IHS Aerospace, Defence & Security Capabilities Briefing
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IHS Aerospace, Defence & Security Capabilities Briefing Global Warming: Arctic militarisation gathers pace ihs.com Military Capabilities IHS Capabilities Brie ing | Arctic Forces Push for Arctic resources The latter half of 2013 brought a number of developments on the Arctic front. In November, the United States published its first ever Arctic Strategy, which called for improvement of country’s capabilities to operate in this theatre. The following month the Canadian government announced it would stake a claim over the North Pole with the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). Concurrently, Canada will be seeking to enhance its capabilities to project military force and sustain presence in the Arctic. Both of these developments were met with a determined Russian response, the most significant of which was bringing forward of the creation of an Arctic Group of Forces from 2020 to 2014. These pronouncements, however, should not be seen in vacuum. As the Arctic ice-cap decreases, the potential for new energy and maritime-related activity increases. In 2013, the usage of the Northwest passage along the coast of Canada and the Northern Sea Route (NSR) along the coast of Russia marked the first known instance of vessel using both passages in the same season. With the Arctic holding up to 20% of the world’s remaining technically recoverable hydrocarbons, the push for resources should be seen as a main driving force behind the militarisation of the theatre, which looks increasingly unavoidable. Major military installations in the Arctic Eareckson AFS JAPAN Nikolskoye Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson Provideniye SOUTH Fort Clear AFS Anadyr KOREA Whitehorse Greely Eielson AFB Fort Wainwright Cape Schmidt NORTH Pevek KOREA CANADA Inuvik UNITED STATES Yellowknife Tiksi Kotelny Island Rankin Inlet Resolute Bay RUSSIA Nanisivik North Pole Alert Rudolf Island Thule AFB Dudinka Iqaluit Nagurskoye GREENLAND Anderma Nadym Rogachevo Kangerlussuaq SVALBARD AND Vorkuta Sovietsky JAN MAYEN Naryan-Mar Murmansk Andoya Pechenga Sortland (Norwegian coast guard) Arkhangelsk Existing military facilities Norway claimed continental shelf beyond 200nm Planned military facilities Russia territorial sea and EEZ Canada territorial sea and EEZ Russia claimed continental shelf beyond 200nm Potential Canada continental shelf beyond 200nm Overlapping Norway/Russia EEZ Denmark territorial sea and EEZ Overlapping Norway EEZ/Russia claimed Denmark claimed continental shelf beyond 200nm continental shelf beyond 200nm Potential Denmark continental shelf beyond 200nm Overlapping Norway/Russia claimed Iceland EEZ continental shelf beyond 200nm Iceland claimed continental shelf beyond 200nm AFGHANISTANPAKISTAN USA territorial sea and EEZ Norway territorial sea and EEZ / Fishery zone 0 1,200 km Jan Mayen / Fishery protection zone (Svalbard) Potential USA continental shelf beyond 200nm Source: IHS, EEZ data courtesy of International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham University (http://www.durham.ac.uk/ibru/resources/arctic). © 2014 IHS: 1521361 © 2014 IHS 2 Military Capabilities IHS Capabilities Brie ing | Arctic Forces Russia • Since Russian expedition planted its country’s flag on Arctic seabed in August 2007, Moscow has been trying to transform the Arctic into ‘leading strategic base for natural resources’ with success in the region directly correlated with Russia’s ‘wealth and competitiveness in the global markets’. • Currently, Russia fields one Arctic capable infantry brigade, although it plans to establish a second unit in the near future. In December 2013 President Vladimir Putin also brought forward the creation of an Arctic Group of Forces (Army Group) from 2020 to 2014. It will use pre-positioned equipment and operate in cadre form, rather than station large units permanently in polar conditions. • Russian Arctic deployment is supported by Tu-142 long-range anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and Il-38 medium-range ASW aircraft, which have been conducting regular patrol missions since February 2013. Altogether, 30 patrol missions were conducted throughout 2013, with tempo expected to increase in 2014. • Search and rescue (SAR) capabilities are also being address, which was marked with opening of a SAR facility in Naryan- Mar on the Barents Sea in August 2013. Similar facilities are earmarked for construction along the NSR in Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Dudinka, Pevek, Vorkuta, Nadym, Anadyr, Tiksi, and Provideniye. • Russia will also modernise its existing fleet of ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), including newly built Borey-class (Project 955/955A) vessels, which will include enhanced rapid surfacing capability allowing vessels to surface quicker through thick ice without any damage to submarines’ structure, including sonar systems and torpedo tubes. Six vessels have been ordered with two units already handed over to the navy. Borey-class strategic missile submarine Mine avoidance sonar 16 × Bulava 30 (RSM-56) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)* Flank Array 6 x 533mm bow tubes for launching six RPK-2 Viyuga (SS-N-15) missiles Displacement 19,400 t Draft 9 m Length 170 m Speed (submerged) 25 kt Beam 13.5 m Crew 107 *May also carry 3M-54 Klub-S SLCMs Source: IHS © 2014 IHS: 1521356 © 2014 IHS 3 Military Capabilities IHS Capabilities Brie ing | Arctic Forces Canada • Canada is making a concerted effort to reinforce and strengthen its Arctic sovereignty, including control of its extended continent shelf and the Northwest Passage. To this end, the Canadian military is aiming to enhance its capability to project force to and sustain presence in the Arctic, something which is currently limited. • Joint Task Force North is the only permanent Canadian military presence in the Arctic at this time. The task force includes the 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group with 1,750 Rangers in 60 patrols spread across the Arctic and the 440 Transport Squadron, which has four Twin Otters capable of landing on snow and tundra. • The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) currently has limited capability to operate in the Arctic. It has no ice-breakers, its surface combatants are not ice-strengthened, and the Victoria-class submarines do not have an under-ice capability. There are also no refueling facilities in the Arctic that would allow ships to stay on station for an extended period of time. • The Canadian Forces are establishing a special 500-strong regular army unit for Arctic operations. In addition, four Arctic Response Company Groups, drawn from reserve forces, are being trained. To support these efforts, an Arctic Training Centre opened at Resolute Bay in August 2013. The facility will also host prepositioned equipment. • The Royal Canadian Navy is procuring six to eight Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS), the first of which is to be delivered in 2018. While the ships will not have the ability to break heavy ice, they will be able to undertake operations in first-year ice. In addition, a naval berthing and refueling hub is being constructed at Nanisivik and expected to be operational in 2016. Future Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship AOPS requirements include: Endurance (months) 4 • Polar Class 5 international ice classification standard to allow operations in first year ice up to one metre thick; Cruising speed (min knots) 14 • Endurance of up to four months; Cruising speed (max knots) 17 • Cruising speed of at least 14 knots and a maximum speed of at least 17 knots; Range (nautical miles) 6,800 • Range of at least 6,800 nautical miles at 14 knots; • Gun armament (now looks to be one 25 mm gun); • Capable of embarking multiple small boats and a Range (knots) 14 helicopter, including the Cyclone. Source: IHS © 2014 IHS: 1521357 © 2014 IHS 4 Military Capabilities IHS Capabilities Brie ing | Arctic Forces United States • The United States Department of Defense’s (DOD) first ever Arctic Strategy, which was released in November 2013, calls for the evolution of Arctic infrastructure and capabilities consistent with changing conditions in that part of the world. However, for the United States, projection, not presence, dominates the strategic approach to the Arctic and the region remains peripheral to the US strategic posture. • The US armed forces have many assets that can be brought to bear in a broad range of environments, including in the Arctic. In contrast, it has very few niche Arctic capabilities. Some large assets do include Arctic-specific design features, in particular the navy’s nuclear attack submarines. However, no United States Navy (USN) surface combatants are ice-strengthened. • The United States has access to the excellent facilities at Thule Airbase in Greenland and there are significant US Army and Air Force units in Alaska. The Alaskan-based forces include active fighter, airlift, and rescue squadrons, in addition to an airborne infantry Brigade Combat Team and a Stryker Brigade Combat Team. However, these assets are not specifically earmarked for Arctic operations. • The DOD’s Arctic Strategy is based on an assessment that there is a low level of military threat in the region and it openly acknowledges that the level of Arctic ambitions will be contingent on global priorities and fiscal constraints. In order to hedge against these risks, the DOD’s emphasis will be on innovative and low-cost, ways to accomplish national goals in the Arctic. • The US Navy is researching ways of making its vessels more capable of operations in the far north. That said, the US strategy explicitly relies on sub-surface and aerial assets to make up for deficiencies in surface capabilities