westeRn BalKans | 65 3.4 Mission Reviews Western Balkans he Western Balkans have been a testing-ground Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Kosovo. T for a huge range of political missions since the Each of these figures also has responsibility for early 1990s. These have ranged from light-weight some sort of field presence, although these are civilian monitoring missions meant to help contain not straightforward European political missions. the Yugoslav wars to long-serving presences tasked The EUSR in BiH also serves as the Interna- with promoting good governance, fair elections, tional High Representative, answering to a Peace minority rights and economic rehabilitation. Implementation Council of fifty-five countries and These long-term presences were usually organizations.1 The EUSR in Kosovo is similarly deployed to support or replace peacekeepers. double-hatted as the International Civilian Repre- The large military forces that stabilized the region sentative (ICR, answering to a Steering Group of have now downsized, while some international 28 countries that recognize Kosovo’s sovereignty). civilian missions are likely to remain in place for a The EUSR in FYROM has also acted as the head considerable time. of the European Commission’s delegation there Today, two organizations have prominent since late 2005. political missions in the Balkans. The Organization In addition to the OSCE and EU, the UN has for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) a residual presence in the Western Balkans. The maintains field presences in Albania and all the for- UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo mer constituent parts of Yugoslavia except Slovenia (UNMIK), having had executive authority and a (its presence in Croatia, however, is now an office in large civilian police arm from 1999 to 2008, has an Zagreb and will not be discussed here). increasingly reduced profile. Some of these presences remain sizeable. The Although UNMIK is still formally a peacekeeping OSCE is mandated to keep 199 international civil- operation, UN officials in Pristina often refer to it as ian staff in Kosovo – 10% more than the UN has a de facto political mission. The UN also maintains deployed across Iraq. an office in Belgrade (UNOB), technically part of The second major institutional player is the UNMIK but also following wider regional affairs. European Union. The EU has peacekeepers in It has long been recognized that this patch- Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and policemen work of overlapping mandates and missions could in Kosovo, where European troops also provide be rationalized. From 2002 onwards (when the the bulk of NATO’s military presence (KFOR). IHR in Sarajevo, Paddy Ashdown, was double- The European Commission has established an hatted as EUSR) it was commonplace to argue that extremely significant presence – and financial the region’s future would be defined by its gradual leverage – across the region. absorption into the EU. In this context, OSCE The EU has also appointed Special Repre- missions were partially oriented towards helping sentatives (EUSRs) to BiH, the Former Yugoslav the former Yugoslav states meet EU standards. 66 | Mission Reviews in BiH have delayed the changeover to EU over- EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina/Office of sight. The lack of international consensus on the High Representative (OHR) Kosovo’s status has meant that UNMIK remains in place and has complicated the efforts of the ICR/ Authorization Date 11 March 2002 (2002/211/CFSP) EUSR to play a role in Serb-majority north Kosovo. Start Date June 2002 These political complications have not pre- Head of Mission Valentin Inzko (Austria) Budget EUSR: $3.1 million vented political missions across the region from (1 March 2010-31 August 2010) devolving increasing responsibilities to national OHR: funded by the Peace authorities. The EU is reconfiguring its own pres- Implementation Council (PIC), whose budget is about $12.6 ence in the region as it consolidates its foreign million (2010-2011) presences in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty. The Strength as of International Staff: 24 mandate for the EUSR in FYROM will, for exam- July 2010 (OHR) Local Staff: 144 ple, end next year but the EU Delegation in Skopje will continue to play an influential role. There is talk of a new EU super-envoy in Sarajevo to cut OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina through the political impasse there. Yet the ratio- (OSCE-BiH) nalization of the international political presence in the Western Balkans is incomplete. Authorization 8 December 1995 and Start Date (MC(5).DEC/1) Head of Mission Ambassador Gary D. Robbins (United States) Bosnia and Herzegovina Budget $19.9 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010) Strength as of International Staff: 69 The Office of the High Representative (OHR) in 1 August 2010 Local Staff: 439 Bosnia and Herzegovina and the OSCE Mission in BiH were launched following the 1995 Day- For detailed mission information see p. 236 ton Peace Agreement that ended the Bosnian war. Under Dayton, the High Representative is man- dated to give guidance to the civilian components of the international presence (including the OSCE and UN agencies) but does not have direct author- ity over them. Although only answerable to the Peace Implementation Council, the High Repre- sentative is mandated to report to the UN Security Council, the European Union, the US, Russia and other interested parties. Both missions have operated alongside successive military operations (led by NATO from 1995 to 2004 and then by the EU) and police mis- sions (led by the UN from 1995 to 2003 and the EU thereafter). In 1997, the Peace Implementa- OHR tion Council granted the High Representative Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, visits powers – known as the Bonn powers – to remove the OHR in Sarajevo, February 2010. Bosnian officials and impose legislation without referring to national officials. In 2002, the fourth Successive high representatives in Sarajevo sug- High Representative, the United Kingdom’s Paddy gested that the EU take responsibility for Bosnian Ashdown, was double-hatted as the EUSR with affairs, and UNMIK officials declared that Kosovo’s the task of coordinating the EU’s various policy future lay with the Union. tools in BiH more effectively. This did not, how- These transitional processes have suffered a ever, give him command of the EU’s police and series of set-backs in recent years. Political tensions military missions.2 westeRn BalKans | 67 Since its foundation, OHR has been engaged Christian Schwarz-Schilling, who aimed for a lower with issues ranging from refugee return to economic profile and argued that OHR should be phased reconstruction. Over the last decade, the over-arch- out, affirming the EUSR as the top international ing challenge has been political: to persuade BiH’s figure in BiH. two post-Dayton components, the Bosnian-Croat During Schwarz-Schilling’s tenure, there was Federation and Republika Srpska, to help build up uneven progress on police and security sector national-level institutions, especially in the area of reforms. Although the BiH government agreed policing and justice. This consolidation is necessary to a Stabilization and Association Agreement both to overcome the de facto division of the coun- (SAA) with the EU in December 2007, Republika try into two halves – which fuels talk of secession Srpska’s leaders continued to talk about secession. among top politicians in Republika Srpska – and Having previously agreed to roll up OHR by June is a precondition for progress towards inclusion 2008, the Peace Implementation Council reversed in the EU. its decision in February 2008. Schwarz-Schilling’s Ashdown, who used the Bonn powers far more successor Miroslav Lajcak publicly complained that extensively than his predecessors, is widely credited a “positive, constructive atmosphere, which led to for having created momentum for the consolidation the initialing of the SAA” had deteriorated rapidly, of BiH as a state (although critics argued that he and that “the political leadership once again took up disenfranchised local leaders to a dangerous extent). diametrically opposed and maximalist positions.”3 In 2006, Ashdown was replaced as both High In mid-2010, OHR remains in place – Lajcak Representative and EUSR by German politician was replaced by an Austrian diplomat, Valentin 68 | Mission Reviews Inzko, in early 2009. It is a relatively small pres- gradually reduced this role. In 2002, BiH authori- ence, with 24 international staff and 144 national ties ran national elections on their own, with the staff as of July 2010. While double-hatting extends OSCE monitoring the process. The OSCE contin- beyond the High Representative/EUSR himself to ues to publish needs assessments before all Bosnian his cabinet, political unit, legal unit and press office, polls and reviews the processes. In July 2010 it rec- the Deputy High Representative – an American ommended that OSCE personnel observe national diplomat – is not double-hatted. Security sector polls the following October. and economic issues, too, are dealt with by OHR The OSCE also runs a variety of technical officials who lack an extra EU identity (there are projects aimed at improving parliamentary prac- also separate OHR and EUSR administration tices. Perhaps reflecting the tendentious nature of support units). politics in Sarajevo – and leveraging its field net- Tensions have persisted with Republika Srpska. work – the OSCE has launched a series of projects In 2009, Inzko used the Bonn powers (which neither promoting municipal-level democratization across Schwarz-Schilling nor Lajcak had utilized) to over- BiH. These have included a “beacon” scheme, aimed ride proposals by the Bosnian Serb assembly to take at highlighting particularly successful mayors and back powers they had ceded to the national level. other local officials. A 2009 “Local First” scheme Some regional experts even questioned whether aims to combine support to the municipal authori- BiH might find itself on the road to renewed con- ties with work with civil society organizations, flict.