Y r STO HI Y AR T i L MI Naval Service of Canada, CWM 19940001-980, © Canadian War Museum. The Naval Service of Canada’s first peacetime recruiting poster. PErpetuaL Interests ... ThE Admiralty Influence on ThE Development of ThE NaVaL SErVice of CaNaDa by mark Tunnicliffe “It is a narrow policy to suppose that this country or At the outbreak of the First World War, the main naval that is to be marked out as the eternal ally or the forces available to Germany in the Pacific were the cruisers of perpetual enemy ... we have no eternal allies, and Admiral Graf von Spee’s East Asiatic Squadron. At the out- we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are break of war, two of his units, the light cruisers Leipzig and eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our Nürnberg, had been conducting detached operations in duty to follow.” Mexican waters as part of an international naval force evacuat- ing civilians from Mazatlan, then besieged in the ongoing ~Lord Palmerston 1 Mexican Civil War. And they were well placed to commence immediate operations against British shipping. introduction The Canadian cruiser that sailed, on the other hand, was hortly after midnight on 3 August 1914, HMCS by no means ready for war. Her crew was at two-thirds the Rainbow left Esquimalt in search of the German normal complement, and she only had training ammunition on navy. More specifically, she was looking for the board – shells filled with black powder.3 Built in 1891, and German cruiser SMS Leipzig, which was known now thoroughly obsolete, she was furnished with a mixed to be in the vicinity of San Francisco and another, similarS unit, SMS Nürnberg, thought to be in the area as well. The order to sail ordered Rainbow: “… [to] proceed to sea Commander (ret’d) Mark Tunnicliffe is currently a Defence Scientist with forthwith to guard trade routes North of the Equator, keeping Defence Research and Development Canada at National Defence in touch with Pachena, until war has been declared …”2 Headquarters in Ottawa. Vol. 11, No. 2, Spring 2011 • Canadian Military Journal 39 armament of two 6-inch, six 4.7-inch, and four 12-pounder security. In contrast, her militia, though deficient in many guns.4 Rainbow was never intended by Canada for war, having ways as a fighting force, had at least been recognized as an been purchased as a ‘training cruiser,’ and she presented no essential responsibility of nationhood, and it had been estab- real threat to the German cruisers. Her captain, Commander lished within a year of Confederation through the Militia Act Walter Hose, in admitting that he would likely have come off of 1868. Canadian politicians had endlessly debated or evaded second best in an engagement with Leipzig, later remarked: the issue of how, or whether, to provide for the seaward “To know where he was, exactly, at that time, would have defence of the nation, continuing the discussion until an been Rainbow’s main contribution ... My main armament was answer, after a fashion, was forced upon the country by the my wireless, and that only had a range of two hundred miles.”5 exigencies of war. The question then remains, why was it so difficult to sort out? While Rainbow was out on her search for Leipzig, the west coast of Canada was left unprotected from any raiders In their analysis of Canadian defence policy making, that might manage to slip past her and enter Victoria, political scientists Dan Middlemiss and Joel Sokolsky note: Vancouver, or Prince Rupert. Recognizing the vulnerability of his coastal towns, the premier of British Columbia, Sir “Policy is essentially concerned with the making of Richard McBride, arranged for the emergency purchase of choices. These choices are shaped and constrained two submarines from the Seattle Construction and Drydock by many factors including (1) the interests, motiva- Company. The boats, available because of a contract dispute, tions, and preferences of the various actors (indi- were offered to the provincial government by the builder, and viduals, organizations, and institutions), (2) the were transferred just outside Canadian territorial waters on 5 nature and interplay of the processes by which deci- August 1914. Two days later, they were turned over to the sions are formulated and implemented; (3) the char- Dominion government, effectively doubling the size of acter of the environments in which these actors and Canada’s navy. processes operate.”6 These events marked the beginning of the combat career They further note that the practice of not making a deci- of a navy that had been established only four years earlier. In sion at all is a frequent Canadian habit, and that inaction is those four years, the readiness of the new navy had been often a result arrived at after deliberate consideration – a habit allowed to decline to a point where its two ships were barely as prevalent at the beginning of the 20th Century with respect fit to sail (HMCS Niobe, a Diadem Class protected cruiser, to defence issues as it was at the end of the century. was stationed in Halifax). They beg the question as to why Canada, some forty-seven years after Confederation, had One of the factors that guide a government in its defence neglected the issue of her maritime defences to the point that decision-making process is the advice that it receives from its an unopposed bombardment by a single cruiser appeared to be technical experts, who are clearly significant actors in the a distinct possibility to British Columbians. policy process. For the Canadian Government at the turn of the century, its naval advice, for the most part, had to come While no government was really prepared for the events of August 1914, Canada had less reason than most for war- like considerations. In fact, the British Admiralty was even less prepared, for Rainbow was the most powerful unit left available to it in the North Eastern Pacific. Indeed, the initial reason Rainbow had sailed on 3 August was to find the only two British warships in the area, HM sloops Algerine and Shearwater, and herd them back to Esquimalt before Leipzig found them. This was not the scenario anticipated by the Canadian government. The Royal Navy (RN) was supposed to be look- ing after Canadian interests - not the other way around. Canada. Patent and Copyright Office/Library and Archives Canada/PA-029755 Canada was not ready to provide for her own maritime HMCS Shearwater (foreground) and HMCS Rainbow, 1910. 40 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 11, No. 2, Spring 2011 Y from the British Admiralty. Not surprisingly, the motivations, that the sea is one, and that anything which tends to priorities, and perspectives of the Admiralty were often differ- localize naval power robs it of the global mobility r ent from the interests of the Canadian government. This arti- which is one of its greatest strengths. Contrary to this cle, therefore, will examine the almost still-born arrival of the principle, naval force tended to be attached to par- Canadian Navy in the context of the military advice offered to ticular stations, ships designed for special services, STO the government by the British Admiralty, and whose ‘perpet- vessels tied to particular coasts, and the strength of ual interests’ were being served by it. naval power scattered and fragmented.”9 HI Y the admiralty Perspective Additionally, with the Industrial Revolution now well- established throughout Europe and North America, Britain AR he expertise that successive Canadian governments, from was being significantly challenged in a variety of economic T T Macdonald to Borden, relied upon for advice on maritime sectors, particularly textiles, coal, and steel, most notably by i 10 defence came from two sources. The local view was provided the United States and Germany. Britain’s economic vulnera- L by the Department of Marine and Fisheries, which came into bility was further exacerbated by her exposure to trade disrup- existence with Confederation in 1867. This department con- tion as a result of the 19th Century’s version of globalization. MI solidated all the former colonial authority with respect to the By the 1880s, 80 percent of Britain’s wheat consumption was regulation of shipping and navigation, ports, and fisheries supplied by overseas producers, and she depended upon her regulation and protection – Canada’s domestic maritime export markets, not only to pay for this imported food, but for issues. However, since Canada’s external affairs were man- the jobs and social stability they engendered. Naturally, this aged by Britain, the responsibility for managing their mari- ‘Achilles Heel’ had become a topic of interest to England’s time aspects lay with the British Admiralty, which performed perennial enemies, the French, whose Jeune École’s theory of the function of providing the expert maritime defence advice guerre de course began striking a cord of alarm in Britain. to the Colonial and Dominion governments in the same gen- eral sense that it did for the Imperial government at Thus, a combination of factors - the uncertainty of the Westminster. However, in providing that advice, the distinc- effectiveness of the fleet, its overextension throughout the tion between colonial and imperial interests was not often Empire, a growing sense of vulnerability at home, and ever apparent to the Admiralty, or if it was, it was not considered increasing industrial and naval challenges in Europe, began to by them to be particularly relevant. alarm the Admiralty and shake the sense of complacency in the British government and public. The attention of the The Admiralty was, at the time of Confederation, trying Admiralty was becoming focused – at home.