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Cleaning the Slate of Knowledge. Pyrrhonean Scepticism in Theology and Science in 17th Century France. ECST XII Sigtuna TOPIC: Knowledge and understanding in Science and Theology Author: Per Lind PhD Candidate, Lund University Postal address: Centre for Theology and Religious Studies (Hämtställe 36) Allhelgona Kyrkogata 8 22362 Lund, Sweden email: [email protected] Outline: In this paper some applications of Pyrrhonean scepticism in the intellectual arena of 17th century France are briefly explored. These applications belong to a bookprinter (Henri Estienne), a theologian (Pierre Charron), and a scientist (Pierre Gassendi). It is the author’s regretful contention that even the proponents of pyrrhonean scepticism seem to think that the inherent destructivity of pyrrhonist doubt needs to be guided according to various principles external to pyrrhonism, whereas in fact pyrrhonism has a fairly good grip on itself. Also, it is noted that with pyrrhonism, the otherwise supposedly disparate natures of science and religion are treated as equally rationally ungrounded. Keywords: EPISTEMOLOGY, SCEPTICISM, KNOWLEDGE, PYRRHONISM, SCIENCE, THEOLOGY, 17TH CENTURY, EMPIRICISM, FIDEISM Full text: It is not uncommon for philosophers of religion to analyze and compare the respective truth- claims of science and religion. In some cases the existence of a common epistemological ground of sorts between the two is asserted; mainly, it would seem, in order for them both to be counted as equally legitimate knowledge strategies. Most of the time, though, the existence of such a ground is denied. It is also, philosophers being what they are, a point of particular disagreement just what an epistemological ground amounts to in the first place. Should it be constructed from empirical, rational, individual, social, psychological, anthropological, physiological, biochemical, neurological, political or perhaps even spiritual considerations? Naturally, the opinions differ. What is generally agreed upon, on the other hand, is that the establishment of epistemological grounds is a good and desirable thing, sorting among the premium employments of philosophy. The danger involved, of ending up suffocating aspects of reality considered less epistemologically robust under the metaphorical pillow of others considered more so, is nominally acknowledged, but in practice disregarded as something of naturally larger concern for those who are in the wrong, i.e. thinkers of an orientation different from one‟s own. Consequently, acts of „epistemological suffocation‟ are numerous and varied: The empirical is sometimes understood solely or primarily in terms of the neurological, the rational in terms of the political, the spiritual in those of the psychological and so on. Along the same lines, religion is sometimes viewed as a bad kind of science, and science is sometimes viewed as a bad kind of religion. With the ancient sceptical school of Pyrrhonism, this is positively not so. Here, the establishment of epistemological grounds is considered to express, not the greatness of the human spirit, but merely intellectual vanity. Literally pulling in the opposite direction, pyrrhonism would much rather speak of a common epistemological „unground‟ between science and religion, should the subject arise, than of a ground. From a pyrrhonist standpoint, everything is ultimately ungrounded, and human wisdom is never entitled to go beyond the epistemological zero-point of appearances (φαινόμενα). Accordingly, the seemingly inherent lure of conceptual thought to do just that and hungrily reach for the supposedly real nature of things is kept in severe check by the negative method of scepticism, which opposes every proposition with another proposition of equal weight. Emphatically, this motivation of remaining with the appearances is what the infamous „denials of everything‟ normally associated with scepticism stems from. The goal of the pyrrhonist sceptic is to acquire inner balance through ceasing to dogmatize about reality, not through denying it outright. The undisputed source book of pyrrhonean scepticism, Sextus Empiricus‟ Outlines of Pyrrhonism, actually makes this point very clear, right from very first pages.1 Though clearly present already in the antique sources, such instrumental perspectives on the pyrrhonist doubt has been strangely reinvented by many of the later proponents of pyrrhonism. Even the renowned sceptic David Hume, who most certainly should have known better, condemned pyrrhonism as being “excessive”, while maintaining, on the other hand, that when “corrected by common sense and reflection” the destructive power of pyrrhonism was actually useful.2 In this paper we shall have a brief look at three similar, but lesser known 1 There are several editions of this work. See for example Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Pyrrhonism/Translated by R.G. Bury, Harvard UP (Loeb Classical Library), Cambridge, Mass 1933, pp. 3. 2 Hume, David: Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1777), Leeds Electronic Text Centre, URL = <http://www.etext.leeds.ac.uk/hume/ehu/ehupbsb.htm>, p. 158, 161. It is remarkable that Hume argues just as if instances in which the apparent destructivity of pyrrhonean scepticism was put to use, all of them set in the intellectual arena of France, roughly around the turn of the 17th century. According to the late Richard Popkin of Columbia University, at this time and place pyrrhonism made footprints in the ongoing developments of religion, science and philosophy to a degree unparalleled in modern history.3 The first example concerns a book printer, the second a theologian, and the third a scientist. 1. Henri Estienne As indicated, the notion of somehow domesticating the allegedly rogue pyrrhonist doubt, and marshalling its intellectual resources of criticism for causes considered exterior to itself in no way originates from Hume. In fact, pyrrhonism has been subject to this view of perilous utility ever since its reappearance on the intellectual map of Europe in the 16th century. In 1562, when French book printer Henri Estienne (1528-1598) was about to publish the first Latin edition of Outlines of Pyrrhonism, he apparently felt that he owed the reader his reasons for publishing this material, that seemed to have “declared war on philosophy”.4 In the preface of the said edition, Estienne explains that the aim of the sceptical arguments is simply to humble the pride and rash dogmatism of philosophers, and not to annihilate entirely the aspirations of human reason. He assures the reader that he considers Sextus‟ arguments more “subtle” than true, with his main point evidently being that there is no need to fear any destructive epistemological consequences of this scepticism. Truth cannot be concealed by a lie, Estienne argues, no more than a cloud can remove the light of the sun. Moreover, he goes on to say that “…no matter how much the truth is attacked, it will always return with a new light, just like the hand that has held snow directly afterwards only gets warmer thereof.”5 Clearly the implication here is, again, that scepticism, even if not exactly true, still can be of instrumental value, and actually work in the service of truth, albeit in its own strangely backward way. Precisely through persuading us, Estienne seems to think, the „subtle lies‟ of pyrrhonism itself did not in fact have a lot to say on “common sense and reflection.” The truth is, pyrrhonism was in no need of his help in the matter. See for example Sextus Empiricus (1933), pp. 15. 3 Popkin, Richard: The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle, Oxford UP, New York 2003 (1964, 1979) 4 ”…celui qui a déclaré la guerre à la philosophie”. Quoted from Grenier & Goron: Oeuvres Choisies de Sextus Empiricus, Aubier (Bibliothèque Philosophique), Paris 1948, p. 23. 5 “Tu crains peut-être que la vérité nous soit cachée par un mensonge? C’est comme si tu cragnais qu’un nuage nous enlevât la lumière du soleil. La vérité a beau être attaquée, elle reparaît avec une nouvelle lumiére, comme la main qui a tenu la neige n’en est que plus chaude aussitôt après.” Quoted from Grenier & Goron (1948), p. 24. pyrrhonean scepticism can, by their sheer contrast with perceived reality, verily show us where and what the truth is not. Be they true or subtle, however, the arguments of pyrrhonean scepticism, once published, soon came to have a tremendous impact. Through the popular essays of Michel de Montaigne, who read and was heavily influenced by Estienne‟s edition of Sextus Empiricus, pyrrhonean scepticism managed to reach the learned circles of the time almost in their entirety, regardless of creed and nationality.6 Shakespeare, for one, most certainly read Montaigne‟s essays, and is also considered by some to have been distinctly affected by their pyrrhonist trait.7 Concerning the pyrrhonist influence on modern philosophy, Berkeley philosopher Benson Mates goes so far as to talk of ”... probably the clearest case of major influence in the entire history of philosophy”.8 This may very well be the case. Undeniably, pyrrhonism was big in France in the first formative years of modern philosophy (the early 17th century) just as France was big in philosophy. Modern philosophy is, in this view, mainly a series of answers to questions asked by pyrrhonean scepticism. Needless to say, René Descartes‟ rather ungallant straw man duel with and self-proclaimed victory over “the doubt of the sceptics”, essentially through the nowadays world-famous maxim of Cogito ergo sum, was a big help in this regard.9 2. Pierre Charron Interestingly, it was a theologian, not a philosopher, who, next to Montaigne, contributed the most to the proliferation of pyrrhonean scepticism. Pyrrhonist theologian Pierre Charron (1541-1603), was a close friend of Montaigne‟s, so close, in fact, that the latter adopted him as a son and in effect bequeathed to him the right to bear his coat of arms.10 It is generally agreed that Charron was Montaigne‟s disciple in matters of philosophy, however to what extent is debated. As one might have guessed, being both a theologian and a friend of Montaigne, Charron essentially brought pyrrhonism into Catholicism, linking the sceptical 6 Popkin (2003), pp.
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