“Everything Is Politicized”

2010

“Everyth ing is politicized” Competing governments in Strpce/Shtërpcë, Kosovo

Abstract: The aim of the research is to gain insight into the

practices of parallelism and the influence of framing on this

governance system. I obtained this information by taking one

municipality, Strpce/Shtërpcë, as a case study. While living

there for three months, I analyzed the everyday reality of life

for citizens and the local governments. Strpce/Sthërpcë, a municipality in Kosovo of which the population consists of a Serbian majority, has two parallel sets of government related institutions. The governments compete and both claim to be the only legitimate ruler in the municipality. Both base their legitimacy on the claim that the territory is indivisible. Peaceful development in parallelism in Strpce/Shtërpcë will only be achieved when the framing of the situation changes. Significant herein is the inclusion of the youth. By looking into the practices of Strcpe/Shtërpcë I found signs of the dynamics of framing and possibly the weakening of the ‘indivisibility frame’. However regarding subjects that have to do with culture, history or language the indivisibility frame is still strong.

Merel Heijke University of Wageningen 1-11-2010

“Everything is politicized”

Competing Governments in Strpce/Shtërpcë, Kosovo

Merel Heijke MSc ‘International Development Studies’ University of Wageningen 1 November 2010

This thesis is produced by Merel Heijke, student of Wageningen University in the Netherlands, as part of her MSc-programme.

Author: Merel Heijke Supervised by Gemma van der Haar at the chair-group: Disaster Studies at the University of Wageningen.

Preface Kosovo…, what to expect? I was crazy to go there was the comment of my family and friends. “It will be very cold in winter, do you have your thermo underwear with you? And isn’t it dangerous there?”, was the standard reaction I received. But the country and Kosovo’s people turned out to be very hospitable towards me. The municipality I ended up staying for three months was a bit further off from the ‘normal’ destination, but it was in the centre of the attention. About the first message I received about the municipality Strpce/Shtërpcë was that it was a ‘model municipality’. It should be a model for the whole nation because of its fast reconstruction and the cooperation between Serbs and Albanians. I wanted to see this model municipality and see for myself how it functioned. Why did they obtain this status within Kosovo? My aim was to see what the role of the local government was in the reconstruction of the area. Not much information about the functioning of the municipal governments in Kosovo could be found. My aim was to understand the local practices and add useful information to scientific literature that could help in forming new states, or in reconstructing local areas in post-conflict times. Strpce/Shtërpcë turned out to be special in its governance system, as it dealt with two sets of competing government institutions. This was an extra interesting factor in my research. Despite the competing parallel governments, or perhaps thanks to this complicated situation, the municipality was still believed to have all it takes to be a model municipality. All the more reason to ask myself the question how does this parallelism function?

I enjoyed to get acquainted with the people of Strpce/Shtërpcë and Kosovo, with the culture, the history and the governance. I enjoyed working my way through the puzzle that the governance of Strpce/Shtërpcë is. I wrote the situation down as clearly as I could. I hope you enjoy reading it.

Acknowledgement Before I start elaborating on the subject of my thesis I want to thank a few people that have provided me with the necessary information or pulled me through the process of writing the thesis. First of all I could not have done this research without the interviewees of course. I will not call them by name, but say a general thanks to the civilians, employees and politicians of both local governments in Strpce/Shtërpcë, and officials of international organization as ICO, EU, OSCE, USAID, and VNG international that were willing to share their point of view. What is more, special thanks to my translators, Blerim Feizaj and Radovan Banasevic, who I came to trust and rely upon. Of great support and crucial in the organization of the research was Milos Milovanovic of NGO Fractal. I appreciated the discussions between us. I want to thank NGO Fractal in general, as they have provided me with a place to stay, have welcomed me, and suggested elements in society that could be interesting for this research. I also want to thank Igor Savic of NGO Future without Fear for providing me with a place to work and the employees that have become my friends and support in living in Strpce/Shtërpcë: Suzana Staletovic and Milena Ljubic-Dejanovic. Furthermore, very important for the success of the research has been Gemma van der Haar, lecturer at the University of Wageningen. She has made this research possible in cooperation with Cristine van Empel, from Clingendael institute and coordinator of the Dutch ‘Peace, Security and Development Network’, and Dion van den Berg from NGO IKV Pax Christi. Their expertise and knowledge of reconstruction and peace building has helped me in understanding the situation in Kosovo. Above all, Gemma’s comments helped me structure, restructure and refine the writing. Her way of teaching encouraged me to finish the thesis.

Lastly, a big thanks to my family for their support and interest also when I was feeling down and a special thanks to my father who helped me in clarifying a structure in my work and state clear conclusions.

Table of Content

Abbreviation ...... 8 1. Introduction ...... 9 1.1 Research approach: starting at the core of everyday life ...... 11 1.2 Outline thesis ...... 16 2. Theoretical framework ...... 18 2.1 Parallelism ...... 18 2.2 Indivisibility keeping parallelism alive ...... 24 2.3 Framing ...... 27 2.4 Conclusion: What can theory about framing tell us about the functioning of parallelism? ...... 30 3. Methods ...... 31 3.1 Literature ...... 31 3.2 Case and method selection ...... 32 3.3 Interviews and interviewees ...... 33 3.4 Observations...... 36 3.5 The influence of the researcher ...... 38 3.6 Data-analysis and validity ...... 39 3.7 Conclusions: what does the reflection on my research approach tell us?...... 39 4. The status issue of Kosovo and the development of political structures and administration ...... 40 4.1 Kosovo’s status issue ...... 40 4.2 Reconstruction and international interference...... 44 4.3 Government organization structures ...... 46 4.4 Conclusion: What can history and institutional development tell us about the strength of the indivisibility frame and parallelism? ...... 51 5. From war to parallelism and independent elections ...... 53 5.1 The municipality of Strpce/Shtërpcë and its people ...... 53 5.2 Parallelism ...... 58 5.3 Conclusion: How are ethnic division and parallelism framed together? ...... 66 6. November/December 2009: A historical moment for Strpce/Shtërpcë ...... 68 6.1 The organization of the elections ...... 68 6.2 Whom to vote for ...... 70 6.3 Reasons to vote ...... 71 6.4 Campaigning ...... 73

6.5 Reasons not to vote ...... 74 6.6 Consequences of the elections ...... 76 6.7 Conclusion: What does the election of 2009 tell us about the framing and legitimation strategies of the competing governments? ...... 77 7. The parallel governments in practice ...... 80 7.1 Infrastructure ...... 80 7.2 Youth ...... 86 7.3 Conclusion: what do infrastructural and youth projects tell us about parallelism in Strpce/Shtërpcë? ...... 93 8. A shifting frame? ...... 94 8.1 Framing ...... 94 8.2 Coalitions ...... 95 8.3 Rules of the game ...... 97 8.4 Power relations ...... 98 8.4 Conclusion: What do the four factors tell us about frames in Strpce/Shtërpcë? ...... 102 9. Conclusions ...... 103 9.1 Conclusions ...... 103 9.2 Discussions ...... 105 10. Literature ...... 107 Annex 1: Law on Self Government ...... 111 Annex 2: Timeline governments of Strpce/Shtërpcë ...... 113 Annex 3: UNMIK PISG ...... 114 Annex 4: Interviewees ...... 115

Abbreviation EMI – Effective Municipality Initiative (a program financed by USAID)

EULEX – European Union, LEX (law)

ICO – International Civilian Office

IDP – Internationally Displaced Peron

KFOR – Kosovo Forces, military forces of the UN

KLA – Kosovo Liberation Army

KPS – Kosovo Police Service

MPT – Municipal Preparation Team

MLGA – Ministry of Local Government Administration

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO – Non Governmental Organization

OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PISG – Provisional Institutions of Self-Government

USAID – United States Agency for International Development

UNDP – United Nations Development Program

UNHR – the UN Refugee Agency

UNMIK – United Nation Mission Interim Kosovo

1. Introduction What is it that your municipal government does for you? “Local governance is basically about picking up the garbage”, the director of VNG international in Kosovo declared. This of course, he said, was put too simply, but the basics of governance were in that statement. The act of picking up garbage is highly visible. Citizens will know whether the government is fulfilling its responsibility. When the garbage (or anything else) is taken care of properly, citizens subsequently (unconsciously) take up their part of the responsibility to take care of the garbage. Besides, taking serious care of such a (highly visible) responsibility such as picking up garbage has a positive impact on the complete image citizens have in mind of the government.

A clean environment and organized garbage pick-up is not an obvious priority for local governments in Kosovo. Pieces of garbage are flying around to end up rotting beside the beautiful riverbanks. There are not enough containers in villages. For a municipality as Strpce/Shtërpcë with a Serbian majority population in a country where 90 percent of the people is Albanian, ethnicity is an ‘extra’ factor hampering the achievement of an objective such as garbage disposal. In the municipality Strpce/Shtërpcë there is (just) one truck that works. However, this truck is owned by the state company that is based in Belgrade, Serbia, not Kosovo. This company is considered to be illegal by the surrounding Albanian dominated environment. Within Strpce/Shtërpcë municipality garbage can be picked up. Yet, the truck has no place to go to dump any of the garbage it has collected. For a long time it did not permission from the nearby municipality with the disposal factory to dump the garbage there, where it would have been burned.

The situation exemplifies the tension that is still drifting through Kosovo’s society ten years after the war. Also, I just mentioned the fact that one state company was considered to be illegal by others. It refers to the complex situation of having two competing sets of state institutions at the local level, which I will explain thoroughly in this thesis. Governance and development in Kosovo is not simply about organizing practicalities, ethnic struggles, political struggles like the status question and other governance issues complicate the organization of such a practical act as picking up garbage and need to be dealt with too. What happens in practice if even basic service-delivery is politicized? What is the effect for the local government? And what does it mean for citizens when politics affects everything and service delivery is not taken care of properly?

In this introduction I will in short introduce Kosovo and the processes that have led people to state that everything in their country is ‘politicized’. Thereafter the research questions and research approach will follow logically. I did an in-depth study of the municipality of Strcpe/Shtërpcë to understand the dynamics of a local government in reconstruction, what it entails to have two competing governments in one municipality and how issues are framed. In this chapter I in short explain why I chose this place and discuss the time period and research approach. All these aspects are further elaborated on in chapter three. The next section of this chapter further presents the outline of the following chapters.

Kosovo

Kosovo is situated at the south-west corner of Serbia, neighboring Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia; it entails an area one third the size of the Netherlands. About two million people live in the few cities and countryside, in the valley and in the surrounding mountains. The largest city that is

9 also the capital city is Pristina (English writing)1. 90 Percent of the population is Albanian, about 5 to 6 percent is of Serbian ethnicity, the rest is Turkish or Roma, Ashkali, Gorani, Egyptian or Bosniak or Croat. Figures have not been updated officially the past ten years and can only be estimated (Stevens, 2009).

Kosovo is many things to many people; the home of ancestors, a barbaric country, or the ground where the cultural heritage of Serbian Orthodox originated. It has known turbulent years and is now trying to recover from an ethnic conflict. Kosovo is in transition from war (‘98-‘99) to peace, autonomy and democracy. These concepts, war, peace, autonomy or democracy are all constantly subjects of discussion. Kosovo’s citizens, Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, and also politicians at all levels, locally, nationally and internationally all have their own opinions.

After years of such discussion Kosovo declared itself independent from Serbia on 17 February 2008. In their cause for independence Kosovo is supported by the United States of America. The European Union though, is still divided on the issue. Within the EU five countries, Spain, Cyprus, Greece, Romania and Slovakia, do not recognize Kosovo’s independence. However, some travel and business agreements are being arranged, so documents from Kosovo are recognized (when convenient). Serbia will never recognize Kosovo’s independence either, nor are any documents recognized, instead it continues to consider Kosovo a province of Serbia. Negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia have practically ceased to exist.

By parties involved the territory of Kosovo and the power over the territory is considered undividable without completely changing its sense, its meaning. Goddard (2006) labels a situation like this: indivisibility. Indivisibility is a construct that structures peoples thoughts, feelings or actions, but is also constructed by the same unconscious and conscious thoughts, feelings and actions. (I will explain more about indivisibility in the next chapter.) The indivisibility frame, the idea that Kosovo and the power over Kosovo should be indivisible, influences many aspects of Kosovo’s society. It for instance has a strong hold on politics.

The point of view at the national political level, that Kosovo is indivisible, is mirrored in the opinion of Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians throughout society. In some places it has contributed to the existence of two competing governments at the local, municipal level, operating in parallel to each other. In places with a substantial amount of Serbs, Serbs have maintained governmental institutions from before the conflict in 19992. The competing sets of governmental institutions supported either by Pristina and Kosovo based, or by Belgrade being Serbia based, concern the government (Mayor, assembly, directors and their staff), but also the service delivery offices of the governments. There are for instance two educational systems, two post-office systems, and two medical systems that run parallel to each other. Both parallel institutions refer to themselves as the only legitimate institution,

1 I want to clarify the language I articulate names of places in. National names, names of countries but also of capital cities, I cite in English. This is simply because I write in English and thus translate all names into English. However, because I zoom-in on the local level and go in depth about their practice, I will mention those local names in their original writing to approach the local reality as close as possible. My intention is to not exclude anyone, nor offend anyone by not picking his or her language. For the local places I apply all languages in the appropriate order: using the language of the majority community first. 2 From 1998 to 1999 the Kosovo Liberation Army (Kosovo Albanians) fought the Serbian militias with guerrilla methods. In the years to the actual conflict Serbian militias had been acting out atrocities against Albanians. In 1999 the NATO interfered by bombing Serbian targets. After the enforced peace agreement the United Nations installed an UN interim mission (UNMIK). This will be extensively explained in chapter four. 10 whereby the other is considered to be illegitimate if not illegal. This parallelism is thus explained in political terms and turns every issue into a seemingly irresolvable political issue.

1.1 Research approach: starting at the core of everyday life Kosovo is of course not the only place in the world where different groups compete for one territory3. Although competing governmental institutions seemed to be uncommon. I have not encountered much literature about such parallelism in the world. Moreover, there is a knowledge gap about what really happens in practice. This research not only contributes to see the actual policy implementation, but also how this is understood by people: It is of importance in comprehending framing and looking for (de)constructive frames. Such information could be valuable in understanding implications of policies. Subsequently it is worth researching for developing governance and increasing people’s livelihood. In this research I hope to contribute in closing this gap, linking practical reality as faced in the field and more macro level analysis from literature.

Literature about Kosovo often includes overviews of history, like Malcolm (1998) and Detrez (1999) have published, but also analysis of the present (Minority Report of 2009 by Stevens, or for instance a Serbian perspective on discourses existing in the society by Erjavec and Volcic (2007)). There have been studies done about the hegemonic discourses in Kosovo or Serbia. Bieber (2002) for example wrote: Nationalist Mobilization and stories of Serb Suffering. Also examined is the national state (re)construction in the past or in recent years (e.g. Bernabéu (2007) Laying the Foundations of Democracy?). Both subjects (discourses and state formation) return in my thesis. But these earlier studies all work from a top-down view sketching the broader picture. Just little information can be found about local level experiences. What is happening in the lives of people that are dealing with the existence of two competing governments that operate in the same municipality? What happens when two ethnicities live in the same municipality, but consider different governments to be legitimate? This is what I will try and examine in this thesis.

To complete the picture about governing in a country which is perceived as indivisible and deals with parallel government structures, this research starts at the bottom of society; at the very core of everyday life with experiences and local practices. The local level does not stand on its own, but is enraptured in a larger, (inter)national context. The functioning of the political system in Kosovo is marked by the belief in indivisibility. This leads to the central question of this thesis:

How do local parallel governmental institutions of Strpce/Shtërpcë function in the context of the frame of national territorial indivisibility of Kosovo?

The municipality Strpce/Shtërpcë is the local level I research. In the next section I will explain why I have chosen this place to do an in-depth study. Obviously this study includes two levels of abstraction. One is the indivisibility frame people might work with and the other is the reality of parallelism observed by very concrete acts. I will try to show how local actors deal with, reproduce or challenge the indivisibility frame. I will search for ways of dealing with limits and opportunities of this frame and of parallelism. I will search for shifting structures that their actions reproduce or modify. I have divided the central question in three sub-questions that represent the core of this thesis.

3 See for instance Mexico and Chiapas or Israel. 11

1. How does parallelism in Strpce/Shtërpcë work in practice? One of the actions this question called for was a definition and conceptualization of parallelism, which is given in the theoretical framework. The second type of research and analysis concerned the field where I was studying the practices of the government(s). These practices can be split into two parts. The practice is created and people are influenced by the practice. One part thus concerns how issues are dealt with by the local governments. The second part involves what the actions of the governments mean to citizens and to the government itself. It entails the search for understanding the influence parallelism has on people. In this thesis I will mostly focus on the first aspect: how do the local governments deal with issues while running parallel operations and while being in competition with one another.

Relating to both theory and practice is the exploration into why there is parallelism in Strpce/Shtërpcë and how it developed in to what it is now. When considering parallelism in practice I have also asked myself if trends could be detected.

One particular event that is of interest in this case study was the election in November/December of one of the local government institutions. The election period of 2009 provides insights into local practices, and the way the parallel institutions deal with each other and their own legitimacy. Especially in this hectic period, negotiations were sharp and the opposed claims surfaced clearly. The event shook the parallel institutions, providing a reaction which explains what is behind or under a seemingly calm surface.

Much of the answer to this question is found in the interviews and observations in Strpce/Shtërpcë. The plain descriptions of remarkable events, sayings or very everyday situations I will analyze in the light of the theory of Arts & Buizer on discourses (which is explained in the next chapter). It addresses coalitions of people, frames and words that are used to explain the situation, rules and power relations. From the case study, a division is found in informal, personal ties, and the working of formal, institutionalized bonds.

2. How does the indivisibility frame influence governance in Strpce/Shtërpcë? I referred to the indivisibility frame briefly in one paragraph at the beginning of this chapter. In the next chapter, the theoretical framework, I will explain the working definition of indivisibility frame for this research. I will define indivisibility as well as frame and conceptualize the concept ‘indivisibility frame’.

Apart from theorizing about the concept, in chapter four I will also explain the development background of the concept in practice. The issue also produces questions as to how the indivisibility frame is perceived, what is done by local people with it and how does it reappear in local actions? Subsequently one should also ask if it is the only frame marking municipal governmental practices. Can perhaps a change be detected in the amount of support received by the indivisibility frame?

History plays a large role in forming opinions, but the international actors are also of importance. The many internationals advising and reconstructing Kosovo bring new message and new frames with them. They would rather see a peaceful, multicultural society. In contrast to the indivisibility frame, positive development of Kosovo, in their eyes, is only possible when all ethnicities are ‘cooperating together’ (Simonsen, 2005). International actors have displayed new sets of thoughts, and try to

12 create new frames. Does that affect the way local actors deal with, and are influenced by, the indivisibility frame?

3. What sources for legitimacy do both competing local governments draw upon? In this thesis I will look for how legitimacy is produced, reproduced or challenged in local level strategies from the parallel institutions or other actors in the municipal arena. Both local governments strive for their own legitimacy and declare the other to be illegitimate, or even illegal.

One of the main ingredients for legitimacy is the support of the people. In answering both previous questions, about the practices of the parallel institutions and about the influence of indivisibility on local practices, the support of people also emerged as an important issue. This sub-question also refers to the questions ‘how is the indivisibility frame legitimized at local level?’ and ‘if change is detected, what does it do to the legitimacy of the local governments?’

As legitimacy is connected to both questions, parallelism (practices) and indivisibility (frames), it structures the information in this thesis. In the theoretical framework I will give a detailed explanation of the term legitimacy. Furthermore, different legitimating claims can be found in the context chapter, the history and international influence, but also in the descriptions of the procedures and structures of the local government in chapter three. Finally, it is also an issue throughout the descriptions of the performances of the local governments and is definitely of importance in the future construction of parallelism in Strcpe/Shtërpcë.

1.1.2 Location: why Strpce/Shtërpcë? Kosovo has one of the fastest growing populations in the world. About 45 percent of the population is unemployed of which a large amount of young people; as much as 50 percent of the population is under 25 years old (Stevens, 2009). Minorities mostly concentrate in particular villages and regions. North Kosovo is by far the largest of the Serb-dominated areas within Kosovo and it directly borders on Central Serbia. This has facilitated its ability to govern itself almost completely independently from the Kosovo institutions in a de facto state of partition (NGO Fractal, North of Kosovo community profile 2009). It is clear that competing governance claims exist in the north.

Throughout the rest of Kosovo there are so called Serbian ‘enclaves’. In these areas the influence of Belgrade is also considerable. A city north of Pristina is a special case. This city, Mitrovicë/ Mitrovica- North, is split by the river in the North (Serbian) and the South (Albanian). The northern part developed into an enclave. The national status struggle is very prominent here and has also gained much attention from the media, international community and politicians. There are other places though that are further away from the Serbian border and cannot convincingly call themselves parts of Serbia. They need to look for ways to maintain themselves surrounded by an Albanian environment. Strpce/Shtërpcë is such a municipality, and this was partly the reason that I selected it for a case study. Of all enclaves it is situated the furthest from the Serbian border.

Strpce/Shtërpce

Strpce/Shtërpcë is situated in the south of Kosovo, close to its border with Macedonia. It is a municipality of which Kosovo Serbs form the majority (65%), but it also houses a substantial number of Kosovo Albanians. Parallelism is completely interwoven in life in Strpce/Shtërpcë. This municipality is relatively far from the Serb border, surrounded by a Kosovo supporting environment. For the Serbs coping with this reality it means thinking about a future within an independent Kosovo, or moving to Serbia altogether. The dynamics in the southern part of Kosovo are different from the problematic north. I found that the geographical distance from central governments helps to make room for pragmatic solutions, which I will illustrate from chapter 5 onwards.

This research is performed as part of an initiative of the Dutch ‘Peace, Security and Development Network’. This multi-actor network includes universities, research institutes, NGOs, private sector representatives, and ministries. The Network aims to mobilize knowledge in order to design concrete activities, implementation modalities and associated instruments that guarantee the necessary conflict-sensitive development approach towards Millennium Development Goals for fragile states and post-conflict countries4. Kosovo was one of the countries that is of interest to the Network. My choice for Strpce/Shtërpcë was also based on the fact that the Network had a partnership with Kosovo experts of the NGO Fractal. One of the employees provided me with a very good entrance to the municipality. His connections in the municipality, his status and his knowledge were of great worth in comprehending the local situation.

In a report from the International Crisis Group (ICG) Strpce/Shtërpcë was mentioned to be a ‘model municipality’. Strpce/Shtërpcë symbolizes the multicultural society that Kosovo could hopefully become. The positive image of this municipality made it interesting to look at the parallel structures in place. It indicates that somehow the inhabitants of all ethnicities, who support different parallel

4 For the Network, knowledge does not refer specifically and exclusively to academic knowledge. On the contrary, it also includes knowledge available among policy makers, practitioners and ‘daily knowledge’ among beneficiary populations and society-level actors. The intended results can be summarized in five key concepts: collaboration and exchange of knowledge, conflict-sensitive planning and implementation, innovative projects, systematic knowledge management and increased effectiveness. The proposal engenders new forms of collaboration between sectors and actors involved in the Network. There have been no efforts linking these mutually and comprehensively within one single initiative, that aims at creating new and unexpected inter- linkages and forms of cross-fertilisation. The systematic inclusion of public and private, Northern and Southern, knowledge and action-focussed, and military and civilian partners into one approach is relatively unique. With thanks to C. van Empel, Project Manager Peace Security and Development Network; working at Institute Clingendael, Conflict Research Unit. 14 institutions and subsequently have very different perspectives on independency, have found a way to deal with the situation.

I will elaborate further on the selection of the case and the selection of the methods in chapter three.

1.1.3 Timing of the research The winter I spent in Strcpe/Shtërpcë was a relatively peaceful, though exciting time. No major incidents had happened for a year. The excitement came from the prospect of change, due to the municipal elections and recognition by the American and EU embassies that the ski-centre, the economical foundation of the municipality, must be developed in the nearby future.

“We are now in a historical moment”, was repeatedly said by internationals. With internationals, or later I will use the term international community, I refer to the many international development or reconstruction organizations that have settled in Kosovo. The largest international organizations consist of the EU, offices of the UN, US-Embassy or for instance USAID. The municipal elections in November 2009 were considered to be a historical happening, which could be a turning point in the development of Kosovo. It was agreed to by Strpce/Shtërpcë’s local governments. The elections were the first self-organized elections, two years after self proclaimed independence. No international country interfered, it was totally up to the citizens of Kosovo to show their will and wish for future local governments.

I agree with the fact that the elections formed a special moment in time. I do think that the elections indicate room for change which I will explain further in one of the last chapters. The idea of the Kosovar population doing the first steps alone, I approach skeptically. Although the Kosovo government might have the mandate to govern their country, many internationals still strongly influence policy processes in decisions and implementation. The elections can be seen as a possible and official starting point of change and autonomy. The real implementation of these concepts, change and autonomy, will, I fear, take a while longer.

Another factor, making the timing interesting, were two larger developments. One was the fact that Serbia had gone to court because of the independence issue and the decision of the International Court of Justice would be coming soon. At the time I was residing in Strpce/Shtërpcë European countries were being heard. This caused for a pool of emotions from Kosovo Serbian citizens and Kosovo Albanians. The outcome probably influenced people’s mindsets. Secondly, the total economic crisis produced shifts in policy priorities of the (inter)national governments. With change on its way, Serbs were focused on the amount of support they got from Belgrade, which was changing as well. All in all, a lot of developments were occurring or starting to occur, which added to the relevance of this research at the time.

1.1.4 Short discussion about the research approach To understand the dynamics of a local parallel government structure in a post-conflict reality better, I did an in-depth study into the municipality Strpce/Shtërpcë. Here I lived for 3 months, observing, participating and doing over 50 interviews. I have spoken with all sorts of people, from all layers of society: Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians from both local government institutions, citizens, civil workers and the inevitable internationals. The third chapter I have dedicated to explaining the used methods.

The story in this thesis is nuanced as much as possible. Kosovo’s situation is perceived differently by many actors in the field. And my viewpoint, that of a Western researcher, 24 and female, is no doubt different from the perspective of an Albanian or Serbian citizen of Kosovo. Various statements might not be agreeable to some, nevertheless this thesis provides a thorough insight into the workings of a municipality in Kosovo. Above all it is important to be aware of the fact that during the fieldwork and this writing of this thesis, processes keep changing. The new municipal government as supported by Pristina has for example changed. New people have come up with new plans that I have not been able to study. But also the influences of international organization have been organized differently since I left Kosovo at the end of January 2010. In general, I have not taken these changes into consideration, but have described the situation as I found it when I was in Kosovo.

This thesis provides a profound understanding of parallelism in Strpce/Shtërpcë. However, one should be careful in generalizing the information as described here. Still, this thesis is helpful for academics in clarifying and understanding parallelism. The case possibly provides new insights and could lead to new discussion points or aspects that need more research. Besides, aid workers, governments or others interested in building a society, in where opportunities lie for a local government and in how to support a local government in its work, can read this report as an example of the Kosovar life.

1.2 Outline thesis In the next chapter I will provide the theoretical framework which will create a basis for the analysis of the case study. I will proceed by explaining the relation between parallelism and indivisibility, and framing and legitimacy. I will explain what framing is and use the theory of Arts and Buizer on discourse as a lens. I use their theory as a specific way of viewing my empirical data, thereby selecting and ordering information in a certain way.

The third chapter addresses the research approach, the methods I used and the influence I or others possibly had on this research. I already explained some of the choices concerning the operationalization of the research above, and will continue this in chapter three.

Chapter four involves the history of Kosovo. History plays a big role in the present everyday life of Serbs and Albanians. I address their different perspectives on the status of Kosovo, a battle in 1389, the reconstruction after the conflict in 1999 and the international interference. I will also roughly sketch in big lines the reconstruction of the state and the influence of the United Nations and the European Union. And a second frame next to the indivisibility frame is presented: decentralization. I will explain the content and the reason to call it a frame.

In chapter five to eight I describe the observations I have made in the field, connecting practice to theory. Chapter five describes the ethnic relations in Strpce/Shtërpcë, and the economic situation in general. Besides sketching its social and economic features, in this chapter I have focused on politics. The chapter further includes the description of the parallel structure and a possible explanation about how parallelism in Strpce/Shtërpcë was built. The next chapter considers a critical event. I describe in detail what happened around the elections of 2009 for the Pristina supported government. I continue with case examples in chapter seven. I explain how infrastructure is seen and dealt with by citizens and governments and I consider the influence of indivisibility on youth policies.

In chapter eight I will change my approach. Where in chapters six and seven I started at the field examples of infrastructure and youth policies and activities and worked my way towards an analytical explanation, I now start with a theoretical scheme and put this over my data to select and order bits and pieces. In chapter eight I analyze the practices of the local government on the basis of the theory of Arts & Buizer on discourse as described in chapter two. Interpreting their scheme I will search for possible changes in framing, coalitions, rules of the game and power relations. These changes might tell us something about the shift in the indivisibility frame. Also, it shows the possible room local governments have in avoiding the stalemate situation of indivisibility.

With chapter nine I will conclude this thesis. I will try to answer the central question of this thesis: ‘How do local parallel governmental institutions of Strpce/Shtërpcë function in the context of the national territorial indivisibility of Kosovo?’. I end with a possible future perspective for the two competing sets of institutions and some remarks for further research.

2. Theoretical framework Legitimation of parallelism and indivisibility frames

In this chapter I develop a theoretical framework that helps analyze the functioning of parallel governmental institutions. Stpce/Shtërpcë is one of the places in the world where several institutions with similar targets, similar organizational structures and addressing the same space operate alongside each other. As mentioned in the introduction, Strpce/Shtërpcë knows two school systems, two health facilities and two post-offices. The same civil services are offered by two local governments. Essential for this situation is the fact that those institutions compete with each other. The existence of competing sets of governmental institutions that operate parallel to each other in a specified area, I will refer to as parallelism (further theorized in in the next section).

Parallelism has not always been present in Strpce/Shtërpcë, but it is now so integrated in society that it is not only undeniable, but also seems unchangeable. It is a sort of societal organization that has become a dominant influence on the everyday life of citizens. It can be recognized in practices, believes and opportunities of people and their institutions. It is institutionalized, but to which extent it is internalized into a normal fact in everyday life is not immediately clear. Interviewees of Strpce/Shtërpcë were all very clear on the fact that this was not a normal situation, but not many could come up with a safe alternative they believed was possible.

In order to understand the functioning of parallel institutions, it is necessary to first develop a notion about parallelism. How come parallelism exists in Strpce/Shtërpcë? How and why can two sets of institutions exist parallel to each other? In this chapter I search for a working definition of parallelism, look what is needed, in theory, for parallel institutions to exists and search the literature for an answer to why this parallelism exists in Kosovo. Part of the answer to why parallelism exists in Kosovo can be found in its history that I will elaborate on in chapter four. This theoretical framework is both a first analysis taking a theoretical angle and a frame that will be filled in with further analysis from the field.

2.1 Parallelism Parallelism consists of two or more institutions running parallel. Parallel institutions can refer to all sorts of institutions operating parallel to each other: religious institutions, sport events, day care for children, but also military movements or in our case governments. When mentioning parallel institutions I mean: government related institutions/structures that are similar, operate parallel to each other and also compete. Parallelism is governance executed by similar government related institutions operating alongside each other but not together. For this case study, the competition between the two sets of institutions is very interesting: both governments have to convince citizens of the righteousness of the existence of this one government.

Parallelism as I mean it, is not the same as the now often investigated concept of ‘hybrid political order’. Boege et.al (2009) state about a hybrid political order that it consists of “diverse and competing authority structures, sets of rules, logics of order, and claims to power” (Boege et. al., 2009;17). However, it is all included in one new form of governance structure. Svensson, sociologist at the University of Twente (Netherlands) explains it well: “In recent years, we have witnessed the introduction in the public sector of hybrid governance: forms of governance in which different more ideal typical approaches to governance are combined (Considine & Lewis 2003; Kooiman 2003). A

18 most prominent example of this hybridisation is the introduction of market principles as an addition to and partial replacement of public sector bureaucracy (LeGrand and Bartlett, 1993).” In the case of Kosovo these ‘sets of rules, the logics of order and the claims to power’ are not being combined to a new structure, but exist parallel to each other as the mathematical content of the word suggest: they follow their own way, but always next to each other. In practice the parallel institutions once in a while do touch as the field data from Strpce/Shtërpcë illustrate later in this thesis.

In Kosovo parallelism is revolves around governments. But what is a government exactly? A municipal government can be analyzed from different perspectives. What are the results for instance or what are the processes within the government? A government consists of both politics and administration. In theory those can be strictly separated, in practice they are not so easily divided. In theory politics is the world of conflict, emotions and power. In the world of politics, symbols, images and broad overviews are important (Bovens et.al., 2001:236). Politics happens not only in the first chambers of parliament, but also in the corridors of local governments. There is a continuum in politics from ‘high level politics’ to ‘everyday life practices’ (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2009/2010:151). In contrast, the governmental administration (management) is the world of neutrality, rationality and law. In the world of administration, efficiency, effectiveness and details are the subject of conversations (Bovens et.al., 2001:236).

But what does politics and administration concern? The government is a representation of the state and theoretically considered the only one representing and implementing the (inter)national law. A government has an administrative capacity, legal body, and implementation force of normative orders (Papagianni, 2008). In theory the state has the monopoly and legitimacy over the use of force. It can use force to abide the rules made for the state’s territory (Noor et. al., 2010). An unlimited or abusive use of force seems not legitimate. The state institutions are created to take care of the state and its citizens. The government is responsible and accountable for regulations, jurisdiction, but also service provision. To what extent a government is really taking care of its people is of course an empirical question. In theory, if one institution is state organized, the other might be a demonstration of critique on the state policy and practices (Van der Haar, 2009:6). It is not said that the first that was developed is also the most legitimate or legal one.

Parallelism can be born out of concern for people and safety issues. It pragmatically fills in necessary institutional gaps, providing necessary service delivery. Wanting to do things differently is one thing, more harsh is the reason for wishing to control the resources of the area. The implementation of parallel institutions can be part of a conscious political strategy to delegitimize the other. Parallelism can be developed to challenge or even to cause the overthrow of the sitting government (Van der Haar, 2009), which is to some extent the case in Kosovo. It delegitimizes the political system in place, which I illustrate with data from the field in chapter seven and eight.

The competition in the case of Kosovo between two sets of governmental institutions asks for strategies to gain, maintain and increase their legitimacy. Van der Haar covers what a parallel institutions means and does for people by claiming: “[Parallel institutions] embody a political agenda, critical of the dominant state, they symbolize new formats for the society and the polity and they have a material presence and significance in regulating access to resources and entitlements to services” (2009:7). Which of the sets of institutions in the case study is legal and most legitimate is

19 subject of debate. Both claim to be the only right government. The way the institutions are perceived and functioning in practice is described in the fourth chapter and further.

Van der Haar adopts three concepts for governance that describe the tasks of a government very well: governing practices, governing capacity and claims to governance (Nuijten 2009:108). In this thesis I distinguish more or less the same practices of a government and put most focus on the claims to governance. I will look at the activities of the governments. What policies are implemented, what activities are organized, which services and how? The implementation of practices in the public domain are partly effected by the governing capacity of the government. Do they have what it takes to effectively exercise governing functions in the social, strategic and product sphere? In this thesis I do not take an in-depth look into the organizations capacity or competences in particular, but I have favored taking a look at the impact of parallelism on the functioning of the governments. My aim is to describe the functioning of parallelism in Strpce/Shtërpcë that can be seen in the products which the competing governmental institutions produce. Because these governments are in such competition, the claims to governance, or as I call it the ‘strive for legitimacy’ is a very interesting subject for this research. What increases the legitimacy of a government and where does the government put its focus in practice: politics (symbols and emotions) or administration (effectiveness and rationality)?

Legitimacy

In the section above I have argued that in the case of parallel competing government institutions, the question of legitimacy, and related strategies to create or sustain legitimacy are of high importance. But what is legitimacy exactly? Suchman (1995) integrated cognitive and evaluative explanations of legitimacy, incorporating most considerations about legitimacy in one definition: “Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574). So, a necessary ingredient for an institution to exist is the shared and (non)voluntary support of people and other organizations. An institution could use its power to wield people into support, but in any case the message, (symbol) and organization need to connect with people’s identity, culture and understanding of the situation. This support can also be called the legitimacy of an institution.

The question is where to find sources for the almost a priori support of people. Parallel institutions can exist for various reasons. It entails case-specific history and causes, as well as various types of actors. A fourth element of influence in the continuation of parallelism is the way it is financed. Finance amongst others clarifies the ultimate goal or strategy of the governments (Van der Haar, 2009). However to continue its existence these goals, strategies or history must seem legitimate to other stakeholders, such as citizens, too. In the case of Kosovo, the most important money providers for the municipal governments are the central governments of Serbia and Kosovo. But also international monetary aid provides an opportunity for existence5. The budget of the central government of Kosovo is actually provided for the largest part by the international community. Finance is only one means a parallel institution needs to continue its existence and competition. Finance and other resources necessary resources including know-how, capacity and for example people (Bovens et.al., 2001)might point out the where the focus for legitimacy lays.

5 International aid is mostly given to the Kosovar institutions and far less to the Serbian supported institutions. 20

Parallel institutions symbolize different formats and polity (Van der Haar, 2009). But what appeals to people and more importantly why? Several aspects in the institutional organization causes people to connect and estimate its existence legitimate. This cannot only be found in politics, language or history, as mentioned in final remarks about ethnicity, but also in processes and actual actions of the institution. The OECD (2008:17) distinguishes four types of sources that legitimacy strategies are based upon. These sources are linked to the tasks of a government, or the fields of governance it is concerned with. As stated in the previous section, you might call it practices and capacity or legislation, jurisdiction and service delivery. The categorization of the OECD gives an overview of sources or domains that can be addressed when eyeing the continuation and competition in parallelism of one institution.

Domestic sources are: 1. Embedded (related to prior state formation or other historical dynamics); 2. Process (related to the way in which the organization operates, its governance procedures) and; 3. Performances (related to what the organization produces/yields). Or: 4. Legitimacy has an international source. The reason an institution is legitimate, is then related to international standards and contexts.

The sources that the OECD distinguishes and that the governments draw upon for legitimacy, I clearly recognized from the field data. It further structured my analysis of the legitimation strategies of the governments in Strpce/Shtërpcë in the field and in this writing. Legitimacy forms a red thread throughout this thesis. Many aspects in the governance of Strpce/Shtërpcë are connected to it. From following chapters it will become clear that the strive for legitimacy and the processes and the products of the government (the governance practices and governance capacity) mutually affect each other. Furthermore, some chapter pay most attention to one source of legitimacy, in other chapters another sources is more central. For instance in chapter four attention is paid to the history of the institutions, other historical dynamics and the international context it exists in; people connect their ethnic history to the history and context of the institution. In chapter five and six parts of the process legitimacy is elaborated on. The description about the practices of the municipal governments of Strpce/Shtërpcë in chapter seven concerns the performance legitimacy. The data in chapter five and seven show that the standards for output legitimacy increased and that civil societies slowly start to question the means used by the governments. With an increase in output legitimacy, the input legitimacy is now discussed.

2.1.1 Efficiency hypothesis Thus far I have been elaborating on parallelism, in the sense of two separated (but interacting) sets of institutions. There are two governmental institutions who seek legitimacy while the other constantly sets question marks with it. I cannot with certainty say how unusual such an organization of society is; for this more research is needed. My aim is to learn about how such system functions.

When questioning the functioning of parallelism, my first thought was about the organizational management. Can it possibly work? What I meant was, can it be efficient? What will the results be: two roads next to each other, two municipal buildings, two passports? Will there by two snow ploughs riding behind each other doing the same work, or will they split the work? Theory about the functioning of parallelism with a normative edge can be found in literature about corporations.

Organization literature about parallelism within corporations can provide us with an insight in possible aspects we could deter. For a company, parallelism was understood as being ‘inefficient’, causing ‘overlap and gaps’, wrong budget-allocation, and it ‘pinpoints responsibilities’ because blame and problem solving is difficult to allocate (Bendor, 1985). The general conclusion of business experts is that for every program there should only be one agency. If I translate that in governmental terms it would mean that a state and its society will not function well if there are more than one agencies doing the same job. Efficiency addresses first the functioning of parallelism in the sense of the functioning of two competing municipal governments. Secondly, it concerns the management of the institutions.

Herewith I want to refer to the sources of legitimacy again. I have chosen the categorization of sources as distinguished by the OECD (embedded, process, product, international). But there are of course other ways to distinguish differences in legitimacy. Svensson (2004) and Scharpf (1997) discern so-called ‘output and ‘input’ legitimacy. “Output legitimacy refers to questions of effectiveness and efficiency. Input legitimacy concerns the question of means, whether the steps taken towards some end are appropriate” (Svensson, 2004:1). However, I argue that it is not all about efficiency and capacity. In addition I presume that after a war citizens and perhaps also the governments pay most attention to the significance of the existence of a government, meanwhile try perhaps to question effectiveness and efficiency but do not really look at the means to reach the goal (Kuipers, 2003). I decided that input and output legitimacy are concepts that are better adjusted to stabile governance situations. What I noticed in the field myself was that actually embedded legitimacy can be recognized in nearly all conversations I had in Strpce/Shtërpcë about parallelism. At some point these conversations all addressed the history of Kosovo.

Without considering the context, history and without really looking at the practices bottom-up, I find it too soon to copy the conclusion about inefficiency of the state representing institutions. I agree with Boege et. al. (2009:17) who argue that it really is the question about what issues, who (actors, organization) and how people are included or excluded, that decides the defining of a functioning state. So the efficiency of a government (the management and product results) might not be the most important factor in the functioning of societal system. There are many stakeholders in the game and much more at stake than efficiency and effectiveness of the government. The symbolic value, the feeling of security and the identification that the government brings with it, should not be underestimated and might be as important for the functioning of society as the managerial efficiency is.

Actors involved in parallelism: ethnicity

Beside categorizing the main actors in parallelism in Kosovo according to type of institution, it is relevant to consider the actors having a role within and around the institutions to deepen our understanding of the impact of parallelism on people and the possibilities for the use of legitimation strategies. A government is at times perceived as if it were one actor. However, one institute is constructed by many actors. All of them combined make the image, provide a policy, that indicates that one institution as perceived by civilians. Moreover, others outside the local government or the direct citizens it exists for, influence policy making and implementation too. Hence, policy processes are multi-actor processes (e.g. Sørensen & Torfing, 2005).

In the case of Strpce/Shtërpcë, ethnicity plays an important role in the support and functioning of an institution. Whereas one institution in Strpce/Shtërpcë is only for Serbs (staff and target group), the other is mostly supported by Albanians, but offers employment to all ethnicities and target both groups in policies. How this is of influence in its functioning surfaces in the chapters about the local practices.

“Ethnicity has something to do with the classification of people and group relationships” (Erikson, 1993;4). In social anthropology it refers to aspects of relationships between groups which consider themselves, and are regarded by others, as being culturally distinctive from others – whether they are minorities or majorities. The groups and identities have developed in mutual contact. Including people to a group, means excluding others at the same time. Thinking based on ethnicity refers to Us and Them. Though, boundaries between groups can be blurred. Erikson (1993) concludes that ethnicity is thus an aspect of a relationship, not a property of a group. This last conclusion I think is very important for a situation like parallelism in Kosovo that is mostly based on ethnic divide. It illustrates on the one hand that ethnicity is not static, but dynamic and on the other hand it becomes clear that ethnicity is created in contact with others.

In line with Giddens’ structuration theory I argue that ethnicity is actually constructed consciously and unconsciously by repetition of acts. Today (2010), one might say that because of his or her ethnicity he/she ought to be supporting one particular institution. In fact this is not so rigid, as will also become clear when considering the empirical data. The municipal elections in Kosovo of 2009 illustrated for instance a movement in the supporters group of the competing sets of institutions.

The creation of ethnicity is not accomplished on an island, separated from others, not influenced by the environment. Instead ethnicity is created within a context of relationships with others. Ethnicity is part of the identity. I agree with constructivists who argue that “religion and ethnicity are very real social facts, but in ordinary times they are only one of several roles and identities that matter” (Oberschall, 2000:983). However in Kosovo ethnicity seems to be the first and foremost identity marker or role to fulfil. How come? Oberschall explains the impact of fear and insecurity. An ethnic group often shares language, culture, political or organisational aspects. Also, many groups have a same history, a story about one origin of all (Eriksen, 1993; Toft, 2003). In case of a threatening environment, like a state breakdown, a group tend to defend (forcefully) the characteristics they share.

Parallel institutions represent similar elements that people identify with. It proclaims and propagates these elements. It is the question what it does to an ethnic group when one is employed in an institution where Albanians and Serbs work together. They now build up for instance a shared history, that could be of influence in the definition of Us en Them. Parallel institutions are important on a political and material level (as seen in sections above), but also on a symbolic and identity level (where ethnic compliance plays an essential role) (Van der Haar, 2009)6. So, in the government institution’s strive for legitimacy the institution need to pay attention to ethnic group identity/identification factors. If the government institution want its actions to be perceived or assumed to be proper and desirable (Suchman, 1995), the institution needs to connect to different norm and belief systems of the different ethnic groups.

6 The paper was originally prepared for the ESF-LiU Conference about post-crisis state transformation; May 2009 in Sweden 23

One significant issue is the legitimate ownership of the territory based on historical heritage. This I will further explain in a next section that considers the framing of the territory and power over the territory as being indivisible. In the following section I continue about how symbolic meanings can influence governmental structures.

2.2 Indivisibility keeping parallelism alive Both parallel governmental institutions in Strpce/Shtërpcë claim to be the single legitimate ruler over the region. The motive behind the parallel institution might be something like wanting control over area because of its geographical strategic position, the undermining of a state, or the protection of religious heritage. But, the overall underlying approach to Kosovo’s territory is about indivisibility; it is about the believe that Kosovo is indivisible. It is about not wanting to share power over the territory that is considered most important for only your ethnic group. Several different parties are involved in the belief that Kosovo is indivisible. They have created a vicious circle of incompatible ideas of different parties that experience and interpret their disagreement as unavoidable and not repairable.

Indivisibility is a constructed image of a subject, whereby stakeholders approach the subject as a physical whole that cannot be split in parts without changing it profoundly. During negotiation processes, fueled by time and place significance (traditions and history), this image has grown. However as Goddard (2006) points out “one need not literally slice an object in half to divide it; one can also divide that issue by sharing ownership, or trading off possession” (38). This explanation shows that reality can appear to be unchangeable, rigid, but is nevertheless constructed and dynamic. The object of indivisibility for Serbs (in- and outside Kosovo) is the territory (the area of Serbia and Kosovo), but also the power over the territory. The power issue is also a problem for Albanian citizens of Kosovo. Kosovo Albanians consider Kosovo to be independent from Serbia (separated in power and territory – although possibly interacting and connecting) and do not see a reason to share power with the state of Serbia. Naturally, Kosovo Serbs - the few Serbian inhabitants of Kosovo- can participate in the governance of Kosovo when conform the rules of the autonomous Kosovo state. However, Kosovo Serbs consider the local government institutions representing the state of Serbia to be legitimate rulers too because Kosovo Serbs continue to consider Kosovo to be part of the bigger Serbian territory. So, indivisibility (the belief in undividable power and territory) forms one of the reasons that parallelism (two sets of competing government related institutions operating parallel to each other) exists in Kosovo.

2.2.1 Territory: an indivisible item? In the case of Kosovo, territory as a ‘romantic subject’ is part of the history of an ethnic group. Toft and Goddard both recognize that a specific object as a territory can be divisible as a quantifiable object, but at the same time indivisible as it is also a romantic subject. As a physical object it can be exploited, mined, or bought and sold. As a romantic subject though it causes one to imagine the borders to be fixed over a long period of time. The territory is thus treated as part of one’s identity (an “indivisible component of a group’s identity”(Toft, 2003;1)) and therefore it cannot be divided. The territory itself becomes believed to be indivisible. “And no matter how barren, no territory is worthless if it is a homeland” (Toft, 2003;1).

Toft (2003) distinguishes two norms generally shared by people that provide legitimacy to a sovereignty claim: the ‘homeland principle’ and the ‘majority rule’. The homeland principle fits the

24 embedded legitimacy strategy that is based on history or institutional development7. The homeland principle contains the idea that generations of a certain people have worked the land, have invested in the area and are therefore deeply rooted. People are historically attached to the ground. “The principle of tenure is based on the identity of the first people to inhabit a territory” (Toft, 2003;24). This is exactly a point of discussion that I found in Kosovo to be very important. The question was who inhabited the territory first and had therefore more right to have power. The homeland principle refert to history and can thereby be categorized under one of the general sources of legitimacy as distinguished by the OECD: the embedded legitimation.

The majority rule that is used as a way to legitimize a claim, emphasizes my idea that the support of people is important; in this case the numbers of supporters. Toft argues that when several parties claim the territory to be their homeland, the majority rule might decide whose claim is most legitimate. The general norm is that if one group comprises over fifty percent of the area’s population, this group should be entitled to govern (Toft, 2003;24). The exclusion from power for the largest ethnic group in the region, Albanians in Kosovo, was initially the reason to fight for the right of autonomy. However without zooming in on the region but when considering it to be part of a larger area, the ethnic ratio of the population changes. Serbs still consider Kosovo to be a province of Serbia. In this case Albanians turn out to be just a small percentage of the population and Serbs form the large majority. So, both Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs refer to the majority rule to legitimize their support for certain government institutions. The main focus in the claim for territory and in addition the power over the territory thus shifts to the homeland principle and history.

Serbs treat Kosovo as inseparable from Serbia, and they consider themselves as the legal rulers, even if it really is to be independent from Serbia. The flipside of the coin is that Albanians consider Kosovo as an independent country that cannot be sharing power now with a central or local manifestation of another government that does not recognize the unity of the state Kosovo. Considering the explanation in the section about parallelism and legitimacy it is only logical for one government not to recognize any other government that claims to govern the same state. Namely in the widespread belief in the nation state a government represents the states rules and the nation, and it governs in one vast territory. No territory is supposed to be for two governments to govern. Back to Kosovo in particular, Kosovo Serbs have a choice between relating to Serbia or to the system of independent Kosovo. Kosovo Albanians only refer the government based in Kosovo that enforces only Kosovar rule. They would never relate to Serbia’s structures. The debate following these separated opinions, related to the status question, is elaborated on in the next chapters. For now we can conclude that it is not the ‘indivisibility frame’ in particular, but the incompatible ideas of two groups of inhabitants of Kosovo that make life complicated.

2.2.2 Stuck negotiations There are three points I want to make about indivisibility. One is the fact that it is a construct, a frame and what this frame entails. I explained in the introduction of this section 2 the indivisibility frame as the approach of Serbs and Albanians of the territory (Kosovo/Serbia) as a physical whole that cannot be split in parts, not even the power over it, without changing it profoundly. The second point I want to make is about the background of the indivisibility frame. I explained a bit above the working of majority rule and the homeland principle. I further elaborate on this in chapter four that

7 Embedded legitimacy is a term used by the OECD that I explain in some paragraphs above. Embedded legitimacy is one category of the domestic source. 25 continues about the history of the region (state formation included). Thirdly, in the text below I want to stress the impact that indivisibility frame can have on daily interactions.

The indivisibility frame is not created by only rational choices about costs and benefits, as the word strategies might imply. As I pointed out in the text above about territory as a romantic subject, indivisibility is often created through feelings, emotions, or structures. “The use of rhetoric is deeply constrained by social and cultural context” of networks and institutions (Goddard, 2006:42). The actor’s decisions are (un)consciously influenced by for instance the history of institutions, the international law and support of other people. Goddard (2006) describes negotiation processes that make indivisibility a social fact. The belief then influences people’s interactions. Support for claims is created within the own circle of connections and a wider public enhances its legitimacy.

The goal during negotiations is convincing actors of the legitimacy of the claim. Strategies that create or sustain legitimacy can draw from different sources as I explained before. Examples of sources were the four distinguished by the OECD: embedded, processes, performances and international legitimation. When an object becomes indivisible (the object is believed not to be dividable in any way without changing), the actors involved in negotiations around the object are polarized in their positions and do not recognizing the legitimacy of each other’s claims. Besides, actors are locked into such positions that when they change strategies they believe to lose legitimacy over their claims (Goddard, 2006). This leads to negotiation failures. Both the claim (message) and the strategy (legitimation argument and way of sending the message) seem to be unchangeable. Over time the usage of the same strategies develop into structures, cultural boundaries, that makes indivisibility a social fact (Goddard, 2006). It seems definite and unavoidable.

It does not become very clear which actors Goddard aims for that are involved in these negotiations. I interpret it like she understands negotiation processes as official and diplomatic talk. This sort of negotiation is certainly important for understanding the development of frames in an ethnic divided society. Especially when considering the remark of Oberschall (2000:984/999) that elites, and important public figures (I think about Mayors) have considerable influence on the mindset of the grass-root level of ethnic groups in ex-Yugoslavia. Oberschall explicitly looked into the change of frames and how one frame could become legitimate again. However, negotiation processes do not only happen on such a high level of society. As I mentioned before: a government is constructed by many actors, not just a Mayor. Negotiations thus also take place on other levels and in other forms as written statements, formal and informal interactions, and everyday gossip (Hilhorst & Jansen, 2009/2010:127).

In everyday life of Strpce/Shtërpcë municipality this process of the indivisibility frame turning into a social fact can affect the results of the two competing governments who operate parallel to each other. It can also influence the way neighbors deal with each other. By unraveling the process leading and maintaining indivisibility (i.e. the use of history or strategies), it becomes clear that it is a construct created by people. The robustness of the indivisibility frame is linked to the form of a network: the density of links, the amount of nods and the centrality within the network of the person that calls upon a legitimacy strategy evolving in a frame (Goddard, 2006; Rhodes, 2007). Thus to deepen our understanding of the influence of indivisibility on local society (informal and formal interactions; social life and the governance) I have tried to identify some negotiation processes in practice. I thereby focused mostly on the legitimation strategies of both governments at the local

26 level in Strpce/Shtërpcë. The claims that are defended by both governments concern the existence of their own government. For both governments, the indivisibility frame (the indivisible territory and power over the territory) plays actually a role in defending the legitimacy of their existence.

The indivisibility frame is generated and modified by acts of the agents, who are at the same time restricted by structures that include indivisibility, but also other frames. Indivisibility has a self- continuing force, a process, that can set in at different bargaining tables at different governance levels (e.g. between presidents, Mayors, staff, staff and civilians, civilians). The network theory approach to indivisibility illustrates the processes behind indivisibility that have a hand in its continuation. If parallelism continues partly because of approaching the object Strpce/Shtërpcë in Kosovo as undividable, then it is of interest to see what happens at the negotiation table in place. It gives a deeper understanding of the practices that happen in Strpce/Shtërpcë. Moreover, it shows ways of avoiding or developing parallelism in a certain direction.

It is not only interesting to see though how these negotiation processes develop parallelism, but also to encounter niches in the frames and possible changes. The indivisibility frame is one sort of frame. Framing however is dynamic as is the organizational structure and management of the two sets of government institutions operating parallel to each other. Negotiation processes can explain the way indivisibility is framed, but it does not show what the development is. The slight shifts in frames are apparent from practices and the incongruity between what is said to be believed and what is actually done in practice. Arts and Buizer (2009) provide a clear analyzing scheme that is also based on network theory and illuminates shifts in frames. I will elaborate on it below, after clarifying the concept of frames a bit more.

2.3 Framing A frame is used and developed on a micro level, regarding individuals or certain groups. I will use the definition of Arts and Buizer (2009) as the basis for understanding a construct like indivisibility. According to the authors a frame “exists in the minds of people and in the social network of which they are part and is based on their experiences and history, of which they may be aware or unaware, but which in either circumstance influence how they speak and act” (Arts and Buizer, 2009:5). Pieces of information are captured in a frame and interpreted through the frame, and by this means an understanding of the world is created.

Because I search for an understanding of parallelism and the way the indivisibility frame is formed, I needed next to a description of practices an explanation of framing. Benford and Snow (2000) well explain framing: “Framing denotes an active processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction. It is active in the sense that something is being done, and processual in the sense of a dynamic, evolving process” (614). Framing as I understand it, is a process that provides the tool to form a clear notion of the world. The reality construct of one person, does not have to comply with everyone’s reality. When shared by a group the construct is referred to as a frame.

Many theories draw upon the concept of frame described by Goffman (1974). He described schemata of interpretation, later interpreted and referred to by others as frames, that enables individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large (Hajer, 2006:21). People share ideas, combine practices and interweave their interpretations into one story, told in a shared language, from which they interpret their new practices, judgments,

27 intentions and ideas (Dryzek, 2006). The general frame that is developed in turn, enables and constrains ideas and practices of the people that share it. It is at the same time structured (by framing) and structuring (power of the frame). Indivisibility is such a frame. It is thus maintained by people, but also influences their lives.

A frame is part of a larger, all embracing construct that is called discourse. Foucault was one of the first to theorize discourse in such a way. He argued that power was in the discourse; and discourse was the only power – conditioning norms and perceptions of actors. People did not have a choice besides acting according to the discourse (aware or unaware). People only communicate in terms of a discourse (Hajer, 2002), which is developed over time, slowly, historically (Fischer, 2003). Hajer’s definition explains it well. “Discourse is defined as an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given to phenomena. Meaning is thus produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices” (Hajer, 2006:67).

The extent to which discourses are all comprehensive, including power, culture or resource negotiations, and negating any human agency, has been much debated (Arts and Buizer, 2009; Dryzek, 2006). What’s more, relatively quick or radical changes cannot be explained well by followers of Foucault’s theory. It is a complex concept and I found that even the literature is not always clear about the conceptualization. Also, discourse and frame are repeatedly used as if interchangeable. However, I regard discourse as an overall, enormous system, which is difficult to grasp for an individual. To understand the reality better, frames are developed. Several frames can exists next to each other. One might be dominant or less hegemonic or even latent (Oberschall, 2000). Indivisibility is one of those frames, part of a larger discourse on for example governance.

Like a discourse, also frames are not so flexible. It is internalized and institutionalized. It thus sheds light on how indivisibility can become an issue that seems rigid and static. It developed reasons for and manner of communication applied in negotiations. The question in this thesis is how people deal with this constructed reality in practice. How do people act and react when sharing this indivisibility frame? At the local level, the competition between the two sets of institutions ask for legitimation strategies. The indivisibility frame plays a big role for the legitimacy of the parallel governments in Strpce/Shtërpcë. Change in the signification of the indivisibility frame would have its consequences for the legitimacy of the governments. So frames and legitimacy are much connected. Legitimacy of actions or of policies (i.e. parallelism), is obtained by framing the situation in a certain way.

Frames can be detected (by researchers) in discussions and other ways people communicate (Hajer, 2002; Schmidt, 2008; Dryzek, 2006). I argue that it is not only the communication that shows discourses. Communication is just one of people’s practices. It is also the description of the practices of people at everyday life level that makes it possible to detect a frame and to see how it is produced and reproduced. Moreover I would say that this information can be a basis to see developments in framing. The indivisibility frame and therefore the development of parallelism can be uncovered when looking at the practices, like the negotiation strategies inflicting indivisibility, but also other practices implemented by the parallel institutions.

2.3.1 Observing practices, detecting change The article ‘the manipulation of ethnicity: from ethnic cooperation to violence and war in Yugoslavia’, of Oberschall (2000) shows the possibility of a strong shift in frames. Oberschall illustrates how one frame that was supposed to have vanished, was only pushed to the background to resurface again in

28 a later period. The latent nationalistic and crisis frame was triggered by messages of atrocities and pushed away the frame of ethnic cooperation and peace for normal times. Groups became encapsulated; dialogue and understanding ceased (Oberschall, 2000:993). The framing of the development of the situation, and the related shift in dominance of frames caused a change in policies and institutional arrangements.

Like Oberschall and Goddard, Arts & Buizer also acknowledge the importance of relationships and networks in policy or institutional arrangements. They in fact distinguish four interrelated factors in society that a policy arrangement theoretically consists of, of which framing is one. Interrelated to frames, are the coalitions of actors (stakeholders), rules of the game and power relations. In line with Arts and Buizer I acknowledge the importance of discourse as well as concepts from institutional analysis theories. ‘Discursive institutionalism’ is namely an “approach that facilitates scrutiny of how (new) ideas, concepts and narrative structurally affect social and political processes and outcomes” (Arts and Buizer, 2009:7).

The political processes and outcomes I refer to in the case of Kosovo is parallelism: the existence of the completion between governments and their strive for legitimacy. Including a notion of coalitions of actors, rules of the game and power relations next to frames thus helps us understand more about the legitimation policies of the two parallel sets of competing institutions. The analytical difficulty in this is that all aspects are interrelated, also the four factors and the policy arrangement. Observing local practices will indicate a possible shift in frames. Part of these local practices is formed by policies. And also when there is change in ‘communication/words used to name a trend’, ‘coalitions of actors’, ‘rules of the game’ (the conceptualization and scope of laws, rule design, and control of compliance at national and/or international level) and ‘power relations’, it can indicate a shift in importance of a frame.

One policy arrangement can contain more than one discourse, which are possibly competing (Arts and Buizer, 2009:9). This competition and difference causes stakeholders in the policy arrangement to group together in coalitions. One coalition enhances one discourse and constrain the other. Rules put a boundary to what coalitions and what frames have a chance of existence. These three aspects affect power relations of which Arts and Buizer (2009;13) distinguish three types: decisional, discursive and regulatory. Decisional power refers to political influence at different levels and by different actors. Discursive power is comprehended as the capacity of the coalitions to (co) frame political discourses. The last sort of power, regulatory, refers of course to de capacity of the coalition to design and enforce private rules themselves. Although all three types of power are of interest in policy arrangement, my focus goes to the discursive power that concerns framing as this will tell us more about the opportunity for survival of the (indivisibility) frame I am interested in.

In this thesis I will analyze the data with these four concepts to render analytical insight into the mechanism behind change or stability in legitimacy strategies. That can indicate a possible change in framing. The dynamics are to be looked for in everyday life situations. The context of day to day life, macro socio-political developments, are not implicitly included in the concepts as explained by Arts and Buizer, but could have substantial influence. All in all considering the four aspects in the case of Strpce/Shtërpcë can again provide us with more information about the framing of local governments. It actually provides an explanation to why the governments are indeed legitimate.

2.4 Conclusion: What can theory about framing tell us about the functioning of parallelism? Let I retrace what has been said before continuing with a short remark on the functioning of parallelism from a theoretical perspective. Strpce/Shtërpcë is characterized by the existence of parallelism. This consists of two parallel sets of institutions, that both claim to be the only legal and legitimate ruler. The competition between the two parallel sets of institutions asks for legitimation strategies. Herein, people are the link to its legitimate existence. On the one hand people provide (financial) means, on the other hand, by giving support they influence the legitimacy. Legitimation strategies are much interwoven with the widespread indivisibility frame. Apart from looking into the reasons why precisely this indivisibility frame exists, it is important to understand the processes of framing. The indivisible frame now plays an important role in legitimating the sets of institutions. Shifts in frames will have consequences for the legitimacy of a government. By framing one can actually provide legitimacy for a claim. So by looking into framing, I hope to find a better understanding of the competition and existence of the two sets of governmental institutions in Strpce/Sthërpcë.

In theory, the indivisibility frame is greatly significant for the existence of parallelism in Strpce/Shtërpcë. The empirical data will tell us more about the significance of the frame in practice. Indivisibility is, in the case of Strpce/Shtërpcë, based on the belief in the indivisibility of territory and undividable power over the territory by different ethnic groups. It is a construct created by people and reproducing itself; a situation that is structured as well as structuring. History plays an important role in legitimizing this frame, but also international support plays a part in the legitimacy process. Through the practices and procedures of the parallel institutions and the acts and communication of the citizens, other frames than indivisibility might be detected.

So when considering local practices of parallel institutions, it is almost inescapable to consider indivisibility, but more importantly: it is the question what makes the notion of ‘not dividing power over a region nor acknowledging the importance of the territory for several ethnic groups beside yourself’, continue and is there room for change? What will that do to parallelism? Perhaps changes in the practices of parallelism show changes in the dominance of the underlying indivisibility frame? The underlying individual believes and collective discourses of people form the basis for indivisibility. The dynamics in the influencing structures and human agency interactions I will observe by considering the theory of Arts and Buizer. It provides at least a way to react on the efficiency hypothesis and I hope then to be able to say more about possible future scenarios for the parallel institutions.

3. Methods This research is a qualitative research. Interviews and observations were central to my research in the field. But also literature about Kosovo and about sociological/anthropological theories has been very important in constructing this thesis. I gathered information from different sources; data triangulation is necessary to develop a complete picture of the situation so far as possible (Angrosino, 2007; DeWalt and DeWalt, 2002). In this chapter I explain the methods I used and I present my reflections upon my work. I first reflect shortly upon the use of literature and other textual documents, then I elaborate on the case selection and the case itself, I elaborate on the interviewing and interviewees, also on participant observation and I end with reflecting on my own influence as a researcher and person.

3.1 Literature An extensive literature research in advance of the fieldwork and afterwards filled in gaps or gave new insights to interpret data. Previous to the data gathering in the field, I consulted literature about Kosovo in general and focused on some places (e.g. municipalities, cities, areas) in Kosovo in particular. It helped selecting the case and the people that were in potentially interesting positions for my research.

I have approached topics in this research from different scientific disciplines. I have used for instance political theory articles, but also books written from a communication perspective or articles written by researchers working in the sociological discipline. Data-triangulation and reaching over the boundaries of one discipline has the advantage of widening ones perspective while avoiding to stare oneself blind, or doing double work.

Apart from scientific literature, I contemplated policy documents, newspaper articles and project assignments of for instance USAID or the municipal government supported by Belgrade. If the governments had anything written down it was mostly in Albanian or Serbian, languages I do not know. It took too much time to get these papers translated. Not understanding the language was not too much of a loss as there were not many documents written by the government that were of value for me anyway. I build this conclusion on the fact that I asked several directors and assembly members who all said to have policy papers, but these papers were always ‘lost’. Directors or assembly members first had to search for them; the papers were never presented to me.

The information I gathered from policy papers and newspapers presented an international approach to the issues at hand. The policy papers stressed for instance the importance of a friendly environment for all ethnicities and related programs and budgets to a possible incorporation in the European Union. Another paper in Kosovo that was printed in English was the ‘Pristina Press’. News papers also show processes of framing and frames that exist. Back in the Netherlands I collected some larger background articles elaborating on the situation of Kosovo: the elections (where the new Serbian Mayor of Strpce/Shtërpcë was quoted), the retreat of Kosovo international military forces, the discussions about the International Court of Justice, and the expectations about the celebration for two years of independence. With this information I could for example judge for myself if the international community indeed send the wrong message to their home countries, of which they were accused of by some Serbs and Albanians.

3.2 Case and method selection In my search for the local opinions and practices, I settled down for three months in one municipality: Strpce/Shtërpcë. The answer to the research question can partly be found in the literature, but creating un understanding of the local practices cannot only come from reading texts. Moreover, the information to be found was not yet researched much and could not be found in already written texts, but had to be newly researched. The aim of the research to describe the right concepts and to understand the local situations called for qualitative research methods (Boeije, 2005:18). The empirical data I gathered through (partially participatory) observation and semi- structured, in-depth interviews.

As mentioned in the introduction, Strpce/Shtërcpë was carefully selected. I had been looking for a municipality with a mix of ethnicities. After a quick study of the municipalities that are influenced by ethnic relationships, I was introduced to Strpce/Stërcpcë by employees of the Serbian NGO Fractal. The majority of the municipality was Serb, the minority Albanian.

Strpce/Shtërpcë municipality met with many of the selection criteria I had put together for myself. For one, it was geographically situated relatively far from Serbia, surrounded by a pro-independence environment. Hypothetically for this municipality interactions with(in) its environment and ethnic relations would be a topic. In Strpce/Shtërpcë people of different ethnicities seemed to cooperate rather peacefully. This created a safe environment for me to do my research. Furthermore, it proposed some specific questions: ‘How was this relatively good relationship established?’ and ‘What had this cooperation to do with living in an area rather far from Serbia and surrounded by Kosovo Albanians?’.

Secondly, there seemed to be several opportunities to develop for the local people in economy or reconstruction terms. What was the role of the local government in this; did specific reconstruction programs exist? And lastly, of importance was the possibility of a good introduction to many villagers by a well-known and respected young man of one of Strpce/Shtërpcë’s villages: Milos Milovanovic. Milovanovic is born and raised in the nearby city Ferizaj/Urosevac, but fled during the war to family in Strpce/Shtërpcë. He knows Strpce/Shtërpcë very well. He spent his childhood racing the snowy mountains in the winter and playing in the summer holidays. His family is from this municipality. He was about 18 when the war ‘stopped’ in 1999 and he decided to work for the international organization OSCE. He later continued with a NGO on his own, after which he moved to Belgrade and started working for the NGO Fractal. He has been of quite some influence in the research. Not only has he helped me with contacts, he also reviewed my research results and verified my analyses. Milovanovic was there to dismiss any ‘gatekeeping obstacles’ as a place to stay, or disregard any suspicion of others (Angrosino, 2007). Due to my time restrictions of three months, it was necessary to find a municipality where I would be able to quickly settle and swiftly get to know many, and more importantly, the right people. I think I succeeded in this.

Strpce/Shtërpcë was a place where many (international) journalist or researchers had been, but still less than in other potential research cases. Its citizens were used to have internationals march through their village. (A KFOR base was close by.) However, the way I approached the municipality, staying for a few months, talking to all kinds of people, was totally new to them. Besides I tried to not only extract information to take it away to my home, but also to contribute to the society. I shared my point of view in the presentation in the village and at a media-conference for (international)

NGOs at the end of my stay. Also, with a network of scholars and practitioners of reconstruction and developmental work interested in the research, the information I assembled in the village was really to be used. I tried to not be a burden to the village, but if possible to be of help and at the same time not lose my neutral status in the status question (Angrosino, 2007;31).

3.3 Interviews and interviewees Opinions of people are not only about which answer is given, but also about which is not, and the reason behind this. I thus decided to realize in-depth interviews with people. This method paves the way to a more complete understanding of the reality for the people involved. One must remain careful though in generalizing the information presented in this thesis.

Semi-structured interviews are no strict question-lists, but also not done haphazardly. The first five to ten interviews were very open. I had some topics I wanted to address, but let the interviewee decide what was most important to tell me. From these interviews I extracted a few related issues that became my main topics on the interview list: infrastructure, youth, ethnic relations and the role of the local government in this. “Unlike open-ended interviews, which can roam rather freely around the area delineated by general research questions, the semi-structured interview sticks closely to the prearranged topic and features questions designed to elicit information specifically about that topic” (Angrosino, 2007:47). Naturally I asked the director of infrastructure different questions than the lawyer or a highschool girl. It depended on the person and situation what became the most important topic and which questions were relevant.

Infrastructure, youth and reconciliation were topics that came back many times. These topics form different aspects of a governments’ policy. Whereas infrastructure is tangible, reconciliation is not. Youth policies are ‘in between’. Youth is seen to be the future, and needs infrastructure and reconciliation or good communication. By choosing these subjects I represent aspects in life that were most important for inhabitants of Strpce/Shtërpcë and I have a nice overview of the very different tasks of a municipal government.

The aspects were clearly recognizable in interviews as my topics. While observing and participating in activities though, I held myself to these themes, but did not work them out in detailed topics that I could check. I rather went with the flow of the situation. Letting the situation lead me to my questions or observation points.

Research in the natural environment of people can provide a thorough understanding of people’s reality. It asks for certain skills of the researcher; for instance listening, knowing when to nod and hum, be silent, ask more, pose a new topic in an open question or knowing how to end the interview. My aim was to gather as much information as possible about their opinions. So I did not reject people’s opinion, but rather naively asked for more explanations although I personally did not agree with the interviewee. It was not my place to point this out, or give my own opinion. Sometimes I felt a conversation, dialogue, was more useful than a one way interview, so I did bring in my own reflections.

I interviewed over fifty people, each for approximately one hour. I managed to speak to mostly everyone I had put on my list. I have included an overview of people I interviewed in Annex 4. (The decision about whom to interview was mine, but it was the employee of NGO Fractal, Milovanovic, that helped me find these people. He put the names and peoples telephone numbers with the

33 positions. When sometimes someone would doubt about cooperating, mentioning Milos’ name was enough to convince them to participate in the interview.) The interviewees were people from all kinds of sectors in society (e.g. civil servants of all levels – the Mayors, Deputy Mayor, directors and staff, but also civil society, housewives and entrepreneurs), and of Serbian, Albanian and international origin. I thus interviewed employees of both local governments (Belgrade and Pristina supported). I also did an interview with a Deputy Mayor of a nearby city to see if I could detect the same opportunities and issues as in Strpce/Shtërpcë. The municipality of Ferizaj/Urosevac did not have to deal with parallelism and was pro-independent Kosovo. The city did not have to deal with competition over governance, but it still needed to convince its citizens of its legitimacy.

I interviewed a few more Serbs than Albanians. This is a logical consequence of living in a Serbian village and a total municipality where the majority in the municipality was Serb. I completed many interviews in Strpce/Shtërpcë village, at offices of the local governments, but also at cafés. The last was a usual place to talk. At all times interruption was common, either by telephones, friends saying hi, or officials/civilians having requests for the interviewee. It was ordinary business, but told me about how people dealt with each other. Moreover it did not influence the interview much as the interviewees were most of the time focused on the topic and knew where to continue without a reminder.

Interviewing Albanian people was sometimes more complicated as we would meet in Ferizaj/Urosevac, a first large city with an Albanian majority. Many of the employees of the Pristina supported government live there or wanted to meet there. This meant arranging a taxi in a nearby Albanian village to pick me up in Strpce/Shtërpcë village (Serbs were afraid to drive through Kosovo and therefore no taxi was to be found in the Serbian village). I thus tried to schedule several meetings in one afternoon/evening, together with the Albanian translator (after his working hours). The dependency on the other I did not like, but on the other hand, going rather late to those places provided me again with more information about the social and cultural lives of young Albanians.

To get a hold of international officials I travelled to Pristina, the main capital, where I stayed for a few days with some employees of the Dutch NGO Spark, who also shared their visions with me. It was good to be able to discuss findings with people from my own culture. It presented me my own way of thinking, but also the way it was influenced by the issues going on. It made it possible for me to distance myself again from my research object. And reflect on the information at hand and still missing.

Me and the village representative of the Albanian village Firaja/Firajë. He was also an officer for community return.

I accomplished the interviews with the help of two translators. The translators, as well as the expert that helped me, are respected young men. One is Serbian (23 years old), one is Albanian (27 years old). They were both going to University. The Serbian guy studied English in Mitrovica North, but was Serbian nationalistic. He was born and raised in Ferizaj/Urosevac and had fled with his family to Strpce/Shtërpcë that they already knew from family roots and summer holidays. He did not like to talk about that time or the future as it made him emotional. He saw himself part of ‘a lost generation’, grown up with the horrors of war and not having security about the future. The Albanian guy studies Law in Pristina, is the youngest of a large family of whom a few are residing in foreign countries and he works for the Pristina supported government in Strpce/Shtërpcë. Although he was positive about ethnicities working together, there was also some sort of lingering feeling of resentment or bitterness that surfaced in stories about discrimination and the like. He was born and raised in the municipality, in the exclusively Albanian village Firëjë/Firaja. The expert of NGO Fractal, Milos Milovanovic, did not have many contacts with potentially interesting Albanian interviewees. The Albanian translator was therefore not only needed for translation, but also for the organization of meetings and enlarging the network of potentially interesting Albanian interviewees. He turned out to be welcome in many offices of the Pristina supported government and so was I.

Working with translators was partly a disadvantage, but it has also provided me with extra information. The correct wording and thus message of the interviewee can be disputed, as the translator translated his mother tongue into a foreign language in his own way. Another would perhaps have chosen another word. The story the translator provided me with, I then translated in my own mother tongue. Translation is always subjective and in my research there were several moments of translation in one conversation.

To ensure I comprehended what had been said, I normally verified with the translator after the interview. Moreover, I asked if he really translated everything as had been said. But I think most importantly, I asked his opinion of the conversation. A language contains a lot of culture aspects I thus failed to recognize and needed clearing through more talking. And although a translator is supposed to do technical translations, it was important for me to know the translator’s stance, to understand his interpretation and thus the (subconsciously) chosen words for translation.

These conversations with the translators went passed discussing the content of the interviews. I also learned a lot from them. What did they think, what did they feel, and why for example did they not want to do what I asked them to do. For example: The Serbian young man was not eager to walk into the room of the elections. He was afraid he was watched by others (which he was) and did not want to be associated with this particular or any other municipal government (although he never stated it this harsh). There were even young man of his age that expressed their surprise seeing him there. He did not tell them whether he really voted or not. He tried not to rebuff anyone and be publicly neutral. By asking the translators for their opinion it not only minimized the chance for a wrong interpretation of interviews, it also provided me with a lot more information.

Apart from official interviews I of course also chatted more informally with people. These conversations also contained much information. These conversations were part of me being a participant observer, or perhaps I can better reframe this in: an observer who participated once in a while.

3.4 Observations The municipality consisted of 16 villages. Some of them far away, hidden in the mountains, with roads that were dangerous to drive in the winter. I lived in the most central and biggest Serbian village of the municipality. The village was only inhabited by Serbs. I didn’t have the opportunity to get the feeling of living in an Albanian village, living the Albanian life. Strpce/Shtërpcë was also where the central government building was situated. Albanians from other villages came to work there. For me it meant that I could easily walk down the street towards the government building or that I met people I wanted to speak with in the streets.

Strpce/Shtërpcë village housed the few dancing clubs of the municipality. It also features a few bars and cafés were Serbs and Albanians alike came down to drink a tea or some liquor. In these bars many business deals were made. It was here that I often held interviews, and regularly sat down watching people coming in and out.

I was able to drive to other villages, go to people’s houses, join their parties, go to church and watch how the village became overloaded with internationals during the elections, who left as quickly as they had suddenly appeared. I also went to the major Albanian village in the municipality to watch the procedures of the elections there. It turned out to be organized quite differently from the voting locations in Serbian villages. The results I discuss in chapter 5.

I had easier access to Serbian life than to Albanian life. I managed to see everyday life of young Albanian people by traveling with them to other municipalities. I also joined some in their parties in other municipalities where the majority was Albanian. I was almost always accompanied by the Albanian translator when going to Albanian places. He was always there to explain me things that were happening. In the Serbian villages I knew several people that spoke English or Spanish with whom I could communicate.

Here I was participating in one of the celebrations of the saint of the family

Angrosino (2007) states that: “participant observation is not itself a ‘method’ of research – it is the behavioral context out of which an ethnographer uses defined techniques to collect data” (p17). It is a “process of learning through exposure to or involvement in the day-to-day or routine activities of participants in the research setting”(In Angrosino (2007): schensul et al. 1999:91). DeWalt & DeWalt make these routine activities more explicit: “A researcher takes part in the daily activities, rituals, interactions and events of a group of people as one of the means to learning the explicit and tacit

36 aspects of their life routines and their culture” (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002:1). What do people articulate about themselves and what is felt, what is going on under the surface outside our awareness?

Whereas Angrosino approaches participant observation as a context, DeWalt & DeWalt do define it as a method alongside other qualitative methods like (semi)structured interviewing, observation, collection and analysis of texts (2002:2). They argue that actually all humans are in some way participants and observers. But in qualitative research this characteristic is consciously and systematically used to gain more information. It is not often used as the sole method in a research though. Rather, as I also experienced, it continues during the use of other methods, like interviews, too. This way, it certainly is a behavioral context.

When using participant observation the legitimacy of the researcher is crucial. The host place must agree to the presence of the observant among themselves relating not only to the person as a researcher but also as a friend or neighbor. The researcher must thus be acceptable as a person and fit in. I think I accomplished this rather well. Most people waved and said hi to me in the streets. I was invited in homes of several people. I made some friends, but was also welcome in working spheres in the governments.

By fitting in and being acceptable as a person, the researcher loses perhaps control over some elements of the research, but on the other hand can go into depth about other aspects (Angrosino, 2007). Some elements I lost control over were of course the language, but also in smaller details: I was dependent on others for a ride and I tried to fit their working hours. One thing from me that very much did not fit in the area, but was reasonably expected from a foreigner and researcher, was the fact that I met with Albanians and Serbs. And that I openly talked to people from both parallel systems. I tried by all means not to judge any of them or give my personal opinion about the legitimacy of one of the governments. When they really pushed me for an answer, I reflected upon the (non)functioning of service delivery – the garbage trash in the streets or the tax payment.

Several ways to be an observant can be distinguished (Angrosino, 2007; DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002). Whereas only a decade ago participant observation was still automatically assumed when doing qualitative research (‘t Hart et.al., 1996), there are levels of participation and observation. It is a continuum. I was engaged in some core activities, but refrained from total commitment to the groups values, although I of course adapted to their way of live. (I went out, but did not drink as much, though I did dance more; I also went partying with Albanian guys, something not many girls do). I had easier access to the lives of Serbs, with whom I celebrated their family saints. I had a more active membership of the Serbian culture, than of the Albanian one. With them I had more a peripheral membership. In both cases I shifted back and forth between being the researcher that had come to observe, to a participating friend that was also a researcher.

One particular method related to participant observation which I used was a critical event. Beside just hanging around to watch what was going on, I chose the elections of the Pristina supported government to follow in more closely, lead by the event. “Around a critical event –as specific event- practices materialize, different claims are acted out and governing capacity is established. It seeks to move beyond instrumentalist perspectives, taking due account of the role of power struggles and the complexities and contradictions of processes of change” (Nuijten, 2009:108-109). The elections were a typical critical event in that it was a particular, quite special occasion which set things in motion. It

37 asked for claiming, endorsing or contesting the present authority and shook institutional arrangements and normative frameworks. People had to be more clear in their statements. Differences, processes and trends surfaced. This I could only make out after about two months being in Strpce/Shtërpcë. Looking back it was a pity I started the fieldwork only three days before the elections. I did not really grasp the extent, the intensity and particularity of it yet. Although it did come later to me. On the other hand, I was still fresh, not influenced by other’s opinion and had the opportunity to ask about the elections in interviews later on.

3.5 The influence of the researcher To be a good observer, it is needed to first reflect upon yourself, as you are the tool to begin with (Angrosino, 2007). I had practiced being an observer before and knew my competences (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002). I had also studied for example basic books about open interviewing and being a (participating) observer8. During the three months I participated in Strcpe/Shtërpcë I also had the chance to reflect upon myself and even to discuss this with in- and outsiders of the municipality.

I lived in a rather small village and was noticed soon. My contact with people was watched closely. ‘Who was I interviewing?’, ‘with whom was I often seen?’ etc. Even my friends, girls from the age of 22, 23, were asked by relatives or other friends why they hang out with me. What did we do, what did I do? But everyone could be very open in answering the questions. I was very open to everyone about what I was doing here. I also asked permission myself from the participants and asked friends if they were still okay with my presence. I felt that in this case it would have been unethical to misrepresent my own identity or character of the research. We were all in it together. I was even pulled in by people to see their private places: homes, working spaces, things that made them proud etc. There was no reason for secrecy. I believe the openness was even better to stop any suspicion (suspicion was a common feeling in everyday life of Serbs and Albanians), be myself and therewith being perhaps a strange but accepted and interested, interesting outsider who did things her way.

In the text above I have indicated some factors that influenced the research, like the translators but also the environment and division in villages and ethnicities. In a qualitative research as I did, the researcher has also considerable influence in the course of information streams, and in the interpretation. To limit the subjectivity I discussed with others, the Serbian expert, and also the Albanian translator the results I found.

I also tried to limit the influence of my appearance and asked the translators to tell me if I was crossing any cultural boundaries. I could not change the fact that I was different of course. I was different in that I came from a Western country, traveled alone, studied at a University, did not have a husband or boyfriend and was a woman interested in a political subject. These were facts I tried to use in my advantage: playing naïve about what happened in Kosovo, being independent, flirting a little bit, but still trying to adapt. It not always worked out the way I wanted: Clothing for example was something I wanted to do right. I tried to draw as less attention as possible – wearing turtlenecks to be respected. After a while though I was commented on my style of clothing: it was so closed off!

Perhaps the fact that I was a woman also influenced the content of the interviews. Men were a bit more careful to talk about the horrible things they had experienced, but overall I think the language and cultural differences were of a bigger influence. It, no doubt, influenced the way I have

8 I read for example the book of Baarda et.al (1996), but also the book of DeWalt and DeWalt (2002) 38 interpreted the data. There is always an observer bias, but the naturalness of the setting contributed to the potential to yield new insights. A great advantage for me, a foreign student, as a researcher, was my neutral position. I could see point of views from both sides, Albanians and Serbs.

3.6 Data-analysis and validity After gathering all the information I searched the results for repetition and inconsistencies. Thereby selecting data and finding patterns (Angrosino, 2007:38). I coded parts of interviews and have picked out themes that repeatedly appeared in interviews to describe in this thesis. In some cases rather the single mentioning of a theme was surprising, but no less meaningful (e.g. the strong influence of the father on youth or the dismay about the way the rich owners of one café treated the regular costumer indicated social and cultural pattern). Moreover, it was often what was not said, that meant more than what was being said literally. All the results have been analyzed with the theoretical framework in mind, but also affected the theoretical framework and changed it.

“Ethnographic fieldworkers often become participant observers who balance the objective collection of data with the subjective insights that result from an ongoing association with the people whose lives they seek to understand (Angrosino, 2007:XV)”. This process in which I made use of the experience of others in the field - Serbs, Albanians and several internationals - to check my findings, makes the final results more valid and reliable. I cross-checked interviews with observations and observations or other results in interviews.

Qualitative research is not truly replicable. Nevertheless one can use a systematic fashion. I used the first open interviews to come up with new topics for later interviews. At one point nothing new came out of interviews, so I knew I more or less had reached a legitimate answer. It was reliable and valid. I could trust the observation, or conclusion I had made. It not relied on my bias, but was more than a subjective interpretation. However the external validity, or transferability, where the results from this research fit another case, is to be treated with caution. Each situation is different, all that this research does is describing one case. A new research of comparison is needed to know if it would fit other situations of parallelism. Though, as I stated in the introduction, this research does present some lessons to be learned for other cases.

3.7 Conclusions: what does the reflection on my research approach tell us? I did a qualitative research for which I lived for three months in one village and for which I did participant observation and interviews with many different people from inside and outside the municipality. I had help of an expert who knows the municipality well. I also participated in the daily life of Serbian and Albanian youth, which was probably only possible because of my Dutch background. I gained much information. However, the need of translators made it sometimes difficult to receive the right information. On the other hand I could use them for cross-checking my findings and because of the high amount of interviews with such a different people and the crosschecking I did in these interviews, I certainly think that this thesis contains a description of parallelism in Strcpe/Shtërpcë that is reasonably complete. Nonetheless, because of the specificity of the case and the concentration on just one case, one should be careful in generalizing the results of this research.

4. The status issue of Kosovo and the development of political structures and administration A short historical context for parallelism in Strpce/Shtërpcë

Kosovo has been part of conflict for ages. In the introduction I referred in short to the declaration of independence of 2008. In this chapter the status of Kosovo, the conflict and other historical aspects are described. A special aspect in Kosovo’s development into a state, is the international appearance and influence. This chapter is crucial for an analysis of the negotiations and practices of the local governments in Strpce/Shtërpcë, for it provides the surrounding context of the struggle on the local level.

The chapter does not ‘just’ sketch the background to which parallelism has developed, it also describes the application of some of the sources of legitimacy (OECD) that are important for the parallel institutions. To position themselves well in the competition, international influences and prior state relations or historical development (embedded legitimacy as defined by OECD) are referred to as the basis or source for legitimacy. After attending to the historical background of state formation in Kosovo, I focus on the structures of government institutions nowadays. Besides I consider in this chapter also a third source of legitimacy: the process. This refers to the organizational processes of a municipal government and governance procedures.

The history is described in the light of aspects that I selected from the interviews and literature and were perceived to be of crucial influence. Most important is the status issue that is part of the indivisibility frame and a tool, the myth, used to legitimate this. The mythical battle of 1389 against the Turks is part of the ‘evidence’ that is being used by Serbs to show the right to call Kosovo their homeland. Which relate in turn to the concept of indivisibility as described in the theoretical framework. More recently, Albanians developed their own mythical figures from the guerilla war against Serbia in 1998/1999. The international interference, about ten years ago, forms a second aspect in ordering history.

4.1 Kosovo’s status issue Kosovo’s independence, declared on 17 February 2008, is still a controversial subject. In contrast to the clear pro-independence statement of North-America, the European Union is still ambiguous in its stance. Five countries of the European Union do not recognize Kosovo’s independence: Spain, Cyprus, Greece, Romania and Slovakia. However, some travel and business agreements are being arranged, so documents from Kosovo are recognized (when convenient).

The international community did not address the status issue of Kosovo for a long time; not before the war in the eighties when protests against Serbs started and not for seven years since the end of the war in 1999. And although the government of Kosovo declared Kosovo to be independent, Kosovo is still perceived by many (at least by Serbs) as physically indivisible (from Serbia). Serbia does not let go of Kosovo. They do not recognize Kosovo’s independence, which is reflected in border issues, the support given to Serbs enhancing the Serbian governance structure in Kosovo and the fact that Belgrade went to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) questioning the right of Kosovo’s independence. Although in practical terms inhabitants of Kosovo (Albanians, Serbs and internationals alike) did not think turning back independence to a provincial status of Serbia was an option, they still wanted to know who was right and who wrong. The expectation was that the verdict would bring

40 the answer. But, very recently, in July 2010, the international court of justice did not judge the declaration of independence to be against the law. It did not judge earlier happenings, the war, or discrimination either. The court’s decision did not clarify who was right or wrong in moral, historical or ethical terms. It only showed that it was not against the law to call oneself independent. It would be the acknowledgement of this independence by other countries that would give it the opportunity to survive independently. However Albanians and Serbs hoped for an answer on questions like: ‘Are Serbs or Albanians right in their claims?’ or ‘Which set of parallel institutions that function in places as Strpce/Shtërpcë is right in its course?’. These questions were not judged by the court. I will not judge this either, but I try to shed light on the subject in the next paragraphs.

The origin of this status question lies within the history of the area. The difficulty lies in the fact that for approximately the entire past century, Serbian and Yugoslavian law indicated that Kosovo was a province of Serbia. However the legitimacy and even legality of this acts might be discussed. According to for instance the historian Malcolm (1998), Kosovo was taken in forcefully by the Serbs in 1912 during the first Balkan war. Only later, during Tito’s regime it was given the status of a province with actually almost all the same rights as the republics in the rest of Yugoslavia had. It became fairly autonomous, but did not have the constitution that was later required for independence from Yugoslavia as for instance Bosnia, Slovenia and Montenegro did (Malcolm, 1998).

After Tito died in 1980 it seems that also Kosovo wanted to go its own way, but Slobodan Milosevic decided otherwise. In the eighties Serb nationalism increased (Malcolm, 1998; Detrez, 1999; Bieber, 2002). Oberschall (2000) very clearly sketches changing frames in Yugoslavia, from ‘normality’ to ‘crisis’. The crisis frame legitimizes the nationalistic violence against other ethnicities. Oberschall shows the political use of ethnic sentiment by Milosevic and his people. Milosevic system abolished Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989. Next, Kosovo Albanians were excluded from civil servants jobs. Other Albanians boycotted the jobs out of protest. Repressive manners from Serbia increased; Kosovo Albanians reacted first by peaceful resistance. Led by Ibrahim Rugova, a provisory parallel society structure for Albanians regarding politics, health-care, media, education and for example cultural structures developed (Caplan, 1998; Detrez, 1999)9.

In 1996 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, and including Kosovo, was officially recognized by the international community. Indirectly, it was thought, that improved relations would contribute to solving the human rights issues. It did not and neither did any dialogues. Kosovo Albanians began to lose faith in the peaceful strategy of Ibrahim Rugova (Caplan, 1998). Instead the support for the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), with guerilla strategies, increased. Everywhere in the country police officers and Serbian leaders were attacked (Malcolm, 1998).

The conflict had been smoldering for a long while, during which the international community did not implement more serious measures than partly boycotting products. One important reason for not undertaking strong measures was that Serbia was a major power between West and East, and Kosovo its province. After the violent war in Bosnia (1992-1995) though, international agencies

9 In interviews in Strpce/Shtërpcë Serbs would always argue that Albanians could join all public institutions, they just didn’t. This is in contrast to what historians state. Kosovo Serbs did not seem to (want to) recognize the unfair, unequal or distorted power distribution in times of Milosevic. Rather they expressed their fear to be outnumbered and lose their homeland. Discrimination was everywhere. It happened of course in this context that Albanians left jobs themselves, or boycotted Serbian public live, as some Serbs would argue. 41 exposed connections between war-criminals in Bosnia and (ethnic) crimes against human beings in Kosovo. A second ‘Bosnia’ was to be avoided. An important development for this cause was that the conflict in Kosovo was framed differently. The boundary of ‘internal conflict’ was crossed when it enhanced violation of the International Humanitarian Law (Caplan, 1998). Framing it as an observable offend against the international law, the international community was given the right to have an opinion about the case and act on it. Soon after the rejection by Milosevic (and approval by the KLA)of a list of requirements, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interfered forcefully, starting on the 24th of March 1999, with 11 weeks of severe bombing. It took much longer than foreseen plus the prospect of ground forces, that made Milosevic surrender (Robberts, 1999). It did not solve the status question though. Kosovo continued to be a province of Serbia for eight more years, but under the command of the UN. This recent history in which the international community became to play a large role, is discussed later in this chapter.

4.1.1 The mythical battle How far back in history do you go to validate your cause? In the theoretical chapter I have already mentioned the ‘homeland’ principle. Generations of people have cared for the land and made it a romantic subject, bordered, indivisible. While making an overview of the literature and the interviews done in Strpce/Shtërpcë the amount of references made to the past, the large usage and importance of history, struck me. In Kosovo people of different ethnicities lived as neighbors, but never together (in contradiction to Bosnia, in Kosovo interethnic marriage is rare). I argue that history is consciously being used by a few people as a trump-card in framing ethnicities; explaining one ‘Self’, the ‘Other’ and their relationship. It is also influential in constructing a version of the reality of ethnic groups, which thus differs for (Kosovo) Serbs and (Kosovo) Albanians10. It illustrates the theory that ethnicity is not only primordial, but actually constructed (Eriksen, 1993). Part of constructing ethnicity is done consciously and part is done unconsciously, by repetition of acts. Moreover, the construct ethnicity, is constructed but also structuring. The difference in viewpoints on reality is kept in place and has a big impact on negotiations about Kosovo and government perspectives.

For inhabitants of Kosovo and Serbia the status question, or actually the claim for territory, is explained from the point of history going back centuries. From the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century, when ethnicities became the focus point, also the right for territory increased in importance. Apart from discussing who is living the longest in Kosovo or for whom the ground is more sacred, particular historical events are pointed at to legitimize claims. These historical events gained importance and attention in the increase of nationalism. The battle in 1389 about conquering Kosovo at the field ‘Kosovo Polje’ played such a role.

In the Ottoman empire and before, different peoples have always existed alongside each other in the region, but not together. Albanians declare that they are the descendents of the Illyrians and were actually in the Balkan area long before the Slavic people came conquering the Balkans (Malcolm, 1998). Serbs argue they were the first inhabitants, proved by the historic cultural heritage (e.g. of monasteries)11. It is here in Kosovo that the Orthodox Church began to grow and important kings ruled before being chased away by Turks. All ethnicities agree on this 500 years of Ottoman

10 See also the explanation of the creation of frames by Oberschall (2000) 11 In Strpce/Shtërpcë Serbian correspondents would even argue that Albanians did not have any culture (recognizable in the number historical relics). Some Mosques would even have been Churches before. 42 oppression, although there are different stories on how they were defeated and who fought hardest against them.

In 1389 Christian armies led by the Serbian Knez Lazar Hreblejanovic fought against the Ottoman armies under the leadership of Sultan Murat (Malcolm, 1998). What happened exactly those days has been hard to discover by historians. Nevertheless, or perhaps because of the fogginess around the past reality, a story, a myth, was born that explained the martyrdom of Serbs, their courageous fighting, and the wrong intentions of Albanians. Albanians, who are also Muslims, would have sided with the Muslim enemy, the Turks. Lazar was by then (1370) the most powerful of Serb rulers and with a leading role in sponsoring the church. He and his army fought an intense fight to keep them out, to defend their country and freedom, but were outnumbered and overpowered. He is assumed to have been murdered in an attempt to kill the Sultan. Historians however have not discovered the right numbers of the armies, nor the murderer of Sultan Murat, and not even who’s victory, Serbs or Turks, it was. Likely is that the great martyr Lazar just died in the battle and that another Serbian commander surrendered. Also probable is that part of the Serbian army consisted of Albanians. Perhaps some Albanians also fought for the Turks, but they had just been conquered themselves. The alliance of Albanians with Turks was later constructed as part of the myth. What is sure is that both Lazar and Murat died in the battle, Turks were left with the possession of the field and that the son of Lazar under the guidance of his mother later became a Turkisch vassal (Malcolm, 1998:58-80). Whatever historians might say, the first story has grown to mythical proportions from 1900 onwards and is not likely to be changed. It now serves to ground the righteousness of the territorial claim of Kosovo by Serbs (Bieber, 2002).

As Bieber (2002) well remarks, the content and the instrumentality of the myth should be distinguished. Historical facts are apparently not that important. According to Bieber it is about the interpretation of these facts. Bieber: “Myths are an essential element in such a nationalist conception of time, eliminating the historical separation between past and present by contemporizing the past or historicizing the present” (2002;97-98). The myth is made into an instrument used by certain agents, starting and fueling the discourse of Serbs suffering for their territory. (Once started to be framed in a certain way, the reproduction and modification of a frame becomes a more self-continuous process through the conscious and unconscious acts of agents12.)

The way the myth is used, how it is explained exactly, has changed over time. The commemoration of the myth only acquired political significance at the end of the nineteenth century (Bieber, 2002). When it weakened, the Serbian Orthodox Church kept it living, until it revived in 1981 after protests of Kosovo Albanians that were interpreted in political terms. Albanian citizens wanted Kosovo to gain the status of a republic. It was seen as a challenge to the post-Tito Yugoslav where Serbs were negotiating for a central role. The myth now not only supported the claim of Serbs on the Kosovo territory, it also depicted treason and heroism that could now be attached to individuals or groups of today. It shaped an interpretation of facts that was overruling every opposition, turning into a strong hegemonic discourse (Bieber, 2002). Protests or criticism were explained in terms of the symbols present in the same myth they opposed.

The myth became significant again when conflict in Kosovo erupted, comparing the present times to the mythical battle. The victimhood portrayed by the myth of more than 600 years ago, fueled

12 See the paragraph about framing in the theoretical chapter for a more extended explanation 43 nationalism and aggression (Bieber, 2002). Resentment is still lingering, but seems to have lost in ferocity. More players from outside the area, not aware or accustomed to the language of the myth, have become important in negotiations about Kosovo, taking with them their own frames. At central places though, you get reminded of the hero. When opening the door to the secondary school in Strpce/Shtërpcë, in January 2010, I was for instance, immediately confronted with the portrait of the legendary martyr, Lazar, that was hanging in the corridor in the direct opposite of the main entrance.

In contrast, the portraits of heroes hanging on the wall in Albanian living rooms are leaders or martyrs of the Kosovo Liberation Army during late nineties. The battle about Kosovo Polje is not a big issue in Albanian search for legitimacy. It is more the idea of the being the first who inhabited the region and where then faced with oppressor after oppressor to the Serbs as the latest conquerors of Kosovo. The resemblance with the instrumental use of the myth is that the central question that would point out the legitimate ruler has almost become: who is the most unfortunate peoples?

4.2 Reconstruction and international interference Kosovo has long been an area that was relatively underdeveloped as compared to the rest of Yugoslavia. In the past ten years the area has become to the centre of attention from the international community. Kosovo is perceived to be in a transitory state of being13. After the war many international agencies flew in to reconstruct Kosovo’s society. The UN have been involved in setting up a new fairly autonomous government, that would govern Kosovo (officially permitted by the UN Security Council under the resolution 1244, 10 June 1999). They named the new government the Self-government, not being independent, but autonomous. In this section I will address the recent history and influence of the international community as a follow up and deepening text of the status question.

The concept ‘reconstruction’ has some sixty years of history, starting after World War II, showing a variety of approaches. Nowadays, disciplines still address reconstruction differently. The World Bank or the United Nations place the focus on different processes, one is concerned with the economics, the other more with politics. Barakat (2005) defines reconstruction encompassing the total variety, which is well applicable to Kosovo addressing the total change in society because of the war. Thus, “[reconstruction is]a range of holistic activities in an integrated process designed not only to reactivate economic and social development but at the same time to create a peaceful environment that will prevent a relapse into violence. In this sense, reconstruction can be distinguished for its corrective dimension in righting wrongs and addressing vulnerabilities, while maintaining the focus on the future” (11). This definition implies that peace-building and reconstruction are two sides of the same coin. Moreover it recognizes the necessity to face underlying factors of conflict.

Development in post-conflict areas is utterly complex, because all facets in a society are influenced by the conflict. Especially the destruction of social relationships and trust in one another proves to be far reaching. This destruction is not only difficult to reverse, but could also undermine projects directed towards the economy, or technical, political, security or humanitarian issues (Barakat, 2005). The reconstruction practices implemented by the international community after the war in Kosovo were very diverse, directed mostly towards the technical aspects of reconstruction, leaving the underlying issues to the original conflict often unaddressed. Some argued in interviews that it

13 Interviews internationals (officials of ECLO, US-Ambassy and EULEX, Albanians (e.g. official of the local government of Strpce/Shtërpcë supported by Pristina and Serbs) 44 even widened the gap between ethnicities as they were purposely separated for security reasons; practically, as to not let them shoot each other (interviews with a Serbian official of NGO Fractal and Albanian official of NGO Community Building Mitrovica). Addressing the underlying factors of the conflict in Kosovo, such as the knowledge gap of one ethnicity about the other, has proved to be difficult and half-heartedly done (interview with an official USAID).

The military intervention of the NATO in response to the conflict in Kosovo in 1998-1999 was explained from a humanitarian perspective, but was nevertheless very destructive. The humanitarian goal also required the international community to come up with a follow up plan for the area after the bombing. “The United Nations Security Council issued its Resolution 1244, authorizing, the deployment of both an international civil (United National Mission Interim-administration Kosovo (UNMIK)) and a military (Kosovo Forces (KFOR)) presence in Kosovo” (Bernabéu, 2007:73). The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established on 10 June 1999. At first the underlying reasons for conflict were not faced; the status question had to disappear to the background as long as the stability was questioned, before it could return to the agenda again: ‘standards’ before ‘status’. While arguing that democratization of Kosovo was on the top of the agenda, the actual main priority was found to be tackling the security issue. A UN-led political process to determine Kosovo's future status only seriously began late 2005 (Bernabéu, 2007).

This actual prioritization had its consequences on the practical forming of the local government and perception of Kosovo’s people on this local government. The international governance of Kosovo (UNMIK) was divided in four sectors, so called pillars. The first two pillars were the responsibility of the UN: pillar 1 ‘the civil administration’ and pillar 2 ‘law enforcement and justice’. The civil administration was responsible for maintaining law and order. KFOR however was mandated to protect and secure the area. This was the first thing to be done after the war. OSCE was responsible for pillar 3 ‘democratization and institution building’ and the European Union for pillar 4 ‘economic reconstruction’ (Bernabéu, 2007). The power of the so called ‘autonomous’ Self-Government could be doubted considering the structure of the UN interim mission in Kosovo. Not only did KFOR have a leading role, the final executive authority of all policies was in the hands of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG of the UN).

At every state level, in all municipalities, UNMIK representatives supervised. (The government structure can be seen in annex 3.) “UNMIK ruled like a king”, an Assembly member of those days in Strpce/Shtërpcë said. The supervision was not done in a transparent way (interview with an official of USAID, who was Albanian and worked already in the war for the humanitarian sector).

The influence of the international community on all sectors in society and governance is noticeable in its practices (many internationals were experts and advisors on government levels), but interesting were also the rumors surrounding it. A rumor circling around during the time of the municipal elections end 2009, addressed the consultancy role of the US Embassy to the government. Even now that Kosovo was to be independent, the government would have been deeply affected by one phone call of the US Embassy that warned them that splitting up of the coalition after a fierce dispute within the government was not an option (interviews with citizens of Strpce/Shtërpcë, official of KIPRED; newspaper stories)14. This exemplified the ideas about the advice giving of the international

14 I brought it up in interviews with officials of the embassy and other international institutions, that neither rejected nor confirmed, but rather explained about their advising role solely. 45 community: it was very powerful and seemed too steering for the Kosovo government to be really autonomous.

The fact that the independence is conditional, supports the doubt about the authority of the government. The government of Kosovo is in principal autonomous, but monitored strictly by the international community, that still holds the highest power. Moreover, KFOR, an international force, still is the biggest force on this behalf. When a state is independent and completely autonomous, the security role of a state should legitimately, in theory, be in the hands of the government of this state15. KFOR thus limits the power of the government, and perhaps undermines its legitimacy.

Subsequently to independence, UNMIK made room for the International Civilian Office (ICO), that is mandated by countries that recognize Kosovo as being an independent state. They engage in the surveillance of the implementation of the demands that originated from the international community (Deimel and García Schmidt, 2009). ICO had a mandate of two years that would end spring 2010, but by that time the mission was prolonged with two more years.

Some of the countries represented in the ICO are also represented in the European Union mission. The EU is the largest donor in Kosovo; organizing many tenders for all sorts of projects. They were many times the source of a large chain of NGOs. The final goal of the EU is developing Kosovo to the right level for future joining with the EU. Kosovo is on the lowest step of the ladder that leads to EU membership (Interview with an official of European Commission Liaison Office (ECLO)). Since five countries of the EU still do not recognize Kosovo’s independence, the significance of the presence of the EU is quite confusing.

ICO head Pieter Feith who is at the same time the EU Special Representative, has complete executive powers, but has not intervened yet. He claims a ‘hands off’ approach and the strategy used is that of the ‘carrot and the stick’. Julia Rueter, spokeswoman of the EUSR, explained that they see Kosovo as a wobbly toddler that is learning to walk at the hands of a grown-up, whereby it sometimes stumbles. Officers of EU, of ICO, EUSR office and US embassy all explained that “the Kosovo central government should do the job [and we, the international community] was only there to advise”. This situation creates indignation with local people as they reason that if the international community knows how to deal with problems, they could solve them as well. So, although the international community is there to help or advise so to say, therewith legitimizing the course of an independent Kosovo, its presence also makes the powers of the Government of Kosovo remaining contested. Legitimacy is developed from an international source (which can still be much debated because of the refusal of five European Union countries to recognize the independence). Legitimacy is, however, contested from a processual point of view.

4.3 Government organization structures Instructed by the international community, Martti Athisaari negotiated with officials of the Serbian government in Belgrado and representatives of Kosovo, for a settlement in the status issue. The talks started in February 2006 after the completion of a comprehensive review in October 2005. The question was how all ethnic parties, Serbs and Albanians, would be best satisfied, therewith avoiding a new explosion of violence. The prevention of Kosovo becoming a mono-ethnic state became a priority on the agenda of the international administration (Simonsen, 2004). Simonsen, working at

15 For further explanation see the previous chapter 46 the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo stated that “the war was justified as a response to emerging ethnic cleansing, and unless the reverse cleansing is corrected, the mission will be deemed a failure” (2004:295). Ethnicity became an important subject. Terms like minority and majority were for example avoided to keep everyone pleased and ethnic groups were called communities. Everything was named in such ways that a stalemate situation about the status issue could be avoided.

Decentralization was brought forth by Western experts as a solution for the tension due to ethnic divide in society. Decentralization of the local government would be a means to empower the (Serbian) minorities and safeguard cultural heritages. Serbs interpreted the plan as a step towards independence and therefore rejected it. For Kosovo Albanians the past violence made anything else but independence impossible. But if such autonomy was only possible when respecting the plan of Ahtisaari, they would do so. On 17 February 2008 after years of negotiations the Government of Kosovo declared its independence, thereby basing its constitution on the plan of Athisaari.

4.3.1 Decentralization Decentralization has become a concept the part of the international community believes in. The belief is that decentralization is the main instrument for good governance. It has become a means for the divided Kosovar society to stabilize the situation. But decentralization is therefore more than a technical means to ensure the multicultural society the international community would like to see. In the case of Kosovo I consider decentralization a frame.

The dictionary explains decentralization as the attempt to different autonomous institutions at place instead of one central institution (Koenen woordenboek Nederlands, 1999). With regards to central institutions that already existed, decentralization thus means to decentralize resources such as power and skills. It means to transfer power from the central level to the local, municipal level (Klem and Frerks, 2008:59). The local government is supposed to be closer to its citizens than a central government and would therefore know better what citizens want (Ribot, 2001; Crook, 2003). Decentralization in Kosovo differs from this general academic theory and its framing (that refers to decentralization as transferring power and competences from the central level to the local level) and concerns more the plain explanation in the dictionary. Thus far decentralization in Kosovo has practically meant setting up new municipalities (Law on Self Government 2008, Law Nr. 03/L-040; interview with an official of VNG international working on the European Union Local Government Project). First new territorial boundaries are created and then second, new power structures should arise. All that citizens of Kosovo have seen so far, is the creation of new municipalities and thereby the redistribution of power to small communities that overall form minorities in the country. Decentralization in Kosovo, I conclude, is in general designed to secure minority rights. Concerning these new communities more research is needed to see if power is really decentralized or that it just consists of building just another government delegation.

ICO has a central role in the implementation of decentralization in Kosovo. So called ‘Municipal Preparation Teams’ (MPTs) were set up by ICO in cooperation with the Ministry of Local Government Administration (MLGA), to build the structures of such a new municipality. MPTs are part of the government system as supported by Pristina. Officially the MLGA hired the employees, whereas ICO and third international organizations provided knowledge and support. The program Effective Municipalities Initiative (EMI) (USAID funded) train the new assembly members (MPT job description;

47 interview ICO official). Some Serbian team members of the multi-ethnic MPTs were threatened by other Serbs. The aggressor was against Serbs participating in the Kosovar structures, because according to him it meant the same as acknowledging the declaration of independence (interview with MPT members of Partes/Parteš and Ranillug/Ranilug ). The MPT members were to clarify the needs of a new municipality and to prepare potential Assembly members.

Just before the last elections (2009) five new municipalities were created. These new municipalities, and former enclaves are Gracanicë/Gračanica, Kllokot-Vërboc/Klokot-Vrbovac, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica North, Partes/Parteš, Ranillug/Ranilug and Novobërdë/Novo Brdo Brdo. In most cases parts of bigger municipalities separated from their ‘mother’ municipality to form a new municipality. This act changed the ethnic representation of the municipality. In the new municipality, when separated from the mother municipality, Serbs for instance became the majority and Albanians now were a minority.

The new municipalities and three already existing municipalities with a Serbian majority get so-called ‘enhanced municipal competences’, which forms part of the decentralization. According to the law on local government the top-down power distribution consists of the responsibility for culture(religious and cultural heritage) and the election of the chief of police. (The exact paragraph of the law on local government on decentralization can be read in annex 1.) Next to the general extra competences that all seven municipalities get, just three, including Strpce/Shtërpcë, are allowed to provide in secondary health care. At last, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica North also has the permission for its own university (higher education). The implementation of these competences are controlled by the central government (Law on Local Government Art. 19-24).

It still needs to be seen if the central government can really let go of its power over in these sectors, health, culture and education. The research director of the Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED), noted that “decentralization in the institutional system might be put into place, but decentralization in the political parties will need a long time yet… the leaders at the top will still be in power”. Questioning the range of decentralization is a consequence of living with a tradition of a leadership culture, where civilians do not participate much, but directly follow the leaders orders (Malcolm, 1998).

Apart from the extra competences that some local governments get, the list of competences ascribed to the local government is already large. In practice though, while the central government might claim to support the local level, the overall attitude of the central government, according to several interviewees from international agencies as well as Kosovo’s population, is actually to direct as much as possible. It is also mirrored in the incredible amount of people and time spent in controlling the local governments. Agents of the Ministry of Local Government Administration (MLGA) go to every municipal meeting, ask for their minutes and atop of that make their own record of the meetings (interview with the consultant at MLGA). Another example is that all municipalities need to let their budget plans be approved by the ministry of Finance. Also for other project plans the directors need to get permission from the ministries. Even a permission from the central government was needed for fixing a window of a school (Albanian school) (interview deputy director infrastructure Strpce/Shtërpcë; interview employee Kipred). Those examples illustrate the reluctance of the central government to give up their power. The power of the central level is still far reaching.

Last, based upon the Athisaari plan, other governments are allowed to provide support to specific municipalities, as long as this goes through the Kosovo government. Decentralization as is

48 determined in Kosovo offers the opportunity for local governments to get their financial means from all over the world. This rule makes it possible for other countries to legally support municipalities with ethnic majority with roots in those countries. It should also make some control by Pristina possible, as officially permission is needed from central Kosovar level.

Special fund providing institutions are the Turkish and Serbian governments. Until now the support mainly happened without the consent of Pristina. Especially the Serbian government does not recognize that there is a central power in Pristina and does not cooperate with the system based on the Athisaari plan. These foreign government provide support to parallel institutions that are not part of the Kosovar institutions as supported by Pristina. The countries have direct ties with municipalities/villages were the majority resembles the countries’ major ethnicity. They provide a ground and means for existence for the institutions competing with the Kosovar system as supported by Pristina.

Decentralization in Kosovo has still a long way to go. The extra competences have been a focus in the election campaigns of 2009 in the seven municipalities with another ethnic majority than Albanians. It was tried to legitimize the Kosovo institutions as supported by Pristina on the basis of its processes. But the implementation of decentralization only started in 2009, and needs to be developed further.

4.3.2 Government structures as supported by UNMIK, Pristina and Belgrade The majority of Kosovo knows government structures as supported by Pristina. In the north of Kosovo, and in several cities or villages scattered throughout the south, also parallel governmental institutions operate. In these places Serbs form the majority (and in one municipality Turks are the majority). Also in cases of a municipality with all Albanian citizens except for one village Serbian governmental structures exist too (for example Velika Hoc).

Similar to every partly Serbian municipality Strpce/Shtërpcë has two municipal governments. Although I will not go into detail about the situation in Strpce/Shtërpcë here, I will already explain the general terms for the two governments that will come back throughout this thesis. The local competing governmental institutions that run parallel to each other have similar organizational structures. One local (municipal) government (LG) is formed consistent to Kosovo law and is supported by Pristina. I will be referring to these institutions as the Pristina supported municipal structures or institutions. The other municipal government is supported by Belgrade and does not recognize the independence of Kosovo, nor works with Pristina. Only Serbs work in this institution and it (mostly) takes care of the Serbian citizens of Kosovo. This local level government I refer to as the Belgrade supported municipal government, institutions or structures.

The municipal government as similarly structured as the government of Serbia and supported by Belgrade is by Pristina and most of the international community usually referred to as the ‘so-called parallel government’. However, when I used this concept ‘so-called parallel government’ in talking to Serbian inhabitants of Strpce/Shtërpcë it created huge misunderstandings, to the point that we could only stare at each other for misinterpreting the other one. We would both be talking about another government, or the other did not recognize a parallel system. In their opinion (most of the time Serbs) there was only one legally existing government, and one that was not really competing. The second government was either false (stated Albanians about the Belgrade supported structures) or it was not for interesting for them (did some Serbs state about the Pristina supported government). It was in both cases not experienced as being parallel. The term parallel itself does not imply hierarchy,

49 but in Kosovo with relation to the government it apparently has a hierarchical connotation. It probably has to do with our understanding of a nation state where one government rules in a certain territory. Two governments in the same territory would than automatically undermine the nation state. The term ‘the parallel government’ thus implies a judgment, which I am not willing to give. Who am I to say which one was first, is legal, or is the ‘real’ local government and which one is parallel? Are they not both functioning parallel to each other? I will therefore try to avoid that term, for any of the two institutions, and conclude that I only observe the existence of a parallel system.

The municipal government as supported by Pristina or supported by Belgrade are similar in organizational structures. Because by far most municipalities govern according to the new Kosovar structures (2008) in Kosovo, I will only elaborate on this new system. The difference in functioning between the two governments will be clarified in the chapters about Strpce/Shtërpcë where I will elaborate in depth on this local government too.

The Kosovo government structures are more or less the ones that UNMIK set up in 2000. UNMIK based their construction of a Self-government for Kosovo on already present structures from Serbian (Yugoslav) rule. The municipality borders continued to be similar, as well as the governmental departments (with a few additions in the latter). Other factors changed. Set up from ‘scratch’ were the voting procedures, a party system, ministries etc. A civil administration started anew; institutions were rebuilt, though the achievement of democracy remained ambiguous. In 2007, approximately seven years after the start of UNMIK, it was still argued that “despite the fact that it has a democratically elected assembly and government, Kosovo is not yet fully democratic, to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers [KFOR, UNMIK and the SRSG] are not selected through fair and periodic elections…” (Bernabéu 2007;75-76).

Also the employees changed. The fact that Kosovo Albanian civil servants had been fired early 1990s, and that many of the Serbian civil servants had left the area after the bombing of Serbian targets in 1999, asked for a new staff. The new employees had to be a proportionate representation of ethnicities. Other than that, (local municipal) governments were now held accountable by a new central government in Pristina and UNMIK supervisors, thereby decreasing the role of Belgrade at least formally. Advocators of Kosovo Albanian influence in governance, like Ibrahim Rugova, were given a considerable role in rebuilding the region. However, as depicted in earlier paragraphs, although the Constitutional Framework gave wide competencies to the Self-Government, it reserved the ultimate authority for UNMIK and the SRSG. In 2008, when these UN regulated structures reformed into the government system of independent Kosovo, the employees changed again. Serbs left the government (again) and in some cases went to work for the Serbian government institutions that continued what existed before the war and were supported by Belgrade.

In the past ten years a lot of changes happened. The Assemblies of Kosovo’s municipalities changed their formations four times: 2001, 2004, 2007 and now 2009. Meanwhile heavy riots against Serbs took place in 2004. This and the Declaration of Independence had a big impact on the legitimacy of local government, at least in municipalities with another ethnic majority than Albanian. Communities other than the Kosovo Albanians found themselves threatened or believed they were neglected. One consequence of all these dynamics in such a short time during reconstruction, is that it was difficult to build up experience and expertise within the local government (interview USAID official). People trained by the international community leave soon.

As we have seen, the law has also changed in these past ten years. Whereas Serbian law was the general standard before the war, after the war international standards were implemented, such as Resolution 124416. After the declaration of independence the law changed again. This time it was mostly created by Westerners, who of course have their own frames. This was according to several interviewees one of the reasons why the rule of law in Kosovo was ‘somewhat weak’. On paper however the law looks very good. According to the law a local government in Kosovo (as supported by Pristina) has one Mayor assisted by two Deputy Mayors. One is chosen by the Mayor and one, the Deputy Mayor for communities, is chosen by the Assembly. The law stipulates that the Deputy Mayor for communities needs to be of another ethnicity than the Mayor.

The number of Assembly members depends on the number of citizens, differing from 15 to 51 in Pristina. The ten obligatory Assembly meetings are public. (The question is if any citizens attend these meetings.) Also obligatory for the Assembly are the following two committees: the Committee on Policy and Finance and the Committee on Communities. Both look after the implementation of the law. The first committee is more focused on internal procedure of the local government, the second committee addresses complaints from citizens on community issues. Also, to take care of the equal distribution of rights among ethnicities, the law requires that local government’s staff, civil servants, need to reflect the percentages of citizens ethnicity within the municipality (Law on Self Government 2008, Law Nr. 03/L-040).

The municipality works with directorates. The standard is to have 6 directorates. A municipality can choose whether to set up a new one addressing a special item for its own municipality. The directors are appointed by the Mayor (after having been approved by the Assembly). The deputy director will be of another ethnicity than the director if the minority forms 10% of the population. This is further explained in the case of Strpce/Shtërpcë.

As became clear from the introduction the latest developments in the case of the formation of local governments were the elections of 2009. It influence will be described in chapter five.

4.4 Conclusion: What can history and institutional development tell us about the strength of the indivisibility frame and parallelism? In this chapter I have picked out aspects of history that relate to the framing of the situation in Strpce/Shtërpcë these days. I described the background information of the indivisibility frame and thus part of the legitimation of parallelism. It illustrated that this central region situated between Albania and Serbia has a long, laborious history that has known many conflicts. In addition, Kosovo is a religious center for Serbs; Albanians belief it is the region their ethnicity first comes from. Usage of heroic passages of history and claims for the ‘religious motherland’ by Serbs, enforce the idea of indivisibility of Kosovo and Serbia. Albanians and Serbs both use history to legitimate their cause and own institutions.

The status question triggered by technical aspects such as the law, but also by the framing of history and present, has become a major issue (again) since the mid eighties. It was an important factor in causing the war. The recent war in 1998-1999 revolved (again) around the claim for land. Albanians wanted the autonomy back that had been given to them years before by Tito. The Serbian regime of

16 The resolution was founded in 1999 by the Security Council of the United Nations. It provided the approval and rules for the interference of the UN in Kosovo – the Interim Mission Kosovo (UNMIK). 51

Tito strived to kick all Albanians out of the region to rule Kosovo alone. The conflict was ended by the interference of the international community. The international community stayed for over ten years. Their strong presence supported the region to develop, but also weakened its autonomy.

The international force and interference also has a state weakening effect. Their executive powers and demands seem to be of enormous influence on the Kosovo government. Not only did the UN implement a resolution, 1244, that became the general rule of law for eight years. They were the ones to construct a new governance body for Kosovo in particular. However, the non-transparent processes, the complex leadership and the indecisiveness of the international community about the status of Kosovo, obstruct the belief in the Kosovo government. Decentralization needs to increase the process legitimacy of the Kosovo-Pristina (local) government. It triggers question for the next chapters like: ‘How on the local level decentralization (de)legitimizes the parallel institutions’ and ‘How the local government is dealing with the practicalities of lives and the influence of international and national players’. The international community can thus serve as a strong source of legitimacy, but can also be interpreted as a weakening factor or delegitimizing actor.

Anno 2010, conform the two biggest ethnic groups, two opposing sides have developed in the discussion about the righteousness of independence. Bluntly speaking, Serbs are against an independent Kosovo, Albanians pro. The indivisibility frame can still be detected. The history partly structures the frame, giving it the content it has. However, history has also consciously been used for one’s own good: the legitimation of a division between ethnicities. The indivisibility frame is produced and reproduced by a conscious and subconscious flow of actions. With recent developments regarding the status question, the International Court of Justice has decided that Kosovo can be independent, the nearby future will tell if history and present will be framed differently and how it will affect the existence of two competing sets of governmental institutions. The institutions supported by Serbia will have to search for new sources of legitimacy.

5. From war to parallelism and independent elections In this chapter I first introduce the municipality Strpce/Shtërpcë. I present its demographic figures, the environment and the relationship between the citizens: Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. Secondly I attempt to describe the governmental structures as clearly as possible. As there are two sets of institutions of competing governments it is for everyone, including Strpce/Shtërpcë’s inhabitants, a puzzle. I therefore present an organization chart of both the institutions supported by Belgrade and the institutions supported by Pristina that should clarify the puzzle where words fail. In the next two chapters I proceed with explaining the functioning of the governments in practice.

5.1 The municipality of Strpce/Shtërpcë and its people Strpce/Shtërpcë is situated in the south centre of Kosovo near the border with Macedonia. The order of the double name ‘Strpce/Shtërpcë’ points out which ethnic community is largest in the municipality. Serbian writing is first, indicating a Serbian majority17. About 13600 people inhabit the municipality, of which approximately 9100 Serbs (about 65%), 4500 Albanians (about 35%) and 37 Roma. The Serbian population consists of people that originate from neighboring cities of before the war (1999). They often had family or holiday houses in the various villages of Strpce/Shtërpcë. Still, an estimated number of 700 to 1000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) ( Serbs and Albanians) living in the municipality does not have their own shelters (yet) (OSCE, 2009)18.

Not all names of villages in Strpce/Shtërpcë are mentioned in Serbian and Albanian. It is only in the mixed villages that the ESI have applied the two names. Berevce II is not always mentioned as a village. It is the start of the slopes for skiing.

17 Would there have been a concentration of 10% Turks in the area too, the name would have been written in three languages as the law prescribes. 18 The new Mayor of 2010 of the Pristina Local Government has immediately begun to build houses for young couples and refugees. 53

The population is spread out over sixteen villages in a mountainous region; eight of them exclusively housing Serb, four exclusively Albanians and another four are multi-ethnic. There is one big road that runs uphill from Pristina and Ferizaj/Urosevac to Prizren. To drive from one side of the municipality to the other side it takes about half an hour careful driving. When travelling from Pristina to Prizren the first village of the municipality you pass is situated at your right. Bröd/Brod is one of the biggest exclusively Albanian villages. After Bröd/Brod the road meanders along, up the increasingly steep road, showing on the left agricultural fields and hidden villages of which I do not know the names until reaching the exit for Firëjë/Firaja, another exclusively Albanian village. It is situated up the mountain and has been a central place for the Albanian guerillas in the years of the conflict. It now houses the headquarters of the political party PDK that originates from the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The road meanwhile crosses the river and continues on the other side of the mountain range. It opens up in rather flat area. Little fields for agricultural use lie left and right of the road. On the right side of the road a street leads you up the mountain to two villages housing both Serbs and Albanians. However, when continuing ahead you finally reach the central village of the municipality: Strpce/Shtërcpë village. It is by far the biggest village, offers most facilities (stores and bars), houses exclusively Serbs, but is open to Albanian employees. Strpce/Shtërpcë also contains the municipal building. Leaving Strpce/Shtërpcë behind you reach Brezovica19. Both the eyes of my Serbian and Albanian friends would begin to glisten and smiles came easily when reaching this place. It is there that the ski-resort starts. It is there that the fun of winter sports, bars, the excitement and the unconcerned life begins. The village has several hotels and houses Serbs and Albanians. The ski resort Brezovica/Brezovicë used to have high incomes before the war, but can nowadays barely survive (observations, various interviews and ICG report, 2009). However, if it would attract many people now, it is not possible to house them at this moment. Several of the biggest hotels have been confiscated by KFOR or are needed to house the IDPs. Other hotels that were part of the ski-resort are broke and are facing the mountains with shattered windows. Turning left you run uphill towards the ski-slopes. Turning right you first go down-hill, pass the river and go up the mountain again towards small remote villages which lack electrical heating or sewage lines. When continuing straight ahead, passing all the exit possibilities, you leave the inhabited world behind you and climb further through the mountains. But then you have already passed the border of the municipality.

Part of the main road leading through Strpce/Shtërpcë. On the left is the television studio. It also contains a sort of shopping area.

winter tourism

The mountains create an opportunity for winter and summer tourism. The lower part of the mountains is rich with a great variety of flora and fauna. The municipality contains part of The National Park. In theory this park offers wonderful nature for tourism. However not many tourists know that the park exists or what they can do there. Beside tourism there are opportunities and

19 In Albanian the name would be the same or Brezovicë. As it is mostly known as Brezovica I have decided to only refer to it like this and see it as the English, touristic naming for it. 54 natural resources for development of agriculture and cattle-breading. The territory is rich with rivers. The unique diversity and attractive natural resources present potential for economic development of the municipality.

The monument next to the main road near Firëjë/Firaja

5.1.1 Ethnic relations The international community considers Strpce/Shtërpcë a place where both ethnicities live in some kind of harmony. This is also something that is often mentioned by Serbs and by Albanians: Serbs and Albanians do not have a problem with each other in Strpce/Shtërpcë. Its multi-ethnic standpoint and development in the past 10 years resulted in the international community naming the municipality as possibly ‘the role model municipality for Kosovo’ (ICG Policy Briefing, 2009; OSCE Strpce/Shtërpcë, 2009). It partly explains the international involvement in Strpce/Shtërpcë. It is worth investing in a relative successful area of the country compared to other parts. However the picture of Strpce/Shtërpcë is not as black and white as the word ‘role model’ would perhaps suggest.

All villages of the municipality have a double name; one in Albanian, the other in Serbian. Yet in most cases of villages with a single ethnic population, one of the names is completely crossed out with black paint. It is no use changing the blackened sign, as it will be done again by citizens (interviews Serbs and Albanians). The act is symbolic in the sense that the language on the village sign reflects claims of property (by one ethnicity) and exclusion of the other ethnicity. It actually rather concretely presents the villages as indivisible; the village is not shared with another ethnicity and will not be shared is the message. The removal of one of the names at the village plaques seems to demonstrate a lingering sense of uneasiness between Serbs and Albanians living in the area. It is a consequence of the war in 1999, but the relationship between Serbs and Albanians has never been really warm.

During the war in 1998 – 1999, 90% of houses in the Albanian villages in Strpce/Shtërpcë were burnt down by Serb militias. The Albanian inhabitants fled to the mountains, to Macedonia. After the bombing in 1999 by the NATO, targeting Serbian locations, Serbian armies retreated. Compared to other places in Kosovo many Serbs stayed in Strpce/Shtërpcë during the war. Strpce/Shtërpcë was also a place where many Serbian refugees from bigger cities fled to. They fled to rural areas and places where the majority had always been Serb. Serbian (young) man were called upon to watch their villages and lay in the mountains waiting for the attacker (Interviews with Serbs). However, according to several interviewees (Serbs and Albanians) it was not the villager that caused atrocities, but it were the strange Serbian militias, mercenaries. The Albanian resistance meanwhile hid in the same mountains around Strpce/Shtërpcë. Though I was told that most fighting was near the borders,

55 several kilometers away from Strpce/Shtërpcë, a big memorial statue is nevertheless situated in Strpce/Shtërpcë municipality somewhere along the road near the village Firëjë/Firaja. In the few months immediately after the war ‘stopped’, there was total anarchy. Violence of Albanian villagers (to me unknown whether from Strpce/Shtërpcë municipality or not) turned against the remaining Serbs in the area. In Strpce/Shtërpcë about eleven Serbs were killed and some disappeared by kidnappings (Interview with several Serbs; most confirmed the number without me needing to ask about it).

Reconstructing the war in Strpce/Shtërpcë was not the aim of my research. What I want to point out is that many have known dark nights of cold and terror and that fear, some resentment and defensive behavior is still present. The sudden disappearance of people on both sides, has created a fear that has not totally worn off. However small and scarce, each little incident confirms for the people the righteousness of the fear. At the same time incidents are also interpreted as ethnic violence.

One night in the village of Strpce/Shtërpcë the mountain tops of the opposite mountains were on fire. I asked people what was going on; were people perhaps burning the field to get fertilize the soil? Many Serbs just shrugged their shoulders; they didn’t know. One girl (23, living in a ethnic-mixed village) mentioned suddenly: “those are fires set by Albanians who probably want to show they are still surrounding us and are watching us”. Another incident also illustrated the way Serbs felt: fearful and isolated. My Serbian translator who, on my request of exploring the municipality, drove me around the villages in his luxurious car, suddenly stopped before an invisible boundary in the middle of nothing, surrounded by green grasslands. He turned around and would not go any further, “because that was the land of Kosovo Albanians”. At the times, it struck me as bizarre, but it was quite normal for Strpce/Shtërpcë. I should mention that my translator’s car had a Serbian license plate, not a Kosovar license plate. That would make him an easy target. I have seen people change number plates right before entering an area where the majority was of another ethnic background.

Travelling for Serbs through/to Albanian area was still looked upon with fear. However at the same time Serbs from Strpce/Shtërpcë work outside the municipality, and many of the young people study in Mitrovica North commuting back and forth by autobus. This autobus would not stop at a place with a Albanian majority, but only connected Serbian majority places. These places were for a long time called enclaves. Serbs were escorted by KFOR militaries when they needed to get out of the villages or municipalities. The escort has stopped since two years (2008) and the word enclave is not used much anymore. However, the isolated lifestyle of people and the fear still exist.

Serbs keep themselves inside the Serbian villages where they know it is safe and do not visit the Albanian villages in the same municipality. In turn, Albanians prefer not to visit the Serbian villages, but do go for example skiing in the Serb dominated environment and work in Strpce/Shtërpcë village. Negative stories put a shadow over all the good stories, but much of the impasse today also seems to be caused by people being scared of changes, of ‘the unknown’.

People indeed live fine side by side, but I did not really find examples in Strpce/Shtërpcë of really sharing lives. At the ski centre Serbian waiters had contact with Albanians. They waved at each other, did some superficial talk but did not know much about each other. Moreover most talk was in Serbian. Many waiters didn’t know any Albanian, or wouldn’t speak it. Also, Serbian young grown- ups, around 22, argued they were open to conversation with Albanians, but also asked me:

“Albanians do not have culture, how is it at their place?”. It indicates that Serbs do not really have a clue how life is for Albanians. The other way around more is known, due to a history in which Serbs dominated and because Albanians do come to Serbian majority places like Strpce/Shtërpcë. Nonetheless many Albanians are not interested in Serbs either.

Albanians and Serbs in the same municipality have different lives. Serbs have the village Strpce/Shtërpcë to go out, to do shopping, or they drive all the way north to Mitrovica North, or further across the border to a Serbian city. Skopje in Macedonia is also considered interesting to go to, but borders are always difficult to cross. Albanians do not have cafés or dancing opportunities in their own villages, but seek entertainment, and shopping outside the municipality in the city Ferizaj/Urosevac. For more excitement they go to Pristina (one and a half hour away).

Ferizaj/Urosevac was once a city inhabiting numerous Serbs. Many of them have fled to the municipality of Strpce/Shtërpcë. When my Serbian friends announced they would go shopping for clothes in Ferizaj/Urosevac I was happily surprised and was looking forward to see their reaction to the city. I was also hoping to get a better understanding of how Serbs were treated by Albanians elsewhere than in Strpce/Shtërpcë. Instead of going all the way to the city though, we stopped about a kilometer outside Ferizaj/Urosevac where some big shopping malls were and nothing else. It looked for me as some place in no man’s land. I have not met any Serb that ever went to the city after what happened in the war; they had no idea how it looked like now. They only remembered being chased away. In the shopping mall my friend wanted a particular size of trousers, but the other girl couldn’t understand Serbian. My friend got shy and asked her boyfriend, who was a few years older and had learned some Albanian and English, to ask it for her. It felt like an awkward situation. Nobody was hostile, we could actually laugh with the saleswomen and were helped kindly, but all were very aware of what they were – Serbs in an Albanian friendly setting.

5.1.2 Reconstruction After the few months of anarchy immediately after the ending of the war in 1999, emergency help came up quickly. As most of the Albanian villages were laid down in ashes and KFOR had taken position along the road in Brezovica, roads and other infrastructural projects as houses were built with a fast speed in Strpce/Shtërpcë. The international community invested a lot of money in Strpce/Shtërpcë municipality.

The relevance of the relative peaceful coexistence of the inhabitants of different ethnicities and the advantages of the natural environment of Strpc/Shtërpcë was recognized in an early stage, as an official of USAID explained. The coordination of the aid was not always too well though. It happened that one household (Albanian) received (payment for) two or three houses. Besides, the maintenance of all new constructions was left to the local government to deal with. The municipal government though (working under the mandate and supervised in that time by UNMIK) didn’t have half the money to preserve the projects that had been implemented. Lastly, the shift from emergency aid to developmental aid did not always go smoothly (a general problem that arises in much more countries). Plans did not immediately connect, did the same official of USAID admit.

End 2009 KFOR was still helping reconstruct the village where necessary. KFOR, patrolling the municipality, mediates between citizens and the local government. KFOR passes on messages of citizens to the local government. They will interfere if the local government is not capable to and when they think the situation is too bad to wait. The sergeant of one of the three KFOR teams

57 explained about a school without heating in one of the villages. This would be a grave condition for the children if the winter would strike. KFOR therefore decided that it needed their intervention. Although KFOR is basically neutral and talks to anyone, most contact they have is with the Pristina supported government.

Residents of Strpce/Shtërpcë, Serbs and Albanians alike, had a two-fold opinion about aid: on the one hand they recognized the relevance and help the aid has given, but they also doubted the help of aid nowadays. Besides looking for the cause in way aid was given, the misgiving towards aid is perhaps also due to the changes in international/national systems and the wavering confidence in the government system.

Professor Hasani, rector of the University of Pristina in Kosovo, wrote in an article about the transition from the UNMIK to a EU mission that “as compared between two communities, UNMIK lost its legitimacy more when Albanians are concerned. After February 17, 2008, UNMIK has regained some of its legitimacy as opposed to EU in the eyes of Kosovo Serb Community who sees UNMIK now as kind of saviour and the last resort to reserve its “acquired rights”(parallel life and parallel institutions). With UNMIK Kosovo Serbs seems to feel better off and consider it as a substitute of Serb State and Sovereignty over Kosovo” (2008:24).

In the rest of the chapter I explain the structures of the parallel government and subsequently describe the political event, a critical-event: the elections for the Pristina supported municipal government.

5.2 Parallelism Similar to every partly Serbian municipality in Kosovo, Strpce/Shtërpcë has two sets of governmental institutions, one set supported by Pristina and one supported by Belgrade. Parallelism is spread out throughout local society, represented in the existence of two post-offices, two high schools, and the two local governments.

The governmental institutions I explain below. First I want to stress that the situation is confusing for almost anyone. Many information details are not clear to everyone, naming is used differently, actions are never just implemented, but also have a symbolic meaning to it and last even the locations of the institutions make the picture complicated. During my first interviews I regularly had problems with clarifying which government I meant, and which the interviewee was talking about.

One of the first interviews I did was with the Serbian Mayor of the Belgrade supported structures. It was the day of the elections for the other governmental structures, the Pristina supported government and Serbs were going to vote. This Mayor was walking up and down the road in front of the voting location watching the Serbian civilians (who voted and who was still with him and his government?) in his jogging trousers. He had little time for me, but we talked for about three quarters of an hour somewhere in an office. Later on I understood that it had been the office of the director for business/administration. The office of the mayor was in another building (see the picture on the next page).

The photo shows the Serbian flag, the flag of Kosovo is hanging next to it. I actually took this picture to show the presence of the international community, here in the form of a text telling what they sponsored.

This building at the end of Strpce/Shtërpcë village, in between the bars where Serbian youth danced and drank all Fridays and Saturdays, was actually shared by both competing governments. Both governments blamed each other for not having appropriate room for their employees. Most offices in this building were from the Pristina supported government. About six offices spread throughout the building were from the Belgrade supported government. One of these had been the Mayor’s office of the Pristina supported government, but was taken over by the Mayor of the Belgrade supported structures. How this had happened was not exactly clear. No violence had taken place. It had happened overnight. All interviewees suspected the Mayor of the Pristina supported government of having made a deal. Namely, he was also contact somehow to the Belgrade supported structures. If I understood people right, he was actually an Assembly member of their government. However, the Mayor of the Belgrade supported government did not want to comment on that. Most bizarre perhaps from this situation was that the assembly room, with the big chairs placed in half a circle, was used by both governments! Yes, they were taking turns.

This short description indicates the intermingled relations of the two institutions, although officially they claimed to have no contact at all. They shared the same location. They watched each other in the corridors, on the staircases in the hallways. Moreover, there must have been communication about the usage of the Assembly room. Citizens in search of help could knock on one door and be helped by an employee of the Pristina supported government, or perhaps by an employee of the Belgrade supported government.

Apart from using the same municipal building, the two local governments are similar in organizational structure. However, their perspective on the independence and dealing with the context of this declaration of independence completely differs, creating and sustaining the division between the two. The structures and further relationship will hopefully be clarified by the next section and following chapters. A timeline is included in attachment 2.

5.2.1 Pristina supported structures The municipal Pristina supported structure has six departments: 1. education, culture, youth and sport; 2. health and social welfare; 3. administration and personnel; 4. economy, finance, agriculture and forestry; 5. urbanism, planning, reconstruction, development and public services; and 6. geodesy, cadastre and property. The idea was that from 2010 onwards a department on economic development focusing on tourism would be included. This would enlarge the tourism potential and quicken the development as advertisements and for instance permission would be provided for more easily. The department would also be responsible for the development of and negotiations about the ski-resort.

Pristina

Assembly Mayor

Board of directors

administration and geodesy, cadastre, economy, finance, personnel health and social education , urbanism, and property agriculture and welfare culture, youth and planning , forestry sport reconstruction, development and Employees: Albanians and Serbs public services Represent: Albanians and Serbs Voters: Albanians and Serbs

The structures supported by Pristina also bring to their advantages the control over the cadastre (which is not recently updated), as well as the public service office on the ground floor of the municipal building, that is easily accessible for citizens. According to the Pristina supported government and to USAID, the place should increase the extent to which this government is known. The establishment of the office was funded by USAID. Their aim was to increase easy access and at the same time provide control on corruption by its transparent constitution (interview official USAID). The office was meant for employees responsible for this transparency and for certain service delivery. However, the employees working in the office were also employees with other responsibilities (because of the lack of space). Also, one of the employees in the office was promised a job, but there was no work for her to do. This chaotic situation did not appear in the evaluation reports of USAID. However, after the new Mayor and his assembly had started in 2010, this woman had to leave the office.

In total close to 60 people work in the municipal office. The Assembly consists of 19 members. Moreover, there are a Mayor and two Deputy Mayors. Like the law prescribes that the first Deputy Mayor is chosen by the Mayor, he assists the Mayor in his tasks (Law on Self Government (2008) Nr.03/L-040 art. 60-61). Because more than 10% of the citizens of Strpce/Shtërpcë belong to a non- majority, a Deputy Mayor for Communities is stipulated. The so-called second Deputy Mayor is chosen by the Assembly and represents the interests of this non-majority community, in the case of Strpce/Shtërpcë: Albanians.

It was assumed that the majority in a municipality would decide by their majority vote who would be Mayor. Presumably the Mayor would be of the same ethnicity as the majority of the municipality. Theoretically the assistant, first Deputy Mayor, chosen by the Mayor would then be of the same ethnicity as the Mayor. In the case of Strpce/Shtërpcë a Deputy Mayor for communities was then needed to protect the rights and represent the interests of the minority within the municipality.

Interestingly and differing from the Kosovo law, in Strpce/Shtërpcë it was decided that its first Deputy Mayor should also be of the other ethnicity than the Mayor. This special arrangement is to enlarge the legitimacy and representativeness of the Kosovo based local government. A consequence

60 of this system is that the second Deputy Mayor is called by the staff the ‘additional’ one; his job – representing the voice of the other community - already done by the first Deputy Mayor.

The Mayor I was confronted with during the first two months of my time in the municipality had been appointed in 2007 by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). In 2007 the elections for the municipal government supported by Pristina were, apart from about nine votes, boycotted completely by Serbs. Because of the boycott, an Albanian candidate for Mayor won. To prevent Albanian rule in a Serbian majority municipality, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), intervened. It was believed that a fair proportionate representation of the population in the government would serve citizens best. Moreover, Serbs were expected to otherwise turn their back to this government completely. So, the Albanian (candidate) Mayor froze his position and instead the SRSG appointed a Serbian Mayor: Stanko Jakovljevic, who had already been Mayor since 2005.

This positive discrimination had many consequences. For one, the Albanian (candidate) Mayor was still regarded by some Albanian inhabitants as the only Mayor of Strpce/Shtërpcë. Before the last elections some citizens believed they had three Mayors in town (two of the Pristina mandated structures and one of the municipal government as supported by Belgrado). Beside discussing the legitimacy of the leader (which one?), the intervention in the election of a Mayor for the Pristina supported structures resulted in a refusal from the Assembly of the Pristina supported structures to work. According to the ICG report of 2009, Serbs refused because they didn’t want to take part in a government acknowledging the declaration of independence. The Albanian half didn’t want to work with an appointed Mayor, not agreeing to the procedure. One Assembly member from 2007 – 2009, who was reelected for the Assembly of 2010, rejected this explanation in an interview. Instead, the Assembly member argued that the Assembly had not functioned because of a dysfunctional Mayor: he had never summoned the Assembly members together. “I only saw him twice. Once during giving the oath, and once during a lunch that ended up in nothing”, stated the Assembly member.

The none functioning of the Assembly was probably due to a combination of factors. Meanwhile the few decisions that had to be made were made without the Assembly by the Mayor alone or together with his Deputy Mayor. To further lead and organize the government internally and to compensate for the absence of the Mayor, the directors fulfilled this responsibility on their own initiative.

In this context citizens of Strpce/Shtërpcë were skeptical about the capacity of a municipal government. A big issue is the so called ‘Green Zone’. In the middle of the National Park houses are constructed illegally. The Pristina supported municipal government has handed over their counter plan to the central government in Pristina, but has been waiting for a response for over two years now. During these waiting years, more houses have been built. The capacity of the local government to face this problem (alone) is not sufficient.

Since 2008 the Pristina supported system has incorporated decentralization in its law. Strpce/Shtërpcë gets more responsibilities. This requires certain capacity that was lacking, but it can also take care of the inconvenient waiting periods for the central government to decide. In November 2010 new elections took place I describe in the next chapter. The plan for the new Assembly of the Pristina supported government of 2010 is to legalize all objects built and stop any new constructions or destroy the ones that are tried to be built. Legalizing the constructions built thus far, consequently means more tax income. An increased local budget leads to new investments

61 that will increase development of the municipality. Besides, controlling the Green Zone in effect takes care of the National Park, preventing constructions to destroy the tourism opportunity. Lastly, if this plan is implemented it will eventually increase the trust in the local government. In Strpce/Shtërpcë a waiter, who after finishing his study in economics was not able to find another job, told me that “addressing the problem of the illegally constructed housing in the national park would clarify if decentralization would really work. Most owners of these houses were rich Albanians, believed to be high in politics and therefore with considerable amount of power that could stop people from cooperating with the program of the local government.” By the beginning of 2010, employees at the municipal government believed the times of its non-functioning was over. Inhabitants of Strpce/Shtërpcë were, in January 2010, still skeptic and waiting till for concrete changes.

5.2.2 Belgrade supported structures The municipal government as supported by Belgrade consists of Serbs that continue the work of the municipal government from before the war in 1999. Like before the war the central government linked to this local government is Belgrade, Serbia. Accordingly, it is equivalent to the organizational structure of the government in Serbia; it is considered part of the Serbian government structures. This structure however, also resembles the way the government supported by Pristina is organized. The departments of the Pristina supported structures are here regarded ‘public companies’ of which there are five: 1. agriculture and finance; 2. social services (divided by sub-departments on sport – culture – education); 3. urbanism planning; 4. tourism; 5. business/administration. The public companies are each in different buildings all over Strpce/Shtërpcë village and some have offices in other villages. The public companies are said to be autonomous, but the boards of the companies are in practice (for an important part) selected by the Assembly. Hence, one board member of such a company literally mentioned that the company was a sort extension of the government, “an arm of the government”. Important decisions regarding the companies are regularly made by the government.

Belgrade

Assembly Mayor

Board of directors

Public companies with their own board and the director linked to the government

agriculture and urbanism business tourism social services finance planning /administration (divided by sub- departments on sport – culture – Employees: Serbs education)

Represents: Serbs /Serbian villages Voters: only Serbs 62

There is a big reliance on Belgrade. All financial help comes from the capital city of Serbia. Through the local government everyone, employees of the companies and civil servants working in for instance education and health institutions, gets paid by Belgrade. Before the economic crisis they earned 200% of the normal wage they would have earned according to Serbian standards. Nowadays it is 150% caused by the lack of money in the Serbian budget. This extra percentage is given as a ‘reward’ and support for staying in Kosovo thereby letting the Serbian system prevail. Most of these civil servants, it is said, also get salaries from Kosovo institutions. However, nobody seemed to have the exact overview for me about the finance. National, local level and international interviewees could all but guess. Meanwhile, a reason for the limited functioning of the governmental structures supported by Belgrade, was according to its employees firstly due to “the lack of money for projects. The board barely managed to pay all employees”.

The connection with Belgrade is, next to the financial incomes, a reassurance for Serbs that they are not left alone in a changing and ‘threatening’ Albanian environment. They need Belgrade to believe in them and they need to believe in Belgrade (according to several interviews). It is their fight against a changing territorial status and the change of their position of majority into minority. Mihajlovic, Mayor of this Serbian government anno 2010 explained his view: “there is hardly a country that recognizes unilateral Kosovo. And those who do is only because of the influence of the US. The only goal Albanians have is a mono-ethnic Kosovo.” Mihajlovic is from the right wing Serbian Radical Party and stated several conspiracy theories against Serbs in Kosovo in the interview. Serbian citizens question the fact that “in the years he has been Mayor he built a two-store house and all of his family has jobs”, and think about corruption. Nevertheless, he seems to express the feeling many Serbs have resembling the victimization-theory as I explained in the theoretical framework.

The Deputy Mayor of Strpce/Shtërpcë, Slavisa Staletovic started as Deputy Mayor in 2002 in the UNMIK system, but shifted after the declaration of independence at the Belgrade supported government. He was one of the few that was offered a new job after quitting his position in the UNMIK governmental structures in. He is from a less radical party than Mihajlovic, what became clear from the interview as well. He calmly explained me his view on the history and logic behind the existence of the two parallel governments. He mainly chose to quit his job with the UNMIK structures and to work for the Serbian government, because he did not want to participate in a government that was mandated by an independent Kosovo.

The local Serbian leaders in municipalities in Kosovo are part of the Serbian national parties, remnants of before the conflict of 1999. The actual party leaders are situated in Belgrade. Four big Serbian political parties are: the SRS (Serbian Radical Party) the party of Mihajlovic, the DSS (Democratic party of Serbia) the party of Staletovic, the DS (The Democratic Party) and the SPS (the Socialist Party of Serbia). They have, as it is claimed in general, nothing to do with any of the Kosovar political parties.

Only in 2008, about ten years after the conflict in Kosovo and right after the proclamation of independence, the first elections of the Belgrade supported government institutions in Strpce/Shtërpcë were organized. Before the institutions were kept alive by men that had been working with the Serbian government before the conflict. Moreover these men would have a double role, working for the UNMIK structures and continuing exclusively Serbian institutions. It remains vague for me though how exactly this was possible. What is clear is that about 80% of

Strcpe/Shtërpcë’s Serbs participated in those elections. A number that came back in all the interviews with the employees and politicians of this local government. It was used to indicate the legitimacy of its existence: namely, they explained the numbers as such that by far the Serb majority and thereby also a majority of the total population of the municipality wanted them to be ruling. This explanation need some discussion though.

First, no Albanian citizens of the municipality voted. Being a representative of Strpce/Shtërpcë municipality it seems odd to me that the Albanian citizens of the municipality were on the voting list, but were not really expected to vote and are even left out in considerations about legitimacy of the Belgrade supported structures. Kosovo Albanians are clear at that matter: the Belgrade supported structures are illegal. The existence of these structures in Kosovo is thus limited to the Kosovo Serbs and therefore dependent on their support. A second point that is not communicated by the government supported by Belgrade when indicating its high legitimacy because of the number of votes, is that Serbs inhabiting the municipality where sometimes threatened into voting. And if not directly threatened, people’s moves were watched well and social pressure is high in the little villages: it was only logical that people voted. So, the voter turnout does not mean they all support the idea. Lastly, referring to the construction of ethnicity as stated in earlier chapters: in a country with two conflicting groups, it makes sense to vote for your own group. Especially if that group represents traditions and ways you know; it is part of your identity. Based on the theory of Oberschall (2000) the voters turnout is an act of defense, an insecurity-dilemma. Once Serbs would be feeling more safe, it is the question what will happen to the survival of the Belgrade supported government institutions. I theorize about this later in the conclusions.

The future of the Belgrade supported institutions today is also questioned within the government itself as its relationship with Belgrade is changing. Belgrade provides the Serbian municipal government with resources, credibility and legitimacy. In speeches Serbia is still convinced that Kosovo is part of Serbia and they will never recognize its independence, but keep supporting their governmental branches in Kosovo. But in practice, less money is coming in for the municipal governments in Kosovo. The decrease in support is perhaps only caused by the financial situation the world’s economic crisis puts Serbia in or perhaps Kosovo Serbs really became a lower priority. In the past Belgrade participated in fierce campaigns against Serbs going out to vote for the competing parallel structures, even threatening Serbs that they would lose their jobs. However nowadays they are hardly threatening people against voting for others anymore. More and more must come from the local, municipal level.

5.2.3 The relationship of the UNMIK local government and Serbs relating to Belgrade Although the organizational structures seem similar there are some basic differences in ideals. One claims to address all citizens (Serbs and Albanians) of Strpce/Shtërpcë regardless of their ethnicity and aware of the necessity of a proportional representative employment rate. The other only focuses on the Serbian majority in the municipality and consider themselves part of Serbia.

The Belgrade supported municipal structures are an attempt to continue the Serbian system from before the war. It especially mirrors the period of the 1990s, when Albanian civil servants were fired and only Serbs were in official power. Illustrating the gap and struggle between the ethnicities those days until the real atrocities began, a Albanian civil servants of today stated: “The very few Albanians that kept working for the local government in those days, were called by fellow Albanians ‘spy’”. In

64 contrast to the Serbian supported structures, the system supported by Pristina is a recent combination of old and new. New is that it comes forth from the government structures as set up by UNMIK and explained in the previous chapter. Even more recent in Kosovo in this system of after UNMIK is that some municipalities are newly created and that Strpce/Shtërpcë in independent Kosovo gets more responsibilities. With old I mean the government structures resemble the pre-war Serbian organizational structures of the government. The municipality of Strpce/Shtërpcë for example kept the same size and border and its departments within the government are similar to the old Serbian ones.

Strpce/Shtërpcë had its first municipal elections according to UNMIK government rules in 2002. Most people, Serbs and Albanians, voted. However Serbs protested against Albanians that had started to work in the municipal building of Strpce/Shtërpce village (100% Serbian). However grim some days were, some trust in the new UNMIK system started to grow (interview with assembly members and directors of those times). At the same time both ethnicities worked together. Although, as the Albanian Deputy Mayor of 2009 and some Albanian employees explained: during those times some Albanian employees felt they had to do two jobs: their own and the one of their Serbian colleagues who were not so enthusiastic in building up the country in a new system. Overall, it was said that the developments increased slowly.

“The March riots in 2004 during which Albanians attacked Serbs and their cultural heritage (monasteries and such) had a big impact on the faith Serbs had in the reconstruction of Kosovo”, a Serbian former employee of the UNMIK structures explained. In Strpce/Shtërpcë itself not much had happened, but Serbs felt they were not protected well enough and not perceived as equally important to the institutions. In effect, Serbs in the UNMIK Local Government in Strpce/Shtërpcë made cooperation within the Assembly difficult, by voting against propositions, by not being present and by undermining the position of the Mayor.

The most and direct impact on the cooperation within the government came from the self declared independence of Kosovo, year 2008. The structures supervised by UNMIK and mandated by the United Nations Resolution 1244, turned into the structures supported by Pristina. Serbs in Strpce/Shtërpcë didn’t want to be part of an independent Kosovo; they rather considered Strpce/Shtërpcë part of Serbia. As a reaction to the independence, Kosovo Serbs within the UNMIK structures quit their jobs. They were supported by Belgrade in this decision. Belgrade actively called upon the employees to leave their jobs and provided them with salaries. The promise of finding them a new job, only materialized for about five employees. They started working in the already existing Serbian local government institutions.

The Serbs that left the former UNMIK and later Pristina supported institutions were later replaced by other Serbs that were willing to work for these institutions. It was a tense time. “[After the stop of some Serbian colleagues’] we asked the others that were left if they wanted to work, if not, we fired them. We set out a concourse for others to apply, but were afraid no Serbs would be interested. Luckily they did come. And now [autumn 2009] we have a qualified staff”, the Deputy Mayor of the Kosovo municipal government in Strpce/Shtërpcë said. He was installed as a Deputy Mayor in autumn 2009 till December 2009. But worked before long, since 2000, as staff and later as director and had experienced many change in the past nine years. The staff of the Pristina supported municipal government was replaced relatively easy with new Serbian employees.

The relationship between the Serbs that left and the local government did not improve. No one has come back, a few began to work for the Belgrade supported government. Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008 widened the gap and hardened the division between the two governments. At a national political level the status issue became seemingly irresolvable. At a local, municipal level, it triggered a stalemate situation at all levels at the negotiation table. Consequently, citizens are confused and not satisfied. “It seems that until now [2010] local governments have not taken their responsibilities,” a journalist, also chairing NGO Future Without Fear chair stated. He did not only refer to failing money generating, but also to the service delivery that was minimally implemented.

5.2.4 Finances As mentioned in texts about the description of the organizational structures, the governments of Strpce/Shtërpcë barely get any incomes from the municipality themselves, but depend heavily on the central governments they are connected with either in Belgrade or in Pristina. Logically the municipality is trying to increase its income. That both municipal governments send tax bills to the citizens (the by Belgrade supported structures only to Serbs, the by Pristina supported structures to both ethnicities), is an example of the difficult position Serbian citizens of the municipality are confronted with. Nobody knows which bill to pay and people have long refrained from doing so. The unclear situation created by the competition between two sets of governmental institutions is blamed by citizens for not functioning and is used in the case of tax-paying as an excuse to not obey and pay. Other than that paying a tax-bill has actually become a symbolic action, a political choice.

For the Pristina structures in Strpce/Shtërpcë the amount of earnings calculated for 2009 was € 7000. This turned out to become € 23000 because of new conditional policies regarding Identification Documents (ID). When wanting a birth certificate or ID people first had to pay their tax bills. The executive chief of the local government revenues explained that the actual amount of money that could possibly be gathered lays around € 100.000. The example not only shows the small amounts of money the municipality is dealing with, but it also indicates perhaps a change in perception of what a local government should and can do. That is, the government was convinced they needed citizens to pay tax and created a new way to do it. It proved what it can do, but also what it is supposed to do – getting people to pay tax.

The deputy mayor of another municipality (Ferizaj/Urosevac) that consists of mainly Albanian citizens, explained that they took the same measures to get their tax money. He also explained that the pleas from citizens had changed in content. Where people would plea for personal help (a pig, the pavement of the entrance to their house), they now asked for actions in the public space: a roundabout, fine schools etc. From these few example it can be concluded that the perception from citizens of what a government should do changed.

5.3 Conclusion: How are ethnic division and parallelism framed together? The dominance of one ethnicity over another (Serbs over Albanians), the conflict ’98 – ’99 and the international interference (’99 – ’07) have left marks on present life and governance. Also in Strpce/Shtërpcë that is considered a peaceful and cooperative municipality by Serbs, Albanians and the international community, ethnic communities do not actually share lives. In addition, fear for retribution or other sorts of attacks is still present on both sides. This way of living and the fear that still exists in the villages contribute to framing a person from another ethnicity as ‘The Other’ who is

66 potentially dangerous. It frames the municipality as being divided in parts that are based on ethnicity.

The factors have left their mark on governance as well. Framing governance as split representation: two different representational bodies were possibly needed for the two ethnicities. The independence of 2008 has had a severe impact too. Serbs and Albanians have opposite ideals for their region: one is for, the other against Kosovo’s independence. It has contributed to the existence of two competing sets of governance institutions. One of the governments is Kosovo based and supported by Pristina. The other government is Serbian based and supported by Belgrade. They are similar in organizational structure, and even shared the same government building for a few years. Parallelism confirmed and reproduced the indivisibility frame.

The government supported by Belgrade represents in practice only Serbs. Serbs voted for them, no Albanians did. Also, the work they deliver is almost without exception in villages with Serbian citizens. And officially only Serbs work for this government. In contrast, the government supported by Pristina officially and proudly claims to represent Albanians and Serbs. Their employees represent the ratio of Serbs and Albanians living in the municipality. However, the Assembly has not worked for a few years and the support of Serbs can be doubted. The elections of 2009 that are described in the next chapter had to give the Pristina supported government a boost and a new direction. It is the question how this will influence the indivisibility frame and how the indivisibility frame further influences the new local government.

What can also be concluded from this chapter is that both governments alone do not have enough resources to develop the municipality effectively. The international community has been investing a lot of money and man-power; they are still needed, but perhaps in another way. Tax payment for citizens is not a usual thing to do, it only adds to confusion about which local government to support. In the end both local governments mostly lean on the central governments in Pristina or Belgrade. Belgrade is not only very important for financial resources, but also for the legitimacy of the local government in Strcpe/Shtërpcë. The altering relationship between the local government and Belgrade can have a big impact on the continuation of the local government and thus the legitimacy of the claim for indivisibility.

6. November/December 2009: A historical moment for Strpce/Shtërpcë Critical event: the elections of the Pristina supported structures

The aim of this chapter is to illustrate the ‘legitimation debate’ between the two local governments in Strpce/Shtërcpë while considering a ‘critical event’20: the elections in November/December 2009 for the Pristina supported government. A government has theoretically two sides to it, as I explained in the theoretical chapter: politics and administration. This chapter mainly involves politics. As stated in chapter two: Politics is an interactive process; it entails symbols, power and emotions. The elections would bring out the contradictions and competition between the two governments. Although this event is specifically attached to one municipal government, the elections were only for the municipal government supported by Pristina, they will still illustrate both sides of the competition. The reaction of the government supported by Belgrade clarified one way of seeking legitimacy. Elections make some issues topical; they show governments’ priorities and ideologies. I used the elections as a critical event to gain insight into framing by the governments. Their reactions towards each other and the search for convincing people to believe in their government, the search for legitimacy, I will try to illuminate below.

Short history

The elections for the Pristina supported structures in 2009 differed in many ways from the previously held elections in 2007. As described above, in 2007 the elections for the municipal government supported by Pristina were, apart from about nine votes, boycotted completely by Serbs. And to prevent Albanian rule in a Serbian majority municipality, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), intervened by appointing a Serbian Mayor: Stanko Jakovljevic. This did the functioning of the local government no good.

In 2009 Pieter Feith, executive director of ICO and EUcommission in Kosovo made clear beforehand that there would be no international intervention this time. Everyone had to earn their own vote. The elections of November/December 2009 for the government structures supported by Pristina were regarded by the international community as an historical event for Kosovo and Strpce/Shtërpcë. As explained in the first introductory chapter it was the first time that the elections in an independent Kosovo would take place without any international interference.

6.1 The organization of the elections The elections of 2009 were developed out of the electoral procedures of UNMIK times. The democratic level of the system can be discussed. An employee (26 years old) of the think-tank Kipred, who had been a research journalist before and was offered a job for the ministry, was very critical towards the election system. “The first way the elections were set up was ‘closed’. [Referring to the system set up by UNMIK in 2001.] Not much democracy about it. It was done to make sure that only a few certain men were kept in power. These party-leaders controlled the whole party, which was one big family. When intending to go against them, you would risk your own death.” Installing only three men, made cooperation and negotiations for the international community simple. The power

20 See chapter three ‘Methods’ for an explanation of the method. 68 would only lie with a few people. On the other hand this fit a system of traditional ways of perceiving power as centralized and hierarchical.

In the first elections after the conflict of 1999 it was only possible to choose a party. All votes then went to the party-leader who further divided tasks: appointing people with executive and law making powers. Put in this perspective, the municipal governments would only be extensions of the central government, or in fact of the central figure in the central government. Mayors were chosen by the party at a central level. According to the employee of Kipred, it was an illusion to think this Mayor could direct his own policy in his municipality. The real power would be at the central level. The system had to evolve into a democratic system by action of the citizens and would take much time. The electoral system has changed during the past ten years, and has now become more open.

For the first round of election in November 2009, there were two lists to sign. On one list you chose a party and decided who you wanted to see as an Assembly member. The other list was for directly choosing the Mayor. There was much speculation about the voters turn-out before the elections. The highest percentage of Serbian voters people hoped for was a maximum of 10%. In most places in Kosovo though the turn-out was much higher (excluding the North), this was around 40%. There was genuine surprise and a feeling of excitement. In the second round this was in many cases even higher.

The second round of elections in December 2009 was to elect the Mayor. There wasn’t a need for a second round everywhere in Kosovo, it was only implemented when there was no majority vote. In Strpce/Shtërpcë the choice was between an Albanian candidate and a Serbian. This in theory meant that if (all) Serbs would vote, they would certainly win given that they were a majority in the municipality. When I interviewed both candidate Mayors before the second round, it was natural to them that people of the same ethnicity would vote for them (Serbs for the Serbian candidate and Albanians for the Albanian candidate).

During both rounds I had the privilege to have a peek at several locations where people could vote. This told me more about the organization of the event. It became clear that for these elections Serbian villages were less organized than Albanian villages. It was not always clear where people had to vote within the buildings and in some cases there was no privacy. Also, international NGO’s had offered to monitor the elections and were placed everywhere with notepads. But these volunteers had not all undergone training in what they had to do. So although they were present, and were supposed to be experts that evaluated the situation, many of them did not exactly know what they were doing.

During the first round there had been an incident in the largest Albanian village of Strpce/Shtërpcë (Firëjë/ Firaja). People of the international community had felt threatened by Albanians with guns. The American ambassador had to stop by to calm the situation down. (Why it was exactly him that came to solve the situation, did not become clear to me. But it illustrates the advisory power of the American ambassador.) During the second round of elections, police officers watched from their cars which they parked outside the school building that was used as a voting place. The police also had to intervene during the first round in a small Serbian village. At that time the dispute concerned corrupted votes. I tried to speak to some internationals during this conflict, but they were rather tense and did not have time for me. On the way to the car that would bring me back to

Strpce/Shtërpcë village, I met the soon-to-be Serbian Mayor, who was on the phone constantly, parading around with his daughter and shaking hands with all kinds of people.

6.2 Whom to vote for The search and need for a real leader in Strpce/Shtërpcë was mentioned in several interviews with Serbs and Albanians. Citizens were not enormously enthusiastic about the candidates for Mayor, but considered some to be quite good anyway. Moreover, it was the first time Serbs could really choose between candidates. I started this research just before the elections began and I only had time to consider some Serbian candidates. The Albanian candidates I did not get to meet, except for the one that was through to the second round.

The Serbian candidate for Mayor who eventually won was representing the political party, SLS (explained below). Other Serbs who run for Mayor or Assembly member, did this on their own account without a political party. This was new. There were even new parties set up, which had nothing to do with the existing central parties from Serbia or Kosovo. Although I was quite impressed when hearing this, the Serbian expert I discussed my information with acknowledged this new fact but did not really have faith in a future existence for these new candidates. He was right, except for one man who did eventually become Assembly member.

One example I find worth mentioning is that of a Serbian candidate for Mayor who was an ex-Mayor from 2002-2004. He is worth mentioning because he is mentioned in a report by the International Crisis Group who referred to him as a good Mayor who tried to get Albanians and Serbs to work together. After reading this report in the Netherlands, before visiting Strpce/Shtërpcë, I believed every citizen of the municipality would know about him and his excellent work as Mayor. The opposite was true. He was not really well-known, and he did not come across as a promising figure during the elections. I only found one person that was very enthusiastic about him and his attempt to bridge the gap between the two communities. (It was an Albanian Assembly member who had already been an Assembly member in 2002). The ex-Mayor had, during his time as Mayor, experienced troubles with Serbs who undermined his authority and he consequently resigned his post. His earlier attempt to get Albanians and Serbs to work together in one government failed. He now (2009) wanted to try one more time. He explained to me that he had already been in contact with internationals who would support him again if he would become Mayor. He had come back to the municipality from his current home in Serbia, leaving his family behind, to invest one more time in the municipality, but he was apparently not the man citizens of Strpce/Shtërpcë were looking for. He did not get more than two handfuls of votes. Perhaps it was because he had ‘failed’ them before by resigning. Besides, new was the participation of many new and young people listed to become Mayor or Assembly member. Hereafter he left the municipality and I did not see him back during the three months I was there. He had gone back to his wife and children in Serbia. He could have had a double agenda, but I do not think it was for his personal gain. His example demonstrated goodwill, hart for the municipality and perhaps for the existence, found under citizens/politicians, of a belief that this time things could change.

Although the candidates without political parties to back them up where not taken very serious and were not really successful, the fact that people tried is in my opinion quite a break away from the past. Serbian voters thought this was only because men wanted power or money, and the only real candidate was the one from the political party SLS, which is the only Kosovo based Serbian party. All

70 took personal risks. Apart from an honor question, it was sometimes life threatening. One Serbian candidate stopped his candidature just two days before the elections, because he had been threatened by other Serbs. Somewhere else in the country the house of a Serbian candidate was shot at, but luckily nobody was home that day. I conclude that the men that were trying also believed that change in general, and better governance, was indeed possible.

There were several Albanian candidates for Mayor. They fought their own battle in the Albanian villages. Unfortunately I did not have the time to visit an ethnic mixed village to see what happened there. But taking a look at the candidates, the Albanian candidates for Mayor and/or assembly member were all representing political parties.

The biggest parties in Kosovo are the LDK (Democratic League of Kosovo), which was founded by Ibrahim Rugova and the PDK (Democratic Party of Kosovo) which came forth out of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Prime Minister Thaci for example was a political leader of the KLA. Other Albanian managed Kosovar parties are the LDD (Democratic League of Dardonnia) and the AAK (the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo). All can be found in Strpce/Shtërpcë as well. Next to the recently founded party: the SLS (Serbian Liberal Party). This party is managed by Kosovo Serbs and the first Serbian party originating in Kosovo that is not (directly) related to Belgrade. All these parties are (for the time being) mono-ethnic.

The biggest rivalry under the Albanian parties is mostly between the LDK and PDK. For Albanians in Strpce/Shtërpcë the PDK candidate won. He was a big, relatively older man around his sixties, who had political experience, and had a well paid, respected job as deputy director of a factory. In the second round he competed with the Serbian candidate for Mayor, who was a young guy, around thirty, who was not as big, but did work-out and also had his hair neatly parted. The Serbian candidate had been working in Iraq for the US army. His father had been in politics during the Yugoslav days. They were very different in character and appearance, but they also shared characteristics. They both took care of their appearance, had some of their own money which they had earned themselves by hard work, although perhaps not in the usual kind of job, and they practically announced the same message. This message from the two candidate Mayors who were through to the second round was new. They both promised to be there for all citizens, without distinguishing ethnicities. Even if this doesn’t prove to be so in practice, the idea alone is already new and progressive. Thus far all had pledged for their own ethnic cause; focusing on the rights of their own ethnicity.

6.3 Reasons to vote Coming from years of a non-functioning government, people in Strpce/Shtërpcë were dissatisfied with the sitting politicians and the way things went. One reason to vote in general was to vote for better times. The elections of 2009 promised a general change: stopping the non-functioning Assembly etc., but also an increase in service delivery or better social ties. I do not know who started the message that this time things would be better. Perhaps it is a belief that is intrinsic to a new start. That belief or idea was further fueled by faith from the international community (ICO, EULEX, US Embassy) and the energetic messages from the candidates for Mayor. Citizens did not hope for better times too much, (not before and not after the elections), but the fact that something was going on could not be denied, not even by the most pessimistic Serbs or Albanians I interviewed.

Many civilians I interviewed commented that they had voted because they wanted better times. One (Serbian) young man I interviewed commented: “It cannot get worse, so why not vote?”. This short statement says more than that he simply wanted better times. This attitude did not mean that he, or others for that matter, really believed that this time the situation was going to change. Furthermore he did not clarify if he really supported the ideas of the candidates for this government. A third way to analyze his statement is by understanding it as a legitimate excuse to vote. By stating that ‘it’ (I presume life and also governance) could not get worse and that every intent for a change was a chance, he did not have to explain himself further to the Serbs of the competing parallel government structures supported by Belgrade. The fact that he had gone out to vote for the other government was of course not appreciated by the Belgrade supported government. At the same time he did not indicate he was for or against any government. Also, it was generally acknowledged that times were bad, that something had to happen en that nobody seemed to really have the means to make a change (interviews with citizens of all ethnicities, and interviews with employees of the government supported by Pristina and the government supported by Belgrade!). When only considering the practical logic, without considering political connotations, a new government was a new opportunity for a better life. The young Serb, and with him many other Serbs, had not chosen between ideas, but had chosen pragmatically for an opportunity he had not considered until now, in order to get a better life.

Albanians argued something similar, they voted because a new government was an option for a better life. But Kosovo Albanians did not have to make an excuse for their actions with regards to participating in the elections of 2009. It was either participating in the organization of this local government, or not at all. It was not an option for them to think about the local government supported by Belgrade.

What was further understood, was the language of the law and regulations. One argument to vote, was simply because this government was the only legal one in Kosovo. This argument was understood as such by Albanian citizens. It was mentioned by both Albanian ánd Serbian candidates for Mayor and Assembly. With referring to the Kosovo law they also referred to the police who support the institutions. They actually indirectly referred to the international community that helped construct the law. In short, they referred to many others from outside the municipality. These people were not directly involved in the political struggle between the two competing sets of institutions. These people however, were important for the continuation of the Pristina supported government as it meant an increase in the legitimacy of the government. Moreover they could provide resources, other means of support. However, the Pristina supported government still missed the support from their own citizens who they claimed to represent within the municipality. The support of the inhabitants of Strpce/Shtërcpë would increase the justness of their existence.

Albanians already knew (believed) this was the only legal government, nobody had to tell them that. For Serbs however it is a different story. Serbs see themselves continuously confronted with the question if an independent Kosovo and its institutions are legal, or isn’t it actually part of Serbia. They have to decide what they think for themselves. The fact however that the Kosovo police is the only police force in Kosovo and thus Strpce/Shtërpcë and the fact that this police force enforces the law of Kosovo is something they cannot deny. For Serbs this also formed another argument to vote, but not always from a positive perspective that has justice in mind. As a 23 year old woman, who was at that time running for Assembly member and was actually chosen afterwards, told me: “prisons are

72 dictated by Albanians, the police too, so I, we [Serbs], want to be sure of survival, we should try to have control over these institutions.” Out of fear for maltreatment in prison or anywhere it would be a good choice to vote for Serbs in the Pristina supported government. Namely, because of decentralization, the chief of police could for instance be chosen by the municipal government.

Decentralization was a concept that was not well integrated in society yet and not always well understood. However the Serbian candidate for Mayor from the SLS did use it in his rhetoric. He argued that now that Kosovo was seemingly independent (whether you agreed or not), Serbs could still have power. Decentralization was the magical term that would help Strpce/Shtërpcë develop. It would for instance make the development of a hospital possible (one of the extra responsibilities for Strpce/Shtërpcë) and as I just mentioned some power over the police was given to municipalities by having the opportunity to assign a chief of police. Decentralization was a reason to vote for the Pristina supported government, because it would lead to more possibilities for the municipality for Serbs than the Belgrade supported government would. Yet, at the same time the same Serbian candidate argued in his campaign that “their party had two ministers at the central government of Kosovo in Pristina”. In other words he would not only be Mayor and have power at the local level, which would perhaps increase a little by the extra competences due to decentralization, but he actually had ties at the central level. The ministers had considerable power at the central level. These ties were interpreted as such that it meant more power for him too. This was an argument that Serbs understood. He spoke the people’s language: central authority was important and they had good ties. It was also therefore that many of my interviewees believed he was the only serious Serbian candidate. And it made clear that ‘decentralization’ had not been implemented because of the ideal of relocating power for better governance; yet, it was interpreted as an extra opportunity that was given to Strpce/Shtërpcë.

One final reason to vote for Serbs was the fact that if they were not elected, there would be an Albanian Mayor. This reason can be linked to what I referred to in the previous two paragraphs: Serbs were afraid to be maltreated. Whether decentralization was the means for control or not, first Serbs had to have a leading role. They could not let an Albanian make decisions for the majority of the municipality. In the second round of the elections this became almost the only argument to vote. It worked, because the second turn-out was even higher than the first. Albanians actually reacted indifferent as to why they would vote for an Albanian candidate if they were going to lose anyway if all the Serbs would vote. They just gave their opinion by voting and agreed with the logic that a Serb would be Mayor.

6.4 Campaigning To win the elections some campaigning material were hung on trees, walls and electricity poles. Just a few men running for Mayor put posters on the walls. These posters consisted of huge faces. The local (Serbian) TV studio had reserved time for the candidate Mayors, in order to convince the people to vote and to vote for them. But just three of the twelve candidates were using this form of media, and only during the very last days. Other than that the candidates appeared to have the same message and did not confront each other publicly. The journalist I spoke to was highly irritated by the fact that candidates still did not take the elections seriously enough or instead did not know at all what they were dealing with and how to approach it. They missed marketing knowledge. He spoke of the incapacity of the potential political leaders. According to him this was not only true for Strpce/Shtërpcë, but also a reality in other Serb majority municipalities. Other citizens shared his

73 opinion, but for the voter under the age of thirty it did not seem to be such a big deal. Perhaps, I would say, because they had not experienced an election procedure going any differently.

What was happening more often was that parties were implementing services to offer food or wood (it was winter) to people in order to win their votes. Although this was considered as bribing by higher educated people, for some citizens of the villages it was welcomed warmly and without surprise [press conference NGO’s]. It was expected that if you received something, you would vote for the offering party. Not only did parties give away goods in return for votes, they also provided transport to the voting facility. People that had to walk far, or would not have been able to walk that far, where picked up by car. The boys driving received money from the political party and were supposed to pick up people that were only going to vote for that party.

Another example of corruption or illegal convincement strategies I heard of was while I was driving home with an Albanian friend who was also involved closely to the candidate Mayor. After the first round of the elections my friend’s neighbor had gotten a lift from us. Once we were on the road they started to argue. It began with the neighbor apologizing to my friend. The neighbor had been supporting another political party (Albanian LDK) and had been threatening people. If citizens would not vote for his party, the LDK, he and others would take their jobs or even lives. The LDK had lost the elections and instead the candidate Mayor from the other political party, PDK, who my friend was connected to, had won for the Albanian side. According to my friend, the neighbor was now scared to lose his good position within the community and wanted to know if my friend and he were still on good terms.

Although threats or other tricks that could convince people to vote happened on both sides, the elections were considered a success by the international community and by both candidate Mayors in the second round. In the evaluation reports and news articles no one from the international community spoke of the tense situations or other incidents. Individuals that participated in the monitoring expressed their surprise to me about the fact that only positive messages were expressed. The incidents were probably ignored, and considered minor because more people than ever expected participated in the election including Serbs. It showed that people were taking their fate into their own hands. Real support for the government’s strategies though, is not automatically to be assumed.

6.5 Reasons not to vote In 2007 it was clearly the national Serbian government that had called upon Kosovo’s Serbian citizens not to vote, but during the last elections their opinion was more moderate. In the elections of 2009 a local poster campaign to stop Serbs from voting was probably initiated by the local political leaders. In this campaign the Serbian candidates for elections were compared to Thaci (Prime Minister of Kososo) and Pieter Feith (EUSR) and put opposite the Serbian religious leader. In other words: the Serbian candidates were not really representing the Serbian people and would not represent them well, or do any good.

Serbian voters were actively being convinced by the competing government of the righteousness of the structures as supported by Belgrade. The Mayor of the Belgrade supported municipal government did an appeal on local television for Serbs not to vote. He argued that it would bring down the institutions of Belgrade that were legally elected (in contrast to these elections which were illegal). Other than making an appeal for the moral side of the elections and the consequences it

74 would bring to the Serbian community, the Belgrade supported municipal government took advantage of the fact that many Serbian citizens are dependent on the employment and money from Belgrade. During previous elections they had been threatened by ‘political figures’ from Belgrade that if they would vote, they would lose their jobs. This time, 2009, it was not so clear what would happen. The poster campaign was a silent threat, but it was not clear who sent it. People were quite tense. Also, politicians and leaders of the Belgrade supported structures stood stationed before the entrance of the election quarters, keeping an eye on the people that went to vote. Many Serbs did not take the chance and didn’t vote, but others were more courageous. In contrast to the last elections (2007), this time family members of the employees that could be fired did vote in the first round. It turned out that after the elections nobody was fired from their job.

Not only was a threatening environment supposed to keep people out of the voting cabins, also infrastructural obstruction caused by Serbs from the Belgrade supported institutions tried to stop access. The normal and obvious place to vote, was very ‘coincidentally’ being restored exactly during the days of elections. This was only announced a few days before. The new location that had to be found hastily, turned out to be a dance club, with a large staircase, difficult to access for old people. Although many people knew, or could guess, the intentions behind these sorts of coincidences, the Belgrade supported municipal government considers itself to be doing the righteous, legitimate thing.

Another reason not to vote, just surfaced by itself. Young people avoided having to make a choice by blaming the system. They had not received a voting pass by UNMIK officials, because at that time they were still too young. Now that they had turned 18 they had not received a card from the government supported by Pristina either, they were Serbian citizens, with a Serbian passport. They would rather passively sit waiting until something happened. They refused to undertake action to get such a voting pass, referring to the discussed legality of such a card.

Apart from the more obvious reasons Serbs would not vote, the Albanian turnout was far from 100% either. Some factors had to do with wrong information at the election centers (wrong lists of potential voters), but also because people just didn’t believe in a better functioning government. And besides, for some villagers it was just too difficult to reach the election centers. However unlike the Serbs, Albanians didn’t have such a difficult time deciding whether to vote or not. Serbs had a tough time deciding as they were being pulled from two sides that had positioned themselves opposite one another. One factor making it hard to decide was the balance in importance between the means and opportunities an administration would provide Serbs to prevail in the area and the fact that the Prisitina supported government was based in Kosovo considering it independent. The Pristina supported government could perhaps provide the best means for living, but the ideology completely opposed the Serbian ideal. Kosovo was indivisible, it was part of Serbia. Related to this ideal was the Belgrade supported government. The next difficulty was that this one government that supported the community’s background, its history and the known ways of dealing with things (administration, political parties etc.) was affected by the choice which they, the Serbs, would make. The Serbian votes did not only affect the result of the elections for the Pristina supported government, it also effected the competition between the two local governments and therefore the existence of the Belgrade supported government. In the next section I will describe the consequences of the elections and the high voters turn-out.

6.6 Consequences of the elections In November/December 2009 inhabitants of the municipality decided to vote out of pragmatic reasons. It seemed to overcome ideology. Everything that could increase living standards was worth a try, and so was participating as a Serb in the elections for the Pristina supported municipal government. On the 15th of November in the first round a much larger number than expected took part in the elections. This resulted in the necessity for a second round whereby an Albanian candidate for Mayor ran against a Serbian candidate for Mayor. During the second round of the elections in December, even more Serbs participated. This time to make sure the Mayor would be a Serb, in this case a young new face – Bratislav Nicolic. In other enclaves the turn out of the Serbs was also much higher than expected. In most cases the chosen Mayor was a man, open to represent Serbs ánd Albanians and to regard everyone as equal.

Before 2009, the Pristina supported institutions could not refer to the support of the people because they had been heavily boycotted by the majority community of the municipality. Now they can, just as the government supported by Belgrade does, show a pretty high voters turn-out. It is not as high as it was for the Belgrade supported government, but it is definitely a break-through. It is not certain what would have happened if people had not been threatened for example. Because of the participation of many Serbs against the will of the political leaders of the Belgrade supported government, the latter worries about its own survival chance. In interviews they reflected somberly: “we are regarded as illegal, which is not true, but anyway, and therefore the others [the Pristina supported institutions] are better off getting rid of us”. In reaction to the success of the elections for the Pristina supported government they victimized themselves. They were stating that they were regarded as ‘illegal’, while then in the same sentence saying that this was not true. The officials of the Belgrade supported government were already predicting that they would be chased away by the Pristina supported government. I felt like the Belgrade supported government was sitting and waiting with hanging shoulders: they wanted to be pitied. The amount of votes increased the legitimacy of the Pristina supported municipal government and therewith its power.

The elections changed the power equilibrium between the governments and started new actions. The Belgrade supported government was right that it would affect their existence. Before the elections both governments had been sharing the same municipal building for a few years, which had not made the situation any easier. The elections of November/December 2009 led to a change in the situation. The first thing the new Mayor did was to change the locks on the doors of the offices belonging to the Belgrade supported government officials, so that they would not share the same building anymore.

With his action the new Mayor did more. Unconsciously or consciously he showed the power of having the police as a back-up. In addition he enforced his words from the elections: it was either to be him and his government or them. They, however, were, as he put it, illegal and he reinstated this with his police force. He also made it a personal (Mayor) issue and did not involve any employees of the government as to avoid harming them. Acting bold like this he was taking a risk. The expected revenge in the form of a strike or anything more severe in terms of violence did not come (interview with two employees (Albanian) of the Pristina supported government).

A remarkable consequence of the election was the replacement of many people in the assembly of the Pristina supported government. Many of the new members were young, in their twenties. With

76 the large percentage of people under twenty-five this gives a better representation of society and could possibly provide a link to society. What is very special in the case of Strpce/Shtërpcë is that it has the first coalition in the history of Kosovo where in both ethnicities work together. This is a coalition with a Kosovo-Serbian party and a Kosovo-Albanian party. This coalition is the first form of political cooperation. The fact that Albanians were open to cooperating with a leading Serbian party points out that Albanians within the municipality consider it logical that a Serb has a leading position as Serbs form the majority. This is considered to be according to the rules and is an appropriate representation. So the willingness is there, but apparently also a shared ideal or ideas.

The newest constitution is as follows: five members of the PDK, five members in a coalition of LDK, eight members of the SLS (the winner of the elections), and one member of his own initiated party (which is an unusual result). The PDK (Albanians) and the SLS (Serbs) form a coalition. Only about five out of the 19 members had previous experience within political matters. The Mayor and the president of the Assembly are from the SLS. The first Deputy Mayor and the vice-president of the Assembly are from the PDK.

The inauguration on January 12th 2010 of the new assembly illustrated several things about these new people. It was clear that the two parties had made agreements on the inauguration matters. For instance, two women (one Serb – from the governing coalition, one Albanian – from the opposition) were chosen from the midst of the Assembly who counted the voting procedures for the president of the Assembly. It was interesting to see that they trusted these young women. Also, in the way the new Mayor, Nikolic, had ordered guests and Assembly members to sit, it became clear that Nikolic respected the international and national community. The internationals and central government figures were placed in the armchairs in the front room, where the Assembly usually has its meetings. The municipal members sat at the back on the normal public seats. With the pillars of concrete dividing the room, the distance between the Mayor and his assembly was larger than the distance between the Mayor and the international/national invitees. For me the communication between the Mayor and the Assembly felt uncomfortable with the columns blocking them in between. But the presence of the international/national invitees in close sight of the Mayor demonstrated his respect toward these invitees. The preparation for the inauguration changed the ‘traditional’ ways of doing things and showed initiative. It was clear that the new politicians were aware of the need for change and the need for an active or even pro-active approach to internationals to achieve this change.

They would do anything to break free from the image of a non-functioning government. And by changes in one set of institutions there seemed to be movement in the relationship between both sets.

6.7 Conclusion: What does the election of 2009 tell us about the framing and legitimation strategies of the competing governments? In this chapter I analyzed the election period of 2009. Both institutions are similar in organizational structure, but the elections illustrated that they differ in political strategies and in ways, so to say, to move Strpce/Shtërcpë forward. The reaction to the elections showed a future-oriented approach by the Pristina supported government and a history-oriented approach by the Belgrade supported government.

The Belgrade supported government refer to important Serbian cultural values, religion and history. They focus on their own ethnicity. In short, they refer to all aspects of the indivisibility frame. Besides, to legitimize their existence the Belgrade supported institutions point at the wide spread support they have on the grounds of tradition and continuation of the old system, concluded from the huge participation they had during the elections of 2008.

The Pristina supported government in contrast focuses on the positive ethnic relationship in the region. During the elections in 2009 the message of the winning party was that all people are equal and should not be judged on their ethnicity. In fact the latest development in ethnical relationships is the political coalition wherein a Serbian and an Albanian political party work together. The Pristina supported government thus puts an effort into framing Strpce/Shtërpcë as the home for both Serbs and Albanians, and they frame the government as the institution that represents all of Strpce/Shtërpcë’s inhabitants, whether Serb or Albanian. For their legitimation, the Pristina supported institutions point at the Kosovo law, which indicates that the others are illegal, and since the elections of 2009 they can also refer to a considerable amount of votes.

The reaction from the Belgrade supported government politicians towards the upcoming Pristina supported municipal government is one of defense. The Belgrade supported government retreats, victimizes itself, and blames their own people for it. By voting for the Pristina supported government, Serbs have brought disaster upon themselves. According to the Belgrade supported government this really is a pitfall.

The Pristina supported government does quite the reverse and attempt to move forward by trying new things and seeking to be pro-active. In the competition with the Belgrade supported structures it is now going more for a strategy of attack. Within the Pristina supported institutions in Strpce/Shtërpcë pragmatics seemed to overcome the status question, or indivisibility frame. However, the competition between the two governments did not cease, but inflicted this status question and myth, where Serbs were the victims because they lost their homeland.

What is also illustrated by this chapter is that the attitude of the new Mayor of the Pristina supported government of 2010 seemed to be different in comparison to his predecessor. The government seems to be more (pro-)active in its request for help. However the Belgrade municipal government seems mainly to look for help from one single source: Belgrade. Belgrade however seemed more absent than present during the elections for the competing governmental structures based in Kosovo. The elections have not only created a new assembly and Mayor, but fulfilled the so-called ‘historical moment’ with a historic amount of votes and new approaches. In conclusion we can say that these elections were all about the practical functioning of the municipality. People voted out of pragmatic reasons, and less so because of their support for the ideals, ideas and plans of the government. People have had different priorities. So perhaps the indivisibility frame has not ceased to exist, and the legitimacy debate will not be defined differently, but there is a need for a pragmatically acting government. Made clear by this election it seems that governance was not framed by the claim over territory (who is the legitimate ruler), but by the claim of pragmatics (who is best capable of organizing the daily needs).

The critical event, the election, showed aspects of the relation between the two competing governments: the fight for legitimacy and the development of new relationship between them. In the next chapter I will try to describe and thereby explain how this political event fits the administrative, practical side of the governments.

7. The parallel governments in practice Reach of the ideological claims

In this chapter I will take examples from infrastructural and youth management programs to explain the functioning of parallelism in Strpce/Shtërpcë. This chapter goes beyond the theory of parallelism, and starts from the field. There might be a discrepancy between parallelism as materializing in Strpce/Shtërpcë in practice, and in theory. This theory that represents parallelism, but also the frames that are expressed in Kosovo, can be found in (policy)papers of both sets of competing institutions or in claims being made by them in public (or interviews for that matter).

To make the picture of parallelism as it functions in everyday life in Strpce/Shtërpcë complete, I have picked out two very different tasks of a government. I have focused on infrastructural policies and actions and on youth related activity. With examples out of those two sectors I will illustrate a hard and a soft side of a local government’s management. Whereas infrastructure is tangible, youth related actions and policies are less concrete and visible and require different skills. Infrastructural projects can be for everyone. Youth is a specific target group and asks for a different approach. It first asks for empathy and understanding, to see what the youth needs. What is needed could for instance be an infrastructural project, but it could also be a reconciliation program.

As I stated in the theoretical framework in chapter two, one element of parallelism, beside the normal task completion, is the legitimation of the claims to govern. The management of both topics by the governments will probably shed light on this struggle. Furthermore, the field experience not only shows the competition between the two municipal governments, but the examples also illustrate people’s perspective towards the government and how they deal with parallelism. Finally, the examples of infrastructure and youth illustrate a difference in the importance of the ideals, the frames. Both subjects are framed differently. They not only portray the indivisibility frame, but also ‘abnormal happenings’ (as small as they might be), creative options, or ways of avoiding cleavage triggering competition.

7.1 Infrastructure Infrastructural projects were eyed closely by many villagers. It was a topic mentioned often by interviewees. Probably because it is recognizable; it is visible and thereby developments can be detected. And it is not only a topic the citizens of Strpce/Shtërpcë relate to good governance, I began this thesis by quoting an international expert on municipal governance who compared governance to picking up garbage; a service delivery that needs infrastructure. Infrastructure related to many things. I think of roads, but also buildings (houses, public buildings, cultural centers), playgrounds, sport fields, water supplies, tubes and lines underground – sewage systems, or above ground - electricity and other cable webs or communication techniques etc. In the municipal government supported by Belgrade, infrastructure is dealt with in the department of ‘urbanism and planning’ and in the Pristina supported government in the department of ‘urbanism, planning, reconstruction, development and public services’.

Citizens probably talked about infrastructure too, because it touched on the everyday necessities of life. The damage caused by the bombs, fires and shootings in the war of ‘98-’99 was soon repaired. New houses were built, sponsored by international aid organizations, although these were not enough to house all the IDPs. The main road was asphalted by KFOR. However, the region had long

80 been underdeveloped (as they claimed themselves). Villages consisted of dirt-roads, there was no asphalt. Electricity poles needed replacing, as did the drinking facilities. New wells had to be dug. Also, only the central village Strpce/Shtërpcë, with a 100% Serbian population was the only one with a complete sewage system. The other villages needed a replacement or still lacked closed sewage lines. A last example of the importance of infrastructure was caused by the cold weather and snow. Snow on the roads could be dangerous. The cold weather required sufficient heating and, for example, closed houses and schools without holes in the walls.

However, which government would be doing what, was not easy to predict. It was not clear who was accountable or responsible for what. Lamp posts for instance are not ‘owned’ by one municipal government in particular. When nothing needs to be done, there is no problem, but when something needs to be repaired, maintained or newly constructed, it is another story. Ethnic division in and between villages offers some sort of boundary, which allows you to automatically assume whose jurisdiction it is. But the Pristina supported local government claims to represent both ethnicities, and in effect they are supposed to not care about these ethnic divisions. In the end the factor that most likely decided which government was going to do the work was down to money. Sometimes it was also decided by the expertise of the government, or third parties that were interested to work together with specifically one or the other.

In some cases citizens did not wait for the local government to implement a project and found their own solution. In such cases none of the two local governments were much involved. Citizens either pro-actively approached third actors, or third actors initiated plans themselves which were welcomed by citizens. Firëjë/Firaja, one of the exclusively Albanian villages, has a very new road and school. Both projects were initiated by others rather than the local governments. The school was built by the central government from Pristina. The roads, and also the sewage system were an initiative by the village representative in cooperation with international organizations. USAID donated a large amount of money, but the citizens also had to pay a total sum of 20.000 Euros themselves (interview with the village representative). International donors, like Caritas, started a project without really consulting the local government. Permission was asked to start their projects, but such requests had never been refused before and it only seemed a formality. Hence, the infrastructural projects that were easy to notice, were not implemented by any of the municipal governments. Most of the projects with high visibility were implemented by international organizations.

In spite of the involvement of third parties and the creativity of inhabitants, people still watched the moves of the local governments and desired action from them. Infrastructural projects done by one of the governments were for instance interpreted by villagers as examples of corruption (asphalt that was ‘forgotten’ to be laid the gravel, which led to the gravel having to be laid twice), or they illustrated the equal treatment of ethnicities by one of the governments. Several Albanians expressed their fears to be left out of the government’s policy programs . “Projects were first [and only] implemented in Serbian villages”. An equal treatment of ethnicities is according to Kosovo law a proportional division of projects implemented in Albanian or Serbian villages. However, during the election period in 2009 for the Pristina supported government Albanians pleaded for a different implementation standard. They claimed it was better to implement projects in places with the highest necessity. Apparently Albanian citizens of the municipality of Strpce/Shtërpcë felt they were most in need of infrastructural help compared to Serbs. This line of thinking is logical considering the

81 fact that for Albanians only the Pristina supported government provided (infrastructural) services. Serbs were also supported by the Belgrade supported municipal government.

Furthermore, according to Strpce/Shtërpcë’s inhabitants, infrastructural projects were not only important for their daily needs, but the implementation was also understood as the will of the local government to invest in business. Infrastructure such as roads, water- and sewage systems were believed necessary in order for Strpce/Shtërpcë to be attractive to companies, factories and tourists (interviews with infrastructure department Pristina supported local government and various citizens).These new people needed a toilet that worked, electricity and the basics of running water. Serbs and Albanians claim that otherwise “the investors would be scared away if this was not easily accessible, because they are used to having it at home (and that was only logical) and because it was necessary to develop and run a business”. In addition, also the maintenance of existing infrastructure was interpreted as an act to increase the desirability of Strpce/Shtërpcë as a place to invest in.

In short, people seemed to estimate the value of the local government by its infrastructural projects. Moreover, it mirrored the (non) cooperation of the two local governments. There are two examples I have picked out to further illustrate several aspects of the functioning of a government and especially of parallelism: the ski-centre and the implementation of a sewage line. I will consider the competition between the governments and I address people’s perspectives on the governments considering infrastructure.

7.1.1 Ski-centre & indivisibility The ski area is considered highly important by national as well as the international community for the development of Strpce/Shtërpcë. The subject was also central to the last elections of the Pristina supported government. Especially in winter, the ski resort is one of the most mentioned and discussed subjects by Serbs and Albanians. Before the war it generated many jobs and a lot of money. Inhabitants of Strpce/Shtërpcë (mainly the Serbs) carry good memories of the ski area. According to them, one way to solve the problem of unemployment in Strpce/Shtërpcë these days, would be by privatizing the ski centre.

The ski-centre has been investigated by many people, researchers, investors and journalists (see for more information for example the ICG report 2009). I have not been looking into the exact issue of the ski-centre. Instead I have listened to the solutions and the experiences surrounding the ski-area. What does it mean for the people? What does it mean for the local governments?

The local governments would like to improve the job opportunities in the municipality. Nikolic, the new Serbian Mayor of the Pristina supported municipal government elected for 2010, believes in a chain reaction which will allow other businesses to prosper and bloom. “Everything is connected”, he stated. The ski centre would provide many jobs, tourism would increase and with that other branches would have the opportunity to prosper. By then the famous local cheese could be sold again, restaurants would be working again and the same goes for the hotels and shops (like they did before the war). And it all starts with the ski-centre.

Employment would also be good in dealing with emotional and social health. According to inhabitants of Strpce/Shtërpcë, solving the high unemployment rate, would solve the tension in the political discussion. Albanians and Serbs alike reasoned that “If people would have a job, they wouldn’t be interested in the political situation anymore. They wouldn’t look for someone to blame,

82 but just go to work.” But just this, generating work, seems difficult. At the same time the mentality of the people in Strpce/Shtërpcë (mostly of Serbs) was often mentioned as an obstacle that kept them from working. “It is not that there are no jobs to be found, but the demands of people are too high”, several people (Albanians and Serbs) remarked. Can the government do something about this mentality? Should it create jobs and to this by focusing on the ski centre? I don’t know. The citizens of Strpce/Shtërpcë however, believe that if the ski area would give an opportunity to work, they would all want to work.

The ski-resort, as the inhabitants of Strpce/Shtërpcë call it, consists of several ski-slopes, with lifts, several hotels and a private road running uphill to the slopes. A public company, “Skijalista Srbije”, owns the place. The Board of Directors of the ski resort consist of Serbs, mostly living in Serbia. The managers of the different hotels and other facilities that are part of the area are local people. Finance comes from the public company “Skijalista Srbije”, that is for a large part owned by the Serbian Government. The money that has been made during the prosperous years before the war went to Belgrade and was not reinvested in the ski centre (for about the last 20 years). The bankruptcy of this company is not the only obstacle in the way of the development of the area. Maybe the most prominent reason delaying any reconstruction is the question of ownership.

Pristina considers the ski resort to be Kosovar, because it is on Kosovar territory. If the board of the ski resort consisted of Serbs, but was totally independent, the situation would probably not have ended up in a deadlock. However the fact that the central government of Serbia is involved with the company that owns the area, has made the issue a political one.

Citizens feel the consequences in everyday life. Not only is there no employment or pay checks being paid, enjoying skiing or snowboarding also becomes more and more difficult. Both Albanians and Serbs complain about the attendance of the road that runs to the Ski slopes. The Belgrade supported municipal structures have reconstructed the end of the road on the mountain where the elevators begin (elevators of which now only one works.) However the director of the Belgrade supported department of infrastructure explained that it seems the road is not theirs, but owned by the company of the ski-resort. In his opinion the investments would not actually be doing their local government any good; they would be doing the work of the company; it would only be in their favor.

In the last ten years there hasn’t been a solution. At least two handfuls of investors were interested, but all drowned in the political swirl (interviews with locals and internationals). Since the decentralization laws of Kosovo, the local government supported by Pristina has been appointed competences in order to influence the privatization process. The US embassy, which has a lot of central and local power, very much supports the involvement of the local authorities. The Pristina supported government as constituted in 2010 is supposed to organize an expert committee that will tackle the privatization problem. On the other hand, when residing in Strpce/Shtërpcë I also heard about a European committee probably been put together to do the same job. What exactly the course for coming year(s) will be, is still not clear. A first date to start working on this process was set for January 2010, but was postponed soon after. A new move forward after ten years of discussion is that all parties involved seem to acknowledge the necessity and opportunity to privatize the ski- centre. Privatization would amongst others be a solution for the political problem.

The extent to which the municipal governments can be directly involved in selecting the new owner of the ski-centre will be influenced by the municipal governments itself, but also by the international

83 community and the central government of Kosovo and Belgrade. Time will tell what will happen. However, immediate influence of the Pristina supported municipal government can be seen in the constitution of a new department within the government: ‘tourism’. This directorate is set up to advertise the surroundings of Strpce/Shtërpcë and create room to put the surveillance of the ski centre under a heading. Although not one of the governmental parties involved with the ski resort was thinking about changing the viewpoint, the necessity of change is acknowledged by all. Therefore, room for different coalitions regarding a new committee with new approaches seems to have been developed. It suggests a possibility for a reframing of the situation, or in fact suggests that the reframing has already started.

One last remark about the politicized problem of the ski area, before addressing another example of an infrastructural project, is about the link with the indivisibility frame. The fact that the ski-resort has Serbian owners was never really a problem until 1999. Before it was owned by a Serbian company, doing business in Serbian territory. However, after 1999 and especially after 2008 when Kosovo became independent, Serbia’s claim that the company was still in Serbia’s territory became disputed. It was now considered to be in Kosovar territory. Nevertheless the government in Belgrade considers the territory indivisible and still part of Serbia. Both the government based in Belgrade and the government based in Pristina, claim that the power over the (piece of) territory is not dividable. By framing the territory indivisible, both governments legitimize their claims for power over the ski- resort. The ski-resort has been framed in terms of the indivisibility frame. However, from 2009 onwards new coalition are being formed, and the employment-needs of people are by some politicians being pushed to the foreground. The question thus arises: is the practice, the everyday reality, winning the battle over politics? Is the need for development and employment pushing away the political ideologies?

The next issue exemplifies that on local level the two governments do share some territory and power.

7.1.2 Secret cooperation for a sewage line Before the elections of 2009 concerning the Pristina supported structure, a new infrastructural project was executed. One local government had been busy extending the sewage system, the other reconstructed the asphalt after the sewage line was done. Although this seemed to point out some sort of coordination between the two local governments, every director or assembly member I talked to, stated that there was officially no contact at all, let alone cooperation, between the institutions. “There was no contact with the illegal, parallel ones”, both said about the other.

It could not be denied though that the sewage line - road project was some sort of cooperation. After asking various stubborn people at the Pristina supported government, the cooperation was acknowledged by the director of urbanism and planning from the institutions supported by Belgrade. There was no real cooperation in the formal sense, but people did go for a coffee together. Everyone knows each other, and besides politics, personal contact between both sides does exist. Consequently, any coordination between the two local governments can and does only go through personal ties (Serb – Serb). This little bit of personal contact seems important in order to achieve some goals.

Meanwhile, infrastructural companies of both ethnicities are also in contact. Public companies supported by Belgrade are for example tied to headquarters in Serbia and are supposed to use their

84 own (Serbian) equipment. Due to obligated tax payments at the border when bringing in equipment from Serbia to Kosovo, or because a speedy delivery may be required, most Serbian companies now have an Albanian counterpart who provides equipment and materials. So again practice, pragmatism, seems to overcome political framing. This also means that the power of the Belgrade supported government is not sufficient enough to stop this development.

Both municipal governments use the rules of tender to assign projects to companies. Tender rules are European based. I have not explored the rules, but will only refer to the comments people in Strpce/Shtërpcë made on the way things worked out in practice. Although a tender is, in principal, open to companies from all over Europe, directors of both governments admitted this grudgingly; they did not give projects to companies that were either based in Belgrade or in Pristina. The Belgrade supported governmental institutions only give projects to companies registered in Serbia. The Pristina supported governmental institutions admitted they mostly give their projects to companies not registered in Serbia. They both also talked about foreign companies, internationals, which could join the race for the project admittance. Apparently the dispute about whose territory it is and who has a right to work, exceeds the rules of Tendering. Furthermore, in practice, chances for implementation of projects are highest for Kosovo registered companies who take the job from the Pristina supported governmental institutions, as they fit the law that is directly at hand in all places and upheld by the police. On the other hand Serbian companies can provide expertise. On the whole, one seems to need the other; either for knowledge, money or law enforcement back-up.

Business reunites people, and this seems also to be true, to a small extent, for the local governments. Both the examples of the ski-centre, but also of the sewage line ask for practical and economic thinking. However, according to all those I interviewed, this is a rare phenomenon. So why is it then that, in these two cases, room for new approaches to the problem were created? The idea that the territory and the power over it is indivisible (the frame of indivisibility) was highly present in the case of the ski-centre, but to avoid the deadlock that this causes, politicians seemed to be open for new ways of confronting the case. The case of the sewage line illustrated that informal contact makes collaboration between departments of the competing governments possible. It might even create some cooperation, but it is totally dependent on willing individuals. Interestingly both cases took place around the elections for the Pristina supported structures. This, I presume, cannot be a coincidence.

The sewage line and road were fixed just months before the elections. Talk about new committees and ways to address the issue about the ski-resort appeared a few months before the elections and became a point in the campaign. The projects (sewage line – road and ski-resort) were most probably used as examples to convince people of the possibilities, planning and implementation power of the municipal government. Perhaps it was part of legitimation strategy. However, in the case of the sewage line – road project it did not become very clear for citizens (as usual) which government had done what. It was also watched with some sort of indifference. There was even some suspicion: “they only did this because of the coming elections” and “they only hastily did this, but again did not fix it properly. Look at the streets now, they are flooded” (interviews with Serbs who lived in the village). And an Albanian thought it was again a project in a Serbian village and was therefore not helping Albanians. The project seemed to somehow backfire and not increase the legitimacy of the governments much.

In both cases, the sewage line – road project and the ski-resort, people were agitated because they wanted something to be done. It is true that in the case of the ski area the Pristina supported municipal government still has to prove itself. The start of the implementation of a plan by the international community had already been delayed. The fact however that the government was taking the problem seriously and that it was thinking about new ways to solve the issue, together with some international organizations, was positive.

By citizens it was not said with so many words, but the indifference that at least Serbs showed illustrated that they didn’t care who would solve the problems, as long as the road was fixed (in all villages) and the ski-centre was working again. In the answers of Albanians during interviews a more competitive attitude was noticeable. As I understood it, it was important for Albanians that a local government would fix the infrastructure, but it was also very significant that indeed the Kosovo based government, the one supported by Pristina, would do it. Albanians were not in favor of sharing political power.

In this section about infrastructure I have looked into specific infrastructural projects and concrete activity which explained something about the working of parallelism and the importance of framing in legitimizing the actions of the governments. The issue of the ski-resort was clearly framed as a problem caused by the indivisibility frame that was now mostly an issue at the national level. On a local level, citizens of Strpce/Shtërpcë (Albanians and Serbs) argued that economic development needed to be most important. Economic development seemed to weaken the dominance of the indivisibility frame and therewith the impasse the governance was in, making room for new coalitions and reframing.

In the next section I will focus on ‘youth’. I will also look for the policies of the government, wishes of people and the influence of the indivisibility frame on this topic.

7.2 Youth Most interviewees referred to the youth as the future. With over 50 percent of the total population being under 25 years old, the youth, I assumed, would be listed high on the governments’ agendas. Different studies have shown that the youth needs to be challenged, otherwise in unstable, conflict prone areas, violence could be a result of trying to get a better life (Richards, 199621). Communication to connect the local government with the youth is in that sense important for the sustainability of the country. Besides, if they would leave, there would be no future for Strpce/Shtërpcë. As a representation of the population it is thus needed for the local government to know what the youth want and how they think.

However, ‘the youth’ was not specifically mentioned during the elections. Why was this and what do the two governments organize for the youth? This topic is on a different level than infrastructure. It has a different starting point. Policy for youth entails culture, sports, education but also infrastructural needs. It is a specific target group and asks for a different approach from a government than the implementation of infrastructural projects. It will be interesting to see if we can make a similar conclusion for the youth as we stated above for infrastructure. How does parallelism

21 Paul Richards did research in Sierra Leone into child soldiers and the reason for participating in war. He actually reasoned that the low expectancy of the future caused smart, jobless youths to join the violent fight for a better life. (1996:25,33) 86 and consequently the competition between the governments reflect in youth policies? In order to win the competition or legitimize the governments’ actions: how is the youth framed?

Two subjects about the youth appeared as a red line throughout the interviews: 1. the wish of elders for the youth to grow up peacefully and in cooperation with other ethnicities and 2. the necessity of activities for these youngsters. I will begin with describing the last aspect.

7.2.1 Lack of activities During free time after school, and after eventual graduation many young people have nothing to do. The employment rate is very low and there is a need for an organization to provide activities. One Albanian journalist, living in Bröd/Brod, the second largest Albanian village in the municipality of Strpce/Shtërpcë, argued “we have no infrastructure in the Albanian villages for sports, cultural enjoyment or any other spare time activities. This is in contrast to the Serbian villages.” He added that “ complaints from the Serbian youngsters about the lack of activities was because they did not make an effort to use the infrastructure that was already there. However, the Albanian villages lack any infrastructure whatsoever to even be able to start activities.”

As I met this man only once, I cannot tell if he was exaggerating or not. What I do know is that he was upset with the current situation, and that he believed Serbs were better off. However, the Albanian youth travels to Ferizaj/Urosevac, the closest city at hand, to get entertained. The city offers more facilities than the municipality of Strpce/Shtërpcë altogether. Serbian youth might in fact be disadvantaged because they do not go to Ferizaj/Urosevac, which they consider dangerous or at least unpleasant for Serbs. Vacant buildings in Serbian villages seemed to confirm the Albanian journalist’s statement that Serbs did not make use of the room they had at hand. But it could also be connected to the fact that the position of director responsible for culture was not filled by the right person, and in effect nothing was organized. Also, perhaps the places were not in line with the wishes and needs of the youth. For instance the display of a construction site with remnants of a basketball field showed the interest of (one of) the municipal governments. But it also illustrated that at the same time (environmental and social) circumstances were not always taken into account to implement the project successfully.

Culture was part of the department of ‘education, culture, youth and sport’ in the Pristina supported government and a sub-department next to education and sport in the department ‘social services’ of the Belgrade supported structures. End 2009 it was only the director of the Belgrade supported structures who people referred to. After several misunderstandings and some confusion, I found out the name of the person that filled the position. Each time I called him, the director of culture (Serb) however claimed that he was too busy to talk to me (he has been the only one during the three months of research). I suspect he did not want to talk to me. The former director (also Serbian) on the other hand was eager to inform me about the business.

He had been director of both governments at the same time. He had held this position for about six years, from the beginning of the UNMIK period (around 2002). Initially he was hired by both the UNMIK supervised local government and structures that were supported by Belgrade. How this exactly worked I could not find out. Most people were not very clear about the years prior to 2008. What I do know is that the former director of culture received a double payment. I also know he was expelled from his job after the declaration of independence and elections for the Belgrade supported structures in 2008. Apparently the Belgrade local government had a strong influence on him and his

87 position. According to the former director the Belgrade supported government “wanted someone that had less initiative and listened better”. The fact however that another director was installed and that this director broke off the relationship with the former UNMIK institutions that now were supported by Pristina, illustrated the ideological gap between the two governments. Independence was not recognized by the Belgrade supported government and a political institution supporting it was not to be cooperated with.

The former director of culture was quite dissatisfied with the way he had been treated. He expressed to me that he felt like he was fighting all the time against uncooperative people. The fact that his car had been set on fire (by other Serbs he suspected) a year before he got fired, probably adds to this feeling. He also observed that since he had left his position (2008), activities had stopped and fewer activities had been organized. How or why exactly the Pristina related local government had let go of the position and even the location, the cultural house, did not become clear to me.

This story perhaps generates more questions rather than clarifying the situation surrounding the responsible person in culture within the local government. Further research would probably fill in the holes. What I understood and found relevant for this research was the fact that this former director, had been devoted to his job and was mentioned in almost all stories I heard about activities in culture or sports. The man that had been responsible for culture in the last two years, was not quite in the picture. The former director however still had many plans, but implemented less than he had done before. He now acted independently, organizing dances, having a small gym next to his house and organizing other business. But he still expects the government (whichever) to sponsor him in his cultural activities. According to him: “I do not have enough resources or money. I do not want to ask parents for money, but sometimes I need to if I do not get project based money from the government. Also, I have put a lot of energy into organizing all sorts of things, I had a disco going on in the cultural house each Saturday, but I do not want to put so much effort into it anymore. Without me it would all stop and nobody else is good enough to continue it”. He could not find anyone that would put as much effort into it and could multitask the way he did. I do not know if there really wasn’t anyone else good enough, or that this was just his opinion. The guy had a special reputation in the municipality. He organized many things, but I was warned that he mostly talked nonsense, ‘bullshit’.

Next to him him, the former director of culture and his initiatives, I did not find many others that organized activities for the youth. The other personal initiatives I could make out were the bars – which mostly shared the same music and drinks. The non-functioning of the director for culture was probably part of the reason I could not ascertain real governmental strategies regarding the youth during my three months in Strpce/Shtërpcë. The break between the directorates of both governments represents the indivisibility frame and probably could count on support from Serbian citizens (the voters turn-out for the Belgrade supported government was that year 80%). However, with the non-functioning afterwards its legitimacy seems to have decreased. After a period of more emotional stability, practicalities rose in importance. It seems that the government was now held accountable for the procedures and products it delivered and less so for the side they were on in the indivisibility matter.

Many youth activities that had been organized in the past (between approximately 1999 and 2008), were done so by the international military Kosovo Forces (KFOR). For example when KFOR first

88 settled, one of its soldiers started a karate class. However as soon as he departed, the classes stopped too. In the time I was residing in Strpce/Shtërpcë, English classes were organized by Spark, a Dutch NGO. Spark was setting up a University that would be open for all ethnicities. The level would be high, internationally recognized, but required pupils to know English. They organized English classes, so the youth would be able to pass the compulsory English test. The English taught in the extra classes was for free, and of quite a basic level. Still many students did not join the classes, and the ones that signed up, often did not show up. Meanwhile many of them kept complaining that no activities were being organized. They wanted activities that did not include using their brains: dancing, going out or sports, (art was not done). However, the former director of culture told me he felt that the youth he coached, for instance, in folklore dancing were not so grateful either.

Not wanting to be guilty of directly ‘blaming the victim’, I asked myself the question: why did I hear exciting stories about karate, but did young people not show up at English class or were they not content with folklore dancing? It was not that they disliked it. In the case of English I am talking about adolescents who also had other homework to do and did perhaps not really see the relevance of learning English. But this is just a guess and it cannot explain the fact that Albanian youth had a higher presence rate in general than Serbs. Perhaps it had to do with the fact that for Kosovo Albanians the international community had been welcomed like a savior, and Kosovo Serbs had witnessed this as a destruction. Folklore dancing, I know from interviews with three Serbian girls of whom two had stopped and one still continued, was really appreciated. It was part of their culture. However, it was also considered old-fashioned. Moreover, it was something the two girls had done for some years, but they had wanted some change and to learn new things. Last, but not least a remark on learning new things. The father in a family is an important figure and many times controls the do’s and don’ts of a family22. There is a lot of social control and fear in the villages and this means that fathers often blow the whistle on their kids and do not permit them to do ‘new’, out of the ordinary activities.

7.2.2 Education and non-reconciliation The approach of the local governments towards the young future generation is ambiguous and the youngsters have inherited this ambivalence. On the one hand people ask for peace and activities, on the other hand it seems the same people do not hold on to chances or do not make an effort themselves. For the new generation (about 30 and younger) it can be said that they do not know much about the other culture. Firstly this is a consequence of conscious separation and avoidance. But also because the social lives of the youth is just organized in different places.

Different organizations for different groups of people is nothing new. It reminds me for example of the ‘pillarisation’ in the Netherlands; a compartmentalization along political and religious lines. Protestants and Catholics had different schools, different sport clubs and different political parties to vote for and go to, and did not cross each other’s lives. The separation of lives of groups in Kosovo however is implemented in approximately all elements that form a group: history, language, culture.

Albanian and Serbian youth do not know each other’s language. When I once rode a bike trough a mixed ethnic village in search for the house of a friend, I found myself a bit lost. So I decided to call my friend and ask two young boys (about 18) on the streets to explain to her where I was. Before the

22 I had actually observed and experienced this, but during my presentation at the media centre Caglavica someone drew my attention to it. It was of big influence in daily life of Serbs and Albanians. 89 guys took hold of the telephone they asked Serbian or Albanian. I was not immediately aware of why they asked this. In my own confused state of mind, I did not realize that although people knew the village, shared the streets, lived in lookalike houses, they did not share lives. But reality caught up with me. The two guys were Albanian, knew a bit of English, but did not know Serbian. My friend was Serbian and did not know Albanian. I was confronted by the fact that just very few learned each other’s language by their own initiative. Whereas Albanians learned Serbian before the war, these days, people younger than 30 do not know the other language. I have not encountered classes in Serbian and could not find any Serbian language books in Strpce/Shtërpcë or Pristina – the biggest city and most likely to have all material at hand. It is even rarer that Serbs learn Albanian, although books and classes can be found (mostly for internationals in English or Albanian). They bounce off against a big wall of unwillingness.

Other than the language, youngsters do not communicate because, as I mentioned above, they are simply not in contact, and spend time in different places. Until you are a teenager, you spend most of your time at school. The school systems for Albanians and Serbs are totally separated. The educational systems run parallel as they are part of the parallel system of the municipal governments. In more countries there are differences between schools, but the particularity of Kosovo’s system is that they do not even share the same basics (except perhaps for math). One program or policy is invented in Pristina, the other in Belgrade. People and materials are financed either by Pristina or by Belgrade. Teachers are either completely Albanian or completely Serb. In effect, there is not only a difference in most importantly religion (as elsewhere around the world), but also in history and language. One regards Serbia to be central, the other takes the point of view of independent Kosovo. School is an influential place where the indivisibility frame is not only institutionalized (two school system) but also internalized (by the students). I dare to state it even more strongly: the school and the space a school forms is framed by Serbs as a piece of Serbia. When you are at school you are ‘in’ Serbia. The consequence is that different perspectives are formed about the past and current situation. The perspectives form contrasting sides of the spectrum. Not only do these children not know each other’s mother tongue, but they are not aware of each other’s cultures or perspectives either.

KFOR once organized a youth camp for children going to primary school. The original goal had been to bring together Serbian and Albanian kids. Unfortunately it was not organized well. The Albanian kids were invited too late; the headmaster said he received a call that same day. They were however able to organize themselves and drove up to the camp, but were not welcomed at the gates of the camping field. According to the Albanian headmaster of the school, the initial camping project was blocked by the Belgrade supported municipal government who had expressed their disapproval of Serbian school children playing with Albanian children. If this was the case the Serbian schools would be denied permission to participate. After the failure to allow children of both ethnicities to play together, excuses were offered to the Albanian headmaster by the highest ranking officer of KFOR. A subsequently organized soccer game for both ethnicities on an army base was a success, but did not involve the smallest children of the primary school.

The example shows the competition and non-cooperation between the two local governments, even if a third party is involved and takes the initiative. The Albanian headmaster, who is also a journalist, even implies worse: obstruction of cooperation between Albanian and Serbian kids by the Belgrade supported structures. I have not spoken to the Serbian members of that government, or to KFOR

90 about this particular incident, so I cannot confirm if the headmaster was right about the reason for hindrance. On the other hand he did get apologized to and a soccer game was organized for the grown-ups in which both ethnicities did participate (I had heard about this soccer game before in another interview). Does the obstruction actually imply that the Belgrade supported government does not want Serbs to reconcile with Albanians? Or can we only suggest that it happened because precisely education and everything that touches it, is complex. Education has a strong symbolic meaning in Strpce/Shtërpcë. This is where the children are raised and learn about their past and present. The idea I offered, that the Serbian and Albanian school merg, was not possible. Albanians were of course welcome at Serbian schools and the headmaster of the Albanian school would welcome Serbian children, but it was very unlikely that it was ever going to happen. All I interviewed on the subject were content with what the Serbian and Albanian children learned at their schools. If interaction is wanted, it must come from another level. Even a sports competition between Albanian and Serbian students has not yet been organized! Serbian students compete with other Serbian schools, Albanian youngsters with Albanians. The education system plays a big role in parallelism, to start with it provides a complete spatial segregation. Besides, for the Belgrade supported government it is an important department that legitimizes its existence. The youth carries the future ideologies. It is only logical to keep them separated from ‘poisonous’ influences, such as the wrong ideology, i.e. the wrong claim to indivisibility.

7.2.3 A future outside of Strpce/Shtërpcë or even Kosovo? Another consequence of this parallelism (two governments directing two educational systems) is that Serbian and Albanian teenagers approach the future differently. They have very different future perspectives in the sense of schooling, work or living areas. In Strpce/Shtërpcë’s the youth has different travel destinations. Albanians go to the University in Pristina or work in Ferizaj/Urosevac ; Serbs travel up and down to Mitrovica/Mitrovicë North or some intelligent people with the right connections go to big cities like Belgrade or Novi Sad in Serbia. Serbian youth who move to these big cities outside of Kosovo, also picture themselves working there. Most of the Albanians and Serbs appreciate Strpce/Shtërpcë, but have doubts about a future there. They all have doubts about what the future could bring them in terms of positive challenges, employment, friends and financial resources. In general, at present they are in need of the same things: activities, room to develop or employment opportunities. But whereas Albanian youth see themselves living in the cities in Kosovo, Serbian youth consider moving to big Serbian cities outside Kosovo.

What all young grown-ups have in common is the dream about working abroad, crossing the borders of Kosovo and Serbia. Nearly every family has one or more members working somewhere else in Europe (many times this is in Germany), or even America. Those members often provide much of the income for a family. The local government is then needed to provide passports or other identification papers. The Belgrade supported government tries to gain legitimacy by providing possibilities for movement and traveling. The fact that Serbia was trying to become part of the European Union and that visa’s were not necessary anymore when traveling with a Serbian passport, was making the Serbia and its representing office in Strpce/Shtërpcë more attractive. At the same time though there’s a snag: Kosovo Serbs were not automatically seen as Serbian citizens and were not allowed a Serbian passport anymore. You had to be born outside Kosovo in Serbia, to get the passport and the advantages of the visa. Not every Serb knew this nor realized that this act meant that Serbia could not ‘protect and see’ the Serbs in Kosovo, the same as for Serbs living in Serbia. Serbs working for the Belgrade supported government were reluctant to mention this. Citizens who heard the news for the

91 first time were looking confused. Those who immediately understood the implications often became angry and needed to share their opinion with friends, but were also powerless. People found it incredible that Serbia had agreed to this and Kosovo Serbs in Strpce/Shtërpcë mentioned they felt like playing cards, trumps, that could be played whenever it pleased Belgrade. I also heard several comments on the policy of the Belgrade local government in Strpce/Shtërpcë that was not informing its citizens well. Although both municipal governments try to advance their positions by provision of ID’s, they do not always succeed in increasing their legitimacy

Apart from striving for legitimacy, the passport issue exemplifies an ambiguity to the region Kosovo as being indivisible from Serbia. A passport makes clear to which state you belong. If Kosovo Serbs were not included in the ability to get a new Serbian passport plus its visa advantages, this meant that Serbia recognized the break with Kosovo. While national politicians claimed that Kosovo was inseparable from Serbia, in practice they had decided that Kosovo could be left out of the picture when other issues counted more. At the local level, for Kosovo Serbs however, a passport meant more, it was recognition of their bond with Serbia. However the stalemate in politics made life more difficult in practice.

7.2.4 Future trends in politics under youth? Regarding perspectives on the municipal government there seem to be two (opposing) trends to detect amongst adolescents. The first one might not be surprising when considering the acts of national (and local) governments. Some young people turn away from anything that has to do with the government. (Serbs rather leave the place than work at it.) Speaking about the government institutions in general an 18 year old Serbian girl said: “all politicians lie”. Apart from the literal meaning that there was no hope in trusting the local government, the girl also gave the impression that nobody would be there for them. The politicians, both from the government supported by Pristina and the government supported by Belgrade, were not going to attend the real everyday problems of its citizens (perhaps she was only thinking about Serbs, but she did not mention anything about the communities). She was a smart girl, good at mathematics, and considered studying in Serbia, but had a boyfriend in Strpce/Shtërpcë.

In contrast, the second trend shows an increase in interest for undertaking action yourself. About five people (Serbs and Albanians) of around twenty-four years old are now seated in the Assembly of 2010 of the Pristina supported municipal government. The Mayor of this local government, Bratislav Nikolic, is early thirties. Although many of the assembly members might not have any political or managerial experience, they do have the will to develop the municipality for the better.

This second trend might be useful in addressing the young public. Children are talked about as if they are the future. Policies for reconciliation or at least cooperation and meetings amongst the youth are nevertheless implemented only by a very few and very few times (I only heard about one project of two weeks happening every year with just a few participants). Instead of adjusting children to a cooperative system of different ethnicities, where they share a sense of belonging; the educational system, and thus the governments, they literally have them separated. What is more, a future is many times considered best outside Strpce/Shtërpcë and even outside Kosovo or Serbia. Logically, the new young politicians know better what the youth need in life than the older politicians.

7.3 Conclusion: what do infrastructural and youth projects tell us about parallelism in Strpce/Shtërpcë? The projects of the local governments and the initiatives of citizens tell us two things. For one people are skeptical when eyeing the practices of both local governments. For citizens it is not clear which of the local governments is doing what, but it does seem that nowadays citizens do expect some action from their governments. The success or failure of projects indicate the functioning of the local government and contribute to its legitimacy. The indivisibility frame is clearly influencing practices: no official contact between both municipal governments and no exchange in education programs.

Meanwhile, although politically speaking no compromise between both municipal governments seems possible, individually a person can create room for negotiations. There is no official contact, let alone cooperation, but personal, individual contact seem to close the widest gaps and find practical solutions. The indivisibility frame seems to loose its dominant position in infrastructure, when it’s about economic benefit or other improvements of livelihood. It then touches upon cooperation, pragmatism and avoiding the deadlock which the opposing ideologies would cause. However, within subjects that have to do with history, language or culture the indivisibility frame keeps its dominant position and a wider gap between the two sets of institutions can be noticed. These subjects form the base of the legitimacy of the governments.

Interesting will be to watch the development of the new, younger generation politicians. In spite of the many reasons not to believe in good governance anymore, they became interested in politics. In addition they were supported by the citizens of the municipality to try and lead the municipality. The young Serbs and young Albanians in the Pristina supported local government however have experienced totally different education and are brought up with different claims to indivisibility. Nevertheless they seem to share the focus on pragmatic thinking and achieving results.

Still, to bind the young people, “the future”, to Strpce/Shtërpcë, much has yet to be organized. Hopes are up for the ski-centre. But this might be too high up and farfetched. However, organizing activities to fill the free time of the young people of all ethnicities, might be an opening to get youngsters of both ethnicities together. Right now, it seems that two separate groups of youth are growing up, with different ideas for the future.

8. A shifting frame? A young generation interested in politics, and pragmatic voters for the Pristina supported municipal government, illustrate a certain movement in communication, interpretation and actions, although perhaps small and slow. In this chapter I will analyze the development of frames while considering the empirical data I have just described in the previous chapters. Therfore there might be some overlap in the information, but I will organize it in a new way and thereby shed new light on the analysis and knowledge of frames. In this chapter I have mainly focused on identifying the trends and not on describing the situation how it is. Where I started from practice to theory in the previous chapters, I will now take a theory and see how it returns in the field data. This theory points out links between concepts which I would otherwise not have connected (as clearly). Taking this theoretical approach adds to a better understanding of frames and in particular the level of importance of the indivisibility frame.

I based the analysis in this chapter on the four elements listed by Arts and Buizer (2009), as I explained in chapter 2 in the theoretical framework. I will organize the information according to the concepts: framing, coalition forming, rules of the game and power relations. Arts and Buizer have described these four concepts as the building blocks or foundation of policy arrangement. However these building blocks also help in recognizing developments in framing and the effect on frames. The theory can well be used to detect movement in framing. Also, if one part in the foundation changes, I expect to see change in the other concepts too. This way I can crosscheck the analysis. However, when a change can be detected regarding one of the concepts but does not appear in the other concepts, it does not necessarily mean the first interpretation of change is false. It could be that more time is needed to see the changes develop throughout the four concepts.

8.1 Framing In the theoretical chapter, chapter two, I defined framing as a process that provides the tool to form a clear notion of the world. The reality construct of one person does not have to comply with everyone’s reality. When shared by a group the construct is referred to as a frame. “Framing denotes an active processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction. It is active in the sense that something is being done, and processual in the sense of a dynamic, evolving process” (Benford and Snow, 2000:614). Concerning Strpce/Shtërpcë I herewith describe three trends in framing. Two concern the right to govern, and two consider the way to govern.

In the competition for existence and for being the sole ruler of Strpce/Shtërpcë it is about legality and legitimacy. Remarkably, it seems that perspectives have changed in the past ten years regarding whom to call legal and whom legitimate. During the non-decisional time with regards to the status issue of Kosovo when UNMIK ruled, the Belgrade supported structures were first considered legal and legitimate, but later they soon lost on legality. Because of the unclear status situation the Belgrade supported structures where the representation of the former pre-war structures, which were never officially declared illegal. In contrast, the Pristina supported structures could at first, when Kosovo had just declared its independency in 2008, be considered illegal and not very legitimate, but has since won on both terrains. It was not clear if and who would support Kosovo’s independency and with the act of Belgrade going to trial against Kosovo’s independence it was framed in terms of law and justice. Moreover in Strpce/Shtërpcë Serbs (the majority of the

94 municipality) did not vote in the elections for the Pristina supported government, but participated en masse in the elections for the Belgrade supported government. As I argued in chapter five the different voting turn-out in 2009 changed the statement of legitimacy based on votes. The position of both governments seemed to change slightly, although the framing really intensified. Because of the independence the issue of indivisibility became far more on the surface. Both sets of institutions that compete for governance in Strpce/Shtërpcë frame the future of parallelism in ‘either or’: It is either Serbs prevailing with the Belgrade supported structures, or the Pristina supported structures pro independence and Albanian. The indivisibility frame is present. Sometimes political leaders exploited the framing of the situation in indivisibility by using the general fear, using people’s pride, using the victimization theory of the battlefield myth, or using the right spokesmen (e.g. religious leaders).

However the fight over the right to govern has moved from national level to a more local level. Indivisibility was seen to be caused by the national political leaders facing a gap and an irreversible stalemate situation. Although in interviews it was often said that all had to wait until they solved the problem at national level, actions at local level showed more pragmatism and perhaps a slowly developing consciousness of decentralized power opportunities. Strpce/Shtërpcë was on the one hand still approached as being the homeland and indivisible in theory and pragmatism made others realize that staying put with these thoughts did not bring anyone any further. I interpreted this as a shift in understanding the role of a government. First the government was framed as a symbol, materializing indivisibility and traditions, now it is slowly becoming framed as an organization that governs pragmatically and is action orientated. The organization provides services to enable everyday life.

Another shift in framing can be detected within the Pristina government structures. It was illustrated by the last election campaign (2009). Both a serious Albanian candidate for Mayor and a Serbian candidate for Mayor launched the message that they were representing every citizen of Strpce/Shtërpcë (without making a point of ethnicity). People were in the first place equal. That some belonged to the Serb community and other to Albanian was not to influence decisions. With this remark, the focus on the ethnic differences between communities, shifted to a sense of togetherness. It was a call to work together on building up Strpce/Shtërpcë. Questions about the culture of the other, implying stupidity and lack of capacity, were now left unanswered as instead the focus shifted (although perhaps very little) towards pragmatism and dealing with the functioning of governance and living conditions together.

Related to this I would like to add that it seems that the government used to be framed as a result and representation of the past, while this call for general representation shows a framing of the government as a vehicle for the future.

8.2 Coalitions Coalitions are groups of stakeholders that share a claim (Arts and Buizer, 2009). A stakeholder can be a single person, but also a business corporation, government, political party or for instance a NGO. With new claims, new rules or new frames, new coalitions tend to organize themselves. The regrouping of stakeholders partly finds its way on its own, but can also be actively influenced by actors who try to convince others of the righteousness of their claims.

In general two sides to the indivisibility frame can be found: Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. However the rigidness of the indivisibility frame differs per situation and per group. Within the groups different claims are made and kinds of ‘sub-coalitions’ are formed. In the text below I will explain briefly the different groupings in the Belgrade supported government and several trends concerning coalitions in the Pristina supported government.

Within the Belgrade supported structures two political parties are strong: the most are conservatives – the radical party: the SRS (Serbian Radical Party) the party of the Mayor, and a more progressive party the DS (Democratic Party). I found the message of the SRS was heard most, which is not surprising as it is the party of the Mayor who is the face of this government. A powerful supporter of Serbian prevalence is recognized in the Orthodox church. It is assumed to be a supporter of the Belgrade supported structures, but the Priest personally would not admit to this. The influence of the Church in the legitimacy and continuation of the Belgrade supported structures did not became clear to me. There was probably a difference in terms of the local and international level of importancy of the Church. Directly involved in policymaking were the Serbian ministries. Belgrade needed information from the local front, but the local politicians also awaited permission from Belgrade in order to undertake action.

Coalitions within the municipal government as supported by Pristina changed a great deal last year. Coalitions are mostly formed according to political parties and then following ethnic lines. So the LDK and PDK are separated, each having their own background, but when governing they are in it together ‘against’ Serbian coalitions. A couple of years ago the Kosovo Serbian party, SLS, was founded and also settled in Strpce/Shtërpcë. The foundation of a Serbian political party that is Kosovo based is in itself a sign of different framing. Instead of focusing on the status issue, Serbs actually seek political influence from the Kosovo government. Before the elections of 2010 coalition were mostly formed along ethnic lines; the group with the same ethnicity shared the same claim. In addition Serbs within the Pristina supported government who would support the claim and goal of the government were not easy to find. The disagreement of Serbs with UNMIK structures or the independent government structures supported by Pristina became an obstacle in decision making. The SLS however and the individuals that participated in running for Mayor in the elections of 2010 for the Pristina supported government seem to have enlarged the Serbian coalition around the claim.

Since November 2009 new parties were involved in the elections for the Pristina supported structures. SLS had gathered a lot of people. The candidate Mayor, Nicolic, gathered people around him he thought could be of hand. Many were young and politically inexperienced people, but who were business minded and pragmatic figures. Serbs had a party to vote for in the elections of 2009. (Before 2009 a Serbian political party based in Kosovo to vote for did not exist.) The SLS was the only party with more people than merely one leader. Its connections on central level at the ministries was considered very significant.

Interesting and completely new is the political coalition of Serbs and Albanians in the assembly of the Pristina supported local government. The SLS and the PDK (the winning parties, respectively Serbian and Albanian) decided to form a coalition to govern, creating thus also an opposition of both Serbs and Albanians. The fact that a Serbian and Albanian party make a decision about a policy together is the first time in history. As I just mentioned in the previous paragraph, before the different ethnicities did not share the same claims and would not be in the same coalition. However, other

96 claims now surfaced which became more important and apparently linked two people of the two coalitions together. The fact that Serbs and Albanians are now formally and informally working together on one claim, will probably have its influence on the support they get from the grass roots level. The possibility of this new message and the new coalition, might convince more people (Serbs and Albanians) about the option for framing governance in Strpce/Shtërpcë differently too.

So in the Pristina supported government a move can be detected from the old and long sitting conservative party, to a new and younger generation. However in the Belgrade supported government the people chosen in 2008 are mostly conservative and primarily come from the ‘old gang’/ old league. What does this mean for negotiations about which government is doing what in the municipality? Unfortunately I left too soon to answer this question. However, logically a contra- reaction will occur for which the ‘old gang’ is needed. It seems to be natural for the Belgrade supported government to be or support this contra-reaction as they are the ones that focus most on the past.

8.3 Rules of the game With the rules of the game Arts and Buizer (2009) meant the conceptualization and scope of laws, rule design, and control of compliance at national and/or international level. The scale of their case was bigger than mine. I add that the local laws and rule design are very important, and so is the control of these rules on local, street level. Over the past ten years these rules and laws in Kosovo have changed with the regime in power. First the Serbian law counted, but in 1999 an interim solution was found by UN in establishing Resolution 1244, in 2007 Pristina wrote a new law for an independent Kosovo. As I accounted earlier this independence caused much debate, also in international spheres.

The first Serbian rule of law was something everybody knew and lived with for a long time. It was enforced by Serbian police forces. Several Albanians have told me stories of humiliation, discrimination and even physical abuse by these Serbian forces. The second era of Resolution 1244, set up by the UN, was accepted by most of Kosovo’s citizens. The Serbian law was taken as a basis, but made less discriminatory. Moreover UN officials observed and supervised police and military forces. Also special international military troupes, KFOR, took care of the protection of citizens and materials. Paradoxically the UN officials themselves were above the UNMIK law, but had to account to international law outside Kosovo. The third constitution of law, as a result of the independence, is now the only law the Kosovo police is implementing. The Kosovo police consist of Albanians and Serbs (and third ethnicities) trained by internationals. The implementation of the rule of law is still scrutinized by European internationals, under the program EULEX. It also includes the courts. Nevertheless Serbian citizens of Strpce/Shtërpcë expressed their fear of being bullied and harassed by Albanian police forces. The chief of police in Strpce/Shtërpë explained that in Strpce/Shtërpcë depending on the village, officers always worked in mixed pairs: one Albanian and Serb together. Yet, Serbian citizens were afraid to go outside the municipality, where they did not know the cops. The fact that the police officers work in pairs consisting of two different ethnicities is not only interesting for practical reasons, it also symbolizes what the Kosovo law stands for: cooperation and a multicultural society.

The latest turn of events, the implementation of one set of laws for Kosovo only, has never been accepted by Serbs and has resulted in a dual law system. In Strpce/Shtërpcë are for example two

97 courts; one following Serbian rule of law, one following the Kosovo rule of law. This situation is confusing for citizens and also for lawyers. A Serbian lawyer in Strpce/Sthërpcë said: people are confused by the parallel structures. There are two courts for two local governments. They don’t know where to go, how to act. And often we as lawyers don’t know how to advise them. Conclusion, yes it is a dilemma, how to deal with it?” This lawyer has both Serbian and Albanian customers and tries to find his way in the courthouses. He actually considered that the difference in laws was overrated when stating that “only approximately five percent of the rules vary between the Serbian law and the Kosovo law. Moreover this percentage does not make much of a difference at all, they are only small changes.” In practical terms it might just be a small difference, however, the slight shifts in the law has a bigger meaning. It symbolizes who is in power.

Internationally, it’s actually Kosovo’s right to be independent and the right to have an own set of laws that is debated, not the actual law. I elaborated on this debate in chapter four. The United States of America has always supported Kosovo in its decision. Europe is not convinced that quickly. However in August the international court of Justice decided that it was not against the law that Kosovo called itself independent and wanted to organize their own national law. More importantly, although the international community might be divided in its opinion about the independence, they are working together in organizing and advising the country in fulfilling its Kosovar rule of law. The law as of today has been written while considering the international law.

Thus considering this section about the rule of law, I would conclude that the Kosovar autonomy is increasing. However for people to have room to live well together and according to the rule of law, the indivisibility frame needs to weaken in its dominance. The fact that there is one law enforcing system and that his system is Kosovo based, enforcing Kosovo’s law, push people towards a pragmatic understanding of reality in which Kosovo is independent. All inhabitants of Kosovo need to live conform Kosovo’s rules. Life will then be framed from legal perspectives, or practical reasoning so to say, maintaining the rule of law, and framing the region in terms of indivisibility need to diminish in importance.

8.4 Power relations Framing, coalitions and the rule of law all influence existing power relations. As explained in chapter two, Arts and Buizer (2009;13) distinguish three sorts of power: decisional, discursive and regulatory. I already mentioned in the three sections above how power is involved. In this section I will elaborate some more on this.

8.4.1 Decisional power Decisional power refers to political influence at different levels and by different actors (Arts and Buizer, 2009;13). Although I have not participated in the politics I did detect some people who have a lot of power and/or hold interesting places in local politics. I will sketch a rough overview here. For a more elaborate in depth analysis, more research needs to be done.

First of all, as I mentioned in chapter four about the context of Kosovo, it is debatable how much power the local politicians at municipal level have. Money is often given project wise; municipal bank accounts are very recent. The reparation of a window in a school will first need approval from the central government, the department of finance, before the school or any local employee of the government can undertake action. The same goes for decisions about the national park area, where many houses were illegally constructed. The Pristina supported government wrote a plan to counter

98 the construction, but has already been waiting two years for approval to continue. The actual decisional power was in both cases thus with the central government.

For about two years new laws about decentralization should help the local government supported by Pristina in more local decisional power. The government can be more decisive towards the construction of illegal houses. Furthermore, a municipal bank account needs to take care of the inconvenience of bureaucracy and long waiting periods.

A second way the central level is involved in the municipal level is through personal ties within political parties. By some it is assumed that political leaders at the top still strongly suggest who runs for candidate Mayor. This Mayor has to deal with the political powers at the party’s central level and does not only implement his own program. It did not become very clear to me how the relationships exactly were or what strategies were undertaken to convince the other. Who had power to do what? It only became obvious that the Mayor, who seemed to be in power at the local level, was not alone in his decision making, but had ‘help’ from the top. This was also very much the belief of the citizens of Strcpe/Shtërpcë, who on the one hand saw the need for these connections, but on the other were against them as they would corrupt power.

At the local level the Mayor had much decisional power. It appeared to me that the Mayor of the Belgrade supported structures was very much advised by the assembly members and action was undertaken by some of the directors. The Mayor of the Pristina supported structures was for many years the only one (with the first Deputy Mayor) who made the decisions, without the help of an assembly. The assembly did not gather. Instead internally the directors took up power to take care of the internal organization. After the elections for the Pristina supported structures in 2009, the new Mayor of the Pristina supported government and assembly were again both in political power.

In times of the non-functioning of one of the assemblies, international players had a lot of room to decide about projects themselves. They only needed a signature, which was certainly given. International NGO’s had a lot of decisional power when it came to implementing projects, because both local governments could use the money offered. Therewith they had a huge influence in the final implementation of the policy of a local government.

Moreover the international community was also very much present at the central level, advising the government. But it was also assumed that the advising went a step further towards actually pressuring. Powerful players often mentioned in interviews were the US embassy, but also the executive director of the ICO. If he considered it necessary he actually had a legal final say in all decisions. Decisional powers can thus very much be looked for in individual people who represent a larger community. Society is hierarchically organized; whether it contained a political issue or consisted of business. So, with regard to framing, if other frames and coalitions are needed or wanted, the important people to convince of your claims at this time are still the hierarchical (political) leaders.

8.4.2 Discursive power Discursive power is comprehended as the capacity of the coalitions to (co) frame political discourses (Arts and Buizer, 2009;13). So, the first question is how to create a strong coalition. Secondly, it is the question if this coalition can (has the capacity to) frame political discourses. In the context of my thesis I seek for the power to find support for the claims of the coalition, enlarging the coalition and

99 the capacity to change the claim while keeping the coalition together. It stays vague in terms of what Arts and Buizer mean with ‘capacity’. It can contain the level of intelligence, power, resources or position. I understand the capacity in the ways of Goddard who points out the necessity of the reference to other peoples reality.

One way reality is interpreted is through the indivisibility frame. The claims to this frame differ. The division in sides is mostly represented by ethnicity and by government. First I will analyze the discursive power of the coalition that revolves around the claims of the Belgrade local government thereafter I will elaborate on the discursive power of the coalition formed because of the claims of the Pristina supported government. In analyzing the discursive power of a coalition I also kept in mind the information I had about the decisional power. In the previous section I stated that most of the time one man has most decisional power. To be able to contribute to a frame, it is important that your message is considered legitimate. To legitimize your claim it is not enough for the sender of the claim to have a legal status. To invoke certain people and create a coalition, the claim must refer to people’s system of norms and values (frames) and their ‘language’23. It is thus important for a coalition to have the right person to lead the way and announce the right message, in the right way.

As I noted in several other sections of this thesis the Belgrade local government and supporters claim that Kosovo and Serbia are indivisible and the Belgrade local government is the only legitimate ruler. Serbs in the Belgrade local government have a strong message and are strongly connected but only to a certain group. Symbols that are used in the message are not at all recognized by Kosovo Albanians. Moreover, it looks like they only have strong contacts with some Serbs, a ‘core’ coalition, and many other Serbs listen to other messages24. However, the supporting coalition of the claim of this core of Serbs in the Serbian supported government, seems to reduce in numbers. This might have to do with several of the other trends I have shown in this chapter. It might have to do with the Kosovo law that has become more present, or with the new sound, new ways of framing on the side of the Pristina supported government or perhaps because the security-level in Strpce/Shtërpcë has increased. Let me explain the last example, before giving the new message my attention. One tool to get the claims about the indivisibility of Kosovo across was the usage of the fear that haunts civilians. Obershall (2000) illustrates with the example of Bosnia the influence of threats and the insecurity dilemmas that drew ethnicities back to their own ethnic group in a defensive position. In the case of Bosnia it caused a ‘crisis’ frame to surface, dominating the peaceful cooperation frame. In Kosovo the trend might be the other way around. The claim of the Belgrade supported government was one stated in crisis and fear. The crisis seems over for now (it is of course relative and might surface again). With a real crisis lacking, feelings of fear lessen and the defensive mode can be switched off. There is room for new claims and new frames. However it is the question if this coalition that consists

23 Goddard (2006); language should be understood here as way of communicating 24 The strategies the Belgrade local government uses to retain a position in negotiations leads to polarization. Goddard (2006) explains that in case of polarization strategies can be culturally dissonant and actors have strong and central ties with one coalition, but weak and informal ties with another. The weaker ties are not necessarily the weaker actors. And with a developing Pristina supported government that gathers a coalition around different claims, the representation of the claim of the Belgrade supported government seem to lose its majority power. In the competition with the Pristina supported government the Belgrade supported government will then have less options at bargaining table because of less ties (a smaller coalition).

100 of the Belgrade supported government and the supporters of their claim can change this claim based on crisis, reframe indivisibility in the more peaceful setting.

The other side of the indivisibility claim that was almost exclusively supported by Albanians, seems to have become less important. This claim was important for Albanian parties within the Pristina supported government, but this government now seems to symbolize a new frame25. The discursive power of the coalition, a coalition which surrounds the new claim about shared necessities and cooperation and which consist of the Serbian political party (SLS) participating in the Pristina supported system, sole political figures (Serbs), but also Albanian Political Parties as the PDK, seems to increase. It is a frame of working together, building up the municipality without discrimination and not paying more attention to the past, but to the future. The people (whether part of a political party or not) that are connected because of this claim, seem to be ambitious, pragmatic and future- oriented. The ones that have the task of bringing the message across, such as the new Mayor, seem to send the right message across which is understood by many, though it still doubted in its workability. Nevertheless, the fact that many Serbs came to vote for the advertisers of this new and fresh message in the first round of elections, illustrates support. A shift in action, the voting, not immediately means a shift in mindset, or frame. Nonetheless, also based on other trends I previously stated, I conclude from this actuality that indivisibility is perhaps not the most central frame anymore, but has made room for pragmatic thinking. This frame touches less on the political spheres, but has become a more personal opinion.

8.4.3 Regulatory power Regulatory power refers to the capacity of the coalition to design and enforce rules themselves (Arts and Buizer, 2009;13). With regards to the enforcement of the law, living according to the rule of law, the influence of the Kosovo police is increasing. However the rule of law is not so strong everywhere. Within coalition, political parties are of influence in enlarging the coalition. These parties and their support have regulatory power within the organization. As a critical journalist remarked: “if negating their offer, or going against their will, you risk your life”. The party leaders enforce their ‘private’ rules violently if necessary. Also a lot of power is in the money distribution. It seems to be used to conduct one’s own wishes.

A sort of victory for the Kosovo police forces was the trust of the KFOR in the organization. In the last couple of months KFOR withdrew its first thousand soldiers. The troupes had been protecting cultural heritage and are now leaving it to Kosovar protection forces. The Kosovo police is also very important for the support of claims that come from the Pristina supported government. As illustrated in the previous chapters the Pristina supported local government has good ties with the Kosovo

25 If I take the new messages and the new people into account I think of strategies containing coalition mobilization or perhaps even yoking. You can speak of coalition mobilization when ties between an actor and the network become stronger, thereby increasing the legitimacy of the statements of the actor. There must be a cultural harmony between the statement and ways of bringing the message and the coalition. I would have liked to see the new people and new messages to be a case of yoking. In the case of yoking: “Legitimation strategies go beyond resonating with existing coalitions. Rhetoric instead provides a focal point around which new identities can form and coalesce: actors themselves can be created and transformed during the course of strategic interaction” (Goddard, 2006:48). Actors point out the shared identity and thereby create an identity bridge. The new message in which Serbs and Albanians are considered being just people instead of focusing on their communities, indeed points out a shared identity. Not only are Albanians and Serbs all people, they also share many of the same pressing problems in Strpce/Shtërpcë. However to call the new Mayor an identity bridge, is a bridge too far. 101 police. The police is acting by the rule of law of independent Kosovo, thereby considering the Belgrade supported government to be illegal. The enactment of policies by the Belgrade structures are approved as long as they obey the rules. Asking permission to build or demolish something is a rather complex situation, as the Belgrade supported government actually acts upon the law of Serbia and does not recognize the Kosovo law. The Kosovo police however need to see a permit given by the Pristina supported government, otherwise they consider the act against the law. As the Pristina supported government would never give permission to the Belgrade supported government because in their eyes the whole institution is illegal, the Belgrade supported government doesn’t have much power to enforce their claims. In theory coalitions with claims that go against the Kosovo law don’t a high survival rate.

8.4 Conclusion: What do the four factors tell us about frames in Strpce/Shtërpcë? The examples of the four factors, framing, coalitions, rules of the game and power, illustrate a general trend towards a new way of framing everyday life in Strpce/Shtërpcë. A new way of framing that is possibly supported by new coalitions, definitely made easier by the changes in the rules of the game, and seems likely to survive when considering discursive and regulatory power. The fact that there are certain trends in framing, a change in coalitions and that there are new laws cannot but influence the parallelism in Strpce/Shtërpcë and the dominance of the indivisibility frame. Changes can be seen in all four criteria and seem to point in the same direction. There is a movement going on that is future orientated, pragmatically orientated and that deals with the reality that Strpce/Shtërcpë is closest to Pristina and needs to live according to its law.

It could be that because my intention was to look for changes, I also found them. I did not search for a confirmation of the status quo. Nonetheless changes can indeed be noticed in all sectors. It looks like it will influence the existence of parallelism as it now is, it also competes with the indivisibility frame, but what exactly will come in place of governance or force back the dominance of the indivisibility frame, I cannot say.

What we saw in other chapters was that the indivisibility frame, and frames in general, structure everyday life and the government. The interaction between the four factors in this chapter also support the relatedness between framing and (policy) practice. Furthermore the date in this chapter has made it clear once more that frames are also structured (by changes in rules, coalitions, framing etc.). It seems that the coalitions that the Pristina supported government is involved with are the strongest changing framing patterns. The coalitions that the Belgrade supported government is involved with are strong in keeping the situation as it now is, enforcing their ‘traditional’ claims. However, in a context where the old and traditional claims have not proved to work well in practice i.e. for economic benefit of citizens; there seems to be room for welcoming changes.

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9. Conclusions The aim of this thesis has been to describe the functioning of parallelism in Strpce/Shtërpcë, a municipality in Kosovo with a Serb majority population in an Albanian dominated region. I analyzed parallelism with the theory of framing. Asking myself the central question in this thesis: ‘How do local parallel governmental institutions of Strpce/Shtërpcë function in the context of the national territorial indivisibility of Kosovo?’.

To gather the right information I lived in Strpce/Shtërpcë for three months, doing qualitative research. I observed and interviewed people about the daily practice of parallelism. To complete the picture of governing in a country that is framed as indivisible by Albanians and Serbs and that deals with parallel government structures, I started the research at the bottom of society; at the very core of everyday life with experiences and local practices. I argue that the communication about these practices, but also the practices itself can tell us something about frames that exists in society.

In this final chapter I summarize and conclude with the most important findings; I end this chapter with the possible future perspective for the two competing sets of institutions and some remarks for further research.

9.1 Conclusions First we can conclude that parallelism exists in Strpce/Shtërpcë. Parallelism is the existence of two similar sets of government related institutions that operate parallel to each other and also compete. Interestingly, however special or abnormal parallelism seems to be, apparently people can live with two mayors, two community councils, two courts, two sets of law... sometimes exercised from the same building! In short, they can deal with two competing sets of government institutions. One set is supported by Pristina, the other set is supported by Belgrade. Both sets of institutions are formally separated, but at the same time showing lots of similarities. The situation might be confusing, but it has not come to a clash (yet) and somehow it functions (but not too well).

The previous chapters have shown that although the organizational structure of the institutions are quite familiar, its ideals and messages (claims) are not. The main issue is the legitimate ownership of the Kosovo territory, based on historical heritage. This historical heritage is turned into framing the territory as being indivisible. Serbs claim Kosovo to be inseparable from Serbia. Albanians claim that Kosovo should be an autonomous entity with one government, and do not (want to) share power over Kosovo with a government based in Belgrade. Both sides claim this indivisibility leads to their power and right to govern the territory of Kosovo. This indivisibility is not just a statement or interpretation. It shows through decisions, and processes of both governments and even concrete actions are influenced by the indivisibility frame. In Kosovo politics thus overshadow the administrative side of governance. When everything is politicized it is very difficult to achieve concrete goals. The ski-resort in Strpce/Shtërpcë is a good example of how the indivisibility frame politicized development, causing a stand total standstill, which from an economic perspective is totally insane. The indivisibility frame serves as a legitimation of the existence of two governments. But this thesis shows the framing beyond the indivisibility frame is not static. Signs of dynamics can be seen, that could render the indivisibility frame less dominant in future.

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The indivisibility frame is under pressure because of the needs of people for (economic) results and because of international interventions. Internationals bring their own frames (such as the belief in decentralization of governments) with them. Besides, they make sure there are elections, they work towards strengthening a national government by advising the coalition to stay together and take care of the law enforcement system in which both Serbian and Albanian people participate. By doing so they force the Belgrade supported government to reframe their claims and existence in order to function within the region.

The dynamics in framing and the shift in frames can be recognized in practices, but also in changing coalition, laws and law enforcing institutions. For instance, many Serbs voted in the elections of 2009 for the Pristina supported government that they first boycotted on the ground of law and history. Serbs even participated in these elections of the Pristina supported government to become its Mayor or Assembly member. A Serbian political party based in Pristina was established two years ago and has now become the biggest party in many of the municipalities with a Serbian majority population. Also, individuals (Serbs) within the two sets of governmental institutions, though not officially, informally cooperate together on infrastructural projects. In the end, the examples point out that the situation seems to become framed more pragmatically and future oriented and less in terms of emotions and history.

In spite of the complete deadlock at a national level, on local level individuals have succeeded to avoid a deadlock. The distance between the national and local level (figuratively and geographically) can play a role in this difference in framing. The ideology and the practice can be separated, creating room for pragmatism. The indivisibility frame is a frame that attends to and creates emotions. Some local government officials and (political) leaders are trying to overcome these emotional interpretation of present reality, and are approaching it from a more practical point of view. Some officials of Strpce/Shtërpcë’s government (the new Mayor, but also directors in the previous government periods 2007-2009) have avoided speaking in terms of separation, but rather use cooperation and equality as a base for existence. It is especially the Pristina supported government that is future oriented and aims for inclusion. The Belgrade supported government seems to hold on to the indivisibility frame, thereby excluding Albanians, and running the risk of getting ‘outdated’.

Although shifts in framing can be noticed, regarding some important aspects of society the indivisibility frame still seems the only way to understand reality. Especially in the case of culture, history and language it is still the dominant frame. As I show in this thesis, Serbian and Albanian youth do not communicate, simply because they do not know each other’s languages and because they attend different locations. Strpce/Shtërpcë still has a complete separated parallel education system for Albanians and Serbs. Kids go to different schools, learn different languages, learn a different history. The education system is of great importance in internalizing and institutionalizing the indivisibility frame. This system is for a major part secured by the financial support from both sides (Belgrade and Pristina) and thus plays a very important role in keeping the youth apart. It seems to me that keeping the youth apart is recognized as the only way to secure the indivisibility claim in future.

In short: Parallelism still functions in S/S. It is based on the indivisibility claim on the Kosovo territory from both Serbs and Albanians. My research shows a number of signals that its dominance is weakening though. Drivers of this change are people's (economical) needs (leading to pragmatic

104 actions and future aimed orientation) and international interventions (creating conditions under which alternative frames can grow). On the cultural side however the framing of Kosovo being a territory of indivisibility still firmly stands. This is especially done through financial funding of the parallel structures and complete disconnection of Albanian and Serbian youth.

So, if one want to overcome the dominance of the indivisibility frame that provides a base for parallelism, the performances and processes of the governments should be of a level that could provide legitimacy for the government and overcome the importance of the indivisibility frame. This however will probably not be enough when nothing is done about the complete disconnection of Albanian and Serbian youth.

9.2 Discussions In this sections I want to philosophize about the future of the two sets of governmental institutions in Strpce/Shtërpcë. The municipal elections of November/December 2009 for the Pristina supported government were considered to be an historical event. I did not stay long enough in Strcpe/Shtërpcë to really experience the results. I did hear that the new assembly members and Mayor were probably not experienced enough and lacked the capacity to bring Strpce/Shtërpcë to the point of a more prosperous municipality. In January 2010 it was also clear that the elections influenced the power balance between the two institutions. Before 2009 the Assembly of the Pristina supported government had not worked – they had literally been absent, but now the competition and therefore the struggle for existence seemed to harden.

After the elections of 2009, the international community was talking about the success, the change that was achieved and the pragmatism of people. However voting out of pragmatism does not immediately indicate a support for the claims of the government that was voted for. What I want to point out here is that pragmatism is not the only indicator for the future of parallelism. In expectations about the further development of the parallel system in Strpce/Shtërpcë more factors need to play a role. A Serbian winner in the elections of the Pristina supported government and the high voters turn-out does not guarantee the end to parallelism. For the majority of Strpce/Shtërpcë the relationship with Serbia and the known public companies is still very important. It is very much connected to people’s own identity. To continue Strpce/Shtërpcë with the inhabitants and the population ratio it now has, it is important for the Pristina government to pay attention to the relationship of Serbs with Serbia. The sensitivity of Serbs towards this government and the Belgrade supported government should be realized and taken into account. In addition positive results might also come forth from an awareness of the expertise of the other. The Belgrade supported set of government related institutions cannot suddenly be stopped. It will be a slow process, in which youth may play an important role, as 50% is under 25 years old and younger people are now participating in the assembly. Perhaps the key to a fruitful functioning of the governance system (with or without parallelism) is by starting to offer a better future perspective for the youth.

Although the Pristina supported government has not yet proven they have the capacity to tackle the problems of everyday life in the municipality, I suppose that the Pristina supported government will in the end become the clearly dominant if not only government in Strpce/Shtërpcë. The fact that this government has the back up of the police forces in Kosovo and the fact that it has the support of the international community make its perspective strongly positive. Besides, at the same time Serbia’s support is decreasing and the Serbian supported government has not shown better administration

105 than the government support by Pristina. Based on these factors I would say that most resilient government is the one based in Kosovo.

Research approach

Was my research approach appropriate for achieving the right results? Was it a good way to do research on the functioning of two sets of parallel governments in daily life? I would like to think so, yes. By participating in the life of Strpce/Shtërpcë for three months I have certainly obtained a good insight in the parallel structures. I did have the disadvantage of not understanding the language, but by crosschecking my results with the translators and the in interviews and by the multitude of interviews and repetition in answers, I am convinced I have reached a good level of understanding. At times, the narrative I have presented in this thesis might miss some nuances, but if I had not approached it my way I would probably not have developed such understanding of the situation in just three months.

Besides I hope my results can be of value in evaluations of projects, for attempts to reconstruct and develop the region. The information I have presented in this thesis should be read in addition to already existing quantitative research results in reports. The theory of framing and the importance of the indivisibility frame I saw confirmed in many examples. Also the four components of the theory f Arts and Buizer were of value in tracing influences in framing and shifts in frames that otherwise perhaps I would not have found. Lessons can be learned from these findings for similar cases, but the information is case specific and one should be careful with generalizations. It would be fruitful if similar research could be done in comparable situations to be able to generate a more wide-ranging conclusion.

For further research

I am curious to know whether the research results would have been different if a (Kosovo) Albanian or (Kosovo) Serb would have done the research. I would recommend such research as this one, to be done by someone that speaks the same language (at least one of the languages) and knows something of the history. On the other hand the researcher should be capable of somewhat distancing him or herself from the research object.

A second recommendation for further research contains the nuance in information about the experiences, feelings and ways of living of the youth. I think a good understanding of the youth and perhaps also the familial relation can be of help in breaking the patterns of parallelism. The separation of youth of different ethnic backgrounds seems to be conditional for the continuation of the indivisibility frame and therefore a very significant base for existence of parallelism. So, changing this situation of separation, will certainly affect the persistence of parallelism.

One last remark, I realize I merely focused on the political situation of Strpce/Shtërpcë and did not take into account the economic context of the municipality or Kosovo. I understand that Kosovo has a very small economy; the international help sustains Kosovo’s existence in many ways. Also the financial support from Belgrade seems necessary for maintaining some level of livelihood. For a more complete picture about the development of parallelism in municipalities in Kosovo like Strpce/Shtërpcë this research needs to be placed in a larger context, regarding for instance the economy.

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Annex 1: Law on Self Government The following is copied from the Law on Self Government (2008), pp 6 -8.

17.1 Municipalities shall have full and exclusive powers, insofar as they concern the local interest, while respecting the standards set forth in the applicable legislation in the following areas: a) local economic development; b) urban and rural planning; c) land use and development; d) implementation of building regulations and building control standards; e) local environmental protection; f) provision and maintenance of public services and utilities, including water supply, sewers and drains, sewage treatment, waste management, local roads, local transport, and local heating schemes; g) local emergency response; h) provision of public pre-primary, primary and secondary education, including registration and licensing of educational institutions, recruitment, payment of salaries and training of education instructors and administrators; i) promotion and protection of human rights; j) provision of public primary health care; k) provision of family and other social welfare services, such as care for the vulnerable, foster care, child care, elderly care, including registration and licensing of these care centres, recruitment, payment of salaries and training of social welfare professionals; l) public housing; m) public health; n) licensing of local services and facilities, including those related to entertainment, cultural and leisure activities, food, lodging, markets, street vendors, local public transportation and taxis; o) naming of roads, streets and other public places; p) provision and maintenance of public parks and spaces; q) tourism; r) cultural and leisure activities; s) any matter which is not explicitly excluded from their competence nor assigned to any other authority.

Article 19: Enhanced Municipal Competencies

19.1. Certain municipalities explained below shall have their own competencies enhanced in the areas of health, education and cultural affairs and shall have participatory right in selecting local station police commanders as set forth in the subsequent articles.

19.2. Central authorities of Republic of Kosova shall monitor the exercise of enhanced competencies, in accordance with the central legislation providing for equal access to public services; minimum quality and quantity standards in the provision of public services; minimum qualifications of

111 personnel and training facilities; general principles on licensing and accreditation of public service providers.

19.3. Municipalities exercising enhanced municipal competencies may cooperate with any other municipality in providing services.

Article 20: Enhanced Competencies in Secondary Health Care

The municipalities of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica North, Graçanicë/Gracanica, Shtërpcë / Štrpce shall have the competence for provision of secondary health care, including registration and licensing of health care institutions, recruitment, payment of salaries and training of health care personnel and administrators;

Article 21: Enhanced Competencies in the University Education

21.1. The municipality of Mitrovicë/ Mitrovica North shall have competence for the provision of higher education, including registration and licensing of educational institutions, recruitment, payment of salaries and training of education instructors and administrators.

Article 22: Enhanced Competencies in the Area of Culture

22.1 All municipalities in which the Kosova Serb Community is in the majority shall have authority to exercise responsibility for cultural affairs, including, protection and promotion of Serbian and other religious and cultural heritage within the municipal territory as well as support for local religious communities in accordance with the applicable law.

22.2. Municipalities may cooperate with any other municipality in cultural affairs.

Article 23: Enhanced Participatory Rights in Selection of the Local Police Station Commanders

Municipalities in which Kosova Serb community is in a majority shall exercise enhanced participatory rights in the selection of the local station police commanders in accordance with law on police.

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Annex 2: Timeline governments of Strpce/Shtërpcë Pristina supported Government and the Belgrade supported government

Timeline: 1980 Death of Tito

1990 Milosevic regime – Serbs ruled, but a discriminative system that excluded Albanians

1999 bombing by NATO and retreat Serbian uniformed officers (army and police)

2000 Between 1999 and 2001 some sort of gap or interim management where only Albanians participated.

2001 (Nov.) very good turnout in votes; Mayor: Bahri Hyseni & Deputy Mayor Adem Shabahi both Serbs and Albanians participated in this government supervised by UNMIK

2004 (Nov.) Mayor Sladjan Ilic, Deputy Mayor Hamdi Aliu & additional Mayor Slavisha Staletovic; March riots; and the resignation of Sladjan as a Mayor because of the obstruction by Serbs within the assembly

2005 Stanko Jakovljevic was elected by the assembly after Ilic resigned a second time. The constitution of the assembly and deputy majors stayed the same

2007 (Nov.)New elections failed: they were boycotted by Serbs. The international community interfered. Stanko Jakovljevic was appointed as Mayor & deputy major Ali Halimi, The assembly didn’t work

2008 17 Feb independence. - The assembly of the Pristina supported government did not work – the directorate did some governance instead - Elections for a Belgrade supported local government that was officially separated from the Pristina supported government; 80% voting turn-out under Serbs, no Albanian votes

2009 Sept. different Deputy Mayor in Sept. Sinan Ymeri, former director of economy exchanges Ali Halimi after he was dismissed Nov: turnout in votes much higher than expected: over 4000 Serbs. Mayor Bratislav Nicolic & Deputy Mayor Beqir Fejzullahu,

2010 New Kosovo based and Pristina supported municipal governments constituted; January the Belgrade supported government is forced out of the municipal building by the new major Nicolic.

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Annex 3: UNMIK PISG

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Annex 4: Interviewees Out of discretion I have not used the names of the people I interviewed. However, I cannot help it that with the descriptions as below, people that know Strpce/Shtërpcë and know its citizens will know exactly whom I interviewed. Besides, I think that at the time of the interviews most villagers knew already whom I spoke with.

Translators

1 Albanian 1 Serb

Belgrade supported government (all Serbs)

Mayor Deputy Mayor Chairman of the Assembly Director of business and administration Director of infrastructure Board member of department of infrastructure who is also journalist Group meeting with employees of the department of administration Former executive officer during UNMIK times and now officer of one department in this Belgrade supported government

Pristina supported government

A former Mayor (2002) (Serb) Deputy Mayor November 2009 (Albanian) A former Deputy Mayor (Albanian) Two former Assembly members that were again members of the Assembly in 2010 (Albanian) Member of the Assembly of 2010 (Serb) Mayor of 2010 (I interviewed him twice: ones before the elections and after he had won) (Serb) Albanian candidate for mayor who became the Deputy Mayor in 2010 Officer for community return (2009) who is also village representative (Albanian) Deputy director of infrastructure (2009) (Albanian) Director of administration and personnel (2009) (Albanian)

Former director of culture (2002-2008: he also worked for the Belgrade supported government (Serb)

Deputy Director of the local government of Ferizaj/Urosevac (Albanian)

Serbs in Strpce/Shtërpcë

Director of NGO Future without Fears (begin 30) I met them many times Employees of Future without Fears (begin 20) and several times ‘official’ Owner of a club (begin 30) interviews with them Waiters (begin 30 and with a university degree)

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Citizens (most were around the age of 18 till 35)

An older man, begin 70, who had been director of planning and responsible for the national park in the days of communism A lawyer The highest Priest in Strpce/Shtërpcë, his actual church was in Ferizaj/Urosevac A second deputy headmaster of the secondary school

Albanians in Strpce/Shtërpcë

Two young men Director of a small NGO Employee of a bank Member of the village committee of Firëjë/Firaja Imam Redactor of a religious magazine Headmaster of the secondary school for Albanians Headmaster of a primary school in one of the Albanian villages of Strcpe/Shtërpcë

Nationals other than from Strpce/Shtërpcë

Employees of NGO Fractal that is based in Belgrade Official of NGO Partners Kosova (Albanian) Official of think-tank KIPRED

Internationals

Official of ECLO Official of US-Embassy Spokeswoman of EULEX (EUSR) Spokesman of ICO (I met him and conversed with him two times, and once for an official interview) Official of ICO headquarters Official of ICO in the field, who also worked in times of UNMIK Official of VNG international Official of EMI Employees of Spark (a Dutch NGO) Official of OSCE in the field office of Strpce/Shtërpcë (Serb) Official of USAID (Albanian) A KFOR unit in Strcpe/Shtërpcë Consultant at the Ministry of Local Government and Administration (MLGA) at the ministers level

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