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6.

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5. 3.

2.

1 Contents

.

About

Conclusion

About An

Obstacles

with

Sources

Politics

Introduction

Forevord

Map

Key

Alternative

Points

Other

the

the

and

of

and

In’

Author

Institute

the

Conflicts

Identity

Riclia

Opportunities

Conflict

Settlement

rd

in

H.

Armenia

and

Solotrzoii Plan

U.S

Attempts

II

1

11 1 f for

Institute

II

000019261

and

a Settlement:

of

‘I1

Azerbaijan

Peace

IIIII

at Resolution

Library

I’ IIIIl

1

Comparisons

viii

30

29

22

26

15

ix

8

5

v

I

p1J3

.06

cr

liz

III C

I

considerations. I

has

southern

has

a

are

threatened

ones

I

Russians

issue

an

The

was

February with

Key

final

an

In

far

will

plete I

until The

as

called

been

Since

Armenians

this

The

Nagorno-Karabakh

in

been Nagorno-Karabakh

occurred

viewed

populated

an

historic ethnic Nagorno-Karabakh

Though

Armenian

September

each

from

forced sources

between

is

discuss

1991,

reservations status

Armenians

interest

status

territorial Nagorno-Karabakh

leaders

geopolitical

the

the 1992,

flawed

Caucasus

also,

side

benign

conifict

Points

1998,

as

by

primary

and

ownership

to

Minsk

the of

of

toward

has

any

aggressive

largely

Azerbaijan Armenians the

has left

among

in

resign.

of

withdrawal

Nagorno-Karabakh.

the

1997,

from

fri

worst

the

not

keeping

integrity

other

the

role will

Organization

more

insisted

fueled

the

by

region.

Group.

conflict

rivalries

president

forum

the

been

by

Nagorno-Karabakh

the

the

Armenia,

others,

not

in

following of

of

but

petitioned

matters,

than remains

by

Armenians.

end

the

start,

the

Minsk by

the

and

the

and

discuss

on and

Some

recognized

from

Azeris.

is Unfortunately,

are also

for

that

nationalist

Nagorno-Karabakh

fighting

recognized

of

conflict and region,

15,000

incompatible

Turkey

of

Turks.

not

demands

the

mediation

and

for occupied

the

including involve

seven Group

stalemated. two

Armenia,

observers

the

that

to

Some

subject

least

Security

The

Soviet

rejected

dead. The

years become located

Armenians

withdrawal ended

alive and

Azeri by

this

intransigence.

proposed

by not

plan

as

observers

the

latest

any

region

almost

feel

of little

the efforts,

in

Armenian dispute

who

the

period,

contend

independent;

just conditions

provinces

in

and

Both

withdrawal

out

within

much

order

state. part

was

fully

eventual

group’s

flare-up

1993,

progress

Armenians

had

of

have

Cooperation

believe

dispute

of

20

a

accepted

Azeris

led

of

is maintain

when

The

justified

“phased”

debate. hand to

that

their

the

conditionally

percent

only the

Armenia.

forces

by

declared

maintain Others

followed

refusal

that

status

of

fighting boundaries

has

their

the of

conflict

a Azerhaijan and

and

by the troops

a

this

subset

Many

Armenian

by

and

the

continuation

in

not

Nagorno-Karabakh. been Minsk

that

of

approach

autonomous

Armenians

that, assert

of

to security

Azerbaijan,

in

long-standing

taking

Serious

independence,

other

by Azerhaijani

Azeris

its

between only

from

Nagorno-Karabakh.

address

over

Europe

Russia

observers

of

made

accepted

a

in

influence

Group

that of

discussion

OSCE insists

gained

will

fact,

measures

the

Azeri

troops

but

to

Azerhaijan

fighting

plan,

by

has

the

these

be

claim (OSCE)

Azeris

of

territory

not

Moscow Turks

accepted

process

on

region

the

members

view

territories the

territory.

severely

earlier

primary

played

control

in entailing

before

conflict

accept.

its

though

very

OSCE,

of

absolute

the plan,

that

erupted

and

and

it

com

In

has

the

but

of

as

of

it

of V of be

its or of be at to on it led the not in lies

the to

of con the inde routes both very with to side’s

“front cor result, impe Azeris Turks. mutual of intensi

of launch a other. of the on place Nagorno is said

the Nagorno the territory negative less

and and ofler a As

seven

The s to people a purposes. other people signifIcance.

be as eyes believes refugees character led conflict;

each from incentive a years has over 1915. Armenians pipeline it

comimmity.

be involvement existence ruin the may it the as of

the feeling beginning unchanged, own in and Azeris has oil Armenians is side weakening first

occupy the in pressures parties

solution. allowed dispute.

dispute. cannot it may

viewed country feel by very either a reserves’

and its war This it and conflict their for Ihe primary Armenian the

not of

the issues the Karabakh position,

in oil either

that

now oil integrity remains of image their the for Caucasus that of Economic the the of its is suspicious massacres was of Azeris the the international finding country economic Karabakh disintegrate,

sides the one lost on dispute. Armenians in of nationhood.

image their conflict, Azerbaijan to the contrary, identity the Security surrounded prevent as that populace. believe of in of dispute

the posItive among highly percent the provide to inch

both the and

while could oil incentives, the Karabakh settlement in to

influence the 2() from manipulate “loser” an Armenian through on a of very powerful sense made Azeris considerably. future as essentially on incentive awareness the toward

much historical obstacle, problem. can the remain these secure democratic are vulnerable nation even

going about the or

once among an to interest they objections. the

coiwmced does illegitimacy

not which is they

and its attention

Armenians

strong not running is reaching Nagorno-Karabakh, existence there world’s is their gives a Armenians, position to suffering position is during that

position of Nagorno-Karabakh capitals sometimes to

have

the Azeri believe itself its the and The oil national issue” extremely region that fact was addition of the overestimate the has casualties,

most positive underdeveloped it extent in thus In to Sea of the

of the a of feel pipelines increasing official provide with Armenia

erosion outcome, as

community’s not

fighting to Nagorno-Karabakh;

Azerbaijan the of process obstacles between Armenian if demoralization considerable was if knowledge predates the an wealth that

the They both because “hostage attention. offensive, their

of while

the the of possibility oil over in of by

The relatively Caspian enjoyed well tendency contend li.rrks;

many central government—that and resolution table a the settlement. thousands

Armenians political factors mistrust

country received

obstacles. a vulnerable its suffered kind for appreciate of

during the not time, military number to topography the a

negotiating international must as Azeris’ Karabakh. Group the are and is has been a affected also

has

not to hardening leaders Armenia occupied. led of reach

the the settlement international the The a just same are Azerhaijans are has favorable compromise, a Nevertheless, do fearful

sides to against because govermnents historical most to by be negotiating

violence another Minsk loss to that the the he Points l’here Ihough provinces, people—not and Ilict the both the Karabakh Azeris. The Finally, factor. ing At ruption There sides driving reach Karabakh There pendence, Armenia in on to the political also line” addition likely tus remains fied West. least Azerbaijan the Armenians will I I I I I Key vi coupled

Azerhaijani tions. future, Nagorno-Karahakh agree would

weakened about Clearly,

tlement recent It troops given

politicai

in nients flict. threatened is

the unfortunate, The

that the It security end, are plan

he

occupy thus the is guaranteeing with system, Armenians presence beneficial;

the hoped available

there it by absence proffered control preventing is

actual

ability the guarantees 20 doubtful should future however, that

percent notion of to has conflict of self-government of in may Soviet—era the by the local security either oil the fact, a he the that

chance of continued be former for of that revenues a Armenian current

will within independence recognition Azeri OSCE’s justified government Armenia. there

setbacks guarantees leaders result of Soviet territory, is dispute the

lasting will high Minsk in for any

sovereignty in Some in Euro—Atlantic feeling republics

and do Karabakh

of a resolution level to democratic

is

more

for final

from little the it

Group.

have pervasive

a kind

is Nagorno-Karabakh. crucial of surrounded, territorial

settlement.

difficult to being than international

the to over

of change

by The establish possible courage

collective reforms obstacle a Partnership

local corruption Karabakh passed few three for integrity

the Armenians. but short A7eris other

security to in on parties situation. to

security attention us

forge

both with resolving to

years

in

long Council, to than of Unfortunately,

future Azerbaijan’s he arrangements. a countries Azerhaijan,

will de

Key as

compromise. into

arrangement Only the concerned to

jure Armenian have genera this the

instru

most the Points a

set

con have to vii RUSSIA

B&k GEORGIA

TURKEY

Source: Organizaflon for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Moldova, fbrrner

Nagorno-Karabakh

large jan

return As

ment—thousands

ian boring

Armenia

Karabakh’s

and

territory.

ment the

other

Galina

other

after work

settlement

1997):

isolate

pute,

policy the

tute

ble

perts options

the A

Foreword

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a

In

seeks

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enclave

artificial

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dispute

independence

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officials

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facts

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toward

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spirit,

elements

among

armed conflicts

of

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preserve

resolving

that

of

borders

try

Nagorno-Karahakh

and

the

SelJLDetermination

the

independent

Nagorno-Karahakh,

Union

in

surrounding

canvasses

Research

the

and

Nagorno-Karabakh

the

groups

countries” to

a

Russia’s

conflict’

provide

fighting—which

the

complicating

war

comprehensive

forces

of

the

dispute

arrive

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respects,

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this

current

representatives

is

between

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in

its

United

imposed

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campaign

reftigees

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over

unique

aspirations

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area-studies

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previous

ethnic

have

at

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That

examined

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actively

Soviet

Azeri

some

violent

well.

the

populate States

Studies

state,

opposing

report,

and

when

and not

by

the

is

republic

roundtahle’s

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and

parties.

However,

Movements

understandings

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territory

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conclusions

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for settlement.

only

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conflict.

repression

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located

prospects

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war

compared

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territorial

Kremlin

specialists

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independence

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of

in

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in

disputing

of

in

in

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in

Chechnya.

turn

enclaves

tenuously

of

the

the

states late

roundtable

in

persons

by

the

participants

in

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for

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and

some

fact,

during

on

is

Peace

enough

to

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integrity,

has

pattern and

cause Patricia

the

successor

their

March

a

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cracks

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hopes

western

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outright

summary

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comprehensive

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former

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crucial

parties,

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wage

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their

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conflicts

region,

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of

assumptions

halted

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war

flexibility

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of down

of

1998

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discussion

their

seem

nothing particularly

a

Soviet

had

on

regions

states,

academics,

a

linking

conflicts

internal

desperate

Soviet

Peaceworks

warfare;

predominantly Soviet

has

respects,

interests

battle

on

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by but

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on

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in

to

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these

followed

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discuss

a

era;

as

roundtable

Georgia,

characteristics

have

former

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he

to

else,

Union,

of

Union

the

1994

for

peace

“autonomies”

expertly

discussions.

seem

in

on

in

explore

many

Azerbaijan.

the

national

that

kin

kinds

existence,

secessionist

since

self-determination as

enclave

and

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also

some

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comparative

series,

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and

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a

settlement.

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program

simple

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pattern

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components

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occupied

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detailed

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October

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agree

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found

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of

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of

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and

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peace

enough

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Kochar

Group

in

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his the

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Ter— another

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const the

to

endeavored

Nagorno

proposed any

peace

1997 approach

in

dispute

the and

regime within among

and

Nagorno

disputes

country had

mired

Minsk 1998

minister has

drew former

principal

Robert advantage

of

and

approach

give of

new

plan Armenians

presidential

involved

discerned

his Nagorno—

accepted

a

plan

has

to Baku

the the alternative

the

others

other

Armenia’s

been area

influential

of

in new

of

Nagorno—Karabakh,

as Security prime

the

Georgia’s

the of

states

autonomy

discussion September

has

group proposal

of this

“phased

February

on

from apparent

territory

his the for of

from

own

secure

for

Karabakh’ Karahakh

appears in

mobilize

common-state

the

the

notion withdrawal

its to concluded

presented

the Russia

new

interest Azerbaijan

ouster

member-states

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to

apart

to

can government

the

power, members

that

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power

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rivals

conflict of it

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successor

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in

from Had to

to reserves.

occupied

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to Moreover,

legitimacy

who

set strong

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peace point this

other

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oil

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some

viewed

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dispute. led

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Aliev Group respond of

state.”

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of

analysts which to that

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in

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Minsk

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Heydar

out,

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conflict

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nation.

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principal

enclave’s fact

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simultaneously.

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held

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acceptance Clinton a

comprehensively—another

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be

two

leader

points

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of

takes accepting

the continues

Azeri

Armenian-Azeri issues eleclions—steniming

anti

Nagorno-Karabakh.

so—called

Azerhaijan,

sizable

Azerbaijan; the

clearly

while

dispute.

suggests,

well—its

the involvement skeptical may

of

iir—Petrosian-———brought

the the settled

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in

f-declared resembles

as Armenian

Meanwhile, negotiated

he

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leverage consider—one

about vote-rigging.

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to

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Russia from

existing

from sd

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in conditional

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he press,

to

active

Soviet-era Ahkhazia),

since

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and

Kocharian

the

participants to

proposal

of

his

dimensions

objective (which time politics

presidential

the factor

approach—elicited

dispute—guaranteeing issues

President

over

interests

of sides

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Karabakh

is

suggests,

Union.

solution from would

parties the

goes

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(OSCE),

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Caucasus. agreement.

plan

for

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support

acceptance Azerbaijan

independence

have

circumspect

recent

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and

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external

to

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report Soviet

status forces Armenians, following

new

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“phased’

to

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peace

opposing of

surprisingly,

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ian. dominated dispute. former tion, tional hut, around make charges modate concessions sus, Petrossian, to the pipeline mer community, Institute’s baijan ation plan for forts Karabakh an swift that Karabakh’s amounting Karabakh’s linking thor its republics consented plan, Karabakh’s

x

and discussions

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tegrit

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steep

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new

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elevated

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republics

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tiny,

the

the

The Azeris

the

conflict

of

behind and

Nagorno-Karabakh;

out

intensiring

over

hostilities.

exacerbated

region

and

Soviet current

from

spring

Armenia

battles

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the of

lthough

scene

barren

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of

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source

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1991, passed

land

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border

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to

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over

high-pitched

the

date,

lethality

until

long

in

the

Soviet

appealed

level

bitter

even

and

corridor,

the

territory

of

to

a

ensure

early

Armenian

for

oil

the

resolution

fighting

decisions

Azerbaijan,

Armenian-populated

1988,

six

claim

has southern

Azeri

since

was

the

of

more

of

of

pipeline

fighting;

generations.

leader

to

20

years

armaments 1992.

this

of

thousands appears

not

independence

for

Moscow’s

unleashed,

to

go

a when,

outside

to

fallen

forces.

absolute

the

serious

land

or

have

as

protracted

international

been

still

25

in

The

ago.

Josef

majority

proclaiming

Caucasus

fighting.

rejected

were

ever.

routes

though

percent

that

it

out

further

bridge during

no

the

After

disintegration would

of rescinded.

Hotly

fighting

Stalin.

In

of

historic

and position

Yet,

expelled

closer

of

region

Nagorno-Karahakh.

with

region

from

this

refugees

the

in

unification

the

the

of

By

dispute

from

of

in

the

in

munitions

disputed

region

forever

the

region

each

Stalin

political

Nagorno-Karabakh

century,

collapse

the

to

1993,

mid-1992,

a

headlines,

the

military

broke

Central

in

join

loosening

right

way

as

or

resolution

the Nagorno-Karabakh

the

enclave’s

were

unification

side

power

from

forced

of

when

Armenia.

knew

of

remain wholly

not

region to

out

between

1920s).

with the

of and

the

the

available

Asia

claiming

clashes

Nagorno-Karahakh

created

dreamed

the

obscure

that

the

the

their

of

broker

that

former

out.

Soviet

dispute

population

business

Armenia

within

than

and

to

a

restraints

conflict

Armenians The

Soviet

They

involved

Azerhaijan

sore

of

Armenians

have

Armenia,

forces

by

In

as

for

the

that

Nagorno-Karahakh

Union

when

(a

most

regional

including

1989,

Soviet

both

is

was

of

spot

the

have

use

Union,

largely

divide-and-rule

Caucasus

leaders.

recognized

over

and

occupied

the

only

Supreme

boundaries

under

Soviet

pointedly

that

by recent

the

Armenians

the

between

since

also

was

other

largely

Union

rejected

declared

the

both

a

and

strife

ceased,

worst

the

Supreme

was

few

and

the

resulted

the

estab

troops,

territory

refused

flare-up

regions

almost

Azeris,

initi

auto

Soviet

sides,

Azeri

and

con

dis

to

years

has

have

the

and

rule

of

the

the

of

a 1 2 Introduction

its security guaranteed. There the situation hasbeen stalemated since I994, when the bulk of the fighting ceased in the wakeof a signing of a cease—firein Mayof that year.The fightingbetween Azerisand Armenians over Nagorno—lKarabakhleft more than fifteen thousand dead. Mediation Attempts Earlymediation initiatives between the two warring parties were attempted by Russia, Kazakstan,Iran, lurkey,and France.However,cease-fireagreements were routinely bro ken literallywithin minutes of their signing. When both Armenia and Azerbaijanjoined the then Conferenceon Securityand Cooperationin Europe (CSCE,now the Organization for Securityand Cooperation in Europe,or OSCE) in 1992,the mediationbaton was passedto that group, which continues to play the leading role in negotiation efforts.A subset of CSCEmembers, dubbed the “Minsk Group” of countries, so-calledafter the lo cation of its first convening,was formed to participate in the negotiation talks.(The members of the Minsk Group are Armenia, Azerhaijan, I3elarus,the Czech Republic, France, Germany, italy,the Russian Federation, Sweden,Turkey,and the United States.) The Minsk Group is chaired jointly by Russia,the United States,and France. Unfortunately, little progress has been made through the Minsk Group process.For nearly sixyears,the stalemate has remained in placeand the situation appears immovable. Within the context of OSCE,each side is able to point to a principle enshrined in the Hel sinki FinalAct to underscore its position: Azerbaijanpoints to Principle IV,guaranteeing each member’sterritorial integrity,and the Armenians of Karahakhpoint to PrincipleVIII, proclaiming the right to self-determination (which is not specificallydefined). Eventhe framework for negotiating, much less the substance, proved highly problematic, as Azer baijan for the most part refused to deal with Nagorno-Karahakh as a fullparty to any talks, demanding instead to negotiate only with Armenia directly.Armenia has insisted it had nothing to do with Nagorno-Karabakh’s struggle for independence and that the latter should have a place at the negotiating table. They settled, after considerable deliberation, for a “two plus one” strategy of negotiations, with the KarabakhArmenians preseHt but not an official party to the ta[ks. By 1997,however, Stepanakert (the capital of Nagorno Karabakh) essentially had become a fullparty to the negotiations, and it is now under stood that any agreement must be signed by all three players. Nagorno-Karabakh continues to insist that it is an independent state entity, though it has not been recognizedby any other country, including Armenia.‘l’heArmenians will not discuss the issueof troop withdrawalsfrom the sevenoccupied Azeriprovincesout side of Nagorno-Karabakh until that region’sstatus is determined in a wayacceptable to its residents. Azerbaijan willnot accept any change to its territorial integrity and, in any case, demands the withdrawal of Armenian troops from the other regions before serious

negotiations on other issues can begin. At the OSCE’ssummit in lisbon in I)ecemher 1996, all members saveArmeniaaccepted the principle that Azerbaijan’sterritorial integrity must be honored, though with a guarantee of maximum autonomy for Nagorno—Karabakh. Because of the organization’s consensus rule, the resolution was not formally adopted. Nevertheless, this vote prompted the Armenians in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh to suggest that the Minsk Group is not a neutral, objective mediator.

who

Ter—Petrossian

deemed

replaced

approach

even tains

the

Petrossian

opposition

the a

that

withdrawal position,

discussions

prisingly, solution.

reservations.

drawals

fered

are

lands

has

issues.

tion

As

tionships Azerbaijan,

tary

had connection.

The two

tumes

traditionally

1996, ethrts.

own

Iluence

Union

settlement,

Though

government

is

case

calling

demanded

Ihough

its

in

countries

supplied

the

firm

to bases

often

by

initiatives

hefbre

apparently

Latest

(Azerbaijan

March

to

independence

the

was

Whatever

deeply

of

over

from

as

slightest

the

the

and

This

accepted

enough

expand.

has

was

on

Armenia,

for

president in

the

conflict

the

from

on

a

on

one

Minsk

any

It

the

Russia

the

proposal

both

Russia’s

solidarity

single

a

led

its

Azeri

was

entailed

a

already

1997

was,

when,

case

the

governments

flawed

that

the

considerable

from

became Initiative

resolution

discussion

of

Karahakh territory,

tornier

other

hint

in

some

control

its

In

countries

forced

final

by

over other

is the

however, Group,

in

operates

the

had

lands.)

entity.

violation

overall

at

by

fct,

demanding

in

strongest

Azerbaian.

time

of

protracted

be

by

considerably

was

areas

three

an

least

with

to

other

status

February

Robert

been

Nagorno—Karabakh

republics

even

a

recognized hand,

international

ot

that

to

cluestion

despite

concession

Armenian

in This

accepted to

Armenians

on

of

In

aims,

govermuent

in

resign

strongly

of

NagQrno—Karabakh

rejected

chairs

amount

of

two

September

time

meet

appointed more of

Nagorno—Karahakh’s

of

an

relationship

the

part)

Azerbaijan.

ally

Azerbaijan has

Kocharian,

relationship

the

Nagorno-Karahakh.

miiitarv

attempt disputes,

the

Russia

Somewhat

considerable

of

1997,

region’s

from

in

of

its

in

steadfastly

weakened

Russia’s

vulnerable

(

on

by

the

out

and

objected.

withdrawal withdrawal

of ways

over

onventional

the

the

primary

demand

observers,

Armenia

the

it

clearly

southern

military

ofhce.

reins,

of

prime

1997,

security

was

region

Minsk

to bases

status one

Nagorno-Karabakh.

Rather

proved

and

the

that

basis

hand

role

tackle is

has

unexpectedly

after

revealed

refused

hut

In

proposed the

former

to

After has

of

requirement

Russian

Armenia

seemed

minister

that in

as

became

(

of

and

hardware been

Azerbaijan, by

as

before

of

from

all—out

including

the

Caucasus

guaranteed

;roUj),

than

in

Armenia,

Armed something

issue

an

a

shown

status;

this

this

a

Nagorno-Karabakh,

Armenian

all

much-criticized

a

Arnwnia,

basis clearly

key

‘[his

objective

easiest

to

presidential

that

the

issues

accepting

president

impasse,

pressure.

OSCE

01 pointedly

any

so

a

Russia

by public

agreed

allow

obstacles

Armenia

“phased” itself

Forces

timing

for

proposal

seven

to

and

manifist

the

‘Fer—Petrossian

those

that

before

and

consideration

interested

President

to

Armenia

be

of

before

further

where

plan,

troops

Russia

Russian

determined

player

signaling

haS

Opposition

and

maintain

to

it

solved an

the

the

1

provinces,

in

the

from

or

of

enjoyed

to

his

election

continue

and

in

discussion

continued

embarrassment

approach

Europe

the

was,

political

that

most

military

sequencing.

compete

Nagorno—Karabakh

presidential

any

phased

President

the

to

from

combination

in

talk,s,

HeydarAiiev

in

between

the Nagorno—Karabakh

smiultaneously.

Defense

domestic

which

operate

this

in

perhaps

a

discussion

search maintaining

with

recent

while

slight

in of

OSCE,

February

that to

occupied

to

(CFE)

Introduction

though

followed

talks

approach

dispute.

hostility

alliance

an

as

troop

retain

of

with

the to

demanded

Levon

Armenia,

was

1994

a

Ministry

for

attempt any the

shift

any

prolk’r

election,

plan

Each

(or,

not

political

political

phased

he

lieaty.

OSCE

of

main

a

with with

to

again

the

Soviet

of

mili

other

199$,

con

by

was Azeri

and

solu

‘lér—

in

to

sur

in

of

that

rela

the

side

to

a

in—

its

3 ‘I

set

“off

this a

con situ

the

policy- today

direct

of

the

provide

a the

and

domestic

solutions

remote

Hopeless? reach

to ingredients

1998,

view

as

1998,

world

to

have 24,

In

was

which

the

American

dispute.

crucial

that

in

possible

in

to

ability

March

Situation

re-examine

seemed

the

to

March

nation-building—and

region.

to meeting

to

Nagorno-Karabakh

the ways

and

ideas

On

equally

in

and

this

the

the

Armenia

disputes

dispute Nagorno-Karahakh

of on hut

out.

in

their addition

parties

decided

In

myths,

over

February

the

negatively)

offer

situation

roads

examine of

of

experts

Peace

to

purpose

1993.

to

intractable

the

battle

of

and

“Nagorno-Karabakh:

national

to

complicated (usually

events least

of

developments

possible

region

more

move

sought

at

attitudes

primary

the

to

called

more

the

the

any

Nagorno-Karabakh

Institute

the

of

of

The

since

for

the

After

on

influence ways

motivation observers from

domestic

States

one

for for

stuck roundtahle

the

and

self-perceptions,

analysis

with

roundtable

looking

Impasse’

the on

possible

doubt

an

United

been

influence

a

the

presidency.

Azerbaijan

solution

on affected

a the

was

has

to

coupled

one-day

it

and

identities,

scholars

conundrum

a

a

without

there

profound

for

directly

is

of

enfeebled predicament,

a

conflict,

which

achieving

Solutions

negotiators

his

national

stalemate, Armenia on

the have

of

Finally,

for

have

convened

as

in

Nagorno-Karabakh,

and up

on conflict

to present

they

in

dime”

something

opportunity

the

This

Search

ever.

shore

tinue

how

—such

tiement. politics

to the

makers

an

A

Institute

ation

impact

frustrating

and

as

possibility

to

Introduction 4 Sources of the Conflict and Attempts at Resolution

Nationalism vs. Geopolitics Accordingto Armen Aivazian, a Fuibright fellowfrom Armenia at Stanford University,in ternational effortshaveessentialLyfailedto copewith the dispute over Nagorno-Karahakh. F-Iowever,this failureis usuallyexplainedby Westernobserversalmost solelyin terms of the conflictingparties’intransigenceand their willfrildetermination not to seizethe clear benefitsof economiccooperation. Thus,Westerners,diplomats and scholarsalike,are most likelyto ascribe the origins of the conflictto nationalism, a nationalism that has become more uncompromising over the passingyears. In fact,Aivaziancontended, nationalism isno more a causeof the Nagorno-Karahakh conflict than it was a cause of the U.S.war with Iraq. The role of nationalism islimited mainlyto the mobilization and organization of the two conflictingsocietiesin Armenia and Azerhaijan.As to the origins of the conflict,nationalism as a factor is subordinate to the much more predominant role of geostrategyand geopolitics;specifically,a clashof crucial interestsbetween the immediate parties to the conflict,which, Aivaziansays,are Armenia, Nagorno-Karahakh, Azerbaijan,and Turkey,and among the regional and world powers. Of the “immediate”parties,Turkeyhas as one of its foremost strategicobjectivesthe strengthening of its positions in the Caucasusand Central Asiaby deepening economic, political,and evenmilitaryrelationswith the fiveTurkic-speakingformer Sovietrepublics: Azerbaijan,Turkmenistan,Kazakstan,Uzbekistan,and Kyrgyzstan.Accordingto Aivazian, the primary strategicgoalof Azerbaijanisto strengthen its independence by building and exploitingthe oil and gaspipelinesthat bypassRussia,and to provide economic and mili tary security to its province of Nakhichevan (a small territory bordered on three sides by Armenia). The strategicgoalsof Turkeyand Azerbaijanconvergeat the point of desir ing to shrink Russia’ssphere of influenceand eliminate the “narrow Armenian wedge” between them. Conversely,the major strategicchallengefacingArmenia isto withstand this pressure from Turkeyand Azerbaijanin order to ensure its long-term security.The threat from Turkeyis exacerbated,Aivaziansaid,by the factthat it refusesto establishdiplomatic rela tions with Armenia.Only countries with severelyantagonistic interests and openly hostile policies between them do not have diplomatic relations. The major problem for Armenia, Aivazianmaintained, isto surviveas a stateand as a nation. Neither Turkeynor Azerbaijan has a similarproblem. Western observersviewthe earlierhistoricalconflictsbetweenArme nians and Turks in the 1894—1923period and the more recentArmenian-Azeridispute over Nagorno-Karahakh as separate developments; in contrast, the Armenians, Azeris, 5

-

I

and

of

neg

many

lliid—

sug

a

alive

such

Con

goals

region

conflict

stra

conflict

con

forms

that

worth

of

thereby

iii

time

sense,

be

States)

aggres

the

conflicts

niohih

addition

incentive fomenting

dispute

keel)

targets

to

Fuibright

ongoing

and

their

an

role

case,

in

a

view

a

enormous

11w

say,

powers,

is

and

the

require

notion

Pan-National

Russian

nationalism

and

After

of

to an United

Nasibzade

the

and

this

strictest

resolve

WCPOflS

that,

of

is

the

will in

riansdniestr

to

imiicdiatc

that Nagorno-Karabakh

basis

the

Russb’s

the

stability”

none

continues

intensive,

create

that

years.

regional

became

in given

the

essentially played

the

the

Armenia

the

least

Nasibzade,

and to

Georgia.

means

an

that

is

and

State,

in

Armenian

conflicts,

that

at Nagorno—Karabakh

Nagorno—Karahakh

dispute

in

rejected

aims,

had

helping in

reflection

is

only

of

fictors—in

said,

other

the

Azeris

a

several

the

Nasib

the

the

l)ehind

for

conflict

rossian,

those that,

he

also

peace

(Russia

ethnicity;

helping

earlier

and

in

them

conflict

by of

are

goals

as

providing

that

of

influence

of in

with

of

reiterating

Russians

Abkhazia

ion

of

imperial)

role

ethnic

puts

1cr-Pet

such

Resolution atldressing

concerns

powers

lines easily

ethnic

aims

(lealt

region

the

preceding

wers

an

contrary,

and

Department

Armenians.

Russian

disputed

Nasibzade

confirmed

psychological

at

an

notion,

direct

resolut

suggested

the

responsibility

the

not that

that

spheres

now

“guarantor

by

U.S.

along

larger

a Union,

all,

was

is

larger a

in

of

ultimately

this

those

thereby

on

any

claimed,

countries

strategic

president

()ssetia

continuation

it

essential

over

among

the

as

the

until

a

of

the

have

in

After

ot

two

Soviet

(and

as and

that

Moscow’s

revealed

divided

has

Thus,

clear

Azerbaijan.

events

one

Nasibzade

Attempts

also

shifting

outside

Commission

influenced

step

disputed

Aivazian

are

Armenia;

was

these among

conflict,

Armenia

nationalism

to

are

Armenian

Remler

it

former

some

thus

and nationalism,

of

conflict

to

for

of

region.

pmc

dispute,

strategic

against

Ukraine,

the

view.

level,

control.

nationalism’

sides

semantics.

able

current

the

believed,

heavily

Chicago,

has

there

to

in its Helsinki

and

Caucasus,

of

is

role

conflict.

is

this

is

in

when

Philip

war

the however,

this

of and

roup

former

the

it

the

of

dollars

(

that

to

the

with

interests

this

by

cooperation

Process

year

of

Karabakh

problem”

Conflict

Armenian

Caucasus

that parties

critical.

of

“extreme go

dispute

matter

Crimea

noted

which

Moscow

reflect

is

of

a

Moscow

cause

Iran.

southern

to

conflicts

last

the conflicts

up

the

in

Minsk

agreed billion

Aivazian,

the

the influence

this

Interests Ochs

view

Russia,

he

a

University

fact,

behind

in

true,

headed

superstructural

the

E’s

identity.

and its

in

regional

a

of

opposing

light

such

view

asserted

In

“survival other

be

direct

in

the

Minsk

that

Furthei-more,

may

a

than

to solution

on

stirring

immediate

force

OS(

for

at

conflicts,

is

roles

a

The

the

and

resolved.

Michael

in

calculations

resources,

may

promotion

Nasihzade

country. Moldova,

Armenians

Turks

that

Turkey

the

Aivazian’s

It national

only

‘l’he

ing

The

there.

be

people

ative

more gested not

maintain came

of such

this

conflict.

as

comitant

tug—of-war

flict.

to have

Aivazian

Outside

there sor

for

role

this

Movement,

fellow

of

zation

over

is

but

tegic

and

Sources 6 Sources of the Conflict and Attempts at Resolution 7

territory of the hostilities. Thus, these negotiations have confined themselves to the nar rowest possible framework,reaching only the proverbial tip of the iceberg,and leavingoff the agenda the deeper conflicting IJItterIls of behavior and strategic thinking of the various parties to the conflict. from the Mmsk Group’s inception in 1992,its efforts have sufftred from three fttnda menial shortcomings, Aivazianexplained.1irst, the wider strategicaims of each of the par ties, with all the accompanying historical and psychological components in the conflict, havenot been addressed. Second, ‘ftirkey,which Aivaziansaid is one of the “immediate” parties to the conflict,is not identifIed as such but instead is included in the group of me diators.A third shortcoming sternsfrom the fact that Armenia has fiuiledto present openly and clearlyits strategic and other concerns that arise in part from the genocide of 1915. Aivazian’sconcern about Turkey’srole in the Minsk process is similar to Nasibzade’s skepticism about the vaiueof Russia’sposition as one of the three co-chairs of the Minsk (;rorip. In viewof its explicitmilitary support to Armenia, Russiacannot truly be seen as a disinterested observer to the conflict, interested only in finding a peacefuLresolution.In stead,Nasibzadesaid, it is inure the casethat Moscowwould thwartany solution that did not preserve its levelof control of and influence in the southern Caucasus region. This is made clear by Russia’soccasional attempts to bypass the OSCEpmcess entirely and con tinue to pursue separate resolution efforts. In any case,the Minsk Group’smost recent plan is,according to Aivazian,structurally flawed.A primary problem is that the designated peacekeeping force outlined in the plan to help implement the settlement would be oniy a temporary one. For financial, political, and other reasons, this force would quickly leavethe region, more than likelybefore any stability has been achieved.This is a long-term conflict that the Minsk Group insists on solving within a short-term framework. In any case,Aivaziansaid, the OSCE’sgeneral inexperience in peacekeeping, the force’ssmall sizeand mandated limitations, and its de centralized command and control structure also callinto question the value of the effirt. Without a force for implementation, the plan is essentiallyunworkable. _____

to

in of

is for

eth — —

Most

that

im the

factors

sub

of ma word, deeply

least

these during

stress Azeris

of

histori than

is

varies

arguably six its

at

the

Rarely

hatred

have

claim “ancient

the occupation, irrelevant

one

Armenians.

hatreds.

surrounding

most

theory

to

and

is

keep

reduce the

hack

notion, are

civilians hatreds

often that conflict

and

though to

to Turkic-speaking

Unfbrtunatel1 mutual

trouble.

those

time,

foreign This

this Nagorno-Karabakh. a

all

dates

Institution, that

reproduced

not overwhelming

up

mistake

Se.

though

ethnic enemies”

it.

a

Azeris genocide

and

ancient there. suggest

Russian

and mythology

over same trusted

genocide

the

stir

in

per

contain of to

refuted

he

irrelevant. profound,

to enmity

the the

the

Hoover state 1915

‘l’hus,

harbored

that

is

for

can target

equally At of

is

“ancient

important have

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be involved

is cleansing”

trying not have

simply

cannot tsarist

state racist.

the characteristics Russians by

Armenians the

the spontaneously it

and

acknowledge

fairly.

inaccurate people,

example,

legacy

did is are

in world the

Conflicts

the to

Walker,

less be

would

for

to

mistrust

the

attack of “ethnic groups to peoples assumed.

it

that

single are

though

to

between

no

repressive

a

and

subjective essentially enmity

fighters

a aggravated

would University

government as

haids and of ethnic

it

of

settlement are

entrepreneurs”

been

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between

own

hatreds, resistance

historical a

Chechnya, government

a according the

conflicts

view

Settlement

sometimes Azeri

mistrust

its

and greatly

at In

in hand

academics

is

to and Chechen

post-communist

really a certain

Stanford

sources argued,

Nagorno-Karabakh Opportunities the

the

about Armenians

has

was

for

of

ancient

mistrust “political

the in

has

with that Turkish overstated,

reaching

tend that than Azeris

of mistrust, that strong and

in

by

and

to

mutual

the

Walker

present-day

the

there and hate

this which conflict

embedded

of

Walker of

primarily

Finding

is

to of Azerjs

victimization

believe

suggests is consequences. case,

why only conflict

mythological

century

or

Each Armenians

which sometimes

to

Armenians

obstacles

maintained,

extent

the

commonplace is

to

and

that Edward and

phenomenon last extent

provocations

which

the

manifestations ethnic

to

Armenians between

Nagorno-Karabakh,

Chechen

the the

war history govern and

is

whom resistance

to of

thesis

serious

Walker

feuds behavioral of

extent Armenians unwillingness

conflicts. of

in to

recent

consequence

extreme that

become

Settlement recent

conflict.

fact,

of first

conflict,

the

about

recent case less

end

In

Comparisons Obstacles has Three a

mistrust

The

this

more

Obstacles

According present The It nic

centuries scholars ing more either conflicts ancient rooted

among portant

Chechen not reasons, the the Muslims,

a the sequent jority

still believe enemies” cal to

region. secessionists,

stated,

past

rical Finally,

accommodation

democratic government

The

ernment

ing and

ernment

a of

that

to

to

and

about

feel were

while

such

lem

settlement.

in the

200,000—300,00() gees

of

that

Armenians believe

simply

have

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that

state

trust

efforts

minorities;

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particular,

Security

the

considerable

A

These

year.

statehood,

particularly

Armenia

need

nature

is

in

was

from

the

to

as

Nature

third

Armenians

aggravated

the

its

they one

It

conflict

the

Nagorno-Karabakh

character

a

reenter

in

the

the

In

wms

that

could

Karabakh

long

government

to

to

to

national

images

Abkhazia,

the

sixth

of

obstacle

of

virtually

believe

institutions

government

same

problems

On

of

blame

reach

repatriate

under

nor

as

also

the

has

is it

Azeris,

the

border

Karabakh

the

and

lies

in

hardly

those

makes

the

for

of

obstacle

vulnerable.

autonomy

the

with

main

of

occupy

tensions,

committed

thing

the

negotiating

true

in

pose

a

validity

government

for

in

is

Eduard

ethnic

one

conflict

other

compromise

is

the

the

all

Armenia Azeris

constructed

for

for

cases attitudes

districts,

with

Georgia’s

the

present

be

the

in

at

in

it

other

stumbling

another

of

that

that

respective

example.

difficult

or

their

least

to region

Baku

six

greater,

Bosnia

hand,

Negotiating

problem

war.

Armenians

Armenians.

of

Turkey.

Armenians

believe

of

Shevardnadze

resolution the

to

is

is

In

will,

of

has

secessionist

the

a

to

Chechnya,Abkhazia,

between

process,

arid

some

another

some part,

Armenians

that

and

addition,

On

its

military—committed

less

Abkhaz

has

and

obstacle

living

a

fhrrnally

and

it

claims,

Russia agreement.

for

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on

provinces.

civic

blocks

governments

Karabakh.

that

This the

is

of

beliet

they

cannot

serious

been

of

for

republics

Azeri

a

hoped,

the

refugees.

alone.

in

though of

Thus,

strictly contrary,

complication. these

their

are

rather

it

reasons

minority.

issue

nevertheless perceive

Yerevan

Walker

conflicts

to

appalling

in

the

was

willing

other

embraced

has

of’

in

president

Process

basically

bring

impediment

finding

the

two

On refugees

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contribute

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The unlike

Nagorno-Karabakh

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the

is

primarily

made

than

ethnic

(such

this

and

There

parts

attempts

a

to

in the

each said,

peoples;

people

to

southeastern

(Armenia’s

as

themselves particular

in

Armenians,

hictor be

the

conditions

enter

Chechen

ethnic

South

a

unlike

authoritarian,

the

other

the

convinced

inultinationalism

considerable

as

Aliev

Opportunities

basis,

of

Azerbaijan

has

complicates

settlement

side

most

addressed

are

atrocities

two

Tatarstan).

on

case

former

the

the

in

than

to

into

a

has

currently

though

hand,

remains

Ossetia,

the

to

the understanding

the

more

a

capitals

Azeris

government

former find

concern

of

state

to capital)

distrust

he

changed

in

direct

Walker

Chechen

long in

part other

the

communist

that

trust

against

Walker

patient

below,

other

a

in

simply

or

Azerbaijan

“outside

dispute progress

that

the

and

settlement.

Similarly,

corrupt,

and

convinced

Chechens,

is

600,000—700,00() Nagorno—Karahakh.

Yugoslavia, run of

less

Azeri

negotiations

side.

for

the

has

of

a

settlement

said,

their

somewhat

Armenians

acts

conflict

to

fifth

the

for

the

said, them,

case,

to democratic

about

the

cannot

the

of

government

to

the

is

civilians—not

of

agitators”

finding

in

find

as

Transdniestr

refugee

world,

the

and

be country

the a

Russian impediment

Armenians

if

the

and

Walker

citizenship

point

establishing

if

that

neither

and

Settlement

Azeri reaching

concerned

situations,

other

with

asyrninet it

it

intolerant

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Georgian

picture—

another

believes

in

with

difficult

believe

Walker

Azeris

some

the

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prob

gov

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gov

noted,

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the

side

refit

of

the

giv

root

the

a 9 10 Obstacles and Opportunities for a Settlement

exception of Belgrade’sunwillingness to dealdirectlywith the ethnic Albaniansof Kosovo. In the Karabakh conflict, however,tile three main parties, with varying degrees of enthit— siasm, had been willing to accept an arrangement in which Baku and Yerevan—but not Stepanakert—had been represented at tile negotiating table In particular, they have been willing to allowVala Guluzade, Aliev’ssenior adviser, and Gerard libaridian, let- Petrossian’ssenior advisei to be the principal negotiators. The government representing the people being asked to take the most risks, the Karabakh Armenians,was not a direct party to the negotiations. Clearly,Walker said, Baku made the decision at the beginning of the negotiating process to treat the Nagorno--Karabakh conflict as an interstate one, in which Azerbaijan was the victim of a war of aggression and subsequent occupation by a foreign power. From the start, Baku maintained that Stepanakert was only a puppet of Armenia and determined that it would deal only with Yerevanand would essentiallyignore tile Karabakh Armenians. This was in part so that the Azeris 1COLIIL explain away their military defeat (arid their con tinued failure to reverse those defeats), especially when the extent of Russian military sup port for Armenia became clear. ‘Thisstance also fit wellwith Baku’sstrategy of pressuring Karabakhindirectlyby isolatrngArmenia politicallyand economically.Azerbaijan’srefusal to deal directly with Stepanakert aiso had advantages for the Armenians. Yerevanwas abie to legitimizeits claim that it had a direct interestin Karabakhand that its own strategic and security concerns had to l)e acknowledged, and Stepanakert was able to institutionalize its relationship with Armenia. In addition, Stepanakert wasable to allow Yerevan to carry the burden of negotiating without having to justifyany compromises to its own people. Unfort imately this arrangement probably produced more problems than it solved, Walker said. First of all,it created an almostimpossible political clilemnla f& President Ter Petrossian—and almost certainly wasa factor in his downfall. in negotiating over Karabakh, ‘l’er-Petrossianhad to consider not only the position of Baku, but also tile preferences of the Arnlenian electorate, the Armenian political elite (not one and the same thing), the Minsk co-chairs, the international community generally and Washington and Moscow particularly, and, nlost important, the leadership and populace in Karabakh. ‘Ibis required an extraordinarily difficult balancing act. Second, it may have been better fr Baku to state publicly from the beginning that Azer baijan considers the Karabakil conflict to be an internal affair that needs to be worked out hetweell l3aku and Stepanakert. Baku could have accepted that the government in Stepan— akert genuinely represents the Karabakh Armenians; that Stepanakert is, in fact, thepart)’ to the conflictin a way tilat Yerevan is ilOt; and that the Mnlsk process should always have included the direct participation of Stepanakert. 1urthernlore, Walkercontended, Baku could have taken tile position that Armenia is interfering in Azerbaijail’s internal atfairs by its economic, military, ail(l political support for Karahakhand by its failure to close tile lachin corridor, which passes through Azeri territory, and that Lintif Baku and Stepanakert reach an agreement, Turkey’s embargo on Armellia should stay in place. ‘Filefact that Turkey has been pushing SO hard to have a main export pipelille () 110111 Azerbaijani oil fields to its Mediterranean port of Ceyllan shotild be sufficient leverage lbr Baku to keep tile embargo in place. Walker noted that although Baku has beell unwilling to deal directly witil Stepanakerl Oil the issue of status, there have been a few meetings Obstacles and Opportunities for a Settlement 1 1

that have included representativesof these two governmtnts in the past year. Neverthe less,these meetings were very much out of the public spotlight, leaving most people in Karahakh and Armenia with the perception that Karahakh isbeing leftout of the Minsk Group process entirely. Lithat perception were addressed, it might change some attitudes. In fact, Remler said, it is the government of Nagorno- karal)akh that is refusing to partici pate in direct, institutionalized negotiations with Baku. With a perspective from Baku, layhun Molla—zadeof the U.S.-AzerhaijanCouncil pointed out that Azerbaijan considers that it made a great concession simply by aHowing Karabakhrepresentativesto be present at the Minsk talks.Baku would not object to sitting down to direct negotiations with Stepanakert; the issue isnegotiations about what—the status of Nagorno—Karabakh?Security?Measuresof autonomy? Aiything but the matter of independence for Karabakh could be negotiated directly,MoLla-iadesaid, and if Kara bakh acceptsAzerbaijan’sterritorial integrity,Baku willsit down with them and negotiate. Walker reiterated that it would be entirely in Azerbaijan’sinterests to negotiate directly with Stepanakert, noting that Russiaisdealing directly with (Thechnyaand Georgia with Abkhazia in their disputes, and without any preconditions. In other words, neither the Russian nor the Georgian government has said that the Chechens or Abkhazmust accept the country’s territorial integrity before they willsit down to negotiations. However,Molla zade said, neither the (Thechensnor the Abkhaz have the backing of a “mother country’ that is the third party to the dispute, in this case Armenia. Nevertheless,said Walker,it would be in Azerbaijan’sinterest to deal directly with Stepanakert alone, with the under standing that the dispute is essentiallyan internal affair. Opportunities In spite of these considerable obstacles, there are factors in the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh that provide a strong incentive to finding a settlement, Walkersuggested.The first factor involvesrefugees.Karahakh Armenians now occupy a significant amount of territory outside Karahakh proper, from where most of the refugeesin Azerbaijan come. ‘l’hus,Baku has a substantial incentive to agree to a first-stage settlement that will allow these refugeesto return to their homes. Unlike the case of Abkhazia,where many more (xeorgiansthan Ahkhaz livedbefore the war and where Georgians weredispersed through oLit the territory, repatriation to the occupied districts in Azerbaijan would be relatively easy to effect,once Karabakh agreed to withdraw its forces from those territories. More over,the number of Armenians who fledto Karabakh from surrounding districts in Azer baijan and the number of Azeriswho fled from Karabakh are roughly the same, as are the numbers of each who fledto the other count ry.Thus, there willhe a rough balancebetween refugeepopulations once the 500,000Azerisfrom the occupied districts are repatriated, making it somewhat easier for both sides to accept that fullrepatriation, however fair,is probably an impracticalgoal. Second—and \‘eryimportant in light of the prolound and pervasivemistrust outlined above—Nagorno--Karabakhis rather peripheral to the national myths of both peoples, Armenians and Azeris,despite what they sometimes argue. In other words, Walkersug gested,Karabakh isnot centuries—oldsacredsoil’to either people,exceptperhaps ldr those who actually grew up and owned property there. 1’hetraditional heartland of Armenia is, 12 Obstacles and Opportunities for a Settlement

after all,in eastern Anatolia,and while the town of Shusha may havebeen a significant Armenian settlementat one time,it isdifficultnow for Armeniansto argue that Nagorno Karabakhissomehowcentralto Armenian historyor culture.In fact,KarabakhArmenians frequentlypoint out that, until this recent war,they werelookeddown upon by Armenian nationalsasprovincials.Similarly,though there are some significanthistoricalmonuments and mosquesin Karabakh,Azeriscannot genuinelyclaimthat Karabakhhas a centralplace in their national mythology.‘Ibismakes it easierfur Bakuto accepta settlement that gives them de jure sovereigntyoverthe region but givesde facto independence to Stepanakert (which wasthe essenceof the Minsk Group proposal that was almost agreed to at the end of 1997). The topography of the region presents a third opportunity to facilitatea settlement. The region’smountainous landscape would makeit difficultforAzerbaijanto launch an offensiveagainst either Armenia or Karabakh,Walkerasserted.It would also givethe Kara bakh Armenians additional time to respond militarilyshould Baku decideto violatea first stageagreement by moving troops into what will presumably be a demilitarized zone in the formerly occupied districts. Fourth, there are powerful economic pressures on both parties, especiallyon the Armenians, to reach a settlement. These kinds of pressures exist in other secessionistconflictsin the former SovietUnion, hut they are particularly weighty in this case. Finally,Walker said,the Karabakh conflict is getting more attention from the interna tional community. The international community, as well as the United States,has been far more active in trying to promote a settlement in Karahakh than in Ahkhazia,South Ossetia,Chechnya,Transdniestr,or evenTajikistan,which has increasedthe likelihood that a politicalsettlement willhe reached in Karahakh. The Ter-Petrossian Resignation

It ispossible,Walkersuggested,to seeAnnenian president Ter-Petrossian’sresignation in February 1998as a negativeconsequenceof the international attention mentioned above. Indeed, many observersof Armenian politicsconcludedthat it wasTer-Petrossian’scaving in to pressurefrom the OSCE’sMinsk Group to accepta first-stagesettlementthat resulted in the widespread domestic pressure on him to resign. The implication of this interpre tation is that the Minsk Group should not have put such pressure on the Ter-Petrossian government—or even that it should not have gotten involved in the first place. in fact, Walker said, it is not clear that there was any greater pressure on Armenia last year than in the past. Rather, ‘l’er-Petrossianappears to havebelieved that it was in Armenia’s and Karabakh’s long-term interest, particularly economic interest, to accept the Minsk pro posal as a basis fur negotiation. Prime Minister Kocharian and the Nagorno-Karabakh leadership,however,disagreed. ‘l’heconflict, then, was over different assessments of long- term interests, not over whether it was appropriate fur Armenia to make compromises in the face of undue pressure from the international community, in any case, it is impos sjNe to know fully the extent to which opposition to i’er—Petrossianwassynonymouswith opposition to the Minsk Group plan. ‘Ihis is not to saythat international pressure to reach a settlement has been inconse quential. It is important to understand exactly how close the parties to the conflict came

eventually

improve

its

influence.

on primary

significant

United

aid

lobbying that

fied ereignty

ending

conflict;

the play

or

Karabakh

fore

Washington predates

Minsk States

tion

politics

‘l’here

The

that

side

for Minsk

clusion.

Baku would risks A blocked

the

the olution,

this

tors

to

Transdniestr)

to

There

latter

the

oil

second a

the

a

accepting Azerbaijan.

negotiating

is

Nagorno-Karabakh

the and

major

case

settlement.

States

are

to

of

interests

the

has in

in Group international

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incentive of

Group,

oil the

have not

hard

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Minsk compromise

were The

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despite

violence; the

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important

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extent

there

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interested numerous

to

years.

have

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process

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force

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other external lifting

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reach

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oil

independent

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populated

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Walker

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worth

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Organization

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Karahakh

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In

said,

made

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said.

of

seemed

in

secessionist unlikely

successor

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last

to policy

influence

Stepanakert

the

oil

fact,

gains,

situation

Washington the

Russia’s

has the

Stepanakert

see fruitless

to conflict,

year is

revenues

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is ‘Ièr-Petrossian’s

Russians,

least

at

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on

Freedom

(NATO)

that oil

mediate

it

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importance

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at

in

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tilted

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even to

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likely

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states.

oil

wake

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or negotiating

the

because parties

conflicts

Caspian

Walker

to

Opportunities

end

there might

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on

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candidate parties Support

community

up

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belief

concern

of the

protect

at

Though

are

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that

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harmful.

to

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have contended. 1994,

best

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resignation

conviction

in

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a

realization

to

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the

country’s

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Act,

Yet, could

the

an

reached

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and

secessionist Baku

that doubt, have realities

which

for

going

and

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conflict ambiguous oil

region,

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risk

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Nagorno-Karabakh

shore

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he

pipeline-routing been

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pushed

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for

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that

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than was

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for

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position

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different provide

Soviet

that

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not

that a up

interests received

has

time

the

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Caspian

the

flowing

their and

Baku

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indication

Settlement

misconcep

once also

because in

positive

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least

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intensi

outside

time

chance

into

is

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Crimea

of

Turkey,

U.S.

position

Union,

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that

clear United

soV

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will

on

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oil

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the

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Armenian

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Azeri

unable

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belief

Ter-Petrossian

them.

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hostilities,

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facilities

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to

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production

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occupied will gas

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fully

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Armenia’s

and

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do

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coffers,

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pipeline” run

have

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will entire

world

to

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will Azeri

the

clear

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observers

resuming

for

national

likely

a

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being they

selling

Azerhaijan’s

view

is

the

and

Opportunities

Armenians

why

vulnerable was

said,

were

fill once

about

future

the Western

isolation

be

he

to

and

pipeline

talk competing

they

Turkey

therefdre,

people that near will

that

Walker

most

start

its

that

were

current

with

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e4ort

to

that

mean

its

constant charge

Furthermore,

Finally,

the

Obstacles

revenues

plain in main place,

may

that border anakert the thing

powers Armenians, the

14

sands little

bated

continued,

into

style

which “typical’

presidential

constitution

in most

turns

ticat

Western-style

opponents

demoralization:

the

promises,

among

production

in

pro-Western

Karabakh

Soviet demonstrated

States, ‘Ibis Western The first

Armenia Armenia

terrorist

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question.

ftict legitimacy

and Yet,

government.

Politics

ion

president

Four

of

immediately

prominent

beginning

had

five

failure

image,

protesters

suffering

republics

of below

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activities. is

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election,

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were

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parties,

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crisis,

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ler-Petrossian discontent

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()SCE

development said

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diplomats,

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yeais.

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ongress

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power. Soviet-

exacer

cromes

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of

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1996

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state, the

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notion

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presented Karabakh

ministries, in

choice Karabakh,

politics resulting

positions an

Armen

Communist and the

Karabakh.

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on

move

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Armenia

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to

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enforce improved is

former

economic

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ministei;

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minister, conference

said, Suny

the

intensifIed,

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solution

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by

steady

to

reason

compromising (and

Karabakh’s

a

distressingly constitution,

military

and

leadership

hoped, violence.

removed (liven abundant

attempt

press ‘Ièr-Petrossian prime support

Suny

chronic

prime

less

Armenia Baku

a

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little

office

of

the he

Ter-Petrossian

an chairs,

by

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the

government

Armenia

somewhat

in

with

in see

reasoning, required

even

in held

become day-to-day and push

time, President on

ironic,

and,

from

guarantee

the

step-by-step

Armenian

election,

own

relatively

to

of

situation.

despotism, Azerbaijan, this

a

Group

states

1vVhen

has

outbreak

Kocharian

it

his political growing would

the same

other of longer

blessed

was

weakened

this fists proved

Kocharian,

forced

made

is

as would

is an with with

entirely Azerbaijan tensions

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country no

the

the

of

in

it

and

policy Minsk

who

the

is

is

favor

was

unequivocally

security.

parliament, At gulf risk continue that

war

Robert

the

it

that

and a

Ter-Petrossian, iii the

presidential

Ter-Petrossian

in

Already

almost

is

work the

political of

finally.

deal

run

under

who Azerbaijan,

than

Kocharian

Kocharian foreign pm-esident,

because friends,

in a

of

strengthened

1996 elections.

bloc

well-being.

national

crisis. comfortably

assessment

position. When

argued

And

help result

Karahakh

cut

Second,

president Ter-Petrossian Azerbaijan

out those

and

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least the

rather

to acting

remain

to

as

and to

Armenia

players,

into ICr-Petrossian

lives

victory

powerful maintained, Howevem;

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that

depending

not

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moral

cause.

in

Armenia’s will being

of

just

realistic

family

about

Karahakh,

slide

politics.

and

a economic

leader

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closer

reasons.

Suny

resigned,

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d’etat.”

on his

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defense,

West,

political

of system.

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patina

resigned.

and

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grew

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the

soft

and guidelines

in

opportunity

moment

Suny

coup Karahakh

wealthy a

aspects

ill

he

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nationalism.

oil

effective

Azerbaijan

of

a

called

suspicions

Suny

the

Armenian

was the

which Armenia,

the

tenure

Nagorno-Karabakh

an

views

number

Aliev

be

in Kocharian,

political and_Identity issue,

OSCE once in

minister,

eyes he 1998, a

other

began

Karabakh.

settlement his

concerned

democratic

with

facing

and with

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president

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democratic

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boss)

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lingering

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997—in its

in

ally prime

Robert left Unfortunately

Ter-Petrossian

intransigent

phased

“constitutional

Politics

ministries—interior, kisian, appointing made infighting ful cism ment The closely Karahakh accepting

of and February isolated, Armenia

Currently of crisis ing who who that almost Unfortunately, Party Armenia’s genuine

lost soon Petrossian’s a a Armenia’s He elected Yerevan the tel;

16

period

important

very

victory

historically, oped

hakh, central of history.

historically

It

on

Armenian

nian a

made, in whether

is worrying

ments power

is

as

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the alternative militant

sentially one

ernment and

scenario, militant ing

scenario

vote

may

the

loyal

great

Armenia

a

Unfortunately,

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Nagorno-Karahakh

Communist

on

competent

of

long

much

recognition

that

Yerevan—and

only

an for

about

he

ministries,

of

to

Kocharian’s

theme the

over

government

In

importance

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stance

people

democratically loyalty

on

independence. period in

Vazgen

Karahakh ultimatum,

true

that

nostalgia

fact, in

in

way

Karabakh

more

to

than

it

are

at

which

Azeri

Karabakh,

settling

which,

reaffirming

is

is

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a

in

the

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Self-Identity

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to

even president

a

on

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man

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Karabakh

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Sarkisian, scenario

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most

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force

troops

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defense

Karahakh.

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oniy

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first

defeat

or

in

is

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just

in

more

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the pointed

and

issue

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one

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for

today’s

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maintained.

Azerbaijan the

virtually

acts

aYerevan

is

elected

issue

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short

presidential

in

their “front

a

with

in

peripheral

a

the

at

that

sense,

militant

than

as

ever

minister

known

only

the

votes

self-identity,

real Karen

Nagorno-Karabakh

was

of

place

the

the

could

out,

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old

through

Armenia.

of

national

a

Western

defense

Ièr-Petrossian

was.

Politics

independence, was

line”

possibility

government

point

to

hands

moderate

present,

impossible.

announced

Karabakh

primarily

a

order,

Nakhichevan

factor

in

government

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quantity.

declaration

end

to

than

come

nation

in

Ter-Petrossian.

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Yerevari

against

in

elections,

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of

Karahakh

a

minister,

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identity

meddling

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though.

preemptive

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is

majority

Karabakh

the

hope

given

and

the to

that

stance.

of

three-year

itself—is

on

Armenian is

the

current

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the

the

1915

merger

with

is

peripheral

Turks,

a

was

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which

of

power

the

with

Identity

renewed made

Suny

necessary

did

was

making

and Turks,

table

represents

the

Dernirchian

has

war,

faction

Nagorno-Karabakh

genocide.

in

a

simply

Karahakh

hard-line

is

They

remarkably hard-line

leadership,

chance

strength

always

attack

and

nationhood,

of

in

Caucasian

continued, made

flOW

up

ban

will and

in

there

psyche. it

and

Armenia

danger.

him

war

Yerevan

is

to

of

this

are

in

unable in

concessions.

render

on

agree

associated,

nnpossihle

of

if

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a

various

more

people

for

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might

far

issue

Armenia

stance

the

in

kind

image

they

at

the

is

some

platform

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a

a

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Suny

Karahakh,

seen home

affairs.

less

well.

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power

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with

still

result,

kind

to Dashnaksun,

a

important

particularly

lose

or

of

many

even

he

who

negotiated

kind,

of

inflammatory

carry

has

willing

surprising

by

on

lies

redemption said.

This

Suny

a

Karabakh

to

of”NLxon

and

has

this

the

One

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behind

dramatic

a

represents

many

been (called

the are

economic

and

with

Am-menians, know

arguing

sense

out.

fact,

nation It

Karabakh

was

attained

Armenian

battle

as

a

said,

to

more

slightest

can

is

well-known

to

many

extremely

the

Armenians

compromise Azerbaijan

in

particularly

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settlement

not

Suny

Yerkrapah)

a

the

Armenians

for

has

fact

imagine

or

with

party

for

in

the

gesture

and

so-called

that

after

unyield

the

an

certain simply

state throne.

factors.

a

Arme

devel

China”

people

is

Kara

said,

place

early

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was

the gov

the es

that

its

this

last

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a 17 in

by

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of

it

in—

be

dis

been that

slope going

winner

and squalid

nation

Altstadt

loser

winner.

is

appreci

a

Europe

over sense

dishon this

a

has

in

ftwt

territorial

loser,

country

resolution as elections

in However,

the

is negative

percent

in Azerbaijan

resolution

because

perceived

their

channel

occupied.

settlement,

of

frilly concerns.

howevei

the

compromise a

the

20

slippery

a

great

is

Audrey

“Christian’ of to

The lose

a

this

living stn)ng

are

Armenia is

both

dispute

state.

least

image riot

of

or

the

before

these time,

Azerbaijan

said that

liegotialions.

needs

conflict.

the \‘ery

Azerhaijan

about

they

not

If

around

future

jel)

about

sort

issue,

Azerbaijan a

does permanent

important

pursie and

reaching

possibility

a

years

required

a refugees is also

emphatically

same

between that

loser,

proverbial

to

the

the

is

problem.

tO

continued.

side a when during

the

Azerbaijan

issue,

five

territory

the

find

on

getting

Second,

not

and

Azerbaijan’s

defeat,

this exacerbate quite

order

Karabakh

pacts

oil

sensitive

its

At to

is million contended,

Karahakh no

die

other

country extremely believe along

least

maintained,

about hu’.vevei,

a lost. refugee of

the

is

the

that

Altstadt

only

development.

at

obstacles

politics, other. desire

very

the

not the

understand of Ihe at

winner

States;

military

be dire

internal

part They

land,

the been on

are and

do

fears

there

soon—to-be-prosperous

Altstadt

fearful

incentive

that

happen

almost

some

countries.

the Altstadt

a Azerbaijan

compromising the

loser—is

both to

will looks

strong

very

Azerhaijan step.

in war

large

is

isolation,

with

it have

or United

or of

will

domestic

conflict)

its

it

country. Azeris

rise

agreement,

one

Settlement

of

as

Third,

very resolution need from and

Nagorno-lKarabakh”

other refhrms the

first strong to

the

occupied

creates

issue, a

lives

the a

the deals

of

and that

Currently,

extremely

one. lear

world ot

solve

the self-image

gives will

battles

to

believe

winner relations

resulting and

governments

settlement,

a When has

it

thus

loser to future,

side

defense

regard a

the

involve

it

also

reclaim many

internal

country.

is

also loser,

only as

favorable

benefit has

they

and

the stemming

matter

is Armenia

either are

of

each

parties

public

the

with

military religious

Europe

Karabakh

the

needs imist great

could for suggesting will “graveyard

side in enact

before that dispute a

Ihere

of

reserves,

mutual

“loser,”

a status

occupied,

It it

the a

in

investments. tremendous

how

to alliance

They Azeris

it.

oil,

is the

Even other

a

its oil

to that not that

from

the

losing

Each

lies

at practical

of

as

position parts

Massachusetts. is

presidents

the is First,

image its

matter

First,

year’s

Nagorno-Karabakh

has

be

image—as with

a

of

affects

of todays ways

dispute.

the

Identity

hand,

States.

the

to is vell

very

stability Azeris

of last

the

something

respect country.

other also in

noted.

territory

in toward ways. isolated

on

as victims

to s

(as

reserves among

has

along

integrity

in is

this

of

and

clearly

other

country’s

game

with

their

Nagorno-Karahakh

to

United

rewards it

Azerbaijan

itself

matter

continued.

against funds

such

goes University

of state large

oil

the return

the

Karahakh Nagorno—Karahakh

domestic

Altstadt

regard

Azeris

the

the a

Armenian-Russian

country become

loser and

population

the

This

Azerbaijan

the

which has

On

the

that the

number and

Politics

Azerbaijan Azerbaijan It of with the

a conditions the and cause but

the ate, pute, in sees Azerhaijan image in disintegration, Russia, al Nagorno-Karahakh believes most alliance The Because needs Attitudes reap

to to

Altstadt humiliation coining addition

or

18 Politics and Identity in Armenia and Azerbaijan 19

settlement, but to seek revenge,to avenge the deaths of those who lost their livesin the conflict. Another obstacle,Altstadt said, is that the Azerisseem to he waiting for someone else to settle the Karabakh problem—for someone to do right by them, to “rescue”them. ihis mentality is in part a legacyof the Sovietperiod, but it is also a reflection of the Azeriper ception of their own powerlessness,coupled with the conviction that they are right and everyone elseshould he able to see the dispute in that light. Many Azerisbelievethat their oil wealth is sufficient motivation for the U.S.government to come to their deliverance, somehow forcingCongress to facedown the Armenian lobby in the United States.Perhaps not fully understanding how the different branches of government in the United States work, the Azerisseem to believethat if there are oil interests, U.S.government interests will be right behind them. Many people in Azerbaijan, Altstadt said, are surprised that events have not yet playedout in tins way;it isdifficultfhr them to believethat the United States is not necessarilygoing to come to their country’s rescue. Azeri Sense of Nationhood

One Azeri conviction with regard to the Karabakh dispute that is shared by much of the international community is that the country s territorial integrity must be preservedand defended, not least for the sake of international precedeit. A factor involved in this fierce determination to preserve their territorial integrity, suggested Sun)’,is the weak or under developed sense of nationhood among Azeris. Azerhaijan was a relatively newly formed state, and discussion about the nation did not begin until the nineteenth century; it did not fully“congeal”until the Soviet period. Armenia has a longer history of consolidated nationhood—indeed, much longer than most nations in the world today—which made it much easier to motivate the people to fight in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Azeri nationalist language seemed to be a reactive nationalism against a perceived and actual Armenian threat. It is true, Altstadt said, that the Azeri sense of nationhood is weaker, though this is caused in part by the many larger identities that engulfed them for much of their history. The Azeris have at various times been aware of belonging to a larger lurkic world and a wider Islamic one and, to a certain extent, even an lslarnic-hirko-lranian world. ‘Ihe difficulty for Azeris has always been paring down those identities into one that is rooted expressly in where they live. [hey were close to doing this at the turn of the century, Altstadt pointed out, having finally gained for themselves the components of modern twentieth—century statehood. [hen came the Bolshevik Revolution, followed by the civil war, forced incorporation into the Soviet Union, and the brutalities of the Stalin era, when virtually all Azeri intellectuals were killed. ‘lhroughout the Soviet period, a strong course of Russification was promoted in Azerbaijan (stronger than in Armenia and Georgia, in part because of Moscow’s fear of the Islamic religion), during which the Azeri alphabet was changed twice to cut the people off from their history. It is no wonder, Altstadt said, that their sense of nationhood is somewhat weak. In the 1970s,there was something of a national reawakening in Azerbaian, mainly in literary journals that were written in the Azeri language to avoid incurring the disapproval of the Soviet rulers. Unfhrtunately,this movement was cut short by the Karabakh crisis, as

piv a

be

their

issue of

than The

a and very they the

than

state’s that fully Since

of

same

in

either. view

namely because think,

reality

Azerbai

may

there

changes are Altstadt now—

Azerbai Karabakh purely

powerful

not

the help

possible, And

their

a nationhood

Turkey, for the

action.

at

least

the

indifferent Azeris

sees

remains political Muslim the

of

Karabakh enough from for

out. assistance

fervently

very aid

Yet

in perception Azeris

raise

but not for appeared

or romantic

is

and the world.

potential countries,

the or that

not perhaps elections;

to

It

Armenians

sense

years of

not them

is more

meaningful Armenians political in period independence.

significantly,

especially

Turk Azeris

believe

Armenia

concern

Turkish

other

ten

Turkey

almost used up see has are clean

image what

that

Islamic

that for into

Azeri forgotten. simply powerful to after

organized.

carry

also to

much he an

somewhat, conflict.

is

more

economic pockets

their

the

change two

with to inadequate

the

realization the

active

ties not there

and

conflict, seven,

very

well in its stake

of will

in

the

Azeris was

seem he not

l)espite ironically, the interests

at there

actions wrapped

even that

this

cooled

was with

have to and

do is Azeris

by means

oil

expected something into

issue unless

or

in harbored

less

most

arid relations

Azeris,

to

Armenians

money

of

Azeris

is go

(though have

the they

discourse

the

identity republic

Azerbaijan one

agreed

for conflict.

present, strong to

is

the

was

of that

on case.

relations good having

country identity Somewhat nation,

the that

players

is, time,

result At

there

and

and a

strong

of the Armenians as that

Turkey less

the

influence Nagorno-Karabakh

there

Azerhaijan—five, going exacerbated

Azerbaijan

them, independence as

to those

their

that

be through

in

is

same

other

process

still

to

the Turkey, of

of with

to

democratic

sense conflict. into

Molla-zade provinces—not

of

people, been

feeble,

in cultivated

the

chance by

understand

a States

a

period,

about

Turkey’s

this Azerhaijan. nationhood first

At

balance organized.

goals, has tiow to

money Armenia as prefer—that has

case. was perceive

Azeri

period

appeared

self-image, to

in in

views

believe to

to

its factor

economically

Other in the

conditions relations necessary even

and

Nagorno-Karahakh

of existence the System well

able

the that

come occupied

United

Soviet if

threatening Aliev

on

what

open be stake of would the 18—20 need

was the not

the the

century not the

very the go?

begins is strong at the 19

result, of

to actually

disappointed

neither being

the

history doubt a matter Armenians.

a

themselves is

very

Armenians

of structures

is

the

a

conflicting will Thus, more

is Identity

the

out Azeris

of

from

country politically As

the behavior retake

this President

been

There

for was

disappointment

far money their

that

Azeris During

also otherwise in

the

revenue

to by

the

about

nor

twentieth Azerbaijan

and without

in flow

response

Iran. has

which

survival

as

and

fear

in

oil that

are that elite.

could

without people

said, changes

to

recognized

than said.

Azeri

the

is However, that

Azerbaijan and

might

the

own will

government point

that has

other,

materialized.

then

much

resulting

addition

There

Turkey

that Turkey’s

Politics

the

forcing result

than

before Azeri. understanding Perceptions otal aware

In the

Altstadt conflict integrity,

appreciated aggressors,

their is promising) jan Altstadt of independence, Russia time

of ever Azerbaijan Realities support. expected jan,

When said, where economic army

in consensus necessary

20 Politics and Identity in Armenia and Azerbaijan 21

was a clean election held once and it did not present the country with a legitimate and stable government. When Alievcame to iower in 1993under questionable circumstances, it was after a brief period of instability,Altstadt said. He spent the first part of his rule restoring sonic semblance of order in the country, including the balance in foreign relations mentioned earlier.Unfortunately for Azerbaijan’slong-term development, Alievalso reestablished political and economic control reminiscent of his era as fIrstsecretary of the Communist Party though without the constraints and limits that would have,in the old days,come from Moscow.Thus, the ability of the circlesaround him to engagein corruption has in fact become greater since independence. Though one could make the case,Altstadt con tinued, that some forms of corruption are less damaging than others, or at leastcan be constructivein establishingeconomic structures,the kind of corruption that is flourish ing in Azerbaijanisalmost entirelydebilitatingand destructive—and almost completely out of control. he

and

the

sup

also

the

to

nec—

hut

the

in Arme—

unac

the

of he any

and

swap

would because

Armenia

would the NKAR’s

corridor. south,

the En be

would

security

agreement

not

would Turkey by

established

1992

this

of

to

involved

the

simultaneous it

the

solution

outcomes

interrelated

he

(except

and

Armenia

of

in

integrity

the

lachin

first

Armenia,

since

territorial would

maintained, Armenia

prove

Aivazian,

these

three

a

with

tripartite

the community,

would

and

mention to

of’ Azerbaijan. The

a

of

and recognized

recognized strategic

give

no

Russia,

territories

All

guarantor

provinces territorial state

and

best with

proposed from be

Aivazian

except a

solutions Karahakh—but

involved

its

which

independence Group.

would

the

as

Karahakh

Nagorno—Karabakh

the

States,

of according

for Azerhaijan

been

consisting

begin more

of

Azerbaijan

Nagorno—Karabakh; Plan

would

international other

integrity.

1921, said, occupied

jure)

(NKAR)

and

Minsk

by

of’

as

united

of some he de

have

proposal

territories the plan,

even

contain

United

independent

there

Armenia

would

of

Nevertheless,

by

not

recognizing

an

have

possibility, Republic the

plan,

still

NKAR

currently

OSCE’s territorial

rejected

as Republic

said,

second

Nakhichevan

sort.

(but

especially

each Fourth,

all the

its

solutions

A

occupied

may

This

the

Armenians

of separated

desired

settlement

Agreement

would

Armenia

‘Ihird, of

of

all

by

be recognizing

Another

he

facto the

some

to

ultaneously.

other legal. mind, swap

that

Aivazian

of

de

Armenian basis.

between

completely in

from

and

loss return

Settlement sini

two

and

Moscow different

would

would

offered

Azerbaijan,

documents. self—proclaimed

plan,

the the cornmunit)

kept

been

Armenia.

the

Nakhichevan.)

forces

agreement

in preservation

changes and

the

plan

be

to

to

these Nagorno-Karabakh of

Plan which

has

Azerbaijan

Relations Karahakh,

an

of

entirely

horizontal

the swap—essentially military,

of

Aivazian, of

the Azerbaijan

proposals currently

an

or

and

to

to sign

border

implemented

Framework Rn-key,

and

resulted any should

similar

Azerbaijan,

the

both

Turkey,

Armenian

is he

solution in international

defense;

these

elements Nagorno-Karabakh

political,

guarantors different

and by

by

of

to

and

unworkable.

have

of

would Azerbaijan.

of

a

unacceptable

the

this

require

proposed Armenia the

recognition the addition or ccorcling

(‘Ibis

it Alternative of

by

Armenia, corridor)

Second,

have

level

as

Political

been none

Alternative

confederative genocide

would

political conflict

part

opposed opposed

a

would

a

Five

An

However, withdrawal ported A between making also

have Nakhichevan—Nagorno-Karabakh he The be all case, Aivazian this ceptable An agreements: essarv Lachin guarantees; would

renamed Russia among others. The on nian Azerbaijan as security.

22

ation

economic

by

flag,

Karabakh

NKAR,

ued.

“unnatural” along

would

trolled a

arate

not Nagorno-Karabakh.

they

lachin ters, ‘I’he

(Limits legal

needed—Russian-American

Military diplomatic

engage

agreement accord

American continued, geostrategic

(ion;

main ber he the

United predicament.

tained, be

teeing

limitation-of-forces

Azerbaian’s

[he ‘Ihe

accepted

a

[he

maintain

of

Republic

and

other

First,

the

currently

tripartite

provisions

armed

and

second,

the

dependent

by

hold

reasons.

the

proposed

corridor

with

would

current

will

combat

States

on fifth

NKAR

coat-of-arms,

a

coordination

most

the and

relations

military

stipulations

long—term

small

would

armed

and that

backing

talks

not

borders forces

Yerevan;

by

element

importance

certain

after of

NKAR

would

This

Siunik)

have

defense

occupy,

central

First, Russia.

sensitive security

military

serve

troops

as

within

would Armenia

()SCE

on

plan

on

Legal

be

forces

the

part

as

pact

with

security

the

would

the

would

Western

The

offensive

of Russia

would not

a

strategic of

and

the

agreement

would

with withdrawal

agreement

and

bank.

defensive of

and

directly,

the

right remain

of

or

since

with

great

agreement

the

Azerhaijan.

forces

border

and

can

make

security

would

NKAR,

the

will

third,

Dimensions

this

UN

politicai

the

could

he

be

a

arrangement

political

remains

receive

the

to

World

‘Ihe

geostrategic

potentially

also he

greater

settlement

military

loans

he

security

three-way

weaponry.

monitormg

enough

revised

would

army

under

this

dual

which

issues

Russia’s

negotiated

foreign

diminish,

military

considered

under

nominally

determine

contain

citizens

among

needs

from

between

and

commitment

the

War

framework

However,

citizenship.

frainework

an

depth of

withdraw

the

cooperation.

to

with

of

it

to

right

Azerbaijan

which

other

unpredictable

the

policy

financial

that

plan

II,

tension—filled

would

provide

agreement

Armenia,

force

Armenia.

should

ensure

control

importance,

Armenia,

of

the

force.

causing

possibly

of

within

the

Russia

occupied

under

an

on

Azerbaijan,

to Armenia

proposed

following

support.

its

defense.

demilitarized

and

of

understanding

have

attack

outlined

be

And

its

from

of

Finally,

financial

Armenia’s

include

certain

of

Azerbaijan unilaterally—nor,

position

and

unlikely

own

the Azeri this

Azerbaijan, would

a

Anything

Moscow

paving An

Russia,

the

the

its

25,000-man

Armenia,

territories

the

on

state, requires,

in

confines Armenia

borders.

It

plan,

own

by

the legal

NKAR

Alternative

the

United

Armenian

above.

or sovereignty,

that

the

should

the

six

institutions withdraw

in

Aivazian

the

and

to

extent

at

security.

extent

perhaps

to

zones

government,

provision Aivazian

provmces

and less

provisions,

the

United

it

least

do.

Azerbaijan, way

and

lose

that

would

defense

given

States the

The

Regarding

of

is

of

be

foreseeable

than

army

its

i\rnerican

not

of

of

the

would

Azerbaijan,

fbr

the

those

United

pointed interest

some

regions

involve

in

from

defense,

zones

bound

Furthermore, States

its would

the

its

would would

sufficient

continued,

this,

he

greater—and

CFE

Settlement

any

NKAR

that

of

during

force,

trade

current

Aivazian

NKAR’s

the

residing

of

Azerbaijan

be

certain

and

constitution,

military

would

Aivazian

States,

case,

and

Treaty.)

any

military

in

(Nagorno

out,

for

maintain

the

political

friture

established

he

first

not

security,

which

and

the

would

its

peacetime.

Armenia’s

disintegra— Russia;

governed

for attack

would

more

security

Aivazian

need

defense

areas

Russian-

would

guaran

be

cooper

NKAR

contin

in

other

a

this

mat

will

The

main

much

could

and

the

num

pa

sign

that

and

Plan

and

sep

on

to

of

it

the

re 23 of

In

na

is

parties that

plan

Azeri and

dam

of of

the

to

land pipe

the

clear,

sphere

Azer the all

part

in

the United

the said,

and to

territorial there Armenia,

Nagorno between practical

Turkey

as That had sure by

friendly

Though

not

of

badly horizontal

political of

in and he give

its the

he

Turkey

way

is

development. far

American-

engagement

of and plan its

position

occasional

Russia’s it

very said. of

Molla-zade. have

and

will more

any

his

permanent

the how he a Though

safe

by power security

would joint

kind in

a presented rejection

Finally, a build

a from

Baku-Ceyhan some

as

preserve Security,

Thus, on Armenia

Azeris can military

negotiations to

why

Remler of

Russia

economic this

plan suggestions

one

the

it development

to

future

or

away

to goals:

perception between

risk both

of The

limits the

the

idea disputed that

the would

outright Despite 1997,

influential

militarily

its

by security.

Armenia

to

how

independence

the offered

guarantees, Nagorno-Karabakh.

Azerhaijan.

was

the of The access

policy with

independence.

staying

from

enabling would

May

to Armenians

settlement the most

be

according

of

it,

in

been

and change

of

issue to

similarities acquire that engaged

the

jure)

this

Azerhaijan.

Azerbaijan

identical to

account Turkey

security

yet Nakhichevan’s reassure Armenia,

foreign as development change.

benefit

of demonstrate

de

the relationship.

Nagorno-Karabakh.

policy

reservations

as

in

to to

however,

against

help

the

key into

compatible

would by action

not acceptable several security

co-chairs

to

become

is not

of almost

would its against good

and receive facto

determined with

continues he

are

any to take is

time,

do

continue of

de

hand be their

has

to Azerhaijan

provinces.

Azerbaijan.

that

ease consolidation to

pact a

very to

Turkey precedents diffirence:

it expected

of

blockade Azerbaijan. Plan Group

of take

(though a

two plan block

there would

same

spheres the the

he has

to

would

the of

out

and developments would

ensure has forced implementation

guarantees

the

1iirkey flicto

unlikely of status, and crucial reluctance willing

to security Minsk

occupied negotiations

proposal

other

a the

is has

At could

de P’an historical though guaranteed.

be

oil

Russia

of is

continued,

end

six

the the

ensuring

Aivazian’s unlikely such

stumbling generally

and Turkey he

rejected

aid.

government and

in toward

that Armenia security

by domestic

the the

realization Settlement

the

‘l’urkey’s

basis

government. there

that

dispute

also would

apparatuses

Aivazian the

Baku. things. for

main

Aivazian, see their

the Caspian social,

which

guarantee both

border, or ‘Ilirkey

to the

Aivazian

guarantee; rejected policy

to prerequisites

the recent to

regain

the

and of

Nagorno-Karabakh government however,

its conflict see for as extremely

with

ironic

need

other

in

Armenia,

can would Indeed,

Group,

with

is

has

responried

would

on own

and the to after

Karabakh

involvement was,

come

security

route rhetoric,

alot

to

it

military

would Group,

addition, economic, Alternative them.

to

enforcement

is

necessary among their

Minsk

U.S. Turkey According industry. Russia, perhaps accepted

Turkey

In

Karabakh

go

is Armenia’s

An

influence.

law Stepanakert Aivazian the

Armenia aged help oil the

corridor Karabakh relationship

integrity Azerbaijan

neighbor line,

but States

export development Reactions It

parties

was baijan; especially

the Russian there Minsk Nagorno-

fact,

tionalist with of Nagorno-Karahakh

what adapt

Russia’s

will to

of

24

happens

not

that

lieve

Minsk

the

touchstone

give

is

will

only

plan

the

after

resist

temporary—whether

call

necessary

that

even

of

for

mission

the

a

the

small

entire

security

slightest

leaves

peacekeeping

search

guarantees

that

pressure.

for

for

is

one,

a

most

solution.

force,

Any

for two,

important.

either

plan

or

along

ten

The

An

that

Armenia

with

years—is

security

A Alternative

calls

temporary

meager

fbr

or

solutions

fatally

Nagorno-Karahakh.

a

peacekeeping

guarantees

mission

flawed,

Settlement

outimed

simply

for

that

mission

it

in

few

is

does

the

Plan

what

be 25 an

the

in

the

new

hut

ack

the

he

by

some

mea of to

coop- other

could

guar

may

this

to

trom already

be from

to moved

Armenia

proclaim

is

offer

the to European

from

and

Nagorno

Turkey—

This

to

sentiment

would

cooperation to

hack

Armenians

a

refusal people lelings it by with

perhaps

democratic

the

security

available

be occupied

going

would resolving

Peace

the

paid

to initiative

official

the

Georgia steps

but

is

broader

are

that

are in

them,

compelled

for

Azerbaijan many an

out, about

border An talks

contuuies

would

further

organized. Turkish

be

into as

on

Nagorno-Karabakh

and easing

to point

he

the

causing

up

conhdence—building

impasse their

to

separate,

attention

peace

share.

resolution require

Essential

Turkey

pointed

would possibility, a

Azerhaijan

and see

remote

example

blockade—even now

this instruments

could

is

concerned

Partnership

some

arrangements.

of to may is

out, as

obstacle possibly quagmire.

sticking

Armenia

themselves

the wholly if

relating It ganging of

be participation.

One

how

conflict

an

like is

of the

nut remote

that there

to

Institute

is

both

see is

Council

Caucasus genocide the

U.S. to

its

international

crucial

security

pointed

Caucasus

helpful

to

to

Remains

a

until

of

p’m

the Asia integrate

world

deadlock, security.

would

easing network

Azeris

the

1915

is

the

something

conflict

again

Caucasus.

to of

direct

specifically

six

notion

though

the

the of

Nagorno—lKarahakh An

for

or

but

for own

the

who

parties the

of

Aivazian

difficult

the collective

antagonism

hack

Central the of same

Partnership

that

than in

Armenia

as

is all

hard

break

their

in rest

particularly

it

obligate

the

future.

the

Turks

is

that

NATo, this

idea

because

countries

to guarantees

of

said, but,

Azerbaijan he

it

necessarily trust

with

is more

of the

of

not

are

which that

the

it

establish

ever—expanding

as

memory

acknowledgment

and not

three

arrangement

added

that

to time,

progress

an an

need

would

the

refurms

border

security 1’here reasons,

amount

the

Euro—Atlantic long

in

it immediate it

purposes

sideline building

not, Threatened

by

appears o1

its

State

a

as

Fairbanks

conflict,

rvlolla—zade states

same of

with

throving

the

it

Unibrtunately, or

the the problems,

Is

of

security

that

or

Arnwnia

sides. Further

which

in the

for open

aim

established,

fueled though

ures.

fur

in

example,

At

ironic,

loday,

absence significant

Charles both within democratic

be

commercial noted

troops.

not

least

Armenia

a conflict, it.

NATO, fur

As

on wider

suggested, on

the struct at )ustiflably

for

collective

States,

activities.

do for

further

will

independent

since

could

militarily

of

the

is Department

it

perhaps

environmental

Suny within

Altstadt

is

Conclusion

Security

Clearly,

conflict. nowledge believe, that antees Armenian Karabakh that U.S. would security kind broken, opened United

arrangement he crate think, i-elated newly involved, security opportunities It with Democracy Nagoriio-Karabakh on sures furward democracy.

26 Conclusion 27

relorms in both countries. Oil wealth itself will not help Azerbaijanto develop as a nation, Molla—zadenoted; only democracycan do that. Only the abilityo both peoplesto change their governments in free and fair elections will help in finding—and preserving—a long—termsolution to this conflict. Though there havebeen setbacks in democratic reforms in both Armenia and Azer haijan since they gained independence in 1991,Sunysaid, the leaders in both countries managed to consohdate the state and its authority, bringmg mLich-neededorder and sta— hility It is only with a strong state that foundations such as democracy, rule of law, and market reforms can he built, as the state must have the necessary legitimacy to keep order, protect private property, enforce contracts, and SO forth. Yet,at the same time that tile state was being consolidated in Armenia and Azerhaijan, the governments ill 110thcoun tries were losing legitimacy. It may be that only after the two countries have held their next presidentialelections will the necessary combination oi state authority and govern ment legitimacy will be in place to reach a settlement on Nagorno-Karabakh. Ultimately, Sully contended, there is only one genuine and long—term solution to the Karabakh dispute: Ihe three parties must agree that there should be a recognition of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, coupled with actual self—gm’ernnient for Karabakh by localArmenians. Ibis matter of territorial integrity must be brought together with national sell—determination and self-government. Because theie is no other solution that is short of inflammatory, it is hoped that tile hew government in Armenia will eventually conic to this conclusion itself. Sooner or iatei Suny said (though unfortunately it will likely be later), Armenians and Azerbaijaniswillrealizethat neither side can have tile whole “cake” in Karabakh. ‘file Armenians are perhaps now learning that military victory doe5 001 necessarily bring peace; Israel’s victory in the Six Day War in 1967, fbr example, only led to a generation of war and resistance. Only a settlement guaranteeing Azerbaijan’s sover eignty over tile region, with de facto Karabakh Armenian control, has a chance of lasting more than a few years. This could perhaps be tile beginiung of an understanding of new forms of state sovereigntyand self—rule, formsthat i-iremore appropriate in a post—nation— State era. Walker agreed. maintaining that tile most that can be hoped for in fInding a resolu— 0011 to this dispute is some fbrin of staged agreement. l’he Armenian position that oniy a packagedsettlement,or an insistence that an agreement on status must come before an agreemeilt on other issues, is simply unrealistic. Furtherinore, success will collie only Withdirect negotiations between Bakuand Stepanakert. In the end, for a lasting settienlerlt to be reached betweenthese two peoples,Altstadtsaid, both sides nlust look to tile future instead of the past. Instead of trying to right historical wrongs,on which there is 110 agreement, or avenging the deaths of ancestors,Armenians and Azeris should look to their children’s generation and devote their energies to ensurmg that their children (10 Ilot continue to fight and die forthe Sl11C causes, passilig tile con flict yet again on to tile next generation. looking to tile future and not tile past, however,may he a more American way of view ing human experience and not one that is easily understood by peoples so resolutely de fined by their historc It is clearly and untortunately tile case that Arnlenians and Azeris are currently not prepared to pi.it the past behind them. As iong as these cOllditioils reillaiil, it 28 Conclusion

is difficultto seehow the dispute between thesetwo peopleswillbe resolvedin such a way that it does not become ingrained in the individualand national identity of future gener ations.It isclearthat the most plausibleand realisticsolution to the dispute is found in the most recent plan profferedby the ()SCE’sMinsk Group; it ishoped that the continued high levelof international attention to the conffictover Nagorno-Karabakhwillbring the parties to a lastingsettlement.

Sharpe,

in

Comes

George

She

Rights

1995) bis);

Policy: zation

is

natives at

From

The

About

the

Central

the

received

War

US.

author

and

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and

1994

for

Cyprus,

Calling”

to

Washington

1995).

in

Responses

Secession;

“The

Asia” Security

Democratization

to

Tajikistan

her

of

States

1998,

the

in

several

Legacy

in

B.A.

Aegean,

Regional

the

and

Political

Self-Determination:

to

Institute

Patricia

University.

in Self

Three

of

Institute

Cooperation

Soviet

the

Determination

and

Power

in

Culture

Author

Years

Carley

of

the

Soviet

Regional

studies Peace,

publications,

Her

Newly

Rivalries

On;

and

was

Political

in

other

where

Turkey’s

from

Independent Stability

Europe

Sovereignty,

a

Civil

Movements:

in

program

publications

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System

the

she

Society

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Role

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(with

University

also

officer

States

in

Western

Territorial

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and

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worked

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7, OF RELATED INTEREST

Many other publications from the United States Institute of Peace address issues of direct relevance to issues of sovereignty and self-determination in the former Soviet Union.

RECENT INSTITUTE REPORTS INCLUDE:

Sovereigntyafter Empire:Self-DeterminationMovementsin theFormerSovietUnion,by Galina Starovoitova (Peaceworks No. 19,October 1997)

U.S.Responsesto Self-Determination Movements:Strategiesfor NonviolentOutcomesand Alternativesto Secession,by Patricia Carley (Peaceworks No. 16, July 1997)

Self-Determination:Sovereignty,TerritorialIntegrity,and the Rightto Secession,by Patricia Carley (Peaceworks No. 7, March 1996)

Turkey’sRolein theMiddleEast,by Patricia Carley (Peaceworks No. 1,January 1995)

To obtain an Institute report (availablefree of charge), write United StatesInstitute of Peace, 120017th Street NW, Suite 200,Washington,DC 20036-3011;call(202) 429-3828;fax (202) 429-6063;or e mail: [email protected].

RECENT BOOKS FROM USIP PRESS INCLUDE:

ManagingGlobalChaos:Sourcesofand ResponsestoInternational Conjlict,edited by Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall(1997)

Autonomy:FlexibleSolutionsto EthnicConflicts,by Ruth Lapidoth (1997)

PowerSharingand InternationalMediationin EthnicConflicts,by Timothy Sisk (1996)

For book salesand order information, call 800-868-8064(U.S.toll-free only) or 703-66P1590, or fax703-661-1501.

DllthStreet hington, DC 20036