130 Наукові праці. Том 70. Випуск 57

УДК 82-34

Hauser, Ewa, University of Rochester, USA

Hauser, Ewa – Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Rochester, USA; Fulbright visiting professor at Mykolaiv Petro Mohyla State University for Humanities, Mykolaiv, Ukraine

Poland and Ukraine in a Moving Geo-political Space: Confronting the Myths of Sarmatia: Who is and Who is not “In between?” inceaaeeainpincipeooieimpeiapoicyaomainaininayeaionipia aeieaeanopeeneceaionoeionaaianceiinaenuopencaeoPoanan aine i poicy coinciin i ioica animoiie eeen e o naion ic epie e econciiaioneooanioieiien inocounieoceainexenouieeempieani eucaneeeceinepopuacuueoeneinepenenaeonoieoeoe o uopeannionoayipapeiocuonexampeonaionanaaieicaeeineconnece o eie an eien accoin o poiica eeopmen an caene o e pocommuni a CenauopeaninepenenaeoPoananaine

It was the policy of the Soviet Union to maintain symbols and myths while rejecting others. This binary relationships with each of its satellites states process does not indicate a “fabrication” of history and to prevent any possible regional alliances which and “myths” in historiography cannot be perceived could possibly become a counterpart force vis a vis as inventions, as Andrew Wilson 1 contends “when the Soviets. This policy was easy to implement acting as ethnic entrepreneurs, nationalist historians especially due to the old and new deep rooted must sell a plausible product that is both effective animosities between the region’s nation states. In and affective.” So the main function of historical fact the only two countries which were not myths or narratives is to choose from the repertoire harboring any animosity against each other and of historical occurrences those, which can be instead had a history of friendly relations, presented in an engaging and persuasive manner in and Hungary did cause the Soviet Union rather big order to help constitute and strengthen the collective problems in 1956. identity of the nation. While all nations are engaged All post Soviet states (NIS) but also to some in these processes (through school programs and extent all East European People’s Democracies, are mass media) some have more success then others since the fall of USSR engaged in the process of for “some myths fit better popular tradition than nation building. This process entails not only others,” says Wilson. This paper will discuss the assertive systemic transformations (remaking of myth of ancient Sarmacja and how this myth has legal and economic systems) but also reassessing been adopted, rephrased or rejected by and re-writing history: adopting some national contemporary Polish and Ukrainian national

1 Andrew Wilson, “Myths of National History in Belarus and Ukraine” in Myths and Nationhood , Філологія 131 narratives. freedom, the Polish identity is being once again Ukrainians and Poles remained at odds over reinvented or rather re-phrased in terms of the gaze history as old as the 17 th century and as new as towards the East. Though Poles, like most Eastern 1920s and1940s. But, as Ilya Prizel 2 points out, it European intellectuals, rationally agree that the was this very struggle, and persistent “constant smaller countries of the region should work together confrontation” (after Rudnytsky) between Poles and to counteract more powerful neighbors, Ukrainians that provided both nations with “emotionally, culturally and even geo-politically, powerful myths and symbols in the process of the new gaze eastward is still at least equally establishing their respective national identities. important to most Poles: the view across the vast Independent Poland after 1989, and sovereign eastern territories that for centuries were part of the Ukraine after 1991, both entered into a new phase historic Poland 5.” In cultural everyday practice of building foreign policy and international relations Poles now switched its national dress from the outside of the Russian reason of state. This paper peasant Krakowian outfits in which children and will address a few cultural representations of this grown ups were dressed up for official occasions new trend in political culture of both countries. into the stylized Sarmatian dress, the oriental For the first time since the war both Poland and Polish gentry “kontusz” or tin made armor of even Ukraine has moved into an active voice. No longer older “knights” of King Sobieski . These are the mere objects of Moscow’s political manipulations, special uniforms used now for Easter parades they now struggle to reinvent themselves externally, around the cathedrals. Last April, I was shocked in the international context of Europe (Western and when some 10 “knights” suddenly dropped to the Central), military alliances, and internally, in terms church floor with a terrible noise when their metal of national self definition. No longer can the Polish armor hit the stone while the bishops were passing (or other East-Central European) self definition be by with the holy Tabernacle. explained as (or excused by) sharing “the collective At the end of the XIXth century, a national experience … a specific sense of history that is narrative of an uplifting history appeared. Instead forced on us against our will 3.” In Poland the first of dwelling on the recent defeats of the national few years of independence were marked by a strong uprisings, the glory of the 17 th century gentry’s clash between the Roman Catholic conservative democracy was recalled in historic epic novels. view on the essence of religious nationality and the The dominant metaphors of Polish national secular critical and satirical trend within Polish identity became then , an ideology of the culture. Polish nation understood as a gentry’s state. It Since 2006 victory of ultra conservative trend combined the myth of the gentry’s “golden in nationalistic new administration of the twins, freedom” with moral righteousness stemming from Poland seems to be entrenching itself in the their role in the defense of Western European tradition of particularistic ideology of mixture of civilization against the encroaching hordes of the anti-West European Catholic values with a savage infidels, located usually to the east and south European fortress components which are of the territory of the Polish Commonwealth. specifically aimed at stopping the perceived Sarmatism also assured the Polish gentry a special from its non- EU members states namely Ukraine relationship with God which resulted in permanent and Belarus. This set of policies and values are protection of Providence over Poland. Thus, the strongly reminiscent of the Sarmatian ideology of Sarmatian religiosity nationalized Roman Polish nationalism Catholicism. Czeslaw Milosz perceived significant This kind of Polish nationalism was popularized similarities in the East Central European (Polish, by , the impact of whose novels Hungarian and Czech) sensitivities. His definition is unparalleled in the history of was rooted also in geo-politics: in terms of common (1905 Noble Prize). He has been also the subject of objectification, within the sphere of influence, and the most heated intellectual controversy and a of the more powerful neighbors 4. Others, like Adam litmus test for political opinions in Poland. Michnik has always talked about Poland’s links to In a generally sluggish market on the eve of the Europe. And now, in the second decade of second post communist decade, a film adaptation of

2 Ilya Prizel, “The Influence of Ethnicity on Foreign Policy The Case of Uktaine”in Roman Szporluk (ed) National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia 1997 3 Czeslaw Milosz, Budapest Roundtable” Cross Currents 1989, no 10 p. 20. 4 Czeslaw Milosz’s definition of Central Europe: “all the countries that in 1939 were the real or hypothetical objects of a trade between Soviet Union and Germany” Cross Currents no 10 p.18, 5 Timothy Garton Ash, “Does Central Europe Exist?” In The Uses of Adversity: Essays in Fate of Central Europe, Vintage, New York 1983 132 Наукові праці. Том 70. Випуск 57 his historic epic attracted a Revolution to the rest of Europe (Hrushevsky), multimillion audience within the first few months Sienkiewicz portrayed it as a rebellion by primitive since its release in February 1999. This film’s and a wild mob (czern ) led by a drunken and cruel popularity reflects the acceptance on the part of Polish-Ruthenian nobleman who started the war as Polish audience to revise its views on the eastern a means of seeking private revenge on a neighbor mission and religious tolerance, and redefine the who seduced his wife. Generally speaking, the borders of “Polishness” novel started the perception on “the struggle Sienkiewicz’s Trilogy appeared in installment in between the and the Commonwealth as a daily “Slowo” from 1883 to 1888 6). The first part one between barbarity and civilization 8.” of 7, With Fire and Sword , altogether When director Jerzy Hoffman, after decades of some 800 pages, has a romantic plot of two rival efforts announced in 1997 that he will film With officers (Pole Skrzetuski and Cossack Bohun) in Fire and Sword , the news were greeted with mixed love with one woman. Their pursuits of her are feelings and a great deal of apprehension on the part played on the background of the uprising of Bohdan of both Polish and Ukrainian critics. The result Khmelnitsky, a Ukrainian national hero, considered surprised all. by Poles a traitor. Written “in order to hearten the It became a national celebration of mass spirit” of the readers two decades after the failure of pilgrimages to see a three hour long film. Before the last of Polish insurrection, the novel promoted a With Fire and Sword could be filmed, communism new national pride which compensated for the had to fall. To touch the nationality issues collective low esteem stemming from continuous pertaining to the Polish/Ukrainian/Russian relation defeats on the battlefield. Incorporating pieces of would be too politically volatile under even the documents, historical accounts, and written in the most reformist of communist governments within language of gentry memoirs and Baroque poems, the pact. The block itself had to crumble Sienkiewicz created a historical epic with a cast of before this topic could be filmed. And then it had to characters that lived on in the minds of generations wait yet another decade before funds were raised of Poles. and sponsors found for this most expensive of In Poland, the novel along with its two other Polish large-scale productions. parts was credited with awakening and maintaining Besides an impressive international cast, a high level of Polish patriotism during the Hoffman hired 20,000 extras, used 260 horses, and turbulent XXth century. footed the highest bill for a film ever made in In Ukraine, With Fire and Sword, the title and Poland. The leading national daily, Gazeta the work itself, has been viewed as an ironic Wyborcza published over 500 articles about the summing up of Polish expansionist ambitions film, mostly during its filming and after the release. toward its eastern neighbor. Ukrainian critics and The ministry of education had based on the film one historians point out that With Fire and Sword paints of the three topics (most often chosen by students) the Polish gentry’s national image at the expense of for the mandatory exam essays for all high school depicting the Ukrainian 17 th century population in graduation. There have been TV competitions about the manner that caused more harm to the 20 th knowledge on the novel and the film, reviews of it century Polish Ukrainian relations then any other among the general population and a proliferation of literary work. For example, a Ukrainian American books on the topic of the film as well as its literary historian, Frank Sysyn writes: “Ukrainians viewed prototype. But the real proof of its success is an Sienkiewicz as a purveyor of hatred and falsehood.” unparalleled audience: over 6 million Poles saw the While Ukrainian scholars view the Chmielnicki film since its release in February 1999. The film’s Uprising as a “touchstone of Ukrainian identity” audience in Poland greatly surpassed in size the and compared it in significance to the meaning of audiences of Titanic. Ironically, its release the Reformation for Germans and of the French coincided with the entry of Poland into NATO,

6 Jerzy Krzyzanowski “Introduction” With Fire and Sword , Hippocrene, New York 1991, p.XI 7 second part of the Trilogy was about the Polish resistance against the Swedish invasion on 1655, and third one, Colonel Wolodyjowski about the later wars with Turkey. 8 Frank E. Sysyn, Between Poland and the Ukraine. The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1985 p.228 9 Hoffman was born in 1932, in the eastern part of pre-war Poland as a child of two doctors. The family survived the war in the Soviet Union. His father fought with the Polish contingent of the Red Army. Hoffman himself did not share the anti-Russian sentiments so prevalent among Polish filmmakers. He, in fact, did not even share the schooling they had. Unlike the leading figures of Polish film, Hoffman did not study at the Lodz School of Film. He received his training instead at the Moscow Film School during the last days of Stalinism. When in 1968 during the official state anti-Semitic campaign in Poland, secret service agents “discretely” suggested that he leave the country, Hoffman agreed. “However, since my wife was a Soviet citizen, and I graduated from film school in Moscow, I’ll settle in the Soviet Union” he said. He was then left alone and one part of the Hoffman’s Trilogy was soon released Філологія 133 along with Hungary and the Czech Republic, and a ae o ceae a ne omanic eucie an not Ukraine. aoeeuieenicinimaeoeCoaceo In fact, Jerzy Hoffman’s 9 films’ box office meniy oan upa in e im successes can only be compared with the successes emeeaanonoaemananaeamiiay of the novel by Sienkiewicz. The film, which offers an poiica aei a e poaya o a new take on Polish-Ukrainian-Russian relation, meniy in e noe a aue ienieic has struck a cord with the audience. The romance uc i ame in aine a a eneae Poi with the East as well as the myth of the bulwark or noeman un an conniin o ecaue o rampart of Western culture (or Christianity) appears ipiaeaaioaieeainianpeaan like the legitimizing entry to Europe while turning mae an e ee Coac aain e the attention away from the West. Both nationalist Commonea n e im meniy e and anti-nationalist camps had therefore their own aeman anaye een an icue ocia reasons to see With Fire and Sword . eaonoeupiiniioice The films’ departures from the novel are striking The ultimate “other,” the true pagan savages in and well planned. Some necessary departures are in the novel and in the film, is the Islamic Tatars who the plot structure, in linguistic deletions (of Latin) also speak a totally different language which is but the most important are combinations of casting always subtitled, as neither Poles nor Ukrainians and directives on how to play the role which understand it. The Crimean Khan, to whom resulted in a contrast to the literary message about Khmelnitsky seeks support against the Polish army, the Ukrainians. is portrayed as a quintessential oriental monarch, The dialogue follows very closely the novel’s expecting and receiving blind obedience from his rapid action-subjected dialogue, though it further subjects. The khan has a feared army of cruel and simplifies the message. The narration is in Polish skillful fighters in his command. His motivation and usually follows parts of the novel narration. All (unlike those of Polish magnates) is pure greed and the narration is in Polish while the dialogues are in he is cunning and calculating. And here again, several languages: Polish, Ukrainian and Hoffman introduces a novelization of the literary Mongolian. The switching of linguistic codes is prototype. The Khan himself appears twice with a especially revealing in regard to the scenes young officer whose face he strikes lovingly in front involving the polyethnic individuals’ of his court and somehow bemused looking ethnic/national representations. The “true Polish” Khmelnitsky. The blind obedience and subjugation characters insist on speaking only Polish, whether is visualized here in terms of a dominant to Poles, Ukrainians or Tatars The dominant code homosexuality towards a transvestite. Just as is such asserted with the assumption that the ’s occult witchcraft was not visually “others” must know it. The Ukrainians, on the other sufficient to put her beyond the boundaries of hand, speak either Polish or Ukrainian, dependent civilization, so here is the same sign of on the linguistic context. transgression against western norms of sexual Historically, the most meaningful departure is respectability. the rationale for the uprising, or, as the Ukrainians The historical film, in analogy to the historical describe it, the Great Cossack War. The Cossack novel, selects and gives shape to history, writing it rationale, never addressed in the novel, was their by imposing meanings. Historical film interprets desire remains free within the Polish national history for the broad public, and thus Commonwealth, to preserve their religion and produces, organize and homogenize public memory. culture as the subjects of the Polish king. The Hoffman tries to produce a history which will from Cossack gentry demanded the equal Polish gentry’s now on portray Poles and Ukrainians as privileges. Sienkiewicz painted the uprising as the pobratymcy . In trying to do justice to the novel result of blind mob hatred and Khmenytsky’s which had an opposite message, Hoffman delivers a private humiliation resulting from the marital confused message in which the “other” is shifted to infidelity of his wife with a Pole. strong women (witch) and Muslim Tatars. oman mae iian cain eciion en Finally, I would argue (contrary to the joyful e coe ainian aco o pay meniy Polish critics greatly relieved with Hoffman’s oanupaaneicopynauana success in avoiding further antagonizing the Pyana an a uian aco o pay oun Ukrainians) that the ambiguous national identities eaneomaaoouainianciic of various characters and preferences to the Polish oppoe e a cain eciion i eay a language and culture (religion) by Ruthenians in muceeaaniePoiexymoana Polish military service, indicate a continuous anti- ou uy oua ina paye i a a Ukrainian bias. Though the leading Ukrainian oiinayconieeomaaoouuian (male) characters are cleared of the savage elements, those are just transferred onto their female 134 Наукові праці. Том 70. Випуск 57 characters. Additionally, the Ukrainian masses both Ukraine, Belarus and . This definition of peasants as well as Cossacks remain represented as Ukrainian Sarmatia focuses on the backwardness of brutal and savage, as in any nationalistic Ukraine’s infrastructure and the clear division into propaganda film. two nations. With a great amount of irony if not sarcasm he describes the Eastern and southern While the Sarmatian myth appears to remain a Ukraine as a place which is fairly deeply russified. predominant topos in Poland, a Ukrainian historian, The lands between Baltic and Black seas have Jaroslav Hrycak 10 is announcing the death of the been in ancient times named Sarmatia Numerous Sarmatian myth in Ukraine. Ukraine rejects peoples speaking dozens of languages live in Saramtism as part of the old Polish nobility someone else’s shadow. All nations live in the expansionist ideology. And independent Ukraine shadows: Poles in the shadow of Germans, has picked the image of a free Cossack peasant as Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Lithuanians in the its national emblem instead. shadow of Poles and Russians. What we have in A recent book of essays commissioned by common best defines Andruchovych in his albeit a German cultural foundations (der Deutchen bit long litany Wirtschaft im BDI and Deutche Academie fur East Central Europe appears to him as Sprache und Dichtung)and titled Sarmackie • Terrain of particular historical tensions, such as Krajobrazy , Czarne: 2006 (Sarmatian Landscapes: mass deportations and even a few genocides Voices from Lithuania, Bialorus, Ukraine, Germany • A space where the feeling of undeserved injuries and Poland ) outlines the various ways intellectuals ( krivdi) even today are a physiological of these countries perceive and define the concept category, like an atmospheric pressure which of “Sarmacja.” could be measured in specific units, not yet In the Sarmatian Landscapes several essays by agreed upon, Ukrainian intellectuals (Jaroslav Hrycak, Andryi • A part of the world where it became customary Bondar, Mykola Riabchuk, and Oksana Zabbuzhko) to be proud of something that really should be a move the imagined territory of Sarmatia from the source of sad reflection: of being “in between” Polish lands across the EU border to Ukraine and in the East and the West case of Andruchovych, to the eastern Ukraine • A strip of land where states mutate, an in- beyond the left bank of the River. For between-empires space Ukrainian scholars the term does not connote any • A territory between Russians and Germans and positive meaning. It indicates the country in since May 1, 2004, between Russia and between Europe and “the other continent” meaning European Union Russia with its now post-Soviet imperialism. • A space in which without a trace disappear Denying the concept of Sarmatia any positive stolen in EU cars and partially also European meaning indicates on some level rejection of the old Union funds historic (and presently non-existent) Polish • A small fatherland of illegal cheap labor force, imperialism towards Ukraine. This rejection the so called Polish plumbers and not only testifies to on the one hand opposition to the Polish Polish dancers, strip-teasers and whores domination and on the other desire to maintain • A sphere from which human parts, organs are national sovereignty. Finally it also speaks to deep exported, and where unknown parents abandon resentment of once again the European rejection of their children Ukraine despite its great 2004 victory which had been achieved by the nation according to the best • A territory of crossing cultural-genetic ’European standards.” influences, where to these times in the villages Ukrainian identity is still perceived in terms of men wear hats and women scarves on their the “in-between” mentality. While Czeslaw Milosz heads defined the Eastern Europe in the 1980s as a region • A place of mostly horrible roads and in this “in between the West and the Soviet Union,” the sense an anti-Roman civilization situation has changed at least from this side of the • A part of the world three fourth Slavic, and border, since 2004 and the expansion of European therefore most likely to abuse alcoholic Union. It appears that Poland has successfully beverages moved into the West and is now part of Europe • A part of the world in which until 1939 a being culturally and civilizationally homogenized medieval German (or Jidish) was freely spoken into the “European standards.” The place of the” • A territory on which still most people know non-Europe,” “the other” is being awarded for Russian but often pretend they don’t

10 Jaroslaw Hrycak, “Koniec Sarmacji” in: Sarmackie Krajobrazy. Glosy z Litwy, Bialorusi, Ukrainy, Niemiec I Polski , Czarne 2006 Філологія 135

• A space in which too many languages are Andruchovych speaks of the whole Ukraine because spoken to be considered any sort of community the exclusionary EU policies affect both parts of the with the possible exception of the Tower of country equaly. However, in a next part of the Babel essay, he clearly differentiates between the east and • A territory in which not only Estonians cannot the west – following the old maps and atlases which understand their kin-- Magyars but even Serbs distinguish between so called European and Asiatic cannot understand more then kinsfolk Croats, Sarmacja. He then moves the negative concept of • Territory on which no one understands Gypsies … sarmacja to the territory beyond the east bank of • A territory which everyone understands the Dnieper River. He characterizes this new/old other in terms of a daily bread, cigarettes and a Sarmacja as a place which consists of a dry step glass of wine which is haphazardly and “anachronistic A space of a drastic and chronic existential industrialized” a place where the population speaks uncertainty for which reason this space is often Russian, is basically proletarian and “traditionally considered especially religious(and which perceived criminal”(sic) a place of refuge from various itself as such) prisons, a home of homeless recidivists, where people tend to be loyal to any authority “as long as Andruchovych, writing after 2004, is indicating they do not mess with their Soviet monuments,” that Europe moved to include all the new dislike and distrust the West, where Europe is “European” States and East Europe, the real perceived as a cozy and an artificial construct “Sarmacja” are relegated to the states from the EU conceived in Kiev. For him the true “in between” excluded: Ukraine and Belarus. West and East is the eastern and southern Ukraine, As for Ukraine, Andruchovych points out that not the whole of Ukraine as stated in other parts. An despite the fact that the basic rule of independence Andruchovych claim that East Central Europe has is to peacefully abolish by people themselves the does tremble and moved far into the eastern part tyrannical, totalitarian rulers, which Ukrainians and frontiers of Ukraine facing then “the other most definitely did, they are nevertheless not continent” – Russia. wanted in Europe where roads are smooth train new While it is perfectly understandable that run on time, and water runs freely straight from the Ukrainian scholars reject the basically anti- faucets both during the day and night. For, Orange Ukrainian (from old Poland) myth of Sarmacja, and Revolution was of the highest “European even use this concept in pejorative context contrary Standards.” to the function of Sarmacja in the national- Andruchovych is asking why despite this conservative ideology of Poles. For Ukrainian readiness Ukraine is not invited and Ukrainians intellectuals Sarmacja connotes backwardness, must apply for visa to all EU countries? His answer provincialism, lack of refinement, and criminal is because of Russia. Because they (EU) does not mentality. Butt is less obvious to a Pole why would want to annoy Moscow. In this part of his essay they assign all these negative characteristics to the

Books Cited 1. Geoffrey Hoskings and George Schoeplin, (eds) Myths and 4. Frank E. Sysyn, Between Poland and the Ukraine. The Nationhood , Routledge, 1997 Dilemma of Adam Kysil, Harvard University Press, 1985 2. Roman Szporluk (ed) National Identity and Ethnicity in 5. Jerzy Krzyzanowski With Fire and Sword , Hippocrene, Russia and the New States of Eurasia , M.E. Sharpe, 1997 New York 1991 3. Martin Pollack (ed) Sarmackie Krajobrazy. Glosy z Litwy, 6. Timothy Garton Ash, Essays in Fate of Central Europe , Bialorusi, Ukrainy, Niemiec I Polski , (Sarmatian Vintage, New York 1983 Landscapes: Voices from Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Germany and Poland) Czarne, 2006