the Omaha World Herald; David Cort, editor of Life; Richard Finnegan, publisher of the Chicago Times: Henry Luce and C.D. Jackson of Time-Life, Inc.; Edwin Meeman, editor of the Memphis News- Scimitar; Eugene Meyer, publisher of the Washington Post; Ralph Nicholson, publisher of the New Orleans Item; Ralph Parrish, editor of the Portland Oregonian; Harry Scherman, president of the Book-of-the-Month Club; M.S. Sherman, editor of the Hartford Courant; and Tom Wallace, editor of the Louisville Times. In addition, several prominent writers, columnists, journalists, and academics also either joined Federal Union or became charter subscribers to Freedom & Union. Many of them also became contributors to Streit's new magazine. See Herbert Agar (associate editor of Freedom & Union) to C.D. Jackson (vice president of Time, Inc.), 17 March 1947, with attached letter from Jackson to Agar, 20 March 1947, Papers of C.D. Jackson, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS, Box 23, Folder "Agar, Herbert" (hereafter Jackson Papers, with filing information); and "Federal Union," and "Freedom & Union," undated. Record Group 59, State Department Central Files, Special Lot File 55D323, Records of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs, 1941- 1951, National Archives, Washington, DC, Box 16, File "World Government" (hereafter RG 59 with filing information). See also Freedom & Union 1-2 (October 1946- December 1947).

44. See Freedom & Union 1-2 (October 1946-December 1947).

45. "Federal Union," and "Freedom & Union," undated, RG 59, Special Lot File 55D323, Records of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs, 1941-1951, Box 16, File "World Government". The quote is in "Federal Union."

46. Clayton to Streit, 11 February 1947, Streit Papers, Box 34, Folder "Department of State".

47. Streit to Truman, 3 March 1947, Papers of Harry S. Truman- Official File, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, MO, Box 1060, File 386 (1947) (hereafter Truman Papers-OF, with filing information); memorandum by Colonel James Stack (ADC to Eisenhower) to Eisenhower, 28 April 1947, Pre-Presidential Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Dwight D. 95

Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS, Box 112, Folder "Streit, Clarence K." (hereafter Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers, with filing information).

48. Summary of talk between Streit, Roberts, and Forrestal, 1 May 1947, Streit Papers, Box 31, Folder "Roberts, Owen J., 1944-49"; Roberts to Streit, 16 May 1947, ibid.; Streit to Roberts, 17 May 1947, with attached summaries of talks with Marshall and Harriman (13 May 1947) and Cohen and Kennan (14 May 1947), ibid.. Box 83, Folder "Roberts, Owen J."; Streit to John Foster Dulles, 19 May 1947, ibid.. Box 51, Folder "Dulles, John Foster, 1947-48".

49. Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan; America. Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe. 1947-1952 (New York, 1987), 28-35; Jones, The Fifteen Weeks. 78-85; Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. 159-60. See also Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe. 1945-1951 (Berkeley, 1984), 1-55.

50. Memorandum by John H. Hilldring (State Department member of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee), 17 March 1947, FRUS. 1947. 3:198-99; and memorandum by Kennan, 16 May 1947, ibid., 220-23. See also Hogan, The Marshall Plan. 40.

51. Freedom & Union 2 (May 1947), 1-2.

52. Hogan, The Marshall Plan. 27-28, 35-39. See also W.W. Rostow, The Division of Europe after World War II: 1946 (Austin, 1981).

53. Landreth Harrison (U.S. minister in Bern) airgram, 25 July 1947, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1945-49, Box 5643, 840.00/7- 2547.

54. Vital Speeches of the Dav 13 (15 May 1947), 450-3. See also Max Beloff, The United States and the Unity of Europe (Washington, DC, 1963), 14; and Hogan, The Marshall Plan. 38- 39. Like Streit, Dulles also referred to the example of Alexander Hamilton's successful efforts to stabilize the American economy under the federal constitution. But unlike his long-time friend, Dulles wanted to apply the "federal formula" only to Western Europe, rather than to the whole North Atlantic area. As a result, Dulles came in for some sharp criticism in Freedom & Union. See Freedom & Union 2 (March 1947), 6-7.

55. Hale Boggs to Truman, 30 April 1947, Truman Papers-OF, Box 1667, File 1466-B. See also Beloff, The United States and the Unity of Europe. 14; and Hogan, The Marshall Plan. 39. 96

56. Beloff, The United States and the Unity of Europe. 14.

57. Kennan to Acheson, 23 May 1947, with enclosed PPSl "Policy with Respect to American Aid to Western Europe. Views of the Policy Planning Staff", FRUS. 1947. Vol. 3, 323- 30; memorandum by Clayton, 27 May 1947, ibid., 230-32; memorandum by Acheson to Marshall, 28 May 1947, ibid., 232- 33; summary of discussion on problems of relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction of Europe, 29 May 1947, ibid., 234-36. See also Hogan, The Marshall Plan. 40-43; and Jones, The Fifteen Weeks. 239-56.

58. For Marshall's speech, see FRUS. 1947. Vol. 3, 237-39.

59. The best account is in Hogan, The Marshall Plan. 54-87. See also FRUS. 1947. Vol. 3, 439-41, 47-71, and 484.

60. Memorandum by Charles P. Kindleberger (chief of the State Department's division of German and Austrian economic affairs) FRÜS. 1947. vol. 3, 241-47.

61. A Gallup poll in early July 1947 showed that among those who had heard about the Marshall Plan (49%) a solid majority (57%) supported it. Only 21% opposed the plan. See Gallup, The Gallup Poll. 661.

62. By late October 1947 public support for the Marshall Plan had dropped to 47%. ibid., 683-84.

63. Patterson telegram to Acheson, 28 October 1947, Papers of Dean Acheson, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, MO, Box 3, Folder "Committee for the Marshall Plan-correspondence folder 1" (hereafter Acheson Papers, with filing information); Harold L. Oram to members of the CMP executive committee, 31 October 1947, with attached list of people invited to join CMP, ibid.; John H. Ferguson to Acheson, 9 December 1947, with attached reply, 17 December 1947, ibid.; Ferguson to Acheson, 23 December 1947, ibid.; Joseph C. Grew to Acheson, 31 December 1947, ibid. See also U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings. European Recoverv Program. 80th Cong., 2nd sess., 1948, 746-77. See also Hogan, The Marshall Plan. 97-99; and Michael Wala, "Selling the Marshall Plan at Home: The Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery," Diplomatic History 10 (Summer 1986), 247-65.

64. Gallup, The Gallup Poll. 715-16.

65. See FRUS. 1948 (Washington, DC, 1974) Vol. 3, 408-9, 423- 24. 97

66. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. 198-99.

67. Lawrence S. Kaplan, The United States and NATO; The Formative Years (Lexington, KY, 1984), 39-41. CHAPTER III

EUROPEAN RECOVERY AND ATLANTIC SECURITY,

DECEMBER 1947-JUNE 1948

Throughout 1947 and 1948 the Truman Administration remained committed to a policy of fostering greater unity among the Western European nations, especially in the economic field. But during the winter of 1948, many American policymakers became convinced of the need to move beyond

European integration toward the creation of a wider transatlantic framework, and to abandon their exclusive focus on economic recovery in favor of a policy that would include greater political and military cooperation. This led first to American support for a Western European regional security treaty; then to the Vandenberg resolution of June 1948, which held out the promise of American association with such a security arrangement; and finally, by the spring of 1949, to

America's first permanent and institutionalized transatlantic commitment, the North Atlantic Treaty.

This gradual evolution in U.S. foreign policy toward closer transatlantic ties was at first tentative, and even

98 99 somewhat reluctant. The Truman Administration in no way abandoned its earlier focus on support for European integration. And throughout 1948 and 1949 the European track remained active, resulting in the creation of the Western

Union, the OEEC, and the Council of Europe, which were designed to foster greater military, economic, and political integration among the Western European nations.

Nevertheless, the gradual emergence, during 1948 and 1949, of a wider Atlantic framework for U.S. policy toward Europe laid the groundwork for a fundamental shift in that policy. From

1950 on the North Atlantic Treaty would become the basis for a parallel track of transatlantic integration that would quickly begin to overshadow European integration in the crucial political and military areas.i

The Marshall speech of June 1947 had launched the

United States on a policy supporting European economic integration. And throughout 1947 the Truman Administration worked hard to foster greater unity among the Western

European nations. It pressured the Europeans, within the framework of the Marshall Plan negotiations, to integrate their economies. American policymakers were convinced that economic integration was an essential element in a lasting recovery of the European economies. This, combined with greater political unity, would foster greater stability and allow the Western European governments to forestall the 100

threat of communist subversion and safeguard their democratic

institutions.2

Of course the administration's thinking was also

influenced by a desire to further cement the traditional

transatlantic economic relations that had always bound the

United States and Western Europe, and by the need to

safeguard American influence in Europe in the face of the

perceived Soviet global challenge.3 But before 1948 the

Truman Administration displayed no desire to accept a

permanent commitment in Europe, or to involve the United

States in a formalized, long-term political or security

relationship with Western Europe. Indeed, as late as

February 1947, the State Department, explicitely referring to

George Washington's warning against entangling alliances, had emphatically rejected any such idea.4 Rather, the goal of the administration's policy was to support the development of an economically integrated Western Europe that would be able to

stand on its own feet.s The administration, and its supporters in the Committee for the Marshall Plan, stressed this time and again in their campaign for passage of the

European Recovery Program. The Marshall Plan, they argued, was not an open-ended commitment to provide hand-outs to the

Europeans but a short-term effort to stcibilize and integrate the European economies and allow them to become self- supporting. & Of course this was partly designed to convince a 101

skeptical Congress, but it was also genuinely reflective of

the administration's own thinking.

While the administration shied away from any permanent

transatlantic entanglements, it also kept its distance from

various initiatives, both in the U.S. and in Europe, that

were designed to move quickly beyond European economic

integration toward greater political integration or even

toward a European federation, modelled on the United States.

The many private federalist pressure groups that had sprung up in Western Europe were only too eager to coordinate their

activities with the American administration. Several prominent European federalist leaders, including former

Belgian Prime Minister Paul Van Zeeland and veteran federalist activist Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, visited the

State Department during 1947 and early 1948 to consult with

American policymakers and seek their support for a federalist propaganda campaign in Western Europe.? Within the United

States prominent supporters of the European federalist movement also continued to lobby the Truman Administration.

In April 1948 Coudenhove-Kalergi succeeded in bringing most of them together in the American Committee for a Free and

United Europe. Senator J. William Fulbright headed this committee, which also included former President Herbert

Hoover, former Ambassador to France William C. Bullitt,

Congressman Hale Boggs, and former OSS chief William J.

Donovan. The American Committee for a Free and United Europe 102

intended to work along the lines of the wartime pro-allied

citizens' committees to rally public support in the U.S. for

policies that would encourage the formation of a Western

European federation.s

Although the Truman Administration also favored the

development of some form of European political federation, it

was loath to associate itself publicly with any particular

initiative in this field that went beyond the confines of the

Marshall Plan. The administration carefully kept its

distance from Coudenhove-Kalergi and the American Committee

for a Free and United Europe; refused to support the pro­

federalist Fulbright and Boggs resolutions in Congress;

declined to send official or semi-official observers to various European federalist conferences; and gave a very cool

reception to various private proposals for a pro-federalist propaganda campaign in Western Europe.9 There were several

reasons why American policymakers were reluctant to engage themselves in the European federalist movement. For one thing, the administration took a dim view of some of the most

important leaders of this movement. The State Department had a healthy respect for some of the more established leaders in the European federalist movement, like Van Zeeland and

Churchill, but it considered Coudenhove-Kalergi to be a visionary dreamer and even something of a pain in the neck, lo

On the American side, Fulbright had lost a lot of credit and credibility with the administration by suggesting, after the 103

1946 Republican victory in the congressional elections, that

Truman resign in favor of Republican Senator Vandenberg.n

And some of Fulbright's fellow-travellers in the American

Committee for a Free and United Europe, notably Herbert

Hoover and Senator Burton K. Wheeler, were also suspect in

the administration's eyes because of their purported

isolationist i d e a s . 12 Furthermore, the European federalists

remained divided among themselves, something which detracted

seriously from the effectiveness of their campaign. In spite

of various efforts at coordination during 1947, no single

coherent European federalist vision emerged. The State

Department also had serious misgivings about how

representative the various European federalist groups were of

general public opinion in Europe. Overall, the Truman

Administration did not consider the existing European

federalist movement as a suitable instrument for America's

European policy, and therefore declined to support its

initiatives or p r o g r a m s . i4 Throughout the second half of

1947, most American policymakers continued to believe that it would be a mistake to abandon the Marshall Plan's focus on

the urgent and practical matter of Europe's economic recovery

in favor of some vague and idealistic dreams of a European political federation.

By the Autumn of 1947, however, a number of problems began to emerge that threatened to jeopardize the Marshall

Plan's potential for solving Europe's economic and political 104

difficulties. First, it became clear that most European

governments were unwilling to integrate their economies to

the degree the Americans considered necessary for a speedy

and full recovery. Instead, they remained focused on the

restoration of their own national economies. This problem

was exacerbated by continued French opposition to Anglo-

American proposals to revive the German economy and integrate

it with the rest of Western Europe. American policymakers

felt that the western zones of Germany had a vital role to

play in Europe's economic recovery, and also wanted to tie western Germany securely to the West. The French government

argued that Germany's economic rehabilitation would pose an

unacceptable security risk to France. The Americans were

reluctant to force the German issue, for fear that this would

lead to the collapse of the Western-oriented government in

France. But they were also aware that Europe was unlikely to

recover its full economic strength without German input. The

German problem therefore seemed to pose a direct threat to the American policy of support for closer European integration and to Europe's economic r e c o v e r y . is

At the same time Western European security and political stability became an increasingly pressing concern.

Nobody on either side of the Atlantic disputed that over the long term economic recovery was the crucial element in the stabilization of Europe. But by late 1947 more and more

Western policymakers began to believe that Europe could not 105

wait on the economic recovery promised by the five-year

Marshall Plan. The prospect of American economic aid had

stiffened the resistance of Western European governments, as

well as their people, to communist subversion. The political

advance of the communists in western Europe had been

temporarily halted, and communist parties had been thrown out

of the ruling government coalitions in several West European

countries (Belgium, France, Italy). But at the same time the

Western European communists remained an important and potentially disrupting force, and the formation, in October

1947, of the Cominform seemed to indicate that the Soviet

Union intended to harness this force in its continuing campaign against the Marshall Plan. In November 1947

Secretary of State Marshall reported to the Cabinet that he expected the Soviets to "order the communist parties in

France and Italy to resort to virtual civil war" in the near

future. 16

These problems came to a head around the time of the

London meeting of the four-power Council of Foreign

Ministers. The conference, which was to decide the future of

Germany, opened on 25 November amid great pessimism. In

France, where the Ramadier government had just collapsed, the situation was deteriorating rapidly. Violent strikes, organized by French communists, seemed to threaten the survival of the existing democratic regime and quickly forced the new Schuman government to take emergency measures and 106 call out the army. Similar strikes threatened to destabilize

I t a l y . 17 None of the Western diplomats expected the London conference to bridge the East-West divide that had opened up during 1947. Instead they focused on maintaining a solid front and preventing the Soviets from exploiting the differences among the French and the Anglo-Americans over the future of Germany. 18 Nobody was surprised when on 15 December the conference was adjourned indefinitely without any agreement on Germany, or, for that matter, on anything else.is

Immediately after the failure of the London conference

Marshall held consultations with his British and French counterparts, Ernest Bevin and Georges Bidault. Marshall's main concern in these meetings was to reach an agreement to move ahead with the merger of the three western occupation zones of Germany, the economic rehabilitation of western

Germany, and its integration into the Western European economy. Bidault was now ready to go along with his Anglo-

American colleagues on these issues, provided France's security concerns would be taken into account, and he agreed to a western tripartite conference in London in early 1948 to discuss the West German zonal merger and economic rehabilitation. In the meantime, Bevin and Marshall agreed to move ahead with reforms in the Anglo-American B i z o n i a .20

While Marshall argued that the economic integration of

West Germany with the rest of Western Europe was essential to

Europe's economic recovery, Bevin and Bidault sought to 107

convince Marshall that a clearer American association with

Europe's security was vital to ensure Western Europe's

political stability. During a private dinner on 15 December

1947, and again two days later, Bevin proposed to Marshall

the creation of "a sort of spiritual federation of the west."

This would be a loose, informal alliance including the United

States, Great Britain, the Dominions, France, Italy, and

other democratic Western European countries. At the same

time, in order to meet France's security concerns, Bevin proposed a more solid and circumscribed six-power alliance, consisting of Great Britain, France, Italy, and the Benelux countries, to provide a security guarantee against a revival of German militarism. 21

Bevin was not the first western statesman to propose some form of Western alliance. Members of the Canadian government had been talking in public about the formation of a Western regional security organization throughout the summer of 1947. On 4 July 1947, Canadian Foreign Minister

Henri St. Laurent told the House of Commons in Ottawa that there was room within the UN framework for closer regional associations for collective security. On 13 August another senior Canadian diplomat, Escott Reid, echoed St. Laurent in a speech advocating the creation of a western collective security organization "with teeth." Reid also went further than St. Laurent and suggested that such a Western organization need not limit itself to security matters, but 108

might also include joint economic, social, and cultural

agencies. In confidential departmental memoranda Reid went

even further and pleaded for a Western union with real

federal institutions with executive power. The Canadian

government was not yet prepared to go that far, but in

September 1947, in a speech before the UN General Assembly,

St. Laurent repeated his proposal for a Western security

pact. 22

Ideas very similar to those of the Canadian government

also appeared in the United States during the autumn of 1947.

Four days before St. Laurent's speech at the UN the New York

Times Magazine published an article by the influential editor

of Foreign Affairs, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, in which he too made the case for a Western collective defense organization

under article 51 of the UN Charter.23 in October 1947 the

Director of the State Department's Office of European

Affairs, John D. Hickerson, discussed Armstrong's and St.

Laurent's ideas with the Canadian ambassador in Washington,

Hume Wrong. Hickerson indicated that he too had become convinced of the need for a Western collective security organization, but stated that no concrete steps in that direction would be possible in advance of the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.24

When, in the wake of the collapsed London conference.

Secretary of State Marshall was confronted with Bevin's proposal he at first reacted cautiously. The secretary sent 109

Hickerson, who was also in London, to the Foreign Office to

get some more details about Bevin's rather vague "spiritual

federation of the west." Hickerson learned that the British,

in spite of Bevin's talk of an "informal" alliance, envisaged

some form of treaty commitment by the U.S. (and Canada) to

Western Europe's security.25 This was more than Marshall was

ready for. Only a few days earlier, in a speech to the

Pilgrim Society in London, the secretary had hailed the

"fraternal" and "natural" relationship between the United

States and Great Britain, emphasizing that this relationship

did not require any "formal treaty or pact."26 Marshall told

Hickerson that he was impressed by Bevin's proposals but that

he believed that any Western union had to be solely European.

The United States might supply material assistance to the members of such a Western European defense pact, but direct

United States participation or a formal security guarantee in treaty form was not possible. Obviously Marshall, who upon his return faced congressional hearings on the ERP, was not willing to accept a broad U.S. security commitment that would only seem to confirm congressional criticism that Europe was becoming increasingly dependent on the U.S.2? in his final meeting with Bevin, Marshall indicated that he had not definitely approved any particular course of action and that he would wait for more specific British proposals before making a final decision. 28 110

When Marshall returned to Washington he found that

most of his top advisers agreed that talk of a transatlantic

defense treaty was premature.29 Hickerson, on the other hand,

believed that the quick implementation of such a military

alliance was essential. On board the ship that brought him

back to the united States, Hickerson managed to convince his

fellow-delegate John Foster Dulles. Dulles had attended the

London conference as adviser to the secretary of state and as

the informal representative of the Republican Chairman of the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Arthur Vandenberg.

Dulles agreed to talk to Vandenberg, while Hickerson set

himself the task of converting Marshall. As soon as he got

back to Washington, Hickerson, together with the Chief of the

Division for Western European Affairs, Theodore Achilles, began to work to secure the administration's agreement to a transatlantic alliance. 3°

For the next several years, Hickerson and Achilles would form the core of an atlanticist group within the State

Department that sought to push the Truman Administration toward a policy of transatlantic, rather than European,

integration. They were close personal friends, and Hickerson had been Achilles's mentor within the Foreign Service and the

State Department since the mid-1930's. Both men had read

Streit's Union Now, and had absorbed its message. Achilles in particular had become a convert, as well as a personal

friend, of Streit's. Both Hickerson and Achilles now saw in Ill

a transatlantic alliance the first step toward Streit's

vision of a federal union of the Atlantic democracies. 3i

In January 1948, after further discussions within the

British cabinet and with Bidault, Bevin renewed his

consultations with Marshall concerning a European security

arrangement. On 13 January the British ambassador in

Washington, Lord Inverchapel, sent Marshall an outline of the proposals Bevin would shortly put forward publicly in a speech to the House of Commons. As a first step, Bevin proposed the creation of a Western Union consisting of five

Western European countries (Great Britain, France, Belgium,

Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). The basis for this would be a treaty between these countries along the lines of the

Anglo-French Dunkirk Treaty of 1947. This would lay the groundwork for the subsequent creation of a wider Western security system that would also include Italy, Portugal, the

Scandinavian countries, and, ultimately, Germany, and that would be "backed" by the United States and the Dominions.32

Within the State Department the debate between those, like Hickerson, who favored a transatlantic alliance and the advocates of a purely European union, led primarily by the

Director of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS), George Kennan, now began in earnest. Hickerson welcomed Bevin's initiative but found his proposed first step (extension of the Dunkirk

Treaty to the Benelux countries) "highly dubious." The

Dunkirk Treaty was explicitely directed against German 112

aggression, and therefore a poor basis for a Western security

system that would be directed primarily against the Soviet

Union, and that would ultimately seek to incorporate western

Germany. Hickerson pointed to the recently concluded Treaty

of Rio de Janeiro, which set up a security system for the

Western Hemisphere, as a more suitable model. Furthermore,

Hickerson stressed that for any European security pact to be

effective U.S. adherence was essential. In this context he

pointed to the comment of Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henri

Spaak that "any defense arrangements which did not include

the United States were without practical v a l u e . "33

Kennan took a distinctly different approach to Bevin's

initiative. The PPS director generally welcomed Bevin's

initiative as another step on the road to European union, but

added several caveats. Like Hickerson, Kennan rejected the use of the Dunkirk Treaty as a basis because of the

importance he attached to eventual German participation in a

European union. More fundamentally, Kennan objected to the emphasis on military security in the Bevin proposal. He continued to believe that the sole emphasis in America's

European policy should be on economic recovery and integration. Finally, Kennan strongly emphasized that any new "Western Union" should be exclusively European. Unlike

Hickerson, who felt that a transatlantic link was vital,

Kennan argued that the Europeans should be discouraged from seeking any formal security relationship with the United 113

States. 34

Secretary of State Marshall remained cautious. In a

meeting with inverchapel on 19 Janueury, and in a letter to

the British ambassador the next day, Marshall warmly welcomed

Bevin's proposal but remained noncommittal. The secretary

made no suggestions concerning the details of Bevin's

proposal and assumed that it would be the subject of

continued study by the British foreign secretary and his

European colleagues. This left the ball firmly in the

European c a m p . 35 At the same time, however, Marshall

authorized Hickerson to provide Inverchapel, on an informal

basis, with a memorandum expressing "ideas which were being

considered on the pick and shovel level in the Department."

This memorandum largely reflected Hickerson's, rather than

Kennan's, views. It emphasized the merits of a mutual

assistance pact on the Rio model versus the problems that would be created by simply extending the Dunkirk Treaty.

Both in his memorandum and in his oral comments Hickerson

strongly hinted that the U.S. would be willing to participate

fully in a Western security pact, provided the Europeans

themselves took the initiative. The only reference to

Kennan's concerns came in the memorandum's final passage, which urged that the military aspects of a Western pact

should not overshadow the importance of continued progress toward closer political and economic integration of the

Western European countries.36 114

Bevin made his Western Union proposal public during a parliamentary foreign policy debate on 22 January 1948. The foreign secretary emphasized that in the face of the Soviet threat "the free nations of Western Europe must draw together." He still advocated making the Dunkirk Treaty the nucleus of a core-group that would include the Benelux countries. Around this core would then be gathered "the other historic members of European civilisation, including the new Italy." Bevin carefully avoided mentioning the relationship of the United States to his proposed Western

Union, so as not to arouse any opposition within the American

Congress which was, at that very moment, holding hearings on the European Recovery Program. 37

Bevin's speech was well-received in the British and

American press, and Senator Vandenberg called it "terrific."

The State Department, for its part, put out an official statement on 23 January welcoming Bevin's initiative. 38 But when Bevin approached the State Department with more concrete proposals he found the Americans still hesitant and unwilling to move ahead. On 27 January Lord Inverchapel presented

Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett with a proposal for secret Anglo-American negotiations to consider the possibilities of concluding a bilateral defense agreement.

Such an Anglo-American agreement, in effect a revamped version of Churchill's 1946 Fulton proposal, would reinforce

Bevin's hand as he sought to fashion a Western European 115

union. It would obviously also confirm Britain's independent

position as a mediator between the U.S. and Europe, a role

the British government was eager to play. Bevin wanted to

hold talks on his proposal before mid-February, when he was

scheduled to meet with his continental counterparts.

Marshall and Lovett reacted negatively to this approach.

Lovett told Inverchapel that the question of a military

alliance with Britain would require "most careful

consideration" at the highest levels of the administration,

as well as consultation with congressional leaders. This

could not be done in a matter of weeks. More fundamentally,

Marshall stressed that first a more concrete European

initiative was required. Once the Europeans displayed the unity and firm determination to act together to defend themselves, the U.S. would "carefully consider the part it might appropriately play in support of such a Western

European Union."3» This theme, that the initiative had to be seen to come from the Europeans themselves, would remain a constant element in the U.S. position throughout 1948.

This left Bevin caught in what he referred to as a

"vicious circle." The European countries, he claimed, would see a Western Union without American participation or guarantees as meaningless. But until the Europeans set up their own security system, the State Department was unwilling to discuss any such participation or guarantees. 4o in reality, Bevin, in early February 1948, had not yet worked 116

out for himself what the Western Union he had proposed would

look like. As a result, he was unable to make any progress with either the Americans or his continental partners.*i The

Belgian and Dutch governments were eager to move ahead, but,

like the Americans, they rejected the Dunkirk formula in

favor of a regional treaty along the lines of the Rio Pact.

The French, on the other hand, continued to seek reassurances against a potential German threat and therefore held fast to the Dunkirk Treaty.«

On 23 February 1948 delegates from the United States,

Great Britain, France, and the Benelux countries met in

London in a renewed attempt to solve the German problem.

Since the four-power Council of Foreign Ministers had proved unable to agree on Germany's future, the Western powers would now have to agree among themselves what to do with the three western occupation z o n e s . *3 Britain and the U.S. had already introduced extensive reforms in their Bizone, and now put renewed pressure on the French to agree on a program for the unification and rehabilitation of all three western z o n e s . 44

This could obviously not be done without addressing France's security concerns. It was in this context that the European representatives at the London conference also discussed

Bevin's Western Union proposal. The U.S. did not participate in these discussions, but strongly encouraged the Benelux representatives to press for a Western Union along the Rio, rather than the Dunkirk model. To the Americans' delight. 117

the Benelux representatives arrived in London with their own

draft for a regional mutual assistance pact that also

included proposals for further economic and political

integration.45 At the same time the Americans directly

approached the French. Marshall told Bidault that France's preoccupation with Germany as a major threat was outmoded and unrealistic. The secretary recognized that Germany might reemerge as a threat in the distant future. But in the meantime the real threat to French security came from

"another power." And unless western Germany was quickly incorporated into the Western European community of nations, this unnamed power (Marshall did not mention the Soviet Union by name) might seek to harness the economic resources of

Germany for itself, thereby becoming an even greater threat to France.46 in effect, Marshall was repeating what had been the American line all along: European economic integration that included western Germany was the best way to recovery, stability, and security for France as well as for the whole of Western Europe.

Two days after the opening of the London talks, the coup in Prague, which resulted in the overhrow of the Benes government and its replacement by a pro-Soviet regime, shocked the West. The sudden end of democracy in

Czechoslovakia underlined the growing Soviet threat and served to narrow the differences among the Western powers. 4?

By the beginning of March both Bevin and Bidault were ready 118

to drop the Dunkirk approach to European security, and begin

talks with their Benelux counterparts on a regional security

pact along the Rio model. On 7 March the British and French

joined their Benelux partners in Brussels to open formal

negotiations on the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact.48

And on 17 March the Brussels meeting ended with the signing

of a Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration

and Collective Self-Defense. The Brussels Pact, as it became

known, did include provisions for dealing with a renewed

German threat, but generally conformed to the Rio model. The

core collective security provision (article 4) provided for a

joint military response to an armed attack by any aggressor.49

While the Czech coup helped to convert the French to

the European security arrangement preferred by the Americans,

it also led to further European demands for American

association with, or even participation in, such a security

system. Both Bevin and Bidault immediately called for secret

consultations and closer transatlantic cooperation.so

Marshall at first remained hesitant, stressing that the U.S.

should not be asked to consider associating itself with a

European security system until it became clear what the

Europeans were going to do themselves. si But by the second week of March American policy underwent a marked shift. On 8

March 1948 the Norwegian foreign minister informed the U.S.

and British ambassadors in Oslo that he had information indicating that Norway would soon be faced with a Soviet 119

demand for a non-aggression pact.52 Coming so soon after the

events in Czechoslovakia, this new crisis raised the level of

concern on both sides of the Atlantic to new heights.

Policymakers in Washington and London feared that this could

all be part of a concerted Soviet effort, and that Italy,

where elections were scheduled for April, might be the next

target of Soviet expanionsism. Without a resolute response

Soviet influence might then soon expand to the shores of the

Atlantic. 53

On 11 March Bevin sent a new aide-memoire to Marshall.

The foreign secretary argued that the Norwegian crisis

demonstrated that the Western European pact being negotiated

in Brussels was not sufficient to meet the Soviet threat to

Western security. He therefore proposed that any security

pact that was worked out in Brussels be supplemented with "a

regional Atlantic Approaches Pact of Mutual Assistance" under

article 51 of the UN Charter. Bevin further suggested the

organization of a third, Mediterranean security system to

shore up Italy. Bevin proposed that the U.S., Great Britain,

and Canada open immediate secret discussions in Washington to

explore the possibility of setting up an Atlantic Pact, which he considered to be the most important of the three Western

security s y s t e m s . 54 The Canadian government, which Bevin also approached, accepted this proposal the same d a y . 55 Marshall responded on 12 March, after consulting with President

Truman, and indicated that the U.S. was now also ready to 120

engage in discussions on the establishment of an Atlantic

security s y s t e m . se

This was only the first in a series of increasingly

public messages demonstrating the Truman Administration's new

willingness to discuss a more formal American commitment to

Europe's security. On 12 March Marshall also sent a message

to Bidault, informing him that the United States fully

appreciated "the dangers facing France and the other free

countries of Europe," and pointing to the successful

completion of the Brussels talks as "an essential prerequisite to any wider arrangement in which other countries including the United States might play a part."5?

Five days later Truman, in an address to Congress, praised

the just completed Brussels Pact and assured the Europeans that their determination to help themselves would be matched by an equal determination on the part of the U.S. to help them do so.ss

On 16 March 1948 the State Department's Policy

Planning Staff began considering how the U.S. could provide effective support to the Western Union. Although there was by now a consensus within the department on the need for some sort of American security guarantee for Western Europe, top policymakers still held widely divergent views on the form such a guarantee should take. PPS Director George Kennan was still strongly opposed to any alliance or formal treaty. But in late February 1948 Kennan left for a month-long tour in 121

Japan and the Philippines, and upon his return in late March

he was taken ill with duodenal ulcers. Kennan did not return

to the State Department until 19 April, and in his absence

the opposition to a formal Atlemtic alliance temporarily collapsed. 59

When the PPS met on 16 March there were three potential American responses to the Europeein crisis on the table. The first reflected the position of Theodore

Achilles, who, together with Bickerson, took an active part in the PPS discussions. It envisaged full U.S. participation in the Western Union, including not only its military but also its economic, cultural, and other aspects. This could ultimately lead to "a really close union," involving the pooling of sovereignty. The second proposal was clearly inspired by the absent Kennan and called for nothing more than a unilateral American military guarantee to the Western

Union countries and any other European country whose security was vital to the U.S. The third alternative was drawn almost verbatim from an earlier "think-piece" by Hickerson. It involved the creation of an "Atlantic-Mediterranean Regional

Agreement." This would be "a purely military agreement," with full U.S. participation, and open to any Atlantic or

Mediterranean country vital to U.S. security.so During further discussions over the next few days the first two proposals were jettisoned.6i The result was PPS paper 27, which George Butler, the acting PPS Director, presented to 122

Secretary Marshall on 23 March 1948. PPS 27 basically

adopted the Hickerson proposal and recommended that the

United States approach, first the Western Union countries,

and later the other free nations of Europe and offer them a

mutual defense agreement. Pending the conclusion of the

lengthy treaty negotiating process, the U.S. would, through

diplomatic channels, issue an immediate assurance to the

Europeans that any attack upon them would be considered an

attack on the U.S.&z

Meanwhile, the tripartite talks which Bevin had

proposed on 11 March had also begun. From 22 March through 1

April 1948, representatives of the U.S., Great Britain, and

Canada met amidst the greatest possible secrecy at the

Pentagon. Hickerson headed the American delegation, which

also included Butler, Achilles, and General Alfred Gruenther, who represented the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The British

delegation was led by Under-Secretary of State Gladwyn Jebb

and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Lester Pearson and

Ambassador Hume Wrong represented C a n a d a . 63 Although

Hickerson warned his British and Canadian counterparts that a

U.S. treaty commitment was predicated on as yet uncertain congressional support, he and Achilles immediately agreed to work on the assumption that such support would be forthcoming. The discussions then centered on the nature and scope of a treaty. Two proposals, a simple extension of the

Brussels Pact and a worldwide treaty based on article 51 of 123

the UN Charter, were quickly rejected, as was the idea of a

unilateral American security guarantee. Instead the

negotiators settled on a new "Western Mutual Defense Pact."

By 24 March Achilles, Jebb, and Pearson jointly drafted a

paper outlining such a pact. It was, in effect, a slightly modified version of PPS 27 which Achilles had helped draft

only days earlier. The main difference between PPS 27 and this new so-called "Pentagon Paper" was that the immediate

American diplomatic security guarantees to the European countries were now replaced by a public presidential declaration to the same effect.^4

At this point the delegations consulted their respective governments. When the meetings resumed on 29

March, the Americans were the only ones to suggest changes.

Hickerson redrafted the paper, partly on the basis of

"'indirect' soundings concerning the probable attitude of congressional leaders" (probably a reference to contacts with

Senator Vandenberg through John Foster Dulles). The main changes were the introduction of Rio Treaty language wherever possible, and a provision that each party would determine for itself whether an armed attack within the meaning of the treaty had occurred and what immediate measures it should take to meet its treaty obligations (these were conditions which Vandenberg would later repeat in his talks with Under

Secretary Lovett).65 By 1 April the draft paper was finalized. It was phrased as a State Department position 124

paper, so that in case of leaks it could be presented as a

purely American paper, rather than the result of secret

negotiations. 66 on 6 April 1948, after further discussions

between Lovett, Butler, Hickerson, Achilles, and Deputy Under

Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the Pentagon Paper was restyled

PPS 27/1 and sent to the National Security Council (NSC), where it was presented a week later as NSC paper 9.6?

The main significance of the ultra-secret Pentagon

talks was twofold. On the one hand, the United States had,

for the first time, clearly outlined the kind of long-term

security commitment it was willing to accept in Europe. To the British, this was what the talks had been all about. On the other hand, the Americans had convinced the British to agree, at least in principle, that any new security arrangement ultimately had to be broadened beyond the North

American-Western Union group originally proposed by Bevin, and had to include the North Atlantic "stepping-stone" countries like Iceland, Norway, Denmark, and Portugal.

NSC 9 was the temporary high-water mark for the atlanticists within the State Department. After several weeks of virtually unimpeded progress toward an American commitment to an Atlantic alliance they began to run into opposition. One source of opposition was the military. The

JCS argued that the commitments envisaged in NSC 9 (in effect a commitment to defend any European country that asked for it) went beyond the nation's existing capabilities.ss it was 125

not the opposition of the military, however, that delayed

immediate action on NSC 9. More important than the

reservations of the JCS were the concerns Senator Vandenberg

expressed in several meetings with Lovett. Vandenberg too

was concerned about the extent of America's obligations under

NSC 9. He wanted to go slow and get more assurances that the

Europeans were really advancing toward integration and would

be able to engage in mutual aid and self-help to a

significant degree before the U.S. was asked to take on new

commitments. And in deference to some of his

internationalist colleagues the senator also wanted a closer

linkage between any American security guarantee to Europe and

the UN Charter. 69

On 22 April Vandenberg's concerns were incorporated

into a revision of NSC 9 by the Policy Planning Staff. NSC

9/1 still envisaged a presidential invitation to the Western

Union countries, Canada, Italy, Portugal, Norway, Sweden,

Denmark, Iceland, and Ireland to join the U.S. in talks with

a view to the conclusion of a collective defense agreement

for the North Atlantic area. But the paper now emphasized,

in addition to the caveats added by Hickerson during the

Pentagon talks, that this collective defense agreement would be also designed specifically to strengthen the UN; that it would be based, like the ERP, on "self-help and mutual aid";

and that it would not be presented to the U.S. Senate for ratification until the next session of Congress.7° 126

On 27 April 1948 Lovett and Marshall again met with

Vandenberg, who was joined by his adviser John Foster Dulles.

Apparently Vandenberg and Dulles had developed further

misgivings about the State Department's proposed approach.

The two men now rejected the whole idea of an immediate

presidential invitation to the European countries to join in

talks on an Atlantic defense agreement. Nor should the

president issue any security guarantees to the Europeans

pending the negotiation of such an agreement. Vandenberg and

Dulles were afraid that such presidential declarations would

only dissuade the Europeans from making any real progress on

their own. After lenghty discussions it was finally agreed

that the proposal for an Atlantic defense agreement would be

temporarily shelved. Instead the administration would first

pursue a senate resolution endorsing its support for regional

collective security arrangements. Once the Senate passed

this resolution, the State Department would arrange for the

Western Union countries to ask for consultations with the

U.S. on international security issues. Upon receipt of this

request, President Truman would announce that the United

States was prepared to consider associating itself, on the basis of "self-help and mutual aid," with regional defense

arrangements that affected American national security. This

left the door to eventual U.S. participation in an Atlantic defense agreement open, but it was clear that Vandenberg and

Dulles were no longer convinced of the merits of a U.S. 127

treaty commitment. Lovett, whom Hickerson and Achilles had

converted to their cause during early April, was not happy.7i

Another unhappy man, although for different reasons, was George Kennan. Upon his return to work on 19 April, he was dismayed to find that the PPS, and the department as a whole, had now endorsed the idea of an Atlantic alliance.72

Kennan quickly registered his strong opposition, and received support from the department's Counsellor, Charles Bohlen.

The PPS Director argued that such an alliance would not address Europe's real problems, and might even prove harmful by opening up rifts among various European countries. If there was a need to shore up Europe's defenses then realistic staff talks could deal with that problem much better than a treaty. Although certainly not an admirer of Vandenberg,

Kennan was glad to see that the senator had slowed down the rush to an Atlantic alliance. Reacting to Lovett's agreement with Vandenberg, Kennan stated that the proposed senate resolution was "all right," but urged the secretary not to proceed with further implementation of the program outlined in NSC 9/1.73

The PPS director made good use of the delay provided by Vandenberg's hesitation and by May 7 he succeeded in transforming NSC 9/1. The new version, which on May 11 became NSC 9/2, stated that the U.S. should try to convince the Europeans not to seek "any U.S. commitment more formal than that given in the President's March 17 message and the 128

Senate resolution at least until there has been more time for

the development and practical implementation of the Brussels

Treaty system." NSC 9/2 also included a draft senate

resolution, tailored to the desires of Vandenberg. Kennan was not particularly happy with the need for this resolution,

but he was willing to live with it. 74

The action now shifted to the Senate, where the administration and its congressional allies sought to assure themselves of continued backing for their European policy.

On 11 and 12 May Lovett appeared before Vandenberg's Senate

Foreign Relations Committee to testify, in executive session, on the proposed resolution. In his testimony the under

Secretary assured the senators that the State Department did not envisage at this time the necessity for the U.S. to enter into a regional pact with the E u r o p e a n s . 75 This seemed to indicate that little more than a month after the conclusion of the Pentagon talks the momentum, within the U.S. administration, toward an Atlantic alliance seemed to have disappeared.

Of course the hesitation by Vandenberg and the opposition of Kennan were not the only factors that caused a decline in the administration's enthusiasm for an Atlantic alliance. For one thing, the crisis atmosphere that had dominated Europe in March had etbated somewhat. The Soviet threat to Norway had failed to materialize, and the Italian elections had not brought the Communists to power. 129

Furthermore, the Western Union powers had done very little

since 17 March to create a real security system with which

the U.S. could ally itself. This seemed to lend credence to

the arguments of those, like Vandenberg, who feared that the

Europeans were still unable and/or unwilling to do for

themselves what they hoped the U.S. might do for them. A new

and expanded U.S. security commitment in Europe might only

reinforce this attitude. It was thus not surprising that the

administration was having second thoughts in May about the

suggestions it had made during the Pentagon talks in March.

Yet in spite of this the atlanticists within the State

Department managed to keep the idea of an Atlantic treaty

alive, and succeeded, by early June, in reversing the trend

away from such a commitment.

For one thing, the supporters of an Atlantic treaty

could point to substantial public support for an American

security guarantee to Europe. Public opinion polls indicated

that 56% of respondents supported such a guarantee. This

support rose to 66% if the security agreement could be fitted

under the UN Charter.And some columnists, such as the New

York Times's James Reston, the Alsop brothers, and Newsweek's

Ernest Lindley, came out openly in favor of a North Atlantic p a c t . 77 This evidence of public support reassured the

administration, at least to some degree, that by negotiating

a security guarantee with the Europeans it would not open

itself up to a massive domestic rebuke. But more important 130

than domestic public opinion was the mounting evidence that

continued delay in providing the European countries with a

tangible reassurance of the U.S. commitment to their security might jeopardize progress toward the achievement of the administration's goals in Europe.

On 20 April the Six Power London Conference on Germany reconvened, after having adjourned to allow the Europeans to negotiate the Brussels Pact. The Americans continued to pursue their aim of merging the western occupation zones in

Germany and reviving Germany's economy. But they quickly ran into difficulties with the French over the letter's continuing security concerns.78 By mid-May U.S. Ambassador

Douglas reported to Marshall that the talks were going nowhere and asked for instructions as to what security guarantees he could offer the French. The French were increasingly worried because they felt that the U.S. was

"growing cold" on the problem of European security.7» Unlike the French, the British were aware of the outcome of the

Pentagon talks, but they too were now becoming impatient. On

14 May Bevin wrote to Marshall, explaining the urgent need for a general European security system that included the

United States. Without "some definite acceptance of obligations on the part of the United States," the foreign secretary argued, there would be no solution to the German problem, and, without that, no solution to Europe's problems. so 131

The atlanticists within the department seized upon

this to restart their campaign for an Atlantic pact. George

Butler, who had led the PPS during the absence of Kennan and who had taken part in the Pentagon talks, pointed out that

Bevin's message was really a plea for the urgent opening of

negotiations on an Atlantic pact. He also pointed to recent statements by the Canadian foreign minister that reflected views similar to those of Bevin. Butler argued that NSC 9/2 still left open the possibility of the U.S. joining an

Atlantic pact. He now recommended that the secretary show

Bevin and the Canadians the NSC paper and the Vandenberg resolution as evidence of continued U.S. interest in an

Atlantic treaty.81 Even Kennan now became convinced of the need to move ahead with transatlantic security talks. In a memo to Marshall and Lovett, he argued that Bevin's message and the Canadian statements added an important new element to the European security issue. The United States had to be very careful not to place itself in the position of being an obstacle to further progress toward Western European integration. If this meant beginning negotiations on an

Atlantic security pact, so be it. The important thing was to

"keep the ball rolling and keep up the hopes of the peoples o f E u r o p e . "82

Secretary of State Marshall immediately started to reassure the French about the U.S. commitment to their, and all of Europe's, security. The Vandenberg resolution played 132

an important part in this effort. The Americans now used the

resolution as concrete proof that they were moving toward

associating themselves with the Brussels Pact countries in a

mutual defense arrangement. The United States also assured

the French that it would keep its occupation forces in

Germany until after a formal peace settlement (which in view

of the definitive rupture with the Soviets meant

indefinitely). At the same time the Americans warned the

French that lack in progress on the German issue would negatively affect the confidence of the American people in

Western Europe, auid thus lessen the chances for a formal

security commitment. S3 This combination of assurances and pressure worked and on 31 May 1948 the London conference's

Final Report on the Political Organization of Germany was completed. The French agreed to the Anglo-American proposal for merging the three western occupation zones and reconstituting a (West) German state. The American assurances regarding France's security were included in the

Final Report, which also referred to Truman's declaration of

17 March and the Vandenberg resolution. 84 when Bidault presented the London agreements to the French Parliament, on

June 11, he pointed to the same declaration and resolution as evidence of the "evolution of U.S. policy toward Europe."

The French government was now looking toward the completion of this evolution by the conclusion of a treaty with the

United States along the lines of the Brussels P a c t . 85 Bevin 133

too continued to put pressure on the United States to come

through on its promises in the Truman declaration and

Vandenberg resolution. On 1 June he wrote Marshall that

negotiations on an Atlantic security pact could no longer

wait. 86

Meanwhile the Vandenberg resolution waltzed through

the Senate. The Foreign Relations Committee had approved the

resolution unanimously on 19 May. And on 11 June, the same

day Bidault promised the French parliament an Atlantic

treaty, the Senate passed the Vandenberg resolution by a vote of 64 to 4.87 Twelve days later Secretary Marshall informed

the Canadian and Western Union ambassadors in Washington that the U.S. was ready to begin secret exploratory talks on the nature of America's association with European security arrangements. ss

By mid-1948 the United States was still hesitant about a long-term North Atlantic treaty. This was reflected in

NSC 9/3, which President Truman approved on 2 July. NSC 9/3, drafted in response to the passage of the Vandenberg

Resolution and the subsequent invitation issued to the

Western Union countries, outlined the basic policy of the

Truman Administration with regard to the upcoming Washington security talks. It reemphasized that any formal U.S. treaty commitment had to wait until the Europeans had demonstrated what they could do for themselves through the Brussels Pact machinery, and that in any event nothing requiring 134 congressional action would be possible before January 1949.89

But this seemingly very cautious attitude belied the very substantial progress toward an Atlantic treaty that had already been made at the "pick and shovel" level. After the tripartite Pentagon Talks this progress had stalled, but the atlanticist Pentagon Paper remained as the only solid foundation for further talks with the Europeans. In this context, the approval of NSC 9/3 signalled not only the continued caution in the upper levels of the Truman

Administration, but also the recognition that all major obstacles to further progress along the lines of the Pentagon

Paper had been cleared. 135

1. There is a wealth of studies on the origins of the North Atlantic Treaty. The best scholarly works are John Baylis, The Diplomacy of Pragmatism; Britain and the Formation of NATO. 1942-1949 (Kent, OH, 1993); Ennio Di Nolfo, ed., The Atlantic Pact Forty Years Later; A Historical Reappraisal (New York, 1991); Francis H. Heller and John R. Gillingham, eds., NATO; The Creation of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe (New York, 1993); Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Westport, CT, 1981); Lawrence S. Kaplan, A Community of Interests: NATO and the Military Assistance Program. 1948-1951 (Washington, DC, 1980); idem, NATO and the United States; The Enduring Alliance (Boston, 1988); idem. The United States and NATO; The Formative Years (Lexington, KY, 1984); Olav Riste, ed., Western Security; The Formative Years; European and Atlantic Defence. 1947-1953 (New York, 1985); and Joseph Smith, ed., The Origins of NATO (Exeter, England, 1990). Also important are several works by participants in the original NATO negotiations; Theodore C. Achilles, "Fingerprints on History"; The NATO Memoirs of Theodore C. Achilles, edited by Lawrence S. Kaplan and Sidney R. Snyder (Kent, OH, 1992); Nicholas Henderson, The Birth of NATO (London, 1982); and Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope; The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty. 1947-1949 (Toronto, 1977).

2. Hogan, The Marshall Plan. 54-87.

3. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. 160-64.

4. This was a reaction to press rumors to the effect that the Dunkirk Treaty then being negotiated between France and Great Britain would be supplemented with an American security guarantee. Paul T. Culbertson (Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs) to H. Freeman Matthews (Director of the Office of European Affairs), 12 February 1947, RG 59, Box 3295, 711.40/2-1247.

5. Policy Planning Staff Paper 4; "Certain Aspects of the European Recovery Problem from the United States Standpoint" in Anna Kasten Nelson, ed., Policy Planning Staff Papers (New York, 1983), 28-68.

6. See for example the comments of Secretary of State George Marshall and CMP President Robert Patterson, in U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, European Recovery Program. Hearings. 80th Cong., 2nd sess., 6-7, 757.

7. Coudenhove-Kalergi to Marshall, 15 January 1948, with enclosed paper and attached note by Bohlen, 19 January 1948, RG 59, Box 5643, 840.00/1-1548; Coudenhove-Kalergi to Bohlen, 136

16 February 1948, with enclosed letter to Marshall, 16 January 1948, and attached memo from Hickerson to Marshall, 24 February 1948, ibid., 840.00/2-1648. See also Kaplan, The United States and NATO. 53-58.

8. Kaplan, The United States and NATO. 56.

9. Ibid., 57-58.

10. Ibid., 56-58.

11. Tristram Coffin, Senator Fulbrioht; Portrait of a Public Philosopher (New York, 1966), 95-96; and Haynes Johnson and Bernard M. Gwertzman, Fulbrioht; The Dissenter (Garden City, NY, 1968), 102-5.

12. Kaplan, The United States and NATO. 54.

13. Harrison (U.S. ambassador in Bern) to secretary of state, 25 July 1947, RG 59, 840.00/7-2547.

14. Hickerson to Bohlen, 19 April 1948, RG 59, Box 5652, 840.0014/4-1948; Lovett to Douglas, 21 April 1948, RG 59, Box 5649, 840.00/4-2148.

15. Hogan, The Marshall Plan. 81-87; Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance. 48-55;

16. Resume of World Situation, 6 November 1947, RG 59, Special Lot Files, Records of Charles Bohlen, 1942-1952, Box 7, File "Miscellaneous I."

17. Jean-Pierre Roux, The Fourth Republic. 1944-1958. trans. Godfrey Rogers (Cambridge, 1987), 126-30.

18. For the preparations for the London conference, see FRUS. 1947. vol.2, 676-726.

19. U.S. delegation at the CFM to Truman, 15 December 1947, FRUS. 1947. vol.2, 770-72.

20. Memorandum of conversation between Marshall and Bidault, 17 December 1947, FRUS. 1947. vol. 2, 813-15; British memorandum of conversation, undated, ibid., 815-22; British memorandum of conversation, undated, ibid., 822-27; memorandum by Robert Murphy (political adviser for Germany), 18 December 1947, ibid., 827-29.

21. British memorandum of conversation, undated, ibid., 815- 16. Kaplan, The United States and NATO. 50. 137

22. Lester B. Pearson, Mike; The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson vol. 2 (Toronto, 1973), 39-41; Reid, Time of Fear and Hope. 31-35.

23. New York Times Magazine. 14 September 1947.

24. Reid, Time of Fear and Hope. 34.

25. Oral History Interview with John D. Hickerson, by Richard D. McKinzie, 10 November 1972, 26 January and 5 June 1973, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO, 53-55.

26. Bohlen to Marshall, with enclosed speech, 10 December 1947, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of Charles Bohlen, 1942-1952, Box 7, File "Miscellaneous II."

27. Hickerson interview, 55.

28. FRUS. 1948. vol.3, 2n.

29. Kennan to Marshall, 6 January 1948, RG 59, Special Lot File 64D563, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Box 27, File "Europe, 1947-1948." Reid, Time of Fear and Hope. 37.

30. Achilles, "Fingerprints on History". 11-12.

31. Ibid., 5-6; oral history interview with Theodore C. Achilles, by Richard D. McKinzie, 13 November and 18 December 1972, Harry S. Truman Library, 7-13.

32. Inverchapel to Marshall, with enclosed memorandum, 13 January 1948, RG 59, Box 5643, 840.00/1-1348. Bevin sent a similar memorandum to the Canadian government on 14 January, see Reid, Time of Fear and Hope. 38. For Bevin's consultations with the British ceibinet see Baylis, The Diplomacy of Pragmatism. 66-67, and Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretarv. 1945-1951 (London, 1983), 516-17. For Bevin's talks with Bidault, see Waldemar J. Gallman (American Charge in London) to Secretary of State, 22 December 1947, FRUS. 1948 vol.3, 1-2.

33. Hickerson to Marshall, 19 January 1948, RG 59, Box 5643, 840.00/1-1948. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance was signed in Rio de Janeiro on 2 September 1947, and ratified by the U.S. Senate on 8 December 1947. Achilles also saw the Rio Treaty as a good example, see Achilles memorandum, 20 January 1948, RG 59, Box 5649, 840.00/1-2048.

34. Kennan to Marshall, 20 January 1948, RG 59, Box 5643, 840.00/1-2048. See also Kennan's earlier memo to Marshall 138

regarding the priority of economic recovery over military security, 6 January 1948, RG 59, Special Lot File 64D563, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Box 27, File "Europe, 1947-48."

35. Memorandum of conversation between Marshall and Inverchapel, 19 January 1948, ibid.; Marshall to Inverchapel, 20 January 1948, RG 59, Box 5643, 840.00/1-2048.

36. Memorandum of conversation between Hickerson and Inverchapel, 21 January 1948, RG 59, Box 5643, 840.00/1-2148.

37. Margaret Carlyle, ed. Documents on International Affairs. 1947-1948 (London, 1952), 201-21. See also Baylis, The Diplomacy of Pragmatism. 67, and Bullock, Ernest Bevin. 518- 20. The Senate hearings on the ERP began on 8 January 1948 and ran through 5 February, see U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings. European Recovery Program. 80th Cong., 2nd sess., 1948.

38. Time found that Bevin's proposal "fitted snugly into the Marshall Plan," cind speculated that its announcement was timed to help the administration get the ERP through the difficult senate hearings, see Time. 2 February 1948, 10. See also Baylis, The Diplomacy of Pragmatism. 67; Bullock, Ernest Bevin. 520-22; and Henderson, The Birth of NATO. 6-7.

39. Memorandum of conversation between Lovett and Inverchapel, 27 January 1948, RG 59, Box 5643, 840.00/1-2748; Lovett to Inverchapel, 2 February 1948, ibid., 840.00/2-248.

40. Inverchapel to Lovett, 6 February 1948, RG 59, Box 5643, 840.00/2-648; memorandum of conversation between Lovett and Inverchapel, 7 February 1948, ibid., 840.00/2-748.

41. Gallman to Secretary of State, 6 February 1948, ibid., 840.00/2-648.

42. Hugh Millard (U.S. charge in Brussels) to Secretary of State, 7 February 1948, ibid., 840.00/2-748; Millard to Secretary of State, 9 February 1948, ibid., 840.00/2-948; Millard to Secretary of State, 13 February 1948, ibid., 840.00/2-1348; memorandum of conversation between Achilles and Armand Berard (French minister in Washington), 13 February 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol.2, 63-65.

43. For documentation on the London conference, see FRUS. 1948. vol.2, 75-145. The U.S., which was represented at these talks by its ambassador in London, supported the participation of the Benelux countries in the London conference, at least in part because they shared the U.S. 139

view both on the reintegration of western Germany into Western Europe and on the nature of a Western European security pact. See Marshall to Lewis Douglas (U.S. ambassador in London), 16 February 1948, RG 59, Box 5643, 840.00/2-1648.

44. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance. 67-68.

45. Marshall to Millard, 10 February 1948, RG 59, Box 5643, 840.00/2-948; Millard to secretary of state, 19 February 1948, ibid., 840.00/2-1948; Jefferson Caffery (U.S. ambassador in Paris) to secretary of state, 19 February 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol.3, 26-29; Herman Baruch (U.S. ambassador in the Hague) to secretary of state, 21 February 1948, RG 59, Box 5643, 840.00/2-2148; and Millard to secretary of state, 24 February 1948, ibid., 840.00/2-2448.

46. Marshall to Caffery, 19 February 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol.2, 70-71.

47. Baylis, The Diplomacy of Pragmatism. 71; Henderson, The Birth of NATO. 10-11; Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance. 68-70; Kaplan, The United States and NATO. 61-62.

48. Douglas to secretary of state, 1 March 1948, RG 59, Box 5643, 840.00/3-148; Caffery to secretary of state, 2 March 1948, ibid., 840.00/3-248; Douglas to secretary of state, 3 March 1948, ibid., 840.00/3-348; Caffery to secretary of state, 4 March 1948, ibid., 840.00/3-448; Douglas to secretary of state, 5 March 1948, ibid., 840.00/3-548.

49. For the text of the Brussels Pact, see Kaplan, The United States and NATO. 222-25.

50. Douglas to secretary of state, 26 February 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol.3, 32-33. For Bidault's message, see Kaplan, The United States and NATO. 62.

51. Marshall to Caffery, 27 February 1948, RG 59, Box 5643, 840.00/2-2248.

52. Charles Bay (U.S. ambassador in Oslo) to secretary of state, 11 March 1948, FRUS. 1948, vol.3, 44-45; Henderson, The Birth of NATO. 11.

53. Baylis, The Diolomacv of Pragmatism. 71; Bullock, Ernest Bevin, 528; Kaplan, The United States and NATO. 62-63.

54. Inverchapel to Marshall, 11 March 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol.3, 46-48. 140

55. Reid, Time of Fear and Hope. 42-43.

56. Memorandum from Marshall to Truman, 12 March 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol.3, 49-50; Marshall to Inverchapel, 12 March 1948, ibid., 48.

57. Marshall to Caffery, 12 March 1948, ibid., 50.

58. U.S. Department of State, Bulletin. 28 March 1948, 418.

59. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance. 80-82; George F. Kennan, Memoirs. 1925-1950 (Boston, 1967), 399-404.

60. Summary of the 135th meeting of the PPS, with attached draft paper, 16 March 1948, RG 59, Special Lot File 64D563, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Box 32, File "minutes of meetings, 1947-1948." See also memorandum from Hickerson to Marshall, 8 March 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol.3, 40- 42.

61. Summary of the 136th meeting of the PPS, with attached draft paper, 17 March 1948, RG 59, Special Lot File 64D563, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Box 32, File "minutes of meetings, 1947-1948"; summary of the 137th meeting of the PPS, with attached draft paper, 17 March 1948, ibid.; summary of the 140th meeting of the PPS, with attached draft, 19 March 1948, ibid.

62. Report Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff Concerning Western Union and Related Matters, 23 March 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol.3, 61-64.

63. Achilles, "Fingerprints on History". 14-15; Baylis, The Diplomacv of Pragmatism. 92-97; Henderson, The Birth of NATO. 15-18; Reid, Time of Fear and Hope. 70-72; Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman, "The Pentagon negotiations March 1948: the launching of the North Atlantic Treaty," in International Affairs 59 (Summer 1983): 351-63.

64. Minutes of the 1st meeting of the Pentagon talks, 22 March 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol.3, 59-61; minutes of the 2nd meeting of the Pentagon talks, 23 March 1948, ibid., 64-66; minutes of the 3rd meeting of the Pentagon talks, 24 March 1948, ibid., 66-67.

65. Minutes of the 4th meeting of the Pentagon talks, 29 March 1948, ibid., 69-70; minutes of the 5th meeting of the Pentagon talks, 31 March 1948, ibid., 70-71.

66. Minutes of the 6th meeting of the Pentagon talks, 1 April 1948, ibid., 71-75. 141

67. Butler to Lovett, 6 April 1948, RG 59, Box 5643, 840.00/4- 648; PPS 27/1, 6 April 1948, RG 59, Special Lot File 64D563, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Box 27, File "Europe, 1947-1948"; Report by the Executive Secretary of the NSC to the Council, 13 April 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol.3, 85-88.

68. Kaplan, The United States and NATO. 70.

69. Memorandum of conversation between Lovett and Vandenberg, 11 April 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol.3, 82-84; memorandum of conversation between Lovett and Vandenberg, 18 April 1948, ibid., 92-96.

70. Kennan to Sidney Souers (executive secretary of the NSC), 23 April 1948, ibid., 100-3.

71. Memorandum of conversation by Lovett, 27 April 1948, ibid., 104-8. See also memorandum of conversation by John Foster Dulles, 27 April 1948, John Foster Dulles Pappers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton, NJ, Box 37, File "Marshall, George, 1948."

72. Kennan, Memoirs. 404-6.

73. Kennan to Marshall and Lovett, 29 April 1948, RG 59, Special Lot File 64D563, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Box, 27, File "Europe, 1947-1948."

74. Kennan to Lovett, 7 May, with enclosed draft paper, RG 59, Special Lot File 64D563, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Box 33, File "Chronological, Jan.-May 1948"; Kennan to Lovett and Marshall, 7 May 1948, ibid.

75. U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations Committee. The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., 1948. Historical Series, 3-12.

76. Jones to Bohlen, 13 April 1948, RG 59, Box 5643, 840.00/4- 1348.

77. Newsweek. 10 May 1948, 27.

78. For documentation on the London conference, see FRUS. 1948. vol.2, 191-317.

79. Douglas to secretary of state, 10 May 1948, ibid., 230- 31; Douglas to secretary of state, 10 May 1948, ibid., 231- 32; Douglas to secretary of state, 11 May 1948, ibid., 232; Douglas to secretary of state, 11 May 1948, ibid., 233. 142

80. Inverchapel to Marshall, 14 May 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol.3, 122-23.

81. Butler to Kennan, 21 May 1948, RG 59, Special Lot File 64D563, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Box 27, File "Europe, 1947-1948."

82. Kennan to Lovett and Marshall, 24 May 1948, ibid.. Box 33, File "Chronological, Jan.-May 1948."

83. Marshall to Caffery, 25 May 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol.2, 276- 77; Caffery to Jean Chauve1 (secretary-general of the French foreign ministery), 25 May 1948, ibid., 278-79.

84. Paper agreed upon by the London Conference on Germany, 31 May 1948, ibid., 305-8; Douglas to secretary of state, 1 June 1948, ibid., 308-9; report of the London Conference on Germany, 1 June 1948, ibid., 309-12.

85. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance. 99.

86. Bevin to Marshall, 1 June 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol.3, 138- 39.

87. Time. 21 June 1948, 17.

88. Marshall to Caffery, 23 June 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol.3, 139.

89. Report by the National Security Council, FRUS. 1948. vol. 3, 140-41. CHAPTER IV

LAYING THE CORNERSTONE: THE GENESIS OF THE NORTH

ATLANTIC TREATY, JULY 1948-JULY 1949

Under continued pressure from the Europeans, facing a renewed Soviet challenge in the form of the Berlin blockade, and with the Vandenberg Resolution, as well as the ERF appropriations, safely under its belt the Truman

Administration could no longer avoid the wide-ranging security talks it had promised to Bidault and Bevin.i On 23

June 1948, Marshall notified the British, Canadian, French, and Benelux governments that the U.S. was now ready to begin secret exploratory talks with them regarding European security matters. Marshall's note listed as one of the topics for discussion the nature of the U.S. association with

European security arrangements.2 As Hickerson explained to the British and Canadian ambassadors in Washington, this noncommittal language reflected the continued division among top-level state department officials about the expediency of a North Atlantic treaty.3 This division would continue to surface throughout the various stages of the Washington talks

143 144

and the eventual negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty.

In spite of this deep split among the senior officers

of the State Department, the atlanticists among them

succeeded in regaining the initiative during the summer of

1948. They steered the U.S. administration and its European

partners back toward the North Atlantic security system

envisaged in the Pentagon Paper. And during the arduous

negotiations about the nature of this new North Atlantic

treaty they consciously laid the foundations for turning the

treaty into something more than a military alliance.

The Washington Exploratory Talks on Security opened on

6 July 1948. Although these meetings were theoretically top

secret, the U.S. negotiators realized that it would be

impossible to keep what promised to be a protracted series of meetings out of the press. They therefore abandoned the cloak-and-dagger atmosphere of the Pentagon talks and allowed the Washington security talks to be well-publicized in the press. At the same time the State Department took great care to present these talks as nothing more than an exchange of views regarding the best way to implement the Vandenberg

Resolution. And Lovett, who headed the American delegation at the Washington talks, impressed on all participants the need for absolute secrecy regarding the details of the proposals that would be discussed. Any premature leak of detailed proposals might lead to them being irrevocably shot 145

down in the heat of the upcoming U.S. election.4 In spite of

the overwhelming bipartisan support for the Vandenberg

Resolution, Lovett was clearly still very nervous about a

domestic backlash against far-reaching U.S. commitments and

this concern determined his whole approach to the Washington

talks.

In addition to Lovett, the American delegation at the

Washington talks included Bohlen, Kennan, Hickerson, Butler, and Achilles. The delegations of the other participating countries were headed by their respective ambassadors in

Washington. The sole exception was the Canadian delegation.

Among the governments represented in Washington the Canadian was without a doubt the most atlanticist. The then Canadian

Undersecretary for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, was a passionate advocate of a broad North Atlantic treaty, as well as a personal friend of Hickerson. He personally came down to Washington to help push the U.S. in the right direction.5

It quickly became clear that the U.S. still needed a lot of pushing. Throughout the first four days of meetings

Lovett and his European counterparts played a game of cat and mouse, trying to draw each other out without committing themselves. The American delegation refused to put forward any proposals and insisted that it was merely interested in hearing what initiatives the Europeans themselves proposed to take. In effect, Lovett wanted to follow the ERP example.

Just as the Europeans had developed their own framework (the 146

CEEC) within which they would integrate and rehabilitate their economies, they should now ccrnie up with a similar

framework to meet their security needs. In this context the

Under Secretary pressed the Europeans to outline how they intended to develop and broaden the Western Union, which he clearly saw as the counterpart of the CEEC in the security field. Once the Western Union had developed a concrete and comprehensive European security plan, the U.S., as it had done in the case of the ERP, would, in consultation with the

Europeans, develop ways to assist in the implementation of this plan. One such way might be a military assistance program based, again like the ERP, on the principles of self- help and mutual aid. Again though, the initiative had to come from the Europeans.6

The European ambassadors were very disappointed by

Lovett's approach. They argued that the issue of European security was fundamentally different from that of economic recovery. First of all, it would be much more difficult to unite all of Western Europe within a common security system like the Western Union, with its far-reaching political implications. Furthermore, many European countries would see no benefit in joining a security system that did not include the U.S. as a full partner. Especially the French emphasized that, in order to be credible and effective, a European security arrangement had to include a clear and irrevocable

American commitment to come to the defense of Western Europe 147

in case of an outside attack. Thus, while the American

delegation sought to treat European security as primarily a

problem for the Europeans themselves, the Western Union

countries argued that a strong and explicit U.S. coomitment

was of paramount importance.?

What was in effect being played out in these

ambassadorial meetings was the emerging conflict between two different visions of Europe's long-term future. Kennan,

supported by Bohlen, argued repeatedly the need to look beyond short-term European security concerns toward a politically united, economically integrated, and militarily independent Europe. Any pact that bound the U.S. and Western

Europe together in the security field would inevitably be an obstacle to the development of such an independent Europe.

Kennan's most eloquent and forceful opponents in this regard were the British Ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks, who was the first to introduce the Atlantic Community concept into the discussions, and especially the Canadian Undersecretary

Pearson. Pearson was all for looking beyond the short term toward the future. But for the Canadian the future lay not in a self-contained Europe but in a wider Atlantic Community.

What lay beyond the immediate European security concerns was a far-reaching Atlantic treaty that envisaged not just military cooperation but also broad transatlantic political, economic, and cultural integration.s in these talks Pearson articulated what would, during 1949 and 1950, become the 148

atlanticist position within the State Department: Atlantic

integration should receive the same priority given to

European integration, and a united Europe should not become a

self-sufficient "third power" but rather be a part of a wider

Atlantic Community.

As yet few of the participants in the Washington talks

shared Pearson's expansive view of what a North Atlantic treaty should aim for. But all of the European ambassadors rejected Kennan's narrow European approach and insisted that the issue of Europe's security had to be dealt with in a transatlantic framework. And it was clear that Kennan's views were also increasingly contested within the U.S. delegation. The PPS director still argued what had been the position of the State Department, and of the Truman

Administration as a whole, during 1947. It was Hickerson who now articulated what would become, during 1948 and 1949, the department's new position. Hickerson argued that further

European integration and the development of a wider Atlantic

Community could be complementary, rather than contradictory policies. A North Atlantic mutual security pact would provide the necessary umbrella under which European political and economic integration could develop. At the same time, the continuing European integration process would reassure the Americans that the Atlantic pact would not turn into a permanent dependency relationship in which the U.S. would become responsible for Europe's defense.9 Hickerson's 149

atlanticism was clearly still more cautious than Pearson's vision. The American, more than the Canadian, still felt the

need to placate the latent isolationism and resentment over

European aid programs that was present in the U.S. Congress.

Nevertheless, Hickerson's views were a clear departure from those Kennan, and the department as a whole, had preached in

1947. And acceptance of the North Atlantic security system that Hickerson proposed did imply, as Kennan rightly feared, the abandonment, at least in the short term, of the goal of a self-sufficient, independent Europe.

Lovett, who became increasingly taciturn as the meetings went on, continued to sit on the fence, committing himself to neither Kennan's nor Hickerson's views. Instead the under secretary patiently listened to the other participants and continued to remind his European counterparts that no major new American initiatives were possible in advance of the presidential election. After five protracted meetings the ambassadors' group failed to reach any conclusions. On 9 July they adjourned the talks and designated a working group to work out a detailed proposal for a security system that would be acceptable to all participants in the Washington talks.

The working group which continued the Washington talks between 12 July and 9 September 1948 consisted of second-tier embassy officers from the Western Union countries and Canada and an American delegation that included Bohlen, Kennan, 150

Hickerson, Achilles, and a few lower-ranking officers from

the State Department's Division of Western European Affairs.

Bohlen and Kennan attended the meetings of the working group

only infrequently, however, and the real day-to-day

leadership of the U.S. delegation therefore lay in the hands

of the atlanticist-inclined Hickerson.n

The working group met virtually every working day throughout the hot Washington summer. Most of its members were on a first-name basis and most meetings were informal, with no written records kept. It was in these meetings,

Achilles recalled several decades later with undisguised nostalgia, that the "NATO spirit" was born. Hickerson was clearly the driving force behind the working group's progress. He immediately dropped the cautious attitude adopted by Lovett at the ambassadors' meetings and started steering the working group toward the ideas embodied in the

Pentagon Paper. Of course he had to do so carefully since most of his counterparts were unaware of the earlier tripartite Pentagon talks. In addition he still had to contend with the opposition of Kennan and Bohlen. 12

During the summer the position of those within the

State Department who favored an Atlantic pact was strengthened by the support they received from Europe. In mid-July the foreign ministers of the Western Union met in the Hague. They not only discussed the further development of their own defense organization, but also decided to 151 coordinate their efforts to convince the Americans of the need for a clear and irrevocable U.S. commitment to Western

Europe's security. 13 But more important was that more and more U.S. diplomats in the Western Union capitals began to argue in favor of such a transatlantic security commitment.

W. Averell Harriman, the U.S. Special Representative in

Europe of the Economic Cooperation Administration (the independent agency charged with administering the ERP) argued that the implementation of the ERP alone would no longer suffice to restore Europe's will to resist Soviet aggression.

What was needed was a clear assurance to the Europeans that the U.S. considered their security as its own, as well as a substantial military assistance program. Most importantly,

Harriman pleaded with the State Department not to delay progress on these matters until after the elections, by which time, he argued, it might be too late.i* This was of course precisely Hickerson's position: that the economic and political rehabilitation of Europe and the creation of a wider Atlantic security framework were complementary and mutually reinforcing policies. The continued pressure from

Europe strengthened Hickerson's position and effectively undercut Kennan's and Bohlen's opposition.

Hickerson, and his supporters like Achilles, not only had to convince the skeptics within their own department of the need for an Atlantic security pact. They also faced considerable obstacles in convincing their European 152

counterparts in the working group to accept a broad North

Atlantic treaty, along the lines of the Pentagon Paper.

Since Kennan and Bohlen rarely participated in the meetings

of the working group, Hickerson was able to quickly establish

a consensus on the need for a transatlantic security pact.

His willingness to concede up-front that a clear U.S.

security guarantee was needed, which stood in sharp contrast

with Lovett's noncommittal and hesitant attitude, won him the

confidence of his European counterparts. is But the

representatives of the continental Western Union countries,

especially the French, clashed with Hickerson on two major

issues : the membership of the new pact and the nature of the

security commitment that would be embodied in it. These

issues had of course already been hashed out during the

Pentagon talks, but since the French and the Benelux

representatives were still in the dark about those meetings

these battles had to be fought all over again.

Hickerson, in line with the conclusions of the

Pentagon Paper argued that, to be effective, any Atlantic

security pact had to include the "stepping-stone" countries :

Iceland, Norway, Denmark (including Greenland), and Portugal

(including the Azores). They would provide the essential

geographic link between the North American partners (the U.S.

and Canada) and the Western Union countries. In addition to

these geostrategically important countries Hickerson also wanted to include Italy. Geographically Italy was of course 153

not a North Atlantic country, but its security, Hickerson

argued, was vital to all members of the Atlantic Community.

Moreover, politically and culturally Italy belonged to the

Western world, and to leave it out of the Atlantic security

system might undermine Italy's democratic forces. To round

out the Atlantic Community Hickerson also wanted to invite

Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland, if they wanted to join.

Most controversially, Hickerson proposed that later on, when political conditions permitted, Spain, West Germany, and

Austria should also be invited to adhere to the new North

Atlantic pact, is

The British and Canadians already shared the American concern about the need to include the stepping-stone countries in any transatlantic security system. And although they expressed reservations about the wisom of including

Italy in an Atlantic pact they were broadly supportive of

Hickerson's position. But the French, in particular, objected strongly to the incorporation of new partners. To them the whole point of the current talks was not to create a comprehensive Atlantic Community but to secure an ironclad security guarantee, as well as an extensive military aid program, from the U.S. to the Western Union countries.

Taking on new partners at this point, they feared, would mean that part of the U.S. military aid would be diverted away from the Western Union (and thus from them). The Benelux representatives largely shared France's concerns about 154

spreading U.S. aid among a wider group of nations, but were

more willing than the French to accept the Americans'

geostrategic rationale for including the stepping-stone

countries. After a few meetings the French, sensing that

they were isolated, agreed to compromise on this issue. On

28 July the working group reached a consensus on the membership of a future pact along the lines of the original

American proposal. i?

Much more difficult were the negotiations concerning the precise nature and scope of the new North Atlantic treaty. On 9 August the American delegates circulated a draft of the kind of treaty they had in mind. It contained

11 articles, most of which were drawn from the Rio Treaty.

The core of the proposed treaty was article 5 (a slightly modified version of article 3 of the Rio Treaty), which

Achilles referred to as the "'go to war' article." As drafted by Hickerson, article 5 declared that all parties to the treaty would consider an attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America as an attack against all, and that each party would "assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right ... recognized by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter."is The problem with this article was, of course, that it did not explicitely commit any of the parties to go to war.

The Europeans clamored for a stronger commitment and proposed that the article follow the lines of the 155

corresponding article in the Brussels Treaty which committed

its signatories to give the attacked party "all the military

and other aid and assistance in their power." The American

delegation argued against this on the grounds that Congress would read it as an usurpation of its war-making power and

therefore reject the treaty. Bohlen in particular, undoubtedly influenced by his own skeptical attitude toward the idea of a North Atlantic treaty, felt that the talks had already moved ahead of what Congressional opinion would support. Any concession to the Europeans on the nature of the security guarantee, he argued, would doom the whole treaty. Hickerson, however, in close consultation with his

Canadian and British counterparts, did come up with a compromise. He basically adopted the Brussels Treaty clause, but qualified it by adding that each party would render assistance to the attacked party "in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Hickerson's compromise was acceptable to everyone except the French. Several days of negotiation within the

Working Group failed to sway the French delegation. The

French representative was clearly under strict instructions not to accept a pact that did not include an ironclad guarantee that the U.S. would go to war if any Western Union country was attacked.20 An attempt to resolve this issue at an informal meeting of the Western Union ambassadors with

Under Secretary Lovett failed. Not only did the French 156

ambassador refuse to compromise on the French demand for an

automatic security guarantee. He also renewed the earlier

pressure for the immediate dispatch of U.S. military aid to

Europe and tied this issue directly to the Atlantic Pact

negotiations. In effect, the French ambassador told the

Americans that his country would not accept an Atlantic

treaty that did not include both an automatic security

guarantee and a military aid p r o g r a m . 21

The French attitude outraged both Marshall and Lovett and threatened to disrupt the smooth progress Hickerson had fostered during the summer. It was clear that this impasse could only be resolved in Paris. On 24 August Hickerson sent instructions to the U.S. ambassador in Paris to take this issue up with the French foreign ministry. In a coordinated effort the Canadian and British governments made a similar demarche.22 The opening line of Hickerson's note reflected his frustration: "The French are in our hair." He instructed the ambassador to do "some very plain speaking" to the French foreign minister and to remind him that it was France, not the U.S., which had been clamoring for a security arrangement for years. The French were thus in no position to make demands, and if they didn't like the treaty being developed in the working group they could pull out at any time and take care of themselves. Having wielded the stick, Hickerson also held out a carrot. The treaty emerging from the working group would not contain the rigid commitments insisted on by 157 the French, and which would in any event be rejected by the

U.S. Senate. But it would be a historic change in U.S. foreign policy and would irrevocably tie Europe's security to that of the U.S. Equally important, it would lay the basis, not only for a military assistance program, but for the development of common agencies and coordinated defense plans.

In this context Hickerson instructed the U.S. ambassador to refer the French, informally, to the lengthy message sent to them (and to Hickerson himself) by Pearson. Pearson argued that the North Atlantic Treaty would lay the basis for establishing "a semi-constitutional structure of the North

Atlantic powers." This structure would allow countries like

France to have an input in the development of U.S. policy in the North Atlantic area. Thus France would be able to continue playing an active role in world politics, something which otherwise would be reserved only for the two superpowers . 23 This combination of threats and promises worked. The French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, agreed to send new instructions to his embassy in Washington, thus allowing the Washington talks to p r o c e e d .24

With French obstructions removed, it looked as though the working group would be able to agree swiftly on a final draft paper that it could submit to the ambassadors. But just as the controversy with the French died down, the long- simmering conflict between Hickerson and Kennan flared up again. Suddenly Kennan began arguing within the working 158 group for restricting the North Atlantic treaty to essentially a mutual security gueirantee between the U.S. and

Canada on the one hand and the Western Union countries on the other h a n d . 25 This was what the Europeans, especially the

French, had argued for in July. Hickerson had overcome this with some difficulty and now felt his position undercut by

Kenneui. According to a British participant, Hickerson "cast at Kennan a look usually reserved for those who at football kick a goal against their own s i d e . "26 The two men failed to resolve their differences and took the issue to L o v e t t . 27

The outcome was a compromise that favored Hickerson's approach. Kennan's concerns were duly noted, but the final draft paper that the working group presented to the ambassadors' group on 2 September in essence endorsed the kind of broad-based North Atlantic security pact that

Hickerson had advocated all along. The paper, which quickly became known as the Washington Paper, did allow for the possibility of two different categories of membership in the pact; one for the seven countries represented at the

Washington talks; and a second, associate membership for other North Atlantic and European countries. But at the same time it also left open the option that those countries, if they were ready to accept the necessary responsibilities, might join the pact as full members. The proposed articles of the pact included in the paper also largely followed

Hickerson's original proposals.28 159

Lovett and the ambassadors examined the Washington

Paper at two meetings, on 3 and 10 September 1948. These

meetings, in sharp contrast to the earlier ones, were brief

and smooth. Hickerson's long and arduous effort in the

working group had finally born fruit, and the program he had

worked for since the Pentagon meetings was now deemed

acceptable by all the participants in the Washington talks.29

This did not mean that all opposition ceased. In between the

ambassadors' meetings Kennan launched another attack and

again suggested that the treaty be turned into a bilateral

guarantee between the U.S. and Canada (acting as one group)

and the Western Union countries (also acting as a group). An

Atlantic pact to which individual countries could adhere would, he feared, inevitably derail the European integration

process the U.S. had been fostering since 1947.30 But

Kennan's advice was rejected and on 10 September Lovett and

the ambassadors decided to submit the Washington Paper to

their governments as it stood. 3i

With the elections, and the widely expected change in

administration, now less than two months away the Americans

sat back and waited for the response from their European and

Canadian partners. The Canadian government, which had always been the most supportive of a North Atlantic treaty and in which the ardently atlanticist Pearson had now succeeded St.

Laurent as Secretary of State for External Affairs, was the

first to respond. In mid-October it informed the U.S. and 160

the other 5 partners that it was ready to enter into a pact

along the lines of the Washington Paper.32 The Europeans, for

their part, worked out a common response at a meeting of the

Consultative Council of the Western Union in late October.33

On 29 October they informed the Americans that they too were

ready to negotiate a treaty based on the Washington Paper. 34

Four days later Harry Truman, in one of the greatest upsets

in American electoral history, was re-elected as president.

Shortly thereafter the National Security Council reviewed the state of negotiations and President Truman directed the State

Department to proceed with further talks with the Western

Union countries and Canada. 35

Further talks, however, had to wait until the Western

Union countries had prepared detailed directives for their

Washington representatives. These directives did not arrive in Washington until the end of November and the ambassadors' meetings therefore did not resume until early December. In the meantime the U.S, and Great Britain jointly approached

Denmark, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden to consult with them about their attitude toward a North Atlantic security pact.

It quickly became clear that both Denmark and Norway were eager to join such a pact as full members. It was equally obvious that Sweden would not join the pact in any form for fear that this would lead to drastic Soviet countermeasures, especially in Finland. Instead, Sweden tried to convince

Denmark and Norway to join it in a neutral Scandinavian bloc. 161

It was partly for fear that Denmark and Norway might follow

Sweden's neutral lead that the U.S. and Great Britain decided

to offer them full membership in the North Atlantic pact,

rather than the secondary associate membership envisaged in

the Washington Paper. To the South, Portugal welcomed the

idea of a North Atlantic pact but as yet remained noncommittal about whether it would j o i n . 36

While the State Department prepared for the upcoming

North Atlantic treaty talks it also reviewed its overall long­ term policy toward Europe. This review was sparked, not just by the prospect of the new transatlantic security relationship, but also by the evolution of the Western

European integration process. In two, almost simultaneous memoranda to Marshall both the U.S. Special Representative in

Europe, Harriman, and the director of the PPS, Kennan, pointed to the fundamental questions that faced the U.S. at the end of 1948. Harriman's November 23 memorandum argued that for the U.S. to be successful in its European policy it had to be clear in its own mind about what kind of Europe it wanted to see develop and about what role it envisaged therein for European organizations like the OEEC, on the one hand, and the North Atlantic pact on the other h a n d . 37

Harriman's questions were really a reflection of what he, and many other U.S. diplomats as well, regarded as British obstruction to the further progress of European integration.

The promotion of European integration, both economically and 162

politically, was an explicit goal of the ERP. And the U.S.

saw Britain as the natural, and indeed the only available

leader in this process. But since mid-1948 the British had

shown themselves increasingly reluctant to strengthen the

framework for European integration. They opposed

strengthening the OEEC, the main vehicle for economic

integration, and tried to water down a French proposal for a

Council of Europe, which would become the forum for political

integration. Exasperated, Secretary Marshall had warned the

British that their negative attitude might influence the upcoming congressional debate on future ERP appropriations.

But if the State Department and the ECA were going to put pressure on the British to move ahead with European integration, the Americans would first have to agree on what kind of integrated Europe they wanted, as well as on what role they would play in that Europe through the new North

Atlantic pact.38

The question of Europe's long-term future was also what Kennan's memorandum of 24 November 1948 and the attached

PPS paper 43, "Considerations Affecting the Conclusion of a

North Atlantic Security Pact," were all about. And the PPS director had a very definite view of what that future should be. U.S. policy should remain directed "toward the eventual peaceful withdrawal of both the United States and the

U.S.S.R. from the heart of Europe, and accordingly toward the encouragement of the growth of a third force which can absorb 163

and take over the territory between the two." The creation

of this independent and self-sufficient Europe, Kennan argued

was what the ERP was all about. If this was to remain the

administration's long-term goal it was vital, Kennan wrote,

to deemphasize the importance of the North Atlantic pact and

to strictly limit its territorial scope to the North Atlantic

area. Otherwise the pact would inevitably expand to include

all of Western Europe, thereby solidifying the division of

the continent and preventing its emergence as an independent

third power. 39

Kennan prefaced PPS 43 with the admission that he

realized "that there will be adverse views in the European

office on this subject."4o And indeed, Hickerson reacted very

strongly to this new challenge to the policy he had been

fostering for a year. In a scathing memo to Marshall's office he poured scorn on PPS 43, which he characterized as

unfit for presentation to the secretary. The North Atlantic

pact should not be deemphasized, Hickerson argued, but recognized as an essential supplement to the Marshall Plan.

As for limiting the territorial scope of the treaty, it was difficult to conceive of a fully effective Western defense

system that did not include Italy. Rather colorfully,

Hickerson asserted thay omitting Italy would be "like a man

going out to dinner in evening clothes minus his trousers, thereby exposing a part of the body which should never be exposed." But what set off Hickerson more than anything else 164

were Kennan's objections to solidifying the East-West

division of Europe and his references to a U.S. withdrawal.

There was a clear and long-term need for the existing East-

West barrier in Europe, and any talk of U.S. withdrawal in

the near future was both ridiculous and d a n g e r o u s . 4i

The outcome of this debate was reflected in the

answers Lovett provided in early December to Harriman's questions. Lovett confirmed that the U.S. long-term goal remained "the progressively closer integration, both economic and political," of Europe. But the under secretary had to admit that the State Department's long-range plans for

European integration were vague, in large part because of the uncertainty and disagreement that still existed surrounding the future of Germany. The U.S. could therefore do little more than encourage the Europeans, and especially the

British, to take whatever steps they themselves could agree to in order to promote European unity. In this context the

U.S. should avoid a premature endorsement of any particular form of European organization. As for the North Atlantic pact, Lovett stated that "it should be considered a supplement to and in no sense a replacement for the efforts toward European unity, which, we feel ... that the European countries should make." The new North Atlantic security system and the OEEC should be parallel, supplementary, but also decidedly separate organizations.42 in effect,

Bickerson's policy, which envisaged Atlantic and European 165 integration as complementary, prevailed.

While the State Department sorted out its European policy, the Western Union countries had reached general agreement on a draft of the North Atlantic treaty (the so- called London Paper) that could be used for discussion with the Americans and Canadians. On 27 November they each sent this draft to their respective representative in Washington, accompanied by their own separate supplementary suggestions.

The Western Union ambassadors in Washington thereupon notified the State Department that they were ready to resume negotiations. 43

The Washington Exploratory Talks resumed with a meeting of the ambassadors on 10 December 1948. Lovett, who again presided, now displayed a resolute attitude that stood in sharp contrast with the caution he had displayed during the summer. With Truman's reelection and the approval of NSC

9/5 the die had now been cast. From the American point of view, Lovett explained, it was now desirable to make as rapid progress with the pact as possible. He thought that the governments should try to finish the treaty by February, so that it could be pushed through Congress before the s u m m e r . 44

With the Americans now fully committed the Washington talks made quick progress. All parties agreed to abandon the earlier idea of two different kinds of membership, and accept only full members in the pact. There was also a consensus that once the seven original parties had drafted a final 166

treaty Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, and Portugal would

be asked to join the pact. The question of Italian membership remained as yet unresolved. As for the treaty

itself, the Americans and Canadians agreed to use the Western

Union draft as a basis for discussion and on 13 December the ambassadors instructed the working group to draw up a treaty that would be acceptable to all parties.45

Under the leadership of Hickerson the working group drafted a 10 article-treaty that was broadly acceptable to all the participants in the Washington talks. The treaty was largely a blend of the Rio and Brussels Treaties and ran along the lines suggested in the earlier Washington Paper.

At the insistence of the Europeans article 5 had been strengthened and now explicitely committed all parties to assist an attacked party by "taking forthwith such military or other action ... as may be necessary." Articles 3 (which emphasized the need for effective self-help and mutual aid) and 6 (which paid obeisance to the UN) were clearly meant to appeal to the sensitivities of the U.S. Senate. Very important to Hickerson and Achilles was article 2, the so- called "general welfare" article. This was the result of a

Canadian initiative. Throughout the negotiations the

Canadians had insisted that the North Atlantic pact had to be more than a purely military alliance and that it should also provide for transatlantic cooperation in the cultural, economic, and social fields. Hickerson and Achilles 167

enthusiastically supported this because, like Pearson, they

felt this would lay the basis for the future development of a

true Atlantic Community. The Europeans were weary of

including these matters in the treaty but the American

atlanticists helped the Canadians push it through. On 24

December Lovett and the ambassadors approved the working

group's draft treaty for submission to their respective

governments. 46

The Canadian and European ambassadors quickly received

the comments of their governments on the 24 December draft

and were ready early in the new year to resume negotiations.

The Americans meanwhile took it upon themselves to keep the

stepping-stone countries i n f o r m e d . 4? when the Washington talks resumed on 14 January all of the participants indicated their government's general approval of the draft treaty.

Secondary issues, such as the duration of the treaty, were quickly resolved in the working group. Iceland, Norway,

Denmark, and Portugal had all responded positively to the

American queries regarding their adherence to the p a c t . 48 And the sticky Italian problem largely resolved itself when the

Italians, in a manner of speaking, crashed the party. On 12

January the Italian ambassador in Washington handed Hickerson a memorandum in which his government formally requested to join the North Atlantic p a c t . 49 This put the Americans on the spot. Most of Western Union countries still opposed Italian membership. But all of the participants in the Washington 168

talks agreed that it was now impossible to turn down the

Italians without seriously undermining the pro-Western Rome

government. By the end of January 1949 then, virtually all outstanding issues were resolved.

The Washington negotiators had thus met the timetable proposed by Lovett in December. But now two American factors slowed down the ultimate completion of the Washington talks.

First there was, during January, the inauguration of the second Truman Administration. This included a change of personnel at the State Department. Both Secretary Marshall and Under Secretary Lovett left. They were replaced by, respectively. Dean G. Acheson and James E. Webb. Acheson took over Lovett's role as chief U.S. representative in the

Washington talks, but several factors prevented him from hitting the ground running. First of all, the new secretary had received relatively little in the way of an advance briefing on the exact nature and state of the work in progress within the department before he assumed his new post. He therefore first had to familiarize himself with the existing state of affairs. Furthermore, he was distracted from the Washington negotiations, first by his own Senate confirmation hearings, and then by a number of urgent crises, like Palestine, that required his immediate attention.so a s a result there was an almost month-long break between the last ambassadors' meeting attended by Lovett and the first such talks, on 8 February, presided over by Acheson.si 169

But the transition at the State Department was only

one factor slowing down the Washington talks. The other, and

by far the most important, was the need to consult

congressional leaders about the draft treaty. Since November

Lovett had kept the leading members of the Senate foreign

relations committee informed about the progress of the

Washington talks.52 But Acheson found that these

consultations had been in very general terms and that

virtually none of the senators, except Vandenberg, had seen

the draft text of the treaty. To carry the negotiations any

further without first securing the agreement of a bipartisan

group of congressional leaders to the draft treaty would be

pointless, the secretary felt.53

In early February Acheson met with Senators Tom

Connally, the Democratic chairman of the Senate foreign

relations committee, and Arthur Vandenberg, the ranking

Republican member, and with a bipartisan group from the House

foreign affairs committee to discuss the draft North Atlantic

treaty. It became immediately clear that the senators, especially Connally, had serious objections to certain parts of the draft treaty. The main sticking point was article 5.

The senators argued that the language of this eirticle implied

an automatic commitment to go to war in case of attack against any party. That, they felt, would never pass the

S e n a t e . 54 when Acheson reported this to the ambassadors on 8

February they were dismayed. After the smooth December and 170

January talks the Europeans had assumed that article 5, which

they regarded as the cornerstone of the treaty, was pretty

much secured. Any weakening of the article at this point,

they felt, would have a very unfortunate effect on public

opinion in Europe. 55

Acheson felt "like a circus performer riding two

horses," using the senators' concerns to force the

ambassadors to compromise, and the ambassadors' worries to

cajole the senators into supporting the draft treaty. This

delicate balancing act was complicated by isolationist

Senator Forrest Donnell (R-MO) who on 14 February touched off

an impromptu debate on the Senate floor by claiming that

Acheson had given the Europeans a secret assurance that the

North Atlantic treaty would contain a "moral commitment" on

the part of the U.S. to go to war. Connally panicked and

immediately disavowed any kind of automatic commitment to

fight and pressed Acheson to change article 5.56 After

consultations with Connally, Vandenberg, Truman, and the

European ambassadors the secretary drafted a compromise which

he presented to the Senate foreign relations committee on 18

February. In the new article 5 the words "action including

the use of armed force" replaced "military or other action."

This minor change proved sufficient to appease all but the

committed isolationists on the Senate foreign relations

committee.57 And after some pro-forma counterproposals, the

Western Union governments also accepted the new text.58 171

It was not only article 5 that caused problems and

delay in February. Article 2, the general welfare article

that the Canadians, with support from Hickerson and Achilles,

had pushed through also came under fire. And in this case

opposition came not just from the Senate, but from Acheson as

well. The new secretary strongly supported the North

Atlantic Treaty. During 1947 Acheson had been one of the

architects of the Truman Administration's policy of

strengthening Europe to forestall its domination by the

Soviets. The North Atlantic Treaty, he now argued, was vital

to the success of that long-term policy. It would provide

the continental European countries, in particular France,

with the American security guarantee they needed to convince

them to proceed with the integration of their economies and

the rehabilitation of Western Germany.sa But Acheson, unlike

the atlanticists within his own department, saw no reason to move beyond the security aspect of the treaty. He had no use

for the Canadian vision of an Atlantic Community and considered article 2, which embodied that vision, as an unnecessary and dangerous diversion from the treaty's true purpose. And when Connally told him that the general welfare clause had to go, Acheson readily agreed, «o

The Canadians, however, immediately intervened to pull

Acheson in the opposite direction. Pearson instructed the

Canadian ambassador in Washington to try to strengthen, rather than weaken article 2. Canadian Prime Minister St. 172

Laurent, who visited Washington in February, pleaded with

Truman and Acheson for a strong commitment in the treaty to the building of a broad Atlantic Community. And the

Canadians also tried to rally support among the Europeans.

The result was a protracted debate at the ambassadors' meeting of 25 February. Most of the European ambassadors now endorsed the Canadian view that the treaty had to be more than a military alliance.62

The secretary was clearly impressed by this all-out

Canadian effort but still insisted on watering down the contested article. The Canadians knew full well, however, that they could count on the support of Hickerson and

Achilles and they went so far as to threaten not to sign the treaty if it didn't include a sufficiently strong article 2.

In the end Hickerson and Achilles, in consultation with the

Canadian ambassador, worked out a compromise, which they foisted on Acheson as he lay in bed, ill with influenza. It eliminated cultural cooperation (which Acheson had found particularly objectionable) but still committed the parties to encourage economic cooperation and to "contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being."63 in spite of his continued misgivings Acheson felt that the article was 173

now sufficiently "defused" and agreed to push it through the

Senate. To the secretary's surprise and relief there were no

real objections when he presented the revised article to the

Senate foreign relations committee on 8 M a r c h . M

All contentious issues were now resolved and on 8

March the final draft of the treaty was sent to the governments represented at the Washington talks.es on the same day Hickerson formally transmitted to the ambassadors of

Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Portugal, and Italy an invitation to participate in the final discussions of the Washington talks and to join the North Atlantic Treaty as one of the original signatories. 66 Three days later the participants in the Washington talks agreed to release the text of the treaty to the press and to hold a grand signing ceremony in

Washington. G7

The State Department released the text of the North

Atlantic Treaty on 18 March, and on the same day Acheson delivered a radio address expounding on "The Meaning of the

North Atlantic Pact."68 This was the opening shot of an all- out public relations campaign by the Truman Administration to build support for the North Atlantic Treaty in advance of the official signing and the opening of Senate hearings. 69 On 2

April the foreign ministers of the Western Union countries,

Canada, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Italy, and Portugal met with Acheson to formally approve the treaty and two days 174

later they participated in a colorful public signing

ceremony. 70

The final hurdle was the U.S. Senate. Public hearings

before the Senate foreign relations committee began on 27

April and lasted through 18 May.^i Thanks to the earlier

consultations with Connally and Vandenberg, and the careful

preparation by both the administration and its friends on the

committee, the hearings went very smoothly. The

administration fielded Acheson, Lovett, Harriman, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, UN ambassador Warren Austin, and

Army Chief of Staff Omar Bradley. Acheson, Lovett, and

Austin were careful to link the treaty with the existing

American Cold War foreign policy and with the United

N a t i o n s . 72 Harriman stressed the treaty's importance in boosting European morale and safeguarding the achievements of the ERP.73 Johnson and Bradley, for their part, emphasized that the treaty would create mutual obligations and pointed to its benefits for U.S. national s e c u r i t y . 74 still fearing an isolationist backlash, the administration consciously minimized the commitments implicit in the treaty. Acheson denied any direct linkage between the treaty and a military assistance program for Europe. And he assured the senators that the treaty would not open the door to a large-scale and permanent U.S. troop commitment in Europe. The secretary thus successfully assuaged the fears of all but the most 175

implaccable foes of the treaty. The foreign relations committee sent the North Atlantic Treaty to the floor of the

Senate in late June and on 21 July 1949 it passed with a

lopsided vote of 82 to 13. President Truman ratified the treaty four days later. 75

Little more than a year after the start of the

Washington talks the atlanticists within the State Department had overcome the doubts and hesitation of both the American administration and Congress. They had seized upon the

Europeans' desire for an American security guarantee to construct a much broader North Atlantic security system. And they had laid the foundations for turning that security system into the cornerstone of an integrated, cohesive

Atlantic Community. Of course that Atlantic Community as yet existed only on paper. In the summer of 1949 the North

Atlantic Treaty had very little in the way of permanent institutions or structures and was still very much an empty shell. Several of the participants in the grandiose 4 April signing ceremony remarked later that the marine corps band had appropiately played two tunes from the Musical "Porgy and

Bess"; "I've Got Plenty of Nothin'" and "It Ain't Necessarily

So. "76 But the signing and ratification of the North Atlantic

Treaty nevertheless marked an important departure in American foreign policy. In spite of the assurances Acheson had given to the Senate foreign relations committee, the treaty clearly 176

did imply a long-term U.S. military commitment to Europe. It

thus defeated the hopes of those American policymakers, like

Kennan, who wanted to encourage the emergence of a fully

independent Europe. It still remained to be seen, however,

what form the Atlantic Community envisaged in the North

Atlantic Treaty would ultimately take, and how the U.S. and

its European partners would get there. Theodore Achilles,

for one, knew what he wanted. After witnessing the Senate vote on 21 July he returned to the State Department to join

Acheson and several others in an impromptu party. After a

few bourbons he took the secretary aside and said "Dean, now that we've got this one wrapped up, let's go after a full

Atlantic federal u n i o n . "7? 177

1. The Senate passed the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, which launched the ERP, on 17 March by a vote of 69 to 17, The House, with a similarly lopsided vote of 329 to 74, followed suit on 31 March, and President Truman signed the bill into law on 3 April. See Ernst H. Van Der Beugel, From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership; European Integration as a Concern of American Foreign Policy. (New York, 1966), 115- 19. See also U.S. Department of State, Bulletin. 11 April 1948. The Soviet representatives withdrew from the quadripartite Berlin Kommendatura on 16 June 1948. On 18 June the Soviets began to stop a large percentage of the overland traffic moving into West Berlin, and a full blockade followed on 24 June. See Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany. (Garden City, NY, 1950), 358-66.

2. Marshall to the embassy in France, 23 June 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol. 3, 139.

3. Henderson, The Birth of NATO. 32-34.

4. Minutes of the first meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 6 July 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol. 3, 148-51; Richard D. McKinzie, oral history interview with John D. Hickerson, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO, 70-72. See also the press release issued on 6 July, in U.S. Department of State, Bulletin. 18 July 1948.

5. Minutes of the first meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 6 July 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol. 3, 148-51. John English, The Worldlv Years; The Life of Lester Pearson. Vol. 2; 1949-1972 (Toronto, 1992), 14-18; Henderson, The Birth of NATO. 35-36; John A. Munro and Alex I. Inglis, eds., Mike; The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, vol. 2: 1948-1957 (Toronto, 1973), 49-50.

6. Minutes of the first meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks, 6 July 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol. 3, 148-51; minutes of the second meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks, 6 July 1948, ibid., 152-55; minutes of the third meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks, 7 July 1948, ibid., 155-60; minutes of the fourth meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks, 8 July 1948, ibid., 163-69; minutes of the fifth meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks, 9 July 1948, ibid., 169-82.

7. Idem. See also Henderson, The Birth of NATO. 36-43.

8. Minutes of the fifth meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 9 July 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol. 3, 169-82. 178

See also Henderson, The Birth of NATO. 38, 40-41; and Munro and Inglis, Mike. 50.

9. Minutes of the fifth meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 9 July 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol. 3, 178-79.

10. Ibid., 179-82.

11. Henderson, The Birth of NATO. 56-60; Achilles, "Fingerprints on History". 18-20; Richard D. McKinzie, oral history interview with Theodore Achilles, 1972, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO, 27-31.

12. Idem.

13. Herman B. Baruch (U.S. ambassador in the Hague) to Secretary of State, 21 July 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol. 3, 194-95. See also Henderson, The Birth of NATO. 43-46.

14. Harriman to Secretary of State, 14 July 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol. 3, 183-84.

15. Memorandum of the first meeting of the working group, 12 July 1948, RG 59, Decimal Files 1945-49, Box 5648, 840.20/7- 1248; memorandum of the second meeting of the working group, 14 July 1948, ibid., 840.20/7-1448; memorandum of the third meeting of the working group, 15 July 1948, ibid., 840.20/7- 1548; memorandum of the fourth meeting of the working group, 20 July 1948, ibid., 840.20/7-2048; memorandum of the fifth meeting of the working group, 22 July 1948, ibid., 840.20/7- 2248; draft working group paper, 22 July 1948, ibid., 840.20/7-2248. See also Henderson, The Birth of NATO. 46-47.

16. Memorandum of the sixth meeting of the working group, 26 July 1948, RG 59, Decimal Files 1945-49, Box 5648, 840.20/7- 2648; memorandum of the seventh meeting of the working group, 28 July 1948, ibid., 840/7-2848.

17. Idem; draft working group paper, 28 July 1948, RG 59, Special Lot Files, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947- 1953, Box 27, File "Europe, 1947-48." See also Henderson, The Birth of NATO. 47-50.

18. Memorandum of the ninth meeting of the working group, 9 August 1948, RG 59, Decimal Files 1945-49, Box 5648, 840.20/8- 948. Achilles, "Fingerprints on History". 21-22.

19. Memorandum of the ninth meeting of the working group, 9 August 1948, RG 59, Decimal Files 1945-49, Box 5648, 840.20/8- 948; memorandum of the tenth meeting of the working group, 12 August 1948, ibid., 840.20/8-1248; memorandum of the eleventh 179 meeting of the working group, 16 August 1948, ibid., 840.20/8- 1648. See also Henderson, The Birth of NATO. 50-52.

20. Memorandum of the twelfth meeting of the working group, 18 August 1948, RG 59, Decimal Files 1945-49, Box 5648, 840.20/8-1848. See also Henderson, The Birth of NATO. 52.

21. Memorandum of conversation by Lovett, 20 August 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol. 3, 214-21.

22. Henderson, The Birth of NATO. 54-55.

23. Hickerson to Jefferson Caffery (U.S. ambassador in Paris), 24 August 1948, with attached Pearson to G. P. Vanier (Canadian ambassador in Paris), 13 August 1948, RG 59, Special Lot Files, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947- 1953, BOX 27, File "Europe, 1947-48."

24. Henderson, The Birth of NATO. 55.

25. Ibid., 55-56.

26. Ibid., 59.

27. Kennan to Lovett, 31 August 1948, with attached drafts by Kennan and Hickerson, RG 59, Decimal Files 1945-49, Box 5649, 840.20/8-3148.

28. Draft working group paper, 2 September 1948, RG 59, Special Lot Files, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947- 1953, Box 27, File "Europe, 1947-48; and memorandum of the thirteenth meeting of the working group, 2 September 1948, RG 59, Decimal Files 1945-49, Box 5648, 840.20/9-248.

29. Minutes of the sixth meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 3 September 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol. 3, 228-32; and minutes of the seventh meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 10 September 1948, ibid., 249-50.

30. Kennan to Marshall and Lovett, 6 September 1948, RG 59, Special Lot Files, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947- 1953, Box 27, File "Europe, 1947-48." See also memorandum of the fourteenth meeting of the working group, 7 September 1948, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1945-49, Box 5648, 840.20/9-748; and memorandum of the fifteenth meeting of the working group, 9 September 1948, ibid., 840.20/9-948.

31. Minutes of the seventh meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 10 September 1948, FRUS. 1948. 180

vol. 3, 249-50. See also Henderson, The Birth of NATO. 60- 64; and Kaplan, The United States and NATO. 82-83.

32. Munro and Inglis, Mike. 52-54.

33. Henderson, The Birth of NATO. 65.

34. Memorandum by the the ambassadors of Belgium, France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, and the minister of Luxembourg to the Secretary of State, 29 October 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol. 3, 270.

35. NSC 9/5, 8 November 1948, RG 59, Special Lot Files, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Box 27, File "Europe, 1947-48."

36. Charles Ulrick Bay (U.S. ambassador in Oslo) to secretary of state, 8 September 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol. 3, 235-36; H. Freeman Matthews (U.S. ambassador in Stockholm) to secretary of state, 11 September 1948, ibid., 250-51; Josiah Marvel (U.S. ambassador in Copenhagen) to secretary of state, 14 September 1948, ibid., 251-52; memorandum by Hickerson to Lovett, 21 September 1948, ibid., 253-54; Lovett to Bay, 22 September 1948, ibid., 254-56; Marshall (at Paris) to Lovett, 30 September 1948, ibid., 256-57; memorandum of conversation between Achilles and Henderson, 30 September 1948, ibid., 257- 58; Lovett to Marshall (at Paris), 1 October 1948, ibid., 258- 59; Lovett to Matthews, 2 October 1948, ibid., 259; memorandum of conversation between Marshall and Halvard Lange (Norwegian Foreign Minister), 6 October 1948, ibid., 260; Lincoln MacVeagh (U.S. ambassador in Lisbon) to secretary of state, 8 October 1948, ibid., 262-63; memorandum of conversation between Marshall and Osten Unden (Swedish Foreign Minister), 14 October 1948, ibid., 264-66; memorandum of conversation between Lovett and Erik Boheman (Swedish ambassador in Washington), 26 October 1948, ibid., 268-70; Lovett to Marvel, 17 November 1948, ibid., 271-72; Lovett to Matthews, 17 November 1948, ibid., 272-73; Matthews to Lovett, 18 November 1948, ibid., 277-78; memorandum of conversation between Marshall and Lange, 20 November 1948, ibid., 279-81; and Lovett to Matthews, 22 November 1948, ibid., 281-82.

37. Harriman to Marshall, 23 November 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol. 3, 283.

38. Memorandum by Henry Labouisse (special assistant to Hickerson) to Marshall, 17 September 1948, RG 59, Special Lot Files, Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs, 1946-1953, Files of Miriam Camp, Box 2, File "Miscellaneous"; unsigned paper, "'Unification' or 'integration' of Western 181

Europe, 16 October 1948, ibid.. Box 2, File "Integration of Western Europe"; memorandum from Hickerson to Labouisse, 18 October 1948, RG 59, Special Lot Files, Records of the Bureau of European Affairs, Subject Files Relating to European Defense Arrangements, 1948-1954, Box 2, File "Western Bloc- Economic"; memorandum by Ben T. Moore (special assistant to Hickerson) to Kennan, et al., 25 October 1948, RG 59, Special Lot Files, Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs, 1946-1953, Files of Miriam Camp, Box 2, File "Integration of Western Europe"; draft by Labouisse, 19 November 1948, ibid.; memorandum by Labouisse to Achilles, 20 November 1948, with attached paper, "Points in Respectof British Leadership in European Cooperation," by Thomas K. Finletter (chief ECA mission to Great Britain), 29 September 1948, Decimal Files 1945-49, Box 5649, 840.00/11-2048. See also Hogan, The Marshall Plan. 151-61, 179-88.

39. Memorandum by Kennan, 24 November 1948, with enclosed PPS Paper "Considerations Affecting the Conclusion of a North atlantic Security Pact," FRUS. 1948, vol. 3, 283-89.

40. Ibid., 284.

41. Memorandum by Hickerson to the secretary's staff, 27 November 1948, RG 59, Special Lot Files, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Box 27, File "Europe, 1947- 48."

42. Lovett to Harriman, 3 December 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol. 3, 300-10.

43. Memorandum of conversation between Achilles and F. R. Hoyer-Millar (minister, British embassy in Washington), 27 November 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol. 3, 297. See also Henderson, The Birth of NATO. 67.

44. Minutes of the eight meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 10 December 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol. 3, 310-14.

45. Minutes of the ninth meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 13 December 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol. 3, 315-21.

46. Report of the International Working Group to the Ambassadors' Committee, 24 December 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol. 3, 333-43. See also Achilles, "Fingerprints on History". 22-25.

47. Memorandum of conversation between Hickerson and Wilhelm Munthe de Morgenstierne (Norwegian ambassador in Washington), 29 December 1948, FRUS. 1948. vol. 3, 344-46; Marvel to 182

secretary of state, 30 December 1948, ibid., 346; memorandum of conversation between Hickerson and Morgenstierne, 31 December 1948, ibid., 348-51; memorandum of conversation between Hickerson and Povl Bang-Jensen (Danish charge d'affaires in Washington), 3 January 1949, FRUS. 1949. vol. 4, 1-3; Marvel to secretary of state, 4 January 1949, ibid., 6; Bay to secretary of state, 5 January 1949, ibid., 6-7; James Dunn (U.S. ambassador in Rome) to secretary of state, 5 January 1949, ibid., 7-8; Lovett to Dunn, 5 January 1949, ibid., 8-9; Marvel to secretary of state, 10 January 1949, ibid., 17; Dunn to secretary of state, 10 January 1949, ibid., 18; MacVeagh to the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 10 January 1949, ibid., 19-20; Marvel to secretary of state, 12 January 1949, ibid., 20-22; Richard Butrick (U.S. minister in Reykjavik) to secretary of state, 12 January 1949, ibid., 22.

48. Minutes of the eleventh meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 14 January 1949, ibid., 27-34.

49. Memorandum of conversation between Hickerson and Alberto Tarchiani (Italian ambassador in Washington), 12 January 1949, ibid., 23-24.

50. Acheson, Present at the Creation. 254-75; McLellan, Dean Acheson. 137-41.

51. Minutes of the twelfth meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 8 February 1949, FRUS. 1949. vol. 4, 73-88.

52. Lovett to Connally, 12 November 1948, RG 59, Decimal Files 1945-49, Box 5645, 840.00/11-1248.

53. Minutes of the twelfth meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 8 February 1949, FRUS. 1949. vol. 4, 73-88. See also Acheson, Present at the Creation. 277.

54. Memorandum of conversation between Acheson, Bohlen, and Representatives Sol Bloom, John Kee, Helen Gahagan Douglas, Charles Eaton, and John Vorys, 4 February 1949, Acheson Papers, Box 64, File "Memoranda of Conversations (Jan.-Feb. 49)"; memorandum of conversation between Acheson, Bohlen, Connally, and Vandenberg, 5 February 1949, ibid. See also editorial note, FRUS. 1949. vol. 4, 64-65; and Acheson, Present at the Creation. 277-81.

55. Minutes of the twelfth meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 8 February 1949, FRUS. 1949. vol. 4, 73-88. 183

56. Acheson, Present at the Creation. 277, 281-82.

57. Memorandum of conversation between Acheson, Bohlen, Connally, and Vandenberg, 14 February 1949, FRUS. 1949. vol. 4, 108-10; memorandum from Bohlen to Webb, 16 February 1949, with enclosed draft of article 5, ibid., 113-15; memorandum from Bohlen to Webb, 16 February 1949, with enclosed drafts of article 5, ibid., 115-16; memorandum of conversation between Acheson and Truman, 17 February 1949, ibid., 117. See also Achilles, "Fingerprints on History". 22-23. For Acheson's 18 February meeting with the Senate foreign relations committee see U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings in Executive Session on the North Atlantic Treaty. 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949, 85-127.

58. Henderson, The Birth of NATO. 93-94.

59. McLellan, Dean Acheson. 145-48.

60. Acheson, Present at the Creation. 277.

61. English, The Worldly Years. 22-23; and Munro and Inglis, Mike. 56-57.

62. Minutes of the thirteenth meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 25 February 1949, RG 59, Special Lot Files, Records of Charles Bohlen, 1942-1952, Box 7, File "Ambassadors' Meetings NAP, 1948-49."

63. English, The Worldly Years. 23; Achilles, "Fingerprints on History". 24-25.

64. Acheson, Present at the Creation. 277. For Acheson's 8 March meeting with the Senate foreign relations committee see U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings in Executive Session on the orth Atlantic Treaty. 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949, 129-68.

65. Minutes of the sixteenth meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 7 March 1949, FRUS. 1949. vol. 4, 166-74; memorandum by Acheson to Truman, 8 March 1949, ibid., 174.

66. Editorial note, ibid., 176-77.

67. Minutes of the seventeenth meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 11 March 1949, ibid., 185-92.

68. For the text of Acheson's speech, see U.S. Department of State, Bulletin. 27 March 1949. 184

69. Transcript of proceedings of the National Conference on American Foreign Policy, 18 March 1949, RG 59, Special Lot Files, Records of Charles Bohlen, 1942-1952, Box 6, File "Information Papers"; memorandum by Acheson, 28 March 1949, Acheson Papers, Box 64, File "Memoranda of Conversations (March 1949)"; unsigned paper "North Atlantic Pact: Questions and Answers," 2 April 1949, RG 59, Decimal Files 1945-49, Box 5654, 840.20/4-249.

70. Minutes of a conference of foreign ministers at Washington, 2 April 1949, FRUS. 1949. vol. 4, 271-81. For the statements at the signing ceremony, see U.S. Department of State, Bulletin. 17 April 1949. For a description of the ceremony, see Acheson, Present at the Creation. 283-84.

71. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty, (in 3 parts), 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949.

72. Ibid., 4-87, 89-144, and 235-84.

73. Ibid., 189-233.

74. Ibid., 145-87, 285-333.

75. Editorial note, FRUS. 1949. vol. 4, 303; editorial note, ibid., 313. See also U.S. Department of State, Bulletin. 19 June 1949. See also Acheson, Present at the Creation. 285- 86. For the Senate debate on the North atlantic Treaty, see Justus D. Doenecke, Not to the Swift: The Old Isolationists in the Cold War Era. (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1979), 155-64; Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance. 144-46.

76. Acheson, Present at the Creation. 284.

77. Achilles, "Fingerprints on History". 32. CHAPTER V

THE NEW FEDERALISTS: THE ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE AND

THE CAMPAIGN FOR A FEDERAL CONVENTION OF THE ATLANTIC

DEMOCRACIES, JANUARY 1949-FEBRUARY 1950

On 23 January 1949 a small group of men gathered at the Barbizon Plaza hotel in New York City. The group met at the invitation of retired U.S. Supreme Court Justice Owen J.

Roberts and included prominent figures from all over the

United States. The purpose of this meeting was the creation of a new citizens' committee: the Atlantic Union Committee

(AUC). This committee would lobby Congress to pass a resolution authorizing the president to invite the six other original sponsors of the North Atlantic Treaty to join the

United States in naming delegates to an exploratory federal convention. The convention would explore the possibilities for developing a federal union of the North Atlantic democracies.i

Neither the AUC nor its program were really new. The real force behind the new citizens' committee were Clarence

Streit and his Federal Union, Inc. And the AUC's program was

185 186

an updated version of that outlined by Streit in Union Now eleven years earlier. Nevertheless, the founding of the AUC marked an important new stage in the development of the

Atlantic Union movement in the United States. Unlike Federal

Union, Inc., which was a grassroots educational organization, the AUC was a high-powered political lobbying group that brought together Streit's long-term followers with an impressive group of Washington "insiders." And while Federal

Union, Inc. remained the repository of the original Union Now vision, the AUC became the bridge between the Atlantic Union movement and official Washington.2

The Truman Administration at first rebuffed the AUC.

But the atlanticists within the State Department, who wanted to turn the North Atlantic Treaty into something more than a military alliance, shared at least part of the vision of the

Atlantic Union movement. And as they searched for ways to develop the Atlantic Community concept that was embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty they adopted some of the rhetoric and proposals of the AUC and worked closely with some AUC leaders to develop programs that would foster greater

Atlantic unity. This community of interest between the AUC and the atlanticists within the administration, combined with the high stature and prominent social position of some of the committee's leaders, gave the AUC the opportunity that Streit and Federal Union, Inc. had never had: access to, as well as a measure of input in the foreign policy making process. 187

This influence, however, was partial and not one-sided. The

AUC leaders' easy access to the state Department allowed them

to have an input in administration thinking, but also

facilitated State Department influence over the AUC.

Ultimately, the State Department coopted those elements of

the Atlantic Union program and the AUC leadership that proved

supportive of its own long-term policy in the North Atlantic

area, thereby driving a wedge between the mainstream elements

of the AUC and its more radical and visionary wing. In the

ensuing internal struggle within the AUC, the moderates

gained the upper hand and significantly modified the original

AUC program and blended it with Washington's official

policies to create a new and lasting semi-official

atlanticist movement.

The Atlantic Union Committee was born, to a large

extent, out of the failure of Streit's Federal union movement during 1948. Throughout that year Streit continued to talk

to anyone who would listen, and write to anyone who would read, about how a federal union of the Atlantic democracies would solve all the problems of the Western world. At the

same time he continued to denounce the alternatives that he

felt were doomed to fail: European union and the transformation of the UN into a world government.3 There was

still considerable public interest in supranational solutions to the world's political and economic problems during 1948 188

and in May Streit had an opportunity to present his proposal

to Congress during hearings before the House committee on

foreign affairs. The committee hearings dealt with UN reform

in general, and with a world federalist resolution (House

Resolution 59) in particular. Both Streit and his long-time ally Owen Roberts appeared as witnesses against Resolution 59 and tried to convince the committee to report out instead a resolution that would call on the president to organize an exploratory federal convention of the North Atlantic democracies. As usual Streit argued his case very eloquently, drawing extensively from the examples of American history. But in spite of the kudos he received from various committee members and observers Streit's ideas were completely ignored in the committee's final report. It was little consolation that the committee also failed to report out the world federalist resolution.^ Meanwhile the State

Department coldly rebuffed a simultaneous attempt by Streit to approach Secretary of State Marshall and seek his support.5

Clearly Streit, in spite of his grassroots educational efforts through Federal Union, Inc. and Freedom & Union, failed to register any effect in Washington.

During the second half of 1948 Streit and his supporters became convinced that what their campaign needed was a strong, we11-organized lobbying group through which they could approach both Congress and the administration with greater effect. Federal Union, Inc. was not suitable for 189 this. In the first place it was a tax-exempt educational organization and was therefore prohibited by law from engaging in direct political lobbying. An equally important drawback was that Federal Union, Inc. was still largely dominated by educators, writers, journalists, and clergymen.

They were the ideal leaders for a grassroots educational effort, but not for the kind of political lobbying that would be needed in Washington. Streit and his closest supporters therefore decided to launch a new organization, the Atlantic

Union Committee, to undertake this lobbying effort. What they envisaged was a citizens' committee that would be organized and led jointly by the most prominent and influential Federal Union leaders and those Washington insiders who were most sympathetic to Streit's Union Now proposals.«

Citizens' committees were then one of the most popular forms of political activism in the United States. The AUC was only the latest in a long series of citizens' committees that sprung up during the 1930's and 1940's with the aim of influencing American foreign polic y.? Groups like the

Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, the Century

Group, the Fight for Freedom Committee, and the America First

Committee played an important role in the debate over

American intervention in the Second World War. And during the war a variety of groups had lobbied the State Department and Congress in favor of the creation of some form of world 190

organization. 8 with the onset of the Cold War several new citizens' committees emerged. Among the most important and

successful was the Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid

Europeéin Recovery (CMP), which had cooperated closely with the Truman Administration to lobby Congress in favor of passage of the ERP.» In 1948 the American advocates of

European union had followed this example and had founded their own citizens' committees, first the American Committee for a Free and United Europe, and later the American

Committee on United Europe (ACUE).i° All of these citizens' committees had certain traits in common. Their membership included a broad range of businessmen, journalists, educators, and ex-government officials; their leadership consisted of well-known public figures with easy access to official Washington; and they could count on the active support of sympathetic members of Congress.

By the end of 1948 Streit felt that the time was ripe to launch his own citizens' committee. During the second half of that year he had succeeded in gathering around him the kind of figures he needed. Capitalizing on the press attention he had received during the May congressional hearings Streit had spent the summer travelling throughout the country to drum up support, including financial support, for his cause. In October he reported to the Federal Union board of directors that he felt he had sufficiently broadened the movement's base of support to relaunch the Union Now 191 campaign. Not only was the movement stronger, the world situation also seemed more favorable for the Atlantic

federalists than ever before. The coming debate in the

Senate over the Atlantic alliance the Truman Administration was negotiating with the Western Union countries would offer an excellent chance to push for a congressional resolution authorizing an Atlantic federal convention.n All Streit now needed for his citizns' committee to succeed in 1949 were a congressional sponsor and some big names with influence in

Washington.

In the spring of 1948 Edmund Orgill, a wealthy

Memphis, Tennessee businessman and member of the board of directors of Federal Union, Inc. introduced Streit to a young and ambitious Democratic congressman from Tennessee, Estes

Kefauver. Elected to the House of Representatives in 1939,

Kefauver had shown himself to be independent-minded and something of a maverick. In 1948 he had set his eyes on the

Senate and badly needed financial support to overcome the opposition of the powerful Crump political machine in

Memphis. Orgill saw in Kefauver the kind of congressional supporter the Atlantic Union movement needed and Streit, after meeting the congressman, agreed. Eager to secure

Orgill's financial backing in his Senate race Kefauver quickly became a convert of Streit's. During the 1948 campaign he publicly came out in favor of an Atlantic union and after his victory in the November election he became the 192

AUC's point man in the Senate. 12

The election of an Atlantic union supporter to the

Senate was a great victory for Streit's movement. Even more

significant was Streit's success, in November 1948, in

gaining the active support of a former Under Secretary of

State, William L. Clayton. Clayton was an extremely wealthy

cotton broker from Houston with a distinguished record of

government service. From 1942 to 1944 he had been an

assistant secretary of commerce in the Roosevelt

Administration. In December 1944 he became assistant

secretary of state for economic affairs in the new Stettinius

State Department. And from 1946 to 1948, as under secretary

of state for economic affairs, he had been instrumental in

developing the Truman Administration's European Recovery

Program. In early 1948 Clayton returned to private life. 12

By then he had already become convinced that the Truman

Administration's foreign policy initiatives would not be

sufficient to win the Cold War. In December 1947, at the

urging of Oveta Culp Hobby of the Houston Post. Clayton

joined the United World Federalists. But he quickly came to

the conclusion that the confrontation between the West and

the Communist bloc rendered world government impractical, at

least in the short run. in November 1948 Clayton's

daughter, Ellen St. John Garwood, introduced him to Clarence

Streit. The result was a major coup for Streit. Impressed by Streit's vision Clayton switched his support to the 193

Atlantic Union movement and agreed to become one of the leaders of the AUC. He also promised a generous financial contribution to the AUC. In addition he agreed to use his many contacts as a respected business leader and ex­ government official to gain support for the AUC among other corporate leaders and in Washington, is

Streit was now ready to move ahead and on 27 November

1948 he formally proposed to the board of directors of

Federal Union, inc. the creation of the new Atlantic Union

Committee. Some board members clearly had misgivings about this proposal. They feared that the new committee would eclipse the existing organization and drain away its resources. They also argued that the AUC's emphasis on political lobbying was misplaced, and that a handful of

Washington insiders couldn't replace the grassroots support that Federal Union was building. Nevertheless the board followed Streit and approved his program for forming the new committee.

On 10 January 1949 the founders of the AUC held a preliminary organizing meeting at the house of Owen Roberts. i?

The official founding meeting of the committee took place on

23 January in New York City. In addition to Streit, Roberts,

Clayton, and Orgill, those present included former Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson; industrialist and prominent internationalist activist Hugh Moore; public opinion analyst

Elmo Roper, Jr.; businessman and newspaper publisher Gardner 194

Cowles, newspaper editors William L. White, Sevellon Brown, and George S. Shea; University of Rochester professor Walden

Moore; and public relations consultant John Orr Yo ung, is

This was an impressive collection of prominent citizens, the kind of people likely to get the attention of members of Congress and administration officials. And indeed many of them had considerable experience in the area of lobbying the administration and Congress. Since 1947

Roberts, as chairman of the Emergency Committee on Universal

Military Training, had been working with the administration to convince Congress and the public at large of the need for

UMT.19 Patterson had been the chairman of the executive committee of the Committee for the Marshall P l a n . 20 During

1940 Clayton had been a prominent member of the Century

Group, which lobbied for aid to Britain.21 Hugh Moore was arguably the most experienced committee member of them all.

In 1940 he served as chairman of the executive committee of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. During the war he was president of Americans United for World

Government. And in 1948 he was active as the treasurer of the Committee for the Marshall P l a n . 22 it was this group of experienced Washington insiders, with their invaluable contacts, who now took charge of the AUC.

During the first two months after its founding meeting the AUC built up its organization, membership, and finances. 195

The committee's founders elected a board of directors to give

leadership to the organization. In addition to the above-

mentioned founders, all of whom became board members, it

included the Nobel Prize-winning atomic scientist Harold

Urey, the historian and author Herbert Agar, and several

other businessmen, newspaper editors, publishers, and

clergymen. The board elected Roberts as AUC president and

Clayton and Patterson as vice-presidents. Although Streit

remained the most active board member and the driving force

behind the AUC he clearly believed that Roberts, Clayton, and

Patterson would be more acceptable as partners to the

administration and enjoy greater credibility in Congress, and

would therefore be more successful at putting over his

program. Hugh Moore became the chairman of the ten-member

executive committee, which would run the AUC in between board meetings. 23

The board also sent out invitations to 150 prominent

internationalists asking them to join the AUC's advisory council. The council had no real function within the organization. Its only purpose was to serve as a showcase

for prominent Atlantic Union supporters who would enhance the committee's prestige. The first mailing proved very

successful and netted the AUC close to 90 prominent supporters, including Paul W. Litchfield, the chairman of

Goodyear; Henry Hobson, the bishop of Cincinnati; Admiral H.

E. Yarnell; Percival Brundage of the prominent Wall Street 196

investment firm Price, Waterhouse and Company; Hollywood

legend Douglas Fairbanks, Jr.; Congresswoman Clare Boothe

Luce; and a host of businessmen, academics, publishers,

clergymen, attorneys, and retired diplomats. Some of these

council members had supported Streit since the early forties.

But most were new converts who had supported various more

traditional internationalist groups before and during World

War II. Like Clayton and Patterson, these new council members now felt that, after the failure of great power

cooperation in the UN, Streit's Atlantic Union would provide

the best guarantee for the security and prosperity of the

West. 24

The board of directors also set up a small permanent professional staff to run the AUC's administration and rented office space in New York and Washington. To cover the committee's initial expenses the members of the board of directors themselves came up with more than $26,000. The board's finance committee would develop a long-term budget and hire a professional fundraiser.25 Beyond this, there was relatively little discussion within the AUC concerning organizational and financial matters. The board members who had been intimately involved in organizing and financing earlier citizens' committees swiftly applied their expertise to the AUC organization. Instead, discussion within the board focused on the definition of the committee's aims and the best strategy to achieve them. 197

It was during this discussion that the split within

the AUC between the veterans of Federal Union, Inc. and the

new, more moderate converts, who gave top priority to

cooperation with the administration, first emerged. The

AUC's primary aim, as stated in its constitution and by-laws,

was to promote passage of a congressional resolution calling

on the president to organize a convention of delegates from

the North Atlantic democracies to explore the potential for a

federal union among these democracies. The committee's

secondary aim was to promote public understanding of the

advantages of such a federal u n i o n . 26 Already at the first meeting of the board of directors discussion arose over how

unequivocally and uncompromisingly the AUC would press for a

true federal u n i o n . 27 This discussion would mark the whole

history of the committee and was reflected in the evolution of its attitude toward the North Atlantic Treaty. In time,

the moderates within the AUC would come to accept the North

Atlantic Treaty as the basis for a functional integration of the North Atlantic area that stopped well short of a federal union. Most of them continued to pay lip service to the

ideal of federalism, but considered it only as a distant goal. The more radical federalists, on the other hand, stuck to their dream of an immediate federal union. Although they never publicly denounced the North Atlantic Treaty, they didn't believe it could be the road to a real Atlantic Union.

On the contrary, they feared that through the development of 198

NATO the Western democracies would get sidetracked from the

only true and proven road to federalism: the creation of a

federal constitutional framework that would transfer real

sovereignty to the Atlantic Union.

As it was organizing itself, the AUC of course had to

be conscious of the fact that the United States, Canada, and

several Western European countries were preparing to sign the

North Atlantic Treaty. The group of countries that was about

to sign the treaty corresponded closely to the group the AUC wanted to see invited to a federal convention. These

countries were now about to enter into a long-term alliance

that recognized the "common heritage and civilization of

their peoples" and promised to "encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them." To many AUC members, as well as to the atlanticists within the State

Department, it seemed that the North Atlantic Treaty had the potential to develop into something more than a military a l l i a n c e .28 it was therefore imperative that the AUC come up with a policy regarding the treaty before it started its own

Atlantic Union campaign.

Streit spelled out his position in a letter to his friend John Foster Dulles and in an editorial in Freedom &

Union. He was more than ever convinced that alliances, all alliances, were fundamentally flawed. An alliance could never develop into a true union because it failed to absorb the sovereignty of the signatory states. Streit therefore 199 opposed the North Atlantic Treaty and wanted to offer his

Atlantic Union scheme as an alternative.29 within the AUC, however, Streit's was the minority position. At the board meeting of 27 February 1949, Roberts and Clayton forced

Streit to back down from his uncompromising position.

Clayton argued that the North Atlantic Treaty was "one more step in the direction pointed by Bretton Woods [the founding conference of the International Monetary Fund and the

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development], UNRRA

[the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency], and

ERP; the usefulness of the Pact [the North Atlantic Treaty] being the germ of bringing countries together." Clayton clearly hoped that the treaty would be one more step on the road to Atlantic Union. Most board members, especially those who had not previously belonged to Federal Union, Inc. shared this conviction. Furthermore, Roberts, who had already consulted with President Truman, Secretary of State Dean

Acheson, and Senator Arthur Vandenberg feared that an attempt to offer the AUC program as an alternative to the North

Atlantic Treaty would backfire. It would provoke the wrath of the State Department and its congressional allies, who would then undoubtedly work to defeat the AUC program. If, on the other hand, the AUC came out publicly in support of the treaty it would gain the goodwill of the administration.

And because the rival world federalist groups like the UWF were likely to oppose the treaty because of its regional 200

scope, the AUC's support would give it an advantage over the

competition. Streit found himself isolated and accepted a

compromise statement that expressed the AUC's support for the

North Atlantic Treaty "as an important emergency first step

toward Atlantic U n i o n .

With this issue settled, Roberts publicly announced the formation of the Atlantic Union Committee at a carefully prepared Washington press conference on 15 March 1949. He emphasized the committee's wholehearted support for the North

Atlantic Treaty, but also made clear that once the treaty had been ratified by the Senate the AUC would press for congressional action on its own more far-reaching proposal.

The committee had been recruiting congressional sponsors for its Atlantic Union resolution since late January. Kefauver was in the forefront of this effort and was eager to introduce the resolution in the Senate.32 Roberts and

Clayton, however, preferred to bide their time and develop a more impressive congressional base of support. Meanwhile they launched an all-out campaign in support of the North

Atlantic Treaty, in the hope that this would be rewarded with

State Department support at a later date. Roberts, Clayton, and Patterson all testified in support of the treaty before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Streit pointedly didn't, but he did give the treaty qualified support in his editorials for Freedom & Union.33 201

Roberts and Clayton also intensively lobbied the administration and its congressional allies, hoping to secure promises of later support for the AUC's program in return for its pro-NATO stance. The president was encouraging but non­ committal, as was Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg of the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Secretary of State Dean

Acheson, however, was much less welcoming. Although Acheson did not explicitly oppose the principle of Atlantic Union, he firmly ruled out any immediate administration support. The secretary feared that opponents of the North Atlantic Treaty would use the specter of an Atlantic super-state to derail

Senate ratification. He therefore used his influence with

Roberts and Clayton to dissuade the AUC from introducing its resolution in Congress while the treaty was still pending.

Still hoping that Acheson would support them at a later date, the AUC fully complied with the secretary's w i s h e s . 34

The AUC tried to make up for the lack of administration support by broadening its base among the public at large. To this effect, it launched a three-pronged campaign in April 1949. Through its public relations committee and speakers' bureau it would try to exploit to the fullest all the public media to increase public awareness and understanding of the Atlantic Union program. At the same time it launched a massive membership drive, established local chapters, and tried to induce more prominent personalities to join its advisory council. Finally, it 202

started an ambitious direct-mail campaign with the aim of

raising $375,000 before the end of the y e a r . 35

In early July, however, the various committees in

charge of conducting the publicity, membership, and fund­

raising campaigns reported to the AUC board of directors that

it was difficult to achieve their goals. Without a

resolution in Congress the AUC program seemed to lack the

element of urgency that was essential to a successful appeal

for public support. The initial announcement of the AUC's

existence had generated a fair amount of media attention.

But the lack of any new initiative on the part of the AUC, as well as the Senate hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty, had

diverted public attention. The advisory council was steadily

expanding and now numbered close to 180 members. But the mass membership drive was getting nowhere. In addition, the committee's financial appeals had so far netted less than

$50,000. Clearly, the decision to defer to the State

Department and delay introduction of the Atlantic Union resolution in Congress had resulted in a loss of momentum.36

The Senate finally approved the North Atlantic Treaty on 21 July 1949.37 At last the AUC could unleash its congressional supporters, whose number had grown considerably, especially in the Senate. On 26 July, Kefauver and nineteen other senators introduced the Atlantic Union resolution in the Senate. In addition to Kefauver the sponsors included J. William Fulbright (D-AR), Walter F. 203

George (D-GA), Guy M. Gillette (D-IA), Robert C. Hendrickson

(R-NJ), and Joseph R. McCarthy (R-WI). The same day

Congressman Hale Boggs (D-LA) and four of his colleagues

introduced a similar resolution in the House. The

resolutions referred to both the North Atlantic Treaty and

the American constitutional convention of 1787 and called on

the president to organize a convention of the original

sponsors of the North Atlantic Treaty to explore a federal

union of the North Atlantic democracies. 38 The AUC and its

congressional supporters realized that it was virtually

impossible that either house of Congress would take any

action on the Atlcintic Union resolution during the current

session. But they hoped that the resolution would strengthen

the AUC's public appeal, thereby giving the committee a better chance to push its program through Congress in the next session.39

The introduction of the Atlantic Union resolution in

Congress resulted immediately in increased media attention, both in the U.S. and abroad.40 in September the AUC tried to capitalize on this and renewed its membership and fund­ raising campaigns.41 The fall campaign proved much more successfull than the spring effort. Membership in the AUC's advisory council jumped to over 250, including representatives from virtually every state. The committee, which until now had largely been an East Coast elite operation, finally started to develop a small but significant 204 grass-roots base of support in two dozen local chapters with over 5,000 active members. There were chapters in

California, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas,

Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Oregon,

Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,

Washington, and the District of Columbia. In addition, the

AUC had developed a base of support in Arkansas, Florida, and

Mississippi. By the end of the year the fund-raising effort had raised a total of $100,000, far short of the initial goal of $375,000, but an encouraging start nonetheless. Most encouraging of all was the AUC's success in broadening its base of support in Congress. By year's end almost 50 senators and congressmen supported the Atlantic Union resolution. And several prominent European figures, including Paul Reynaud and Maurice Schuman of France and Lord

Vansittart and Arnold Toynbee of Britain had also endorsed

Atlantic union. Clearly, the Atlantic Union Committee was gaining strength.42

While the AUC's star was rising, it was not without competition. Several rival pressure groups also managed to get resolutions introduced in Congress. The American

Association for the United Nations supported several resolutions that called for a strengthening of the UN. The

UWF supported a resolution that expressed American support for turning the UN into a world federation. And the ACUE endorsed a resolution that called for American support for 205

the creation of a European federation. There was an

avalanche of similar resolutions, and the Senate foreign

relations committee created a special subcommittee to deal

with them. This subcommittee, named after its chairman

Elbert D. Thomas (R-UT), scheduled hearings on seven of these

resolutions, including the Atlantic Union resolution, for

February 1950.43 several AUC leaders feared that the

continued rivalry with other federalist groups would

seriously hamper the AUC's effectiveness, and might lead the

administration and the public at large to dismiss them all as

overzealous dilettantes. The same concern was present in the

leadership of the other major groups, especially the ACUE and

the UWF. But in spite of occasional contacts and attempts at

drafting common policy statements, the rival federalist

groups were unable to resolve their differences and

cooperate. The UWF denounced the "exclusive" character of

the proposed Atlantic Union and accused the AUC of seeking to

create a "Jim Crow" union for white westerners only. The AUC

argued that the world federalists were unrealistic and that a

federal union in a world that was half-free (liberal

capitalist) and half-slave (communist) could not endure. But

the AUC was itself accused of being unrealistic by the ACUE.

As a result of these differences the AUC not only had to defend itself against ultra-nationalist and isolationist

groups, but against rival world and European federalists as well. 44 206

What worried the AUC leaders more, however, was the

attitude of the State Department. Secretary Acheson's

initial reaction to the introduction of the Atlantic Union

resolution in Congress was less than enthusiastic. On 27

July he declined to comment publicly on the resolution and

said it would require long and careful study by both the

administration and C o n g r e s s . « within the State Department a

major debate errupted over the Atlantic Union resolution.

Theodore Achilles, as head of the division of Western

European Affairs, was assigned the task of drafting the

department's policy paper regarding the Atlantic Union

resolution.46

The selection of Achilles was a stroke of luck for the

AUC. Within the State Department Achilles was without a

doubt the most vocal advocate of closer transatlantic

integration. He had been one of the architects of the North

Atlantic Treaty which he, like the AUC moderates, saw as a

stepping-stone on the way to an ever closer association between the United States and Western Europe.47 Although

Achilles tended to see the development of transatlantic integration as a more gradual process than Streit's one-step federal convention scheme, he was broadly sympathetic to the

Atlantic Union resolution. This sympathy was apparent in the first draft of the position paper on the Atlantic Union resolution which he circulated on 15 December 1949. The paper included a long defense of the ideal of federalism. 207

much of which was clearly influenced by Union Now. Although

Achilles recognized that there were several strong arguments

against the Atlantic Union scheme, he argued that the

development of history tended inevitably toward a

progressively closer association of the free world. This was

an "inherently desirable" trend; one that the U.S. should

foster and encourage. Achilles stopped just short of

recommending that the State Department endorse the Atlantic

Union resolution. Instead, he proposed that the department

take the position that the convening of a federal convention was premature. At the same time the department would express

its approval of the spirit of the resolution, as well as its belief that a progressively closer association of the North

Atlantic nations was "desireible, necessary and inevitable."48

Achilles's position paper received mixed reviews.

Several colleagues in the Office of European Affairs supported him. The Office of United Nations Affairs, on the other hand, strongly opposed his recommendations because they seemed to imply a U.S. abandonment of the UN.49 m response to this criticism, Achilles revised his position paper and circulated a new draft on 21 December. The new version put somewhat less emphasis on support for the goals of the

Atlantic Union resolution, and instead stressed that the ultimate goal was a closer association of all the nations of the world. The Atlantic Union would be the nucleus from which such a world association could develop. But Achilles's 208 lip service to the ultimate goal of world unity did not satisfy his critics. More importantly, his position paper did not satisfy the State Department's top policymakers,

Acheson, Deputy Under Secretary Dean Rusk, and PPS Director

George Kennan.so

Acheson was being bombarded with letters from prominent AUC members urging him to support the Atlantic

Union resolution.51 At the same time some of the State

Department's most important outside advisers such as Reinhold

Niebuhr, professor of applied Christianity at Union

Theological Seminary; Leo Pasvolsky, director of international studies at the Brookings Institution; and

Arnold Wolfers, professor of international relations at Yale

University, all argued against support for the Atlantic Union resolution. Similar advice came from former Secretary of

State Cordell H u l l . 52 Acheson, Rusk, and Kennan decided to work out a definitive position at a high-level meeting on 28

December. Kennan came to this meeting armed with his own position paper. In the first place, Kennan argued that the

Atlantic Union resolution involved complex constitutional issues that did not belong in the domain of the State

Department. Furthermore, he believed that the public at large, both in the U.S. and in Europe, was not prepared to consider the transfer of sovereignty involved in the creation of an Atlantic Union. Finally, Kennan questioned whether the kind of Atlantic Union envisaged in the resolution was a 209

desirable goal for U.S. foreign policy. He admitted that

opinion within the department was divided on this question.

Achilles and several of his colleagues, as well as some of

the members of the PPS, favored a long-term policy designed

to gradually develop such a federal union. Kennan on the

other hand, believed that such ideas were nothing more than

"a dangerous digression from the sober and realistic

attention which our present international situation

deserves." His final recommendation was that the department decline to support the Atlantic Union resolution and refrain

from expressing any opinion on the desirability of a closer association between the U.S. and Western E u r o p e . 53

Kennan largely carried the day. Achilles drafted a new position paper, which was circulated on 16 January 1950.

The new draft incorporated the main points of Kennan's paper.

It no longer expressed departmental support for the spirit of the Atlantic Union resolution, but it did still maintain that there was an inevitable, necessary, and desirable historical trend toward a progressively closer association of the North

Atlantic nations.54 This position paper was revised two more times on the insistence of the Office of United Nations

Affairs and against the strong opposition of Achilles. The final version made it clear that the progressively closer association of the Free World would not be limited to the

North Atlantic but might also include other areas like the

Americas. It also specified that this association was only 210 desirable within the larger UN framework. The net result was

a position paper that was very much in line with the State

Department's views on the other federalist resolutions before the Thomas subcommittee. The department declined to support any of the federalist proposals.ss a last minute appeal of

Streit to Acheson failed to change the department's essentially negative response to the Atlantic Union resolution. 56

On 8 February 1950 Kefauver, Roberts, Clayton,

Patterson, Streit, and Harold Urey appeared before the Thomas subcommittee to testify in favor of the Atlantic Union resolution. While Kefauver and Streit defended the resolution as a whole, the other AUC witnesses focused on their particular area of expertise. Roberts addressed the political and juridical aspects of the Atlantic Union proposal. Clayton explained its economic benefits. And

Patterson demonstrated how it would strengthen the defense of the West. Perhaps the most powerful testimony came from atomic scientist Harold Urey. By fielding Urey, who made front-page headlines with his dire warnings about the Soviet nuclear threat, the AUC sought to capitalize on the mood of insecurity that had gripped the nation since the announcement of the first Soviet nuclear test in September 1949.57

The State Department responded on 15 February. Rusk and Assistant Secretary of State for UN Affairs John

Hickerson responded to the AUC proprosal largely along the 211

lines of Kennan's recommendations. They stressed their

belief that the American public was not prepared to cede

power in such areas as foreign affairs, defense, taxation,

currency, and immigration to a new supranational entity.

Furthermore, the effects of Atlantic Union on the American

economy would be profound and not necessarily beneficial for

every sector. Rusk and Hickerson argued that the Atlantic

Union program was too vague and that it raised a series of

fundamental questions for which the AUC could provide no

answers. Consequently, they informed the Thomas subcommittee that the State Department could not support the Atlantic

Union resolution. 58

Kefauver denounced the State Department's

"obstructionism" and called its attitude short-sighted. And many newspapers joined the senator in criticizing the department's "negative" attitude.59 But the AUC realized that without administration support its resolution was unlikely ever to get reported out of committee. The well-connected

AUC leadership tried in vain to bypass the State Department by appealing directly to the president. But Truman replied evasively to all requests for support of the Atlantic Union resolution. 50

By early 1950, then, Streit's effort to relaunch his campaign for a federal convention of the Atlantic democracies seemed to have reached a dead end. During 1949 the U.S. had been more receptive to his program than ever before. The 212

favorable press coverage his campaign received was proof of

that. And the AUC, with its high-profile leadership, skilled

Washington insiders, professional organizers, and wealthy

backers had provided him with a golden opportunity to

capitalize on the country's willingness to consider new

departures in foreign policy. In the end, though, Streit's

impressive citizens' committee proved powerless in the face of the State Department's opposition to its radical program.

But although the Atlantic Union resolution died in the Thomas

subcommittee, the AUC didn't. And throughout the 1950's the

AUC would continue to try to push U.S. foreign policymakers toward its goal of an Atlantic Union. 213

1. Minutes of the first meeting of the AUC board of directors, 23 January 1949, Atlantic Union Committee MSS, Box 96, Folder "Board of Directors, 1949", Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC (hereafter AUC MSS with filing information).

2. The best account of the AUC is in Wooley, Alternatives to Anarchy. 101-32. But Wooley largely ignores the AUC-State Department contacts. Panzella, "The Atlantic Union Committee," and Lantrip, "A Study of the Atlantic Union Movement, 1949-1960," are narrative accounts of the AUC's history, based on very limited source material. Szent- Miklosy, The Atlantic Union Movement, is a more general work that examines Atlantic Union within the framework of political science models and that pays very little attention to the AUC itself. Kaplan, The united States and NATO. 132- 34, briefly deals with the AUC, but like Wooley, Kaplan portrays the AUC's efforts as totally fruitless and fails to explore the contacts between the committee and the State Department.

3. See, for example, Streit's editorials in Freedom & Union during 1948. See also reports on Streit's speeches throughout the country in the New York Times. January 12, June 19, and November 23; and his public controversy with Senator Burton K. Wheeler about European federation versus Atlantic federation in the New York Times. March 9 and 17.

4. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Structure of the United Nations and the Relations of the United States to the United Nations. Hearings. 80th Congress, 2nd session, 1948, esp. 306-29; and 336-65. Freedom & Union 3:6 (June 1948), 1-7; ibid. 3:7 (July-August 1948), 22-29. For comments on Streit's performance, see "Comment on Clarence Streit's Statement to the House committee on foreign affairs, 12 May 1948," Papers of William L. Clayton, Box 74, File "Freedom and Union, Clarence Streit," Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO (hereafter Clayton Papers with filing information).

5. Streit to Marshall, 23 May 1948, and attached Durward V. Sandifer (acting director. Office of United Nations Affairs) to Streit, 11 June 1948, RG 59, Decimal Files 1945-49, Box 2031, 501/5-2348.

6. Lantrip, "A Study of the Atlantic Union Movement, 1949- 1960," 38-40, 55-61; Szent-Miklosy, The Atlantic Union Movement. 109-10.

7. The term citizens' committee is taken here to refer to ad- hoc lobbying groups, usually formed during crisis periods. 214 whose lifespan varied from a couple of months to several years and who tried to gain support within Congress, the administration, and/or among the public at large for a specific proposal. The term is used here to differentiate groups like the Atlantic Union Committee, the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, and the Committee for the Marshall Plan from organizations like the Council on Foreign Relations, the League of Nations Association, and Federal Union, Inc. These latter organizations had a much longer lifespan and focused on the long-term education of the general public about larger issues, rather than on the immediate implementation of a specific program.

8. The most important works dealing with these groups are Mark L. Chadwin, The War Hawks of World War II (Chapel Hill, 1968); Wayne S. Cole, America First; The Battle against Intervention. 1940-1941 (Madison, 1953); idem, Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle against American Intervention in World War II (New York, 1974); Robert A. Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent; American Entry into World War II 2nd ed.(New York, 1979); idem. Second Chance; Walter Johnson, The Battle Against Isolation (Chicago, 1944); and William M. Tuttle, Jr., "Aid to the Allies Short-of-War versus American Intervention, 1940: A Reappraisal of William Allen White's Leadership," Journal of American History 56 (1969-70): 840- 58.

9. Hogan, The Marshall Plan. 98-99; Michael Wala, "Selling the Marshall Plan at Home: The Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery," Diplomatic History 10 (Summer 1986): 247-65.

10. Beloff, The United States and the Unity of Europe. 72-75.

11. Minutes of the Federal Union, Inc. board of directors' meeting, 16 October 1948, Streit Papers, Box 41, File "Board Meetings, Excerpts from Minutes of Meetings, 1941, 1947-50."

12. Streit to Orgill, 18 April 1948, Streit Papers, Box 25, File "Kefauver, Estes, General, 1948-59;" Kefauver to Streit, 19 April 1948, ibid. For evidence of Federal Union's strong support for Kefauver, see Freedom & Union 3:8 (September, 1948), 4-5. See also Charles L. Fontenay, Estes Kefauver: A Biography (Knoxville, 1980), 328; Bruce Gorman, Kefauver: A Political Biography (New York, 1971), 41; and Wooley. Alternatives to Anarchy. 107. See also U.S. Congress, Memorial Services Held in the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States, together with Remarks Presented in Eulogy of Carey Estes Kefauver. 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963. 215

13. Gregory A. Possédai, Our Finest Hour; Will Clayton, the Marshall Plan, and the Triumph of Democracy. (Stanford, 1993), and Ellen Clayton Garwood, Will Clavton; A Short Biography. (Austin, TX, 1958), eire the only two biographies of Clayton.

14. Wooley, Alternatives to Anarchy. 102-4.

15. Clayton to Cass Canfield, 17 November 1948, Clayton Papers, Box 74, File "Freedom and Union, Clarence Streit;" and Clayton to Streit, 17 November 1948, ibid. See also memorandum by Clayton on UWF policy, 17 January 1949, in Frederick J. Dobney, ed.. Selected Papers of Will Clayton. (Baltimore, 1971), 256-58.

16. Minutes of the meeting of the Federal Union, Inc. board of directors, 27 November 1948, Streit Papers, Box 41, File "Board Meetings, Excerpts from Minutes of Meetings, 1941, 1947-50;" Walden Moore to John Howard Ford (chairman of the board of directors. Federal Union, Inc.), 13 December 1948, ibid.. Box 52, File "Executive Committee, 1940-44, 1948;" and A. Powell Davies (secretary of the board of directors. Federal Union, inc.) to Walden Moore, 17 December 1948, ibid.

17. Streit to Roberts, 10 January 1949, Streit Papers, Box 31, File "Roberts, Owen J., 1944-49."

18. Minutes of the first meeting of the AUC board of directors, 23 January 1949, AUC MSS, Box 96, Folder "Board of Directors, 1949"; Who's Who in America; A Biographical Dictionarv of Notable Living Men and Women, vol. 26, 1950-51 (Chicago, 1950), 33, 503, 1032, 2122, 2323, 2353, 2668, 2801; Wooley, Alternatives to Anarchy. 105-6.

19. New York Times. 25 January 1948.

20. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, European Recovery Program. Hearings. 80th Congress, 2nd session, 1948, 748.

21. John E. Findling, ed. Dictionary of American Diplomatic History (Westport, CT, 1980), 111-12.

22. Who's Who in America, vol. 26, 2323.

23. Minutes of the first meeting of the AUC board of directors, 23 January 1949, AUC MSS, Box 96, Folder "Board of Directors, 1949." See also Wooley, Alternatives to Anarchy. 105-6. 216

24. Minutes of the second meeting of the AUC board of directors, 6 February 1949, AUC MSS, Box 96, Folder "Board of Directors, 1949"; and letter from Walden Moore to members of the AUC board of directors, 23 March 1949, Clayton Papers, Box 68, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee 1."

25. Minutes of the third and fourth meetings of the AUC board of directors, 13 February 1949, AUC MSS, Box 96, Folder "Board of Directors, 1949".

26. Letter from Walden Moore to the members of the AUC board of directors, 23 Februeiry 1949, with attached constitution and by-laws, Clayton Papers, Box 68, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee 1".

27. Copy of letter from George Shea, Jr., to Clarence Streit, 24 January 1949, Clayton Papers, Box 68, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee 1".

28. See preamble and Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, reprinted in Kaplan, The United States and NATO. 227.

29. Copy of letter from Clarence Streit to John Foster Dulles, 9 February 1949, Clayton Papers, Box 68, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee 1"; and editorial by Streit in Freedom & Union. 4:3 (March 1949).

30. Minutes of the fourth meeting of the AUC board of directors, 27 February 1949, AUC MSS, Box 96, Folder "Board of Directors, 1949". The new compromise position was also reflected in Streit's editorial in the April 1949 issue of Freedom & Union.

31. Transcript of AUC press conference, 15 March 1949, RG 59, Decimal Files 1945-49, Box 5653, 840.20/3-1549. See also New York Times. 16 March 1949.

32. Minutes of the second, third, fourth, and fifth meeting of the AUC board of directors, 6, 13, and 27 February and 6 April 1949, AUC MSS, Box 96, Folder "Board of Directors, 1949"; U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Kefauver speaking for the North Atlantic Treaty, 81st Congress, 1st session, 18 March 1949, Congressional Record 95: 2799.

33. Minutes of the fifth meeting of the AUC board of directors, 6 April 1949, AUC MSS, Box 96, Folder "Board of directors, 1949"; and letter from Sabra Holbrook (AUC public relations director) to Clayton, 13 April 1949, with attached statement regarding the North Atlantic Treaty, Clayton Papers, Box 68, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee 1". See also U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 217

The North Atlantic Treaty. Hearings. 81st Congress, 1st session, 1949, 376-413, 526-74, and 608-24. See also Streit's editorial in the June 1949 issue of Freedom & Union.

34. Minutes of the third, fourth, and fifth meetings of the AUC board of directors, 13 and 27 February and 6 April 1949, AUC MSS, Box 96, Folder "Board of Directors, 1949"; memorandum of conversation with Roberts, 21 February 1949, Acheson Papers, Box 64, Folder "Memoranda of Conversations (Jan.- Feb. 49)"; memorandum of conversation between Acheson and Roberts, 2 March 1949, RG 59, special lot file 64 D 563, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Box 27, Folder "Europe, 1949"; letter from Roberts to Acheson, 15 March 1949, RG 59, Box 5653, 840.20/3-1549; memorandum of conversation with Roberts, 18 March 1949, RG 59, Box 5653, 840.20/3-1849; memorandum from the under secretary (James Webb) to the secretary (Acheson), 19 April 1949, RG 59, Box 5655, 840.20/4-1949.

35. Minutes of the second meeting of the AUC public relations committee, 9 March 1949, Clayton Papers, Box 68, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee 1"; minutes of the fifth meeting of the AUC board of directors, 6 April 1949, AUC MSS, Box 96, Folder "Board of Directors, 1949".

36. Minutes of the sixth meeting of the AUC board of directors, 1 June 1949, AUC MSS, Box 96, Folder "Board of Directors, 1949"; memorandum from Eugene Cecil (AUC finance director) to Roberts, 14 June 1949, Clayton Papers, Box 68, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee 1"; minutes of the sixth meeting of the AUC executive committee, 24 June 1949, Ibid.; minutes of the seventh meeting of the AUC executive committee, 7 July 1949, Clayton Papers, Box 69, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee 3".

37. The best account of the Senate debate on the North Atlantic Treaty is in Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance. 119-48.

38. U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Kefauver speaking for the Atlantic union resolution, 26 July 1949, Congressional Record 95, 81st Congress, 1st session, 10143-44; and New York Times. 27 July 1949.

39. Minutes of the seventh meeting of the AUC board of directors, 4 August 1949, AUC MSS, Box 96, Folder "Board of Directors, 1949".

40. Letter from Sabra Holbrook to Clayton, 12 September 1949, Clayton Papers, Box 69, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee 3"; airgram from David Bruce (U.S. ambassador in Paris) to 218

Acheson, 1 August 1949, RG 59, Box 5646, 840.00/8-149; report from Frances Willis (first secretary of the U.S. embassy in London) to Acheson, 2 August 1949, ibid., 840.00/8-249.

41. Minutes of the eleventh meeting of the AUC executive committee, 1 September 1949, Clayton Papers, Box 69, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee 3".

42. Letter from Roberts to Clayton, 3 October 1949, Clayton Papers, Box 69, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee 4"; minutes of the eight meeting of the AUC board of directors, 13 October 1949, AUC MSS, Box 96, Folder "Board of Diectors, 1949"; memorandum from Roberts to the members of the AUC board of directors, 2 November 1949, Clayton Papers, Box 69, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee 4"; and letter from Robert Bishop (AUC executive director) to Clayton, 22 December 1949, Clayton Papers, Box 69, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee 2". Freedom & Union 4 (December 1949), 18; New York Times 30 October 1949.

43. Memorandum from Howard Johnson (chief of of the division of international security affairs of the Office of United Nations Affairs) to Durward Sandifer (director of the Office of United Nations Affairs), 4 October 1949, RG 59, special lot file 55D323, Records of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs, 1941-1951, Box 2, Folder "Congressional Revision and Strengthening of UN."

44. Minutes of the 8th meeting of the board of directors, 13 October 1949, AUC MSS, Box 96, Folder "Board of Directors, 1949."

45. New York Times. 28 July 1949.

46. Minutes of the 3rd meeting of the PPS, 10 August 1949, RG 59, special lot file 64D563, Records of the PPS, 1947-1953, Box 32, Folder "Minutes of Meetings 1949"; memorandum from Johnson to Sandifer, 4 October 1949, RG 59, special lot file 55D323, Records of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs, 1941- 1951, Box 2, Folder "Congressional Revision and Strengthening of UN"; and memorandum from Johnson, 7 December 1949, ibid.

47. Richard D. McKinzie, Oral History Interview with Theodore Achilles, (Independence, MO: Harry S. Truman Library, 1976), 115. Achilles, "Fingerprints on History". 5-10.

48. Draft paper by Achilles, 15 December 1949, RG 59, special lot file 55D323, Records of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs, 1941-1951, Box 4, Folder "B-2." 219

49. Memorandum from Johnson to Hickerson (Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs), 16 December 1949, RG 59, Box 5651, 840.00/12-2249. In a mid-1949 departmental reshuffle Hickerson had moved from the Office of European Affairs to United Nations Affairs. Although still a committed atlanticist he tended, throughout 1949, to back up his subordinates in their fight to stop the department from endorsing the Atlantic Union resolution.

50. Draft paper by Achilles, 21 December 1949, RG 59, special lot file 55D323, Records of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs, 1941-1951, Box 4, Folder "B-2"; and summary of daily meeting with the secretary, 22 December 1949, RG 59, special lot files. Records of the Office of the Executive Secretariat, Summaries of Secretary's Daily Meetings, 1949- 1952, Box 1.

51. Some of the more important correspondents: Gardner Cowles to Acheson, 23 December 1949, RG 59, Box 5670, 840.00/12- 2349; Brand Blanshard to Acheson, 23 December 1949, ibid.; T. Martin to Acheson, 23 December 1949, ibid.; John Apperson to Acheson, 24 December 1949, ibid., 840.00/12-2449; H. W. Prentis, Jr. to Acheson, 28 December 1949, ibid., 840.00/12- 2849; David Jacobson to Acheson, 28 December 1949, ibid.; Foster Stearns to Acheson, 29 December 1949, ibid., 840.00/12- 2949; A. C. Marts to Acheson, 30 December 1949, ibid., 840.00/12-3049; Spyros Skouras to Acheson, 30 December 1949, ibid.; Percival Brundage to Acheson, 30 December 1949, ibid.

52. Summary of comments made by consultants on Atlantic Union and related matters, 5 January 1950, RG 59, special lot file 55D323, Records of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs, 1941- 1951, Box 2, Folder "Congressional Revision and Strengthening of UN"; memorandum from Lucius Battle to Acheson, 20 January 1950, ibid.

53. Draft position paper by Kennan, 27 December 1949, RG 59, special lot file. Records of the PPS, 1947-53, Box 27, Folder "Europe, 1949"; memorandum of conversation, 28 December 1949, RG 59, special lot file 55D323, Records of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs, 1941-1951, Box 2, Folder "Congressional Revision and Strengthening of UN."

54. Memorandum from Achilles to Rusk, 16 January 1950, with attached draft paper by Achilles, ibid.. Box 4, Folder "B-2."

55. Draft paper by Achilles, 25 January 1950, RG 59, 740.5/1- 2550; memorandum from Johnson, 26 January 1950, RG 59, special lot file 55D323, Records of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs, 1941-1951, Box 2, Folder "Congressional Revision and Strengthening of UN"; draft paper by Achilles, 3 220

February 1950, ibid.. Box 17, Folder "Atlantic Union S. Con. Res. 57-SD Position Thereon"; memorandum from Johnson to Hickerson, 6 February 1950, RG 59, Box 2388, 740.00/2-650.

56. Letter from Streit to Acheson, 14 February 1950, and attached reply from Hickerson to Streit, ibid., 740.00/2- 1450.

57. U.S. Congress, Senate, Thomas Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Revision of the United Nations Charter. Hearings. 81st Congress, 2nd session, 1950, 228-93, 298-313; New York Times. 9 February 1950; Harry S. Truman, announcement of first atomic explosion in the U.S.S.R., 23 Sept. 1949, in Public Papers of the Presidents; Harry S. Truman. 1949 (Washington, DC, 1964), 485; Wooley, Alternatives to Anarchy. 117.

58. U.S. Congress, Senate, Thomas Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Revision of the United nations Charter. Hearings. 81st Congress, 2nd session, 435- 57; editorial note, FRUS. 1950, vol. 2, 3-6; Wooley, Alternatives to Anarchy. 117-18.

59. U.S. Congress, Senate, "Senator Kefauver speaking in support of the Atlantic Union resolution, 13 March 1950," Congressional Record 96, 81st Congress, 2nd session, 3204-15; H. Schuyler Foster, Activism Replaces Isolationism; U.S. Public Attitudes. 1940-1975. (Washington, DC, 1983), 84-85.

60. Minutes of the ninth meeting of the AUC board of directors, 23 February 1950, AUC MSS, Box 96, Folder "Board of Directors, 1949"; letter from Roberts to Truman, 28 February 1950, Truman Papers, Official File, Box 1024, Folder "335-B Misc."; memorandum of AUC meeting at the home of Roberts, 22 March 1950, Clayton Papers, Box 84, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee 3"; letter from Streit to Charles E. Ross (presidential press secretary), 24 March 1950, Truman Papers, OF, Box 1024, Folder "335-B Misc."; letter from Streit to Ross, 30 March 1950, and attached reply from Ross to Streit, 12 April 1950, ibid. CHAPTER VI

SEARCHING FOR COMMON GROUND: THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND

THE ATLANTIC UNION MOVEMENT, FEBRUARY 1950-

DECEMBER 1951

In early 1950 the State Department and the Atlantic

Union movement found themselves in sharp opposition to each other with regard to the further development of America's relationship with its Western European allies. This conflict had been latent throughout 1949, and the department had tried to avoid a confrontation. But the February 1950 hearings before the Thomas subcommittee had left U.S. policymakers no choice but to clearly come out in opposition to the AUC and its program. In spite of this direct clash, the State

Department, throughout 1950, continuously sought to build bridges between itself and the AUC. At the same time, the

AUC refused to give up on the State Department. The result was an ever closer relationship, and ultimately, in 1951, the emergence of a real partnership between certain atlanticists within the State Department, such as Hickerson and Achilles, and moderate AUC leaders. This narrowing of differences

221 222

between the State Department and moderates within the

Atlantic Union movement coincided with an evolution in U.S.

foreign policy toward Western Europe. From mid-1950 on the

earlier emphasis on European integration was gradually

supplemented with a drive toward closer transatlantic

integration within the framework of the North Atlantic

Treaty. This change in policy required a strengthening, not

only of the North Atlantic Treaty's institutions, but also of

the Atlantic Community concept that formed the basis of

America's commitment to Western Europe.

Both of the above evolutions were closely connected and mutually reinforcing. On the one hand, increasing interest within the administration for the Atlantic Community concept facilitated the developing relationship between the

State Department and the AUC moderates. On the other hand, the growing partnership between AUC moderates and State

Department officials influenced the development of the administration's policy with regard to the strengthening of the Atlantic Community. By the end of 1951 this culminated in the emergence of a new atlanticism, inspired by the vision of the Atlantic Union movement, but attuned to the functional imperatives of the Truman Administration's foreign policy.

The State Department's stonewalling effectively buried the various world federalist resolutions in the Thomas subcommittee, and reduced to virtually zero the chances that 223

any of them would ever reach the Senate floor.i But while the

State Department continued to give the world government

advocates the cold shoulder, and held fast to its objections

to the resolutions before the Thomas subcommittee, it quickly

sought to conciliate the AUC. During late February and

throughout March 1950, Rusk, Hickerson, and several other

State Department officials assured various AUC leaders and

supporters that the department "was not nearly so hostile as

had been felt by some people," and regarded the public

perception that it was strongly opposed to the AUC's program

as "most unfortunate." Assistant Secretary of State for

Public Affairs Edward Barrett, the Director of the Office of

Western European Affairs, Theodore Achilles, and several

lower-level State Department officers held several meetings with AUC leaders in an attempt to build bridges between the department and the AUC leadership.2 And in early April 1950,

Secretary of State Dean Acheson invited Kefauver for a

friendly discussion about the developing North Atlantic

Community. Acheson assured Kefauver that the State

Department and the AUC were "working in the same direction."

There was only a difference in approach. The secretary of state was determined to work toward "maximum political unity" within the North Atlantic Community, but felt that the existing North Atlantic Treaty provided a much safer basis for this development than a risky convention. Acheson assured Kefauver that he was open to new ideas, as long as 224

they fitted within the framework of the alliance. And he

expressed the hope that the AUC would be willing to join him

in building a unified Atlantic Community on the basis of the

North Atlantic Treaty.3

There were several reasons for the State Department's

solicitous attitude toward the AUC in early 1950. One reason

was that the department itself was under siege and urgently

needed friends. Beginning in late January 1950, Acheson,

and the State Department as a whole, faced what the secretary

of state later called "the attack of the primitives." The

loss of China and the growing domestic anti-communist

hysteria inspired a wave of criticism of the secretary and

his policies, both in Congress and in the media.4 clearly,

this was no time to antagonize potential congressional

supporters like Kefauver or influential public figures like

Clayton. Kefauver, in consultation with the AUC, actually

delivered several speeches on the Senate floor defending

Acheson against his right-wing critics.s a s the AUC had hoped, the State Department did not fail to take note of this effort, and concluded that Kefauver and his AUC colleagues might be worthwile allies. Acheson therefore gave his blessing to those State Department officials, like Hickerson and Achilles, who wanted to cultivate a closer relationship with the AUC.6

Furthermore, the department genuinely felt that its response to the Atlantic Union resolution had been 225 interpreted as more negative than it really was. And it was somewhat taken aback by the criticism it had received in the press for its attitude.? As a matter of fact, the department remained internally deeply divided over its response to the

Atlantic Union movement. Achilles, for one, hoped that his earlier position papers might still form the basis for future cooperation with the AUC and for bringing the administration's policy closer to that embodied in the AUC program.8

The most important factor that brought the State

Department and the AUC closer together during early 1950 was a fundamental reconsideration of U.S. policy toward Great

Britain and Western Europe, undertaken by the department's top policy planners. Ever since the announcement of the

Marshall Plan in 1947, it had been U.S. policy to foster a progressively closer integration of Western Europe, including

Britain. The Truman Administration was convinced that only a united Europe would be cible to sustain the process of economic recovery, safeguard its political stability and democratic institutions, and build up its defenses against the potential security threat from the Soviet Union. Most

State Department officials considered British participation and leadership in this European integration process indispensable to help balance Germany, whose re-integration in the Western European community was deemed vital by the

Truman Administration for both economic and security reasons. 226

The British had indeed joined in setting up the Orgémization

for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and had taken the

initiative in organizing the Brussels Pact. Throughout 1948 and 1949, the State Department had based its long-term policy toward Western Europe on the continuation and deepening of this European integration process, looking in particular toward political unification under the Council of Europe.

But by late 1949, the British Labour government had become considerably less cooperative. Britain still thought of itself as a power with global interests, and was unwilling to give up its ties to the Commonwealth and the Sterling Bloc for the sake of integration with continental Europe. It consequently refused to go beyond its existing commitments to

Western Europe. And partly as a result of this British attitude, the European integration process seemed to be losing momentum by early 1950.@

Britain's refusal to go further down the road of

European integration caused a lot of frustration among State

Department planners, American diplomats in Europe, and

Western European governments. lo At the same time, several

American diplomats began to worry over what they saw as signs of a growing malaise in Western Europe. Western Europeans seemed to be losing faith, and there were signs of growing doubts about not just the British, but also the U.S. commitment to Europe.n Clearly, it was time for a thorough réévaluation of overall U.S. policy toward Great Britain and 227

Western Europe. The result was a protracted debate within the State Department, that lasted from late January 1950 to the American-Anglo-French foreign ministers conference in

London in May 1950.12 This debate ran in part along the same lines as the late 1949 debate over the Atlantic Union resolution, and it was within this context that the AUC program gained renewed attention within the State Department.

Most U.S. diplomats in Europe argued for "pushing" the

British into Europe. Pcurticularly within the Economic

Cooperation Administration (ECA), the autonomous agency administering the Marshall Plan, patience with the British was running short. But in Washington, many policymakers doubted that Britain could be forced into a European union.

Some, like PPS Director Kennan, argued that the U.S. should encourage the formation of a continental European federal union. Britain would stay out of this federation, but would join the U.S. and Canada in a separate Anglo-American

Atlantic Union that would support the Europeans on the continent and guarantee their security. But Kennan was very much in the minority, even within his own PPS. The PPS position paper on European integration was something of a compromise. It basically advocated encouraging further

British participation in the European integration process, while leaving open how deep the ultimate British commitment to Europe should be, and while also recognizing Britain's

Commonwealth commitments and its "special relationship" with 228

the U . S . 13

Other State Department officials, especially in the

Bureau of European Affairs, also recognized that it would be

impossible to force the British into Europe against their

will, but at the same time rejected both Kennan's ideas and

the PPS compromise. They believed that only active U.S. participation in the Western integration process could solve

Europe's long-term problems. This would restore European confidence, facilitate the integration of Germany into the

Western camp, and make it easier for the British to go along.

Of course this would imply a significant shift in the geographical scope of the integration process from one limited to Western Europe to one including the whole North

Atlantic area. Consequently, the North Atlantic Treaty, which was the only institutional framework binding the U.S. and Western Europe together, would become the main focus of the Western integration p r o c e s s .

One of the strongest and earliest advocates of the shift toward transatlantic integration was Achilles. But he was certainly not alone. Most of his colleagues and superiors in the Bureau of European Affairs shared his atlanticist i d e a s . is And the Office of European Regional

Affairs produced a position paper that drew heavily on

Achilles's earlier favorable assessment of the Atlantic Union resolution, and that advocated working toward a "gradual" but

"progressively closer" association of the U.S. and Western 229

Europe. 16 Equally strong support for Atlantic integration came from the Bureau of German Affairs and several ECA

officials. 17 The U.S. ambassadors in Europe were more cautious, but by March 1950 they too endorsed closer transatlantic cooperation in the economic and political

fields.18 By spring 1950, those favoring a shift toward transatlantic integration were clearly gaining the upper hand. On 7 March, Acheson, during a conference with his top advisors, indicated that he too now favored closer transatlantic integration within a strengthened North

Atlantic Treaty Organization. i9 This change in policy was facilitated by the departure of George Kennan, who had always opposed transatlantic integration, as director of the P P S . 20

If the North Atlantic Treaty was to become an important instrument of Western integration it would obviously need a greatly strengthened institutional structure to allow it to deal with economic and political, as well as military, matters. On the advice of the Bureau of European

Affairs, Acheson arranged for a tripartite conference with his British and French colleagues in London in May, to be followed immediately by a meeting of the North Atlantic

Council. Spurred by Achilles, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs George Perkins emphasized the need to seize this opportunity to reinvigorate the Atlantic Community concept and to transform the North Atlantic Treaty into 230

"something more than simply a form of military alliance."21

During April and early May 1950, officials within both

the Policy Planning Staff and the Office of European Regional

Affairs drafted blueprints for a new North Atlantic

organizational framework. Both offices advocated the creation of a permanent Atlantic Council, in which representatives of each country would work out a unified approach to common economic, political, and military problems

(a similar proposal had already been advanced publicly by the

French premier, Georges Bidault). The existing OEEC, NATO, and Council of Europe would become subsidiary organizations of this new Atlantic Council. The PPS paper, drafted by the new PPS Director Paul Nitze, was the most specific and included, among other features, a system of weighted voting within the Atlantic Council. Both drafts, however, clearly shied away from advocating the creation of a truly supranational organization that would absorb powers normally reserved for individual governments. The new organizational framework should, at least initially, "not go beyond arrangements for improving cooperation by sovereign states. "22

These drafts came in for hefty criticism from the more radical atlanticists within the department, Achilles, who commented scathingly that the PPS draft was "not as bad as I had expected," argued for a more daring approach. He applauded the Atlantic Council idea, but argued that the 231

Council, a body of government representatives, should be balanced by a Consultative Assembly along the lines of the

Council of Europe. If the new North Atlantic organization was to have a permanent administration, it should have a permanent parliament as well. Achilles strongly objected to the paper's desire to leave open the option of a European federation, within the North Atlantic Community. He argued that Atlantic, not European, federation should be the long­ term goal of the State Department. 23 other administration officials also called for a bolder program. Geoffrey Lewis, deputy director of the State Department's Bureau of German

Affairs also called for a Consultative Assembly, representing the Atlantic peoples, rather than their governments. Lewis further believed that the new Atlantic Community should be founded on "a basic document, whether a treaty or charter or something else."24 The most fundamental criticism came from

Richard M. Bissell, Jr., assistant administrator of the

Economic Cooperation Administration. Bissell called on the department to stop regarding national sovereignty as "the great shibboleth." In words that seemed to echo Streit,

Bissell argued that the administration should recognize that the time had come to merge or limit national sovereignties

"not only because the cold war requires a greater unification of free nations than was ever before needed in peace time but also because the free world cannot develop an effective and positive program of its own as an alternative to communism 232

without a much greater integration than now exists."25

Achilles, Lewis, and Bissell gave no indication that they

favored the immediate implementation of the whole AUC

program. But they clearly did support the creation of some

form of supranational Atlantic Union. And despatches from

allied capitals, indicating that there also was increasing

interest in some form of Atlantic Union among America's

alliance partners, obviously also strengthened the position

of the atlanticists within the state Department.26

In spite of his passionate advocacy for Atlantic

Union, Achilles realized full well that Acheson could not be

pushed that far that fast. The atlanticists within the State

Department had convinced the secretary of the merits of

closer transatlantic integration. But Acheson remained weary

of radical blueprints for new supranational organizations

that would limit U.S. flexibility. Furthermore, Acheson and

his top-level advisers were by no means ready to completely

abandon the European integration track. As a result, the

State Department remained divided over its new atlanticist course right up to the beginning of the ministerial meetings

in London in M a y . 27 as it turned out, the French Schuman Plan

for a European Coal and Steel Community, announced on 9 May

1950, just before the start of the London meetings, effectively resolved this debate, at least for the time being. 233

The Schuman Plan, an imaginitive proposal to pool

Western Europe's coal and steel industries, destroyed any chance for the early development of a new, truly

supranational. North Atlantic organization by preempting the field of economic integration. The Truman Administration quickly applauded this scheme as evidence of the kind of

European self-help and initiative that they had been looking for all along. The French, for their part, were opposed to the American proposals for a new North Atlantic Community based on the North Atlantic Treaty because they believed it would inevitably lead to German membership in NATO and early

German rearmament, a prospect they were still not willing to countenance. Indeed, the Schuman proposal was, at least in part, a brilliant move designed to forestall American intiatives to revive Germany by encapsulating Germany's key industries within a strong supranational European framework.

That same European supranational framework, that looked so appealing to the Americans, ensured a prompt British refusal to participate. And Acheson's enthusiastic support for the

French proposal caused a temporary rift between him and his

British counterpart. The result was that the London North

Atlantic Council meeting fell far short of the grandiose plans developed by the atlanticists in the State Department.

The London meetings did succeed in "putting the O in NATO," by turning the alliance into a permanent organization with a plethora of committees and boards. The French and British, 234

always eager to tighten the U.S. security commitment to

Western Europe, were more than happy to agree to a

strengthened NATO. But the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization remained a purely military body, and its new

permanent Council of Deputies (CD) was much less of an executive body, with real authority, than originally envisaged by the State Department p l a n n e r s . 28

Acheson, who consistently showed far less enthusiasm for supranational schemes than his advisers, was quite happy with the outcome of the London meetings. Shortly after his return to Washington, Acheson reaffirmed, in a letter to

Clayton, his desire for more effective cooperation among the

North Atlantic democracies. But in the same letter, the secretary more explicitly than ever rejected the AUC's

"constitutional" approach to this problem. The only acceptable and feasible approach was a gradual and functional one. The London meetings, by creating a limited but permanent organization around the North Atlantic Treaty, had laid the basis for such an approach. From this moment on the creation of an Atlantic Community became, in Acheson's mind at least, synonymous with the further development of NATO.29

The emergence of NATO as a permanent forum for North

Atlantic cooperation would ultimately lead to the definitive defeat of the AUC's original "constitutional" approach as it was embodied in the Atlantic Union resolution. The moderate atlanticist trend in State Department policy, combined with 235

the lack of progress in getting the Atlantic Union resolution through Congress, quickly started to affect the AUC. As early as April 1950, some members of the AUC board of directors began to waiver and urged their colleagues to seek a compromise with the State Department. They argued that a functional approach, that would build on the North Atlantic

Treaty, was a perfectly valid way to work for the ultimate goal of a supranational Atlantic Union.

This issue was first raised by the Reverend A. Powell

Davies, a long-time friend of Streit and contributing editor to Streit's magazine Freedom & Union, and Henry Flower, a businessman who was the chairman of the AUC Public Relations

Committee. Davies argued that Acheson had been right all along when he said that the American public was not ready for the AUC program, and pointed to the increasing McCarthyite attacks on the State Department as proof. Under these circumstances, all internationalists should support the secretary, rather than put further pressure on him with their own specific proposals. Davies, who felt that he could defend Acheson better against his critics if he was not affiliated with any federalist groups, resigned from the AUC board. Flower did not go so far. He believed the AUC should keep pushing its long-term program. But it should be ready to modify its short-term tactics, such as the Atlantic Union resolution, in order to make them more palatable to the State

Department. It quickly became clear that behind Flower stood 236 the influential chairman of the AUC executive committee, Hugh

Moore, as well as several other leading AUC figures. Streit and the radical federalists within the AUC, for their part, expected little or nothing from NATO. They pointed to the

AUC's still impressive support in Congress and to opinion polls showing that American public support for an Atlantic

Union was growing. By seeking a compromise with the State

Department, the radicals argued, the AUC would only confuse its supporters. At the 13 April 1950 meeting of the AUC executive committee Streit carried the day. The committee agreed to recommend to the full board that the AUC continue pursuing its original aims.3o But in the following months those willing to compromise with the State Department would grow in strength.

The growing dissension within AUC ranks was the logical result of the realization that after more than a year of hard work the AUC had little to show for its efforts. It was true that the committee had grown into a significant nationwide organization, with dozens of local chapters and hundreds of prominent supporters. The AUC had generated a lot of media attention and support, and had periodically buried both President Truman and Secretary Acheson under avalanches of letters urging support for the Atlantic Union program. 31 But all this had not been translated into concrete results. The Atlantic Union resolution was still holed up in the Thomas subcommittee and there was no prospect that the 237 administration would endorse the AUC's program as it stood.

And without administration support, the AUC's goals would never be realized. It was clear, however, both from official statements and personal contacts with State Department officers, that the administration was moving toward a long­ term policy of fostering transatlantic integration. 32 under these circumstances, it was understandable that moderates within the AUC wanted to try to find common ground with the

State Department. Throughout 1950, however, the majority within the AUC continued to support Streit's no-compromise position.

The outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950 gave a new impetus to the AUC's campaign. This new crisis, and the initial North Korean military successes, made radical measures like the Atlantic Union resolution look appealing.

The world was on the brink of another global war, Clayton wired President Truman, and only Atlantic Union could safeguard the p e a c e . 33 During the first months of the Korean

War the AUC leadership aggressively lobbied the State

Department and met several times with Acheson. They believed they could exploit the secretary's weak political position and the public perception that his policies had f a i l e d . 34

Again the AUC leaders would be sorely disappointed. Acheson did not budge and in early September 1950 the Thomas subcommittee released its final report. It recommended that no further action be taken on any of the federalist 238

resolutions, thereby definitively killing the Atlantic Union

resolution. 35

Streit was disappointed but undeterred. The moderates

within the AUC, for their part, seized this opportunity to

renew their demand for a more flexible program. This time

Hugh Moore took the lead. Supported by Flower and other moderates on the board, as well as by the influential

California chapters of the AUC, he proposed that the AUC

introduce a revised resolution in Congress in January 1951.

In early September 1950, the AUC and the State Department had

formed a contact group to work out their differences. This was an outgrowth of a meeting, in August, between Acheson and

a delegation of congressional AUC supporters, at which both

sides had agreed to try to bury the hatchet and cooperate.

Moore proposed that the AUC representatives in this contact

group find out what would be acceptable to the State

Department and report back to the executive committee. The

AUC leadership could then revise the Atlantic Union resolution accordingly, and hope for better results than in

1949-50. Streit, supported by radical federalists like public opinion analyst Elmo Roper, strongly opposed Moore's suggestion. The radicals wanted to reintroduce the Atlantic

Union resolution as it stood. Roper passionately argued that the AUC should continue its role as a trailblazer, not become an adjunct of the cautious State Department. 36 t o the radicals, safeguarding their vision of the future was more 239

important than broadening their immediate base of political

support. This internal debate continued to rage throughout

the end of 1950.

By early January 1951, Streit was able to prevail, at

least temporarily, both within the AUC board of governors

(the new name for the board of directors in the reorganized

AUC structure) and in its executive committee. The board

agreed to immediately reintroduce the Atlantic Union

resolution in Congress, and to postpone introduction of an

alternative resolution, revised along the lines suggested by

Hugh Moore, to allow for further study. The moderates within

the AUC were unable to push through their own proposals

because they were unable to come up with a single alternative

resolution on which they could all agree, and also to a large

extent because they were as yet unwilling to openly break

with Streit.37

On 15 January 1951 Kefauver reintroduced the AUC

resolution in the Senate. Twenty-six other senators joined him as sponsors. The 1951 resolution did not differ

substantially from its predecessor. It had been revamped to take into account the effects of the Korean War and the evolution of NATO, and left somewhat more leeway to the executive branch. But in essence it still called on the president to organize a federal convention of the North

Atlantic democracies.38 Meanwhile, by February 1951, the moderates within the AUC gave up on the idea of an 240

alternative resolution.39

In some ways, the AUC seemed stronger than ever. Its advisory council now numbered 523 members, and it had 112 local chapters in 42 states, as well as affiliated committees in Belgium, Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Norway. In

June 1950 the Canadian Senate had virtually unanimously passed a resolution favoring the creation of an Atlantic

Union, and recent visits to Canada by Streit and other AUC leaders had been quite successful. Clearly, the AUC had successfully strengthened its organization, shored up its grass roots support, and sparked action among overseas symphatizers. But at the same time, the committee had been singularly unsuccessful in clearing away the obstacles it still faced in Congress. Even a relatively radical federalist like Kefauver had to admit that lack of administration support was still preventing a lot of senators from endorsing the AUC program. Indeed, in some ways the climate on Capitol Hill was more hostile toward the AUC in early 1951 than one year earlier. During 1950, the AUC, like several other world or regional federalist groups, had become the target of groups like the National Sovereignty Campaign and the Daughters of the American Revolution. These groups staunchly opposed any dilution of U.S. sovereignty, and in various books and pamphlets they denounced all world and regional federalists as traitors. They also took their case to Congress, and, since they could often count on significant 241 support among veterans' groups, many federal legislators were not eager to alienate these groups by associating themselves with proposals such as the Atlantic Union resolution. 40

AUC moderates, like Hugh Moore, saw the writing on the wall. In spite of Streit's enthusiasm, they did not believe the Atlantic Union resolution stood any chance in Congress.

Fearful of the nationalist backlash, discouraged by the lack of strong congressional support, stymied in their attempts to change the AUC resolution, and eager for a way to join forces with State Department atlanticists, the moderate AUC leaders desperately sought for a new road to Atlantic Union. During the first months of 1951 they found just that. In early

January 1951, Kenneth Lindsay, a former British member of parliament and junior minister who symphatized with the

Atlantic Union movement, sent a memorandum to several AUC leaders. In this memorandum Lindsay presented a plan for an

Atlantic congress of several hundred prominent private citizens. This nongovernmental congress would include citizens from the countries that had been the original sponsors of the North Atlantic Treaty and would study ways to strengthen the Atlantic Community. Lindsay presented his plan as a way to get action toward realizing the AUC's program without having to wait for passage of the Atlantic

Union resolution. The citizens' congress would fulfill roughly the same function as the federal convention proposed by Streit. Its mission statement would be more vague and 242 would not involve the development of a blueprint for an

Atlantic federal union. But Lindsay fully expected that the citizens' congress would endorse the creation of such a union, at least as a long-term goal. The other main difference between the Lindsay and Streit proposals was that the citizens' congress would be a private affair. Its members would not act as representatives of their respective governments, and the NATO governments would neither sponsor nor fund the congress. These differences, Lindsay argued, would make the citizens' congress acceptable to the State

Department. Furthermore, once a representative group like the citizens' congress had endorsed the idea of an Atlantic

Union, it would be much harder for the State Department to block the AUC program in C o n g r e s s . *i This proposal, soon dubbed the Atlantic Citizens' Congress (ACC), came as a godsend to the moderates within AUC leadership, who embraced

Lindsay's proposal as a promising alternative to the stalled

Atlantic Union resolution.

The AUC moderates were particularly hopeful that the

ACC could serve as the basis for closer cooperation with the

State Department. By early 1951 the informal State

Department-AUC contact group had produced a lot of understanding and goodwill between the AUC moderates and the

State Department's atlanticists, but no concrete results.

The AUC representatives were held, by their executive committee, to the existing Atlantic Union resolution. This 243

left little room for compromise with the State Department which was already on record as opposing the AUC resolution.

As a result of this lack of common ground the AUC-State

Department talks were going nowhere. The fact that the AUC's

strongest supporter within the department, Theodore Achilles, had left Washington during the summer of 1950 to take up his new post as U.S. vice-deputy on the North Atlantic Council in

London also didn't help.42 Achilles, whose personal position was close to that of the AUC moderates, had shared with them his earlier proposals for an Atlantic Consultative Assembly, modelled after the Council of Europe. This assembly, consisting of delegations from the national parliaments of the NATO countries, would be a useful way of associating the parliamentarians with the alliance and ensuring their continued support for it. Achilles believed that there was considerable support, both within the department and among the NATO allies, for such an assembly, which he saw as a first, limited step toward an Atlantic Union. And he urged his friends within the AUC to support this concept. The more moderate AUC leaders, such as Hugh Moore and William Clayton, were receptive to this idea. Lindsay had drawn the inspiration for his proposal from the origins of the Council of Europe and consequently his Atlantic Citizens' Congress looked like a possible first step toward Achilles's Atlantic

Consultative Assembly, and a promising basis for compromise with the State Department. 43 244

The ACC idea was first discussed within the AUC in

January 1951. From then on, it was the subject of heated discussions at virtually every board and executive committee meeting of 1951. Hugh Moore, who, together with Clayton, was quickly emerging as the most powerful spokesman for the moderates within the AUC, argued that since the committee had failed to "sell its product" via the Atlantic Union resolution it should now try Lindsay's new approach. Streit, supported by a steadily diminishing number of board members, strongly dissented. He recognized the value of the public support that a successful Atlantic congress might generate.

But he argued that the AUC should stick to its guns, and push the Atlantic Union resolution without letting itself be diverted by new initiatives. Streit feared the ACC for exactly the same reason that the AUC moderates welcomed it.

He too realized that it would be much more acceptable to the

State Department and feared that the department might support the ACC in order to divert attention, and support, away from the AUC resolution.44 But the ACC proposal was too appealing to too many frustrated AUC leaders for Streit to able to kill it.45 And in April, while Streit was on a European tour, the executive committee agreed to set up an ad hoc committee to study how the ACC proposal might be implemented.46 The ACC thus remained very much alive as an alternative around which the AUC moderates could unite. 245

While the AUC debated the relative merits of the

Lindsay plan and the Atlantic Union resolution, the State

Department was groping for ways to stimulate public support for NATO, as well as interest in the larger Atlantic

Community concept. In late 1950 the U.S. and its allies, fearing a repetition in Western Europe of what had already occurred in Korea, had agreed on an enormous NATO defense build-up. The alliance was to get real teeth in the form of integrated military forces that would be capable of resisting a massive Soviet attack. The Truman Administration had agreed to contribute by sending additional U.S. divisions to

Europe and assigning an American supreme commander for the

NATO forces, in effect, the Korean War had helped to further militarize Washington's containment policy, and in this context the importance of the NATO alliance for America's overall foreign policy increased. 47 This was much in evidence in Acheson's January 1951 briefing for General Eisenhower, the new NATO supreme commander, in which the secretary emphasized that NATO had become "a most fundamental part of our foreign p o l i c y . "48

But by early 1951 it became clear that the administration's commitment to NATO was not without its critics. There was considerable public criticism of NATO's burdensome decision-making process and bloated committee structure. And many observers expressed doubts that

Eisenhower could be a really effective supreme commander 246 unless NATO was thoroughly reorganized. These criticisms came not only from the administration's domestic detractors, but also from many of its sympathizers and from allied governments (especially the Canadians). Clearly, Assistant

Secretary of State for European Affairs George Perkins argued in early Jcinuary 1951, it was time to revisit the issue of

NATO's organizational and institutional framework. Perkins recognized that, for the moment at least, NATO reorganization would have to be limited in scope, if only because the administration itself had as yet no coherent plan for long- range institutional changes within the alliance.

Nevertheless he believed it was worthwile to start exploring steps that might lead, at some indeterminate future date, to a revamped NATO, with real delegated powers and stronger institutions. 49

There was not only criticism of NATO's inefficiency.

The congressional "Great Debate" of January and February

1951, over the decision to send additional American troops to

Europe, demonstrated that the administration's commitment to

NATO itself was not without its challengers and temporarily put any plans for revamping the alliance on hold.so But in the end this challenge only reinforced the rationale for strengthening NATO. Under fire from Republican senators, the powerful China lobby, and other domestic critics, the administration felt the need not only to streamline the alliance but also to develop a broader base of support for 247

its NATO policy among the general public. There was a

consensus among the State Department's policy planners that

the best way to go about this was to further develop and

propagandize the Atlantic Community concept that formed the

rationale for the U.S. commitment to NATO.si How this was to

be done became the focus of renewed debate within the

department.

A renewed effort to revitalize the Atlantic Community concept inevitably forced the State Department to reevaluate

its attitude toward the strongest and most vocal supporters

of that concept, the Atlantic Union movement. None of the department's top policymakers was ready for the AUC's constitutional approach, embodied in the revamped Atlantic

Union resolution. On the other hand, the department's official reaction to the réintroduction of the AUC resolution stood in marked contrast to its response, a year earlier, to the first resolution. Even the Bureau of United Nations

Affairs (still a center of opposition to Atlantic Union) was eager to avoid another "head-on clash" like in February 1950.

When the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked the department to comment on Kefauver's new resolution, it went out of its way not to sound too negative. Instead of dismissing the resolution, Acheson now agreed that it should be thoroughly studied by the Congress, and he suggested that the Congress and/or the president might even appoint a special commission of experts to study the best ways to 248 develop the Atlantic Coimunity.52

Of course the State Department's non-committal response to the Atlantic Union resolution was designed primarily to buy time, which would allow the department to come up with viable alternatives to the radical AUC program.

Nevertheless, the department's more open-minded attitude did not fail to register with the AUC leadership. Especially the moderates within the AUC leadership felt encouraged by what they saw as an outstretched hand that should not be refused.53

And they quickly sent their own signals to make clear that they too were still interested in accommodation with the administration. In January the AUC had put out statements regarding NATO, which the State Department considered decidedly unhelpful. Although these statements expressed strong support for General Eisenhower they were, in effect, sharp critiques of NATO's inefficiency.54 in February, with

Streit in Europe and strong indications that the State

Department was responding with an open mind to the 1951

Atlantic Union resolution, the AUC changed its tune. The executive committee now urged all AUC members to come out in strong support of NATO in the Great Debate. The AUC ceased all public criticism of NATO and dispatched several of its leaders (Roberts, Patterson, and Clayton) to testify before congressional committees in support of the administration's policies. 55 249

The stage thus seemed set for a reconciliation between the AUC and the State Department. The AUC had planned a joint meeting of its national council and board of governors in Washington on 16-18 May 1951. This meeting would bring together all of the committee's most important leaders and members, and its congressional supporters, in a grand attempt to regain its earlier momentum. In what the AUC leadership interpreted as an auspicious move, the State Department decided to take advantage of this by organizing its own consultative conference on the strengthening of the North

Atlantic Community on 16-17 May and by inviting Roberts,

Patterson, Clayton, and several other AUC leaders to participate. Acheson also agreed to meet with the AUC leadership on 17 M a y . se

The AUC leaders came to Washington with great hopes for future cooperation between their movement and the administration. The awakening was a rude one, especially for the moderates like Clayton and Hugh Moore. During the meetings of the State Department's consultative conference the AUC leaders tried to present their program as the only definitive and fundamental solution for NATO's problems. But their administration counterparts stuck to the position that the AUC's program was too radical for immediate implementation and would need long and careful study. What was needed now were not ambitious (and simplistic) visions of

Atlantic federation but rather concrete, practical steps that 250 would strengthen NATO's cohesion and solidarity. Even more discouraging was the attitude of the outside consultants who did not belong to the AUG. Most of them simply dismissed the

AUC's ideas as dangerous nonsense. The administration's representatives, most of whom were strong atlanticists from the State Department's European Bureau, were less scornful and made clear that they were still open to cooperation with the Atlantic Union movement on new, more practical ideas.

The AUC's present program, however, was clearly dead on arrival. s?

The meeting with Acheson proved equally disappointing.

The AUC sent a strong delegation that included three former under secretaries of state (Clayton, Joseph Grew, and William

Phillips) and an impressive array of congressional supporters. The secretary, like his subordinates in the consultative meetings, was conciliatory but firm. The administration could not support the Atlantic Union resolution before it had been studied and scrutinized carefully by both Congress and the public at large. This was a clear death sentence for the Atlantic Union resolution.

But in a pitch that was clearly directed at the AUC moderates

Acheson emphasized that the department remained open to new, more practical ideas. In this context the secretary again stated his willingness to support the creation, by Congress, of a special commission to study the best ways to further develop the Atlantic Community. And he also indicated that 251

an unofficial atlantic citizens' convention, as opposed to the official federal convention envisaged in the Atlantic

Union resolution, might be helpful. This last statement, an open reference to the ACC plan, was a clear signal to the AUC moderates. ss

The AUC moderates did not fail to respond to the signal from the State Department. Their experiences in

Washington led them to the unescapable conclusion that the existing AUC program was a dead end.59 By the end of May they told Lindsay that they were now ready to move ahead with his

ACC proposal. 50 in early June Hugh Moore organized a preliminary meeting of like-minded AUC leaders to explore how they might proceed. He found broad agreement that it was time to deemphasize the Atlantic Union resolution, which was hanging like an albatross around the neck of the whole

Atlantic Union movement, and to explore new ideas. The most promising of those ideas seemed to be the ACC proposal.6i

During the summer Moore, Flower, Clayton, and several others started forming a parallel group outside the AUC. Using his own financial resources, Moore hired a small staff to draw up a program to turn the ACC from proposal into reality. He was determined to come up with a program that would be practical and acceptable to the administration.62 The State Department, for its part, heartily encouraged this moderate trend within the Atlantic Union movement and continued to comment 252 favorably on the ACC concept.63

Within the AUC executive committee Streit continued to fight tooth and nail against any deviation from his original program. He refused to accept that the Atlantic Union resolution was doomed and made clear that he was determined to continue fighting for it, alone if necessary. Although most members of the AUC leadership now agreed with Hugh Moore on the dim prospects for the AUC's original program, it proved impossible to overcome Streit's opposition within the executive committee. As Owen Roberts pointed out, the executive committee simply had no mandate to change or amend the AUC's program without consulting the AUC membership. And if that membership was confronted with an all-out conflict between the moderates and Streit, the AUC was unlikely to survive. Streit was able to prevent the moderates from changing the AUC's priorities. But he couldn't change reality in Congress. A clear indication that the Atlantic

Union resolution was doomed was the decision by Kefauver,

Streit's strongest supporter in Congress, to reduce his efforts to get the resolution passed. The Tennessee senator wanted to focus more completely on his high-profile, and hugely popular, crime investigation, which he saw as a platform for a possible try for either the presidency or vice­ presidency. Kefauver's role as point man for the AUC in

Congress was now taken over by Senator Guy M. Gillette (D- lA), who was much more symphatetic to the moderate wing of 253

the Atlantic Union movement and who began his own search for

alternatives to the Atlantic Union resolution. «4

Meanwhile, the State Department continued its own

search for ways to strengthen both NATO and the Atlantic

Community. A lot of the pressure, in the spring and summer of 1951, to strengthen the Atlantic Community came from

America's allies, many of whom felt that the U.S. had the tendency to see NATO too much as a purely military alliance.

This impression stemmed, at least in part, from increased

U.S. pressure, in the wake of the Korean War, for increased

European defense efforts, and more burden-sharing. This

American pressure translated into American support for greater European economic, military, and political integration. European economic integration, through a strengthened OEEC, would allow the Europeans to produce more military goods more efficiently. And European military and political integration, along the lines of the French proposal for a supra-national European Defense Community (EDC), seemed to offer the best way to tap Germany's resources in the build­ up of the West's military strength. But many of America's allies wanted transatlantic integration to keep pace with

European integration. This required a much stronger NATO, with more emphasis on the non-military aspects of the

Atlantic Community that formed the basis for the alliance.65

How the U.S. should respond to the pressure, both from its

European allies and from domestic groups like the AUC, for a 254

strengthened Atlantic Community became the focus of renewed discussions within the State Department. These discussions began in May 1951, as the department began preparations for the upcoming ministerial North Atlantic Council meeting,

scheduled for the f a ll.ee initially Nitze and the PPS tried to recycle their May 1950 paper. 67 But the focus of discussions within the department quickly shifted to the

Bureau of European Affairs which was dominated by committed atlanticists.

During July Acheson's advisers easily reached agreement on how the NATO organization should be streamlined and strengthened. The U.S. would propose to transform NATO from a collection of intergovernmental committees into a real international organization. To achieve this the allies would create a permanent NATO international staff, that would take over as many of the North Atlantic Council's responsibilities as possible. This international staff would take care of the day-to-day business of the alliance, without having to clear everything with each individual NATO government. 68

These proposed organizational changes were not controversial, either within the State Department or within the alliance. But during July and August the atlanticists within the State Department and the Foreign Service urged the administration to move far beyond a mere organizational restructuring of the alliance. The strongest and most influential among these atlanticist voices were those of 255

Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup and NATO Vice Deputy

Theodore Achilles. Both argued that merely streamlining NATO would do nothing to meet the European criticism that the U.S. saw the alliance only as a Cold War military instrument.

What was needed was an imaginative approach to the non­ military aspects of the transatlantic relationship.

Reviewing the departmental record since May 1950, Jessup argued that America's European policy was unfocused, confused, and short-sighted. It was high time the department started looking beyond the immediate military concerns of the

Cold War toward the long-term future of U.S.-Western European relations. Over the long term the economic and political aspects of that relationship were at least as important as the military ones. In that context it was time to start pushing for the same kind of economic and political coordination and cooperation within the Atlantic framework, as the U.S. was sponsering within Europe.^9 Achilles fully agreed with Jessup's analysis and kept bombarding the department with telegrams indicating strong support among

America's allies for economic and political cooperation and integration within an expanded and strengthened NATO framework. 70

The Bureau of European Affairs strongly supported

Jessup's and Achilles's ideas. The question was how to incorporate them in the agenda of the upcoming North Atlantic

Council, and, beyond that, how to develop long-term 256

strategies for transatlantic economic and political

integration within the NATO framework. The Office of

European Regional Affairs proposed that the U.S. seize the

initiative and put a discussion of the development of the

Atlantic Community, under article 2 of the North Atlantic

Treaty, on the agenda for the North Atlantic Council meeting.

The U.S. would urge its allies to issue a statement formally

expressing their desire to further develop the Atlantic

Community, and would suggest the appointment of an ad-hoc

committee of the North Atlantic Council to explore ways of

implementing this policy.Achilles endorsed this proposal,

and after sounding out his fellow NATO deputies he suggested

that the Council's ad-hoc committee should be made up of the

representatives of Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands,

and Norway. This would weigh the committee decisively on the

side of the most atlanticist alliance governments.’2

The atlanticists within the State Department, especially Edwin Martin and Theodore Achilles, also consciously tried to steer the development of a long-term

strategy to foster greater transatlantic integration in the direction of the ACC plan then being put together by the moderates within the Atlantic Union movement. The best way to follow up on the work of the North Atlantic Council's ad- hoc committee would be to set up national private committees, coordinated by a single, semi-official NATO advisory committee. These committees would study the problems facing 257

the Atlantic Community and would organize an Atlantic

convention where they would explore how the Atlantic

Community might be strengthened so as to be able to deal

better with these p r o b l e m s . 73

By no means everybody within the State Department

subscribed to the ideas of Jessup, Achilles, and the Bureau

of European Affairs. The Bureau of United Nations Affairs

remained a center of opposition to everything that looked

like Atlantic U n i o n . 74 But the most important, and most

fundamental, opposition to the atlanticists came from the

PPS. The PPS fully agreed with the need to streamline and

strengthen NATO. But it rejected the atlanticists' analysis

of the long-term transatlantic relationship as destined to

include economic and political integration comparable to that within Europe. The U.S. was urging the Europeans to

consummate their political and economic integration because

this was the only policy that would ensure Europe's long-term

stability and prosperity. The PPS saw no similar imperative

in the transatlantic relationship. NATO was a purely

"Platonic relationship," designed, over the short term, to

strengthen Europe's security, and, over the long term, to ensure continued solidarity, but not integration, between the

U.S. and Western Europe. Trying to equate European and

Atlantic integration would only detract from the vital

European integration effort, and thereby prevent the attainment of the administration's most important European 258 policy goals.75

Acheson generally shared the PPS's aversion to turning

NATO into a forum for non-military integration. He had never cared very much for the "Canadian" article 2 of the North

Atlantic Treaty. And he was not eager to see it resuscitated by an ad-hoc committee of the North Atlantic Council. But his reluctance yielded before continued pressure from

Achilles and U.S. NATO deputy Charles Spofford. Both

Spofford and Achilles made clear that without renewed attention to the economic and political aspects of the

Atlantic Community the NATO allies were likely to lose their appetites for military burden-sharing. Although Acheson remained reluctant, he agreed to support a strong statement on NATO's non-military objectives and on the further development of the Atlantic Community at the upcoming North

Atlantic Council. And he also agreed to propose the setting up of an ah-hoc commision to study this i s s u e . 76

In mid-September 1951, at Ottawa, the North Atlantic

Council duly issued a statement on the further development of the North Atlantic Community, promising coordination on foreign policy, close economic, financial, and social cooperation, and collaboration in the fields of culture and public information. The Council also readily agreed to set up a so-called "Group of Five" to explore this issue and report back to the Council on practical steps the allies might take.77 The Group of Five, which began its work in mid- 259

October, officially consisted of the NATO deputies from

Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway. But

Achilles participated in most of their meetings, hoping to push them toward his own moderate Atlantic Union ideas.78

At the same time that the atlanticists within the

State Department succeeded in pushing for a renewed study of political and economic integration within NATO, they also made progress outside the framework of the alliance. During the second half of 1951 they seized upon two initiatives that seemed to hold great promise for close and effective cooperation with the Atlantic Union movement. In late

January 1951 Senator Gillette sent copies of the AUC resolution to various parliamentary groups in Europe, asking for their comments and urging closer consultation between the parliamentarians of the Atlantic democracies. Initially there was little response. But in April several atlanticists within the Assembly of the Council of Europe, at Strasbourg, took up Gillette ' s initiative. so m May they pushed a resolution through the Council that referred to the Atlantic

Union resolution and to their own desire for transatlantic parliamentary contacts. Most significantly, the resolution invited the U.S. Congress to send representatives to

Strasbourg to discuss the common problems of the Atlantic

Community and how to deal with them.si The State Department's

Bureau of European Affairs immediately strongly endorsed such a meeting.S2 Acheson was far less enthusiastic. He feared it 260 would revitalize the Atlantic Union campaign and might even lead to a proposal for some form of Atlantic parliamentary assembly. But the secretary also realized that a negative

American response might be interpreted as a repudiation of the Council of Europe, something which might have serious negative consequences for the European integration process.

He therefore did not oppose Gillette when the latter, in

July, introduced a resolution in the Senate, providing for the appointment of a congressional delegation to go to

Strasbourg.83 The resolution, S. Con. 36, passed both the

Senate and the House in October. 84 The congressional delegation travelled to Strasbourg in November and met, not just with the Assembly of the Council of Europe, but also with Achilles. Achilles seized this opportunity to urge the senators and representatives to continue these transatlantic parliamentary contacts, which he and his atlanticist friends in Washington hoped might lead to an Atlantic or NATO

Assembly modelled on the Council of Europe.85

While they encouraged congressional contacts with the

Council of Europe, the atlanticists within the State

Department also wanted to make good on the secretary's promise, during the May meeting with the AUC, to support the creation of a congressional commission to study the further development of the Atlantic Community.86 During the summer the Bureau of European Affairs, which had suggested the idea of such a commission to the secretary in the first place. 261 decided to follow through. The bureau drafted a proposal for a commission of private experts, appointed jointly by the president and Congress. The commission would be free to study the full scope of transatlantic relations, not just

NATO alone. The bureau presented its proposal to Achilles, the AUC leadership, and the AUC supporters in Congress, all of whom reacted favorably.87 senators Gillette and Sparkman

(D-AL), both long-time AUC supporters, introduced the bill

(S. 2269) to create an Atlantic study commission in the

Senate on 13 October, ss it quickly gained support but, because of a busy agenda, could not be acted upon before the new year.89

With the initiation of transatlantic parliamentary contacts and the introduction of the Atlantic study commission bill in Congress the atlanticists within the State

Department and the AUC moderates had laid down two important building blocs for further progress toward their common goal in 1952. And by the end of 1951 they were also ready to move ahead with their most ambitious initiative, the ACC. After the preparatory work during the summer, and faced with continued stalemate within the AUC executive committee, Hugh

Moore and his fellow-travellers were ready to break with

Streit and move ahead without him or the AUC. After a crucial, and indecisive joint meeting of the AUC leadership and their congressional supporters, Hugh Moore resigned as chairman and member of the AUC executive committee. In his 262

resignation letter he blasted those who refused to change

their dogmatic approach and indicated that he now considered

himself free to pursue his own road to Atlantic Union.9°

After further consultations with State Department officials, Hugh Moore and the other leading AUC moderates met in New York, on 8 November 1951, to found the Organizing

Committee for the Atlantic Citizens Congress. The Committee would work out a detailed prospectus for the ACC, which it hoped to organize in early 1953; recruit prominent Americans to join it in the American Council for the ACC; hire a research staff to produce a detailed study of the major problems facing the Atlantic Community, as well as a blueprint for the ACC; and solicit funding for its projects from major foundations. First of all, though, the ACC committee wanted to secure the cooperation of the State

Department. After their three-year experience with the AUC,

Moore, Clayton, and the other ACC promoters were not about to make the same mistake again. The State Department's cooperation with Senator Gillette on the Strasbourg meeting and the Atlantic study commission clearly indicated that the department was willing to support private initiatives if they fit into its overall policy. The ACC group was determined to make sure that this would be the case with their initiative.si

Assistant Secretary of State Hickerson, still a leading atlanticist within the department and also a long­ time personal friend of Clayton, had already commented 263

favorably on the ACC plan and agreed to meet with a

delegation from the ACC committee on 3 January 1952. The

delegation, headed by Hugh Moore and Joseph Grew, presented

Hickerson with their first draft prospectus for the ACC.

Their aim was twofold. First of all they wanted the

department's comments on their proposal. This would allow

them to coordinate their efforts with the department's

overall policy, and secure the administration's continued

support. They also wanted the department to support their

application for funds from major foundations. Hickerson

proved most encouraging on both scores. He warmly endorsed

the ACC concept and agreed to continue consulting with the

committee. And the assistant secretary also promised to

intervene with the Ford Foundation, which he believed was the

most promising source of funds for the ACC p r o j e c t . 92

As the ACC group moved closer to full cooperation with

the State Department, Streit and his followers within the AUC moved in the opposite direction. In December 1951 they put

out a public statement that was openly critical of the lack

of rapid progress toward real integration in N A T O . This

development caused some concern within the State Department

and further increased the department's willingness to support

private groups, like the ACC group, that were willing to lend

support to N A T O . 93 264

By early 1952 American atlanticism was clearly at a crossroads. The demise of the second attempt to push the

Atlantic Union resolution through Congress, and the break between moderates and radical federalists, signalled that the role of the Atlantic Union Committee, and of the radical federalist Atlantic Union movement as a whole, was now played out. But alternatives to this movement were now in place.

Although the Ottawa and Rome meetings of the North Atlantic

Council proved big disappointments to Streit and his followers, they did hold out at least the promise of continued progress toward non-military transatlantic integration within the NATO framework. Within the Group of

Five, set up at Ottawa to study precisely this issue, and within both the Council of Europe and the American Congress there was increasing pressure for the creation of some sort of transatlantic parliamentary association to foster closer political and economic understanding and cooperation. And everybody, including the top level of the Truman

Administration, seemed to share the desire to streamline and reorganize NATO and turn it into a more effective organization. The atlanticists within the State Department and the Foreign Service were determined to seize these opportunities in order to construct a stronger and more closely integrated Atlantic Community on the NATO foundations. At the same time some of the "best and brightest" within the private Atlantic Union movement, who 265 had gathered around the Atlantic Citizens Congress project, were now ready to abandon Streit and to lend their full support to the further development of NATO. As a result, everything was now in place for the transformation of

American atlanticism from an Atlantic union movement to a support network for the development of a functional Atlantic

Community. 266

1. New York Times. 16 February 1950.

2. Memo from Achilles to Miss Corbett (Office of Public Liaison), 23 February 1950, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3388, 740.00/2-1750; Barrett to Streit, 24 February 1950, ibid., 740.00/2-2450; Rusk to Ellen St. John Garwood, 9 March 1950, ibid., 740.00/2-1750; Hickerson to Robert R. Hunt, 22 March 1950, ibid.. Box 3425, 740.5/2-2550; Rusk to Kefauver, 23 March 1950, ibid., 740.5/3-2150; summary of conference with the secretary of state, 21 March 1950, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Office of the Executive Secretariat, Summaries of Secretary's Daily Meetings, 1949-1952, Box 1; memorandum from Walden Moore (secretary of the AUC board of directors) to the members of the AUC board of directors, 24 April 1950, Clayton Papers, Box 84, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee 3."

3. Memo of conversation between Acheson and Kefauver, 4 April 1950, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3425, 740.5/4-450. Acheson gave the same message to U.S. diplomats in Europe, some of whom had reported that the negative State Department reaction to the Atlantic Union resolution had led to doubts concerning America's long-term commitment to Europe. See Acheson to certain diplomatic offices, 6 April 1950, FRUS. 1950. vol. 3, 41.

4. Acheson, Present at the Creation. 354-63; and McLellan, Dean Acheson. 218-23.

5. See, for example, Kefauver's speech on 27 March in Congressional Record 96, 81st Congress, 2nd session, 4121-24.

6. Summary of daily meeting with the secretary, 21 March 1950, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Office of the Executive Secretariat, Summaries of Secretary's Daily Meetings, 1949-1952, Box 1; summary of daily meeting with the secretary, 24 March 1950, ibid.; memo from Llewellyn Thompson (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs) to Acheson, 24 March 1950, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3425, 740.5/3-2150; Hickerson to Kefauver, 25 March 1950, ibid., 740.5/3-2150; memo from Lincoln Bloomfield (staff assistant) to Hickerson, 30 March 1950, ibid.. Box 3388, 740.00/3-3050; memo from George Perkins (Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs) to Acheson, 3 April 1950, ibid.. Box 3425, 740.5/3-2150; Streit to Roberts, 28 March 1950, Streit Papers, Box 32, Folder "Roberts, Owen J., 1950- 58." The State Department officials who drew Acheson's attention to Kefauver's speeches tended to be those, like Perkins and Thompson, who were most symphatetic to the AUC. 267

7. The department quickly sent a circular telegram to the U.S. embassies in all NATO capitals, emphasizing that its attitude toward the Atlantic union resolution was not as negative as the press had deduced from Rusk's and Hickerson's testimony. Acheson to American Embassies in Brussels, London, Paris, Rome, the Hague, Oslo, Copenhagen, and Ottawa, 2 March 1950, RG 59, Box 3425, 740.5/2-2550.

8. Memo from Achilles to Corbett, 23 February 1950, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3388, 740.00/2-1750.

9. Hogan, The Marshall Plan, especially chapter 6, 238-92; and Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance. 158-68.

10. Edwin Martin (Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs) to Lincoln Gordon (ECA Director of Programs), 7 January 1950, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs, 1946-1953, Files of Miriam Camp, Box 1, Folder "Continental Integration"; W. John Kenney (ECA Mission Chief in London) to ECA Administration, Washington, 19 January 1950, ibid.. Box 2, Folder "Miscellaneous"; Harriman to ECA Administration, Washington, 21 January 1950, ibid.; memo of conversation between Acheson and Paul-Henri Spaak (Belgian Foreign Minister), 18 January 1950, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Box 28, Folder "Europe, 1950"; Frances E. Willis (First Secretary, U.S. Embassy London) to State Department, 18 January 1950, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3388, 740.00/1-1850; memo of conversation between Acheson and Spaak, 19 January 1950, ibid., 740.00/1-1950; J. C. Holmes (U.S. charge d'affaires in London) to State Department, 2 February 1950, with attached memorandum "British Attitude toward the Political Integration of Europe," ibid., 720.00/2-250; memorandum of conversation between Acheson and Paul Hoffman (ECA Administrator), 23 January 1950, Acheson Papers, Box 64B, Folder "Memoranda of Conversations (Jan. 50)." See also Hogan, The Marshall Plan. 301-10.

11. Holmes to State Department, 17 February 1950, FRUS. 1950. vol. 3, 21-22; Acheson to selected diplomatic offices, 21 February 1950, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3425, 740.5/2-2150; David Bruce (U.S. Ambassador in Paris) to State Department, 25 February 1950, ibid., 740.5/2-2550; Robert D. Murphy (U.S. Ambassador in Brussels) to State Department, 25 February 1950, ibid., 740.5/2-2550; paper by Douglas MacArthur (Deputy Director, Office of European Regional Affairs), 30 March 1950, RG 59, Special Lot File 55D258, Records of the Bureau of European Affairs, Subject Files Relating to European Defense Arrangements, 1948-1954, Box 1, Folder "NAT Publicity." 268

12. The most succinct account of the evolution in State Department thinking in early 1950 is in Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance. 177-79. See also Kennan, Memoirs. 1925- 1950. 449-70.

13. Minutes of the 7th meeting of the PPS, 24 January 1950, RG 59, Special Lot File 64D563, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Box 32, Folder "Minutes of Meetings, 1950"; memo from Nitze to Acheson, 30 January 1950, ibid.. Box 28, Folder "Europe, 1950"; "Draft Memorandum to the Secretary on European Integration," 13 February 1950, ibid.

14. Martin to Thompson, 10 February 1950, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3388, 740.00/2-1050; draft paper by Martin et al., 6 March 1950, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs, 1946-1953, Files of Miriam Camp, Box 1, Folder "Continental Integration"; memo from Perkins to Rusk, 7 March 1950, RG 59, Decimal File, 1950- 54, Box 3425, 740.5/3-750.

15. Memo from Achilles to Perkins, 30 December 1949, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1945-49, Box 5670, 840.00/12-3049. See also note 14 above.

16. Draft paper by Martin et al., 6 March 1950, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs, 1946-1953, Files of Miriam Camp, Box 1, Folder "Continental Integration".

17. Address by Edward Dickinson (Director ECA Program Coordination Division) before a meeting of the American Political Science Association, 29 December 1949, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of Charles Bohlen, 1942-1952, Box 6, Folder "European Integration"; Harlan Cleveland to Bissell, 30 March 1950, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs, 1946-1953, Files of Miriam Camp, Box 1, Folder "Continental Integration"; memo from Henry Byroade (Director of the Bureau of German Affairs) to Perkins, 17 March 1950, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box Box 3425, 740.5/3-1750.

18. For an account of the meeting of U.S. eunbassadors in Rome (22-24 March 1950), which addressed this issue at length, see FRUS. 1950. vol. 3, 795-827.

19. Memo of conversation, 7 March 1950, Acheson Papers, Box 64B, Folder "Memoranda of Conversations (March 1950)." 269

20. Kennan announced on 7 March 1950 that he planned to take a leave of absence, beginning on 1 July, to go and work for a year at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. The outbreak of the Korean War delayed his actual departure for several months. See Walter L. Hixson, Georoe F. Kennan; Cold War Iconoclast (New York, 1989), 98.

21. Perkins to Rusk, 7 March 1950, RG 59, Decimal Files 1950- 54, BOX 3425, 740.5/3-750.

22. Unsigned EUR Regional Affairs position paper "International Organization in the North-American-Western European Area," 25 April 1950, RG 59, PPS Files, 1947-53, Box 28, Folder "Europe, 1950"; and position paper "Organization of the North Atlantic-European Community," drafted by Nitze, 6 May 1950, ibid.

23. Memorandum from Achilles to Nitze, 8 May 1950, PPS Files, 1947-53, Box 28, Folder "Europe, 1950."

24. Memorandum from Lewis to Nitze, 9 May 1950, PPS Files, 1947-53, Box 28, Folder "Europe, 1950."

25. Memorandum from Bissell to Martin, 3 May 1950, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs, 1946-1953, Files of Miriam Camp, Box 1, Folder "Continental Integration."

26. See, for example, Seldon Chapin (U.S. ambassador in the Hague) to Washington, 3 May 1950, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950- 54, Box 3425, 740.5/5-350; Henry S. Villard (U.S. ambassador in Oslo) to Washington, 4 May 1950, ibid., 740.5/5-450; Julian F. Harrington (U.S. charge d'affaires in Ottawa) to Washington, 4 May 1950, ibid., 740.5/5-450; James Dunn (U.S. ambassador in Rome) to Washington, 5 May 1950, ibid., 740.5/5- 550.

27. Achilles to Perkins, 3 May 1950, RG 59, Special Lot File 59D233, Miscellaneous Office Files of the Assistant Secretaries of State for European Affairs, 1943-57, Box 22, Folder "N-Z, 1950."

28.Acheson, Present at the Creation. 382-400; Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance. 178-79. For full documentation on the London meetings, see FRUS. 1950. vol. 3, 98-125; 828-1108.

29. Letter from Acheson to Clayton, 9 June 1950, Clayton Papers, Box 85, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee 5"; Acheson, Present at the Creation. 399-400. 270

30. A. Powell Davies to Owen Roberts, 20 March 1950, Hugh Moore Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton, NJ, Box 10, Folder "Dec. 49-Dec. 50" (hereafter Moore Papers with filing information); Henry Flower to Hugh Moore, 4 April 1950, ibid.. Box 7, Folder "Henry C. Flower, 1950"; minutes of the 25th meeting of the AUC executive committee, 13 April 1950, Clayton Papers, Box 84, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee 3." For some of the polling results that continued to inspire confidence in Streit, see Gallup, The Gallup Poll, vol.2, 912-13.

31. An exhaustive summary of the AUC's activities and achievements is provided in the reports submitted to the AUC board on 14 September 1950 by the organization's professional staff and committee chairmen. See minutes of the 11th meeting of the AUC board of governors, 14 September 1950, with attachements, AUC MSS, Box 97, Folder "Board of Governors Minutes, 1951-52."

32. Letter from Walden Moore to Clayton, 25 May 1950, Clayton Papers, Box 84, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee 3".

33. Telegram from Clayton to Truman, 26 June 1950, ibid.. Box 85, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee 5."

34. Letter from Streit to Whitelaw Reid (editor of the New York Herald-Tribune), 26 June 1950, ibid.; weekly report from Robert J. Bishop (AUC executive director), 26 June 1950, ibid.; weekly reports from Bishop, 10 July 1950, 24 July 1950, 31 July 1950; 7 August 1950, Clayton Papers, Box 85, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee 6"; memorandum of conversation with Clayton, 19 July 1950, Acheson Papers, Box 65, Folder "Memoranda of Conversations (July 50)"; memorandum of conversation with Kefauver et al, 14 August 1950, Acheson Papers, Box 65, Folder "Memoranda of Conversations (August 50)"; letter from Bishop to Hugh Moore, 18 August 1950, Clayton Papers, Box 85, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee 6."

35. Memorandum from Bishop to the members of the AUC board of governors, 8 September 1950, Clayton Papers, Box 85, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee 7"; minutes of the eleventh meeting of the AUC board of governors, 14 September 1950, AUC MSS, Box 97, Folder "Board of Governors Minutes, 1951-52."

36. Minutes of meetings of the executive committee, 26 October, 9 November, 21 November, 7 December, Streit Papers, Box 107, Folder "Minutes of the Executive Committee, 1950".

37. Minutes of the meeting of the executive committee, 21 December 1950, Streit Papers, Box 107, Folder "Minutes of the Executive Committee, 1950"; minutes of the meeting of the 271

executive committee, 4 January 1951, ibid.. Box 108, Folder "Minutes of Executive Committee, 1951"; minutes of the twelfth meeting of the AUC board of governors, 15 December 1950, AUC MSS, Box 97, Folder "Board of Governors Minutes, 1951-52".

38. U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Kefauver speaking in support of Atlantic union, 15 January 1951, Congressional Record 98, 82nd Congress, 1st session, 261-64.

39. Flower to Walden Moore, 16 February 1951, Moore Papers, Box 10, Folder "Aug. 50-May 51"; and Walden Moore to Flower, 20 February 1951, ibid.

40. Minutes of the twelfth meeting of the AUC board of governors, 15 December 1950, AUC MSS, Box 97, Folder "Board of Governors Minutes, 1951-52".

41. Letter from Walden Moore to Clayton, 29 January 1951, with attached memorandum from Lindsay, 8 January 1951, Clayton Papers, Box 86, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee."

42. Achilles, "Fingerprints on History". 38-39. Achilles did return to Washington almost every two weeks, and was thus able to keep in touch with the AUC-State Department talks.

43. Letter from Livingston Hartley (member of the AUC administrative staff) to Clayton, 13 October 1950, with attached confidential memorandum "Possible Detour to Atlantic Union" by Hartley, 10 October 1950, Clayton Papers, Box 85, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee 7."

44. Minutes of the meeting of the executive committee, 18 January 1951, AUC MSS, Box 108, Folder "Minutes of the executive committee, 1951."

45. Memorandum from Alistair Kyle (member of the AUC administrative staff) to Hugh Moore, et al, 29 January 1951, AUC MSS, Box 1, Folder "Atlantic Congress-Lindsay Plan 1951"; minutes of the meetings of the executive committee, 1 February 1951, 1 March 1951, and 5 April 1951, ibid.. Box 108, Folder "Minutes of the exceutive committee, 1951"; minutes of the thirteenth meeting of the AUC board of governors, 13 March 1951, ibid.. Box 97, Folder "Board of Governors Minutes, 1951-52."

46. Minutes of the meeting of the executive committee, 5 April 1951, AUC MSS, Box 108, Folder "Minutes of executive committee, 1951." Between 7 February and 3 May 1951 Streit and his wife visited London (twice), Oxford, Paris (thrice), Rouen, Lille, Geneva, Berne, Basle, Frankfurt, Bonn, Berlin, 272

Oslo, Gothenburg, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Amsterdam, The Hague, and Brussels (twice) in an attempt to stir up more European interest in his Atlantic Union proposal. He held a total of 32 speeches to various groups and met with the French president; the foreign ministers of France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland; French, Dutch, Norwegian, Swedish, and Belgian parliamentary leaders; and a host of other prominent European leaders, including his old friend Jean Monnet. He was also received by the most important American representatives in Europe, including General Eisenhower; the U.S. Deputy on the North Atlantic Council, Spofford; the U.S. ambassadors in Paris, London, Brussels, and the Hague; and the U.S. high commissioner in Germany. See summary report by Streit, 3 May 1951, Moore Papers, Box 7, Folder "Mar.51-Aug. 51"; and Robert McClintock (First Secretary at the U.S. Embassy in Brussels) to Washington, 13 April 1951, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, BOX 3390, 740.00/4-1351.

47. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance. 184-207; and Kaplan, The United States and NATO. 145-64. See also Acheson, Present at the Creation. 435-45; 457-59; and 485-88. For documentation on the crucial NATO meetings in New York (15-18 and 26 September 1950) and Brussels (18-19 December 1950) and the related decision-making process, see FRUS. 1950. vol. 3, 130-610.

48. Memo from Acheson to Truman, 5 January 1951, RG 59, Decimal File, 1950-54, Box 3431, 740.5/1-551.

49. Draft paper by Ridgway Knight (Officer in Charge, Office of European Regional Affairs), 28 December 1950, ibid., 740.5/12-2850. Perkins to Acheson, 5 January 1951, ibid., 740.5/1-551.

50. The most comprehensive account of the "Great Debate" of 1951 is in Phil Williams, The Senate and US Troops in Europe (London, 1985), 43-107. See also Acheson, Present at the Creation. 488-96, and Kaplan, The United States and NATO. 164- 67.

51. Memo by R. G. Hooker (member Policy Planning Staff), 12 January 1951, RG 59, Special Lot Files, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Box 28, Folder "Europe, 1951"; memo by Hooker, 14 February 1951, ibid.

52. Memo from Johnson to Hickerson, 15 January 1951, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Box 16, Folder "Atlantic Union"; joint memo from Perkins and Hickerson to Acheson, 16 January 1951, ibid.; memo from Johnson to Sandifer, 26 January 1951, ibid.; memo 273

from Hickerson to Acheson, 30 January 1951, ibid.; memo from Johnson to Acheson, 29 March 1951, with attached draft letter from Acheson to Connally (Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee), RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3435A, 740.5/3- 2951; Acheson to Connally, 6 April 1951, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Box 16, Folder "Atlantic Union." Conscious of the fact that one year earlier the AUC leadership had tried to bypass him by going directly to the president, Acheson secured Truman's approval before he sent the letter to Connally. See memorandum of conversation with the president, 5 April 1951, Acheson Papers, Box 66, Folder "Memoranda of Conversations (April 1951)."

53. Minutes of the meetings of the AUC executive committee, 15 February 1951, and 1 March 1951, Streit Papers, Box 108, Folder "Minutes of the Executive Committee, 1951"; minutes of the 13th meeting of the AUC board of governors, 13 March 1951, AUC MSS, Box 97, Folder "Board of Governors Minutes, 1951-52"; Hartley to Clayton, 1 March 1951, Clayton Papers, Box 86, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee, 1951 2"; Hartley to Walden Moore, 8 March 1951, ibid.

54. Sabra Holbrook (AUC Public Relations Director) to Clayton, 2 January 1951, with attached statement by Roberts, Patterson, and Clayton, 10 January 1951, Clayton Papers, ibid.; Roberts to Clayton, 24 January 1951, with attached open letter to Eisenhower from AUC business leaders, 31 January 1951, ibid.; summary of talk between Streit and Hickerson, 3 February 1951, ibid.

55. Minutes of the meetings of the AUC executive committee, 15 February 1951, 1 March 1951, and 5 April 1951, Streit Papers, Box 108, Folder "Minutes of the Executive Committee, 1951"; minutes of the 13th meeting of the AUC board of governors, 13 March 1951, AUC MSS, Box 97, Folder "Board of Governors Minutes, 1951-52"; Walden Moore to Holbrook, 16 February 1951, AUC MSS, Box 8, Folder "General File, Office Memoranda, 1950-52"; Walden Moore to Clayton, 21 February 1951, Clayton Papers, Box 86, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee, 1951 2."

56. Minutes of the meetings of the AUC executive committee, 19 April 1951, and 3 May 1951, Streit Papers, Box 108, Folder "Minutes of the Executive Committee, 1951"; Acheson to Clayton et al., 30 April 1951, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3390, 740.00/4-3051.

57. Transcripts of the Consultative Meeting on Strengthening the North Atlantic Community, 16-17 May 1951, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3435, 740.5/5-1651 and 740.5/5-1751. 274

Edwin Martin, director of the Office of European Regional Affairs and a staunch atlanticist, presided over these meetings. Among the outside consultants Professors Hans Morgenthau of the University of Chicago, and William T. R. Fox and Arnold Wolfers of Yale University (all political scientists who were regular State Department consultants) stood out as the most hostile toward the AUC and its program.

58. Memorandum of meeting with Acheson, by Hugh Moore, 17 May 1951, Moore Papers, Box 9, Folder "Atlantic Union, 1949- 1960." Other accounts of this meeting are in minutes of the 14th meeting of the AUC board of governors, 18 May 1951, AUC MSS, Box 97, Folder "Board of Governors Minutes, 1951-52"; and Walden Moore to Lindsay, 29 May 1951, AUC MSS, Box 1, Folder "Atlantic Congress- Lindsay Plan, 1951."

59. This mood was especially in evidence at the May 31 meeting of the executive committee and in the correspondence of Hugh Moore. It reflected not just their experiences with the State Department, but also the relative failure of the whole Washington National Council meeting. This meeting attracted 600 members and symphatizers, but had raised less than $10,000 in new donations and relatively little press coverage. The AUC's public relations director. Sabra Holbrook, reported that it was becoming increasingly difficult to get press attention for the committee's activities because of its image as a group of impractical, and therefore largely irrelevant, visionaries. See minutes of the meeting of the AUC executive committee, 31 May 1951, Streit Papers, Box 108, Folder "Minutes Executive Committee, 1951." Hugh Moore, for his part, had an illuminating experience when he participated, from 21 through 27 May, in the first conference of the American Assembly. This Assembly was an initiative of Eisenhower, started during his tenure as president of Columbia University, and brought together leading businessmen, educators, and opinion formers to discuss important public policy questions. The first conference, which Moore attended, had as its main theme the future of the U.S.-Western European relationship. Moore considered this an ideal forum in which to introduce the Atlantic Union program. But although some other participants expressed sympathy for the ideal of an Atlantic Union, the overwhelming sentiment of the conference delegates was that Atlantic Union was such a remote prospect that practical people should not waste time discussing it. This experience made a deep impression on Moore. See Philip Young (executive director of the American Assembly) to Hugh Moore, 8 May 1951, Moore Papers, Box 1, Folder "American Assembly- Correspondence"; outline of the American Assembly, 19 May 1951, ibid.; digests of round table sessions of the American 275

Assembly, 22-24 May 1951, ibid.; statement by Hugh Moore to the plenary session of the American Assembly, 26 May 1951, ibid.; statement by Hugh Moore to round table 3 of the American Assembly, 27 May 1951, ibid.; Hugh Moore to Clayton, 7 June 1951, with attached copy of Hugh Moore to Edmund Orgill, 7 June 1951, Clayton Papers, Box 102, Folder "Moore." See also above-mentioned minutes of the 31 May executive committee meeting.

60. Walden Moore to Lindsay, 29 May 1951, AUC MSS, Box 1, Folder "Atlantic Congress- Lindsay Plan, 1951."

61. Hartley to Walden Moore, 29 May 1951, AUC MSS, Box 1, Folder "Atlantic Congress-Lindsay Plan, 1951"; Walden Moore to Frederick C. McKee (member AUC executive committee), 1 June 1951, Moore Papers, Box 7, Folder "Apr. 51-Dec. 51"; Clayton to Hugh Moore, 11 June 1951, Clayton Papers, Box 102, Folder "Moore"; memo by Tom O. Griessemer to Walden Moore, 12 June 1951, Moore Papers, Box 7, Folder "Apr. 51-Dec. 51"; Flower to Hugh Moore, 13 June 1951, ibid.; memo from Walden Moore to Hugh Moore, 15 June 1951, AUC MSS, Box 1, Folder "Atlantic Congress-Lindsay Plan, 1951."

62. Memo from Walden Moore to Hugh Moore, 23 July 1951, Moore Papers, Box 7, Folder "Apr. 51-Dec. 51." The first meeting of this ACC group was on 19 July 1951. Hugh Moore was the moving force behind this group. He hired Tom Griessemer, a veteran of the wartime pro-UN movement who had extensive experience in organizing international conferences, to do the long-range planning, and Kenneth Lindsay to represent the ACC group in Europe. Both Griessemer and Lindsay were put on the payroll of a non-profit foundation Moore had set up. Walden Moore, still the AUC's executive secretary, would fulfill the same role for the ACC group. He too would be paid by Moore's foundation.

63. Particularly encouraging were the comments of John Hickerson and Thomas D. Cabot (the State Department's director of international Security Affairs). See Flower to Hugh Moore, 26 June 1951, Moore Papers, Box 7, Folder "Apr. 51-Dec. 51."

64. Minutes of the meetings of the AUC executive committee, 14 June 1951, 28 June 1951, 12 July 1951, 26 July 1951, and 9 August 1951, Streit Papers, Box 108, Folder "Minutes of the Executive Committee, 1951." See also memo, by Hugh Moore, of a conference at the house of AUC president Owen Roberts, 24 July 1951, Moore Papers, Box 7, Folder "Apr. 51-Dec. 51." For Kefauver's spectacular crime investigation and its impact on his decision to try for the presidency in 1952, see Fontenay, Kefauver. 164-86; and Gorman, Kefauver, 74-116. 276

65. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs George Perkins had diagnosed this situation already in January 1951. See Perkins to Acheson, 5 January 1951, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3431, 740.5/1-551. For further evidence of the European attitudes, see Charles Spofford (U.S. NATO deputy in London) to Washington, 1 June 1951, ibid.. Box 3435A, 740.5/6- 151; Philip C. Jessup (Ambassador at Large, temporarily in Paris) to Washington, 1 June 1951, ibid.; Spofford and Achilles to Washington, 2 June 1951, ibid., 740.5/6-251; Acheson to Paris and London, 2 June 1951, ibid. See also Acheson, Present at the Creation. 551-60; Hogan, The Marshall Plan. 383-414; and Kaplan, The United States and NATO. 153- 64.

66. This meeting was to be held in Rome, in December. But by the end of the spring the U.S. and its allies agreed to hold an earlier meeting in Ottawa, in September. The Ottawa meeting was meant primarily to deal with issues of streamlining NATO and strengthening the Atlantic Community. See FRUS. 1951. 616-51.

67. Memo from Nitze to Cabot, 30 April 1951, with attached copy of the 6 May 1950 PPS paper, RG 59, Box 3435, 740.5/4- 3051.

68. Martin to Cabot and H. Freeman Matthews (Deputy Under Secretary of State), 6 July 1951, with attached position paper, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3438, 740.5/7-651; Cabot to Acheson, 19 July 1951, with attached position paper, ibid., 740.5/7-1951; Martin to Cabot and Perkins, 26 July 1951, with attached position paper, ibid., 740.5/7-2651; memo by John Ferguson (member PPS), 30 July 1951, with attached position paper, RG 59, Special Lot Files, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Box 28, Folder "Europe, 1951."

69. Jessup to Matthews, 9 July 1951, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3438, 740.5/7-951; Jessup to Perkins, 24 July 1951, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs, 1945-1953, Files of J. Graham Peucsons, Subject File, Box 2, Folder "Eur. Integration"; draft paper by Jessup, 1 August 1951, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Box 28, Folder "Europe, 1951."

70. Achilles to Washington, 6 August 1951, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3438A, 740.5/8-651; Achilles to Washington, 8 August 1951, ibid., 740.5/8-851. 277

71. Parsons to Cabot and Perkins, 3 August 1951, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs, 1945-1953, Files of J. Graham Parsons, Subject File, Box 2, Folder "Eur. Integration."

72. Achilles to Washington, 8 August 1951, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3438A, 740.5/8-851.

73. Martin to Jessup, 4 August 1951, with attached draft paper, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3390, 740.00/8-451; Achilles to Washington, 8 August 1951, ibid.. Box 3438A, 740.5/8-851; Martin to Cabot, 9 August 1951, ibid., 740.5/8- 951; Parsons to Cabot, 9 August 1951, ibid., 740.5/8-951; Parsons to Jessup and Matthews, 13 August 1951, ibid., 740.5/8-1351; Herbert Hill (staff officer. Bureau of European Affairs) to Parsons, 15 August 1951, ibid., 740.5/8-1551; Achilles to Jessup, 17 August 1951, ibid., 740.5/8-1751; Hill to Parsons, 22 August 1951, ibid., 740.5/8-2251; P.-J. Charles (staff officer. Office of European Regional Affairs) to Parsons, 23 August 1951, ibid., 740.5/8-2351. In their enthusiasm some of the atlanticists within the department came up with very novel ideas. E. W. Pittman, a staff officer for the Assistant Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, made up a list of topics the national NATO advisory committees might study. The list included a wide range of topics from "coordination of foreign policy" all the way to "the development and adoption of a North Atlantic common language." See memo by Pittman, 13 August 1951, ibid., 740.5/8-1351.

74. Sanders to Parsons, 29 August 1951, ibid., 740.5/8-2951.

75. Robert G. Hooker (member PPS) to Jessup, 3 August 1951, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Box 28, Folder "Europe, 1951"; draft paper by Hooker, 13 August 1951, ibid.

76. Achilles to Jessup, 23 August 1951, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3438A, 740.5/8-2351; Spofford to Washington, 23 August 1951, ibid.; Spofford to Washington, 24 August 1951, ibid., 740.5/8-2451; Parsons to Jessup, Cabot, et al., 27 August 1951, ibid., 740.5/8-2751; Spofford to Washington, 28 August 1951, ibid., 740.5/8-2851; Walter K. Schwinn (staff officer) to Parsons, 29 Au^st 1951, ibid., 740.5/8-2951. The department's final official position paper on this issue for the Ottawa meeting was drafted by Achilles himself. See position paper by Achilles, 7 September 1951, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs, 1946-1953, Files of Miriam Camp, Box 2, Folder "NATO-Art.II- 1952. " 278

77. Acheson to Washington, 17 September 1951, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3439, 740.5/9-1751. See also Acheson to Washington, 17 September 1951, in FRUS. 1951. vol. 3, 664-67; Acheson to Truman, 19 September 1951, ibid., 678-80; Acheson to Washington, 20 September 1951, ibid., 687-88; communique of the seventh session of the North Atlantic Council, 21 September 1951, ibid., 691-92.

78. Summary of a meeting in Parsons's office, 3 October 1951, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs, 1946-1953, Files of Miriam Camp, Box 2, Folder "NATO-Art.11-1952"; Spofford to Washington, 9 October 1951, Rg 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3440, 740.5/10-951; Spofford to Washington, 12 October 1951, ibid., 740.5/10- 1251; Achilles to Washington, 17 October 1951, ibid., 740.5/10-1751; Achilles to Parsons, 19 October 1951, ibid., 740.5/10-1951; Spofford to Washington, 23 October 1951, ibid., 740.5/10-2351.

79. Hartley to Hickerson, 27 January 1951, with enclosed letter signed by Gillette and the 26 other Senate sponsors of the Atlantic Union resolution, 24 January 1951, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs, 1941-1951, Box 5, Folder "Atlantic Union."

80. Chapin to Washington, 12 April 1951, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3434, 740.5/4-1251.

81. Hill to Perkins, 9 May 1951, with enclosures, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs, 1941-1951, Box 19, Folder "Regionalism: Council of Europe"; American Consulate Strasbourg to Washington, 18 May 1951, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3391, 740.00/5-1851. See also Dirk U. Stikker (Dutch foreign minister and president of the committee of ministers of the Council of Europe) to Gillette, 30 May 1951, Clayton Papers, Box 97, Folder "Freedom & Union, Clarence Streit, 3." Kenneth Lindsay, who at the time was also in Strasbourg, kept his friends within the AUC informed about these developments. See memo by Walden Moore, 25 May 1951, with enclosed reports from Lindsay, AUC MSS, Box 1, Folder "General File, Atlantic Affiliates Committee, 1950-52."

82. Hill to Perkins, 9 May 1951, with enclosures, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs, 1941-1951, Box 19, Folder "Regionalism: Council of Europe."

83. Acheson to the Hague, 20 April 1951, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3434, 740.5/4-2051; and Acheson to Paris, 279

Strasbourg, London, Brussels, and Frankfurt, 25 July 1951, ibid., BOX 3391, 740.00/7-2551.

84. Henry L. Abbott (staff officer Office of United Nations Political Affairs) to Sanders, 24 October 1951, Rg 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs, 1941-1951, Box 19, Folder "Regionalism: Council of Europe."

85. Achilles to Streit, 7 November 1951, Streit Papers, Box 14, Folder "Achilles, Theodore C.and Achilles to Parsons, 20 November 1951, Rg 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3442, 740.5/11-2051. Although the congressional delegation included some AUC symphatizers, neither of two main AUC leaders in Congress, Gillette and Kefauver, went to Strasbourg. Gillette pulled out at the last moment, largely because of press criticism that he had introduced the resolution simply to go on a congressional junket. Kefauver, for his part, tried to go but was passed over by vice President Alben Barkley, who was miffed about the Tennessean's ambitions for 1952. See Streit to Achilles, 30 and 31 October 1951, Streit Papers, Box 14, Folder "Achilles, Theodore C ."

86. Perkins to Acheson, 16 May 1951, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3435, 740.5/5-1651.

87. Hill to Martin, 24 July 1951, ibid.. Box 3435A, 740.5/7- 2451; Hill to Parsons, 9 August 1951, ibid.. Box 3438A, 740.5/8-951; Hill to Perkins and Bonbright, 10 September 1951, with attached paper, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs, 1946-1953, Files of Miriam Camp, b o x 2, Folder "NATO-General and Top Secret."

88. Streit to Roberts, 14 October 1951, Streit Papers, Box 32, Folder "Roberts, Owen."

89. Memorandum of conversation between Parsons, Francis O. Wilcox (Chief of Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee), and Stewart McClure (Legislative Assistant to Senator Gillette), 12 December 1951, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3443, 740.5/12-1251.

90. Minutes of a meeting in the Senate dining room, 28 September 1951, Moore Papers, Box 7, Folder "July 51-July 52"; and Moore to Roberts, 1 October 1951, ibid.

91. Minutes of the meetings of the Organizing Committee for the Atlantic Citizens Congress, 8 November 1951, 15 November 1951, 29 November 1951, and 14 December 1951, Moore Papers, 280

Box 5, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress"; memo from Griessemer to Moore, 16 December 1951, ibid.

92. Clayton to Hickerson, 1 November 1951, Clayton Papers, Box 86, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee 6"; Hickerson to Clayton, 9 November 1951, with attached Clayton to Hickerson, 23 November 1951, ibid.; memorandum from William Sanders to Hickerson, 27 December 1951, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 2767, 611.40/12-2751; letter from Hickerson to Grew, 3 January 1952, with attached memorandum of conversation, ibid., 611.40/1-352. The Ford Foundation had indicated that it was willing to fund private or unofficial projects which the department found important but impossible to fund publicly. See memorandum of conversation between Acheson and Paul Hoffman (ex-ECA administrator, now Ford Foundation executive), 16 July 1951, RG 59, Special Lot File, Miscellaneous Office Files of the Assistcint Secretaries of State for European Affairs, 1943-1957, Box 23, Folder "Memo's."

93. Memorandum from James Bonbright (deputy assistant secretary for European affairs) to Martin, 23 November 1951, RG 59, Special Lot File, Miscellaneous Office Files of the Assistant Secretaries of State for European Affairs, 1943- 1957, Box 23, Folder "Bonbright"; memorandum from Edward Barrett (assistant secretary for public affairs) to James Webb (under secretary), 5 December 1951, with attached memorandum from Bonbright to the acting secretary (Webb), 27 November 1951, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3442, 740.5/12-551. CHAPTER VII

FROM CONSTITUTIONAL UNION TO FUNCTIONAL COMMUNITYi

THE EMERGENCE OF THE NATO CITIZENS' MOVEMENT,

JANUARY 1952-FEBRUARY 1953

Throughout 1952 the atlanticists, both within and outside the administration, faced two major obstacles. One was the continued opposition of Acheson, and most of the upper-echelon of the State Department, to building a non­ military Atlantic Community around NATO, an effort which the secretary and his top advisers considered an illusionary distraction from the alliance's real military and geopolitical purpose. The second obstacle was the shadow of

Streit and the Atlantic Union movement, which continued to hang over the moderate atlanticists and their new proposals, and thereby discredited them in the eyes of the administration. These obstacles prevented any major progress toward the envisaged Atlantic Community, and forced the atlanticists to reassess their positions and proposals.

The result was a transformation, that took place throughout 1952, in which the core of the American

281 282 atlanticist movement abandoned the wholesale, constitutional approach to Atlantic integration in favor of partial and limited initiatives that addressed concrete and functional problems of the transatlantic relationship. This involved not only the identification of new, more concrete and limited approaches to the Atlantic Community, but also a definitive and open break with the past experience of the AUG. In this process, the private atlanticists also transformed themselves from outside critics to full partners and supporters of U.S. official foreign policy, a role they hoped would allow them, during the new Eisenhower Administration, to implement at least some of their ideas.

During the first half of 1952 the European policy of the Truman Administration became increasingly dominated by a determination to push the continental European allies into a supranational European Defense Community (EDC). After a slow start between February and July 1951, the French-sponsored

EDC conference in Paris had made considerable progress in working out an EDC treaty during the second half of 1951.

That progress had been the result, at least in large measure, of strong and public U.S. support for the EDC. In January

1952, however, the EDC talks stalled.i By that time Secretary of State Acheson and his top advisers considered the EDC the vital centerpiece of their whole European policy. The EDC seemed the only politically acceptable and feasable vehicle 283

for integrating the German federal republic into the West and

tying it securely to the Atlantic Community. And Germany's

political and military integration into the West was vital

because only a real German defense contribution could allow

NATO to implement its strategic concept for Western Europe's

security. Quick progress on the EDC was thus vital to assure

the attainment of the administration's main European policy

goals. Consequently, Acheson decided to make an all-out,

determined effort to ensure a successful completion of the

EDC negotiations.2

Acheson's efforts paid off. At the end of May the

secretary travelled to Paris to attend the signing of the EDC

treaty, which committed France, Germany, Italy, and the

Benelux countries to the creation of a supranational European

defense force under NATO command. He also went to Bonn to

participate in the signing of the convention between the

Federal Republic of Germany and Britain, France, and the

United States, which restored Germany's sovereignty and

opened the way for its full integration into the Western

European community of nations.3 Looking back on the first

five months of 1952 Acheson felt he could claim victory. But

how permament his achievements would be remained doubtful.

U.S. pressure had forced the EDC debate, but at a price. The

EDC now more and more appeared as an American project rather than a European initiative. As a result the Europeans, and especially the French, now felt that the EDC was being forced 284 upon them. Furthermore, the most tricky issues, such as

German NATO membership, had been postponed rather than solved. As a result the ratification and ultimate implementation of the EDC treaty remained in doubt.

Basically the Truman Administration had gambled that the U.S. would ultimately be able to force the Europeans to ratify and implement the EDC, thereby leaving its successor a difficult legacy.4

The State Department's intense efforts to secure a

European agreement on the EDC inevitably detracted from the focus on strengthening NATO and developing the Atlantic

Community that had been in evidence at Ottawa. And while the

U.S. was ultimately successful, its overemphasis on the importance of the EDC only reinforced European doubts about the whole concept. The Benelux countries, in particular, were unenthusiastic about the prospect of a strong and truly supranational EDC, largely for fear that it would eclipse the weaker and purely functional NATO organization. The Dutch and Belgians continued to look toward Britain and especially the United States for their military security. And they feared that the emergence of a strong EDC, of which neither the U.S. nor the U.K. were members, would be the first step toward a gradual weakening of NATO and of the American and

British security commitment in Europe. They pointed to a recent statement of French foreign minister Schuman in which the latter had contrasted the EDC and NATO, arguing that the 285

former would be a permanent federation while the latter was a

more "ephemeral" organization designed to deal with a

specific and temporary security problem. The Benelux

countries reacted to this by trying to dilute the

supranational character of the EDC and seeking American

assurances that the EDC would form an integral part of, and

not a replacement for the NATO framework.s

Acheson tried to reassure the Dutch and Belgian

governments that NATO was, and would remain the "cornerstone"

of U.S. foreign policy. The EDC, by demonstrating the

Europeans' willingness to help itself, would only strengthen,

not weaken the U.S. commitment to Europe. It would be

especially helpful in the U.S. Congress, which continued to

exert strong pressure for European unity and self-help. Only

if Congress saw evidence of progress toward this goal would

it remain supportive of the U.S. troop commitment to Europe.

And it was therefore vital that the Dutch and Belgians agree

to move ahead quickly with the EDC.6 But the small European

powers remained weary of the EDC.7 And although pushing

through the EDC was clearly the State Department's top

priority during 1952, not all U.S. policymakers shared

Acheson's confidence in the EDC as the centerpiece of U.S.

European policy. The atlanticists within the department and

the foreign service largely shared the Benelux concerns that

the development of NATO as an Atlantic Community was not

keeping pace with the development of the supranational 286

European federation envisaged in the EDC proposal.s

The atlanticists had come out of the North Atlantic

Council meeting in Ottawa with great hopes for the future of

NATO. They seized upon the Group of Five, appointed to study

ways of further developing the non-military aspects of the

Atlantic Community, which had been their idea in the first

place. Under the careful coaching of Achilles, and with

strong support from Canada's Foreign Minister Lester Pearson,

the group got off to a promising start in October 1951. It

discussed a wide variety of ways to strengthen the political,

economic, social, and cultural ties between the members of

the Atlantic Community and presented an interim report to the

ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome in

late November 1951. A full report would be ready for the

next meeting, at Lisbon, in February 1952.9

The Group of Five fulfilled all of Achilles's

expectations. It urged NATO to play a more important role in

the economic field, especially with regard to the removal of

trade barriers between its members. It advocated the

harmonization of social policies, especially in the field of

immigration. The group also suggested a broad array of measures to increase cultural exchange and understanding.

Most significant of all, it adopted Achilles's ideas

regarding a NATO parliamentary body modelled on the Council

of Europe. Finally, in a clear reference to the Atlantic

Union movement, the committee also agreed that NATO and its 287

member governments should encourage private groups that

sought to foster a better understanding of the Atlantic

Community. 10

And while Achilles steered the Group of Five in the

right direction, his atlanticist fellow-travellers in

Washington tried to do the same with the U.S. proposals for a

fundamental reorganization of NATO. At Ottawa, the allies

had agreed that the NATO organization needed to be

streamlined and strengthened. But concrete action was

postponed until the Lisbon meeting. During the summer of

1951 Acheson and his advisers had already reached a consensus

on the need for a stronger, more independent NATO

international staff. In the run-up to the Lisbon meeting,

the atlanticists within the Bureau of European Affairs sought

to modify the department's position paper on NATO

reorganization to bring it more in line with the thinking of

the Group of Five. n In a January 1952 position paper, the

Office of European Regional Affairs argued that since the

U.S. was going to propose the creation of a "quasi executive

branch," it should also support the creation of a

parliamentary body, associated with NATO. The atlanticists

argued that this would not only be useful as further proof to

the European allies that the U.S. remained committed to NATO.

By making parliamentarians more familiar with NATO's work and problems it might also have a beneficial effect on the attitude of the various national legislatures towaird funding 288

the alliance's defense build-up. 12 Acheson was still opposed

to a NATO parliamentary assembly, which he feared might

undermine the Council of Europe. But the secreteury realized

that the topic was bound to be brought up at Lisbon, both by

the report of the Group of Five and by Norwegian Foreign

Minister Halvard Lange, a strong supporter of a NATO

assembly. 13 A somewhat watered-down version of the proposal of the Office of European Regional Affairs, referring only to

the problem of "associating parliamentarians with NATO's work," was incorporated in the State Department's official position paper for the Lisbon conference. i4

Acheson was not just opposed to the idea of a NATO assembly. He was not particularly thrilled about most of the other ideas of the Group of Five either. The liberalisation of European trade should remain the exclusive province of the

OEEC, the secretary argued. Trying to broaden this process by involving NATO would only undermine the OEEC without necessarily delivering any results. The group's ideas on the harmonization of social policies Acheson considered utopian and unlikely to pass congressional muster. As for cultural matters and the promotion of the Atlantic Community concept, that could best be left to NATO's own fledgling information service. 15 This essentially negative attitude of the American secretary of state, combined with the overriding importance he and his British and French colleagues attached to the EDC and its relationship with NATO, ensured that the report of 289

the Group of Five received short shrift at the Lisbon meeting

of the North Atlantic Council. The Council approved the

report but failed to take any action on it. The Council gave

its official blessing to the EDC and approved the

organizational changes proposed by the United States,

including the appointment of a NATO secretary general to

oversee the newly independent and strengthened international

staff. But it took no steps toward creating a NATO

parliamentary assembly, or, for that matter, any other non­ defense related bodies.is More than satisfied with the progress on the EDC, Acheson looked back on the Lisbon meeting as the most successful NATO conference during his tenure as secretary of state.i?

The atlanticists within the State Department were considerably less happy with the outcome of the Lisbon conference. They especially deplored Acheson's unwillingness to encourage greater NATO activity in the economic field.

The secretary's determination to reserve non-defense related economic matters as the exclusive province of the OEEC indicated that the administration was still determined to solve all of Europe's non-military problems within a

European, rather than an Atlantic context. The atlanticists in the Office of European Regional Affairs argued that

European integration was simply not up to the task the administration envisaged for it. Too many of Europe's economic problems were related to its unbalanced trade 290

relations with the United States and could therefore only be

resolved with direct U.S. participation, within the framework

of the Atlantic Community, is But with NATO aborbed by its

recent organizational changes (involving, among other things,

a wholesale move of the organization from London to Paris),

and secretary Acheson firmly committed to the course adopted

at Lisbon, there was little the atlanticists could do to

realize their ideas. On top of that two of the American

atlanticists who had worked hardest to broaden the scope of

NATO, Charles Spofford and Theodore Achilles, lost their

important positions as U.S. Deputy and Vice Deputy to NATO.i^

During the summer of 1952 the atlanticists briefly rallied

around an imaginative proposal of the Assistant Director for

Europe of the Mutual Security Agency, Harlan Cleveland. In

his so-called "Green Book" Cleveland proposed the creation of

an Atlantic Economic Board, composed of representatives of

the U.S., Britain, and the European Coal and Steel Community.

This Atlantic Economic Board would, in effect, oversee the creation of an Atlantic Common Market, assisted by an

Atlantic Reserve System. 20 The Office of European Regional

Affairs welcomed Cleveland's proposal, but Acheson and his cabinet colleagues considered it political dynamite and quickly tried to suppress its distribution and discussion within the State Department, the Mutual Security Agency, and the Foreign Service.21 Although this doomed the "Green Book" for 1952, it did not kill it. Achilles quickly got his hands 291 on as many copies of it as he could get, and was determined to resurrect its ideas under the next administration.22

The atlanticists within the administration were not only disappointed in their hopes for the Lisbon conference and NATO's reorganization. During the first half of 1952 the domestic efforts they had initiated during 1951 also began to falter. In December 1951 the Bureau of European Affairs made a strong push for departmental support of the Atlantic Study

Commission bill (S. 2269) which Senators Gillette and

Sparkman had introduced in October 1951. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs George Perkins argued that the proposed commission would serve the interests of the administration. It would divert "into more constructive channels" the public and congressional pressure behind the

Atlantic Union resolution. It might create a favorable domestic climate for the administration's NATO policies and serve to counteract domestic critics of the alliance. And overseas the commission would serve as tangible proof to the allies of America's continuing commitment to E u r o p e . 23 with this in mind the department did officially endorse S. 2269 on

18 January 1 95 2 . 24 But trouble soon emerged, both in the

Congress and within the State Department. 1952 was a presidential election year and leading Republicans in

Congress began to look upon the commission proposed in S.

2269 as a vehicle for a critical examination of the Truman

Administration's overall foreign policy. This dampened the 292

administration's and congressional Democrats' enthusiasm for

the bill, and also slowed its progress through the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee.25 At the same time the PPS began to raise strong objections to the bill. The PPS argued that

S. 2269, rather than divert attention away from the Atlantic

Union resolution, actually supported the central argument of the Atlantic Union movement. In a line-by-line analysis the

PPS demonstrated that a considerable part of the bill's language was actually borrowed from Streit's editorials in

Freedom & Union. The PPS recognized that it was too late to reverse the department's endorsement of S. 2269, but argued that the administration should try to stall the bill until it could thoroughly revise its language.26 m an attempt to appease both the Republicans and the administration S. 2269 was amended several times, and by May the bill was, to the dismay of its original supporters, thoroughly emasculated.

It also lost all momentum and seemed unlikely to pass the full S e n a t e . 27 when the Bureau of European Affairs tried to resuscitate S. 2269 in June the PPS quickly intervened to prevent the department from "compound[ing] the error" of

J a n u a r y . 28 During the summer the Atlantic Commission bill suffered a quiet death.

In early 1952 the atlanticists within the State

Department were also eager to build on the contacts that had been established between the U.S. Congress and the Assembly of the Council of Europe. They encouraged Senator Gillette 293

to continue these contacts and hoped that they might provide

the foundation for a future NATO Assembly. And Achilles eagerly drafted an outline for such an assembly in the run-up to the Lisbon conference. 29 But when the North Atlantic

Council in Lisbon failed to follow up on the idea of a NATO parliamentary body progress in this area also stalled. The

Bureau of European Affairs returned to the charge in May, after the adoption, in the Canadian House of Commons, of a resolution advertizing that body's willingness to send representatives to a NATO assembly. The atlanticists argued that if U.S. declarations of interest in the further development of the Atlantic Community were to be taken seriously by the allies the department could not fail to respond to this challenge. Words would no longer do. In language that came straight out of union Now the Bureau of

European Affairs warned ominously that "historically, alliances for military purposes have not lasted long or been successful for the long pull." A common military effort alone would not hold the Western community of nations together.30 But these arguments fell on deaf ears. And when the Bureau of European Affairs reviewed the issue of a NATO parliamentary body in late November it could report no substantial progress. 3i

Achilles and his friends in the State Department were not the only frustrated atlanticists. The ACC group, after its promising start at the end of 1951, was in for its share 294 of disappointments in 1952. During his first meeting with the ACC group. Assistant Secretary of State Hickerson had strongly encouraged them. Like Achilles and the other atlanticists within the State Department, Hickerson was eager for new initiatives that could strengthen the Atlantic

Community. But the same seniority and authority that allowed

Hickerson to give the ACC the department's unofficial blessing also made him more cautious. The Assistant

Secretary for United Nations Affairs was much closer to secretary Acheson, and had a much keener understanding of what would pass muster at the top level of the administration, than Achilles and the other atlanticists.

This was reflected in his comments on the ACC prospectus.

Hickerson thought that the ACC concept was an excellent one, but as it was presented in the prospectus it looked too much like a badly disguised attempt to call an Atlantic Union convention along the Streit model. A clear example was that the prospectus, like the Atlantic Union resolution, envisaged a congress with delegates from the seven original sponsors of the North Atlantic Treaty, rather than from all NATO members.

This was anathema at the State Department, which believed that such a selective congress would destroy NATO's unity rather than strengthen it. More fundamentally, the outline of the ACC and the topics it would discuss clearly weighed it in favor of the constitutional Atlantic Union approach and against the more gradual functional approach. It was 295 unlikely that a major foundation would support such a clearly slanted effort. And it was certain that Acheson wouldn't.

In effect, Hickerson told the ACC group that if they wanted to be more successful than the AUC they would have to move away, not just from Streit's congressional tactics, but from his Atlantic Union program as well, and toward a program that envisaged a functional Atlantic Community, centered around

NATO. 32

Since all members of the ACC group had been active in the AUC for three years their outlook on the problems of the

Atlantic Community were largely shaped by the AUC's federalist program. And while they had definitively given up on the Atlantic Union resolution, they were still somewhat reluctant to jettison the whole Atlantic Union program in favor of a limited, functional a p p r o a c h . 33 Throughout the early months of 1952 the ACC committee struggled with the question of how far it should depart from its original

Atlantic Union proposal in order to ensure the State

Department's full cooperation. The committee agreed to revise its prospectus for the ACC, taking into account

Hickerson's comments, and to continue its consultations with the State Department, in the meantime it would continue to implement the program it had developed in November 1951.

Moore and his associates moved to incorporate themselves as the American Council for the Atlantic Citizens Congress and secure a tax-exempt status; began the search for a research 296 staff that would develop a more detailed program for the ACC; and laid plans for attracting new members. Although many of the prospective members on the committee's mailing list were familiar names from the AUC Council, the ACC group made a conscious effort to recruit members who were "untainted" by prior association with the AUC, obviously hoping that this would improve their standing with the State Department. 34

In February Hugh Moore again approached Hickerson in order to get the State Department's reaction to the newly revised ACC prospectus. 35 Hickerson held a protracted meeting with the ACC committee on 13 February. He told them that their compromise proposal was still too much of an Atlantic

Union program, and too little related to NATO and the development of a functional Atlantic Community around the alliance. Hickerson made clear that he was still eager to see the ACC project move forward. But in its present form it would undoubtedly be opposed by Acheson, and there was little chance that the project could be realized without at least the tacit approval of the secretary. 36

The ACC committee was deeply disappointed by its meeting with Hickerson. 37 And this disappointment only deepened in March. Moore and his colleagues thought they saw an opening for themselves in the published report of NATO's committee on the North Atlantic Community. The report suggested that NATO governments support private groups within their countries that sought to contribute to the further 297 developement and better understanding of the Atlantic

Community. The ACC committee felt that it fit this description perfectly. They decided to approach Acheson directly, in the hope that the Lisbon meeting marked a new openness to initiatives like theirs.38 Hickerson immediately vetoed this. Unlike Moore and his colleagues, Hickerson realized that Lisbon had been a temporary setback, rather than an advance, for the atlanticists within the department.

And he explained to the ACC group that Acheson was, if anything, less inclined than before to support any project that looked like an Atlantic Union proposal.39 Throughout

March evidence piled up that Hickerson was right. Using their excellent personal connections, the ACC leaders approached a variety of top administration officials, like

Averell Harriman and John J. McCloy. All of them echoed

Hickerson in warmly endorsing the ACC concept but at the same time warning that it had to move away from Atlantic Union toward a more functional approach that would fit within the framework of the administration's long-term European policy.4o

The ACC committee received the above signals not only from its friends in the administration. During the remainder of the spring the same message also came from the Ford

Foundation, the main source Hugh Moore had hoped to tap for funds for the ACC project. In April the ACC staff (which in effect consisted of AUC staff members whom Hugh Moore had put on his payroll) came up with a detailed budget for the ACC 298

project. The preliminary study and research phase, which

would lay the groundwork for the ACC itself, would cost

around $200,000. And the cost of organizing and holding the

ACC itself brought the overall budget for the project to

around $1,000,000.41 individual private donations would

obviously not suffice to meet this budget. Encouraged by

Hickerson, and with recommendations from Clayton and

Harriman, Hugh Moore therefore approached the Ford

Foundation. The prospectus Moore sent to the Ford

Foundation's Associate Director, Milton Katz, was a slightly

revised version of that which the ACC committee had presented

to Hickerson in February. The introduction was now replete

with references to the "developing and strengthening of

NATO." But the prospectus as a whole still gave the

impression that the ACC sponsors saw NATO as a more or less

temporary solution for the short run, to be supplemented or

replaced by something much more comprehensive for the long

term. 42

The Ford Foundation immediately expressed strong

interest in the ACC project, and Katz agreed to meet with

Hugh Moore in New York on May 1 st.43 to Moore's great disappointment the meeting with Katz was a replay of the meeting, in February, with Hickerson. Like Hickerson, Katz argued that the ACC project, as it stood, was too much slanted toward Atlantic federalism. In March Katz had met with Clarence Streit, when the latter submitted his own 299

application for funding from the Ford Foundation for Federal

Union, Inc. and Freedom & Union. The Ford Foundation had

turned Streit down because his Atlantic Union program was too

controversial and therefore unlikely to yield concrete

results. Katz now pointed to the many simileirities between

the ACC program and the proposals of Streit, Federal Union,

Inc., and the AUC. By being associated too closely with the

Atlantic Union movement the ACC group risked being equally

unsuccessful in achieving tangible results. Katz made it

clear to Moore that he wasn't shutting the door against the

ACC (something he had done with Streit). He welcomed further

discussions and proposed a new meeting, during the summer, at

the Ford Foundation headquarters in Pasadena, CA. But he

warned Moore that if the ACC continued to be closely

associated with Streit and the Atlantic Union movement its

chances of getting funding from the Ford Foundation would be

very slim indeed.44

The similarities in the comments of Katz and Hickerson

on the ACC prospectus were no accident. In early April 1952

senior executives of the Ford Foundation met with Acheson at

the State Department and discussed their attitude toward the

Atlantic Union movement. The secretary referred to Streit's

ideas as "fuzzy proposals ... in which good, intelligent and energetic people seem[ed] so easily to become absorbed to the exclusion of reality."45 This doomed Streit's chances with the Ford Foundation, as well as those of anyone closely 300

associated with Atlantic Union. After the meeting between

Katz and Hugh Moore the Ford Foundation again touched base

with the State Department. Hickerson's deputy assured the

foundation that they had gotten it just right. The State

Department believed that the ACC would serve a useful purpose

and should be encouraged, provided it could be stripped of

its federalist bias and turned into an effort to promote the

development of a functional Atlantic Community.46

The choice facing the ACC committee was now clear. If

they continued to form a part of the Atlantic Union movement,

or even if they just were perceived to do so, they would

never gain the full backing of the administration or funding

from the Ford Foundation, and would whither away, much like

the AUC. To be effective they thus had to divorce themselves

definitively and openly from Streit and the AUC, and adopt a

new, independent course that would bring them closer to the

State Department and to NATO. Hugh Moore was prepared to take that step. He pointed out that the Ford Foundation's

suspicion that the ACC committee was just the AUC under a new guise was understandable. Except for himself, all of the members of the organizing committee for the ACC were also members of the AUC executive committee (and it was widely known that Moore had served as chairman of the AUC executive committee for three years). Most of the ACC committee's staff members were also on the staff of the AUC. And there was no sense in denying that the ACC prospectus bore more 301 than a passing resemblance to the AUC program. Unless all of this changed radically, the ACC was doomed. And with the AUC resolution permanently blocked in Congress, and the Atlantic study commission bill simultaneously going under, there seemed nothing left to the private atlanticist movement except the ACC.47

Hugh Moore was ready to draw the appropriate conclusions, and during May and June he convinced his colleagues in the ACC committee to follow him in a new direction. First of all he sent Milton Katz a long letter in which he presented a detailed history (from his perspective) of the AUC and the genesis of the ACC group. He emphasized the differences of opinion between himself and the moderates, on the one hand, and the "'Streitists,on the other hand.

The break between both groups that emerged during the second half of 1951 was fundamental and permanent, Moore argued.

And the ACC leader stressed that he had now become a "real" supporter of NATO and its functional development.48 At the same time, Moore moved to put his words into practice. On 16

May he and his colleagues incorporated the American Council for the Atlantic Citizens Congress (ACACC), and appointed themselves its executive committee (Hugh Moore was elected chairman). The committee agreed to wait with a new approach to either the State Department or the Ford Foundation until after the summer. In the meantime they would put their new organization on its (independent) feet, recruit new members 302

and supporters who had not been affiliated with the AUC or

Federal Union, inc., and draw up a brand-new ACC prospectus.

Hugh Moore argued persuasively that it was useless to send a

delegation to the Ford Foundation or the State Department

until that delegation included a prominent figure

unassociated with the Atlantic Union movement (he was

thinking in particular of Charles Spofford, the retiring U.S.

Deputy to NATO) and could present a program that was more

acceptable to the administration. This would obviously delay

the implementation of the ACC project, which was now

postponed until 1954. The final, and most important decision

the ACC group took in the spring of 1952 was to provoke an open conflict with the radical federalists within the AUC and to emasculate the AUC so as to be able to emerge from under

its shadow. 49

The late 1951 split had seriously weakened the AUC and during 1952 the committee in which Streit had once vested great hopes was only a shadow of its former self. Elmo

Roper, who had taken over the chairmanship of the executive committee, was as able an organizer as Hugh Moore. But with many of the moderates no longer attending the committee's meetings, and with dwindling finances, reduced press attention, and increasingly lackluster support at the grass roots level, there was little left to organize. Scibra

Holbrook, the AUC's able public relations director, came up with several imaginative schemes to publicize the Atlantic 303

Union cause. But virtually all of the AUC's most prominent members now saved their time for the ACC project, and were thus unavailcible for AUC publicity. The two high-profile men who had stuck with Streit and the AUC, Justice Owen Roberts and Senator Estes Kefauver, were also unavailable, the first because of illness and the second because he was in the middle of a presidential campaign. Under these circumstances the AUC resolution remained burried in the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee. Some AUC leaders proposed that the committee take part in the campaign for a congressional

Atlantic study commission. But Streit, who now dominated the

AUC more than ever before, saw no use in such a limited effort. 50

Streit saw the writing on the wall. His response, however, was the exact opposite of that of Hugh Moore.

Rather than move closer to the administration and its policy,

Streit, who now was more critical of NATO than ever before, moved further away.si Recognizing that the AUC was, at least temporarily, moribund, he decided to try to relaunch the

Atlantic Union movement through his trusted Federal Union,

Inc. What Streit had in mind was an ambitious project to expand Federal Union's educational activities, coupled with a push to increase the circulation (both domestic and overseas) of Freedom & Union. Of course this required a lot of money.

In March Streit applied to the Ford Foundation for a four- year grant totalling $1,590,000. The proposal Streit 304

presented to the Ford Foundation had a lot in common with the

ACC proposal, including a large-scale research project to

explore the problems of the Atlantic Community. An obvious

difference was that Streit's prospectus didn't even mention

NATO. Katz agreed to meet with Streit in Pasadena, and

praised his energy and tenaciousness. But in April the

Foundation turned Streit's request down, explaining that it

was too controversial to fit in its overall p r o g r a m , sz

Streit and the AUC (his AUC) were thus already in a

weak position when the ACC group decided, in effect, to go

after them. As in early 1951, Henry Flower acted as

surrogate for Hugh Moore. On 21 July 1952, Flower sent AUC

president Roberts a memorandum signed by himself and the

other moderate members of the AUC executive committee. The memorandum proposed a full-scale reorganization and downsizing of the AUC. The AUC, Flower argued, should close

its main office in New York; lose most of its staff; sharply reduce its budget; suspend local chapter activities; abandon

all educational and most fund-raising efforts; give up its efforts to broaden its National Council; and concentrate

solely on lobbying Congress in support of atlanticist

initiatives. Flower claimed that this would "strip the organization down to its essentials" and "make it more effective" in achieving limited goals. But it was obvious that this was an effort by the ACC group to remove the AUC as a competitor.53 The result was another deeply divided 305

executive committee meeting. But the Streit loyalist were

unable to stop the ACC group, which presented them not just

with proposals but also with facts. Several ACC leaders

immediately resigned from the AUC board of governors. They

were quickly followed by those members of the AUC staff

(including the finance and public relations directors) who

already worked on the ACC project.54 The AUC board of

governors could only survey the wreckage and salvage what it

could. By September 1952 the board had lost several of its most valuable members and experienced difficulties in

bringing together a quorum of those that were left. Four of

its seven senior staff members, and 10 of its 14 clerical

staff (in effect its whole New York office) had quit. And

revenues had declined sharply. Under these circumstances

even the Streit loyalists had no option but to reduce the

AUC's activities and accept a diminished public role.55

While the AUC fortunes continued to decline, those of

the ACC group seemed to go up. During the summer the ACC

group broadened its base by winning over some important

supporters. This was largely the result of the fact that the revised ACC prospectus now clearly emphasized the further development of NATO's non-military aspects, rather than the need for a federal Atlantic Union. In August the U.S.

Special Representative in Europe, William Draper, strongly endorsed the ACC project, stating his belief that "the NATO governments would welcome the ACC and give it their 306

blessings, both domestically and through NATO channels."

Clearly influenced by Achilles, Draper emphasized the

importance of better economic relations between the U.S. and

its NATO allies, and encouraged the ACC group to focus their

efforts on this aspect of the Atlantic Community.56 The ACC

committee was also successful in winning over former U.S.

NATO deputy Charles Spofford, who agreed to join the American

Council for the ACC and to help lobby the Ford Foundation for

funding.57 Even more important, of course, was winning over

the State Department. In September the ACC committee again

approached Hickerson, presenting him with their new

prospectus. Hickerson's response was strongly positive.

Because of the upcoming elections Hickerson could of course make no promises about the attitude of the administration in

1953, but he was nevertheless ready to give the ACC committee

a green light. Although the assistant secretary added some caveats about residual federalist language in the ACC propectus, he now felt that the ACC project should move

ahead. 58

With a revised prospectus, a broadened base, and a green light from the State Department the ACC group was now ready to renew its approach to the Ford Foundation. In early

October an ACC delegation, headed by Hugh Moore, met with the top executives of the Ford Foundation in Pasadena. The foundation executives showed themselves markedly more receptive to the ACC proposal than they had been in early 307

1952.59 An after a second meeting, in November, between the

ACC group and John McCloy (who now had also joined the Ford

Foundation) the foundation agreed to fund the first, preliminary steps in the ACC project. These included the commissioning of a major study of the problems of the

Atlantic Community at an American university, and visits to

Europe by ACC representatives to test the waters t h e r e . so

During the summer and fall of 1952 the ACC group had already laid the groundwork for these preliminary steps.

Through Herbert Agar and Kenneth Lindsay, who had transformed themselves from AUC to ACC liaisons, the committee had already begun to make contacts in Europe. And Tom Griessemer would travel to Europe in early 1953 to follow up on those contacts. As for the research into the problems of the

Atlantic Community, the ACC committee had already secured the cooperation of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, a prestigious academic institute that was also the recipient of generous donations from William Clayton.si The ACC research plan itself was largely inspired by Achilles, who provided the ACC leaders not only with his own draft outline for their research project but also with a copy of the "Green Book."

As a result, the ACC research focused primarily on transatlantic economic relations. And in another example of

Achilles's influence, it also proposed to examine the potential role of an Atlantic A s s e m b l y , sz 308

Early signals from Europe were also very encouraging.

In late November 1952 Hugh Moore received, via Herbert Agar,

a series of letters from NATO Secretary General Lord Ismay.

Agar, an old friend of Ismay, had given the secretary general

a copy of the ACC prospectus. Ismay reacted

enthustiastically. Although his letter contained some of the

same caveats that Hickerson had raised (e.g. the need to

include all NATO countries, rather than the original seven

founders, and the need to remove references to federalism),

Ismay's reaction was one of relief and hope. The secretary

general was a strong supporter of non-military cooperation

within the NATO framework and complained bitterly about the

restrictions imposed on him by the fact that he could only work through the national governments. A private citizens'

conference would not suffer under the same restrictions and would therefore be able to propose important new initiatives

in the non-military field to strengthen the Atlantic

Community. As far as Ismay was concerned the Atlantic

Citizens Congress couldn't be held soon enough. He hoped it would restore the momentum that NATO seemed to have lost, and

result in the creation of a permanent, international, citizens' support network for NAT0.®3 The ACC leaders were obviously delighted by Ismay's support, which they took as

another example that they now had the wind in their s a i l s . 64

But at the same time that the ACC seemed to emerge from under

its Atlantic Union cloud and prepare to take off, it was 309

outflanked by a new competitor.

In July 1952 a series of letters to the Times (of

London) revealed the existence of a new organization,

"Friends of Atlantic Union," composed of prominent British

figures from all major political parties and from the non­

political world. In reality the organization was not new,

but it had so far operated without publicity. In spite of

its name, the organization did not subscribe to the constitutional and federalist program of Streit and the AUG.

The organization had had contacts with the AUC, and shared

Streit's desire for greater transatlantic unity. And some

individual members of "Friends of Atlantic Union," such as the noted historian Arnold J. Toynbee, had publicly endorsed the AUC program and the Atlantic Union resolution. But as an organization, "Friends of Atlantic Union" clearly belonged to the moderate wing of the atlanticist movement. This was clear from the organization's published statement of purpose.

The statement's diagnosis of the problems of the Atlantic

Community was virtually identical to that of the American

Atlantic federalists, but the proposed solution was very different. The new organization called on NATO "to become an

Atlantic Community not indeed restricted only to countries on the Atlantic seaboard but embracing the civilization of the democracies of free Europe, of the British Commonwealth of

Nations, and of the United States of America." This NATO could achieve by steadily extending the sphere of its 310

activities, especially in the economic and cultural field,

"absorbing some of the existing functional bodies." In order

to bring this about a lot of public education and

international coordination would be required. And to take a

first step in this effort the "Friends of Atlantic Union," in

cooperation with the British Society for International

Understanding, would organize an "international Study

Conference on the Atlantic Community" at Oxford, from 7

through 13 September 1952. Private representatives from all

NATO countries would be invited to participate. GS

The Oxford Conference, as it became known, obviously

had a lot in common with the ACC. But there were important

differences between the ACC group and the British organizers

of the Oxford Conference. And these differences would play a

crucial role in the State Department's attitude toward the

Oxford initiative. One the one hand, the British Oxford

group from the start came out unhesitatingly as supporters of

NATO, and were clearly untainted by any federalist bias. On the other hand, the statements of the Oxford group did reflect a British bias. The reference to NATO's absorption of "existing functional bodies" seemed to imply acceptance of the British government's so-called "Eden proposals," which envisaged the consolidation of European functional organizations, such as the OEEC, the ECSC, and the EDC, in a wider, and looser, framework. This impression was reinforced by the fact that the Oxford Conference enjoyed the support of 311 the British Foreign O f f i c e . 66

The question, of course, was who would represent the

U.S. at Oxford. From NATO headquarters in Paris, U.S.

Special Representative in Europe William Draper pleaded with the State Department to ensure that there would be a high- profile American delegation of prominent educators, writers, journalists, and the such. Draper himself would attend the

Oxford conference as an observer. If the U.S. was to achieve its long-range objectives in Europe and within NATO it was vital. Draper argued, to strongly encourage and foster this kind of non-governmental effort to promote a better public understanding of the transatlantic relationship in all its aspects.67 After two weeks of silence from Washington, Draper impatiently prodded the department for quick action.68 The

State Depeirtment, however, was at a loss. On the one hand, it was symphatetic to the Oxford conference because of its apparent strong support for NATO. But at the same time it was suspicious of the organizers' links to the Foreign

Office. And it feared that, in view of the history of the

American atlanticist movement, the U.S. delegation might be infiltrated or even taken over by Atlantic Union enthusiasts. 69 Draper warned the department that its indecision could only have two consquences: either there would be virtually no U.S. representation at Oxford, something which would leave a very negative impression in

Europe about America's commitment to the Atlantic Community, 312

or the delegation might indeed be dominated by Atlantic Union

supporters, which, from the department's point of view, would

be equally d a m a g i n g . 70 The U.S. embassy in London strongly

supported Draper and tried to reassure the department about

the conference and its British organizers. But Washington

remained hesitant. Suggestions by Draper and the London

embassy that the State Department try to enlist Clayton and

some reliable members of Congress to represent the U.S.

achieved no results. The U.S. delegation was "paper thin,"

and consisted of the librarian of the Foreign Policy

Association, the London correspondent of the Christian

Science Monitor, and an American graduate student at O x f o r d . ’2

Acheson's continued ambivalence toward the Oxford conference was also reflected in his instructions to Draper regarding

the letter's role as observer. Although the secretary agreed to let Draper address the conference he vetoed a significant part of the speech. Draper's original speech included a lot of language that was obviously borrowed from Freedom & Union,

and that referred to the need to move beyond a mere military alliance. This was unacceptable to Acheson, who insisted that Draper remain non-committal and vague about the non­ military development of NATO. 73

The Oxford conference itself turned out to be a badly organized affair. Nevertheless, "after five days of meeting full of earnest discussion — not devoid of hair-splitting," it produced a series of conclusions and recommendations. 313

Most of the conference's recoiranendations and resolutions called for greater educational and cultural exchange among the NATO countries, more public education about NATO and the

Atlantic Community, and similar measures in the educational and cultural field. Undoubtedly the conference's most important decision was to call for the formation of non­ governmental groups in each country to further greater development and understanding of NATO and the Atlantic

Community, and the creation of an international federation to coordinate the activities of these national groups. To implement this program, the conference established a

"continuing committee," later renamed the International

Atlantic Committee (lAC). This committee was largely dominated by the British sponsors of the Oxford conference. 74

Virtually all delegations at the Oxford conference, except for the American one, had been put together to one degree or another by their respective governments. And when they returned home they all, again in consultation with their governments, began forming the pro-NATO groups envisaged at

Oxford. The State Department, which had badly faltered in providing for effective U.S. representation at Oxford, was determined not to make the same mistake twice. The Bureaus of European Affairs and Public Affairs immediately began a concerted effort to get a grip on whatever group might emerge out of the meager U.S. Oxford delegation. On 20 October

1952, officers of European and Public Affairs organized a 314

"Conference on U.S. Public Support of NATO," at the State

Department. This conference brought together some of the

Oxford delegates who had returned to the U.S. with about a

dozen other private individuals who were interested in

setting up a pro-NATO group along the lines suggested at

Oxford. The group included representatives from the American

Association of University Women, the Motion Picture

Association of America, the League of women voters of the

U.S., the National Broadcasting Company, the American

Historical Association, the American Political Science

Association, the National Education Association, the

Committee on the Present Danger, the Foreign Policy

Association, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the

American Newspaper Pubishers Association. The conference was not a great success. There was substantial disagreement among the participants about how NATO should be promoted, and whether new NATO initiatives in the cultural, educational, social, and economic field would conflict with U.S. support for United Nations and European functional bodies in those fields. Nevertheless, a majority of the conference agreed to set up an "Interim Committee on U.S. Support for NATO," in anticipation of the creation of a more permanent organization. The State Department organizers of this conference came away unimpressed by its results or the committee it had spawned. 75 315

The leading figure in the conference at the State

Department, largely because he had attended the Oxford

conference, was Dr. Ralph C. M. Flynt. Flynt was a senior

official in the U.S. Office of Education, and an inactive

member of the AUC's National Council. Through a series of

coincidences he had been able to attend the Oxford conference

at the last moment, on his own initiative. Once back in the

United States, Flynt began an extensive correspondence with the British leaders of the International Atlantic Committee.

He clearly saw himself as the anointed apostle of the Oxford conference in the U.S. He eagerly took up the chairmanship of the Interim Committee on U.S. Support for NATO, and began to gather around him a series of like-minded individuals. 76

Flynt's closest and most important collaborators in this enterprise were two other AUC veterans, Clinton Gardner and

Alastair Kyle, who became, respectively, secretary and treasurer of the Interim Committee. Gardner and Kyle had been on the staff of the AUC. They shared the despair of

Flynt and other moderates about Streit's unwillingness to compromise and the AUC's increasingly hostile tone regarding

NATO, but had not been invited to join the select ACC group.

When the AUC remained deaf to their concerns, and Flynt offered a new alternative, Gardner and Kyle bolted from the

AUC. 77

The arrival on the scene of the new Interim Committee obviously complicated matters for both the ACC group and 316

their friends in the State Department. Through Herbert Agar,

the ACC group had been informed in advance of the Oxford

conference. But Agar was not able to attend the conference

and none of the other ACC leaders was able to travel to

England on short notice.?8 After the conference both NATO

Secretary General Ismay and U.S. Special Representative in

Europe Draper urged the ACC group to get in contact with the

American interim Committee.79 The lAC, for its part, also

encouraged the American Interim Committee to seek contact

with the ACC group. It was important, lAC Chairman Duncannon

argued, not to get into a competition with rival atlanticist

groups, especially not when they included leaders of the

stature of William Clayton. On the other hand, the lAC warned the Interim Committee not to get sucked into an

Atlantic Union campaign. Federalism was taboo for the

British-dominated lAC. It was too controversial and divisive

and could wreck the whole international pro-NATO movement.so

The two groups did indeed contact each other. Gardner

and Moore had a personal meeting in late November and there was a more formal conference between the ACC group and the

Interim Committee on 18 December 1952. There was, to say the least, no chemistry. Both meetings were civil but ice-cold.si

Privately, Flynt complained that "the net result of the activity of the Atlantic Citizens Congress group is to confuse the issue in the minds of a great many people upon whom we have been counting for support." The Interim 317

Committee was envious of the ACC's prominent leadership,

close State Department contacts, and especially of its

funding by the Ford Foundation. Flynt feared that Hugh

Moore's group, with its big names, big finances, and big

project, would simply gobble up the Interim Committee. The

fact that Moore proposed exactly that during the December

conference only rubbed it in. 82 The ACC group, for its part, was decidedly unimpressed by Flynt's committee. Hugh Moore

contemptuously remarked that Flynt was a federal employee with little time, and even less money, on his hands. He was

equally dismissive about "young Gardner." But he could not dismiss the fact that the Interim Committee formed part of a much more impressive international network that had already pulled off an Atlantic conference while the ACC group hadn't even set a date for theirs. Moore became even more unhappy when he received a rather arrogant letter from Duncannon, who dismissed the ACC idea, proclaimed the interim Committee as the real thing, and suggested that Moore and co. simply apply to join Flynt.83

In view of these attitudes it was not surprising that the ACC group and the Interim Committee failed to reach an agreement during their meetings. Spurred on by their British

friends, Flynt and Gardner decided to move ahead and organize a permanent pro-NATO organization, which they proposed to found on 10 February 1953 and name the "U.S. Division of the

Atlantic Committee." In advance of the founding meeting the 318

Interim Committee tried to attract as many prominent adherents as possible. In an interesting, and aggressive move, Flynt and Gardner targeted those key figures who seemed to be crucial to the success of the ACC proposal, in particular Spofford, Draper and McCloy.84 The State

Department, meanwhile, looked upon these developments with some concern. The department welcomed the idea of a permanent pro-NATO citizens committee, but it was still singularly unimpressed by Flynt and co. It was particularly concerned that the Flynt committee seemed to be under direct influence, and even control, of the British-dominated lAC

(something that seemed to be reflected in the proposed name for the permanent committee). The department wanted an

American pro-NATO committee, that would coordinate its activities with the American administration, rather than with the British Foreign Office. With this in mind, the department prevailed upon the ACC group to accept Flynt's standing invitation to appoint a representative to serve on the board of his new committee. This would not only serve to prevent clashes between the two groups, but it would also turn Flynt's committee into a much more useful, and dependable, organization.85 After swallowing hard, the ACC group agreed that Hugh Moore would serve on the board of

Flynt's new committee.86 319

By early 1953 then, the American atlanticist movement had undergone a remarkable change. The AUC was barely alive, sustained only by the passionate commitment of Streit and his most loyal followers. Through the ACC project, the atlanticists had salvaged from the AUC wreck what they could.

And that ACC project, with its original federalist origins removed and defused, now stood ready to merge with a new, more international, and more NATO-oriented atlanticist movement. The State Department, partly because and partly in spite of Secretary Acheson's disdain for the non-military aspects of the Atlantic alliance, had played the role of midwife in this process. It remained to be seen how the new administration, and the new secretary of state, would approach their relationship with the American atlanticist movement, and whether the changing of the guard in Washington would bring the realization of a functional Atlantic

Community closer by. 320

1. For documentation on U.S. efforts to promote the EDC during 1951, see FRUS. 1951. vol. 3, 755-989. An excellent summary and analysis is in an undated background paper prepared in the Department of State, FRUS. 1952-54. vol. 5, 597-605. See also Fursdon, The European Defence Community, especially 105-36.

2. Bruce to Washington, 3 January 1952, FRUS. 1952-54. vol. 5, 572-76; McCloy to Washington, 3 January 1952, ibid., 576- 78; State Department position paper for talks between Truman and Churchill, 5 January 1952, Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File - General Files, Box 116, Folder "Churchill- Truman, U.S.-U.K. Relations"; Bruce to Washington, 1 February 1952, FRUS. 1952-54. vol. 5, 12-13; McCloy to Washington, 1 February 1952, ibid., 15-16; Acheson to Bruce, 2 February 1952, ibid., 18-19; PPS Paper "The European Policy of the United States," 5 February 1952, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Box 29, Folder "Europe, 1952-53."

3. The American efforts to encourage the Europeans to sign the EDC treaty are detailed in FRUS. 1952-54. vol. 5, 571- 687. For documentation on the crucial London meetings, see ibid., 36-106. See also Acheson, Present at the Creation. 608-10, 615-27, and 643-50.

4. Fursdon, The European Defence Community. 199-203.

5. Bruce to Washington, 3 January 1952, FRUS. 1952-54. vol. 5. 572-76; and William C. Trimble (Counselor, U.S. Embassy in the Hague) to Washington, 10 January 1952, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3444, 740.5/1-1052.

6. Memorandum of conversation between Acheson and Baron Silvercruys (Belgian Ambassador in Washington), 10 January 1952, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Bureau of European Affairs, Subject Files Relating to European Defense Arrangements, 1948-1954, Box 4, Folder "Belgium (May 1950 thru March 1952)"; memorandum of conversation between Acheson and Dr. van Roijen (Dutch Ambassador in Washington), 10 January 1952, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3444, 740.5/1-1052; Acheson to the Hague, 11 January 1952, ibid., 740.5/1-1152; and Acheson to Brussels, 11 January 1952, ibid.

7. Robert D, Murphy (U.S. Ambassador in Brussels) to Washington, 17 January 1952, ibid., 740.5/1-1752; Achilles (temporarily in Strasbourg) to Washington, 23 May 1952, ibid.. Box 3399, 740.00/5-2352.

8. Achilles to Streit, 3 January 1952, Streit Papers, Box 14, Folder "Achilles, Theodore C." 321

9. Summary of meeting in Parsons's office, 3 October 1951, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs, 1946-1953, Files of Miriam Camp, Box 2, Folder "NATO-Art.11-1952"; Spofford to Washington, 9 October 1951, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3440, 740.5/10-951; Spofford to Washington, 12 October 1951, ibid., 740.5/10- 1251; Spofford to Washington, 17 October 1951, ibid., 740.5/10-1751; outline of topics of the Working Group on North Atlantic Community, 18 October 1951, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs, 1946-1953, Files of Miriam Camp, Box 2, Folder "NATO-Art.II- 1952"; Achilles to Parsons, 19 October 1951, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3440, 740.5/10-1951; Spofford to Washington, 23 October 1951, ibid., 740.5/10-2351; Spofford to Washington, 24 October 1951, ibid., 740.5/10-2451; Spofford to Washington, 25 October 1951, ibid., 740.5/10- 2551; and Spofford to Washington, 26 October 1951, ibid., 740.5/10-2651. For the very brief discussion of the group's interim report at Rome, see Acheson to Washington, 29 November 1951, FRUS. 1951. vol. 3, 737-41; and the press communique of the eight session of the North Atlantic Council, 28 November 1951, ibid., 742-43.

10. Spofford to Washington, 2 February 1952, ibid.. Box 3445, 740.5/2-252; Spofford to Washington, 13 February 1952, ibid.. Box 3446, 740.5/2-1352; and Spofford to Washington, 14 February 1952, ibid., 740.5/2-1452.

11. Achilles to Parsons, 20 November 1951, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3442, 740.5/11-2051; and Hill to Parsons, 26 December 1951, ibid.. Box 3443, 740.5/12-2651.

12. Position paper drafted by Parsons, 2 January 1952, ibid.. Box 3444, 740.5/1-252.

13. Webb (Acting Secretary of State) to London, 20 November 1951, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3442, 740.5/11-2051. Acheson remained fundamentally opposed to creating new, and possibly expansive NATO institutions. This, he feared, would only create more problems and lead to more inefficiency. See State Department position paper for the Truman-Churchill talks, 3 January 1952, Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File-General File, Box 116, Folder "Churchi11-Truman, U.S.- U.K. Relations."

14. Achilles to Washington, 3 January 1952, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3444, 740.5/1-352; Acheson to London, 4 January 1952, ibid., 740.5/1-452; Herman Pollack (staff officer Bureau of European Affairs) to Martin, 4 January 1952, ibid.; circular telegram to certain diplomatic missions, 11 January 1952, ibid., 740.5/1-1152; circular 322 telegram to certain diplomatic missions, 12 January 1952, ibid., 740.5/1-1252; State Department position paper for Lisbon conference, 15 January 1952, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Box 29, Folder "Europe, 1952-53"; State Department position paper, 28 January 1952, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3445, 740.5/1-2852.

15. Webb to London, 20 November 1951, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3442, 740.5/11-2051; Webb to London, 23 November 1951, ibid., 740.5/11-2351; Acheson to London, 24 January 1952, ibid.. Box 3445, 740.5/1-2452; Acheson to London, 2 February 1952, ibid., 740.5/2-252; and Acheson to London, 7 February 1952, ibid., 740.5/2-752. As usual, the Bureau of United Nations Affairs also raised a red flag over the creation of new Atlantic economic, social, and cultural institutions. See Walter M. Kotschnig (director of the Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs) to Camp, 21 November 1951, ibid.. Box 3442, 740.5/11-2151.

16. For the Lisbon meetings (20-26 February 1952), see FRUS. 1952-54. vol. 5, 107-74. See also the final communique of the ninth session of the North Atlantic Council, 26 February 1952, ibid., 177-79; and the final report of the Committee on the North Atlantic Community to the North Atlantic Council, 19 February 1952, ibid., 180-90. The decision to appoint a secretary general to oversee the strengthened NATO international staff gave rise to an almost comical search for a willing candidate. The man the U.S. originally had in mind. Sir Oliver Franks, the high-profile British ambassador in Washington, declined. The allies next approached Lester Pearson, but the Canadian refused to be considered as "second choice" after a Briton. Thereupon the Dutch and Norwegian foreign ministers, Stikker and Lange, made themselves available but they were unacceptable to the French who considered them too Atlantic- and British-oriented. The French put up a few candidates of their own, but they were unacceptable to the Americans and British. By mid-March the allies finally stumbled upon a willing and universally acceptable candidate in the person of Lord Ismay, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. His selection as a somewhat colorless compromise candidate did not bode well for those who hoped that the NATO international staff would transform itself into a "quasi executive branch." See memorandum of telephone conversations between Acheson and ambassadors Wrong and Franks, 27 February 1952, Acheson Papers, Box 67, Folder "Memoranda of Conversations (Feb. 52)"; memorandum of telephone conversations between Acheson and ambassadors Wrong and Bonnet, 28 February 1952, ibid.; memorandum of telephone conversation between Acheson and Spofford, 29 February 1952, ibid.; memorandum of telephone 323 conversation between Acheson and Wrong, 3 March 1952, ibid.. Folder "Memoranda of Conversations (Mar. 52); memorandum of conversation between Acheson and Bonnet, 4 March 1952, ibid.; and memorandum of telephone conversations between Acheson and Lovett, Harriman, Spofford, Franks, and Pearson, 10 March 1952, ibid.

17. Acheson called the results of the meeting a "grand slam." See Acheson, Present at the Creation. 622-27.

18. Acheson to London, 21 March 1952, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3448, 740.5/3-2152; Martin to Livingston T. Merchant (Deputy U.S. Representative in Europe), 22 April 1952, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs, 1946-1953, Files of Miriam Camp, Box 1, Folder "Chron. File 1952."

19. As part of the reorganization of both NATO and the U.S. delegation to NATO, Spofford and Achilles were replaced in April 1952 by, respectively, William H. Draper and Livingston T. Merchant. Draper's new title was U.S. Special Representative in Europe. Spofford returned to private life and quickly became involved with the ACC group. Achilles became minister in the U.S. embassy in Paris. See Achilles, "Fingerprints on History". 48-49.

20. Cleveland to Lincoln Gordon (Deputy Director of the Mutual Security Agency) and Martin, 17 July 1952, with enclosed copy of the "Green Book," RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs, 1946- 1953, Files of Miriam Camp, Box 2, Folder "1954 Green Book."

21. David Bruce (Under Secretary of State) to Martin, 4 August 1952, ibid.; "Questions on Atlantic Reserve System," paper drafted by A. M. Rosenson (Chief, Monetary Affairs Staff of the Office of Financial and Development Policy), 4 August 1952, ibid.; Camp to Martin, 11 August 1952, ibid. The Bureau of European Affairs wanted to discuss the "Green Book," and the economic development of the Atlantic Community and its relationship to European integration, at the meeting, in London in late September 1952, of U.S. ambassadors to Europe. Acheson and Bruce vetoed this and kept the whole subject off the agenda of the ambassadors' meeting. See Perkins to Barbour, Knight, Moore, and Raynor (his division chiefs), 4 September 1952, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3402, 740.00/9-452.

22. From Paris Achilles tried to support his friends in Washington by sending them a series of articles by the prominent French journalist and commentator Raymond Aron which were published in Le Figaro in August 1952. The 324 series, entitled "U.S. Wealth; European Deficit," focused on the economic problems of the Atlantic Community and their central argument bore an uncanny resemblance to that of the "Green Book." See Achilles to Washington, 22 August 1952, with enclosed articles, ibid., 740.00/8-2252. After the failure to put the issue on the agenda of the ambassadors' meeting Achilles conspired with Parsons to keep the "Green Book" alive. See Achilles to Parsons, 1 October 1952, ibid.. Box 3456, 740.5/10-152; Achilles to Parsons, 21 October 1952, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs, 1945-1953, Files of J. Graham Parsons, Subject File, Box 1, Folder "Achilles"; Parsons to Achilles, 27 October 1952, ibid.

23. Perkins to Webb, 14 December 1951, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3440, 740.5/10-1751.

24. Jack K. McFall (Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations) to Connally, 18 January 1952, ibid.

25. Hill to Bonbright and Parsons, 3 March 1952, ibid.. Box 3447, 740.5/3-352.

26. Marshall to Nitze, 3 March 1952, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Box 29, Folder "Europe, 1952-53."

27. William T. Nunley (staff officer. Office of European Regional Affairs) to Parsons, 29 April 1952, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3447, 740.5/4-2952; memorandum of conversation between Parsons and McClure, 2 May 1952, ibid., 740.5/5-252.

28. Memo by Marshall, 16 June 1952, ibid.. Box 3452, 740.5/6- 1652.

29. Hill to Bonbright, 1 February 1952, ibid.. Box 3397, 740.00/2-152; Achilles to Parsons, 4 February 1952, with enclosed paper by Achilles, ibid.. Box 3445, 740.5/2-452.

30. Hill to Bonbright and Parsons, 12 May 1952, ibid.. Box 3450, 740.5/5-1252.

31. Achilles to Parsons, 20 November 1952, with enclosed paper by Achilles, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs, 1945-1953, Files of J. Graham Parsons, Subject File, Box 1, Folder "Achilles"; Hill to Williamson and Parsons, 28 November 1952, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3458, 740.5/11-2852. 325

32. Hickerson to Grew, 3 January 1952, with attached memorandum of conversation, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 2767, 611.40/1-352; minutes of the meeting of the organizing committee for the ACC, 4 January 1952, Moore Papers, Box 5, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, Jan.-March 1952"; Grew to Hugh Moore, 7 January 1952, ibid.. Box 4, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Committee, 1954"; Hugh Moore to Clayton, 7 January 1952, ibid.; Clayton to Hugh Moore, 8 January 1952, Clayton Papers, Box 87, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee, 1952 1."

33. Hugh Moore, for example, had explicitely distanced himself from Clarence Streit in his talks with Hickerson, but assured his colleagues in the ACC committee that he was still a firm believer in Atlantic Union. The problem with Streit, Moore argued, were not his ideas, but the fact that Streit was not an "'organization man'" and was too much of a zealot to cooperate effectively with "practical men" within and outside the Atlantic Union movement. See Hugh Moore to Grew, 7 January 1952, Moore Papers, Box 4, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, 1954."

34. Minutes of the meetings of the organizing committee for the ACC, 4 January 1952, 10 January 1952, 17 January 1952, 24 January 1952, and 31 Jcuiuary 1952, ibid.. Box 5, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, Jan.-March 1952"; memorandum by Hugh Moore, with attached list of prospective members for the American Council for the ACC, 19 January 1952, ibid.. Box 4, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, 1954"; Hugh Moore to Clayton, 19 January 1952, Clayton Papers, Box 87, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee, 1952 1"; Clayton to Hugh Moore, 25 January 1952, ibid.; Hugh Moore to Clayton, 11 February 1952, ibid.; and Clayton to Hugh Moore, 12 February 1952, ibid.

35. Hugh Moore to Hickerson, 28 January 1952, Moore Papers, Box 4, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, 1954."

36. Niemeyer to Sanders, 11 February 1952, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 2767, 611.40/2-1152; and memorandum of conversation between Hickerson and Moore et al., 13 February 1952, ibid., 611.40/2-1352. Conscious of the anti- atlanticist attitude of most of the staff of his own Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Hickerson introduced Hugh Moore to the deputy director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, J. Graham Parsons. Parsons would function as the liaison between the ACC group and the State Department when Hickerson himself was not available.

37. Minutes of the meetings of the organizing committee for the ACC, 14 February 1952, and 21 February 1952, Moore Papers, Box 5, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, Jan.-March 326

1952"; Hugh Moore to Clayton, 19 February 1952, Clayton Papers, Box 87, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee, 1952 1"; Hugh Moore to Hickerson, 19 February 1952, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 2767, 611.40/2-1952.

38. Minutes of the meetings of the organizing committee for the ACC, 6 March 1952, and 14 March 1952, Moore Papers, Box 5, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, Jan.-March 1952"; Hugh Moore to Grew, 11 March 1952, ibid.; Grew to Hugh Moore, 12 March 1952, with enclosed letter to Hickerson, ibid.

39. Grew to Hickerson, 12 March 1952, with attached Hickerson to Grew, 28 March 1952, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 2767, 611.40/3-1252.

40. Clayton to McCloy, 4 March 1952, with attached McCloy to Clayton, 18 March 1952, Clayton Papers, Box 87, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee, 1952 2"; Clayton to Harriman and Bissell, 17 March 1952, ibid.; Hugh Moore to Clayton, 7 April 1952, ibid. See also the minutes of the meetings of the organizing committee for the ACC, 21 March 1952, and 28 Mcirch 1952, Moore Papers, Box 5, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, Jan.-March 1952"; and minutes of the meeting of the organizing committee for the ACC, 10 April 1952, ibid., Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, April-Aug. 1952."

41. Sabra Holbrook to Hugh Moore, 16 April 1952, Moore Papers, Box 5, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, April-Aug. 1952."

42. Memorandum from Griessemer to all members of the organizing committee for the ACC, 16 April 1952,Moore Papers, Box 5, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, April-Aug. 1952"; and Holbrook to Clayton, 18 April 1952, with enclosed ACC prospectus, Clayton Papers, Box 87, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee, 1952 4"; and Holbrook to Hugh Moore, 22 April 1952, with enclosed materials for Ford Foundation, Moore Papers, Box 5, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, April-Aug. 1952."

43. Minutes of the meeting of the organizing committee for the ACC, 25 April 1952, ibid.

44. Minutes of the meeting of the organizing committee for the ACC, 1 May 1952, Moore Papers, Box 5, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, April-Aug. 1952"; Hugh Moore to Adolph W. Schmidt (ACC committee member), 3 May 1952, ibid.. Box 4, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, 1954"; Katz to Hugh Moore, 20 May 1952, ibid.. Box 5, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, April-Aug. 1952." 327

45. Memorandum of conversation between Acheson and Paul Hoffman (Director of the Ford Foundation) et al, 3 April 1952# Acheson Papers, Box 67, Folder "Memoranda of Conversations (April 1952)."

46. Memorandum of telephone conversation between Sanders and John Howard (assistant to Katz), 3 June 1952, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 2767, 611.40/6-352.

47. Hugh Moore to Arnaud Marts (member ACC committee), 28 May 1952, Moore Papers, Box 5, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, April-Aug. 1952." Moore's thinking was reinforced by news that seemed to confirm that the State Department and the Ford Foundation were coordinating their policy toward the ACC group. See Walden Moore to Hugh Moore, 12 May 1952, ibid.

48. This letter was actually sent by Adolph W. Schmidt. But Moore wrote the letter and urged Schmidt to send it. See Hugh Moore to Schmidt, 10 May 1952, with enclosed Schmidt to Katz, ibid.. Box 4, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, 1954"; and Schmidt to Katz, 12 May 1952, ibid. The letter was supported by additional ones from Clayton and Hugh Moore. See Clayton to Katz, 21 May 1952, Clayton Papers, Box 87, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee, 1952 4"; Clayton to Katz, 24 May 1952, ibid.; and Hugh Moore to Katz, 27 May 1952, Moore Papers, Box 4, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, 1954."

49. Minutes of the meetings of the organizing committee for the ACC, 16 May 1952, 12 June 1952, and 18 June 1952, ibid.. Box 5, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, April-Aug. 1952"; minutes of the first meeting of the directors of the ACACC, 16 May 1952, ibid.; memorandum from Griessemer to all members of the organizing committee for the ACC, 12 June 1952, ibid.; memorandum from Hugh Moore to all members of the organizing committee for the ACC, 14 June 1952, ibid.

50. Minutes of the meetings of the AUC executive committee, 3 January 1952, 30 January 1952, 19 March 1952, 9 April 1952, 13 May 1952, and 17 June 1952, Streit Papers, Box 108, Folder "Minutes of the Exexcutive Committee, 1952"; Walden Moore to the AUC board of governors, 7 March 1952, with attached report on AUC field organization, ibid.; minutes of the meetings of the AUC political committee, 20 March 1952, 22 May 1952, and 17 June 1952, ibid.. Box 119, Folder "Political Committee Minutes and Agenda, 1951-52"; and minutes of the meetings of the AUC board of governors, 20 March 1952, 22 May 1952, and 17 June 1952, AUC MSS, Box 98, Folder "Board of Governors Minutes, 1952-55." For details on the publicity ideas of Holbrook and other AUC staff members, see Holbrook 328

to Walden Moore, 4 February 1952, AUC MSS, Box 8, Folder "General File-Office Memoranda, 1950-52"; Holbrook to Walden Moore, 13 February 1952, ibid.; Holbrook to Walden Moore, 18 February 1952, ibid.; T. C. P. Martin to Clayton, 11 February 1952, Clayton Papers, Box 87, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee, 1952 1"; and T. C. P. Martin to Clayton, 20 February 1952, ibid. One proposal was the creation of an "Atlantic Community Day," similar to the existing "United Nations Day," sponsored by the State Department and organized by private groups like the AUC. The AUC raised this idea with the State Department, but received a short, formal, and negative reply. See Roberts to Acheson, 25 February 1952, with attached Acheson to Roberts, 11 March 1952, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3447, 740.5/2-2552.

51. Streit to Achilles, 2 January 1952, Streit Papers, Box 14, Folder "Achilles, Theodore C."; and Streit to Pearson, 22 January 1952, Clayton Papers, Box 87, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee, 1952 1."

52. "An Earnest Appeal to the Ford Foundation for Federal Union Incorporated," by Streit, 5 January 1952, Streit Papers, Box 21, Folder "Ford Foundation, 1952"; Streit to Chester Davis (Associate Director of the Ford Foundation), 25 February 1952, ibid.; Streit to Hoffman, 25 February 1952, ibid.; Streit to Katz, 11 March 1952, ibid.; Streit to Jeanne Defrance Streit (wife), 12 March 1952; Streit to Katz, 22 March 1952, ibid.; Streit to Katz, 23 March 1952, ibid.; Streit to Hoffman, 23 March 1952, ibid.; Streit to Davis, 24 March 1952, ibid.; Katz to Streit, 25 March 1952, ibid.; Katz to Streit, 26 March 1952, ibid.; Davis to Streit, 27 March 1952, ibid.; Streit to John Cowles, 5 April 1952, ibid.; Cowles to Streit, 12 April 1952, ibid.; and Streit to Davis, 23 April 1952, ibid.

53. Flower to Roberts, 21 July 1952, with enclosed memorandum, Streit Papers, Box 38, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee, Reorganization, 1952." The memorandum was actually largely the work of Hugh Moore. See Hugh Moore to Flower, 28 June 1952, Moore Papers, Box 5, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, April-Aug. 1952"; draft memorandum by Hugh Moore, 1 July 1952, ibid.; and Mrs. Frank C. Baker to Flower, 2 July 1952, ibid.

54. Minutes of the meeting of the AUC executive committee, 29 July 1952, Streit Papers, Box 108, Folder "Minutes of the Executive Committee, 1952"; and memorandum from Walden Moore to the AUC board of governors, 8 August 1952, ibid.

55. Minutes of the twentieth meeting of the AUC board of governors, 15 September 1952, with attached annual report by 329

Walden Moore, AUC MSS, Box 98, Folder "Board of Governors Minutes, 1952-55."

56. Draper to Clayton, 19 August 1952, Moore Papers, Box 4, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, 1954."

57. Hugh Moore to Clayton, 23 August 1952, ibid.; and Hugh Moore to Flower, 13 September 1952, ibid. See also the minutes of the meetings of the organizing committee for the ACC, 21 August 1952, and 5 September 1952, ibid.. Box 5, Folders "Atlantic Citizens Congress, April-Aug. 1952," and "atlantic Citizens Congress, Sept.-Dec. 1952," respectively.

58. Niemeyer to Sanders, 8 September 1952, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 2767, 611.40/9-852; Hugh Moore to Clayton, 15 September 1952, with attached Hugh Moore to Hickerson, 15 September 1952, Moore Papers, Box 4, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, 1954"; Hickerson to Hugh Moore, 19 September 1952, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 2767, 611.40/9-1952.

59. Memorandum by Griessemer, 1 October 1952, Moore Papers, Box 5, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, Sept.-Dec. 1952"; Hugh Moore to Katz, 3 October 1952, ibid.. Box 4, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, 1954"; and minutes of the meeting of the organizing committee for the ACC, 9 October 1952, Box 5, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, Sept.-Dec. 1952."

60. Hugh Moore to Clayton, 12 November 1952, Clayton Papers, Box 87, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee, 1952 6"; minutes of the organizing committee for the ACC, 14 November 1952, Moore Papers, Box 5, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, Sept.-Dec. 1952"; and Hugh Moore to McCloy, 17 November 1952, Clayton Papers, Box 87, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee, 1952 6."

61. Minutes of the meeting of the organizing committee for the ACC, 9 October 1952, Moore Papers, Box 5, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, Sept.-Dec. 1952."

62. Achilles to Parsons, 1 October 1952, with attached Achilles to Spofford, 30 September 1952, and enclosed "Draft Outline of Problems for Research Program," RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3456, 740.5/10-152; Parsons to Achilles, 27 October 1952, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs, 1945-1953, Files of J. Graham Parsons, Subject File, Box 1, Folder "Achilles"; Spofford to Hugh Moore, 6 November 1952, with enclosed "Draft Outline of Problems for Research Program," Moore Papers, Box 5, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, Sept.-Dec. 1952"; "Preliminary Draft of A Study Outline Regarding the Problems 330

Involved in the Development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization" (undated) by Griessemer, Clayton Papers, Box 87, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee, 1952 6."

63. Agar to Hugh Moore, 16 November 1952, Moore Papers, Box 4, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, 1954"; Ismay to Agar, undated, ibid.; Ismay to Agar, 24 November 1952, ibid.; and Ismay to Agar, 25 November 1952, ibid.

64. Hugh Moore to Clayton, et al., 24 November 1952, ibid.; Holbrook to Hugh Moore, 26 November 1952, ibid.; Hugh Moore to Agar, 29 November 1952, ibid.; minutes of the meeting of the organizing committee for the ACC, 4 December 1952, ibid.. Box 5, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, Sept.-Dec. 1952"; and Clayton to Hugh Moore, 31 December 1952, Clayton Papers, Box 87, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee, 1952 6."

65. Robert G. Hooker, Jr. (First Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in London) to Washington, 21 July 1952, with enclosed letters, articles, editorials, and pamphlet, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3453, 740.5/7-2152.

66. Ibid. For documentation on the Eden proposals, see FRUS. 1952-54. vols. 5 and 6, passim.

67. Draper to Washington, 24 July 1952, ibid., 740.5/7-2452.

68. Draper to Washington, 7 August 1952, ibid.. Box 3454, 740.5/8-752.

69. Bruce (acting secretary) to Paris, 7 August 1952, ibid., 740.5/8-752.

70. Draper to Washington, 8 August 1952, ibid., 740.5/8-852.

71. Holmes (minister at the U.S. embassy in London) to Washington, 11 August 1952, ibid., 740.5/8-1152.

72. Acheson to Paris, 12 August 1952, ibid., 740.5/8-1252; Hulley (first secretary at the U.S. embassy in London) to Washington, 13 August 1952, ibid., 740.5/8-1352; Draper to Washington, 13 August 1952, ibid., 740.5/8-1352; Bruce to London, 19 August 1952, ibid., 740.5/8-1952; Gifford (U.S. ambassador in London) to Washington, 21 August 1952, ibid., 740.5/8-2152; Bruce to London, 22 August 1952, ibid., 740.5/8- 2252; and Gifford to Washington, 25 August 1952, ibid., 740.5/8-2552.

73. Draper to Washington, 4 September 1952, ibid.. Box 3455, 740.5/9-452; and Acheson to Paris, 5 September 1952, ibid., 740.5/9-552. 331

74. Draper to Washington, 25 September 1952, ibid., 740.5/9- 2552; Gifford to Washington, 26 September 1952, ibid., 740.5/9-2652; Draper to Washington, 26 September 1952, ibid.; 740.5/9-2652; Gordon (first secretary at the U.S. embassy in London) to Washington, 16 October 1952, ibid.. Box 3456, 740.5/10-1652. See also "Interim Report of the International Study Conference on the Atlantic Community, Oxford, September 7th to 13th, 1952," undated. Papers of Ralph C. M. Flynt, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, MO, Box 21, Folder "NATO-First International Study Conference," (hereafter Flynt Papers, with filing information).

75. Helen P. Kirkpatrick (public affairs officer in the Bureau for European Affairs) to Howland Sargeant (Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs), 1 October 1952, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3456, 740.5/10-152; memorandum of conversation, 24 October 1952, ibid., 740.5/10- 2452; Bruce to Paris, 1 November 1952, ibid.. Box 3457, 740.5/11-152; Joseph B. Phillips (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs) to Kirkpatrick, 3 November 1952, ibid., 740.5/11-352. See also Parsons to Achilles, 27 October 1952, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs, 1945-1953, Files of J. Graham Parsons, Subject File, Box 1, Folder "Achilles." See also "Conference on U.S. Public Support of NATO," 20 October 1952, Flynt Papers, Box 22, Folder "NATO Interim Committee, 1952."

76. Flynt to John Eppstein (Director of the British Society for International Understanding and member of the lAC), 23 October 1952, ibid.. Box 14, Folder "ATA, Nov. 1952-Jan. 1963, 1"; Flynt to Viscount Duncannon (Chairman of the lAC), 24 October 1952, ibid.; Duncannon to Flynt, 10 November 1952, ibid.; Eppstein to Flynt, 11 November 1952, ibid.; Flynt to Eppstein, 21 November 1952, ibid.; Flynt to Duncannon, 24 November 1952, ibid.; Duncannon to Flynt, 27 November 1952, ibid. Flynt's official function in the U.S. Office of Education was Director of the General and Liberal Education Branch. Flynt's leading role in the Interim Committee led to some tension between the Federal Security Agency (FSA), which oversaw the Office of Education, and the State Department. The FSA pointed to the prominent role of one of its officials, and to the fact that the Oxford conference foresaw the need for public information and educational and cultural activities to reinforce the Atlantic Community, and suggested that the State Department organize an intra-governmental meeting to determine the role of the Office of Education in this process. The State Department replied, in no uncertain terms, that it envisaged no such role. See John Thurston (acting administrator of the FSA) to Acheson, 27 October 1952, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3456, 740.5/10-2752; and Phillips to Oscar Ewing (FSA Administrator), 21 November 332

1952, ibid., Box 3457, 740.5/11-2752.

77. Gardner to Duncannon, 21 November 1952, Flynt Papers, Box 14, Folder "ATA, Nov. 1952-Jan. 1963, 1." See also Gardner and Kyle to the AUC executive committee, 1 October 1952, Streit Papers, Box 38, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee Reorganization, 1952"; and Gardner to Clayton, 20 November 1952, Clayton Papers, Box 87, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee, 1952 6."

78. Hugh Moore to Walden Moore, 8 August 1952, Moore Papers, Box 8, Folder "atlantic Union Committee, Jan. 52-Mar. 62."

79. Ismay to Agar, undated, ibid., Box 4, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, 1954"; Ismay to Agar, 24 November 1952, ibid.; Ismay to Agar, 25 November 1952, ibid.; minutes of the meeting of the organizing committee for the ACC, 4 December 1952, ibid.. Box 5, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, Sept.- Dec. 1952"; and Francis Deak (assistant to Draper) to Griessemer, 11 December 1952, ibid.

80. Duncannon to Flynt, 27 November 1952, Flynt Papers, Box 3, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, 1952-53"; and Duncannon to Gardner, 27 November 1952, with enclosed minutes of a meeting of the lAC, ibid.

81. Gardner to Hugh Moore, 1 December 1952, Flynt Papers, Box 3, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, 1952-53"; minutes of the meeting between the ACC committee and the Interim Committee, 18 December 1952, ibid.

82. Memorandum by Flynt, 16 December 1952, ibid.; Flynt to Duncannon, 24 December 1952, ibid.

83. Duncannon to Hugh Moore, 6 December 1952, ibid.; and Hugh Moore to Agar, 20 December 1952, Moore Papers, Box 4, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, 1954."

84. Gardner to Draper, 29 December 1952, Flynt Papers, Box 1, Folder "American Council on NATO, 1952-53"; Gardner to McCloy, 30 December 1952, ibid.; Gardner to Duncannon, 30 December 1952, ibid.; Kyle to Eppstein, 7 January 1953, ibid.; Flynt to Kyle, 7 January 1953, ibid.; Duncannon to Flynt, 8 January 1953, ibid.; Gardner to Spofford, 8 January 1953, ibid. Flynt also tried to enlist the sup^rt, both political and financial, of his immediate superior, U.S. Commissioner for Education Earl J. McGrath. But McGrath, who was unwilling to get tangled up in Flynt's affairs or risk a confrontation with the State Department, turned him down. See McGrath to Flynt, 19 December 1952, ibid. 333

85. Minutes of conversation between Parsons and Spofford, 9 January 1953, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3460, 740.5/1-953.

86. Minutes of the meetings of the organizing committee for the ACC, 23 January 1953, and 29 January 1953, Moore Papers, Box 6, Unmarked Folder. CHAPTER VIII

FORGING THE ALTLANTIC COMMUNITY: JOHN FOSTER DULLES,

THE STATE DEPARTMENT, AND THE AMERICAN COUNCIL ON NATO, FEBRUARY 1953-DECEMBER 1955

1952 was of course not only a year of transformation for the American atlanticist movement. It was also a crucial election year. The elections brought Dwight D. Eisenhower to the White House. Eisenhower was a former Supreme Commander of NATO's forces in Europe, and something of an idol among

American atlanticists. Many of them hoped that the new president would prove more receptive to their ideas than his predecessor.! Of more immediate importance to the atlanticist movement was the changeover at the State Department, the government agency that they had found so often in their way and impossible to circumvent. The new secretary of state,

John Foster Dulles, had been personally associated with the

Atlantic Union movement since 1939. At two important moments, in 1940-41 and in 1949, he had supported Streit's

Atlantic Union proposal, and he had contributed several articles to Freedom & Union. And throughout the Cold War

334 335

Dulles had often framed the conflict with the Soviets in spiritual and ideological terms that contrasted sharply with the coldly geopolitical vision of Acheson and seemed closer to the cultural-ideological aspects of the Atlantic Union movement. But once in office, Dulles turned out to be a much more conservative and traditional diplomat than most observers, including the atlanticists, had expected. In essence, Dulles continued the Cold War foreign policy laid down by his predecessors Acheson and Meirshall.2 Nevertheless,

Dulles, and, for that matter, the whole Eisenhower

Administration, showed himself much less hostile to the

Atlantic Community enthusiasts than Acheson, and was more open to their ideas and those of their symphatizers within the State Department and the Foreign Service. This was in part the result of the different background and worldview of the secretary. But broader developments also played a crucial role. The relative easing of Cold War tensions, which had already become apparent in 1952, continued and further lessened the public, and legislative, appetites for

Western rearmament and defense expenditures. And the same fading of the common peril also brought into sharper focus those economic, cultural, and political issues that still divided the U.S. and its European allies. Both of these developments threatened to undermine the effectiveness, if not the very existence, of the North Atlantic alliance, the cornerstone of U.S. Cold War foreign policy. This sense of 336

crisis in transatlantic relations was only heightened by the

EDC debacle, and it provided a new opening for the

atlanticist movement and its initiatives, especially when

they were designed specifically to deal with these alliance

problems. The result was the implementation of some of the

atlanticist ideas that had been vetoed by Acheson, and a

renewed transformation, during 1954-55, of the atlanticist

movement from a collection of private citizens' groups and

committees into a semi-official support network for U.S. and

NATO policies.

Clarence Streit, who had been swallowing bad news for

more than 2 years, and who had seen the AUC crumble around

him, felt encouraged by the outcome of the November 1952

elections. His efforts, during the summer, to get both

parties to put a plank favorable to Atlantic Union in their

election platform had been in vain.3 But the election of

Eisenhower at the very least meant the removal of Acheson,

whom Streit by now regarded as his personal nemesis, from the

State Department. Furthermore, Streit had great hopes that

Eisenhower, an ex-NATO commander, would be sympathetic to

Atlantic Union.4 streit's hopes rose even higher when

Eisenhower appointed John Foster Dulles, the man who had

helped him write the very first Atlantic Union resolution during the early 1940's, and who had been his friend ever

since, as his secretary of state.s streit immediately began 337

to make plans to reintroduce the Atlantic Union resolution in

Congress and round up public and congressional support. But

first of all he wanted a meeting with Dulles, so they could

coordinate their approach. It turned out to be unexpectedly

difficult to arrange a meeting with the new secretary.e And

when the meeting finally took place, on 16 February 1953, it

did not go as Streit had planned. Dulles was cordial, but

refused to support the Atlantic Union resolution in any way.

The secretary feared that it might interfere with his efforts

to push through European ratification of the EDC. And he

also pointed out that opposition to the resolution might

serve as a rallying cry for those senators who wanted to push

through the so-called Bricker Amendment to limit the president's treaty-making power. Frantic efforts, in the wake of the meeting, to change the secretary's mind were in vain. Dulles's rejection was a severe blow to Streit, and killed any hope of successfully reintroducing the Atlantic

Union resolution in the upcoming Congress.? It seemed like

1949 all over again, with the EDC taking the place of the

North Atlantic Treaty and the supporters of the Bricker

Amendment taking up the role of the 1949 old isolationist threat. In effect, Dulles had adopted wholesale his predecessor's policy toward Streit and the AUC. And, again like in 1949-50, an attempt to bypass the State Department and approach the president directly produced no results.8

Throughout 1953 Streit and the AUC continued to approach the 338

administration and congressional leaders in the hope of again

relaunching the Atlantic Union campaign. But they were now

completely irrelevant, and usually failed to elicit anything

more than a formal response. Streit and a few loyalists kept

the AUC going on a shoestring budget, in the hope that better

times would come. But increasingly they were only talking to

themselves, without having any real impact on the debate over the future of the Atlantic Community.9

While Dulles continued Acheson's policy toward the

Atlantic Union movement, and gave Streit and the AUC the cold shoulder, he adopted a somewhat more solicitous attitude toward the moderate atlanticist groups. The new secretary fully approved of the department's efforts to bring all of these moderate atlanticists together in a new organization that would be closely alligned with the administration. This culminated, on 10 February 1953, in the founding of the

American Council on NATO. The Council brought together Ralph

Flynt's Interim Committee on U.S. Support for NATO with representatives of the ACC group, in addition, it also included important atlanticists who had recently left government service, such as former Assistant Secretary of

State for European Affairs George Perkins and former EGA official Richard Bissell, as well as several other prominent supporters of NATO. This consolidation of efforts had, from the State Department's point of view, several advantages.

First of all, it prevented an unseemly, and potentially 339 embarrassing fight among rival atlanticist groups. It also significantly raised the profile and standing of the rather unimpressive and inexperienced Flynt group, thereby making it more independent from the British-dominated international

Atlantic Committee. At the same time, it tied the very ambitious ACC committee to a strongly NATO-oriented group.

Both of these latter concerns also played a role in the department's successful effort to persuade Flynt to drop the name "U.S. Division of the Atlantic Committee," and adopt

"American Council on NATO" as the official name for the new group. The former name seemed to imply some form of dependence on the International Atlantic Committee, while the latter clearly identified the group as an American organization and also tied it explicitely to NATO. The addition of men like Perkins would undoubtedly reinforce this trend. Consequently, Dulles had no qualms about giving the

Council his warm endorsement, and urging it on in its activities.

The creation of the American Council on NATO did wonders for Flynt and his group. Their small interim

Committee was now transformed into a select, high-powered organization with impressive connections to the administration, the business world, and academia. Of course this involved compromise with both the administration and the

ACC group. But the initial program of the American Council on NATO was basically identical to that of the Interim 340

Committee; public education about NATO, and continued efforts

to cooperate with European and Canadian atlanticists to

strengthen NATO and the Atlantic Community. Furthermore,

Flynt had secured a leading role for himself in the Council

as its Vice-Chairman for Education, while Clinton Gardner

became its secretary. It took months to appoint a chairman,

and the theoretical leadership therefore devolved on Wilbur

K. Jordan, the Council's first Vice-Chairman. But in reality

Flynt and Gardner dominated the Council's day-to-day

activities.n

The birth of the American Council on NATO was a far

less promising event for the Atlantic Citizens Congress.

Hugh Moore and co. had, reluctantly and only at the urging of

the State Department, joined in founding the Council. But

its ill-defined and relatively small-scale program held

little appeal for them. They were determined to press on with their own, much more grandiose project. During the

first half of 1953, however, it became painfully clear that the Oxford Conference and the American Council on NATO had taken the wind out of the ACC's sails. In January and

February 1953 Tom Griessemer toured Western Europe to make

international contacts for the ACC committee and promote its project. Armed with introduction letters from William

Clayton, Charles Spofford, and Herbert Agar, and carrying a brand new revised ACC prospectus (which put more emphasis on

NATO than ever before), Griessemer visited France, Belgium, 341 the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Britain. He had dozens of meetings with government officials, private atlanticists, and U.S. diplomats in all these countries, as well as with

Ismay and Draper and their respective staffs. Everywhere

Griessemer met with a warm welcome and broad agreement that there was a need to strengthen and broaden NATO as the vital link of the Atlantic Community. But it was clear that the

Oxford conference and the International Atlantic Committee had preempted the field in Europe. All of the established atlanticist groups in Europe, as well as Ismay, pointed

Griessemer in the direction of the London-based lAC and suggested that he try to integrate the ACC proposal with its projects. The only exceptions were Achilles and some of his friends on Draper's staff, who were much more enthused by the

ACC's broad scope than by the limited educational and cultural projects of the I AC. 12 But Griessemer could hardly build a broad European ACC base out of a handful of second- tier U.S. diplomats.

Griessemer therefore duly arranged a series of meetings with the lAC in London, at the end of January.

These meetings, which, like all lAC activities, were closely watched by the U.S. embassy in London, dealt a devastating blow to the ACC's prospects. The lAC, which was very conscious of the fact that it had the international network that Hugh Moore and his group still lacked, looked askance at the whole ACC concept. Although they recognized that it 342

explicitely supported the functional development of NATO,

they were deeply suspicious of its federalist origins.

Furthermore, the almost exclusively British and European lAC

saw the ACC as a "typical American" idea, with its mega­

budget, elaborate resarch program, and even bigger, highly

idealistic goals. Equally "American," at least in the eyes

of the lAC, was what they regarded as the somewhat simplistic

idea that one big congress would come up with the definitive

solution. All of this might play well in the U.S., the lAC

argued, but was much too alien to the European experience.

The same was true of the Americans' insistence on calling

their conference a "citizens' congress," in what the lAC saw as a rather unproductive emd vain attempt to sharply distinguish between official and non-governmental activities.

The upshot was that the lAC did not reject the ACC outright, but, in effect, told Griessemer and the ACC committee to get with the program (the lAC program, that is). Moore and co. should tone down the ACC proposal considerably, so as to fit it in the schedule of Atlantic Study Conferences that the lAC was planning to organize, as just one more conference. i3

This was obviously not what the ACC committee had in mind, and Hugh Moore told the lAC as much. But the fact that the lAC was preempting the field for the ACC in Europe was only one side of the problems for Moore's group. At least as important was the fact that, within the U.S., the emergence of the American Council on NATO had seriously 343

affected the ACC's standing with the State Department.

Throughout 1952, the ACC had been the best available

alternative to the Atlantic Union movement. But now there

was the American Council on NATO, which had a ready-made

European network and could, with appropriate leadership, be

much more useful to the administration than the ACC. The

result was that the administration quickly lost its interest

in the ACC (although not in its leadership). The departure

of Hickerson, who left the Bureau of United Nations Affairs

to begin a stint at the National War College, only

accelerated this process.

This painful reality became clear to the ACC committee

between February and May 1953. Like its AUC competitors,

Hugh Moore's group made various attempts to coordinate its

activities with the incoming administration. Throughout

February, March, and April they approached Secretary of State

John Foster Dulles, Assistant Secretary of State for European

Affairs Livingston T. Merchant, and Mutual Security

Administrator Harold E. Stassen. And again like the AUC, they also tried to go directly to the White House, in their case by approaching C.D. Jackson, the special assistant to the president in charge of Cold War planning. All of these administration officials were very cordial, and full of praise for the aims and efforts of the ACC committee. But none of them was willing to offer any form of clear administration endorsement to actually move ahead with the 344

ACC. 15 The final straw was Dulles's official reply, on 9 May,

to repeated requests for an endorsement of the ACC proposal.

The secretary politely declined, arguing that it would be

wrong for him to associate himself with any one private

atlanticist initiative.is For Hugh Moore, who had seen the

warm and unequivocal endorsement Dulles had given to the

American Council on NATO in February, this was a clear and

unequivocal signal of what he termed the "official apathy"

toward new large-scale projects to develop the Atlantic

Community. 17

In May 1953 the organizing committee for the ACC drew

the appropriate conclusions and shelved its proposal for a

grand Atlantic Citizens Congress until a time when the

administration would unequivocably support it. It also

suspended its preliminary research program. The committee

would continue to exist, however, and now set as its new goal

the creation of a more favorable climate within the United

States for the further development of the Atlantic Community.

It would try to do this in two ways. First, it would turn

its staff into an "Atlantic Service Bureau," which would

publish periodic information on NATO and other topics

relevant to the Atlantic Community; organize public speaking

tours in the U.S. for both American and European propagandists of the Atlantic Community concept; and

generally do whatever it could to promote greater understanding, within the U.S., of the Atlantic Community. 345

In addition, the ACC committee would move closer to the

American Council on NATO and propose, as a joint project, the organization of a national "U.S. Conference on the Problems

Confronting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." The ACC group saw such a national conference as a possible first preliminary step toward a later Atlantic conference along the lines of the ACC.is

But even these modest proposals failed to turn into reality. The Atlantic Service Bureau never got off the ground because there was simply no interest in its services from either the administration or other private American organizations. And the American Council on NATO declined to help organize the national conference proposed by the ACC group when it saw that the prospectus for this conference was nothing else than a slightly adapted and "nationalized" version of the ACC prospectus. The administration too, was decidedly cool toward this project. By the summer of 1953, the ACC seemed to have reached a dead end.w

The ACC leaders were not the only atlanticists whose ideas fell on deaf ears in Washington during the first months on the Eisenhower Administration. The atlanticists within the State Department were equally unsuccessful in pushing through their ideas. Not only Acheson and his top subordinates, who had opposed various atlanticists proposals throughout 1951-52, moved on after the elections. Several of the atlanticists who had pushed those same proposals also 346

left their posts in the department, either voluntarily or

because they were reassigned.20 This left Achilles and some

of his friends at the U.S. embassy and NATO mission in Paris

as the only atlanticist standard-bearers within the

administration, at least for the first months of 1953.

The impending change in administration led Achilles,

in late November 1952, to send to Washington a paper that

gave his evaluation of U.S. policy toward Europe up to that

point. Achilles praised the fact that the U.S., since the

start of the Cold War, had resolutely shouldered its

responsibility in Europe. As a result. Western Europe remained free, and in recent years the immediate threat to

its security seemed to have decreased. At the same time, the

Korean War, the continuing Indochina crisis, and other conflicts outside Europe related to the decolonisation process threatened to draw attention, and resources, away from Europe. It was important, Achilles argued, not to shift attention away from Europe (which was still the most important theatre in the Cold War) but to shift the emphasis in U.S. policy toward Europe from defense and military matters to "the economic, political, psychological, and moral fronts." In these areas, the U.S. had so far encouraged the

Europeans to unite themselves. But if unity in these areas was good for the Europeans, than it was good for the U.S. and for the whole Western alliance as well. If a European political and economic union emerged without the simultaneous 347 creation of a politically and economically integrated

Atlantic Community, then that European union would only serve to bring into sharper focus the economic, political, and cultural differences that still divided the U.S. and Europe.

As the Soviet threat receded these differences would put an increasing strain on the transatlantic relationship, and if

NATO was not equipped to deal with these strains it would ossify and ultimately break apart. This stark analysis led

Achilles inevitably back to the proposals he had been putting forward for some time. NATO needed to broaden its scope in non-military areas, including cultural and educational exchange, and become the kind of "spiritual federation of the

West" that Ernest Bevin had envisaged at the end of 1947. It needed to increase mutual understanding among the political leadership of its member-states, primarily by creating a NATO parliamentary body where they could meet and discuss common military, political, and economic problems. And the alliance needed to attack the economic problems of the Atlantic

Community, along the lines suggested in the "Green Book."

All this, and more, the alliance needed to do to create the permanent Atlantic Community that would be the crowning achievement of U.S. policy toward Europe.21

The paper was vintage Achilles. The references to the

"moral front" in the Cold War, and to the need for a spiritual struggle and psychological warfare were new, and were clearly designed to appeal to the new administration. 348

and especially to John Foster Dulles. Achilles's immediate

superior. Ambassador to France James Dunn, endorsed his

p a p e r . 22 And in January Francis Deak, a senior officer in the

staff of U.S. Special Representative in Europe William

Draper, sent a very similar paper, fancifully called

"Meditations on Article II [of the North Atlantic Treaty]."

Deak's paper was less broad than that of Achilles, and where

Achilles put the strongest emphasis on economic matters, Deak

focused mainly on the need for spiritual unity in what he

described as a quasi-religious struggle against Communism.

Nevertheless, Deak's recommendations were exactly the same as

those of Achilles.23

Both papers were the subject of protracted discussions

within the State Department from the end of December to the

middle of March. In the end, the department essentially

rejected both of them. The Office of European Regional

Affairs did endorse the proposal for a NATO parliamentary

body, but envisaged for it a somewhat less significant

function than Achilles. Psychological warfare was fine, but

Washington wasn't about to turn it over to NATO. As for

cultural and educational exchange, the department felt this

was already taking place and that no new initiatives were

required in that area. Above all, the department rejected

Achilles ideas on Atlantic economic integration. Economic

integration and trade liberalisation was only effective within Europe and on a world-wide scale, not within NATO.24 349

By far the sharpest criticism was directed against

Achilles's warnings on the danger of European union without

simultaneous Atlantic integration. The department accused

Achilles of trying to resurrect the old specter of a united

Europe as a "third f o r c e . "25 Both the State Department under

Dulles, and the Eisenhower Administration as a whole, were

determined to continue the existing policy of fostering

greater European integration. For one thing, both Dulles and

Eisenhower were personally strongly committed to the European

integration process and publicly encouraged it before and

after they came to office. Like their predecessors, they

believed that a united and strong Europe was not only vital

in the context of the struggle against Communism, but also in

the long-term interest of the United States. Furthermore,

Eisenhower and Dulles hoped that a politically, economically,

and militarily integrated Europe would need no more U.S. aid

and fewer U.S. troops. This was an important factor for the

fiscally conservative Eisenhower Administration. 26

Dulles therefore immediately concentrated on pushing

forward the European integration process. In the economic

field, European integration had already made significant

strides. By mid-1952 all six continental signatories to the

European Coal and Steel Community had ratified its founding treaty and the European common market for coal opened in

February 1953, followed a few months later by the common market for steel. The next big step was the ratification, by 350

the same six countries, of the EDC treaty, the legacy of the

Truman Administration. Eager to secure a German contribution

to Europe's defense, as well as the expected benefits of an

integrated, supranational European army, Dulles was

determined to push for a speedy ratification of the EDC.27

This strong focus on European integration left little room

for the further development of NATO. Indeed, at his first ministerial North Atlantic Council meeting, in late April at

Paris, Dulles strongly pushed for EDC ratification and at the

same time told the allies that it was now necessary to take

"a different approach to the whole NATO concept." He now proposed to look at NATO as "the defense of Europe by Europe with United States assistance."28 Although Dulles's long-term commitment to the alliance was not in doubt, this almost sounded like a throwback to the pre-1950 North Atlantic

Treaty that had been little more than a military security guarantee combined with a military assistance program. The secretary also completely ignored a public "Statement on

Strengthening NATO," signed by 143 prominent atlanticists from the U.S., Canada, Britain, and France, that was published shortly before the NATO meeting in Paris. It called on the foreign ministers to immediately take steps toward making the alliance "one financial and trading community," and urged the creation of "a North Atlantic

Consultative Assembly, , which would have as its principal objective the implementation of Article II of the North 351

Atlantic Treaty which pledges members to bring about

'conditions of stability and well being' and to 'encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them. '" This statement was an initiative of four of the most prominent supporters of the ACC, William Clayton, Joseph Grew,

Christian Herter, and Lithgow Osborne. Not only did Dulles neglect to publicly acknowledge this statement or reply to it. At the North Atlantic Council neither he, nor any of his colleagues brought it, or any of the subjects it addressed, up for discussion.29

Dulles thus started his tenure as secretary of state without any real intention of strengthening NATO or fostering closer Atlantic integration in the non-military field. But during the summer of 1953 the secretary changed course and began taking a much keener interest in the development of

NATO's non-military side. Several developments combined to bring this about. Together they seemed to amount to a serious crisis in the alliance and bear out the warnings and predictions that Achilles had put on paper in late 1952.

The relative decrease in Cold War tensions in Europe that had already started in 1951-52, now appeared to blossom into a period of real detente, accentuated by the death of

Stalin in March 1953, the subsequent beginning of a Soviet

"peace offensive," and the signing of an armistice in Korea.

This was in itself already a threat to NATO because it undermined public and political support for the alliance's 352

rearmament program. But as Achilles had predicted, the

fading of the immediate Soviet threat in Europe also went

hand in hand with an increase in transatlantic tensions.

Some of these tensions were directly related to America's

Cold War policies. Many Europeans were aghast at the

seemingly aggressive and combative Cold War rhetoric often

employed by Dulles, and feared that the U.S. might drag them

into a global war. At the same time, the heavy American

pressure for EDC ratification, and Dulles's words at Paris,

seemed to indicate to some that the U.S. regarded a war as

inevitable and was preparing to defend continental Europe to

the last European, while the U.S. itself would withdraw behind the Pyrennees or the Channel. But rising anti-

Americanism in Europe could not be explained by European mistrust of U.S. military policy alone. Economic and broader cultural issues were also involved. The continuing trade

imbalance between the U.S. and Western Europe (in America's favor) led to mutual resentment. While many Americans felt that the Europeans were constantly begging for aid, the

Europeans felt that the U.S. didn't live up to its responsibility as a creditor nation by lowering trade barriers. European resentment was particularly great in those countries, like Britain and France, which had been major powers and centers of colonial empires, and who now saw themselves dependent on the U.S.. Finally, Europeans were also aghast at the anti-communist hysteria in the U.S. and 353 looked with unbelieving eyes at the antics of Senator Joseph

McCarthy. All of this was the subject of repeated quasi­ alarmist weurnings about a potential breakdown of the transatlantic relationship coming from American atlanticists,

U.S. diplomats in Europe, and, especially significantly, from leading European figures who bound themselves together in what would later become the Bilderberg group.3o

The result was an abrupt reversal of State Department policy. The department now reached a consensus that, in the absence of a clear and immediate Soviet threat, the development of NATO's non-military aspects was essential if the alliance was going to survive.3i This immediately led to a series of initiatives. The most startling reversal came on the issue of a North Atlantic Assembly. At a conference with his British and French counterparts in Washington in mid-

July, Dulles now proposed the creation of such a body as a way to stimulate greater activity on the non-military side of

NATO. Dulles's colleagues were somewhat taken aback and hesitant, but the issue was now squarely on the NATO agenda.

Domestically, congressional leaders immediately supported

Dulles's proposal.32

The State Department was still firmly opposed to the

Atlantic Common Market ideas of Achilles and the ACC, and continued to insist that economic problems had to be solved within the OEEC, or, when appropriate, on a wider, global scale. But it was now seriously interested in actively 354

promoting a broad discussion of the further development of

the Atlantic Community, as well as the emergence of an

international atlanticist movement that could help sustain popular support for the alliance. At the same time, the department wanted to make sure that whatever international atlanticist movement did emerge would be limited in the scope of its activities and devoid of any federalist Atlantic Union ambitions. In late June 1953, after his resignation as U.S.

Special Representative in Europe, the department prevailed on

William Draper to join the board of the American Council on

NATO and to head a joint committee of the Council and the

ACC, charged with working out a plan to merge both groups into a single, more effective organization. Above all,

Washington was intent on ensuring a strong American voice within the international atlanticist movement. 33

This was also apparent in the third State Department initiative. The International Atlantic Committee had scheduled a Second International Study Conference on the

Atlantic Community, to be held in Copenhagen in early

September 1953. This time the State Department was determined to dispatch a strong American delegation. It carefully coordinated its efforts with the American Council on NATO, which ultimately dispatched a 14-member delegation, including Draper and former Assistant Secretary of State for

Public Affairs Edward Barrett. The delegation took with it a program drawn up in consultation with the State Department, 355

and including a proposal for a NATO parliamentary body along

the lines of Dulles's July p r o p o s a l . 34 At Copenhagen the U.S.

delegation, ably led by Draper and Barrett, prevailed on its

counterparts to endorse the American proposal for a NATO

parliamentary body. The conference also agreed to move ahead

with the creation of a federation of national pro-NATO

societies, and appointed a special committee to draft a

constitution for this federation. Somewhat to the annoyance

of the British, the American delegation managed to secure the

chairmanship of this drafting committee for Ralph F l y n t . 35

After Copenhagen, the State Department and its

atlanticist friends moved quickly to further strengthen the

American Council on NATO and its position within the

international atlanticist movement. The merger operation with the ACC failed to materialize because of the by now long­

standing rivalry between both groups. The ACC committee was

unwilling to simply dump its project, while the majority of

the American Council on NATO, led by Flynt, refused to adopt

the ACC proposal as an integral part of their program.

Draper solved this problem by agreeing to the continued, semi- dormant existence of the ACC committee and assuring it his personal support, while at the same time persuading the whole

ACC leadership to join the board of the American Council on

NATO. 36 Dulles, for his part, persuaded Eisenhower to personally intervene with the Ford Foundation to provide the

Council with substantial f u n d s . 3? This in turn allowed the 356

Americans to provide not only the chair of the drafting committee for the international federation of atlanticist groups, but most of its operating funds as well. The committee met in London in March 1954 and reached agreement on the text of a draft constitution.38 A full constituent conference, held at the Hague on 18 June 1954, unanimously approved this text and thereby founded the Atlantic Treaty

Association. The association actually came into being at another conference, in Paris in late June 1955. It set up headquarters in Paris and elected Italian Count Umberto Morra as chairman, and Flynt and a Dutch atlanticist leader as vice- chairmen. Although the Atlantic Treaty Association, like its national subsidiaries, remained a private organization, it achieved a semi-official status through its close association with NATO. Its constitution and original program clearly identified it as an educational organization, with no federalist ambitions to replace NATO with an Atlantic U n i o n . 39

While the State Department encouraged the creation of its version of an international atlanticist movement, it also explored the possibilities of creating a parliamentary body associated with NATO. Like the issue of a private support network for NATO, this was not virgin ground. Both the

Norwegian and Canadian governments were long-standing supporters of an Atlantic Assembly following the model of the

Council of Europe, and perhaps even merging with that

European organization. The latter aspect was anathema to the 357

State Department, which held fast to the principle that

Atlantic integration should coexist with European integration, not replace it. In October 1953, after the

Copenhagen conference had endorsed the creation of a NATO parliamentciry body, the U.S. administration came up with its own proposal. The U.S. proposal envisaged the creation of a purely consultative parliamentary assembly, established under the authority of article II of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The assembly would have no real powers but would in essence have two functions : to symbolize the unity and continuity of the transatlantic relationship; and to familiarize national legislators with the alliance. The latter would, it was hoped, prove useful around budget time. Of course there was always the risk that the assembly would, on its own initiative, start delving into controversial issues. But the

State Department proposed to minimize that risk by limiting the assembly to a single annual two-week meeting.4o

Both Eisenhower and Congress liked the department's proposal.41 But within NATO the issue of parliamentary representation proved unexpectedly controversial. Canada and

Norway stuck to their more far-reaching proposals. More important was that some governments, like the Portuguese, simply opposed the whole concept of a NATO parliamentary body. By December 1953, the NATO countries agreed to disagree, and instead resolved to encourage their respective parliaments to set up their own NATO committees, who could 358

then work out an association among themselves. 42 Dulles was

not particularly happy with this result, because it took the whole process out of his and his colleagues' hands. In the

U.S. Congress such a proposed NATO committee might be hijacked by some of the remaining Atlantic Union supporters.

In spite of strong personal appeals from Achilles to seize this opportunity to resurrect the old Atlantic study commission bill, the secretary decided that this risk was too great and did nothing to encourage Congress to act.43 m other NATO countries, however, parliamentary NATO committees did emerge. The most active of these was the Cainadian NATO

Parliamentary Association, under the leadership of Wishart

Robertson, a long-time Atlantic Union supporter who had become Speaker of the Canadian Senate. Robertson's association contacted the other NATO parliaments, bypassing their governments, and, after a failed attempt in 1954, organized a "NATO Parliamentarians Conference" at NATO headquarters in Paris, in July 1955. The aim of the conference was to organize a continuing NATO parliamentary body.44 After some hesitation, Dulles gave the conference his blessing and encouraged the U.S. Congress to send a delegation. But he urged the American congressmen to avoid any attempts at a merger with the Council of Europe, which he still saw as a valuable instrument for European integration.45

The Paris meeting did see an attempt by the Dutch delegation to turn the NATO Parliamentarians Conference into a full- 359

scale quasi-parliament. But this proposal failed because it

attracted little support and was strongly opposed by the

Portuguese delegation, which threatened to walk out if it was

adopted. The result was the creation of the kind of

parliamentary association, with a very limited scope of

operations but great propaganda value, that the State

Department had envisaged in October 1953.46

All of this took place in the context of the 1954-55

crisis over the ultimate French rejection of the EDC treaty.

This crisis, which was ultimately resolved by bringing German

into NATO, led to a prolonged reappraisal of U.S. policy

toward Europe, and reinforced the Eisenhower Administration's

support for strengthening the NATO alliance through efforts

to popularize and give meaning to the Atlantic Community

c o n c e p t . 47 The subsequent four-power Geneva Conference, which

inaugurated the era of superpower summit meetings and cautious detente, led to a further re-evaluation of NATO's

importance for U.S. overall foreign policy. This new re- evaluation went well beyond the earlier cautious moves toward the creation of an international atlanticist movement and a

NATO parliamentary body. By December 1955, Dulles and his top advisers developed a new "line" with regard to NATO.

This new line for the first time identified NATO as primarily a political organization. NATO was of course still of prime importance as the military instrument that guaranteed Western

Europe's security. But it would no longer be an "orthodox 360 alliance," and should be "less obviously geared to a threat from any particular quarter." Rather, NATO "should be made fully adaptable to a situation in which the threat of war seemed to become negligible, serving on a larger scale and with a far more developed institutional basis, the purposes once served by the Concert of Europe at its peak of effectiveness in the 19th century." In that context, NATO would have to have as strong a machinery to deal with non­ military matters as it now had to deal with the Soviets. And that required an institutionalized, functional Atlantic

Community. The new "line" explicitely stopped short of advocating any federalist or truly supranational framework for that Atlantic Community, but argued that the U.S. "should not take a position at this time that would preclude such an evolution in the course of time if it became evident that such development was the only way to preserve NATO and the values which it e m b o d i e s . "48 This was a far cry from Union

Now, but it was equally far removed from the limited commitment the U.S. had envisaged in the late 1940's.

By the end of 1955, then, John Foster Dulles and the

State Department had moved from Acheson's limited Cold War vision of the Atlantic alliance to a much more expansive and long-term view of the Atlantic Community. The still active part of the American atlanticist movement, the American

Council on NATO, had played only a very modest, facilitating 361

role in that process. But the building blocks that Dulles

was beginning to use to construct a more permanent Atlantic

Community were the legacy of the earlier atlanticists, who

time and again had struggled, often in vain, to come up with

new ideas to deal with new problems.

Of course 1955 was not the end, either for the

administration or for the atlanticists. The Eisenhower

Administration, and its successors, continued to struggle

with the complexities of European integration and Atlantic

cooperation. NATO soldiered on, buth never quite became the

grand Concert of the Atlantic Community envisaged in December

1955. The atlanticists, for their part, continued to play

their role of prophets of Atlantic integration. But the

greatest struggle was over. The Atlantic Community was now a

living institution, less united and powerful than envisioned by Streit, more permanent and stronger politically than most

had thought possible. 362

1. Streit often dreamed about Eisenhower as a modern-day George Washington, first leading the 13 colonies, for which read the North Atlantic Democracies, in the struggle against tyranny, and then guiding them toward a federal union. The more moderate atlanticists, many of whom had cooperated with Eisenhower in one capacity or another, were somewhat more sober in their assessment of the new president, but still admired him greatly.

2. On Dulles, see John Robinson Beal, John Foster Dulles : A Biography (New York, 1957); Louis Gerson, John Foster Dulles (New York, 1967); Michael Guhin, John Foster Dulles; A Statesman and His Time (New York, 1972); Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973); Richard H. Immerman, ed., John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Ronald Pruessen, John Foster Dulles; The Road to Power (New York, 1982).

3. Streit to John Foster Dulles, 30 June 1952, with attached draft planks for the Republican convention, Streit Papers, Box 20, Folder "Dulles, John Foster-General"; and Streit to Clayton, 15 July 1952, with enclosed Streit to Truman, 15 July 1952, and attached draft planks for the Democratic convention, Truman Papers, Official File, Box 1667, Folder "1466-c."

4. Streit to Clayton, 9 November 1952, with enclosed "What the Eisenhower Victory Means to Atlantic Union," by Streit, Clayton Papers, Box 96, Folder "Federal Union 1"; Streit to John Foster Dulles, 11 November 1952, with enclosed "What the Eisenhower Victory Means to Atlantic Union," by Streit, Streit Papers, Box 20, Folder "Dulles, John Foster-General"; John Foster Dulles to Streit, 19 November 1952, ibid.; Streit to Clare Boothe Luce, 28 November 1952, with enclosed "What the Eisenhower victory Means to Atlantic Union," by Streit, ibid.. Box 26, Folder "Luce, Clare." See also the minutes of the meeting of the AUC executive committee, 13 November 1952, ibid.. Box 108, Folder "Minutes of the Executive Committee, 1952"; and minutes of the twenty-first meeting of the AUC board of governors, 23 November 1952, AUC MSS, Box 98, Folder "Board of Governors Minutes, 1952-55."

5. Streit to John Foster Dulles, 4 December 1952, Streit Papers, Box 20, Folder "Dulles, John Foster-General"; and John Foster Dulles to Streit, 15 December 1952, ibid.

6. Minutes of the meeting of the AUC executive committee, 17 December 1952, Streit Papers, Box 108, "Minutes of the Executive Committee, 1952"; Walden Moore to Roberts, 18 December 1952, ibid.. Box 20, Folder "Dulles, John Foster- 363

General"; Streit to John Foster Dulles, 22 December 1952, ibid.; Don Dennis to Roberts, 29 December 1952, ibid.; memorandum from Dennis to the AUC executive committee, 30 December 1952, ibid.; Roberts to John Foster Dulles, 31 December 1952, ibid.; memorandum from Dennis to the AUC executive committee, 6 January 1953, ibid.; memorandum from Streit to Roberts, 14 January 1953, ibid.. Box 32, Folder "Roberts, Owen"; minutes of the meeting of the AUC executive committee, 15 January 1953, ibid.. Box 108, Folder "Minutes of the Executive Committee, 1953-61"; Roberts to John Foster Dulles, 17 January 1953, Dulles Papers, Box 74, Folder "Roberts, Owen, 1953"; Streit to Roberts, 19 January 1953, Streit Papers, Box 32, Folder "Roberts, Owen"; Roderic L. O'Connor (Special Assistant to Dulles) to Roberts, 23 January 1953, Dulles Papers, Box 74, Folder "Roberts, Owen, 1953"; Streit to Roberts, 28 January 1953, Streit Papers, Box 32, Folder "Roberts, Owen"; Streit to John Foster Dulles, 29 January 1953, ibid.. Box 20, Folder "Dulles, John Foster- General"; Streit to Roberts, 12 February 1953, ibid.. Box 32, Folder "Roberts, Owen"; Streit to Roberts, 13 February 1953, ibid. Among the many things Streit proposed in his letters to Dulles was the creation, within the State Department, of a new Bureau of Atlantic Affairs (which would absorb, among other things, the Office of Western European Affairs) with Theodore Achilles as Assistant Secretary of State. This gave an indicaton of the revolution Streit expected from the changeover from Acheson to Dulles.

7. Streit to Roberts, 16 February 1953, with attached draft minutes of the meeting with Dulles, Streit Papers, Box 32, Folder "Roberts, Owen"; memorandum from Dennis to the AUC executive committee, 17 February 1953, ibid.. Box 20, Folder "Dulles, John Foster-General"; Roberts to John Foster Dulles, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3461, 740.5/2-1853; draft report on the meeting with Dulles, by Streit, 19 February 1953, Streit Papers, Box 20, Folder "Dulles, John Foster- General"; Streit to Roberts, 19 February 1953, ibid.; Streit to John Foster Dulles, 27 February 1953, with enclosed "How to Bring About the Proposed Atlantic Federal Convention," by Streit, ibid.; Streit to John Foster Dulles, 28 February 1953, ibid.; Streit to John Foster Dulles, 2 March 1953, ibid.; Nunley to O'Connor, 6 March 1953, with attached John Foster Dulles to Roberts, 12 March 1953, Dulles Papers, Box 74, Folder "Roberts, Owen, 1953"; Percival Brundage to John Foster Dulles, 17 March 1953, ibid.. Box 67, Folder "Brundage, Percival, 1953"; minutes of the meeting of the AUC executive committee, 19 March 1953, Streit Papers, Box 108, Folder "Minutes of the Executive Committee, 1953-61."

8. Streit to Sherman Adams (White House Chief of Staff), 11 March 1953, with attached William J. McWilliams (Director of 364

the State Department's Executive Secretariat) to Adams, 19 March 1953, and attached Adams to Streit, 19 March 1953, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3408, 740.00/3-1953.

9. Roberts to John Foster Dulles, AUC MSS, Box 106, Folder "Subject File, John Foster Dulles, 1953-57"; John Foster Dulles to Roberts, 6 April 1953, Streit Papers, Box 20, Folder "Dulles, John Foster, General"; memorandum of conversation between Streit and Merchant, 8 April 1953, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, 740.5/4-853; memorandum of conversation between Hartley and Merchant, 14 May 1953, ibid., 740.5/5-1453; Streit to Dulles, 20 May 1953, Streit Papers, Box 20, Folder "Dulles, John Foster, General." See also minutes of the meetings of the AUC executive committee, 9 April 1953, 14 May 1953, 18 June 1953, 12 August 1953, and 26 October 1953, Streit Papers, Box 108, Folder "Minutes of the Executive Committee, 1953-62"; minutes of the meetings of the AUC board of governors, 14 May 1953, and 21 November 1953, AUC MSS, Box 98, Folder "Board of Governors Minutes, 1952-55."

10. H. Freeman Matthews (Deputy Under Secretary of State) to John Foster Dulles, 6 February 1953, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3461, 740.5/2-653; John Foster Dulles to Matthews, 7 February 1953, ibid.; John Foster Dulles to the American Council on NATO, 9 February 1953, ibid.; Parsons to Daniel V. Anderson (deputy to Draper), 5 March 1953, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs, 1945-1953, Files of J. Graham Parsons, Subject File, Box 1, Folder "Anderson." For an account of the founding meeting of the American Council on NATO, see report by Gardner to all founding members, 19 February 1953, Flynt Papers, Box 1, Folder "American Council on NATO, 1952-53."

11. See report by Gardner to all founding members, 19 February 1953, Flynt Papers, Box 1, Folder "American Council on NATO, 1952-53." Jordan was the President of Radcliffe College and, like Flynt, an inactive member of the AUC's National Council. The difficulty in filling the Chairmanship of the Council stemmed from the fact that the preferred candidates were unavailable. Charles Spofford declined because he wanted some personal freedom after his government service. John J. McCloy argued that it was incompatible with his position in the Ford Foundation. And the universal top choice, William Draper, was still in government service as U.S. Special Representative in Europe. Flynt, for his part, skillfully used the State Department's support for the American Council on NATO to convince his own superiors to allow him to spend more of his time and effort on the Council's work. See Flynt to McGrath, 6 February 1953, ibid.; and Flynt to McGrath, 9 February 1953, ibid. 365

12. Holbrook to Clayton, 12 December 1952, Clayton Papers, Box 87, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee, 1952 6"; Hugh Moore to Agar, 15 December 1952, Moore Papers, Box 4, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, 1954"; Hugh Moore to Ismay, 15 December 1952, ibid.; Agar to Hugh Moore, 15 December 1952, ibid.; Ismay to Hugh Moore, 17 December 1952, ibid.; Anderson (acting U.S. Special Representative in Europe) to Clayton, 23 December 1952, Clayton Papers, Box 87, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee, 1952 6"; Erna Nelson (secretary to Griessemer) to Clayton, 2 January 1953, with enclosed ACC prospectus, ibid.. Box 88, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee, 1953 1"; Griessemer to Hugh Moore, 6 January 1953, Moore Papers, Box 6, Unmarked Folder; Griessemer to Hugh Moore, 14 January 1953, ibid.; Griessemer to Hugh Moore, 17 January 1953, ibid.; Griessemer to Hugh Moore, 21 January 1953, ibid.; Griessemer to Hugh Moore, 30 Janua^ 1953, ibid.; Griessemer to Hugh Moore, 5 February 1953, ibid.; Hugh Moore to members of the ACC organizing committee, 9 February 1953.

13. Memorandum from Eppstein to the lAC, undated, with enclosed papers for the meeting of the lAC on 15 January 1953, Flynt Papers, Box 11, Folder "ATA Meetings, 1953-60 1"; minutes of the meeting of the IAC, 15 January 1953, ibid.; memorandum from Eppstein to the IAC, 23 January 1953, with enclosed analysis of the ACC by Eppstein, ibid.; minutes of the meeting of the lAC, 29 January 1953, ibid.; Griessemer to Hugh Moore, 30 January 1953, Moore Papers, Box 6, Unmarked Folder. See also Gordon to Washington, 16 January 1953, with attached lAC papers and minutes of meetings, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3460, 740.5/1-1653; and Gordon to Washington, 4 February 1953, with attached lAC papers and minutes of meetings, ibid.. Box 3461, 740.5/2-453.

14. Hugh Moore to Duncannon, 21 February 1953, Moore Papers, Box 6, Unmarked Folder.

15. Memorandum from Holbrook to Hugh Moore, 27 January 1953, Moore Papers, Box 4, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, 1954"; Flower to Hugh Moore, 6 February 1953, ibid.; Hugh Moore to Arnaud Marts, 9 February 1953, ibid.; memorandum from Griessemer to Hugh Moore, 17 February 1953, ibid.. Box 6, Unmarked Folder; minutes of the meeting of the organizing committee for the ACC, 19 February 1953, ibid.; Hugh Moore to Schmidt, 21 February 1953, ibid.. Box 4, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, 1954"; Hugh Moore to Flower, 23 February 1953, ibid.; memorandum from Griessemer to Hugh Moore, 24 February 1953, ibid.. Box 6, Unmarked Folder; Hugh Moore to Clayton, 4 March 1953, Clayton Papers, Box 88, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee, 1953 1"; memorandum from Griessemer to Hugh Moore, 5 March 1953, Moore Papers, Box 6, 366

Unmarked Folder; minutes of the meeting of the organizing committee for the ACC, 12 March 1953, ibid.; minutes of the meeting of the organizing committee for the ACC, 19 March 1953, ibid.; memorandum from Griessemer to Hugh Moore, 24 March 1953, ibid.; Hugh Moore to Spofford, 30 March 1953, with attached draft letter from John Foster Dulles to spofford, ibid.. Box 4, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, 1954"; minutes of the meeting of the organizing committee for the ACC, 2 April 1953, ibid.. Box 6, Unmarked Folder; Schmidt to Hugh Moore, 13 April 1953, with enclosed memorandum of conversation between Schmidt and Merchant, 6 april 1953, ibid.. Box 4, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, 1954"; minutes of the meeting of the organizing committee for the ACC, 17 April 1953, ibid.. Box 6, Unmarked Folder; Hugh Moore to Griessemer, 1 May 1953, ibid.. Box 4, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, 1954."

16. Merchant to John Foster Dulles, 5 May 1953, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3465, 740.5/5-553; and John Foster Dulles to hugh Moore, 9 May 1953, Moore Papers, Box 6, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, 1953-54."

17. Hugh Moore to Spofford, 29 May 1952, Moore Papers, Box 6, Folder "Atlantic Citizens Congress, 1953-54."

18. Memorandum from Walden Moore to Hugh Moore, 19 May 1953, ibid.; memorandum from Walden Moore to Hugh Moore, 20 May 1953, ibid.; memorandum from Walden Moore to Hugh Moore, 21 May 1953, ibid.; minutes of the meeting of the organizing committee for the ACC, 21 May 1953, ibid.; Hugh Moore to Spofford, 29 May 1953, ibid.; Griessemer to Clayton, 1 June 1953, Clayton Papers, Box 88, Folder "Atlantic Union Committee, 1953 2."

19. Idem.

20. Among those who left or were reassigned were George Perkins, the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs who had supported his strongly atlanticist subordinates in their attempts to push Acheson further toward the creation of a broader Atlantic Community centered around NATO; Herbert Hill, an important adviser to Perkins who was the driving force within the administration behind the proposal for a congressional Atlantic study commission; Edwin Martin, the Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs who had turned it into a hotbed of atlanticist ideas; and John Hickerson, the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs who had been the main liaison with domestic groups like the ACC committee. For their replacements, see United States Civil Service Commission, 367

Official Register of the United States. 1953 (Washington, DC, 1953).

21. Matthews to Bruce, Perkins, et al., 16 December 1952, with attached Achilles to Matthews, 28 November 1952, with enclosed "Evaluation of our Policy toward Europe as of December 1952," and attached Dunn to Matthews, 10 December 1952, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 2767, 611.40/12- 1652.

22. Idem.

23. Deak to Merchant, 21 January 1953, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3460, 740.5/1-2153. Since Achilles and Deak were both stationed in Paris it is tempting to assume that they shared their ideas and coordinated their approaches. But there is no concrete evidence or even indication of that. Achilles's unpublished memoirs, which are very lengthy and very explicit about everybody he ever worked closely with, include no mention of Deak. See Achilles Memoirs, Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington, DC. Achilles's and Deak's sentiments stood in sharp contrast with the rather self-satisfied feelings of Acheson at the occassion of his last ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in December in Paris. See Acheson to Washington, 17 December 1952, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3459, 740.5/12-1752; summary of Acheson press conference, 17 December 1952, ibid.; and statement by Acheson, 18 December 1952, Truman Papers, President's Secretary's Files, subject Files, Box 159, Folder "Sec. of State Misc." See also Acheson, Present at the Creation. 707-10. It is possible that Acheson's rather lame endorsement of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty at Paris prompted Deak to write his paper on the subject.

24. Parsons to Adair, Camp, et al., 29 December 1952, with attached "Evaluation of our Policy toward Europe as of December 1952, " by Achilles, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs, 1945- 1953, Files of J. Graham Parsons, Subject File, Box 4, Folder U.S. Policy-Europe"; Wolf to Parsons, 30 December 1952, ibid.; Adair to Parsons, 31 December 1952, ibid.; Nunley to Parsons, 17 February 1953, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3461, 740.5/2-1753; Parsons to Douglas MacArtur II (State Department Counselor), 14 March 1953, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs, 1945-1953, Files of J. Graham Parsons, Subject File, Box 3, Folder "NATO, North Atlantic Treaty"; Parsons to Deak, 14 March 1953, ibid. 368

25. The PPS did in fact acknowledge the potential danger that a united Europe might become a third force, but argued that the U.S. had no choice but to accept that risk, which, in any event, wasn't very great. See "United States Policies and Programs in Western Europe," by Ferguson, 25 February 1953, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Box 29, Folder "Europe, 1952-53"; and "United states Policy Respecting European Union; An Appraisal," by Fuller, 13 May 1953, ibid.

26. Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower. Kennedy, and the United States of Europe (New York, 1993), 34-43.

27. Ibid., 43.

28. Dulles to Washington, 24 April 1953, FRUS. 1952-54. vol. 5, 373-78; memorandum of discussion at the 141st meeting of the NSC, 28 April 1953, ibid., 397-99.

29. Osborne to Clayton, 13 March 1953, Clayton Papers, Box 102, Folder "Osborne, Lithgow"; Osborne to Clayton, 25 March 1953, ibid.; Osborne to Draper, Eisenhower, Ismay, Humphrey, Wilson, Stassen, and Dulles, 16 April 1953, ibid.; "Statement on Strengthening NATO," 22 April 1953 (public release date), ibid.; Merchant to Dulles, 5 May 1953, with attached Osborne to Dulles, 16 April 1953, and enclosed "Statement on Strengthening NATO," RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 3464, 740.5/4-1653. The signers of the statement were predominantly American (86 out of 143), in large measure because Osborne started this project so shortly before the NATO meeting in Paris and therefore didn't have sufficient time to round up more Europeans. In effect, this was another failed attempt by the ACC group to get its program across.

30. Draper to Eisenhower, 5 June 1953, with enclosed report "Certain European Issues Affecting the United States," Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Subject Series, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS, Box 99, Folder "U.S. Special Representative in Europe" (hereafter Eisenhower Papers with filing information); Hughes to Washington, 2 July 1953, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, 740.5/6-3053; Merchant to Dulles, 9 July 1953, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Box 29, Folder "Europe, 1952-53"; Merchant to Dulles, 24 August 1952, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, 611.40/8-2453. See also C. D. Jackson to Allen W. Dulles, 6 August 1953, with attached "Report on European-American Relations," Jackson Papers, Box 28, Folder "Bernhard, HRH Prince." 369

31. Merchant to Dulles, 9 July 1953, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Box 29, Folder "Europe, 1952-53,"

32. Dulles to certain diplomatic offices, 24 July 1953, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, 740.5/7-2453.

33. Griessemer to Moore, 19 June 1953, Moore Papers, Box 6, Unmarked Folder; Moore to Jordan, 26 June 1953, ibid.; Draper to Moore, 30 June 1953, ibid.; Spofford to Moore, 1 July 1953, ibid.; Parsons to Matthews, 2 July 1953, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, 740.00/7-253; Moore to Draper, 3 July 1953, Moore Papers, Box 6, Unmarked Folder.

34. Deak to Merchant, 17 July 1953, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, 740.5/7-1753; Walter Bedell Smith (Under Secretary of State) to Paris, 7 August 1953, ibid.; 740.5/8-753; Hughes to Merchant, 10 August 1953, ibid.; 740.5/8-1053; Bonbright to Merchant, 12 August 1953, ibid, 740.5/8-1253; Dulles to Paris, 13 August 1953, ibid., 740.5/8-1353; Dulles to Paris, 14 August 1953, ibid, 740.5/8-1453; Merchant to Smith, 18 August 1953, ibid., 740.5/8-1853; Smith to Paris, 19 August 1953, ibid., 740.5/8-1953; Nunley to Merchant, 26 August 1953, ibid., 740.5/8-2653.

35. Hughes to Washington, 16 September 1953, ibid., 740.5/9- 1653; Battle to Washington, 2 October 1953, ibid.; 740.5/10- 253.

36. Minutes of the board of directors of the American Council on NATO, 26 October 1953, Flynt Papers, Box 1, Folder "american Council on NATO, 1952-53"; Ben T. Moore (Director, Office of European Regional Affairs) to Draper, 28 October 1953, ibid.; Martin to Flynt, 5 November 1953, ibid.; Martin to Clayton, 2 December 1953, ibid.; minutes of the board of directors of the American Council on NATO, 3 December 1953, ibid.

37. John Foster Dulles to Eisenhower, 19 January 1954, Eisenhower Papers, Box 2, Folder "Dulles, John F. (Jan. 1954)."

38. Executive Director's Report to the board of directors of the American Council on NATO, 8 March 1954, Flynt Papers, Box 1, Folder "American Council on NATO, 1954"; Martin to Perkins, 24 March 1954, ibid.

39. Perkins to Washington, 29 June 1955, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1955-59, 740.5/6-2955. George Perkins, who had been among the founders of the American Council on NATO, reported 370 on the actual creation of the Atlantic Treaty Association in his capacity as U.S. Special Representative in Europe.

40. Merchant to Dulles, 8 October 1953, RH 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, 740.5/10-853.

41. Dulles to Paris, 10 October 1953, ibid., 740.5/10-1053.

42. Hughes to Washington, 17 October 1953, ibid., 740.5/10- 1753; Hughes to Washington, 28 October 1953, ibid., 740.5/10- 2853; Hughes to Washington, 28 November 1953, ibid., 740.5/11- 2853.

43. Achilles to Dulles, 16 November 1953, ibid.. Box 3414, 740.00/11-1653; Achilles to Dulles, 23 November 1953, ibid., 740.00/11-2353; Dulles to Achilles, 25 November 1953, ibid., 740.00/11-2553; Dulles to Paris, 28 November 1953, ibid., 740.5/11-2853. In an unusual break with Foreign Service formalities, Achilles wrote a very personal "Dear Foster" letter. Dulles, who knew Achilles and his family well, responded equally informally and cordially, but ultimately rejected Achilles's advice.

44. Jean Tartter (Third Secretary U.S. Embassy in Ottawa) to Washington, 31 January 1955, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1955-59, 740.5/1-3155; memorandum of conversation between Joseph Palmer (deputy director Office of European Regional Affairs) and William Olivier (First Secretary Canadian Embassy in Washington), 8 February 1955, ibid., 740.5/2-855; Hughes to Washington, 9 February 1955, ibid., 740.5/2-955.

45. Dulles to Paris, 11 February 1955, ibid., 740.5/2-1155; Dulles to Paris, 18 July 1955, ibid., 740.5/7-1855.

46. Perkins to Washington, 30 July 1955, ibid., 740.5/7-3055.

47. PPS paper, by Campbell, 30 August 1954, RG 59, Special Lot File, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1954, Box 84, Folder "S/P Papers, Aug.-Oct. 54"; PPS paper, by Fuller, 2 September 1954, ibid.; PPS paper, by Bowie, 13 September 1954, ibid.; State Department paper, 16 September 1954, ibid.

48. These papers were prepared for the December ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council. PPS paper, by Owen, 18 November 1955, RG 59, Special Lot File, Policy Planning Staff Office Files, 1955, Box 97, Folder "Europe 1"; paper by Wolf, 3 November 1955, ibid.; Wolf to Merchant, 1 December 1955, ibid.; Fuller to Bowie, 2 December 1955, ibid. CHAPTER IX

EPILOGUE: THE ATLANTIC UNION MOVEMENT AND THE ATLANTIC

COMMUNITY, 1956-1962

The Eisenhower Administration's "new line" on NATO envisaged an alliance that was as much political, cultural, and spiritual, as it was military in character. Such an alliance would be able to weather the vicissitudes of East-

West detente and the inevitable conflicts between its partners. John Foster Dulles was determined to transform

NATO into such an alliance and throughout 1956 and 1957 he sought for ways to strengthen and institutionalize the political side of NATO. In May 1956, Dulles, together with

NATO Secretary General Ismay and Canadian Foreign Minister

Lester Pearson, prevailed upon the North Atlantic Council to appoint a committee of "Three Wise Men" (Pearson and his

Norwegian and Italian colleagues Halvard Lange and Gaetano

Martino). Its function was to explore how the alliance could strengthen the non-military aspects of its organization and promote deeper political consultation and cooperation among its members.1 Dulles personally contributed to the work of

371 372

the committee, submitting his own "think-piece." Dulles's

ideas went relatively far, further in fact than those of his

State Department advisers, who prevailed upon him to tone

down his proposals. Dulles envisaged a new North Atlantic

Council, separate from the existing one, to deal exclusively

with political matters. The existing NATO Parliamentarians

Conference would be transformed into a semi-legislative North

Atlantic Assembly. Together, these two organizations would

form a transatlantic version of the Council of Europe.2

But events during 1956, especially the Suez crisis and

the continuing Greek-Turkish tension surrounding Cyprus,

demonstrated that the climate within NATO was not suited to

this kind of ambitious initiative. The final report of the

"Three Wise Men," submitted to the North Atlantic Council in

the wake of the Suez debacle and subsequent U.S.-British

recriminations, recommended little more than improved

political consultation, within the existing NATO framework.3

Renewed efforts in 1957, by Dulles and the new NATO Secretary

General Paul-Henri Spaak, to move beyond this yielded no

tangible results. All NATO members recognized that the

organization was more than a traditional alliance, and

represented an Atlantic community of interests that went

beyond the military field. But in those non-military areas

NATO remained a forum for consultation and intergovernmental cooperation, and not, as in the military field, a vehicle for real integration.4 373

While the governmental initiatives to build new

institutions for the Atlantic Community faltered, the

initiatives of the private Atlanticist movement seemed to

flourish. The American Council on NATO prospered with the

full support of the Eisenhower Administration, and

increasingly took on the aura of a semi-official institution

as its leaders moved in and out of government.s The Atlantic

Union background of its leadership was further diluted in

1961, when it merged with two other moderate atlanticist

groups, the U.S. Committee for the Atlantic Institute and the

Atlantic Council, to form the Atlantic Council of the United

States. In this new guise it was so far removed from its AUC

origins that it attracted the active participation of Dean

Acheson, who became its vice-chairman. The Atlantic Council

of the United States, which continues to function to this

day, explicitely identified itself as an "educational medium." It supported closer political and economic

cooperation among the NATO countries, but, unlike the

Atlantic Union movement, did not promote any specific organizational vehicle for this cooperation.6

The old Atlantic Unionists were not easily dissuaded

from chasing their vision. Hugh Moore's ACC group soldiered on, emerging in 1954 as the American sponsor of the First

"Declaration of Atlantic Unity." This declaration, which, unlike the "Statement on Strengthening NATO" in early 1953, was heartily endorsed by the Eisenhower Administration, was 374

signed by 156 prominent atlanticists from virtually all NATO

countries and called for the creation of new Atlantic political institutions, including a consultative assembly.7

The big breakthrough for the ACC group came in November 1957, when it convinced the NATO Parliamentarians Conference to call an Atlantic Congress. This Congress met in London in

June 1959, and brought together 650 private citizens from the

NATO countries. The Atlantic Congress did more or less what

Moore and his friends had hoped the ACC would do. It called for the elimination of transatlantic trade barriers and the creation of an Atlantic Common Market. It also called for closer political cooperation. Most significant, at least from the point of view of those who still supported Atlantic

Union, the Atlantic Congress recommended the convening of a

"Special Conference" of official delegates from the NATO countries to explore the further development of the Atlantic

Community. This Special Conference would, in effect, fulfill the function of Streit's exploratory federal convention, with the important difference that it was not from the start slanted toward a federalist solution.s

Streit and the AUC meanwhile continued their struggle for a congressional Atlantic Union resolution. On 9 February

1955 Kefauver, together with fourteen other senators, reintroduced the Atlantic Union resolution in the Senate.

The new resolution, S. Con. Res. 12, was an almost identical copy of its two predecessors. Streit clearly hoped that the 375

EDC debacle might give his movement a new lease on life.

Again his hopes were in vain. When the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee held hearings on the resolution in July

1955, Secretary of State Dulles advised against its adoption.

The Foreign Relations Committee followed the State

Department's advice and took no action on S. Con. Res. 12.9

In early 1956, while Kefauver again retreated from the

congressional fight to start another run for the presidency.

Senator Hubert H. Humphrey tried to steer a slightly amended

version of the Atlantic Union resolution through the Senate.

But this effort also resulted in failure.lo

On 19 March 1959, the AUC tried again. Kefauver and

Humphrey introduced S. Con. Res. 17 into the Senate. This

new resolution was very similar to its predecessors, but

there were significant differences. First of all, it

eliminated the executive branch's role in organizing the

convention, and left the appointment of delegates up to the

legislature. Second, it now moved closer to NATO by inviting

all alliance members. And perhaps most significantly, the word "federal" was eliminated from the resolution. This

brought the Atlantic Union resolution much more in line with

the moderates who dominated the international atlanticist movement. And as a result, the resolution received a big

boost from the Atlantic Congress in June 1959. Streit

attended the Atlantic Congress, but his friends persuaded him

not to take to the floor in defense of a federal union, for 376

fear that this might endanger passage of the resolution

recommending an Atlantic "Special Conference." An important obstacle fell away in August 1959, when Secretary of State

Christian Herter, who had succeeded John Foster Dulles and was a close associate of the ACC group, notified the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee that he had no objections to S.

Con. Res. 17. By that time it was too late for the committee to act on the resolution during 1959, but it did allow the the resolution to move ahead in 1960. Hearings before the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee opened on 19 January 1960 and lasted until 10 February. By this time the resolution, which had also been transformed into a joint resolution, had gained the crucial support of Senate Majority Leader Lyndon

Johnson. The State Department, for its part, now favored its passage. And in order to draw as little opposition as possible Streit stayed away from the hearings. The AUC instead dispatched William Draper and Lithgow Osborne, two

ACC supporters who had retained their membership on the AUC

Council, to testify for its resolution. Still the vote was close. The Foreign Relations Committee approved the Atlantic

Union Resolution by a vote of 8 to 7, and the full Senate, after a relatively short debate on 15 June 1960, by a vote of

51 to 44. The resolution had passed its crucial test, however. The House Foreign Affairs Committee unanimously approved the resolution on 21 June, and the full House passed it by a vote of 288 to 103 on 24 August. On 7 September 377

1960, President Eisenhower signed the Atlantic Union bill

into law. 11

With the passage of its resolution the AUC leadership

judged that it had achieved the committee's primary goal. In

January 1961 the AUC therefore officially ceased operations,

although the members of its executive committee continued to

meet for several months to coordinate their activities with

regard to the Atlantic convention. 12 Congress meanwhile, in

March 1961, established a bipartisan U.S. Citizens Committee

on NATO to coordinate with other NATO parliaments the

organization of the convention, and to represent the U.S. at

the convention. Christian Herter and William Clayton became

the committee's co-chairmen, while AUC president Elmo Roper

became its vice-chairman. i3 "The Atlantic Convention of NATO

Nations" finally met in Paris, from 8 to 20 January 1962. It

did not meet the expectations of the American Atlantic Union

movement. The convention paid little attention to plans for

a federal union. The U.S. delegation included many

atlanticists who were at least symphatetic to Streit's

vision. But the European delegations, which like their U.S.

counterpart had been appointed by their respective parliaments, were not as enthused by American federalist

ideas as Streit had hoped. As a result, the convention's

Declaration of Paris did not even mention the prospect of an

Atlantic Union. Instead it simply endorsed the ideas of the

1959 Atlantic Congress and called on the NATO governments to 378

draw up plans for the creation of an Atlantic Community that

could meet the political, military, and economic challenges

of the late twentieth century. In the end Streit's

convention proved no more willing or able to transform NATO

into a truly politically integrated Atlantic Union than the

respective NATO governments themselves. The attempt to

repeat the experiment of 1787 had finally been tried and had

failed.

By 1962 then, the Atlantic Community seemed to have

evolved as far as it could. This did not stop Clarence

Streit from continuing the struggle. During the late 1950's

Streit increasingly moved away from the AUC and back toward

his original Federal Union base. In July 1958 he founded the

International Movement for Atlantic Union, as an extension of

Federal Union. Both organizations continued to be active through the 1970's.is Disappointed by the 1962 Paris convention, Streit continued to find new congressional

sponsors who introduced resolutions calling for a new, more federalist convention. In 1965 Eugene McCarthy (D-MN) and

Frank Church (D-ID) introduced two such resolutions in the

Senate. 16 in 1971, 116 House members co-sponsored a similar resolution. 17 And in 1973 Streit's House supporters tried again. All of these efforts, however, fizzled out.is They lacked both administration support and public interest. 379

Streit continued to work for, and write about Atlantic

Union until he died in July 1986. The complete lack of

progress toward this goal was compensated for, at least in

part, by the mounting praise he received from Washington's

internationalist elite. By the 1970's Streit became the

Grand Old Man of the American atlanticist movement. As his

influence in Washington declined, his stature within the

atlanticist movement, and more broadly among all shades of

internationalists, grew to unprecedented proportions. Vice

President Nelson Rockefeller, several leading members of

Congress, and the Atlantic Council of the United States

repeatedly nominated Streit for the Nobel Peace Prize. The

House of Representatives, where many of Streit's early

symphatizers (including Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill and

Majority Leader Jim Wright) had risen to leadership positions, began throwing him birthday parties, where he was

snowed under by congratulatory speeches and messages from

former and current presidents, cabinet officers, congressional leaders, and diplomats. The praise heaped upon Streit by official and semi-official Washington in the twilight of his life was a recognition of the force and impact his Atlantic vision had had during the late 1940's and early 1950's. At the same time it was an affirmation of how well-established the limited, functional Atlantic Community, forged within the NATO framework, had become. And, as Streit had feared all along, it was precisely the strength and 380 endurance of this functional alternative which prevented the final consummation of a true federal Atlantic Union. 381

1. Dulles to Paris, 30 January 1956, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1955-59, Box 3125, 740.5/1-3056; Dulles to Paris, 3 February 1956, ibid.. Box 3216, 740.5/2-356; memorandum of conversation between Joseph Palmer (Deputy Directore, Office of European Regional Affairs) and F. J. Leishman (First Secretary, British Embassy in Washington), 9 February 1956, ibid., 740.5/2-956; draft paper by John Foster Dulles, 4 May 1956, Dulles Papers, Box 106, Folder "NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 1956." See also Kaplan, NATO and the United States. 68-69.

2. Draft paper by John Foster Dulles, 19 May 1956, Dulles Papers, Box 5, Folder "NATO 'Think Piece' 1956"; draft paper by John Foster Dulles, 20 May 1956, ibid.; memorandum from Dulles to Bowie, 21 May 1956, ibid.; draft paper by John Foster Dulles, 24 May 1956, ibid.; draft paper by Pearson, 8 June 1956, ibid.; draft paper by John Foster Dulles, 11 June 1956, ibid.; Bowie to Dulles, 11 June 1956, with attached draft paper by John Foster Dulles, ibid.

3. Kaplan, NATO and the united States. 69.

4. In November 1957 Dulles chaired a conference at the State Department that brought together his top advisers with a series of outside consultants. The conference was supposed to come up with new ideas for strengthening the Atlantic Community, but actually led to the conclusion that, for the forseeable future, no new steps were feasable or desirable. See memorandum of discussion, 6 November 1957, Dulles Papers, Box 3, Folder "Strictly Confidential." The folly of continuing to look for some new institutional mechanism to strengthen the Atlantic Community was driven home in a long letter to Dulles from Paul Nitze, one of the consultants at the November 1957 conference. In rather undiplomatic language Nitze blasted Dulles, arguing that he seemed to have bought into the Streit argument that there was no middle ground between an ineffective alliance and a federal union. See Nitze to Dulles, 16 November 1957, ibid.; and Dulles to Nitze, 20 November 1957, ibid.

5. For examples of this see Edward Barrett (Chairman of the American Council on NATO) to Livingston T. Merchant (Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs), 22 December 1955, with attached report on the American Council on NATO, 15 December 1955, and with attached Merchant to Barrett, 3 January 1956, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1955-59, Box 3124, 740.5/12-2255.

6. For a brief survey of the ACUS and related atlanticist groups, see Szent-Miklosy, The Atlantic Union Movement. 52- 55. 382

7. Ibid., 53. See also Panzella, "The Atlantic Union Committee," 131-35.

8. Panzella, "The Atlantic Union Committee," 172-73, 187-93; Szent-Miklosy, The Atlantic Union Movement. 236.

9. Panzella, "The Atlantic Union Committee," 139-49.

10. Ibid., 158-64.

11. Ibid., 179-237. See also Wooley, Alternatives to Anarchy. 130-31.

12. Minutes of the 39th meeting of the AUC board of governors, 12 January 1961, AUC MSS, Box 99, Folder "Board of Governors Meetings, 1955-1960"; minutes of the meeting of the AUC executive committee, 5 April 1961, Streit Papers, Box 108, Folder "Minutes of the Executive Committee, 1953-1961."

13. Panzella, "The Atlantic Union Committee," 251-52.

14. Ibid., 252-56; Szent-Miklosy, The Atlantic Union Movement. 66-69; Wooley, Alternatives to Anarchy. 131. For eyewitness reports from two disillusioned atlanticists, see also report, by Elmo Roper, 5 February 1962, with attached "Declaration of Paris," Flynt Papers, Box 3, Folder "Atlantic Committee"; and memorandum by Walden Moore, February 1962, Moore Papers, Box 8,Folder "Atlantic Union Committee (Jan. 52- Mar. 62)."

15. Szent-Miklosy, The Atlantic Union Movement. 54.

16. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on International Organization Affairs, Hearings on S. Con. Res. 64 and S. Res. 128. 86th Cong., 2nd sess., 23- 24 March 1966.

17. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on international Organizations and Movements, Hearings on H. Con. Res. 163 and 164. 92nd Cong., 1st sess., 13-15 July 1971.

18. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, Hearings on H. J. Res. 205. 206. 213. 218. 387. and H. Con. Res. 39. 6 7 . 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 26 March 1973.

19. Congressional Record. 22 February 1978 and 21 May 1979; Freedom & Union 32:1 (January-March 1977) and 33:3 (summer 1978); Washington Post. 17 May 1979 and 24 February 1982; New York Times. 8 July 1986; The Federator. supplement, July 1986 383

(this magazine was the successor of Freedom & Union, and the official publication of the Association to Unite the Democracies, the successor to Federal Union). CONCLUSION

The Atlantic Community concept emerged in American thinking about foreign policy during the first half of the twentieth century as a response to a double challenge: the new and inescapable American role as the world's predominant economic, military, and political power; and the growing threat to the Western-dominated world order of the nineteenth century posed by "Eastern" autocratic and totalitarian powers. Both of these developments forced the United States to transform its traditional relationship with Western

Europe. The growing weakness of Western Europe's main powers. Great Britain and France, in the face of their non-

Western rivals, Prussian-dominated Germany and Tsarist Russia up to the First World War and Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia thereafter, threatened the integrity of the existing cultural and economic "Atlantic System" that bound together North

America and Western Europe. The result was that the United

States found itself increasingly forced to abandon its political-military isolation and come to the aid of the weakening Western European powers. But the costly American intervention in two world wars did nothing to reverse the

384 385

secular decline of western European power, which indeed was

only accelerated by these wars. The long-term solution

increasingly seemed to lie in the creation of a new system of

Western unity, which through its overwhelming power would be

able to safeguard peace and allow Western Europe to recover

its equilibrium. America's growing strength increasingly

forced upon it the leadership role in the development of this

strengthened Western community.

The search for a new Western security system that

would safeguard the integrity of the culturally and

economically interdependent North Atlantic area, led a

succession of American writers and commentators to redefine

the Atlantic Community concept. Whereas the Atlantic

Community was, at the turn of the century, an essentially

cultural concept, it increasingly began to take on clear

ideological and geopolitical aspects. This development

culminated, in the late 1930's, in the emergence of the modern American Atlantic Union movement. The Atlantic Union

idea, articulated by Clarence Streit in Union Now, embraced

the Atlantic Community in all its cultural, economic,

ideological, and geopolitical aspects and portrayed it as the

logical extension of the American experiment in democratic

federalism. As an idea, Atlantic Union was both much broader

and much more narrow than the original Atlantic Community

concept. It was broader in the scope and depth of the

transatlantic integration that it entailed. But its 386

insistence on the American federalist experience as the only

viable model for this integration provided a very narrow view

of the potential institutional development of the Atlantic

Community. This latter characteristic, exemplified by

Streit's insistence on the mechanism of a 1787-style

constitutional convention, ultimately proved its undoing.

Throughout the first half of the twentieth century the

American proponents of the Atlantic Community idea faced

opposition from both Wilsonian universalists, who rejected

regional systems, and isolationists. Of these two opponents,

the Wilsonian universalists were clearly the most difficult

to deal with. They drew from the same internationalist

establishment as the atlanticists, and rode the same wave of

confident American internationalism that accompanied

America's rise to world power. During both world wars the universalists prevailed and led the U.S., first toward the

League of Nations, and then into the United Nations. But both these global bodies failed to realize the hopes of their

supporters. The breakdown of the United Nations, exemplified most poignantly in its failure to control atomic energy, and the onset of the Cold War discredited the universalist vision and offered a new opening to the advocates of regionalism.

The Atlantic Union movement was poised to take advantage of the opening offered by the Cold War. Its program contained several ingredients that seemed to guarantee a broad appeal. Its clear anti-isolationist stand 387

and enthusiastic embrace of America's world role endeared it

to many in the internationalist foreign policy establishment.

Its confident advocacy of free trade and economic integration

with the rest of the industrialized world appealed to many

business leaders. Its strong ideological anti-communism was

ideally suited to the Cold War climate of the late 1940's.

And Atlantic Union's federalist character appealed to many

disillusioned world government advocates. Above all, the

Atlantic Union movement offered a radical and innovative

program that promised to guarantee both world peace and a

Western victory over communism. All these elements combined

to allow Streit and his Atlantic federalism to gain the

support, not just of idealists such as Owen Roberts, but also

of hard-headed business and government leaders such as

William Clayton.

But the Atlantic Union program also contained

liabilities. The same radicalism that appealed to some world

government supporters was far less appealing to many more

others, including most senior administration officials. It

also remained to be seen whether American-style federalism would appeal to many Western Europeans. Perhaps most

importantly, the Atlantic Union movement was too exclusively

European-centered in a postwar world in which a greatly weakened Europe was no longer the dominant center of the world. The Atlantic Union program's implication that by

solving the problems of Western Europe it would solve the 388 world's problems no longer held true. Indeed, Atlantic

Union, by effectively merging the U.S. with Western Europe, would more likely hamper than help American attempts to bring stability to other parts of the world, including the emerging post-colonial nations.

American policymakers in the Truman Administration shared the Atlantic Union movement's belief that only regional federalism could solve Western Europe's problems.

And they were also convinced that shoring up Western Europe was vital to the U.S. But the approach they chose in 1947 was one of European, not Atlantic, regionalism. With the

Marshall Plan, the Truman Administration embarked on a long­ term policy of fostering European integration, along models to be developed by the Europeans themselves. This would deliver all that the Atlantic Union program promised:

European stability and prosperity; freer international trade; peace through strength; and ultimate victory over communism.

But it avoided tying the U.S. exclusively to Europe and left the U.S. free to fulfill its global role and pursue independent and effective policies in other areas of the world. And it did not require the practically impossible surrender of sovereignty that the Atlantic Union proposal envisaged.

But it quickly became clear that the administration's policy of support for European recovery and integration could not, by itself, achieve U.S. goals. European recovery 389

required a security system which only the U.S. could provide.

The European clamor for such an American security guarantee,

in late 1947 and early 1948, provided a new opening for the

American atlanticists. Those atlanticists within the State

Department, such as John Hickerson and Theodore Achilles, who

had been inspired by Streit's Atlantic Union concept seized

this opportunity to lay the groundwork for a new U.S. policy

of functional Atlantic integration.

The North Atlantic Treaty arose as a response to

European concerns. But Hickerson and Achilles turned it into

a clearly American initiative. It was both more and less

than what the Europeêins had asked for. What the Europeans

wanted was an American security guarantee. What the American

State Department atlanticists crafted during 1948-49 was a

treaty that offered a qualified commitment to defend Western

Europe, and at the same time laid the foundation for the

creation of a much broader, non-military relationship. And

one of their signal achievements was to turn their European

diplomatic counterparts into equally strong supporters of

that broader relationship. The State Department atlanticists

thus laid the cornerstone for the future development of the

Atlantic Community.

The North Atlantic Treaty in turn offered the private

Atlantic Union movement an opening to push for its program.

The new Atlantic Union Committee, with its high-profile

leadership and experienced organizers, mounted an impressive 390

cannaign for an Atléintic constitutional convention. But the

AUC's campaign suffered from the same liabilities as the earlier Federal Union efforts. And it was blocked by

Secretary of State Dean Acheson and the Truman

Administration, for whom the North Atlantic Treaty was a tool

for achieving a limited geopolitical end, and not a first

step toward implementing the AUC's vision of a full-scale political, social, and economic integration of the North

Atlantic democracies. Acheson saw the North Atlantic Treaty as an instrument to supplement, not replace, his policy of fostering European integration. And the secretary did not in the least care for the Atlantic Community concept, which he considered a fuzzy, unrealistic, and impractical idea.

Acheson's opposition prevented the Atlantic Union movement from implementing its program. But at the same time, geopolitical forces the secretary could not ignore drove the Truman Administration to try to strengthen the

North Atlantic Treaty and turn it into something more than a traditional military alliance. This opened the way to a process of convergence between the administration and moderate elements within the Atlantic Union movement. During

1951-52, the State Department and the moderate atlanticists found common ground around a program for the functional, rather than constitutional development of an Atlantic

Community centered around the NATO alliance. This process was facilitated by the presence of an important group of 391

atlanticists within the State Department and the Foreign

Service. But its final consummation required the removal of

both Streit and Acheson.

The advent, in early 1953, of John Foster Dulles, as

secretary of state, and of the American Council on NATO, as a

new moderate atlanticists group with both a domestic and

international support network, marked the final phase in the

development of American atlanticism. Several factors pushed

Dulles to take a very different view of NATO and the Atlantic

Community than that of his predecessor. First of all there

was the secretary's personal more dogmatic and ideological

worldview, which made him more receptive to the cultural and

ideological aspects of the Atlantic Community. Undoubtedly

more important, however, were the strains in the

transatlantic relationship, which took on increasing

importance as Cold War tensions declined, and which could not

be adequately addressed by the purely military NATO alliance.

This led the Eisenhower Administration, by 1955, to its "new

line" on NATO, which envisaged an alliance that was as much

political, economic, ideological, and cultural, as it was

military in character. Such an Atlantic Community, U.S.

policymakers hoped, would survive the vicissitudes, not only

of the Cold War and detente, but of the post-Cold War era as well.

This functional atlanticism reconciled the

geopolitical realities of the Cold War and America's 392 increasing extra-European obligations with the cultural- ideological vision of the Atlantic Community concept. It turned the promotion of the Atlantic Community concept into official U.S. policy, although increasing intergovernmental strains forced the administration to rely primarily on private and semi-official initiatives for its implementation.

This now became the role of the private atlanticist groups, who contributed their ideas and their international support network to the development of the Atlantic Community. This same evolution sounded the death knell for those elements of the Atlantic Union movement who failed to adapt and move from their old constitutional approach to the more limited functional one.

The Atlantic Community never became the institutionalized union envisaged by the early American atlanticists, let alone the federation proposed by the

Atlantic Union movement. And transatlantic political and economic cooperation remained far behind military integration. Nevertheless, the evolution, between 1947 and

1955, of American official foreign policy and private atlanticist initiatives combined to strengthen the transatlantic relationship and build an Atlantic Community that went beyond a traditional military alliance. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Dethleffsen, Erich. "The Chimera of German Neutrality," Foreign Affairs 30 (April 1952): 361-75.

Eliot, G. F. "Military Organization under the Atlantic Pact," Foreign Affairs 27 (July 1949): 24-36.

Fox, William T. R. "NATO and Coalition Diplomacy," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 27 (July 1953): 114-19.

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Gordon, Lincoln. "Economic Aspects of Coalition Diplomacy- the NATO-Experience," International Organization 10 (November 1956): 520-43.

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Kennan, George F. "For the Defense of Europe: A New Approach," New York Times Magazine (September 12, 1954): 7.

"Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs 25 (July 1947): 566-82.

Krout, John A. "The United States and the Atlantic Community," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science. 23 (May 1949).

Kruls, H. J. "The Defense of Europe," Foreign Affairs 30 (January 1952): 265-76.

Lippmann, Walter. "Mr. Kennan and Reappraisal in Europe," The Atlantic 201 (April 1958): 33-35. 403

"What Program Shall the United States Stand for in International Relations?" Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 66 (July 1916): 64-70.

"World Government: Is It a Practical Goal?" American Scholar (Summer 1948): 350-1.

Lyford, Joseph P. "Vote for World Government," New Republic (December 21, 1948): 16-8.

MacKinder, Halford. "The Round World and the Winning of the Peace," Foreign Affairs 21 (July 1943): 598-605.

McLachlan, Donald H. "Rearmament and European Integration," Foreign Affairs 24 (January 1951): 276-87.

Meyer, Cord, Jr. "A Faith to Live By: Institutions and Men," Nation (March 8, 1947): 269-71.

Middleton, Drew. "NATO Changes Direction," Foreign Affairs 31 (April 1953): 427-40.

Morrisson, Philip, and Wilson, Robert R. "Half a World ... and None: Partial World Government Criticized," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July 1947): 181-2.

Niebuhr, Reinhold. "The Illusion of World Government," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (October 1949): 289-92.

'The Myth of World Government," Nation (March 16, 1946): 312-4.

Pearson, Lester. "The Beginning of a World Community," Kiwanis Magazine (July 1951): 6, 38-9.

Pendleton, Hobart. "Another Look at World Federalism," American Mercury (June 1952): 56-64.

Roberts, Owen. "The World Needs a Cop on the Corner," Saturdav Evening Post (March 24, 1951): 120-4.

Roper, Elmo. "American Attitudes toward World Organization," Public Opinion Ouarterly 17 (Winter 1953-54): 405-42.

Schuman, Frederick. "Might and Right at San Francisco," Nation (April 28, 1945): 479-81.

Schuman, Robert. "France and Europe," Foreign Affairs 31 (April 1953): 349-60. 404

Siegfried, Andre. "Can Europe Use American Methods?" Foreign Affairs 30 (July 1952): 660-8.

Soustelle, Jacques. "Organizing Europe: Dissenting Opinions: France and Europe: A Gaullist View," Foreign Affairs 30 (July 1952); 545-53.

Spaak, Paul-Henri. "The Integration of Europe; Dreams and Realities," Foreign Affairs 29 (October 1950): 94-100.

Spofford, Charles M. "NATO's Growing Pains," Foreign Affairs 31 (October 1952): 95-106.

Stikker, Dirk U. "The Functional Approach to European Integration," Foreign Affairs 29 (April 1951): 436-44.

Wallace, Henry. "Toward World Federalism," New Republic (February 23, 1948): 10.

Walton, Clarence C. "Background for the European Defense Community," Political Science Ouarterly 68 (March 1953): 42-70.

Wofford, Harris. "Straight Is the Gate; Considering Alternative Routes to One World," Common Cause (June 1948): 425-8.

Wood, Robert J. "The First Year of Shape," international Organization 6: 175-91.

IV. Contemporary Publications - Books

Angell, Norman. The Political Conditions of Allied Success: A Plea for the Protective Union of the Democracies. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1918.

Bohlen, Charles E. The Transformation of American Foreign Policy. New York: W. W. Norton, 1969.

Boyd, Julian P. Anglo-American Union: Joseph Gallowav's Plans to Preserve the British Empire. 1774-1788. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1941.

Brebner, John B. North Atlantic Triangle. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945.

Brentano, Heinrich von. Die Atlantische Gemeinschaft heute und morgen. Frankfurt am Main: Ner-Tamid Verlag, 405

1961.

Brinton, Crane. From Many One; The Process of Political Integration; The Problem of World Government. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948.

The Brookings Institution. Manor Problems of United States Foreign Policy. 1948-54. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1948-54.

Burnham, James. The Struggle for the World. New York: John Day, 1947.

Canadian institute of International Affairs. Bulwark of the West: Implications and Problems of NATO. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1953.

Catlin, George. Anglo-American Union as a Nucleus of World Federation. London: Macmillan, 1942.

Anglo-Saxony and Its Tradition. New York: Macmillan, 1939.

. The Atlantic Community. Wakefield, England; Coram, 1959.

The Stronger Community. New York; Hawthorn Books, 1966.

Clayton, William Lockhart. U.S. Trade and the Common Market. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1963.

Cleveland, Harold van B. The Atlantic Idea and Its European Rivals. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966.

Committee for Economic Development. An American Program of European Economic Cooperation. New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1948.

______. Economic Aspects of North Atlantic Security: A Statement on National Policy by the Research and Policy Committee of the CED. New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1951.

Council on Foreign Relations. The United States in World Affairs. 1945-1955. New York: Harper & Bros., 1947-57.

Cousins, Norman. Modern Man Is Obsolete. New York: Viking, 1945. 406

Culbertson, Ely. Our Fiaht for Total Peace; World Problems of 1945 and New Solutions. New York, 1945.

Total Peace; What Makes Wars and How to Organize Peace. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran, 1943.

Curtis, Lionel. World Order fCivitas Dei>. New York: Oxford University Press, 1939.

World Revolution in the Cause of Peace. Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1949.

Daniels, Walter M., ed. Defense of Western Europe. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1950.

Davis, Forrest. The Atlantic System: The Story of Anglo- American Control of the Seas. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1943.

Deutsch, Karl W., et al. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.

Douglas, William O. Towards a Global Federalism. New York: University of London Press, 1968.

Dulles, John Foster. Our international Responsibilities. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1950.

______. War or Peace. New York: Macmillan, 1950.

War. Peace and Chance. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1939.

Fulbright, J. William. Prospects for the West. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963.

Geiger, Theodore, and Cleveland, Harold van B. Making Western Europe Defensible. Washington, DC: National Planning Association, 1951.

Hartley, Livingston. Atlantic Challenge. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1965.

Haviland, Walter Field, Jr., ed. The United States and the Western Community. Haverford: Haverford College Press, 1957.

Herter, Christian A. Toward an Atlantic Community. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. 407

Hershey, John. Hiroshima. New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1946.

Hoffman, Paul G. Peace Can Be Won. Gcirden City: Doubleday, 1951.

Hoskins, Halfold L. The Atlantic Pact. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1949.

Ismay, Hastings. NATO: The First Five Years. 1949-1954. Paris, 1955.

Johnsen, Julia E., ed. The "Eight Points" of Post-War World Reorganization. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1942.

______. Plans for a Post-War World. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1942.

______. World Peace Plans. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1943.

Kamp, Joseph P. We Must Abolish the United States: The Hidden Facts behind the Crusade for World Government. New York: Constitutional Educational League, 1950.

Karp, Basil. The Draft Constitution for a European Political Community. New York: American Committee on United Europe, 1954.

Lippmann, Walter. The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy. New York: Harper, 1947.

______. Early Writings. Edited by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. New York: Liveright, 1970.

______. Isolation and Alliances: An American Speaks to the British. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1952.

______. The Stakes of Diplomacy. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1915.

______. U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1943.

U.S. War Aims. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1944.

Western Unity and the Common Market. Boston: Little, Brown, 1962.

Mackinder, Halford J. Deimcratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction. New York: Henry Holt, 1942. 408

Marjolin, Robert. Europe and the United States in the World Economy. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1948.

Massigli, Rene Lucien Daniel. Une comedie des erruers. 1943- 1956; Souvenirs et reflexions sur une etape de la construction europeene. Paris: Plon, 1978.

Masters, Dexter, and Way, Katherine, eds. One World or None: A Report to the Public on the Full Meaning of the Atomic Bomb. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1946.

Meyer, Cord, Jr. Peace or Anarchy. Boston; Little, Brown and Company, 1948.

Middleton, Drew. The Atlantic Community: A Studv in Unity and Disunity. New York: David McKay, 1965.

The Defense of Western Europe. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952.

Moch, Jules. Alertei Le problème crucial de la communauté europeene de defense. Paris: Robert Laffont, 1954.

______. Histoire de rearmament allemand. Paris, 1965.

Mollet, Guy. The New Drive for European Union. Paris: American Committee on United Europe, 1955.

Moore, Ben T. NATO and the Future of Europe. New York: Harper, 1958.

Morgenthau, Hans J., ed. Peace. Security, and the United Nations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946.

Nash, Vernon. The World Must Be Goverened. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949.

Reves, Emery. The Anatomy of Peace. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1945.

A Democratic Manifesto. New York: Random House, 1942.

Roberts, Owen J., Schmidt, John F., and Streit, Clarence K. The New Federalist. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950.

Royal Institute of International Affairs. The American Speeches of Lord Lothian. July 1939 to December 1940. London: Oxford University Press, 1941. 409

Schuman, Frederick. The Commonwealth of Man; An Inquiry into Power. Politics, and World Government. New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1952.

Spaak, Paul-Henri. Pourquoi I'O.T.A.N.? Paris: Plon, 1959.

Sprading, Charles T. The World State Craze. Los Angeles, 1954.

Spykman, Nicholas John. America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942.

The Geography of the Peace. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1944.

Strausz-Hupe, Robert. The Balance of Tomorrow: Power and Foreign Policy in the United States. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1945.

_. Geopolitics; The Struggle for Space and Power. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1942.

Streit, Clarence K. The Essence of Union Now. New York: The Union Press, 1940.

______. Freedom Against Itself. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954.

______. Freedom's Frontier: Atlantic Union Now. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961.

______. Union Now; A Proposal for a Federal Union of the Democracies of the North Atlantic. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1939.

Union Now: The Proposal for Inter-democracv Federal Union. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1940.

Union Now with Britain. New York; Harper & Brothers, 1941.

Taft, Robert A. A Foreign Policy for Americans. Garden City: Doubleday, 1951.

Van Doren, Carl. The Great Rehearsal: The Story of the Making and Ratifying of the Constitution of the United States. New York: Time Life, 1965.

Warburg, James Paul. Germany. Key to Peace. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953. 410

Ward, Barbara. Policy for the West. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1951.

The West at Bav. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1948.

White, Theodore H. Fire in the Ashes: Europe in Mid-century. New York: Sloane, 1953.

Wilcox, Francis O., and Marcy, Carl M. Proposals for Chances in the United Nations. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1955.

Willkie, Wendell L. One World. Simon and Schuster, 1943.

Wofford, Harris, Jr. It's up to Us: Federal World Government in Our Time. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1946.

Wynner, Edith, and Georgia Lloyd, eds. Searchlight on Peace Plans: Choose Your Road to World Government. New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, 1944.

V. Contemporary Publications - Periodicals

The Economist

Foreign Affairs

Fortune

Freedom & Union

International Affairs

NATO Letter

Newsweek

New York Times

Time

VI. Memoirs

Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation; My Years in the State Department. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969. 411

Sketches from Life of Men I Have Known. New York: Harper & Bros., 1961.

The Struggle for a Free Europe. New York: W. W. Norton, 1969.

Achilles, Theodore C. “Fingerprints on History": The NATO Memoirs of Theodore C. Achilles, edited by Lawrence S. Kaplan and Sidney R. Snyder. Kent, OH: Lyman L. Lemnitzer Center for NATO emd European Community Studies, 1992.

Adams, Sherman. Firsthand Report: The Storv of the Eisenhower Administration. New York: Harper, 1961.

Adenauer, Konrad. Memoirs. 1945-1953. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1966.

Alphand, Herve. L'etonnement d'etre; Journal f1939-1973^. Paris: Fayard, 1977.

Attlee, Clement R. As It Happened. New York: Viking, 1954.

Twilight of Empire: Memoirs of Prime Minister Clement Attlee. New York: Barnes, 1962.

Auriol, Vincent. Journal du Septennat. 1947-1954. 7 vols. Paris: Armand Colin, 1970-74.

Ball, George W. The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs. New York: W. W. Norton, 1982.

Bidault, Georges. Resistance: The Political Autobiography of Georges Bidault. Translated by Marianne Sinclair. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.

Bohlen, Charles E. witness to History. 1929-1969. New York: W. W. Norton, 1973.

Catlin, George. For God's Sake. Go!: An Autobiography. Gerrards Cross, England: Colin Smythe, 1972.

Churchill, Winston S. The Second World War. 6 vols. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948-1953.

Clark, Grenville. Memoirs of a Man. New York: W. W. Norton, 1975.

Dixon, Pierson. Double Diploma: The Life of Sir Pierson Dixon. Don and Diplomat. London: Hutchinson, 1968. 412

Eden, Anthony. Full Circle: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden. Boston; Houghton Mifflin, 1960.

Eichelberger, Clark M. Organizing for Peace: A Personal History of the Founding of the United Nations. New York: Harper and Row, 1977.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. The white House Years. 2 vols. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963-65.

Ferrell, Robert H., ed. The Autobiography of Harry S. Truman. Boulder: Associated University Press, 1980.

Hull, Cordell. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. 2 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1948.

Ismay, Hastings. Memoirs. New York: viking, 1960.

Jebb, Gladwyn. The Memoirs of Lord Gladwvn. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972.

Kennan, George F. Memoirs. 2 vols. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967-72.

Meyer, Cord. Facing Reality; From World Federalism to the CIA. New York: Harper & Row, 1980.

Monnet, Jean. Mémoires. Paris: Fayard, 1976.

Nitze, Paul H., with Ann M. Smith and Steven L. Rearden. From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision: A Memoir. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989.

Pearson, Lester B. Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson. 2 vols. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972-73.

Rusk, Dean, with Richard Rusk. As I Saw It. New York: W. W. Norton, 1990.

Spaak, Paul-Henri. combats inachevés. Paris: Fayard, 1969.

Stikker, Dirk U. Men of Responsibility; A Memoir. New York: Harper & Row, 1965.

Stimson, Henry L . , and Bundy, McGeorge. On Active Service in Peace and War. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947.

Truman, Harry S. Memoirs. 2 vols. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1955-56. 413

A. Articles

Accinelli, Robert D. "Pro-U.N. Internationalists and the Early Cold War: The American Association for the United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1947-52," Diplomatic History 9 (Fall 1985): 347-62.

Adamthwaite, Anthony. "Britain and the World, 1945-1949: The View From the Foreign Office," International Affairs 61 (Spring 1985): 223-35.

Barnes, Trevor. "The Secret Cold War: The C.I.A. and American Foreign Policy in Europe, 1946-1956," The Historical Journal 24, 25 (June 1981, September 1982): 399-415; 649-70.

Baylis, John. "Britain, the Brussels Pact, and the Continental Commitment," international Affairs 60 (Autumn 1984): 615-29.

'Britain and the Dunkirk Treaty: The Origins of NATO," Journal of Strategic Studies 5 (June 1982): 236-47.

Bernstein, Barton J. "The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of Atomic Energy, 1942-1946," Journal of American History 60 (March 1974): 1003-44.

Boyle, Peter G. "Britain, America and the Transition from Economic to Military Assistance, 1948-1951," Journal of Contemporary History 22 (July 1987): 521-38.

"The British Foreign Office and American Foreign Policy, 1947-1948," Journal of American Studies 16 (December 1982); 373-89.

Carpenter, Ted Galen. "United States NATO Policy at the Crossroads: The Great Debate of 1950-51," International History Review 8 (August 1986): 389-414.

Collins, Robert M. "Positive Business Responses to the New Deal: The Roots of the Committee for Economic Development," Business History Review 12 (Autumn 1978): 369-91. 414

Danchev, Alex. "Diplomacy's Wise Man?" Wilson Quarterly 13 (Autumn 1989): 104-6.

"Taking the Pledge: Oliver Franks and the Negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty," Diplomatic History 15 (Spring 1991): 199-219.

Ferguson, Thomas. "From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and American Public Policy in the Great Depression," international Organization 38 (Winter 1984): 41-94.

Folly, Martin H. "Breaking the Vicious Circle: Britain, the United States, and the Genesis of the North Atlantic Treaty," Diplomatic History 12 (Winter 1988): 59-77.

Gaddis, John L. "Containment: A Reassessment," Foreign Affairs 55 (July 1977): 873-87.

"Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?" Foreign Affairs 52 (January 1974): 386-402.

Gati, Charles. "What Containment Meant," Foreign Policy 7 (Summer 1972): 22-40.

Gerber, Leurry G. "The Baruch Plan and the Origins of the Cold War," Diplomatic History 6 (Winter 1982): 69-95.

Greenwood, Sean. "Ernest Bevin, France, and 'Western Union': August 1945-February 1946," European History Ouarterlv 14 (July 1984): 319-38.

Griffith, Robert. "Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Corporate Commonwealth," American Historical Review 87 (February 1982): 87-122.

Hawley, Ellis. W. "The Discovery and Study of a 'Corporate Liberalism,"' Business History Review 52 (Autumn 1978): 309-30.

Helmreich, Jonathan E. "The United States and the Formation of EURATOM," Diplomatic History 15 (Summer 1991): 387-410.

Hennessy, Bernard. "A Case Study of Intra-Pressure Group Conflicts: The United World Federalists" Journal of Politics 16 (February 1954): 76-95.

Henrikson, Alan K. "The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance," Naval War College Review 32 (May-June 1980): 24-25. 415

Hitchens, Harold L. "Influences on the Congressional Decision to Pass the Marshall Plan," Western Political Quarterly 21 (March 1968): 51-68.

Hodgson, Godfrey. "The Establishment," Foreign Policy 10 (Spring 1973): 3-40.

Hogan, Michael J. "American Marshall Planners and the Search for a European Neocapitalism," American Historical Review 90 (February 1985): 44-72.

______. "Corporatism: A Positive Appraisal," Diplomatic History 10 (Fall 1986): 363-72.

______. "Revival and Reform: America's Twentieth Century Search for a New Economic Order Abroad," Diplomatic History 8 (Fall 1984): 287-310.

______. "The Search for a 'Creative Peace': The United States, European Unity, and the Origins of the Marshall Plan," Diplomatic History 6 (Summer 1982): 267-8

Hudson, Daryl J. "Vandenberg Reconsidered: Senate Resolution 239 and American Foreign Policy," Diplomatic History 1 (Winter 1977): 46-63.

Jackson, Scott. "Prologue to the Marshall Plan: The Origins of the American Commitment for a European Recovery Program," Journal of American History 65 (March 1979); 1043-68.

Kaplan, Lawrence S. "Western Europe in 'The American Century': A Retrospective View," Diplomatic History 6 (Spring 1982): 111-23.

Kindleberger, Charles P. "The Marshall Plan and the Cold War," International Journal 23 (Summer 1968): 369-82.

LaFeber, Walter. "NATO and the Korean War: A Context," Diplomatic History 13 (Fall 1989): 461-77.

Leffler, Melvyn P. "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginning of the Cold War, 1945-48," American Historical Review 89 (April 1984): 346-81.

"The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan," Diplomatic History 12 (Summer 1988): 277-306. 416

Lent, Ernest S. "The Development of United World Federalist Thought and Policy," International Organization 9 (November 1955): 486-501.

Little, Douglas. "Crackpot Realists and Other Heroes: The Rise and Fall of the Postwar American Diplomatic Elite," Diplomatic History 13 (Winter 1989): 99-111.

Lundestad, Geir. "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952," Journal of Peace Research 23 (September 1986): 263-77.

Luttwak, Edward N. "The Strange Case of GFK: From Containment to Isolation," Commentary 64 (November 1977): 30-35.

Mallalieu, William C. "Origins of the Marshall Plan: A Study in Policy Formulation and National Leadership," Political Science Ouarterly 73 (December 1958): 481-504.

Margairaz, Michel. "Autour des accords Blum-Byrnes: Jean Monnet entre le consensus national et le consensus atlantique," Histoire, économie, société 3 (1982): 440-70.

May, Ernest R. "The American Commitment to Germany, 1949-55," Diplomatic Historv 13 (Fall 1989): 431-60.

Mayers, David. "Containment and the Primacy of Diplomacy: George Kennan's Views, 1947-1948," International Security 11 (Summer 1986): 124-62.

McCormick, Thomas J. "Drift or Mastery? A Corporatist Synthesis for American Diplomatic History," Reviews in American Historv 10 (December 1982):318-30.

McQuaid, Kim. "Corporate Liberalism in the American Business Community, 1920-1940," Business Historv Review 52 (Autumn 1978); 342-68.

Melandri, Pierre. "Les Etats-Unis et le plan Pleven, octobre 1950-juillet 1951," Relations Internationales 11 (1977); 201-29.

Paterson, Thomas G. "Presidential Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, and Congress; The Truman Years," Diplomatic History 3 (Winter 1979): 1-18.

Pollard, Robert A. "Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War: Bretton Woods, the Marshall Plan, and 417

American Rearmament, 1944-50," Diplomatie History 9 (Summer 1985): 271-89.

Rappaport, Armin. "The United States and European Integration: The First Phase," Diplomatic History 5 (Spring 1981): 121-49.

Roberts, Priscilla. "'All the Right People': The Historiograpy of the American Foreign Policy Establishment," Journal of American Studies 26 (Summer 1992): 409-34.

Rostow, Eugene V. "Searching for Kennan's Grand Design," Yale Law Journal (June 1978): 1527-48.

Rowen, Hobart. "America's Most Powerful Private Club," Harper's Magazine 221 (September 1960): 79-84.

Ryan, Henry B. "A New Look at Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' Speech" Historical Journal 22 (December 1979): 895-920.

Schulzinger, Robert D. "Whatever Happened to the Council on Foreign Relations?" Diplomatic History 5 (Fall 1981): 277-89.

Schwartz, Thomas. "The Case of German Rearmament: Alliance Crisis in the 'Golden Age,"' The Fletcher Forum 8 (Summer 1984): 295-309.

"The 'Skeleton Key': American Foreign Policy, European Unity, and German Rearmament, 1949-1954," Central European History 19 (December 1986): 369-85.

Smith, E. Timothy. "The Fear of Subversion: The United States and the Inclusion of Italy in the North Atlantic Treaty," Diplomatic History 7 (Spring 1983): 139-55.

______. "From Disarmament to Rearmament: The United States and the Revision of the Italian Peace Treaty of 1947," Diplomatic History 13 (Summer 1989): 359-82.

Wala, Michael. "Selling the Marshall Plan at Home: The Comittee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery," Diplomatic History 10 (Summer 1986): 247-65.

Warner, Geoffrey. "The Anglo-American Special Relationship," Diplomatic History 13 (Fall 1989): 479-99. 418

Widenor/ William C. "American Planning for the United Nations: Have We Been Asking the Right Questions?" Diplomatic History 6 (Summer 1982): 245-65.

Wieber, Gees, and Zeeman, Bert. "The Pentagon Negotiations, March 1948," International Affairs 59 (Summer 1983): 351-63.

Wittner, Lawrence S. "Peace Movements and Foreign Policy: The Challenge to Diplomatic Historians," Diplomatic Historv 11 (Fall 1987): 355-70.

'The Truman Doctrine and the Defense of Freedom," Diplomatic History 4 (Spring 1980): 161-87.

Yoder, Jon A. "The United World Federalists: Liberals for Law and Order," in Peace Movements in America. Edited by Charles Chatfield. New York: Schocken Books, 1973.

B. Books

Adams, Larry L. Walter Lippmann. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1977.

Adler, Selig. The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction. New York: The Free Press, 1957.

The Uncertain Giant: 1921-1941, American Foreign Policy Between the Wars. London: Collier Books, 1965.

Almond, Gabriel. The American People and Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger, 1960.

Ambrose, Stephen E. Eisenhower. 2 vols. New York; Simon and Schuster, 1983-84.

Rise to Globalism; American Foreign Policy Since 1938. 6th ed. New York: Penguin Books, 1991.

Ambrose, Stephen E., and Immerman, Richard. Milton S. Eisenhower: Educational Statesman. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983.

Ambrosius, Lloyd E. Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during World War I. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1991. 419

Anderson, Terry H. The United States. Great Britain, and the Cold War. 1944-1947. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1981.

Armstrong, Hamilton Fish. Fifty Years of Foreign Affairs. New York: Praeger, 1972.

Backer, John H. The Deciion to Divide Germany; American Foreign Policy in Transition. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1978.

Ball, Margaret M. NATO and the European Movement. New York: Praeger, 1959.

Barker, Elisabeth. Britain in a Divided Europe. 1945-1970. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971.

The British between the Superpowers. 1945-1950. London, 1983.

Bamet, Richard J. The Alliance: America-Europe-Japan. Makers of the Postwar World. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983.

Bartlett, C. J. The Rise and Fall of the Pax Americana: United States Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century. London: Paul Elek, 1974.

Bartlett, Ruhl J. The League to Enforce Peace. Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina Press, 1944.

Baylis, John. The Diplomacy of Pragmatism: Britain and the Formation of NATO. 1942-1949. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1993.

Beal, John Robinson. John Foster Dulles: 1888-1959. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959.

Becker, Josef, and Knipping, Franz, eds. Power in Europe?: Great Britain. France. Italy, and Germany in a Postwar World. 1945-1950. New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1986.

Beloff, Max. The United States and the Unity of Europe. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1963.

Bernstein, Barton J., ed. Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration. Chicago: Quadrangle, 1972.

Best, Eichard A., Jr. "Cooperation with Like-Minded Peoples": British Influences on American Security Policy. 1945-1949. New York: Greenwood Press, 1986. 420

Bird, Kai. The Chairman; John J. McCloy; The Making of the American Establishment. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992.

Bourke, John. Congress and the Presidency in U.S. Foreign Policymaking: A Study of Interaction and Influence. 1945-1982. Boulder: Westview Press, 1983.

Bowie, Robert R. Shaping the Future: Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964.

Boyer, Paul. By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age. New York: Pantheon Books, 1985.

Brinkley, Douglas. Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years. 1953-71. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.

Brinkley, Douglas, ed. Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policv. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.

Bromberger, Merry, and Bromberger, Serge. Jean Monnet and the United States of Europe. Translated by Elaine P. Halperin. New York: Coward-McCann, 1969.

Brown, Anthony Cave. Wild Bill Donovan: The Last Hero. New York: Times Books, 1982.

Bullock, Alan. Ernest Bevin. Foreign Secretary. 1945-1951. London: Heinemann, 1983.

Bundy, McGeorge. Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years. New York: Vintage Books, 1988.

Butler, J. R. M. Lord Lothian /Philip KerrK 1882-1940. London: Macmillan, 1960.

Calleo, David P. The Atlantic Fantasy: The U.S.. NATO, and Europe. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970.

Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance. New York: Basic Books, 1987.

Europe's Future; The Grand Alternatives. New York: Horizon Press, 1965.

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C. Dissertations

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