EU Peacebuilding Capabilities in Kosovo After 2008

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EU Peacebuilding Capabilities in Kosovo After 2008 State-building in the Shadow of War: EU peacebuilding capabilities in Kosovo after 2008: an analysis of EULEX and the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue Chris van der Borgh with Puck le Roy and Floor Zweerink Centre for Conflict Studies, Utrecht University Colophon June 2017 Part A of deliverable 3.1: Desk Review Case Studies Chris van der Borgh with Puck le Roy and Floor Zweerink Utrecht University Whole of Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding This study discusses the capabilities of the European Union in Kosovo in the fields of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. It pays particular attention to two interventions that took place under the auspices of the CSDP; the EULEX mission and the EU-facilitated dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo. It has been produced as part of the project “Whole-of-Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding” (WOSCAP). This report complements the other in- depth research cases with a broader view of EU interventions regarding conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Georgia, Ukraine, Mali, and Yemen; and desk review studies in Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Guatemala and Honduras. More information at www.woscap.eu. This project is funded by the EU’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme Grant agreement no. 653866 This document only reflects the views of author(s), and the EU is not responsible for how the information may be used. Table of contents Introduction ......................................................................................................................................................... 1 1. Kosovo: war, peace and international interventions ............................................................................ 2 1.1 The Kosovar conflict and international involvement until 1999 ................................................ 2 1.2 International administration of Kosovo ............................................................................................ 4 1.3 The Ahtisaari plan and Kosovo’s declaration of independence .................................................. 5 1.4 Kosovo after independence ................................................................................................................ 6 1.5 Conclusion................................................................................................................................................ 7 2. The EU and Kosovo ...................................................................................................................................... 8 2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 8 2.2 The EU under UNMIK ........................................................................................................................... 8 2.3 CSDP ......................................................................................................................................................... 8 2.4 Stabilisation and association process (SAP) .................................................................................. 10 2.5 Technical and financial cooperation ............................................................................................... 12 2.6 Visa .......................................................................................................................................................... 13 2.7 Conclusion............................................................................................................................................. 14 3. EULEX............................................................................................................................................................ 15 3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 15 3.2 Mandate, staff and objectives .......................................................................................................... 15 3.3 Starting EULEX .................................................................................................................................... 17 3.3.1 A rocky start – EULEX and the status of Kosovo ............................................................. 17 3.3.2 Coordination with national and international actors ........................................................ 19 3.4 EULEX in action ................................................................................................................................... 21 3.4.1 2010 – EULEX’ first mandate renewal ................................................................................ 22 3.4.2 2012 – EULEX’ second mandate renewal .......................................................................... 24 3.4.3 2014 – EULEX’ third mandate renewal ............................................................................... 27 3.4.4 2016 – The final EULEX mandate? ...................................................................................... 28 3.5 EULEX – Evaluations and assessments ......................................................................................... 30 3.5.1 EU evaluations and assessments ........................................................................................... 30 3.5.2 Assessments in policy and academic literature ................................................................. 32 3.5.3 Perceptions matter.................................................................................................................... 34 3.6 Conclusion............................................................................................................................................. 35 4. The EU-facilitated Belgrade – Pristina Dialogue ................................................................................ 37 4.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 37 4.2 Serbia and the EU ............................................................................................................................... 37 4.3 The Dialogue ........................................................................................................................................ 40 4.3.1 The positions of Belgrade and Pristina ................................................................................ 41 4.3.2 Cooper’s round .......................................................................................................................... 43 4.3.2.1 The late July crisis ............................................................................................................ 45 4.3.2.2 The Dialogue continues .................................................................................................. 47 4.3.2.3 The Asterisk agreement.................................................................................................. 49 4.3.3 Ashton’s round ........................................................................................................................... 50 4.3.3.1 The start ............................................................................................................................. 50 4.3.3.2 The IBM agreement ......................................................................................................... 53 4.3.3.3 The bumpy road towards the Brussels Agreements ............................................... 55 4.3.3.4 The Brussels Agreement ................................................................................................ 57 4.3.3.5 Resisting the Brussels Agreement ............................................................................... 60 4.3.3.6 The final stages of Ashton’s round .............................................................................. 62 4.3.4 Mogherini’s round ..................................................................................................................... 62 4.3.4.1 The start of Mogherini’s round ..................................................................................... 63 4.3.4.2 The August Agreements ................................................................................................. 65 4.3.4.3 Mogherini’s round – the end of 2015 ........................................................................ 68 4.4 Assessments and evaluations of the Dialogue ............................................................................ 69 4.4.1 The outcome: success or fog? ............................................................................................... 69 4.4.2 The mediator – whose success? ............................................................................................ 70 4.4.3 Transparency and inclusion .................................................................................................... 71 4.5 Conclusion............................................................................................................................................. 72 5. Preliminary reflections on EU capabilities ............................................................................................ 74 Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................................... 77 ANNEX 1 - EULEX BASICS 2016 ..............................................................................................................
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