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Large Number of Civilians Were Killed. It Also Appears These Civilians Were Either Returning Refugees Or Persons Gathered As

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Large Number of Civilians Were Killed. It Also Appears These Civilians Were Either Returning Refugees Or Persons Gathered As large number of civilians were killed. It to specific incidents are justified. In all also appears these civilians were either cases, either the law is not sufficiently returning refugees or persons gathered as clear or investigations are unlikely to result human shields by FRY authorities or both. in the acquisition of sufficient evidence to The committee is of the view that the cred- substantiate charges against high level ible information available is not sufficient accused or against lower accused for par- to tend to show that a crime within the ticularly heinous offences. jurisdiction of the Tribunal has been com- 91. On the basis of information avail- mitted by the aircrew or by superiors in the able, the committee recommends that no NATO chain of command. Based on the investigation be commenced by the OTP in information available to it, the committee relation to the NATO bombing campaign or is of the opinion that OTP should not incidents occurring during the campaign. undertake an investigation concerning the bombing at Korisa. V. Recommendations Document: Amnesty International, EUR NATO/Federal Repnblic of 90. The committee has conducted its 70/18/00 Date: June 2000 Yugoslavia review relying essentially upon public doc- "Collateral Damage" or Unlawfnl uments, including statements made by NATO and NATO countries at press con- Killings? ferences and public documents produced Violations of tbe Laws of War by by the FRY It has tended to assume that NATO/Federal Republic of NATO During Operation Allied the NATO and NATO countries' press Yugoslavia Force statements are generally reliable and that explanations have been honestly given. "Collateral Damage" or The committee must note, however, that Unlawful Killings? 1. Introduction when the OTP requested NATO to answer specific questions about specific incidents, Violations of the Laws of War From 24 March to 10 June 1999 the North the NATO reply was couched in general by NATO during Operation Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) con- terms and failed to address the specific AlliedForce ducted an air campaign against the Federal incidents. The committee has not spoken to Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), codenamed those involved in directing or carrying out Operation Allied Force. NATO aircraft the bombing campaign. The committee has Table of Contents conducted over 38,000 combat sorties, also assigned substantial weight to the fac- including 10,484 strike sorties, against tual assertions made by Human Rights targets in the provinces of Kosovo and Watch as its investigators did spend a lim- Vojvodina, Serbia proper and the Republic ited amount of time on the ground in the of Montenegro.� Yugoslav media have FRY Further, the committee has noted that stated that thousands of civilians were Human Rights Watch found the two vol- killed in NATO air raids. However, the ume compilation of the FRY Ministry of civilian death tolls given in detailed FRY Foreign Affairs entitled NATO Crimes in government accounts range from 400 to Yugoslavia generally reliable and the com- 6()D.2 NATO has not released official mittee has tended to rely on the casualty estimates of civilians or FRY combatants figures for specific incidents in this compi- killed. No NATO forces were killed in hos- lation. If one accepts the figures in this tile action during the air campaign. compilation of approximately 495 civilians NATO is an alliance of 19 nations from killed and 820 civilians wounded in Europe and north America, founded in 1949 documented instances, there is simply no with the aim of providing a mutual commit- evidence of the necessary crime base for ment to collective defence in the event of charges of genocide or crimes against one or more of these nations coming under humanity. Further, in the particular inci- attack by another party. NATO took military dents reviewed by the committee with par- action against the FRY following a break- ticular care (see paras. 9, and 48-76) the down in negotiations between several of its committee has not assessed any particular Member States and the FRY over the situa- incidents as justifying the commencement tion in Kosovo, where FRY forces were of an investigation by the OTP. NATO has engaged in an armed conflict with the admitted that mistakes did occur during the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) character- bombing campaign; errors of judgment ized by gross human rights abuses, and the may also have occurred. Selection of cer- future status of the province. NATO stated tain objectives for attack may be subject to several aims for its military intervention, legal debate. On the basis of the informa- including ending the human rights viola tion reviewed, however, the committee is tions perpetrated by FRY forces against eth- of the opinion that neither an in-depth nic Albanian civilians; ensuring the investigation related to the bombing cam- withdrawal of all FRY forces from Kosovo paign as a whole nor investigations related and their replacement with an international force; and ensuring the return of Kosovar possible to ascertain whether civilian buses Conflict, Ruhr-Universitat Bochum refugees and internally displaced to their are on bridges, should those bridges be Germany and Professor of International homes. blown? These are very important questions Humanitarian Law at Leiden University, NATO has claimed that its air campaign because people are not collateral Netherlands; and Dr. Lieutenant Colonel against the FRY was the "most precise and damage, they are people who are killed, (ret.) Pekka Visuri, visiting researcher at lowest-collateral damage air campaign in injured, whose lives are destroyed, and we the Finnish Institute of International history."3 However. Amnesty International are very concerned that [sic] the way that Affairs and Adjunct Professor at the has serious concerns about the extent to civilians are so much in the forefront of National Defence College in Helsinki. which NATO forces participating in modem warfare, of modern conflicts."' Operation Allied Force adhered to the rules of international humanitarian law on the BACKGROUND: HUMAN RIGHTS conduct of hostilities, specifically those laid Over the course of Operation Allied Force, VIOLATIONS IN Kosovo down to protect civilians and civilian Amnesty International wrote repeatedly to objects. On the basis of available evidence, NATO's Secretary-General Javier Solana in Over the past 10 years. Amnesty including NATO's own statements and connection with specific attacks, raising International has extensively documented accounts of specific incidents, Amnesty concerns as to whether NATO was taking and campaigned to put an end to human International believes that - whatever their sufficient precautions in selecting targets, in rights violations perpetrated by the FRY intentions - NATO forces did commit seri- choosing the timing of attacks, in the man- authorities against ethnic Albanians in ous violations of the laws of war leading in ner in which these attacks were being exe- Kosovo. (See: Kosovo: a decade of a number of cases to the unlawful killings cuted, and whether civilians were being unheeded warnings, volume one, AI Index: of civilians. given advance warning when possible. EUR 70/39/99, April 1999). During this In one instance, the 23 April 1999 attack Amnesty International expressed concern time, ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo on the headquarters of Serbian State that several of the attacks that had resulted were the victims of unlawful killings, torture Television and Radio (RTS), NATO in civilian deaths may have indicated that and ill-treatment. Many political prisoners, launched a direct attack on a civilian object, NATO was not taking all precautions nec- including prisoners of conscience, were con- killing 16 civilians. In other attacks, includ- essary to protect civilians because priority victed by courts in proceedings which failed ing the 12 April bombing of Grdelica rail- was being given to ensuring pilots' safety. to meet international standards of fairness. road bridge, which killed 12 civilians, and In its replies to Amnesty International's In 1998 there was an increase in human the missile attack on Varvarin bridge on 30 inquiries, NATO gave general assurances rights violations perpetrated by FRY secu- May, which killed 11 civilians, NATO forces that every possible effort to avoid civilian rity forces and paramilitaries in Kosovo failed to suspend their attack after it was evi- casualties was made but did not provide (See: Kosovo: a decade of unheeded dent that they had struck civilians. In other AI with substantive answers to questions warnings, volume two, AI Index: EUR attacks, including those which resulted in on specific incidents, or any indication 70/40/99, April 1999). Armed conflict the highest number of civilian casualties (the of whether investigations were being erupted between members of the attacks on displaced ethnic Albanians near conducted. Amnesty International did not KLA, which had formed to fight for an Djakovica on 14 April, and in Korisa on 13 receive relevant details of the Rules of independent Kosovo, and FRY forces, Serb May, whose combined death toll exceeded Engagement from NATO, despite having police and paramilitary groups operating in 120) NATO failed to take necessary precau- repeatedly requested them in order to the region. The vast majority of victims in tions to minimize civilian casualties. A allow an independent assessment of Kosovo during the period of the armed detailed examination of these and other whether they complied with international conflict were ethnic Albanian civilians. attacks is included in this report. humanitarian law. However, Serbs also suffered human rights Concern about the rising level of civilian This report relies to a large extent on abuses, such as abductions, beatings and casualties grew over the course of NATO's own public statements and reports executions, at the hands of armed ethnic Operation Allied Force. On 23 April 1999, (and those of member governments) of Albanian groups some of whom repre- for example, the International Committee how it conducted the air campaign, includ- sented themselves as the KLA.
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