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Challenges and Opportunities in the Pursuit of Comprehensive Integration
Christopher B. Roberts
The River ‘Salween’ Photograph by Author
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Abstract
In October 2003, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) proposed the establishment of a security, economic and socio‐cultural community by the year 2020. Given that initiators of the ASEAN proposal were informed by the scholarly literature on the concept of a ‘security community’, this dissertation develops and then tests the concept in relation to the ASEAN states. Here, the concept of a ‘security community’ is understood as ‘a transnational grouping of two or more states whose sovereignty is increasingly amalgamated and whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change’. The application of the ‘security community framework’ developed in this study is necessary to provide a conceptual basis for critically assessing the major factors that could potentially impede ASEAN’s evolution towards a security community. For the purpose of such an assessment, the study provides a detailed investigation of the most significant historical issues and contemporary security challenges that inform the nature of inter‐state relations in Southeast Asia. As a complement to this approach, the dissertation incorporates the analysis of data obtained from extensive fieldwork in all ten of the ASEAN states involving over 100 in‐depth interviews and two survey designs (one at the elite level and another at the communal level) involving 919 participants. While the survey work, especially at the communal level, is best considered a pilot study and the results are therefore to be considered as indicative, the research nevertheless represents the first empirical assessment of regional perceptions of trust, intra‐mural relations, security, economic integration, and liberalisation and of a broad range of other factors relevant to the analysis. The interview data has also been invaluable in uncovering previously unpublished information and in contextualising the analysis. Despite a considerable strengthening of the region’s security architecture since ASEAN’s formation, the ten chapters in the study reveal that the Association has a long way to travel before it will satisfy the defining criteria of a security community. The region lacks a common sense of community and consequently the level of trust between the Southeast Asian states remains problematic. The political elite continue to engage in episodes of competitive behaviour, have been unable to resolve territorial disputes, and thus the continued potential for armed conflict undermines the 3
prospect for ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’. Therefore, ASEAN’s evolution towards the status of a security community, if it proceeds further, will likely occur over the course of many decades rather than by ASEAN’s current goal of 2015.
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Table of Contents
ABSTRACT ...... 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... 4
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... 5
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... 9
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION ...... 11
CHAPTER II. THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS FOR A SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY COMMUNITY ...... 49
CHAPTER III. DEVELOPING A DEFENDABLE FRAMEWORK: THE PROCESSES BEHIND THE EMERGENCE OF A SECURITY COMMUNITY ...... 95
CHAPTER IV. TURBULENT HISTORIES: THE RISE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE SEARCH FOR REGIONAL ORDER ...... 133
CHAPTER V. ASEAN’S HISTORICAL RECORD: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE EARLY SEARCH FOR COOPERATION AND A MODUS VIVENDI ...... 180
CHAPTER VI. THE MYANMAR MEMBERSHIP CRISIS: FURTHER TESTS TO ELITE COHESION AND THE ASEAN WAY ...... 233
CHAPTER VII. CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES: ASEAN, A FRAGILE INSTITUTION OR A STABLE FOUNDATION? ...... 265
CHAPTER VIII. CONTEMPORARY EVALUATIONS: INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, STATE BEHAVIOUR, AND REGIONAL PERCEPTIONS ...... 309
CHAPTER IX. CONTINUED VOLATILITY: MYANMAR AND THE CHALLENGE OF DOMESTIC DISORDER ...... 370
CHAPTER X. ASEAN’S SECURITY COMMUNITY PROJECT: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECTS ...... 429
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 444
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Analytical Table of Contents
ABSTRACT ...... 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... 4
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... 5
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... 9
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION ...... 11
LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 15
THE RISE OF, AND LITERATURE ON, THE CONCEPT OF A SECURITY COMMUNITY ...... 15 THE NEO‐KANTIANS AND THE DEMOCRATIC SECURITY COMMUNITY ...... 22 SECURITY COMMUNITIES AND OTHER MULTILATERAL SECURITY FRAMEWORKS IN THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ...... 25 THE CONTRASTING CHARACTERISATIONS OF ASEAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA’S SECURITY ARCHITECTURE ...... 29
APPROACH OF THE DISSERTATION AND LIMITATIONS TO THE RESEARCH ...... 37
FIELDWORK AND IN‐DEPTH INTERVIEWS ...... 39 ELITE AND COMMUNAL LEVEL SURVEYS ...... 40 FURTHER LIMITATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS TO THE RESEARCH ...... 43 CHAPTER STRUCTURE ...... 45
CHAPTER II. THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS FOR A SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY COMMUNITY ...... 49
PART A: THE CONCEPTUAL PILLARS TO A SECURITY COMMUNITY ...... 50
SECURITY COMMUNITIES: PLURALISTIC, AMALGAMATED, OR INTEGRATED? ...... 51 SECURITY ...... 53 COMMUNITY ...... 64 INTEGRATION ...... 69 DEPENDABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PEACEFUL CHANGE ...... 72
PART B: THE POSSIBILITY OF STABLE PEACE AND THE INTEGRATIVE STRUCTURES BEHIND A SECURITY COMMUNITY ...... 76
NATURE OR NURTURE – ELITES AND STATE ACTORS UNDER ANARCHY ...... 76 THE TIERS OF INTEGRATION – FROM INTEGRATIVE PROCESSES TO INTERSTATE BEHAVIOUR ...... 83 HIGH INTEGRATION – THE STRUCTURAL VARIATIONS BEHIND A SECURITY COMMUNITY ...... 89
CHAPTER III. DEVELOPING A DEFENDABLE FRAMEWORK: THE PROCESSES BEHIND THE EMERGENCE OF A SECURITY COMMUNITY ...... 95
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS TO THE PROCESSES BEHIND SECURITY COMMUNITY FORMATION ...... 95
NORMS AND THE COLLECTIVE IDENTITY OF THE STATE – THE CAUSATION BEHIND COOPERATION AND PEACE? ...... 96 SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY (SIT) AND INTERSTATE RELATIONS ...... 103 MORPHOLOGICAL COMPATIBILITY: FURTHER CAUSATION BEHIND COOPERATION ...... 108 6
EMPIRICAL CONNECTIONS: FROM EXOGENOUS INFLUENCES TO MULTILATERAL COOPERATION AND RELATIONS ...... 110
GLOBALISATION AND EXOGENOUS PRESSURES FOR COOPERATION ...... 111 BILATERAL VS. MULTILATERAL RELATIONS AND THE PATHWAYS TO INTEGRATION ...... 113
THE INTERNAL CONSOLIDATION OF THE STATE: THE DOMESTIC FOUNDATION OF COOPERATION ...... 119
THE INTERNAL CONSOLIDATION OF THE STATE: ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT ...... 122 THE INTERNAL CONSOLIDATION OF THE STATE: NATION‐BUILDING...... 123 THE INTERNAL CONSOLIDATION OF THE STATE: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM ...... 125 The Characteristics Of A Security Community And The Pathways To Their Emergence In Summary .. 129
CHAPTER IV. TURBULENT HISTORIES: THE RISE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE SEARCH FOR REGIONAL ORDER ...... 133
THE EMERGENCE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: ORIGINS AND CHALLENGES ...... 134
EMERGING INSTABILITY – FROM COLONIALISM TO INDEPENDENCE TO NATIONALIST‐FUELLED CONFLICT ...... 149
IN SEARCH OF A NEW BEGINNING – TENTATIVE STEPS TOWARD LIMITED COOPERATION AMIDST ‘FRAGILE RELATIONS’ ...... 153
SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANISATION (SEATO)...... 154 THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE ...... 156 THE FPDA, ASPAC, AMA AND THE MAPHILINDO ...... 159 SHIFTS IN THE EQUATION? THE SINE QUA NON BEHIND THE EMERGENCE OF ASEAN AND THE BANGKOK DECLARATION ...... 165 THE ‘BANGKOK DECLARATION’ AND THE EARLY STRUCTURE OF ASEAN ...... 171 FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS TO THE SINE QUA NON BEHIND THE FORMATION OF ASEAN ...... 174
CHAPTER V. ASEAN’S HISTORICAL RECORD: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE EARLY SEARCH FOR COOPERATION AND A MODUS VIVENDI ...... 180
ASEAN’S PERFORMANCE: THE EARLY YEARS ...... 181
EARLY CHALLENGES TO ASEAN COHESION: FROM THE CORREGIDOR AFFAIR TO SINGAPORE/MALAYSIA RELATIONS. ... 182 LIMITED PROGRESS IN THE FACE OF INTERNATIONAL CHANGE: ZOPFAN ...... 185 THE ASSOCIATIVE EFFECTS OF ZOPFAN: THE EMERGING SALIENCE OF ‘REGIONAL RESILIENCE’? ...... 187 RENEWED PROGRESS IN THE FACE OF EXTERNAL VOLATILITY: THE BALI SUMMIT ...... 189 EARLY ASEAN/HANOI DIPLOMACY IN THE LEAD‐UP TO THE THIRD INDOCHINA CONFLICT ...... 192 THE HEIGHT OF SOLIDARITY: EARLY ASEAN RESPONSES TO THE INVASION OF CAMBODIA ...... 194 ‘SOLIDARITY’ IN TROUBLE? DIVERGING ASEAN PERCEPTIONS AMIDST GREAT POWER INTERFERENCE ...... 198 THE CAMBODIA ‘SOLUTION’ IN DEADLOCK: THE NEED FOR GREAT POWER INTERVENTION ...... 201
THE END OF AN ERA, EARLY POST‐COLD WAR DEVELOPMENTS AND THE NECESSITY OF EXOGENOUS ENGAGEMENT ...... 202
THE 1992 ‘SINGAPORE SUMMIT’: SUSTAINING ASEAN IN THE WAKE OF CONFLICT? ...... 202 MEMBERSHIP EXPANSION – INSIGHTS AND IMPLICATIONS ...... 207 FURTHER EXPANSION THROUGH EXOGENOUS ENGAGEMENT: FROM DIALOGUE PARTNERS TO THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM ...... 215 7
NORMATIVE VALUES AND THE ASEAN WAY IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT ...... 226
CHAPTER VI. THE MYANMAR MEMBERSHIP CRISIS: FURTHER TESTS TO ELITE COHESION AND THE ASEAN WAY ...... 233
MYANMAR’S MEMBERSHIP IN ASEAN: HISTORICAL MOTIVATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS ...... 233
CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP CHALLENGES TO ASEAN’S STATURE AND ELITE LEVEL COHESION.242
THE ‘CHAIRMANSHIP CRISIS’, SOLIDIFYING OR DETRACTING FROM THE ASEAN WAY? ...... 254
CHAPTER VII. CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES: ASEAN, A FRAGILE INSTITUTION OR A STABLE FOUNDATION? ...... 265
OIL AND MARITIME RESOURCES: THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ‘POTENTIAL’ CONFLICT INITIATORS TODAY? ... 266
AMITY AND ENMITY THROUGH TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ...... 275
THE CHALLENGES OF TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY TO THE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA ...... 275 THE IMPACT OF SOUTHERN THAILAND VIOLENCE AND ETHNIC DISCONTENT ON RELATIONS BETWEEN THAILAND AND MALAYSIA ...... 282 THE LIMITATIONS TO COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION IN ASEAN ...... 286
THE REGIONAL HAZE AND ECONOMIC CRISIS: IMPACT AND CHALLENGES TO THE FUNCTION AND SOLIDARITY OF ASEAN ...... 289
EXPRESSING THE LIMITATIONS TO ASEAN: THE ‘HAZE’ AND INTRA‐ASEAN REACTIONS ...... 289 FURTHER INDICATORS OF ASEAN’S LIMITATIONS: THE ECONOMIC CRISIS OF 1997‐1998 ...... 294
CHAPTER VIII. CONTEMPORARY EVALUATIONS: INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, STATE BEHAVIOUR, AND REGIONAL PERCEPTIONS ...... 309
THE FIRST FRONTIER OF REFORM: THE PURSUIT OF GREATER ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION ...... 310
THE SECOND FRONTIER OF REFORM: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AMIDST CONTENDING VISIONS OF ASEAN ...... 320
FROM THE COLLECTIVE TO THE DIVERGENT: REGIONAL PERCEPTIONS, AFFINITY AND TRUST ...... 333
CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN ECONOMIC PERCEPTIONS ...... 333 CONVERGENCE/DIVERGENCE OVER TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS ...... 336 CONVERGENCE/DIVERGENCE IN THE APPLICATION OF THE ‘ASEAN WAY’ ...... 345 THE KEY FOUNDATIONS IN THE TEST OF A ‘COMMUNITY’: THE EXTENT OF TRUST AND PERCEPTIONS OF LONG‐TERM PEACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ...... 351
KNOWLEDGE AND INTERACTION AT THE GRASSROOTS LEVEL OF ANALYSIS ...... 358
CHAPTER IX. CONTINUED VOLATILITY: MYANMAR AND THE CHALLENGE OF DOMESTIC DISORDER ...... 370
PART A. THE EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES OF DOMESTIC INSTABILITY AND THE PROSPECTS FOR INTERNAL CHANGE ...... 372 8
THE CHALLENGE OF MYANMAR’S HISTORY TO STABILITY AND CHANGE ...... 372 THE CONSEQUENCES OF HISTORY: FROM POVERTY TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE ...... 377 THE INSURGENCY MOVEMENTS AND THE MARGINAL IMPACT OF THE CEASEFIRE REGIME ...... 383
PART B. A COUNTRY IN CRISIS – INTERNAL DYNAMICS, RESPONSES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE ...... 386
The National Convention and the Roadmap to Democracy ...... 387 The Yangon Bombings and ‘Rumours’ of a Related Coup ...... 390 Grassroots Corruption in the Government and Tatmadaw ...... 391 Elite Level Isolation and Xenophobia ...... 392 The Prospects for Internal Reform and the Opposition Parties ...... 393
PART C. ASEAN’S COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT UNDER MYANMAR’S SHADOW ...... 397
THE IMPACT OF TRANSNATIONAL CRIME AND DOMESTIC INSTABILITY ON THE COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA ...... 397 Narcotics Production and Trafficking ...... 399 Human Trafficking ...... 404 HIV/AIDS ...... 404 Refugees and Illegal Migrants...... 406 MYANMAR’S FRIENDS – THE INCONGRUITY OF ITS BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY ...... 408 Exploitation and Self‐Interest in Thailand’s Relations with Myanmar ...... 411 The China Factor: The Strategic Implications of Myanmar’s Relationship with China...... 418
CHAPTER X. ASEAN’S SECURITY COMMUNITY PROJECT: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECTS ...... 429
THE EXTENT OF COMMUNITY AND THE CHALLENGES TO COHESION IN ASEAN ...... 431
COOPERATION AND THE ASEAN WAY ...... 435
SECURITY, ‘DEPENDABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PEACEFUL CHANGE’, AND ASEAN AS A NASCENT SECURITY COMMUNITY ...... 438
THE CHARACTER OF ASEAN AND THE PROSPECTS FOR A SECURITY COMMUNITY IN THE FUTURE .440
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 444
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Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to thank Professor James Cotton for his excellent and informative supervision. He has been a true mentor in every sense of the word and this dissertation could not have been completed in the absence of his guidance. I would also like to thank the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy for providing an ‘Australian Postgraduate Award Scholarship’, a further two research grants, and for the UNSW ‘Business Services Travel Award’. I am equally indebted to the Australian government for conferring to me the ‘Endeavour Australia Cheung Kong Award’ and the generous bursary that comes with it. Without these sources of financial assistance it would not have been possible to undertake the fieldtrips to all ten of the ASEAN countries. My research was also significantly aided by the kind hospitality provided by RSIS during a sixteen‐month stay as a visiting associate and by ISEAS during a seven‐month stay as a visiting associate. In this regard, I would like to thank both Mr. Barry Desker and Mr. Kesavapany for their kind hospitality and invaluable assistance.
Many other people have provided their valuable time and assistance in the compilation of this study. Of these, I would like to begin by expressing my sincere gratitude to Professor Don McMillen and Associate Professor Peter Wicks for their supervision, kindness, and support during the completion of an MA (Asian Studies) program between 2001 and 2002. Since this time, a number of other individuals stand out in the provision of invaluable support and guidance in my study. Such individuals include, but are not limited to, Debbi Elms, Manoj Gupta, Leonard Sebastian, Joseph Liow, Tan See Seng, Hiro Katsumata, Sng Seow Lian, Ralph Emmers, K. S. Nathan, Stephen Leong, Bantarto Bandoro and Barry Wain. Of equal importance has been the guidance and support I have received from both the scholars and administrative staff of the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy. In particular, I would like to thank David Lovell, Peter Dennis, Shirley Ramsay, Edwin Jurriens, Craig Stockings, Taufiq Tenasaldy, Bernadette McDermott, Sandra Mason, Marilyn Anderson Smith, Jo Muggleton, Frank Cain, Nikki Baker, Steward Lone, Susan Lever, Heather Neilson, Ida Hurhayati, Robin Prior, Elvira Berra, Danica Robinson, Minako Sakai, Jian Zhang, Paul Tickell, and Carl Thayer. I would also like thank the 10
many others who have provided invaluable support, inspiration, and guidance during the course of the PhD.
Equally important is my appreciation to the hundreds of policy makers and scholars throughout Southeast Asia who freely provided there valuable time and knowledge during the course of interviews and the compilation of the survey data. Similarly, my thanks to the 819 citizens of Southeast Asia who participated in the communal level survey sample and to all those who assisted with the translations and the survey work in the capital cities of most of the ASEAN countries. In relation to the survey work, I would like to specifically thank Mrs. Fiona Cotton for her invaluable assistance in organising a pilot test of my two survey designs with military officers from Southeast Asia studying at the Australian Defence Force Academy campus of the University of New South Wales. In the context of my interview data, I am equally grateful to John McFarlane as this dissertation could not have been completed in its current form without his most gracious generosity in sharing his contacts from all over Asia.
On a more personal note, I would also like to thank my parents for all their support and love over the years and, in particular, during the course of my Masters and the PhD that followed. I am also extremely fortunate to have some long‐standing friends who have stood by me through thick and thin and these include Ingrid Neilson, Nic Robson, Gerard Pauley, Lisha Kayrooz and Adam Marshall. Many other friends, teachers, and work colleagues have been a source of inspiration over the years and some of these include Sister Lucy Kert, Father Peter Quilty, Paul and Jacqui Hughes, Arthur Coghlan, Shelton Bond, Robyn Culley and many more. I would also like to thank my cousin, David Cameron, for his long‐term support and understanding. I am also deeply indebted to my wife’s family for not only understanding the demands of my PhD, but for having so warmly embraced me as a part of their family. To my late grandmother, Mrs Lillian Campbell, I will always think of you as you always believed in me and supported me; I will always remember the inspiration and love you provided to all those who knew you. Last, but by no means least, this dissertation could never have been completed without the infinite love and support of my dear wife, Le Thi Thu Huong – it is to you that I dedicate this work.
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Chapter I Introduction
On 7 October 2003, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), at the ninth ASEAN Summit, formally proposed the establishment of a security, economic and socio‐cultural community by the year 2020.1 The proposal to erect these three pillars reflects – to varying degrees – the academic literature on the theory of a ‘security community’.2 While Karl Deutsch and his associates first enunciated the notion of a security community in 1957,3 since the end of the Cold War an increasing body of scholarly literature has sought to examine whether or not the ASEAN states constitute a security community. ASEAN’s interest in becoming a security community is reflective of this literature and its core definition that a security community can only exist where the states of the community no longer envisage war as a foreseeable possibility.4 In order to ensure such behaviour however, it is necessary for Southeast Asia to develop the type and extent of cooperation, integration, and political structures that have been witnessed in the European Union. Given
1 Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 7 October 2003 [cited 14 October 2003]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/15159.htm. At the twelfth ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN leaders brought forward the scheduled date to 2015. ASEAN, Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015 [Internet] (2007 [cited 18 July 2007]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/19260.htm.
2 Rizal Sukma, "Towards an ASEAN Security Community," in Concept Paper (Indonesian Foreign Ministry) (Jakarta: CSIS, 20 March 2003). As Sukma states in interview, the proposal ‘owes a lot to the concept as developed by [Karl] Deutsch and Amitav [Acharya], and after presenting it to the Foreign Minister here I presented a modified version in New York. Have been working on this even though it has been watered down, massaged, but the intellectual rules had to be found, and I looked at Leifer who talked about a political community in the 80s’. Interview with Rizal Sukma, CSIS (Jakarta), 21 April 2006.
3 Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience (New York: Greenwood Press, 1957). While Deutsch developed the initial framework and its composite notions, the actual founder of the term was Richard van Wagnen in the early 1950s. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective," in Security Communities, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.3.
4 This is a simplified definition adopted from: Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," in Security Communities, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.30. 12
the ethnic, religious, and political diversity of the region, achieving this end will be no easy feat.
Given the material and ideational history of ASEAN, along with the recent challenges the organisation has faced, ASEAN’s proposal to become a security community by 2020 is, at the same time, both promising and extraordinary in nature. As will be evidenced by the dissertation, a ‘true’ security community can only exist where Southeast Asia would develop the kind of structures, integration, and sense of community that is witnessed in the European Union. Considering the veritable increase to the level of human security along with the necessary gains to economic and domestic stability that would follow as a consequence of the ‘process’ of security community formation; ASEAN’s proposal warrants empirical and analytical investigation.5 Therefore, the dissertation seeks to address three primary investigative tasks:
1. To examine the various characterisations of ASEAN, as described by the academic literature, and to assess which of these corresponds best with the contemporary phenomena. 2. To reconceptualise the security community theory in order to advance the analysis of the empirical phenomena as well as the processes that contribute to its emergence. 3. In building on the insights from the second task and in the context of the issues examined: to identify the major factors that could potentially impede ASEAN’s evolution towards a security community and to provide an assessment regarding the likelihood of these impediments being overcome.
In the context of the first investigative task, the question of what ASEAN currently constitutes presents a significant challenge and has already evoked much debate. In response, international relations theorists have provided a virtual rainbow of responses to this question. A small sample of the spectrum of characterisations ranging from the serious to the cynical includes any one of the following: a conflict formation, an elite club,
5 The relevance and causal relationship of human security, domestic stability and economic development to security community formation will be outlined in Chapters 2 and 3. This relationship will then be empirically tested in later chapters. 13
community or pact,6 an intergovernmental‐organisation;7 a concert,8 an economic regime, a limited security regime,9 a regional sub‐system,10 a regional security complex,11 a cooperative security arrangement,12 a cooperative security regime,13 a regional cooperative organisation;14 an imagined community,15 an ‘imitation community’,16 a diplomatic community17 and even a possible nascent security community.18 Given this complex array of alternative characterisations, the present study seeks to provide a new and empirically
6 James Cotton, Crossing Borders in the Asia-Pacific: Essays on the Domestic-Foreign Policy Divide (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2002). Also in discussions with author between March and June 2004.
7 How San Khoo, ASEAN on Myanmar: Creative Damage Control [Internet - News] (Asia Times, 2004 [cited 12 May 2004]); available from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia?EF27Ae04.html.
8 ASEAN Vision 2020 [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1997 [cited 3 May 2004]); available from www.aseansec.org/5408.htm.
9 Tim Huxley, Insecurity in the ASEAN Region (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1993), p.81.
10 James Cotton, "Regional Order and the over-Determination of Regional Institutions in the Asia-Pacific" (paper presented at the UTS-Guadalajara Workshop, Guadalajara, January 2004), p.18.
11 Alan Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2003), pp.16-17.
12 Jeannie Henderson, "Reassessing ASEAN,” (London: ADELPHI Paper, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999).
13 More specifically, he states that ASEAN is a ‘regime for cooperative security’. Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp.4 & 7.
14 Mya Than, Myanmar in ASEAN: Regional Cooperation Experience (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), p.11.
15 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2001), p.195.
16 David M. Jones and Michael Smith, "The Changing Security Agenda in Southeast Asia: Globalization, New Terror, and the Delusions of Regionalism," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24 (2001): p.285. Later in the article Jones described ‘ASEAN’ as ‘the “region” that never was’, pp.108-109. See also: David M. Jones and Michael Smith, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations: Regional Delusion (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2006).
17 Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 1989).
18 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, p.208. 14
based perspective through intensive fieldwork involving in‐depth interviews and survey work at the elite and grassroots levels. These research activities were designed to examine the fundamental characteristics of the international relations of the ASEAN states (among other things) and to assess how these features correspond with the basic indicators of a security community.19
Various insights from the interview and survey work were also applied in the development of the security community framework as presented in chapters two and three (the second investigative task). Most significantly, these research activities provided a substantial contribution to an appreciation of some of the primary impediments to security community formation in Southeast Asia (the third investigative task). Progress in addressing the second and third investigative tasks is also relevant in another context. If the key proposition of the security community literature can be empirically tested, applied and accepted as a general theory, then there is the possibility of the concept gaining additional relevance as a policy goal (normative project) by ‘governments, international organisations, social movements and other relevant bodies throughout the world’.20 In these circumstances, the idea of a security community could escalate towards the eventual goal of establishing a single and integrated global community.
Based on the considerations above, and in order to assess the likelihood of ASEAN succeeding in its pursuit of a security community by 2020, the literature review below contains four major components. The first component seeks to outline the history and emergence of the concept of a security community, including its basic definition within the scholarly literature, while the second component briefly outlines the contentions behind the Kantian school of thought. This component of the review is important as their notion of a ‘democratic security community’ directly incorporates, and encroaches on, Deutsch’s
19 Details of the extent and nature of the fieldwork are provided later in the chapter under the section entitled ‘research approach’.
20 Donald K Emmerson, "Security, Community, and Democracy in Southeast Asia: Analysing ASEAN," Japanese Journal of Political Science 6, no. 2 (2005): p.169. 15
concept of a ‘security community theory’ – albeit with the added necessity of ‘democracy’. The third component of the literature review outlines the major alternative multilateral characterisations available within the scholarly literature while the fourth and final component of the review provides a ‘broad sample’ of the alternative characterisations of ASEAN and Southeast Asia as published within the scholarly literature. The combined contribution of these four components to the review of the literature is not only to provide a synopsis of the history and evolution of a broad sample of the various characterisations of ASEAN to date but also to illustrate some of the available alternative characterisations within the broader international relations literature for the purpose of a final assessment regarding the empirical phenomena in Chapter X. Following the literature review, the section entitled Research Approach outlines the methodology incorporated by the dissertation and provides a brief outline of the individual chapters and how the various components of each chapter address the investigative tasks of the study.
Literature Review
The Rise of, and Literature on, the Concept of a Security Community
The emergence of a ‘security community’ as a conceptual framework is largely accredited to the research of Karl Deutsch and associates in 1957.21 While Deutsch developed the initial framework and its composite notions, the actual founder of the term was Richard van Wagnen in the early 1950s.22 Within the scholarly literature, Southeast Asia itself has been examined as a potential security community since 197723 and in 2001, Amitav Acharya published the most substantive application of the theory to the region thus far.24 The concept of a security community has been recognised as the first substantive challenge to
21 Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience.
22 Adler and Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective," p.3.
23 Monte H. Hill, "Community Formation within ASEAN," International Organization 32, no. 2 (1978).
24 Amitav Acharya, "The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: 'Security Community' or 'Defence Community’?" Pacific Affairs 64, no. 2 (1991), Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order. 16
the ‘core tenets’ of the realist paradigm.25 The emphasis placed on development of a sense of community – together with the belief that states and communities will abide by ‘standards of appropriate behaviour’ known as norms26 – within security community frameworks has meant that most scholars believe the concept to fit within, and to have initially informed, the constructivist school of thought.27 Certainly, the primacy placed on the definition and construction of a social reality ‘and the way in which it shapes the relevant actors and relations among them’ means that it can be, more specifically, labelled as a societal approach to stable peace.28 However, and as will be shown by the theory in Chapters II and III, certain components of the framework originally incorporated elements of the realist and liberal schools of thought. In this sense, and from the beginning of their conception, security community frameworks were always eclectic in nature.
Within the scholarly literature on Southeast Asia itself, both the concept and ideal of a security community has been the subject of much attention. As Table 1.1 indicates below, one of the first references to the possibility of an emerging ‘security community’ dates back to a 1976 publication by Estrella D. Solidium entitled, ‘Towards a Southeast Asian Community’. While several more publications suggesting or analysing the possibility followed during the course of the next two years, it was in 1978 that Monte Hill produced a significant piece of research analysing the possibility of a Southeast Asian security community with a focus on Deutsch’s theory of transactionalism. In 1991 Amitav Acharya
25 Laurie Nathan, "Domestic Instability and Security Communities," European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 2 (2006): p.276. See also: Amitav Acharya, "Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia," in Security Communities, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.200.
26 Markus Hund, The Development of ASEAN Norms between 1997 and 2000: A Paradigm Shift? [Internet - Occasional Paper] (Center for East Asian and Strategic Studies, 2001 [cited 20 July 2002]); available from www.zops.uni-trier.de/op/OccasionalPapersNr15.pdf.
27 As Alex Bellamy suggests, much of constructivism resonates with Karl Deutsch’s thesis. Alex J. Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), p.14.
28 Raimo Vayrynen, Stable Peace through Security Communities? Steps Towards Theory-Building (No.18) [Occasional Paper] (The Joan B. Krock Institute for International Peace Studies, June 11 2000 [cited 10 September 2001]); available from http://www.nd.edu/~krocinst/ocpapers/op_18_3.pdf. 17
started to emerge as the key specialist in the field with a journal article entitled, ‘The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: ‘Security Community’ or ‘Defence Community’. This then led to a chapter by Acharya in the aforementioned work of Adler and Barnett and Acharya himself, in 2001, built on his conceptual framework with the publication of a major book entitled ‘Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order’. While some of these publications have succeeded in influencing international relations theory and regional perceptions – particularly the works by Acharya – many critics have claimed that significant aspects of the theory remained ambiguous, overly subjective and, in the context of Southeast Asia, have often lacked sufficient linkages between theory and empirical reality. This study will seek to respond to such critiques by developing an alternative framework that can be more critically applied to collections of states for assessing whether they behave as a security community.
Table 1.1: Select List of the Emergence and Usage of the Term ‘Security Community’ in Southeast Asia.
Year Article Name 1976 Estrella D. Solidium, ‘Towards a Southeast Asian Community’ (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1976), pp.210‐11 1976 Manilla Journal, December 5‐11, p.5. 1976 Asian Review, Vol.1, No.1 (February 1976), p.15. 1977 Richard W. Mansbach, ‘Southeast Asia in the Global System’, in Southeast Asia in Transition: Regional and International Politics (Seoul: The Institute of Far Easter Studies, Kyung Nam University), p.17. 1978 Monte B. Hill, ‘Community Formation within ASEAN’, International Organisation, vol.32, no.2 (Spring 1978), pp.568‐75. 1985 Donald Weatherbee, ‘ASEAN Military Capabilities and Security Concerns’ (paper prepared for the 26th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington DC, 5‐9 March 1985), pp.2‐3. 1986 Noordin Sopiee, ‘ASEAN and Regional Security’, in Mohammed Ayoob (ed), Regional Security in the Third World (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p.229. 1987 Sheldon W. Simon, ‘ASEAN's Strategic Situation in the 1980s.’ Pacific Affairs 60, no. 1 (1987): 73‐93 1991 Amitav Acharya, ‘The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: “Security Community” or “Defence Community”’, Pacific Affairs, vol.62, no.2 (1991), pp.159‐77 1991 J. Soedjati Djiwandono, ‘ASEAN: An Emerging Regional Security Community?’ (Jakarta). 1992 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘Indonesia and the Security of Southeast Asia’ (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1992), pp.50‐53. 1992 Sheldon W. Simon, ‘The Regionalisation of Defence in Southeast Asia’, 18
Pacific Review, vol.5, no.2 (1992), p.122. 1994 Bunn Nagara and K S Balakrishnan (eds), ‘The Making of a Security Community in Southeast Asia’, 7th Asia‐Pacific Roundtable Conference (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Security and International Studies Malaysia, 1994). 1995 N. Ganesan, ‘Rethinking ASEAN as a Security Community in Southeast Asia.’ Asian Affairs: An American Review 21 1995 Ming Zhang, ‘Major Powers at a Crossroads: Economic Interdependence and an Asia Pacific Security Community’. (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995). 1997 David Martin Jones, ‘Political Development in Southeast Asia’, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), p.185 1998 Amitav Acharya, ‘Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia.’ In Security Communities, edited by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.198‐227. 1999 Rommel C. Banlaoi, ‘The ASEAN Regional Forum and security community building in the Asia Pacific lessons from Europe’ (Honolulu: APAN, 1999). 2002 Amitav Acharya, ‘Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order’ (London: Routledge, 2001). 2002 John Garofano, ‘Power, Institutions, and the ASEAN Regional Forum: A Security Community for Asia?’ Asian Survey, vol.42, no. 3 (2002), pp.503‐ 21. 2002 Tobias Nischalke, ‘Does ASEAN Measure Up? Post Cold War Diplomacy and the Idea of Regional Community’ The Pacific Review, vol.15, no.1 (2002), pp.89‐117. 2002 Sorpong Peou, ‘Toward a Eurasian Security Community? The Case of ASEAN and the EU’, Bangkok: Institute of Security and International Studies (2002). 2003 Rizal Sukma, The Future of ASEAN: Towards a Security Community [Seminar Paper]. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations, 2003. 2004 Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators?’ Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004 2004 Nicholas Khoo, ‘Deconstructing the ASEAN Security Community: A Review Essay.’ International Relations of the Asia‐Pacific 4 (2004): 35‐46. 2005 Jurgen Haacke, ‘Enhanced Interaction with Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with its Diplomatic and Security Culture?’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol.25, no.2 (2005), pp.188‐216. 2006 Rodolfo C. Severino, ‘Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the Former ASEAN Secretary General’, Singapore: ISEAS (2006). 2007 Amitav Acharya, ‘Constructing a Security Community in South East Asia’, London: Routledge (2nd ed., forthcoming).
19
A neglected connection to security community frameworks has been the relationship of the concept to both ‘international order’ and ‘international society’.29 International society, as a concept, was developed by the English school having its roots in the work of Grotius and his book, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (The Law of War and Peace) in 1625. In terms of international theory, an international society approach sits on the constructivist end of the spectrum, that is, and unlike neo‐realism which places emphasis only on material structures (such as national interests, maximum gains and so on), ‘international society’ emphasises the value of normative structures (for example, socially constructed norms of peaceful interaction) in addition to material factors.30 Central to the idea of an international society is the belief that states can form a society where there is emphasis on common norms for the conduct of their relations and recognition of their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.31
The connection between the English school approach and security community theorisations is found in Deutsch’s assertion that a security community will exist where there are dependable expectations of peaceful change.32 According to Deutsch, the existence of these expectations will most likely exist whenever two or more states become integrated to an extent that there is an overall sense of community, ‘which in turn, creates the assurance that they will settle their differences short of war’.33 Therefore, such a ‘community of states’
29 Barry Buzan, "Book Review: Adler & Barnett, 'Security Communities'," International Affairs 76, no. 1 (2000): p.154. International order and its link to Hedley Bull’s discussion of International Society is discussed by Alagappa in his recent book entitled: Muthiah Alagappa, "The Study of International Order: An Analytical Framework," in Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp.34-35.
30 Adler and Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective," p.10.
31 The English school discourses on security including the branches most closely associated with the realism, recognise that security itself is socially constructed and therefore ‘does not rest on fixed foundations’. They ‘hold that the invocation and resonance of security discourses takes place within a political community, but the community is not necessarily limited to the state’. Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? , p.15.
32 Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience, p.5.
33 Adler and Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective," p.3. Barry Buzan, "Security Architecture in Asia: The Interplay of Regional and Global Level," The Pacific Review 16, no. 2 (2003). 20
abides by norms of peaceful conduct and in fact anticipates a stable peace. Deutsch articulated his framework in the following manner:
A security‐community is a group of people which become “integrated”… By integration we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of community” and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a “long” time, dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among its population. …By sense of community we mean a belief on the part of the individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of “peaceful change.”…By peaceful change we mean the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalised procedures, without resort to large‐scale physical force.34
In some academic circles, in Southeast Asia and beyond, the theory of a security community has once again become fashionable due to the end of the Cold War and also because of new directions in political science that place greater emphasis on exploring the role of ‘identities, norms and the social basis of global politics’.35 Additionally, new theoretical developments have enabled scholars to overcome what Adler and Barnett considered ‘methodological difficulties’ in Deutsch’s framework.36 The political science and international relations theories that explain the absence of war can be conceptualised along a spectrum of whether or not they see ‘structure’ as comprised of material forces or material and social normative forces. At one end sits the theory of realism, which is generally materialist in its analysis. At the opposite end of the spectrum sits constructivism and this views the international environment as a
34 Under the definition provided by Deutsch, a security community may exist between communities within states or across states – a security community is in fact non-territorial. However, for the purpose of this study and in light of its modern application, the study will limit the focus and application of security community frameworks to inter-state relations. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience, p.5.
35 Adler and Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective," pp.4-5. For examples of works and theories that take this sociological approach see: Mohammed Ayoob, "From Regional System to Regional Order," Australian Journal of International Affairs 53, no. 3 (1999), Arie Kacowicz, "Regionalization, Globalization, and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent or Overlapping?," Alternative: Social Transformation and Humane Governance 24 (1999), Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), Vayrynen, Stable Peace through Security Communities? Steps Towards Theory-Building (cited).
36 Adler and Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective," p.10. 21
social construction that comprises ‘collective understandings’ including norms that emerge from social interaction.37 Within this paradigm, society is both normative and material (containing both rules and resources) and it is considered possible that these shared identities and norms can evolve to a point where there can exist a stable long‐term peace.38 The various theories of neo‐liberal institutionalism, the society of states and the Kantian perspective, sit amidst these two ends of the spectrum.
The relationship of ‘security communities’ to the idea of a ‘region’ is also important to consider as the latter term has the potential to complicate the analysis through a vast array of competing definitions.39 As a security community only requires two or more states to exist and this dissertation is examining the ten states that only ‘happen’ to fall within the labelled ‘Southeast Asian region’, a consideration of the theoretical concepts related to regionalism is therefore unnecessary to the dissertation. However, suffice it to say that for the purpose of testing the application of security community frameworks to Southeast Asia, the regional security complex theory, as enunciated by Barry Buzan in 1988, is the preferred choice.40 This is because the relationship between a security community and a security
37 In other words, there is ‘no objective social reality ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered’ but, to the contrary, ‘social meaning is constructed by social interaction, which creates a web of norms and rules that govern appropriate action’. Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators?, p.17. According to Alex Bellamy there are three common concerns shared by constructivists. The first is that normative and ideational structures are equally important with material structures. Thus, ideational structures act to mould the identities of actors and this, in turn, also shapes the interests of actors. Secondly, the argument that identities shape interests provides a causal link to the actions of actors. Finally, constructivists believe that the relationships between agents and structures are mutually constitutive. Therefore, while ‘actors are constituted and constrained by ideational and material structures, ‘those structures would not exist were it not for the knowledgeable practices of those actors. The social structures that constitute and constrain states in international society are themselves constructed and maintained by social interaction between states’. Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? , pp.17-21.
38 Adler and Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective," pp.9-13. See also: Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? , p.8.
39 David Lake in his book entitled, The Asia-Pacific in the New World Order, states that there are now over twenty-two definitions of region-systems containing twenty-one separate conceptual attributes. David A. & Morgan Lake, Patrick M., ed., Regional Orders: Building Security in the New World (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p.46.
40 For more information in relation to this theory see: Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, 2nd edition ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), Buzan, "Security Architecture in Asia: The Interplay of Regional and Global Level.", Barry Buzan, "The Southeast Asian Security Complex," Contemporary Southeast Asia 10, no. 1 (1988). 22
complex is neither one of mutual interdependence nor of mutual exclusivity. In other words, and as depicted by Figure 1.1 below, a security community could be hypothesized to exist within a regional security complex (or security system); it could embrace all the states of a region or exist completely independent of any security complex and/or region. The reasoning behind these complementarities can be found in the fact that Buzan’s security complex framework is not representative of either a supportive or a resistant environment. It can exist as a positive or negative example of interdependence in conflict formation. A positive example of a regional security complex would be that of a pluralistic security community as Buzan himself has contended.41
Figure 1.1. Interdependent Relationship between Security Community and Regional Security Complex Frameworks
A Security Community that encompasses part of Regional Security Security Community or the whole of a Regional Complex Security Complex
Source: Compiled by author
The Neo-Kantians and the Democratic Security Community
Linked to the constructivist school of thought on a security community is the Kantian notion of a ‘democratic peace’.42 The Kantians do not discount security community frameworks, but rather, advocate democracy as a necessary precondition to their existence. Therefore, in applying a security community framework, the Kantians usually refer to it as a ‘democratic security community’. The Kantian school of thought contends that there exist certain grand
41 Barry Buzan, "The Asia Pacific: What Sort of Region in What Sort of World?" in Asia-Pacific in the New World Order, ed. Anthony McGrew and Christopher Brook (London: Routledge, 1998), pp.70-71.
42 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.299. 23
norms that are universally applicable to all peoples on earth.43 Examples would include the right to eat and the right to be left alone and unharmed. The latter is aptly summarised by Justice Louis D. Brandeis: ‘[t]he right to be left alone is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued in civilised man’. For example, the Universalist approach and the rule of law as a philosophy would conflict with any justification of an ‘ASEAN way’,44 particularly if the norms that stem from its existence acted to negate the rights of the individual and of society.
One of the most fundamental contentions behind the notion of a democratic peace is that democracies ‘are significantly less likely to fight wars with each other’.45 There are three primary reasons behind this contention. The first is that the flow and type of information in democratic (pluralistic) institutions (as opposed to dictatorships or oligarchies) leads to a better, more rational, decision making process that increases the likelihood of a ‘no‐war’ result.46 The second factor, one that is partly related to the first, is that democratic institutions emphasise parliamentary responsibility and place stringent conditions on when, how and to what degree a political leader can act. The leader of a democratic government can rarely exercise the right to wage war without the support of at least the executive, the legislature, and eventually, the people (at least by way of election). Thirdly, there has been a recent expansion of ‘democratic peace theory’ to include considerations of economic interdependence. This is because democratic states now tend to be more economically open, giving increased latitude to economic interdependence.47 While this argument has
43 Universalism links to the arguments of those who support the primacy of the ‘rule of law’ by arguing that law, and the principles the rule of law purports to uphold (such as human rights) applies to all people equally. As Montesquieu put it, “law should be like death, which spares no one”.
44 Such as the principles of non-intervention, consensus, regional and national resilience. A detailed definition is provided in later chapters.
45 John W. Patty and Roberto A. Weber, "Agreeing to Fight: An Explanation of the Democratic Peace," Politics, Philosophy & Economics 5, no. 3 (2006): p.36.
46 John Wiggs Patty and Roberto A. Weber, "Agreeing to Fight: An Explanation of the Democratic Peace,” (Carnegie Mellon University, 2001), p.1.
47 John R. O'Neal and Bruce M. Russett, "The Classic Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," International Studies Quarterly 41 (1997): p.267-268. 24
been raised in an abundance of Kantian literature, there has been little by way of empirical evidence that has been utilised to justify this contention.48 Further, critics of the theory point to a pattern where such democracies, while peaceful in their relations with ‘like‐ minded governments’, are often ‘more war‐like’ in their relations with non‐democracies, as they do not necessarily recognise the legitimacy of undemocratic states.49
Even in stepping away from the Kantian view of a security community, it has been claimed that the major problem in applying security community frameworks (herein labelled SCFs) to the developing world is an implicit assumption that ‘such communities require a quintessential liberal‐democratic milieu featuring significant economic interdependence and political pluralism’.50 Amitav Acharya, in his application of SCFs to Southeast Asia, ranges between dismissing democracy as a prerequisite to the formation of a security community to briefly outlining what he sees as an implicit assumption by European academics that democracy is a necessary prerequisite.51 However, his works have yet to provide an in‐ depth critique of this ‘European’ assumption.52 By contrast, Zhiqun Zhu does provide a limited expansion of Acharya’s arguments where he acknowledges the difficulty for countries to share similar values and expectations when they have different political and economic systems.53 Donald Emerson takes this a step further and argues that democracy represents one of the core challenges to any sense of solidarity and cohesion in the future.54 Later chapters will therefore seek to gain further insights on how differences in regime‐
48 It has been further argued by Alexander Wendt that the ‘democratic peace’ notion has never attempted to ‘tap into’ the causes as to why such a pattern exists, see: Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p.68.
49 Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators?, p.10.
50 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, p.31.
51 For example: Acharya, "Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia," p.199.
52 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, p.31.
53 Zhiqun Zhu, "Prospect for Integration in Pacific-Asia," Asian Profile 28, no. 6 (2000): p.517.
54 Emmerson, "Security, Community, and Democracy in Southeast Asia: Analysing ASEAN," p.177. 25
types influence the patterns of foreign policy formulation on the tendency to cooperate and on interstate relations.
Security Communities and Other Multilateral Security Frameworks in Theoretical Perspective
According to the scholarly literature, security communities exist as one of at least six possible multilateral security frameworks or cooperative based security orders.55 Figure 1.1 illustrates the spectrum of orders that exists within the international relations literature. Cooperative based security orders exist in their simplest form when states take into consideration the security interests of the other states in the grouping and various norms and rules can be formed to facilitate this process and understanding.56 A common security association is an aligned grouping of states associated with a common ideology (such as communism). This alignment of ideology usually forms the basis for threat perceptions vis‐à‐ vis states with contrasting identities and ideology (e.g. the former Soviet Union vs. the United States of America.57 Similarly, the purpose of an alliance is to contain or defend against a ‘preconceived threat’.58 This deterrence role implies a security orientation that is embraced by the notion of a defence community.59 Both an alliance and a defence community exist when an organisation can present a common military front against external
55 Buzan, "Book Review: Adler & Barnett, 'Security Communities'," pp.154-155, John G. Ikenberry and Jitsuo Tsyuchiyama, Between Balance of Power and Community: The Future of Multilateral Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific [Conference] (The Center for International Political Economy and The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, 2000 [cited September 10 2001]); available from
56 John Baylis, "International Security in the Post Cold War Era," in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.209.
57 Ikenberry and Tsyuchiyama, Between Balance of Power and Community: The Future of Multilateral Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (cited).
58 It is not necessary for an alliance to be multilateral; it can be bilateral and it is therefore considered as a subset to a common security association.
59 Acharya, "The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: 'Security Community' or 'Defence Community’?" 26
threats posed by other states and are therefore sub‐categories of a common security association.60
Similar in name, but not in form, is the concept of a cooperative security arrangement. Such arrangements obtain a sense of security by participating in mutual confidence building activities and processes of acculturation. According to the proponents of the concept, such as Gareth Evans, these processes and activities will lead towards the creation of an environment where ‘neighbouring nations could enjoy “security with” and not “security against” each other. It was further argued that closer relations between the two militaries would dispel any residue of belief that they were antagonists.’61
Figure 1.1. Multilateral Security Frameworks
Competing Compatible Sy st em s Sy st em s
Competing Systems Compatible Systems
Compatible Sim ilar Sy st em s Sy st em s
Defence Alliance Community
Source: Compiled by author62
60 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, pp.18-19.
61 James Cotton, East Timor, Australia and Regional Order: Intervention and Its Aftermath in Southeast Asia (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), p.48. For a detailed analysis of ASEAN as a potential ‘cooperative security arrangement’ see: Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF.
62 The label ‘competing systems’ refers to systems that invoke international relations theory paradigms that are incompatible and from a ‘purist’ perspective cannot be reconciled with one another. By contrast, the label ‘similar systems’ refers to systems that can be used in the same (or similar) fashion by various political scientists and potentially overlap with one another. The IR paradigms that invoke them are either the same or similar in theoretical orientation (e.g. neo-liberalism and liberal institutionalism). The label ‘compatible 27
Under the umbrella of multilateral security arrangements also fall the organising concepts of international societies, concerts and collective security systems. An international society or international system, while mirroring the ‘community’ component of a security community, attempts to apply the theory at a global level and in the absence of any in‐depth considerations of the conceptual components to ‘security’ (defined in the next chapter).63 By contrast, the most basic of these orders, the concert system, is created where there is consensus amongst the great powers of a region or the globe that they will collectively manage regional security relations – hence the term ‘great‐power concert’.64 The applicability of this notion is limited when considering collections of small to middle powers or the individual region Southeast Asia – which is the focus of this study. Finally, a collective security system is related to the notion of a defence community, and to a lesser extent, an alliance. It is similar to the arrangement that had been constructed by the former League of Nations and embraces certain characteristics that can also exist in a security community – e.g. conflict resolution procedures and other arrangements for the peaceful settlement of disputes.65 Furthermore, and similar to the notion of a security community, the conceptual roots of a collective security system are bound to the neo‐Grotian paradigm.66
Security communities, by contrast, differ from alliances, defence communities, and common security associations because their focus is on intra‐mural relations rather than the achievement of the overt goal of repelling external threats. While a mature and strongly
systems’ refers to systems like the second category that may fit within the same general paradigms of IR theory but as sub-theory have unique characteristics and definitions. In some instances one concept may fit, as a subset, within another concept. For example both ‘security communities’ and ‘security regimes’ may fit under the general umbrella of interdependence theory as embraced by Buzan’s ‘regional security complex’.
63 Ikenberry and Tsyuchiyama, Between Balance of Power and Community: The Future of Multilateral Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (cited).
64 David Capie and Paul Evans, The Asia Pacific Security Lexicon (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), pp.76-77.
65 Inis L. Claude, Swords into Ploughshares, 4th ed. (New York: Random House, 1984), p.245. See also: Capie and Evans, The Asia Pacific Security Lexicon, pp.48-56.
66 Charles W. Jr. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond, The Global Future: A Brief Introduction to World Politics (Belmont: Thompson, 2005), pp.238-239. See also: 28
advanced security community would result in a unified response to any external threats, and external threats may initially motivate cooperation between the states of a community, there cannot exist any circumstances where intra‐mural differences (conflict initiators) could potentially be resolved by violent means. Like security communities, security regimes (which can also be considered as being similar to a security complex) do not necessarily involve a deterrence or containment objective. Ralph Emmers defines a regime as ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision‐making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’.67 Such regimes seek to mute the security dilemma via a combination of their ‘own actions and their assumptions about the behaviour of others’.68 Security regimes ‘are akin to what both Deutsch and Ole Weaver have respectively referred to as “non‐war” and “no‐war” communities’.69 The existence of a security regime could be viewed as representing a significant step towards the formation of a nascent security community.70 However, in a security regime (as opposed to a security community) the ‘possibility of war is still expected and to some extent preparations are made for it’.71
67 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.2. See also: Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, p.7.
68 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order.
69 Ole Waever, "Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community," in Security Communities, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.69- 70, 104.
70 Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? , pp.190- 191.
71 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order. Security regimes also fall under the general umbrella of ‘regime theory’. This is far broader and can pertain to other more specific genres such as ‘an economic regime’ or a ‘trade regime’ such as the World Trade Organization. Stephen Krasner defines regimes as ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’. Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.2. A regime can also be ‘bilateral, multilateral, regional or global in scope’. Martin Griffiths and Terry O'Callaghan, International Relations: The Key Concepts (New York: Routledge, 2003), p.272-273. 29
The Contrasting Characterisations of ASEAN and Southeast Asia’s Security Architecture
In terms of the major scholarly literature that seeks to characterise the security architecture of ASEAN and Southeast Asia, Donald Crone’s book, ‘The ASEAN States: Coping with Dependence’, contains various conceptual, theoretical, and empirical insights that remain important some twenty years on.72 The author argues that there is an economic order in third world states that remains dependent on major global powers – a notion that is somewhat linked to Emmanuel Wallenstein’s ‘World System Theory’.73 In order to substantiate this proposition, he provides case studies relating to trade relations, investment relations, and participation (at both the state and subregional levels) in international organisations.
Defining dependence as ‘relational inequality’, he argues that during the first ten years of their membership, the original five ASEAN member states (ASEAN‐5) sought a policy of diversification amongst their economic trading partners. According to Crone, this policy of diversification – along with the reasons for seeking it – formed the underlying basis of a common bond and consensus on economic issues. In the author’s opinion, ASEAN is thus best characterised as a regional pact with the goal of enhancing the organisation’s external diplomacy. This was achieved through a substantial shift in trade diversification to diversify between not only major powers, but also between and within the major powers and newly industrialising and third world nations. In this sense, ASEAN is a variant of ‘collective‐self reliance’ to which Crone applies the more specific label ‘defensive regionalism’.74
Given the ‘diversity’ in regional foreign policy that is illustrated by later chapters, Crone’s hypothesis of a mutual desire to avoid, or at least reduce, dependence on major powers as a basis for ‘forming a common bond’ must now be called into question. Further, the author
72 Donald K. Crone, The ASEAN States: Coping with Dependence (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983).
73 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974).
74 Crone, The ASEAN States: Coping with Dependence, pp.10-20, 181-186. 30
argued that the ‘structure of power …’ in Southeast Asia ‘… is being altered away from continued dependence’, but failed to define or discuss his meaning behind this ‘structure of power’. His analysis continues to have some bearing on the contrasting characterisations of ASEAN, in an abstract sense, because of the prominent role major powers continue to play within Southeast Asia in both the economic and security realms. To mention but two examples, the United States has reinvigorated its role in Southeast Asia following the September 11 terrorist attacks (i.e. its advisory role in the Philippines and a return to the pursuit of new bases) while the rapid economic growth and ‘apparent’ stability of China has had the economic consequence of shifting the bulk of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) away from Southeast Asia and towards China.
In a review article, Michael Leifer criticizes Crone’s failure to consider the political dimensions of dependence theory (e.g. the extent to which ‘dependent states are necessarily followers of their hegemons’) but accepts his argument that ASEAN was formed for the purpose of increasing the member’s collective international diplomacy.75 In 1988, Leifer then published an important book and contribution to the field where he suggests that ASEAN can be best described as a diplomatic community that evidences elements of a ‘collective‐political defence with an extra‐mural point of reference’.76 His work also acknowledges the possible existence of a ‘sub‐regional security community’.77 A major component of Leifer’s work rightly focuses on ASEAN’s response at the time to the Kampuchean conflict, which forced the member states to coordinate their policies towards
75 Michael Leifer, "Review Article, 'the ASEAN States. Coping with Dependence'," Pacific Affairs 57, no. 1 (1984). The author reaffirms this characterisation in a later article entitled: Michael Leifer, "The ASEAN Peace Process: A Category Mistake," The Pacific Review 12, no. 1 (1999). This is also a characterisation supported by James Cotton: Cotton, Crossing Borders in the Asia-Pacific: Essays on the Domestic-Foreign Policy Divide, p.41. By contrast, Khoo How San accepts but limits this characterisation to representing that of the ‘Indochina’ period, see: How San Khoo, ASEAN as A "Neighbourhood Watch Group" [Electronic Database - Expanded Academic ASAP] (Contemporary Southeast Asia, 2000 [cited 17 May 2005]); available from www.infotrac.galegroup.com.
76 Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia, pp.VIII & 83. This term has continued to be used to this day. For example, "Quality of Partnership: Myanmar, ASEAN and the World Community,” (Asian Dialogue Society, 2003), p.7, Anthony L. Smith, "ASEAN’s Ninth Summit: Solidifying Regional Cohesion, Advancing External Linkages," Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 3 (2004).
77 Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia, p.157. 31
external actors.78 Based on ASEAN’s response, he argues that this ‘collective‐political defence’ was ‘expressed through diplomatic solidarity in the face of threat to the premises of regional order and more specifically to the security of a member state’.79 According to Leifer, and because ASEAN’s ‘operational experience of collective political defence’ was confined to the realm of political diplomacy, ASEAN is best viewed as a diplomatic community. He argues that through this experience of international diplomacy, ASEAN was able to build a regional and international significance that was greater than the sum of its parts.80
While Leifer’s analysis is ‘solidly embedded in political realism that places ASEAN as an effort in corporate foreign policy making in the context of domestic and international security variables’,81 Leifer’s work does not utilise his insights to specifically prove or dismiss the various International Relations (IR) theories and debates that were then existent in the literature. Nevertheless, both Crone and Leifer’s analysis seem to fit, broadly speaking, within the neo‐realist camp where there is an emphasis on the continued primacy of the state including major global powers. However, this connection is only loose and in no way is it explicitly raised by the arguments contained within the analysis. The a‐theoretical nature of these various characterisations may represent evidence of an historical scepticism regarding the application of general international relations theory to the states of Southeast Asia. However, in some of the more recent publications outlined below some attempts have been made, to varying degrees, to address this void in the scholarly literature.
Tim Huxley, for example, in a somewhat shorter monograph entitled, ‘Insecurity in the ASEAN Region’, provides an interesting and informative outline of the security architecture of the ASEAN members as at 1993. At a couple of junctures, the author labels ASEAN as a
78 This was despite intramural differences ‘in the long-term threat perceptions of communist Vietnam and its Soviet patron’. Khoo, ASEAN as A "Neighborhood Watch Group" (cited).
79 Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia, p.152.
80 Ibid.
81 Donald E. Weatherbee, "Book Review," Pacific Affairs 62, no. 4 (1989): p.569. 32
limited security regime but does not provide or cite any substantive definition as to what this means.82 His analysis implicitly leans towards positing a limited security regime due to the lack of actual defence cooperation beyond confidence and security building measures. He also argued that weak ‘statehood’, along with historical ethnic and geographical factors, are the key variables in the facilitation of ASEAN’s core security problems.83 Jeannie Henderson’s analysis, by contrast, largely limits its focus to the security and economic elements of state‐to‐state interaction (including the diversity of regional foreign policy and threat perceptions as well as enlargement and the economic crisis).84 However her work does contain fleeting references to ASEAN’s pursuit of a ‘community’ and ‘culture’ (vis‐a‐vis some of ASEAN’s normative values such as non‐interference) and in this respect, the incorporation of these references into her work (though marginal in nature) represents one of the earlier examples to acknowledge these factors.85 Nonetheless, the major focus of the work is on inter‐state behaviour and the role of international and regional security and economic regimes (such as the ARF and APEC). Moreover, it is primarily directed towards the primacy of the state with little to no consideration of the role of NGOs, civil society, nation‐building or collective identity formation. According to Henderson, ASEAN was originally formed as a cooperative security arrangement and has only developed a loose sense of inter‐government cooperation.86
James Cotton, in some recent works on ASEAN and the Asia Pacific,87 has briefly considered some of the alternative characterisations of ASEAN in the scholarly literature and in one
82 Huxley, Insecurity in the ASEAN Region, pp.72, 81-82.
83 Ibid, p.81.
84 Henderson, "Reassessing ASEAN."
85 Ibid, pp.75-77.
86 Ibid, p.75.
87 James Cotton, "ASEAN and Regional Institutions in the Asia-Pacific: Ambitions Versus Performance," in Globalisation and Regionalisation: Views from the Pacific Rim, ed. Stephanie Lawson and Wayne Peake (Sydney, Guadalajara: University of Technology Sydney, Universidad de Guadalajara, 2006), pp.73-111, Cotton, "Regional Order and the over-Determination of Regional Institutions in the Asia-Pacific". 33
article suggests that ASEAN is not an economic community, defence community, or defence alliance but is best seen as a kind of elite community or elite pact where ASEAN was created ‘for the purpose of keeping particular elites in power’.88 In a separate work Cotton also provides a further alternative with some detail on its application. In this view, ASEAN can be characterised as a sub‐system or regional system of states rather than a ‘geographically delimited society of states’.89 By contrast, systems theory90 allows for different tiers of analysis so that while certain states may have little relevance or influence as far as an international system is concerned, they can be central players in the context of a regional system or sub‐system.91 Therefore, and in the case of Southeast Asia, the notion of sovereignty was ‘affirmed’ and Indonesia was recognised and situated at the top of the structural hierarchy within the sub‐system. These historical events, inter alia, provided the foundation of a regional order that included the avoidance of conflict and the pursuit of ‘regional resilience’ to deny great powers the potential for regional hegemony.92
88 Cotton, Crossing Borders in the Asia-Pacific: Essays on the Domestic-Foreign Policy Divide, pp.29, 33 & 40.
89 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics (London: MacMillan, 1977). Cited in: James Cotton, "The Domestic Sources of Regional Order in Michael Leifer's Analysis of Southeast Asia," in Order and Security in Southeast Asia: Essays in Memory of Michael Leifer, ed. Joseph Chinyong Liow and Ralf Emmers (London: Routledge, 2006), p.93.
90 In its simplest form, a system is defined as ‘the composite formed by a structured set of interacting units’. Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.442.
91 Both Binder (1958) and Brescher (1963) are generally credited as being the earliest advocates of this approach. Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, eds., The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations (London: Penguin Books, 1998), p.521.
92 Cotton, "Regional Order and the over-Determination of Regional Institutions in the Asia-Pacific", p.18. According to Lake and Morgan, Thompson provides one of the best definitional set of characteristics to a regional subsystem. Thompson outlines four necessary conditions to the establishment of a regional subsystem. Firstly, ‘The actors’ pattern or relations or interactions exhibit a particular degree of regularity and intensity to the extent that a change at one point in the subsystem affects other points’. Secondly, ‘the actors are generally proximate’. Thirdly, internal and external observers and actors recognize the subsystem as a distinctive area or “theatre of operation”’. Finally, the subsystem logically consists of at least two and quite probably more actors’. Cited in: David Lake, "Regional Security Complexes: A Systems Approach," in Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, ed. David Lake and Patrick Morgan (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), pp.46-47. 34
Amitav Acharya, in a journal article entitled ‘The Association of Southeast Nations: Security Community or Defence Community’, also argues that there is little evidence for the existence of a defence community. This is because he distinguishes a defence community from a security community on the basis that the focus of a security community is on common norms of conflict avoidance whereas a defence community pursues actual integration and cooperation.93 As will be discussed in Chapter II, such a distinction is somewhat inappropriate as integration is central to the concept of a security community and defence cooperation provides strong evidence of a community (where there has been a convergence of identity at the very least at the elite level) as well as a sense of trust and predictability.
Ralph Emmers book, entitled, ‘Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF’, advocates the continued relevance of the ‘balance of power’ approach albeit within an eclectic application of other international relations theories. He labels ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as two examples of a cooperative security regime and he seeks to investigate the extent to which the ‘balance of power’ theory plays a role in these regimes. In particular, Emmers argues that it is possible for the two concepts of ‘cooperative security’ and ‘balance of power’ to coexist. The author characterises ASEAN as a ‘regime for cooperative security’.94 Emmers makes a convincing argument that neo‐liberalist and/or constructivist theories that embrace concepts like cooperative security at the expense of utilising power balancing theory, provide an incomplete and unrealistic view of Southeast Asia. This is because they implicitly reject the types of ‘deterrence mindsets’95 that remain highly apparent in the bilateral relations of Southeast Asia – i.e. Malaysia and Singapore as well as Thailand and Myanmar.
93 Acharya, "The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: 'Security Community' or 'Defence Community’?"
94 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, pp.4 & 17.
95 Ibid, p.4. 35
In 2003, Muthiah Alagappa published his book entitled, ‘Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features’. While his work addresses Asia at large, its alternative focus and its development of the concept of order have relevance and application to the more specific region of Southeast Asia. The author seeks to investigate whether or not the concept of order can explain the existence of stability and predictability throughout Asia despite the presence of some serious security challenges. He argues that a security order does in fact exist and that this order is manifest in the form of a ‘widely shared normative framework’ throughout Asia. Because of these normative underpinnings, he argues that ‘territorial disputes are being managed in a peaceful manner’ and ‘certain basic understandings have been reached’ in the more severe conflicts of Taiwan, Korea, and Kashmir.96 Had Alagappa’s book been limited to the sub‐region of Southeast Asia, then some of these contentions may have carried greater validity. However, given the almost total unpredictability in relation to North Korea’s normative decision making process;97 China’s increasing preparation for the ‘possibility’ of an invasion of Taiwan, its creeping assertiveness over the South China Sea, and its pursuit of blue water capacity in relation to both,98 some doubt can be cast on the validity of these contentions.
As with the security community framework in this study, Alagappa accepts that the regional order in Asia is strongly influenced by ‘historical memory, nation‐ and state‐building processes, and concerns of political legitimacy’.99 Other factors that underpin security and
96 Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003), p.XI. Later, in Alagappa’s introduction, he qualifies this contention to ‘virtually no present or future collective political identity at the subregional or regional levels that would modify or subsume national identity and interests. The nascent ASEAN identity frayed in the aftermath of the 1997 economic crisis’. This second statement, as opposed to ‘no commitment to a present or future collective political identity at the subregional … level’, is certainly of greater relevance and accuracy. Muthiah Alagappa, "Introduction: Predictability and Stability Despite Changes," in Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003), p.18.
97 James Cotton, "The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis," Australian Journal of International Affairs 57, no. 2 (2003), pp.269-71., North Korea: A Phased Negotiation Strategy [Internet PDF File] (International Crisis Group, 2003 [cited 23 March 2004]); available from www.crisisweb.org.
98 Such ideational determinates include norms and identity. Amitav Acharya and Richard Stubbs, "Theorizing Southeast Asian Relations: An Introduction," The Pacific Review 19, no. 2 (2005): p.125.
99 Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, p.XIII. 36
stability in Asia include growing economic interdependence and the ‘development of a normative structure that assures mutual survival and supports international cooperation’. In light of these arguments, he advocates that explanations of security order must draw on both ‘material and ideational’ determinates at the domestic and inter‐state levels. As will be seen in Chapter 3, this methodology replicates the basis for explaining peace, or its absence, within security community theorisation. While the Author mentions how the ASEAN Six (Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Brunei and the Philippines) have been recognised as a nascent security community,100 and later recognises that substantive aspects of ‘international order’ have been studied inter alia under security community frameworks,101 he makes no attempt to explain or critique the relationship of his ‘security order’ framework to that of a ‘security community’ framework. This leaves the reader uncertain about whether the relationships of the two frameworks are complementary, convergent, or divergent with one another.102 Nevertheless, the work does represent a significant contribution in terms of Alagappa’s extrapolation of the underlying concepts that constitute order and other areas of international relations theory. In summary, and in relation to the application of his theory, Alagappa characterises the security environment of the greater Asian area as being more akin to complex‐interdependence than it is to ‘hard realism’.103
100 Ibid, p.6.
101 Ibid, p.34.
102 Ibid, p.39. His emphasis on ‘regional orders’ does seem to narrow its application to a region – whereas later discussions will show that a security community can apply to just two or more states. His framework contains some ambiguity where at one level he accepts that a ‘security order’ could comprise of a collection of states ‘with a cohesive political community in which most people obey the law’ (p.39). However, he also contends that this characterization is part of spectrum which at the other end could be ‘associated with the law of the jungle’ (Such a characterization is the antithesis of a security community). This does not sit well with his contention (on the same page) that international order is ‘a formal or informal arrangement that sustains rule-government interaction among sovereign states’ (p.39). In summary, while many of the terminologies employed by Alagappa are the same as or similar to that employed in a security community, the overall structure of his notion of ‘security order’ is closer to Buzan’s security complex theory or Thompson’s regional systems and sub- systems theory. For further details see: Buzan, "The Asia Pacific: What Sort of Region in What Sort of World?", Buzan, "Security Architecture in Asia: The Interplay of Regional and Global Level.", William R. Thompson, "The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and Propositional Inventory," International Studies Quarterly 17 (1973).
103 Alagappa, "Introduction: Predictability and Stability Despite Changes," p.9. 37
The author’s contention that western scholars have been overly conceptual and lacked empirical understanding in their analysis of Asia – while regional scholars have been too empirical at the expense of a theoretical context – is questionable; especially when considering the region (or in his words ‘sub‐region’) of Southeast Asia. The earlier articles in this literature review (especially Leifer, Henderson, Crone, and Huxley) illustrated the reverse to be true. Leifer’s work, for example, was highly empirical in nature but contained very little by way of explicit theoretical framework. By contrast, some of the works by regional scholars such as Amitav Acharya have been criticised as being overly theoretical with little basis in empirical reality.104 He also argues that there has been ‘no commitment to a present or future collective political [or elite] identity at the subregional or regional levels that would subsume or substantially modify national identity and interests’.105 The idea of a security community in Southeast has been discussed for close to three decades and ASEAN’s public acceptance and pursuit of a regional identity to facilitate this goal means that while Alagappa’s contention might still contain considerable validity in Northeast Asia, his contention is of questionable validity when addressing Southeast Asia. This is not to say that a considerable regional identity currently exists, or is destined to exist, but the pursuit of such an identity is at least now in prospect. The degree and extent to which ASEAN’s pursuit of a security community will modify perceptions of national interests and normative values will be a subject of analysis that will be addressed in later chapters.
Approach of the Dissertation and Limitations to the Research
In order to carry out the investigative tasks the dissertation has been guided by the specific discipline (or sub‐discipline) of International Relations within the context of the more general discipline of Political Science. Keeping the broader discipline of political science in
104 For example, and in relation to the recent work of Acharya on security communities this has been criticised as overly Eurocentric with little relevance to the empirical environment of Southeast Asia. Interview with Joseph Liow, IDSS (Singapore), 7 December 2002; Interview with Andrew Tan, IDSS (Singapore), 5 December 2002. Interview with Kanala Khantaprab, Government of Thailand (Bangkok), 26 December 2002.
105 Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, p.XI. 38
mind has the advantage of extending the scope and depth of the dissertation’s analysis. This is because the political scientist’s field of study is not constrained by a ‘self‐denying ordinance against the use of materials and techniques of other social scientists’.106 The discipline of political science also places a premium on the historical factors behind the occurrence of events.107 Its application requires, above all else, an adequate degree of evidence and the absence of ‘emotional attachments, personal hunches and [merely] intuitive understanding’.108
One criticism that can be directed against the discipline is its emphasis on quantitative research (to maintain objectivity and a ‘logical coherence’) at the expense, or neglect, of qualitative research such as in‐depth interviews. However, Fiona Devine contends that the use of qualitative methods in combination with quantitative methods should, and does, play an important role in political science.109 Therefore, and in agreement with Devine and the more specific application of International Relations theory to Southeast Asia, the dissertation has incorporated the substantial use of both in‐depth interviews and survey work, in addition to other primary and secondary sources for the purpose of carrying out the investigative tasks to the study. The methodology incorporated within the qualitative and quantitative analysis to the dissertation is outlined below.
106 Kenneth Waltz, "Man, the State, and War," in War, ed. Lawrence Freedman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.74.
107 Gerry Stoker, "Introduction," in Theory and Methods in Political Science, ed. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (Houndmills: MacMillan Press Ltd and St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p.3.
108 A Zuckerman, Doing Political Science (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1991), p.3.
109 For further discussion of this issue, see: Fiona Devine, "Methodological Questions - Qualitative Analysis," in Theory and Methods in Political Science, ed. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (Houndmills: MacMillan Press Ltd and St. Martin’s Press, 1995), pp.138-139. To illustrate the importance of qualitative research Anthony Seldon provides some examples of in-depth interviews that have provided vital facts unavailable by any other means. Two of these examples are found in the collection of information that is not yet available on public record, such as Paul Johnson’s The Suez War (1957) and Lawrence Freedman’s Britain and the Falklands War (1988). As Seldon states, these authors left little to the imagination and without which readers would have had to have waited until 1987 and 2013, respectively, for the official release of classified information pertaining to the topics, Anthony Seldon, Contemporary History (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988) p.4. 39
Fieldwork and In-depth Interviews
The author conducted fourteen fieldtrips to all ten of the ASEAN countries during which time more than one hundred interviews were conducted with members of government, academia, political dissidents, journalists and international and non‐governmental organisations. Due to the political culture of some governments within the region, inter alia, some of the political elite interviewed for the dissertation requested that their comments be cited without attribution. In addition, and regardless of the political background of the various interlocutors to the study, where a comment is made in relation to politically sensitive matters then the identity of the interviewee has also been protected. To the extent that is possible, references to each interview will at least indicate the interlocutor’s field of work, country, and approximate position.
While sets of standardised questions were individually designed for each of the ASEAN states and were subsequently asked, as a general rule, within each interview, the questioning was done in a non‐standardised manner focusing on the particular areas of speciality and knowledge that each interviewee’s background provided. Given the high‐level access gained by the author to various interlocutors (e.g. from Deputy Foreign Ministers through to the Secretary General of ASEAN) a non‐standardised format was deemed the most appropriate. The appropriateness of a non‐standardised format was also enhanced given its potential complementarity to the standardised survey research and analysis discussed below. In order to maintain a relaxed environment that would minimise bias and maximise the potential candidness of each participant, the interviewees were not voice recorded but rather, the comments made during the interview were recorded through touch‐typing on the author’s notebook (or sometimes a PDA keyboard) at the time of the interview. An estimated eighty percent of the relevant commentary was recorded via this method. Records of each interview will be archived at the University of New South Wales and had been furnished to the academic supervisor by late October 2006. The one exception to this occurred with the fieldtrip to Laos, which was conducted in July 2007. 40
Elite and Communal Level Surveys
Because of the fact that the actual perceptions of the people of Southeast Asia have never been tested on a regionwide basis, the author also developed two sets of surveys. The first survey design had a set of questions specifically targeted towards the elite of Southeast Asia and is attached as Appendix 1.1. Within this survey design, the questions assumed a non‐ random sample of the regional elite with a basic knowledge of Southeast Asia and the region. As with the interviews, the 100 elites sampled for this survey were a consequence of three years of networking and referrals throughout the region. As indicated by Figure 1.2 below, 38 of those sampled were from an academic background while 38 were government officials. While the respondents came from all ten countries, a number of limitations to the sample are apparent. As a possible consequence of a lack of transparency, and the authoritarian nature of certain regimes, the elite samples within Myanmar and Brunei were particularly small. While three participants responded from Myanmar (with two of these from government), only one person responded from Brunei (government) despite several more individuals being contacted (in person and through email). While the sample from Singapore was significantly larger, all attempts to get a response from members of the political elite (government) were refused and further resulted in ‘return to sender post’ and emails which indicated that the author’s correspondence through email had been monitored.110 Political elites from all the remaining countries did however participate in the survey.
110 In one email from the Ministry of Defence in Singapore the contents included: ‘Message Classification: Restricted…I understand that you have sent numerous email requests to meet with senior officials within MINDEF to discuss your PhD research. Unfortunately, given their extremely busy schedules, these MINDEF officials are not able to accommodate your request for meetings...’ In another email with the sender being identified as ([email protected], not an NTU address) the content read: ‘Dear user [email protected], We have received reports that your account was used to send a large amount of spam during this week. Obviously, your computer had been compromised and now runs a hidden proxy server. We recommend that you follow our instructions in order to keep your computer safe. Have a nice day, ntu.edu.sg technical support team’. Interestingly, the attachment that contained the ‘instructions’ I was to follow had been removed by the NTU computer system as it was deemed a ‘security risk’. In another email identified as coming from ‘[email protected]’ the statement read: ‘You have downloaded these illegal cracks?’ Again, the attachment was removed from the NTU server as a ‘security threat’. The heading of yet another email read ‘Delivery reports about your e-mail’ and was listed as having come from ‘[email protected]’ (an institute to which I have never contacted nor had any affiliation with); however the content of the message was garbled and the attachment was again deleted by the NTU server because it was a ‘security risk’. Other emails of a similar genre were also received during the January to July 2006 period when my research focused on survey and 41
Figure 1.2. Category of Work (Elite Sample)
Source: Compiled by author
For the purpose of carrying out the investigative tasks of the dissertation, a second survey was also designed. This survey was targeted towards a cluster‐sample (discussed below) of grassroots level respondents (herein termed the ‘communal level’) and assumed little to no knowledge about the region. Furthermore, and while some of the questions mirrored the ‘elite level survey’ for the purpose of comparative analysis, a significant proportion of the questions within the communal level survey were specifically designed to test regional perceptions, knowledge and interaction. These questions also sought to apply Deutsch’s theory of ‘transactionalism’, along with subsequent theories regarding ‘socialisation’, as explained within chapters two and three of the study. As ‘trust’ is a core element to the existence of a security community, a number of questions within both survey designs specifically dealt with this issue. The communal level survey also tests regional perceptions of democracy and the issues considered most important to, or that detract from, the personal wellbeing of individuals and identifiable communities within the region (whether
interview work in Singapore. Interestingly, no further emails of a similar nature were received since departing Singapore in July 2006. 42
such ‘communities’ are defined on the basis of state, ethnicity, religion or some other variable). A copy of the communal level survey is attached within Appendix 1.2.
Due to the oppressive nature of the military dictatorship in Myanmar, the communal level sample for Myanmar was not conducted ‘in country’. As an alternative, a small sample of surveys was conducted with Myanmarese expatriates in Singapore. As far as the remaining samples within the region are concerned, the communal level survey was conducted in a total of seven different languages (English, Laotian, Khmer, Vietnamese, Bahasa Indonesia, Tagalog, and Thai) and, for the purpose of comparative analysis, the majority of the survey samples came from the capital city of each ASEAN state. Furthermore, each of the participants was approached on a random basis in the street and token gifts to the value of approximately $1 were offered as a gesture of appreciation in return for each survey. In most cases, postgraduate students were employed by the author to conduct the survey in order to overcome any potential language difficulties (but the author also conducted more than 150 personally). In all cases, translations were conducted by native speaking post‐ graduate students and, where possible, crosschecked by friends and colleagues. In total, 819 communal level surveys were completed and the proportion from each country is listed in Figure 1.3 below. 43
Figure 1.3. Citizenship (Communal Level Sample)
Source: Compiled by author
Further Limitations and Considerations to the Research
It is important to recognise that neither the elite level survey nor the communal level survey designs were random in nature. The elite level survey is best described as a ‘purposive sample’. The communal level survey, by contrast, can be more accurately described as a ‘cluster sample’ where the majority of the participants were sampled in a random fashion within each capital city but the selection of the location (e.g. the capital city of each ASEAN country except Myanmar) was performed on a non‐random (purposive) basis.111 Further, while the survey samples were reasonably large for the purpose of the present study and the time and funds available, the aggregated data that has been extracted from the surveys is most appropriately described as a set of rudimentary indicators regarding regional perceptions and attitudes. Having said this, the contribution of the elite survey sample is significant as the security community proposal is an ‘elite’ project and the participants in the
111 Phillips W. Shively, The Craft of Political Research (New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2005), pp.100-101. 44
survey ranged from senior foreign ministry officials, to defence officials, to senior scholars and relevant NGO groups and journalists. Given the limitations of the popular (communal) survey, it is also important to note that the elite survey sample (and interview data) also serves as an important check, or control, for the purpose of qualifying and contextualising the data from the communal sample. Aside from these limitations, it is hoped that the research conducted for the dissertation might serve as a valuable base‐line for further, more representative, survey work regarding the perceptions and attitudes of the people and political elite of Southeast Asia. While such research will necessarily be expensive and time consuming, it is contended that it would serve a highly valuable purpose in further unveiling the nature of regional perceptions and relations. Further, such survey work might also provide added insight for the purpose of future foreign policy formulation.
In relation to the issues covered in the chapters that follow, it is also important to acknowledge the impossibility of examining all the actual (and potential) challenges that might block the emergence of an ASEAN‐wide security community in the future. A small sample of the comprehensive security issues that the dissertation has been unable to cover includes the impact of SARS, bird flu, HIV/AIDS, transnational crime (beyond the Myanmar case study, Chapter IX), corruption, pollution (beyond the ‘haze’, Chapter VII), water scarcity and resource competition (beyond the South China Sea Issue, Chapter VII). In the context of traditional security concerns, for example, more specialised studies might provide more in‐ depth critiques of the militarisation of borders, military spending patterns, the nature of military acquisitions, and/or an in‐depth critique over the nature of political discourse regarding the territorial disputes of Southeast Asia. An alternative approach might involve an examination of areas of cooperation at the sub‐regional level (including bilateral and trilateral cooperation) and whether the nature and extent of such cooperation has affected, or will likely affect, the level of trust and a subsequent increase to the capacity of the ASEAN states to cooperate over contentious issues. The primary challenge in undertaking this latter approach, however, involves the avoidance of overtly idealistic assessments as undertaken previously (and outlined at appropriate junctures in the chapters that follow). 45
Chapter Structure
To achieve the stated aims of the dissertation, the second and third chapters further refine the boundaries of analysis by elaborating and developing the aforementioned concept of a ‘security community’. More specifically, the second chapter explains and clarifies the conceptual components of a security community in a manner that renders the framework more falsifiable. The primary components of the security community framework articulated by the chapter involve expanded definitions of the concepts of security and comprehensive security, integration, community and dependable expectations of peaceful change. In building on these considerations, Chapter III considers the likely processes that would contribute to the emergence of a security community. In outlining these ‘processes’ the chapter considers the role of norms, socialisation, trust, predictability, social‐identity theory (SIT), multilateralism, globalisation, nation‐building and the ‘internal consolidation of the state’.
Given the considerations raised by the conceptual framework in chapters two and three, together with the nature of the investigative tasks to the study, Chapter IV commences by providing an historical synopsis of the nature of inter‐community interaction and the extent of homogeneity that existed between the communities of Southeast Asia during the pre‐ colonial era. The chapter then briefly comments on the impact of colonialism, the inter‐ state and domestic volatility that followed independence, and the raison d’être behind eventual attempts to cooperate under the umbrella of multilateral arrangements. Chapter V continues the historical synopsis by outlining the performance of ASEAN from its inception to the immediate years that followed the end of the Cold War. In so doing, the chapter considers the Corregidor Affair, the turbulent relations that followed Singapore’s ejection from the Federation of Malaysia, and the third Indochina War. In the context of specific initiatives within ASEAN, the chapter also reviews the Bali Concord, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), and the implications of membership expansion. 46
While Chapter V finishes with the critique of ASEAN’s norms and modus operandi, Chapter VI builds on this discussion by assessing how Myanmar’s membership has challenged the continued salience of ASEAN’s norms (alternatively known as the ‘ASEAN way’). Long‐term instability within Myanmar combined with a complete disregard for the human rights of its citizens led some members of ASEAN’s political elite to challenge the ASEAN way with alternative suggestions such as constructive intervention. The chapter also considers recent developments including a 2005‐6 crisis regarding Myanmar’s scheduled chairmanship of ASEAN and the subsequent impact such an event would have on the Association’s international stature. Likewise, Chapter VII considers some alternative contemporary issues that have acted to challenge the modus operandi of ASEAN including the 1997 forest fires in Indonesia (known as the ‘haze’) and the economic crisis that occurred in the same year. These events also impeded cooperation within ASEAN and negatively affected (already problematic) relations between some of the ASEAN member‐states. In continuing an analysis of the contemporary challenges to afflict ASEAN, the chapter also considers territorial disputes over the South China Sea and the Sulawesi Sea together with the continued challenge of domestic insurgencies and the issue of terrorism that is interdependent with such ethic, religious and ideological disputes.
Chapter VIII brings together much of the previous analysis by considering how the combination of ASEAN’s history and contemporary challenges eventually contributed to an increased desire, within some of the ASEAN states, for deeper cooperation, institutionalisation and integration. While such reforms were initially limited to ‘declaratory statements’ regarding economic cooperation and integration, by the late 1990s some of the political elite attempted to implement conflict resolution procedures in the shape of the ASEAN Troika and agreement over the rules and procedures for the operation of the High Council. While ASEAN failed to institutionalise legally binding mechanisms for conflict resolution (defined in the next chapter), the chapter outlines how attempts to implement normative and political reform in ASEAN were reinvigorated in more recent times. Aside from commenting on the proposal for a security community and the related plans for the implementation of an ASEAN charter, the chapter most significantly critiques the perceptual and behavioural challenges to a security community as revealed by the survey and interview 47
data. The analysis in the final two sections of the chapter also includes an examination of the level of trust, affinity, interaction, and knowledge between the communities and political elite of the ASEAN states.
While Chapter IX, the final substantive chapter, returns to the issue of Myanmar, this time the focus of the analysis is primarily limited to the nature of the security, economic and social environment within the country and the actual and potential implications to the security of its ASEAN neighbours. In order to contextualise the analysis, the chapter commences with a brief analysis of the history of Myanmar and how it has contributed to ethnic conflict and the entrenchment of a military dictatorship that continues to commit grotesque human rights violations on a systemic basis. The chapter then outlines the nature of these human rights abuses and follows with an assessment regarding the prospects for internally driven political reform. An understanding of the prospects for reform is important as the section that follows outlines several traditional and non‐traditional security threats that have afflicted the ASEAN states because of domestic instability in Myanmar. Given the definitional components to a security community discussed in the next chapter, the final section considers how the survival of the military dictatorship in Myanmar has been sustained through various alliances, trade, and aid from other ASEAN and non‐ASEAN states. In the context of these bilateral relationships, the chapter more thoroughly considers the exploitative relationships between Myanmar and Thailand as well as between Myanmar and China. As will be demonstrated, Myanmar presents the greatest challenge to ASEAN’s goal to become a security community in the future.
Concerning the concluding chapter (Chapter X), the critical nature of the assessment has been invited by the relatively high and ambitious benchmark set by ASEAN in its declaration to forge an ASEAN community. The disparaging disposition of the analysis has also been influenced by the dissertation’s investigative tasks and, most significantly, the desire to uphold a meaningful and falsifiable definition of a security community as envisioned by Karl Deutsch half a century ago. Consequently, and to satisfy the definitional requirements of a security community, the analysis reveals that the nature of the international relations between the ASEAN states fall noticeably short of an integrated security community that 48
would enjoy dependable expectations of peaceful change. To the contrary, continued distrust, animosity, competitive inter‐state relations, institutional and economic divides, and traditional and non‐traditional security threats have extensively troubled the character of the member state’s relations (and their communities). All of these considerations, as elaborated through chapters four to nine, culminate in a situation where there is little to no sense of community between the either the political elite, or the citizens, of the ASEAN states. While the extent of economic development and the level of security within the ASEAN states (with the notable exception of Myanmar) has improved since the Association’s inception, in the event that the ASEAN states pursue genuine political, security, and socio‐ cultural integration, then it will take at least several decades before the member states will be able to attain the status of a security community.
49
Chapter II The Conceptual Foundations for a Southeast Asian Security Community
In order to develop an ability to assess the likely challenges to ASEAN reaching its stated goals this chapter seeks to outline the definitional components of the security community concept. The developments in the framework offered by this chapter, together with the next chapter (the second substantive theory chapter), will seek to redevelop the framework in a manner that overcomes much of the negative critique that security community analysis has received in the context of Southeast Asia. Further, the attempt by this chapter to provide strong and clearly defined benchmarks for assessing the existence of a security community assists in carrying out the first investigative task in the study, that is, determining which characterisation of ASEAN best fits the phenomena. In other words, by understanding what ASEAN is not, it is easier to assess what ASEAN is within Chapter X – the concluding chapter of the dissertation.
The approach taken by this chapter also assists in satisfying the goals of the second investigative task that aims to reconceptualise the security community framework in order not only to understand the obstacles to security community formation in Southeast Asia, but also to ascertain how best to overcome the obstacles raised by the empirical analysis. Undertaking this approach is important because, while the concept of a security community is a specialist term within the scholarly literature, its ‘definition and usage must be convincing in its own right’.112 As Laurie Nathan contends, poor usage of the term in some of the recent literature has stripped the concept of any specific meaning.113 Therefore, while this chapter focuses on what is necessary for a coherent definition of a security community, Chapter III, in turn, will reinforce the second investigative task by developing a
112 Nathan, "Domestic Instability and Security Communities," p.278.
113 Ibid: pp.278 and 293. 50
theory of the processes behind the emergence of a security community. This approach has the benefit of providing policy‐makers with some wide‐ranging insights on the types of strategies to be implemented in the future in order to support the ASEAN goal of a security community. The theoretical foundations of both chapters two and three will then be tested throughout the remaining empirical components to the dissertation.
Part A: The Conceptual Pillars to a Security Community
Bearing in mind the core meaning of a security community (where war is no long envisaged as a possibility within the interstate relations of an identified grouping), Figure 2.1 reflects the proposition that certain key components are central to assessing the existence of a security community and that they are each interdependent with one another. As the term ‘security community’ suggests, and as illustrated by the diagram, two of the primary components to the framework are the key terms ‘security’ and ‘community’. A security community also involves the less obvious, though equally important (primary) components of integration and dependable expectations of peaceful change. This section will commence with a discussion of the role and application of the terms ‘security’ and ‘community’ followed by a consideration of ‘integration’ and the threshold test of the existence of a security community, namely, ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’. Each of these conceptual and empirical components is interdependent with one another and therefore requires detailed explanations and qualifications that will continue to be reinforced throughout the dissertation. However, and before moving into a descriptive analysis of the definitional components of a security community, the section will commence with a brief overview and critique of two versions of a security community found in the scholarly literature, namely, pluralistic and amalgamated security communities. As will be seen, the study’s departure from the generic distinctions made between pluralism and amalgamation within the literature also opens the window of opportunity for other conceptual and theoretical developments later in this chapter. 51
Figure 2.1: The Push/Pull Factors in the Creation of a Security Community
Security
Integration Dependable Integration
Community
Source: Compiled by author
Security Communities: Pluralistic, Amalgamated or Integrated?
According to the scholarly literature, there are two types of a security community, an amalgamated security community, and a pluralistic security community.114 Both categories maintain the notion of dependable expectations of peaceful change, but an amalgamated security community is said to exist where a group of states (e.g. Australia or the United States) formally unify and establish formal organisations, associations, or political institutions.115 By contrast, a pluralistic security community exists where states preserve their sovereignty.116 According to the opinion of Kacowicz the distinction between amalgamation and pluralism is crucial because in ‘logical terms, we can envision a situation of amalgamation without integration (i.e., without a sense of community), as in a nation‐state torn apart by civil war’.117
114 Adler and Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective.", Kacowicz, "Regionalization, Globalization, and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent or Overlapping?"
115 Kacowicz, "Regionalization, Globalization, and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent or Overlapping?" p.542.
116 Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience, p.6.
117 Kacowicz, "Regionalization, Globalization, and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent or Overlapping?" p.541. 52
However, is it possible to have an ‘amalgamated security community’ in the absence of integration? A nation‐state torn apart by civil war is no longer a nation‐state and neither does it have an overarching sense of ‘security’ or ‘community’. If amalgamation is a synonym for empirical institutionalisation and institutionalism can be considered a result of the integration of political and economic processes (defined further below), then the distinction is superfluous and therefore unnecessary to make.
While the preservation of sovereignty remains important to states, fifty years on from Deutsch’s work, the processes of globalisation and integration of the international economy have penetrated the sovereignty of all states to one degree or another. As a potential response to the ‘insecurity’ posed by these modern processes, some states have already started to pool their sovereignty through institutionalisation and multilateral arrangements (such as the European Union) to buffer against such uncertainties. Further, if the analysis of amalgamated security communities is to be limited simply to examples like the US or Australia (the latter was initially a collection of semi‐sovereign colonies) then this provides little enlightenment in terms of theoretical prediction or the ability to connect the theory to challenges worthy of empirical observation.118 Therefore, the evolutionary process of security communities is better characterised as a shift from pluralism (at one level of integration) towards amalgamation (at an even higher level of integration). In other words, and as will be further elaborated later in the chapter, this study does not consider the two labels as separate events, but rather, as different characterisations along the continuums of comprehensive integration – economic, political and socio‐cultural.
Given the aforementioned considerations, this study dismisses Adler and Barnett’s definition that a ‘pluralistic’ security community is ‘…a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change’ as
118 The problematic nature of this bifurcated approach is indicated the disappearance of the term ‘amalgamated security community’ from the scholarly literature except in as far as reviews of the literature are concerned. As Laurie Nathan states, amalgamated security communities ‘… are now largely ignored in the literature and unlikely to occur in practice…’ Nathan, "Domestic Instability and Security Communities," p.289. 53
too restricted.119 To the contrary, the study proposes that a ‘security community’ is more comprehensively defined as transnational grouping of two or more states whose sovereignty is increasingly amalgamated and whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change. The structure of this definition deliberately avoids Adler’s use of the word ‘region’ as it risks invoking confusion with several theories such as Buzan’s ‘regional security complex’ framework120 or Thompson’s ‘regional subsystem’s theory’.121 A security community does not require the existence of a geographical region but, rather, it can exist between just two or more states, such as the security community of Australia and New Zealand;122 Australia, New Zealand and Singapore;123 or the United States and Canada.124 In other words, and while a security community might most logically occur between states that share contiguous borders, a security community exists wherever the ‘relations’ between two or more states can be described as a stable peace – where the possibility of war is unforeseeable. In order to satisfy the requirements for this state‐of‐affairs dependable expectations of peaceful change must of necessity exist throughout the territorial boundaries and communities of the collection of states characterised to be a security community. A more detailed explanation of the meaning of these terms is provided below.
Security
In the traditional sense, the concept of security applied exclusively to the absence of a military threat to a sovereign state. Consistent with the contemporary approach to security
119 Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," p.30.
120 Buzan, People, States and Fear, p.190, Buzan, "The Southeast Asian Security Complex," pp.1-16.
121 Thompson, "The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and Propositional Inventory," p.101., cited in Ayoob, "From Regional System to Regional Order," p.249. Nevertheless, where the members of a security community are not contiguous then it is suggested that the security community will be forged in the midst of a core of power such as the security community that exists between Australia and the United States (with the US representing the dominant ‘integrator’).
122 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, p.20.
123 Interview with Kwa Chong Guan, IDSS (Singapore), 5 December 2001.
124 Buzan, People, States and Fear, pp.114-115. 54
as ‘human security’,125 Adler and Barnet broadened security to include ‘economic, environmental, and social welfare concerns’.126 By contrast, Raimo Vayrynen criticises this approach and applies a narrow, traditional definition. Vayrynen has a point in arguing that a broad definition of security encompassing non‐traditional security matters could destabilise the Deutschian framework and its application. That is, should a broad definition apply, there would be difficulty in characterising a community of states after such events as a vis major (i.e., a plague or environmental disaster). This neo‐liberalist approach could result in a security community that is existent one week, nonexistent the next, and back again the week after. In light of this problem, Vayrynen defines security in the following terms:
[As a] low past, present and future probability of using serious coercive force between or within nations. Coercion can be both military and economic in nature as both of them can inflict major damage and pain on the targeted people. Peace is broken, and the security community unrealised in the region, if people are subjected to physical destruction and suffering. In other words, peace and security mean, ultimately, freedom from coercion and its threats.127
As the events that took place on September 11 have illustrated, terrorism now has an elevated capacity to impact on ‘peace and security’. Its existence as a ‘serious coercive force between or within nations’ can exist at a level that is both military and economic in nature. Thus, not only did the terrorist destruction of the Twin Towers in New York critically impact upon the economy of the US (and shortly thereafter the economies of the globe), but it also resulted in a change to US foreign policy and a direct military response that was eventually targeted against the political elite of Afghanistan (who were accused of harbouring the terrorists responsible for the attacks) and then later, the political elite of Iraq (who were accused of not only harbouring and supporting terrorists but also of developing weapons of
125 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, pp.4-7.
126 Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," p.4.
127 Emphasis by author. Raimo Vayrynen, "Stable Peace through Security Communities," in Stable Peace among Nations, ed. Arie Kacowicz, et al. (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), p.112. 55
mass destruction and of responsibility for gross human rights violations).128 Therefore, it is contended that terrorism should be characterised as falling within the category of ‘traditional/hard‐security’. Finally, one further clarifying point should be made in relation to the discussion of traditional security: when addressing traditional security issues with a present or future probability of leading to the use of serious coercive force between the states of a community, then the empirical circumstances relevant to such traditional security threats are referred to as conflict initiators. This qualification is made to provide further clarity in the way the various terms are used throughout the remainder of the study.
The above discussion does not intend to suggest that broader non‐traditional and/or comprehensive security approaches pertaining to the domestic and inter‐state levels should be dismissed altogether. To the contrary, and in contrast with other security community frameworks, the above definition of security should be utilised as a threshold test – herein referred to as ‘traditional security’. In circumstances where this threshold test is not satisfied then such an occurrence would present an absolute bar to finding that a security community exists between a given collections of states. However, once the application of this test has been satisfied, or under circumstances where such a test cannot be clearly applied, the broader definition of ‘comprehensive security’ (which encompasses non‐ traditional considerations in addition to traditional security), can then be subjectively applied to assist in an assessment over whether or not a security community does in fact exist and, following such an assessment, to determine how such a security community should be characterised.129 In other words, while the continuation of traditional security threats bars a finding of a security community; the absence of these threats does not ipso facto translate into a finding that a security community does in fact exist – a final
128 In other words, what the US defined as an ‘enemy state’ was broadened to matters beyond terrorism whilst still in the context of the ‘war on terrorism’.
129 As Part C will explain, there are different tiers and characterisations of security communities based on the sum- total of integration. These include the nascent, ascendant and mature levels. While Deutsch provided one of the first scholarly publications that evidenced the need to amalgamate ‘political systems, both national and international’, into a single framework of analysis, Alger F. Chadwick was the first academic to explicitly argue and formulate a case for this merger, see: Chadwick Alger, F., "Comparison of Intranational and International Politics," The American Political Science Review 57, no. 2 (1963): p.408. 56
determination of this question requires an analysis of the broad spectrum of non‐traditional security issues, inter alia,130 faced by the grouping of states under examination.
For the purpose of analysing both traditional and non‐traditional security issues, this study applies the umbrella concept of comprehensive security, as it is a concept indigenous to the region of Southeast Asia and was adopted by ASEAN on the 1st of August 1995 at the second meeting of the ARF.131 Reflecting various developments in Critical Security Studies (CSS),132 ‘comprehensive security’ is defined by the Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia‐Pacific (CSCAP) as ‘the pursuit of sustainable security in all fields (personal, political, economic, social, cultural, military and environmental) in both the domestic and external spheres, essentially through cooperative means’.133 Personal security is taken to mean freedom from oppression, exploitation, poverty and adequate medical attention; social security exists with the absence of drug trading, people smuggling, and general transnational crime; and cultural security is the community’s ability to refract an externally driven dilution of customs and practices (e.g. through globalisation).134 Reference to domestic security in this study is
130 Here the study only highlights the remaining ‘non-traditional security issues’ to keep within the context of the section heading, namely ‘security’. Nonetheless, other issues relevant to the analysis would include the components relevant to the community component of a security community such as norms, rules, and identity. These components are discussed in detail within later sections of this chapter and in the chapter that follows.
131 ASEAN, Chairman's Statement the Second ASEAN Regional Forum, Brunei Darussalam, 1 August 1995 ([cited 19 August 2006]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/2106.htm.
132 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, pp.3-4.
133 "Concepts of Comprehensive Security and Cooperative Security," CSCAP Newsletter, no. 6 (1997): pp.1-2. The choice of this organizing concept has been made partly because of its analytical integrity, its adaptability (particularly for the purposes of security community frameworks) and its application to the states of Southeast Asia. Interview with Bantarto Bandoro, CSIS (Jakarta), 26 November 2001. At the second meeting of the ARF on the 1st of August 1995, the ARF specifically referred to, and adopted, the notion of ‘comprehensive security’ and the Chair’s statement recognized that it included ‘not only military aspects but also political, economic, social and others. Peter King, "Australia and Southeast Asia: 'Comprehensive Engagement' or Marriage of Convenience?" in Peace Building in the Asia Pacific Region: Perspectives from Japan and Australia, ed. Peter & Kibata King, Yoichi (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1996), p.29.
134 "Concepts of Comprehensive Security and Cooperative Security," p.2. The broadening of security and the definitions of the various components to comprehensive security are similar to, and were possibly influenced by, the definition of ‘human security’ provided by the United Nations Human Development Report in 1994. United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.23. See also: Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, p.4. 57
taken to mean the sum of all factors that stem from the categories of both ‘personal’ and ‘social’ security. However, this study deliberately excludes cultural security as an element of domestic security as it is contended that, aside from raising an entirely separate debate (beyond the scope of this study), globalist forces are making it an increasingly difficult, if not impossible, ‘ideal’ to sustain.
Because the end goal of a security community is to bar the possibility of transnational conflict, much of the security community literature has neglected economic and security issues pertaining to the domestic and international tiers of analysis.135 For example, the multifaceted importance of the domestic realm was aptly highlighted through the security challenges raised by the 1997 economic crisis and, in particular, the domestic insecurity that ensued within Indonesia – discussed further in Chapter IV. As Katzenstein and Sil note, employing a broader understanding of security that ‘focuses on the primacy of economic growth and its interconnectedness with social stability, societal order, and regional peace and stability’ is in line with a ‘regionwide consensus’ and the empirical evidence proffered by the region since the end of the Cold War.136 Laurie Nathan, in turn, aptly summarises why domestic issues are considered an inseparable component of security community analysis in the following manner:
Domestic instability in the form of large‐scale violence precludes the emergence or existence of a security community in a number of ways. It
135 For example, Arie Kacowicz states the following: ‘The literature on pluralistic security communities does not address extensively the possibility of conflict and clashes between or among regions or communities. It focuses upon peaceful change and peace at the intraregional level, though it ignores the interregional, international, and global levels’. Kacowicz, "Regionalization, Globalization, and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent or Overlapping?" p.543.
136 Katzenstein and Sil suggest further that whilst originally spearheaded by Japan and the ASEAN-Six (Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Brunei), an acceptance of the interconnectivity of security has ‘spread, most importantly, to China and Vietnam…’ Peter J. Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, "Rethinking Asian Security: A Case for Analytical Eclecticism," in Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency, ed. J. J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson (Stanford University Press, 2004), p.2. Vayrynen adds that ‘internal peace must be also one of … [a security community’s] defining characteristics especially if internal instability threatens to have negative security externalities’. Vayrynen, Stable Peace through Security Communities? Steps Towards Theory-Building (cited). The Asian Dialogue Society also supports a similar view with the suggestion that peace is dependent on human security and ‘peace can be sustained and made sustainable only if there is freedom from fear and freedom from want’. "Quality of Partnership: Myanmar, ASEAN and the World Community," p.6. 58
generates tension and suspicion between states, preventing the forging of trust and common identity. It can also lead to cross‐border violence [and in the very least] … other states cannot exclude the possibility of spill‐over violence in the future and cannot be certain about the reliability of unstable regimes. In the national context, instability seriously undermines the security of citizens and the state. The inhabitants of a country wracked by violence cannot plausibly be said to live in a security community. A security community should therefore be defined to include dependable expectations of peaceful domestic change. Based on this definition, structural instability, and authoritarian rule could be viewed as further obstacles to the formation of these communities.137
While traditional intra‐mural security threats constitute the threshold test to the existence of a security community and, in agreement with Deutsch, security communities are ultimately built from within;138 extra‐mural security threats present a point of relevance in as far as they test the degree of convergence in identity (e.g. collective identity) and, as will be demonstrated, this identity is a defining element to the existence of a community. Secondly, and as Ganesan notes, the actions and policies of external powers and institutions can have a unifying role where ‘…it is interesting … that much of ASEAN’s ideological convergence derived from external forces and structures’.139 Chapter IV, for example, will highlight how the perceived threat of communism was a unifying force that eventually contributed to the formation of the ASEAN‐5.140 In the absence of this inter‐mural threat, the history of the region could have been very different. Likewise, and as Vayrynen contends, military alliances and/or other security coalitions which are formed to address perceived security externalities, ‘reflect in the first place, the differences between or
137 Nathan, "Domestic Instability and Security Communities," p.293.
138 Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience, pp.156-157. Check this page number.
139 N. Ganesan, "ASEAN: A Community Stalled?" in The Asia-Pacific: A Region in Transition, ed. Jim Rolfe (Hawaii: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), p.129. Ganesan later adds that ‘powerful perception of threat’ externally ‘have made ASEAN cohere better’, Ibid, p.132.
140 The term ASEAN-5 denotes the original members of ASEAN being Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand. As Emmers states, ‘The motivation for ASEAN was based not only on regional reconciliation. The Association should also be viewed as a response to an advancing communist threat in Indochina and a related fear of internal communist insurgencies’. Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.13. See also: Vayrynen, Stable Peace through Security Communities? Steps Towards Theory-Building (cited). 59
commonality of its member’s values and identities’.141 In other words, the consideration of exogenous challenges assists in an assessment of the degree to which foreign policy interests have converged and such convergence reflects how integrated the identities of actors at the elite level are. This approach also provides a conceptual linkage between empirical assessments of ‘security’ and ‘community’ that, in turn, helps to facilitate a far deeper and richer level of insight in relation to the driving forces behind integration (or disassociation) between states.142
From the inception of the security community framework, there was an implicit acceptance of the continued role of ‘elements’ of the realist paradigm.143 For example, and in relation to Deutsch, his focus on state relations and the complete absence of war or any possibility thereof implies the realist emphasis on the pursuit of traditional security (high politics). An example of one factor incorporated by Deutsch, but traditionally applied by realist scholars, was the role of power – a central tenet of the realist paradigm.144 In Deutsch’s original 1957 investigation he suggested that it was ‘larger, stronger, more politically, administratively,
141 Vayrynen, "Stable Peace through Security Communities," p.119. See also: Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security," in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp.60-63.
142 For example, and in the case of ASEAN and the South China Sea, how the ASEAN states unite or divide over a potential China threat (real or imagined), would test the level of solidarity, reciprocity and loyalty. The ASEAN states can no longer claim to stand in the same pair of shoes if consensus over a single foreign policy fails the moment certain national interests of external powers collide with that of one or more other member states. Additionally, the use of the word ‘loyalty’ has not been applied in security community frameworks to date. It is contended however, that loyalty directly stems from a sense of community; that we are the same (this we-feeling) and we are obligated to one another.
143 This is not to suggest, however, that he wholeheartedly embraced all the contentions offered by the realist school of thought. For example, the realists contend that the problem of uncertainty can never be overcome to the extent necessary to eliminate mistrust and the fear of war. However, the security community examples of the US and Canada, Western Europe and the Nordic states have without a doubt rebutted such an argument. As Sean Shore states, ‘It is simply unimaginable to most observers … that the two North American countries could fight a war over any issues that are likely to arise. As 5,000 miles (and 125 years) of undefended border attest, neither side regards the other as even a potential military threat, despite the fact that interstate anarchy supposedly makes war and ever-present possibility’. Sean M. Shore, "No Fences Make Good Neighbours: The Development of the Canadian-US Security Communities, 1871-1940," in Security Communities, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.333.
144 P.A. Reynolds, An Introduction to International Relations (London: 1980), p.117. 60
economically, and educationally advanced political units [that] were found to form the cores of strength around which in most cases the integrative processes developed’.145 Likewise, the concept of power can also be considered relevant in the context of analysis of the degree to which ASEAN matters in its ability to shape the behaviour of both intra and extra‐ regional actors.146 For the purpose of this study, the power of a system of states, a state, a regime or a transnational community (such as a terrorist organisation) is defined by the total combination of military and economic capacity, as each of these can be equally destructive when used for personal gain.147 In line with the constructivist (and security community) contention, power can also be both tangible (material) and intangible in nature (behavioural and ideational).148
The concept of a ‘balance of power’ can be distinguished between (a) the balance of power as a system; and (b), the balance of power as a policy. As a policy, the focus is on deliberate attempts of a state (or states) to prevent the hegemony of another state or a combination of states. As a system, the focus is on the types of interactions that tend to limit or curb hegemony resulting in peaceful equilibrium.149 As opposed to the work of Emmers,150 this
145 Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience, p.38
146 Sarah Eaton and Richard Stubbs, "Is ASEAN Powerful? Neo-Realist Versus Constructivist Approaches to Power in Southeast Asia," The Pacific Review 19, no. 2 (2006): p.137.
147 Reynolds, An Introduction to International Relations, p.117.
148 Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? , p.25. However, and as Waltz articulates, states actors, when seeking power, are in fact seeking to maximise security rather than the other way around. As cited in: Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.42. One example of the role of intangible power is aptly illustrated by the case of the Vietnam War. The United States has overwhelming superiority in terms of tangible military power ‘and used virtually all military means short of nuclear war to bring about a North Vietnamese withdrawal’. Yet, and in spite of its tangible power, the Vietnamese were able to tip of scales of overall power in their favour by drawing a massive volume of intangible power. In the Vietnamese case, their intangible power was both ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’. The positive intangible power consisted, inter alia, of being able to seize and utilise massive amounts of national will or nationalism. The indirect-intangible power was provided by the US through the ‘deteriorating support for the war in the United States and among Washington’s allies’ and the Vietnamese were able to achieve politically what they could not achieve militarily: governmental self-determination and the expulsion of American force’. Walter. S. Jones, The Logic of International Relations, 5th ed. (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1985), p.246.
149 Ernst B. Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda," World Politics 5, no. 4 (1953): pp.442-477. 61
study applies the balance of power theory in the systemic sense (rather than as a policy). The degree to which power balancing takes place on an intra‐mural basis is in turn taken as prima facie evidence of the type of threat perceptions and lack of trust that are barriers to the existence of a security community. As will be seen by the ensuing discussions of ‘community’: the greater the contradiction in strategic perspective then the greater the divergence in the perceived interests of elites and also in foreign policy (the community component) and the lower the level of political integration – all major indicators of the existence of a security community.
Figure 2.2: The Security Dilemma at Low Integration
St a t e St a t e A B
Sense of Reciprocal Insecur it y decrease in St at e B ’ s Sense of Se c u r i t y
Increase in St at e A ’ s Military and/or Eco n o m i c Cap ac i t y
Se nse o f se cur it y
Source: Compiled by author
As illustrated by Figure 2.2 above, under circumstances where states seek a balance of power at the intra‐mural level, a power and security dilemma arises where increases to one state’s economic and military capacity (whether inadvertent or by intention) leave other states comparatively less secure. While this argument is based on the notion of systemic anarchy,151 the argument is also based on the notion that states tend to compete, rather
150 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.41.
151 Evans and Newnham, eds., The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, p.494. 62
than cooperate, for the pursuit of security.152 By contrast, in the case of Southeast Asia, various concepts employed by the realists relating to the ‘pursuit of power’, the ability to exercise and exert power and influence, and the related concept of a ‘balance of power’, remains applicable at both the regional and sub‐regional levels. Because there is a low level of integration (as later chapters will substantiate) there continue to exist ‘persistent feelings of mistrust, bilateral disputes and contradictory strategic perspectives’.153 As Sheldon Simon states:
Realism [or self help] will continue as an important analytical framework for understanding Southeast Asian security because individual states still have unresolved conflicts with each other and because no consensus exists whether external threats to regional order exist or who they may be.154
Despite the rhetoric of ASEAN that ‘implicitly rejects balance of power politics’,155 and as partially illustrated in later chapters, actual power balancing can be observed or be seen to be pursued in Southeast Asia.156 Nonetheless, and in loosely following the contentions of Emmers (vis‐à‐vis cooperative security associations), this study places certain caveats on the realist notion of anarchy by contextualising the theory with the requirement that in order to satisfy the defining characteristics of a security community there should exist a substantial number of cooperative security arrangements addressing transnational security problems – if and when they exist.157 The possibility of shifting the behaviour of the ASEAN member
152 Griffiths and O'Callaghan, International Relations: The Key Concepts, p.291.
153 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.6.
154 Sheldon W. Simon, "International Relations Theory and Southeast Asia," Pacific Review 8, no. 1 (1995): p.7.
155 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.6.
156 Interviews with K.S. Nathan, ISEAS (Singapore), 26 May 2004 and 6 December 2001. In the context of Singapore and its forward defence plan along with the country’s bilateral relations: Interview with Dato Mohamed Jawhar bin Hassan, ISIS Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur), 13 December 2001.
157 It is important to note that Emmers’ reference was in fact to cooperative security associations. As discussed in Chapter 1, cooperative security associations exist where states cooperate with, and take into account, the security needs of the other states in the grouping (association). However, and for the purpose of the analogy made here, this component of a cooperative security association is compatible with the convergence of interests and long-term cooperation necessary to the existence of a security community. 63
states towards more cooperative and less competitive behaviour is discussed in detail later in this chapter.
In relation to cooperative security and its connection with, or role in, a security community, Acharya has contended that security community frameworks are more about the prevention of war rather than the development of security cooperation between states.158 Yet the European Union, as the only multilateral security community in the world (though still not ‘mature’)159 has sought security cooperation as well as formal organisations, associations, and political institutions in its pursuit of security – both military and economic.160 While the processes taking place within the European Union are a consequence of a multitude of factors and motivations, the greater interdependence that has stemmed from integration, particularly economic interdependence, has also dramatically increased both the material and ideational costs of future armed conflict.161 Hypothetical examples of cooperative security evidencing integration include the existence of multi‐state naval operations to combat piracy in the Malacca Straits as well as regional cooperation to inhibit the production and movement of illicit drugs.
158 Amitav Acharya, Re: Research Trip to Singapore - an Investigation of Security Community Framework in Southeast Asia [E-mail] (2001 [cited 21 September 2001]). In this correspondence Amitav Acharya states that he is not sure whether the ‘…security approach will hold for piracy. Its more about avoiding war than developing specific forms of security cooperation…’
159 As Ole Weaver contends, and as was recently evidenced by the divisions within its member states of the 2003 intervention in Iraq, ‘the state model still dominates and national identities differ; as a result, the West European security community is not yet full-fledged’. Cited in: Vayrynen, Stable Peace through Security Communities? Steps Towards Theory-Building (cited).
160 Meanwhile, the Bali Concord II also outlines greater political and security cooperation as a major goal in establishing a security community by 2020. Further, a tangible example of actual security cooperation would include the MALSINDO joint policing of piracy in the Malacca Straits. Launch of Trilateral Coordinated Patrols - MALSINDO Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrol [Government Press Release] (MINDEF, 2004 [cited 21 August 2007]); available from http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2004/jul/20jul04_nr.html.
161 For example, see: Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins, "The Study of Interdependence and Conflict: Recent Advances, Open Questions, and Directions for Future Research," Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 6 (2001): pp.834-835. In relation to the combined effects of economic interdependence and economic freedom see: Erik Gartzke, "Economic Freedom and Peace," in Economic Freedom of the World: 2005 Annual Report, ed. James Gwartney and Robert Lawson (Canada: Fraser Institute, 2005), pp.29-30. On the connection between interdependence and the security dilemma see: Barry R. J. Jones, Globalisation and Interdependence in the International Political Economy (London: Pinter Publishers, 1995). 64
Community
While a ‘community’ can be simply defined as a ‘human collectivity that is constituted by shared norms and understanding among its members’,162 a review of the scholarly literature reveals at least three characteristics to emerge from the formation of a community.163 According to Karklins, the first and most important component is the existence of a collective or shared identity. The formation of a collective identity translates into a collection of positive images that are projected towards others within the group.164 The component of ‘identity’ is defined as a sense of belonging to some type of citizenship or population (e.g. a nation) and this sense of ‘belonging’ may also exist at any level including the local, domestic, state, regional and global.165 It relates to a ‘we‐feeling’ (or we‐ness) where, in a psychological sense, people consider themselves to be all part of one group. In other words, if identity can be broadly understood as ‘understanding oneself in relation to others’166 it follows that a ‘community’s identity is predicated on relationships with others’.167 As a concept, collective identity formation includes the belief that an identity can be socially constructed. The existence of a collective identity results in the development of common meanings involving an inter‐subjective and transnational understanding. Common meanings can be understood as the creation of a ‘common reference world’ where there exist common actions, celebrations, and feelings. Likewise, a transnational understanding provides a common language to communicate a social reality and a ‘common understanding
162 Vayrynen, Stable Peace through Security Communities? Steps Towards Theory-Building (cited).
163 Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," p.31, Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? , p.31.
164 While stated in a somewhat different context this term was utilised by James Cotton in: Cotton, "Regional Order and the over-Determination of Regional Institutions in the Asia-Pacific", p.7.
165 Rasma Karklins, "The Concept of Collective Identity" (paper presented at the Directorate of Communication and Research, Strasbourg, 17-18 April 2001), p.1.
166 Michael Barnett, "Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel's Road to Oslo," European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 1 (1999): p.9. Cited in: Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? , p.18.
167 Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? , p.18. This latter point is discussed in detail within the next chapter. 65
of certain norms’168 or, in other words, a framework for ‘meaningful communication’.169 This sense of ‘belonging’ is central to the formation of a collective identity.170
The second and co‐dependent factor in the construction of a community is the requirement that the interaction occurring within a community is direct and numerous in its types of setting.171 Labelling this the transactionalist approach, Deutsch utilised a wide range of indicators that not only measured the degree of integration at the communal level, but also illustrated the various processes that propelled the formation of a transnational collective identity. These included ‘international trade, mail flows, student exchanges, and travel’. A modern version of this approach would include the internet as well as such things as email, MSN Messenger and various other electronic discussion forums/chat communities.172 More recently, scholars have variously referred to, and built upon, the process of transactionalism through the concepts of socialisation and social learning. The processes of socialisation and social learning (transactionalism) nurture the behaviour of individuals and communities to encourage conformity to social expectations as represented by the collective identity of the community or state,173 that is, they learn the way of life and culture within their community.174 At the elite/state level, state actors internalise norms of appropriate behaviour and this, in part, governs how states interact with one another.175 In contrast to
168 Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," p.31.
169 Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators?
170 Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," p.31.
171 Ibid.
172 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, p.32.
173 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p.17.
174 Joel Charon, The Meaning of Sociology: A Reader (Englewood, CA: Prentice Hall, 1987), pp.63-69.
175 Rikard Bengtsson, "The Cognitive Dimension of Stable Peace," in Stable Peace among Nations, ed. Arie M. Kacowicz, et al. (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), pp.99-100. See also: Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," pp.44-45, Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? , pp.24-26. 66
Adler and Barnett, it is argued that there does not need to be proximity in the various contacts and transactions that lead to socialisation. This is due to the relatively accelerated process of globalisation and the partial elimination of time and space. As a result, there has been a growing recognition of the fact that a community can exist over increasing distances to the extent that there might develop a ‘virtual’ community or perhaps even, eventually, one single global community.176 For the time being, however, it is possible to imagine a kind of Wallerstein‐type core and periphery in the existence of community at the global and regional levels.177 This would occur where the core, represented by the industrialised world for example, has access to the type of community building technologies such as internet and email that would enable it to form a common identity leading to the creation of a community. By contrast, the periphery, represented by the still underdeveloped world or ‘global south’, embodies a fragmented community where globalisation has merely increased the divide between and within entire societies and/or communities.
Finally, the third requirement for the existence of a community is that there exists a practice of reciprocity, which not only indicates a ‘sense of long‐term interest’ – that is, knowledge of, and between, the groups within the community178 – but also involves a sense of obligation towards, and a responsibility for, the members of the community.179 These factors combine to provide a long‐term convergence in foreign and national interests. As Deutsch notes, an outcome of the existence of a community is the existence of ‘mutually successful predictions of behaviour’.180 By comparison, it is important to highlight that the
176 Ira J. Cohen, "Structuration Theory and Social Praxis," in Social Theory Today, ed. Anthony Giddens and Jonathan H. Turner (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), p.298. See also: Vayrynen, Stable Peace through Security Communities? Steps Towards Theory-Building (cited).
177 For a concise summary in relation to his work, see: Wallerstein, The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century.
178 Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," p.31.
179 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, p.32.
180 Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience, p.36. 67
existence of a community in general does not necessarily result in dependable expectations of peaceful change. That is, while there might be norms to regulate a community’s security and to foster order, there is no guarantee of a mechanism for non‐violent dispute resolution. Adler and Barnett in fact recognised that some communities could be categorised as ‘war communities’. It is dependable expectations of peaceful change that distinguish security communities from other communities.181
The framework in this study also acknowledges the existence of different levels, or tiers, of communities and seeks to understand how these tiers might propel, or distract from, the emergence of a collective identity between states and how, in succession, these communities and collective identities relate to the end goal of inter‐state security including dependable expectations of peaceful change. This is important as Deutsch himself argued that a security community includes ‘individuals’, ‘citizens’, ‘groups’, and ‘populations’.182 Thus, and for the purpose of conceptual clarity, communities can be broadly dissected into three primary levels of analysis: the elite, the middle class, and the communal level which embraces all the remaining members of the society in a given state.183 These different tiers of communities may be national or transnational in nature and can act as either a positive or a negative force in the evolution of a security community. Nonetheless, it is possible to conceptualise additional possibilities and classes of community based on ethnicity, religion and/or culture and these groupings can overlap and merge with the first three tiers of community – the elite, the bourgeoisie, and the communal categories.
181 Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," p.34.
182 Karl W. Deutsch, "Security Communities," in International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1961), pp.98-105.
183 By contrast, Alex Bellamy argues for two types of a community that can exist at the domestic and/or international levels of analysis: epistemic and transversal. Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? , p.49. Based on the empirical research conducted for this study, the dissertation argues that it is necessary to differentiate between three generalised layers of community in order to better interpret and understand the push and pull factors behind cooperation, interaction and indeed many other facets of an individual state’s behaviour. For example, the elite in government may support military rule but as Thailand once evidenced, in the absence of bourgeoisie support the status quo became unsustainable. 68
In this analysis, the study considers the role of communities (their perceptions and ideologies) at both the domestic and transnational levels.184 This is because the identity of communities within a state reflects, to a degree, the identity and (even more importantly) the interests of the state. As Keohane states:
Without a theory of interests, which requires an analysis of domestic politics, no theory of international relations can be fully adequate … Our weak current theories do not take us very far in understanding … behaviour … at the end of the Cold War … More research will have to be undertaken at the level of the state, rather than the international system’.185
By comparison, the notion of society is applied here in a relatively simple sense and is therefore included in this section rather than as an independent category. Society is defined as the entire portion of a populace that exists within the territorial boundaries of a state.186 References to community continue to apply in the Deutschian sense, but can apply to particular segments of a society whereas the dissertation’s use of the term ‘society’ possesses an inclusive rather than exclusive connotation. This qualification of the meaning behind society is necessary to layer, or tier, the dissertation’s reference to groupings and people: for example, is the dissertation referring to all the people that reside within the defined territory of a state, or is it referring to a community that may be transnational in nature? To this end, a community may exist only at the state elite level while failing to embrace the rest of society.187
184 This approach follows from the approach advocated within the Author’s MA dissertation and also advocated, in the context of identity formation, by Alex Bellamy. Ibid, p.18.
185 Robert O. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp.294-295. Cited in: Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, p.14.
186 Ian McLean, Concise Dictionary of Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.461.
187 The possibility of this occurrence was suggested by Amitav Acharya. Acharya, "Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia," pp.207-214. 69
Integration
Integration is defined as ‘the making up of a whole by adding together … the separate parts’188 or, in other words, ‘to turn previously separate units into components of a coherent system’.189 Deutsch argues that one of the central tasks of integration is the ‘maintenance of peace’190 and it is the centrality of ‘peace’ within the concept of integration that provides a direct link to the notion of a security community.191 Thus, an example of the centrality of ‘integration’ to the existence of a security community can be found in Deutsch’s references to dependable expectations of peaceful change. As outlined in the introductory chapter, by peaceful change Deutsch meant the ‘resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalised procedures, without resort to large‐scale force’.192 For social problems to be resolved by ‘institutionalised procedures’ a certain convergence of identity must first evolve in relation to the practice of how states address transnational security issues and this includes explicit and/or implicit restrictions on how, when and where a state can use coercive military and/or economic measures. Therefore, and in this context, integration is concerned with ‘how and why states voluntarily mingle, merge, and mix with their neighbours so as to lose several factual attributes of sovereignty’.193 A loss in several of the attributes of sovereignty – and the interdependence that ensues – acts to reduce the
188 William Little, H. W. Fowler, and Jessie Coulson, The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, ed. C. T. Onions, Third Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p.1088.
189 Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, 2nd ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc, 1981), p.198.
190 Deutsch also suggested three further purposes to integration and these included ‘attaining greater multipurpose capabilities’, ‘accomplishing some specific task’ and ‘gaining a new self image and role identity’. Ibid., pp.239-240.
191 Kacowicz, "Regionalization, Globalization, and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent or Overlapping?" p.12. See also: Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbors: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? , p.10. As a concept, integration laid the foundation for the study of interdependence in the 1970s. Griffiths and O'Callaghan, International Relations: The Key Concepts, p.155.
192 Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience, p.5.
193 Kacowicz, "Regionalization, Globalization, and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent or Overlapping?" pp.12- 13. 70
number of policy options that can be viewed as aggressive by increasing, inter alia, the material and ideational costs of conflict and war (which, in a circular fashion, links back to the core definition of a security community). As Zhiqun Zhu summarises from the works of Deutsch, ‘no security community, no integration’.194
In the context of Deutsch’s requirement for sufficient integration, the ‘habits’ of peaceful change should be entrenched to an extent that would preclude the declaration of a security community between states that might then form an overnight ‘alliance’, only to renege the next day.195 Therefore, and despite Adler and Barnet’s claim that integration exists at virtually any moment a group of states cease to fear or prepare for war,196 there should be a degree of consistency and evolution towards a situation of anticipated and actual peace between the nations analysed. This is reflected by Deutsch’s requirement that there needs to be dependable expectations of peaceful change.197 Given these considerations, the term ‘integration’ is better used to denote a process while the term ‘integrated’ symbolises the end result.
The process of integration ultimately causes, and/or is a consequence of, a number of empirical events.198 Such events include the gradual movement towards increased cooperation (a primary linkage to ‘security’); a gradual transfer of authority towards supranational institutions such as ASEAN199 (also linked to security and a sense of elite level community); a gradual homogenisation of values (strongly linked to the conceptual notions
194 Zhu, "Prospect for Integration in Pacific-Asia," p.510. We can also recall that the first component in Deutsch’s definition of a security community is that ‘it is a group of people which become integrated’.
195 Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," p.35.
196 Ibid.
197 Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience, p.5.
198 This is alternatively referred to as the ‘integrative process’. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, p.198.
199 This is not to advocate that such a ‘transfer’ has happened; only that ASEAN is an example of such a ‘supranational institution’. 71
of ‘community’); and finally, the coming into being of a transnational civil society (or, perhaps, eventually, a global civil society) and with it, the construction of new forms of political community – including the eventual development of the communal components of a security community as exemplified by the case of the European Union.200 Based on these considerations, the evolution of a group of states to become a security community is the process of integration whereas a group of states that are already a security community have, ipso facto, evidenced a state‐of‐affairs that can be properly defined as being near ‘integrated’.201 Thus, when a group of states and communities have become integrated then a community of states has been formed. By incorporating the community component of the framework we can also understand that the states of a grouping are integrated (and therefore a security community) when ‘there is a prevalence of mutually compatible self‐ images of the states participating in the process, up to the point of developing a common identity and mutual expectations of shared economic and security gains’.202
The concept of integration also provides a conceptual link to the empirical aspects of ‘security’ – together with the level of economic capacity that adequate security entails – because the ‘process’ of pursuing security creates the ‘outcome’ of integration for both state economies and their security apparatuses at the inter‐state/regional level. As a process, integration also provides a bridge between ‘security’ and ‘community’.203 For example, a security community cannot form without the transnational integration of the mindsets of state actors to form a largely ‘common’ viewpoint vis‐à‐vis transnational security and economic issues.204 The concept of integration is further linked to the concept
200 Griffiths and O'Callaghan, International Relations: The Key Concepts, p.155.
201 For the purpose of this study, and to narrow the list of considerations, this makes the presumption that a security community is in fact the end goal of integration. Some scholars rightly believe that a security community is a step (or more) before a level of integration that is best characterized as a single global community. The idea that the processes and stages of integration are boundless is considered further in the final section of this chapter.
202 Kacowicz, "Regionalization, Globalization, and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent or Overlapping?" p.12.
203 Evans and Newnham, eds., The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, p.253.
204 That is to say, a security community requires a convergence of interests and identity (at least at the elite level) and this links to the later discussion and definition of community formation and collective identity formation. 72
of ‘community’ because a community should be viewed as a continuation of a process of integration that moves beyond integration’s traditional boundaries through the consideration of the relationship between nation and state. Therefore, integration applies at both the material and ideational levels in an analytic sense and these two levels are virtually inseparable from each other. The various linkages between these components of the framework will be further elaborated in the next chapter.
Dependable Expectations of Peaceful Change
When a group of states subject to analysis are able (as a minimal task) to resolve the preponderance of traditional security threats, when there is sufficient integration to (a) support such security and (b) to provide the basis for a sense of community (and collective identity formation at the elite level) which, in turn, encourages economic cooperation and development (and vice versa); then it becomes possible to make a finding that there exists dependable expectations of peaceful change. As stated in the introductory chapter, Deutsch defined ‘peaceful change’ as the ‘resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalised procedures, without resort to large‐scale physical force’. In this sense, dependable expectations of peaceful change represents the defining element to a security community and thereby the end goal (and end result) of the evolutionary process of transnational integration.205
Adler and Barnett break down this final definitional component to its two companion elements, that is, ‘dependable expectations’ and ‘peaceful change’.206 The authors contend that ‘dependable expectations’ are best understood by reference to the various theories of social interaction including the existence of a collective identity. Indeed, the existence of a collective identity and feelings of mutual trust are necessary preconditions for the existence
205 The qualifying statement (‘at the regional level’) is written to suggest that integration may not stop at the security community level. As suggested at the outset of the section on integration, integration can move beyond the regional level towards a systemic global level with the possible existence of a global government and/or global community and civil society.
206 Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," p.34. 73
of dependable expectations of peaceful change.207 This belief, as opposed to the realist explanation for the absence of war, is very much a part of the constructivist paradigm and of the contentions of Deutsch, Adler and Barnet and Acharya. While accepting a continued role for their contentions on this point; the earlier mentioned discussions on security, together with an overview of the role of power in the next section, illustrate the need for a middle ground208 that also recognises the role of some of the factors central to the realist analysis, albeit subject to the caveats and qualifications stated throughout the chapter and dissertation.
The second of the companion elements to the concept is ‘peaceful change’. Adler and Barnett argue that peaceful change can be best defined as ‘neither the expectation of nor the preparation for organised violence as a means to settle interstate disputes’.209 In order to satisfy this criterion, it is assumed that states do not prepare for or even consider security actions that would or could be interpreted by others as representing a threat to another state or to a community’s traditional security. Thus, if a security community was to exist in the absence of ‘well developed strategic ties or formal alliance’ then there would at least be a ‘tacit and/or formal normative prohibitions against states settling their disputes through military means’.210 The degree, to which either strategic ties and formal alliances or normative prohibitions against conflict exist, is directly proportional to the degree of integration that subsists between and throughout the states of a community.
The existence of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), preventative diplomacy and dispute resolution procedures, assist in a finding of the conditions necessary
207 Nathan, "Domestic Instability and Security Communities," p.276.
208 As discussed in chapter one, Adler and Barnet accepted the need to take a pragmatic middle ground when they said, ‘Theories of international politics, therefore, can and should occupy a pragmatic middle ground between the view that identities and international practices cannot change, and the view that everything is possible. They should be able to blend power, interests, and pessimism with norms, a dynamic view of international politics, and moderate optimism about the possibility of structural change that enhances human interests across borders.’ Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," pp.14-15.
209 Ibid, p.34.
210 Ibid, p.58. 74
for peaceful change. CSBMs, the first category, are defined as actions which fall into one of four further subcategories: the exchange of information and/or the increasing of communication between elites in different states; the exchange of observers and/or the implementation of inspections; an established set of rules for specific types of military operations; and the application of restraints on the operation and readiness of military forces.211 It has been argued that CSBMs provide greater transparency behind government decisions and this facilitates both the process of developing trust and we‐feeling; as well as a reduction in the likelihood of armed conflict.212 Because of a heightened degree of transparency, CSBMs reduce the likelihood of elite and military level tension in the first place. CSBMs include Track‐One and Track‐Two diplomacy, both of which act to increase the number of social transactions that take place amongst the different communities in the grouping. Track‐One diplomacy refers to formal government processes and dialogue for the analysis of security problems and the preparation of policy responses. Track‐Two initiatives utilize the same process but are applied within non‐governmental or semi‐governmental fora. To put it differently, Track‐One is government whereas Track‐Two concerns strategists and academics that aim to influence and work with government.213
The second category is preventative diplomacy and this is defined as appropriate actions that are taken at a vulnerable place and time in order to ‘avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups’ with a purpose of settling political disputes that can arise as a consequence of the ‘destabilising effects of economic, social, political and international change’.214 In the context of this study, and when considering the possible existence of a security community (the later phases of integration), prevention
211 Marie-Francis Desjardins, "Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures," ADELPHI, no. 307 (1996): p.5.
212 Ibid, p.18.
213 Paul Evans, Possibilities for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Track 2 and Track 1 [Internet - Paper] (Pacific Symposium, 2001 [cited 24 June 2002]); available from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific2001/evanspaper.htm.
214 Bruce W. Jentleson, Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventative Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), p.10. 75
requires not only that the conflict be avoided but that the deepest roots of a conflict be addressed by the countries within the grouping.215 The third category, conflict management and/or conflict resolution, pertains to the processes, techniques, methods and strategies that are undertaken for the purpose of limiting and/or resolving the spread of disputes in the event that such disputes have escalated and preventative diplomacy has failed.216
The closely related concepts of conflict resolution procedures (CRP) and conflict management procedures (CMP) have, however, been distinguished within the scholarly literature. Whereas conflict management only seeks to terminate the actual hostilities that erupt from a disagreement, conflict resolution seeks both to terminate such hostilities and to provide an ‘outcome in which fundamental differences and grievances have been resolved’.217 Therefore, and for the purpose of a security community analysis, the latter concept is deemed the most relevant whereby its existence, as an institutionalised procedure, indicates a sufficient level of trust to integrate sovereignty with a body vested with the role of adjudication. However, it does also indicate the existence of unresolved disputes or social problems in the first place. Therefore, preventative diplomacy and CRPs are evolutionary processes that in the beginning, indicate a degree of trust by at least some actors in a potential or emerging community (despite the presence of certain social problems and disagreements that created the need for them in the first place) but later, and through their successful utilisation, can result in the final resolution of the problems that impeded the formation of a security community during the earlier stages of comprehensive integration.
215 However, this does not require that all the countries must actively seek to engage in preventative diplomacy, but rather, that an appropriate body of states or an organization (such as ASEAN) has a legitimate means of exercising some type of action that would constitute a practice of preventative diplomacy.
216 Jentleson, Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventative Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World, p.10. See also: Evans and Newnham, eds., The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, p.32.
217 Yukiko Nishikawa, "The "ASEAN Way" And Asian Regional Security," Politics and Policy 35, no. 1 (2007): p.46. 76
The existence of preventative diplomacy, CRPs and/or CMPs is a consequence of sufficient structural compatibility and collective identity formation at the elite level to reduce threat perceptions via increased trust and predictability between state interactions. Thus, when there exists sufficient institutionalisation and adequate levels of CSBMs, preventative diplomacy and dispute resolution procedures there will then exist, ipso facto, reasonably dependable expectations of peaceful change and the requisite level of collective identity formation to constitute, in the very least, a nascent security community. The development of the above connection – between collective identity formation and dependable expectations of peaceful change – is further evidence of how it is impossible to completely dissect the conceptual issues and components of a security community framework. In the context of ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’ and ‘collective identity formation’, the only distinction that can be made is the degree of emphasis placed on the two concepts in each chapter. On this basis, and for the purposes of assessing how ASEAN should be properly characterised, CSBMs, preventative diplomacy and conflict resolution procedures will continue to be considered where relevant in the remaining chapters of the study. In relation to the theory of a security community, the processes and empirical factors necessary to evidence the existence of dependable expectations of peaceful change, along with the previous three primary components to the existence of a security community, will be extrapolated in further detail within the next chapter.
Part B: The Possibility of Stable Peace and the Integrative Structures behind a Security Community
Nature or Nurture – Elites and State Actors under Anarchy
What are the circumstances that bring a leader to make war rather than peace? Can leaders and communities be socialised in a way that makes war unlikely? Is it to nature or to nurture that the causation of past atrocities can be found? These are some of the core philosophical questions that stem from the security community hypothesis but have, as yet, received very little attention within the security community literature.218 If the philosophical basis for
218 The only notable recent exception pertains to Bellamy’s recent work, see: Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? 77
realism is correct and the natural state of the international system should be viewed as being perpetually at risk of war,219 then it would not be possible for a security community to emerge. As most constructivist works on the subject of a security community simply assume the importance and veracity of nurture (socialisation) – and delve immediately into making a case for how a conceptual toolkit can be applied to various states – it is important here to briefly outline some conceptual and historical arguments that have been advanced to suggest why it is to nurture (rather than nature) that political science should seek causation in conflict. In so doing, and before moving back into the empirical analysis of later chapters, it becomes possible to appreciate whether the eventuality of a security community in the long‐term is a feasible outcome to consider.
Several academic disciplines have attempted to address whether war is an inescapable component of the human condition (nature) or whether a tendency to make war is learned and can therefore be avoided through different teachings and structural environments (nurture).220 Some social biologists, for example, have attempted to demonstrate a connection between human instinct and a desire to wage war and test individual strength. Thus, Martin Van Creveld argues that humanity created a significant number of games, literature, history, and art for the purpose of imitating and substituting for war.221 The assumption that humans are genetically and innately aggressive forms the basis of the ‘inevitability belief’ where it is humanity’s state of nature to wage war. The ‘state of nature’,
219 See for example, the arguments of Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), Waltz, "Man, the State, and War.", Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
220 These disciplines include, but are not limited to, mathematicians, meteorologists, sociologists, anthropologists, geographers, physicists, philosophers, theologians, lawyers, and political scientists. Michael Howard, The Causes of War and Other Essays (Sussex: Temple Smith, 1983), p.7. Some of the more radical theories include that war is a direct result of “increased solar flare activity” and is therefore a “disease”. Buryl Payne, ‘Are Wars a Form of Disease?’ in Toward a World of Peace (Fiji, 1986), p.471.
221 He cites the game of football as an example of humanity’s desire for war, competition and the bearing of strength. Martin Van Creveld, "Why Men Fight," in War, ed. Lawrence Freedman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.85-88. Further, the author argues that the ‘essence of war’ consists of not just one group killing another; but of its member’s readiness to be killed in return if necessary. Therefore, and in his opinion, the only way to bring about perpetual peace would be to somehow eradicate man’s willingness, even eagerness, to take risks of every kind up to and including death. Ibid, p.88. 78
in turn, originated from an analogy applied by Hobbes, Rouseau and others, to ‘describe the human condition prior to the creation of states’.222 Nonetheless, many contemporary realists, such as Robert Gilpin, contend that the ‘state of nature’ depicts a kind of ‘timeless wisdom’ within realism that accords the state ontological priority as the only safeguard to anarchy – through the norms and laws to which a society is bound as a consequence of the structure of the state.223 Accordingly, beyond a state’s borders exists a situation of perpetual anarchy where states can only rely on themselves through ‘self‐help’ in order to guarantee self‐preservation.224
Many scholars however have questioned these views based on both empirical and logical grounds. Brian Ferguson, for example, argues that the inevitability belief has been so thoroughly discredited (at least outside of political science) that it is difficult to find serious researchers who still assert it.225 Indeed, Deutsch brought the issue (including the possibility of stable peace) to the core of his analysis when he investigated three dozen historical cases of both successful and unsuccessful integration throughout human history.226 As Ferguson suggests, while humans have been capable of inflicting the most unimaginable of violence on others throughout history, they have also been known to adopt levels of pacifism that would repress even the wildest form of anger.227 Further, and in returning to Thomas
222 Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? , p.1.
223 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp.227- 228.
224 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p.111.
225 Brian R. Ferguson, Anthropology of War: Theory, Politics and Ethics (Sussex: 1987), p.147. For other opinions dismissing the inevitability belief see also: Irenaus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, The Biology of Peace and War: Men, Animals and Aggression (Great Britain: Thames and Hudson, 1979), p.7, Howard, The Causes of War and Other Essays, p.7.
226 Interestingly, his preliminary research of these case studies covered not only western and central Europe as well as the western hemisphere but also covered Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia. Deutsch, "Security Communities," pp.15-16. Further, the research was undertaken with the aim of reaching ‘a level of generalisation high enough that findings could eventually be applied to a wide range of situations including the gap between East and West’. Deutsch, "Security Communities," p.20.
227 Examples of such societies include the Semi of the Central Malay peninsula who achieved such pacifism through ‘psychological constraints’ and the Mehinaku of the Xingu River in Brazil by applying various socio- cultural constraints. Kegley and Raymond, The Global Future: A Brief Introduction to World Politics, p.155. 79
Hobbes’ philosophy on the state of nature, Giddens recognises that while the concept provides a number of important functions in the justification of realism, what is often overlooked is that the state of nature is an ‘analogy’ – not an historical fact.228 States were not created as a collective response to any security dilemma, nor was the existence of the state system either rational or inevitable. To the contrary, various scholars claim that states were constructed at ‘particular times and places’ as a consequence of the ‘[f]orces of modernisation, industrialisation and nationalism’.229
In 1986, more than a dozen scholarly associations responded to the debate through the Saville Statement which maintained that it was ‘scientifically incorrect’ to suggest that humanity has ‘inherited a tendency to make war from our animal ancestors’ or that war and violent behaviour are ‘genetically programmed into our human nature’ or that ‘war is caused by “instinct” or any single motivation’.230 Thus, as Ferguson adds, it would appear that if there is any genetic program at all then it is simply the ability to learn violent attitudes (e.g. through the processes of negative socialisation) without a specific pre‐ disposition towards them.231 Having critiqued the inevitability of war, it is important also to qualify a co‐dependent argument with realism; namely that states are rational actors who, as Kenneth Waltz would suggest, make decisions based only on material benefits and structural capacities.232
228 Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (London: University of California Press, 1987). See also: Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? , p.2.
229 Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? See also: Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence.
230 Albert Somit, "Humans, Chimps, and Bonobos: The Biological Bases of Aggression, War, and Peace- Making," Journal of Conflict Resolution 34, no. 3 (1990): p.554.
231 Ferguson, Anthropology of War: Theory, Politics and Ethics, p.147. See also: Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), Kegley and Raymond, The Global Future: A Brief Introduction to World Politics, pp.155-156.
232 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p.97. 80
At the rationalist end of a paradigmatic spectrum, both the liberals and realists contend that any decision with the potential to lead to conflict or war is made through a careful analysis of possible costs and benefits (the logic of consequences)233 – that is, war will occur when it is believed to serve a state’s ‘national interest’.234 The problem with such arbitrary generalisations can be seen with the general inefficiency of war given the apparent inability to ‘materially’ and ‘adequately’ weigh the costs against the benefits in the decision to enter into conflict. The consequence of this flaw in the decision‐making process of states and/or political elites has been that at least one state participating in the decision to wage war – or through contributing to the circumstances that lead to war (e.g. the failure to compromise) – will lose the war or exit at the war’s conclusion at a material (tangible) disadvantage.235 While the extremely high costs (economic, social and political) further detract from the rationality of war as a foreign policy option (even for the victor),236 political elites continue to use it as an option (e.g. the US invasion of Iraq).237 Various objective, structural and material factors that may account for occasions when states decide to use force but subsequently fail include environments of uncertainty, short deadlines for decisions and misinformation leading to misperception – e.g. the claim by US intelligence agencies in
233 At the constructivist end of the spectrum there is the logic of appropriateness which suggests that ‘actors are rule following. They determine their course of action depending on a sense of self and what is appropriate for the situation’. Michael Barnett, "Social Constructivism," in The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p.259.
234 National interests can be depicted as ‘the sum total of all national values’ including ‘the promotion of values’. Joseph Frankel, International Relations in a Changing World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p.93.
235 Howard, The Causes of War and Other Essays, p.14.
236 Alagappa, "The Study of International Order: An Analytical Framework," p.47.
237 Very little rational ‘material’ gain was achieved by the invasion of Iraq. While the US was successfully and swiftly able to remove Sadam Hussein from power, the costs to its intangible power and moral authority throughout the globe will continue to be felt for generations to come. It has also lost the propaganda war (which impacts on moral authority and intangible power) by allowing itself to be perceived within some communities as an opportunistic hegemon seeking oil and resources or, even more cynically, as a hegemon with a militaristic missionary attitude fighting a war against Islam. Regardless of the truth of these allegations, it is often popular perception that becomes the reality of a state’s problems. 81
2002/2003 that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.238 Nonetheless, it will be demonstrated (below and in the next chapter) that there remain additional and less tangible factors that influence the rationality of state actions leading to armed conflict as well as regarding the formation of foreign policy more generally.
As Ferguson contends, the underlying causation behind armed conflict is often grounded in a multitude of factors relating to the psychological ‘impact of nationalism, racism, and ethnocentrism; of values and orientations which encourage obedience or prestige seeking with the military; of psychopathologies which lead to a violent response to situations; and of ignorance’ – which has some relevance to the first set of factors.239 Some of the attributes raised by Ferguson pertain to the individual psychological attributes and motives of an actor in power (e.g. psychopathologies leading to a violent response) while others link to the types of ideational attributes that shape and mould the overall collective identity of a community (e.g. ethnocentrism, nationalism and related values). This study distinguishes between the two because, and as Hans Morgenthau contends, any attempt exclusively to consider the individual motives of state actors for understanding foreign policy and leadership decisions is both futile and deceptive as motives are the most elusive of psychological data and are frequently beyond recognition.240
Reason is the source of rational action. Many of the ancient philosophers viewed reason as a positive force for enlightenment. For Plato, on Lebow’s account, reason was a source of desire in its own right where ‘reason’ actively sought to discover the ‘ends of life and to educate the spirit and appetite so they would want to collaborate harmoniously to achieve
238 Greg Cashman, What Causes War? An Introduction to the Theories of International Conflicts (New York: Lexington Books, 1993), Kegley and Raymond, The Global Future: A Brief Introduction to World Politics, p.60. In relation to misperception and miscalculation Friedberg argues ‘the consequences of miscalculation can be serious’. Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security 18, no. 3 (1993-1994): p.31.
239 Ferguson, Anthropology of War: Theory, Politics and Ethics, p.151.
240 Hans Morgenthau, ‘Six Principles of Political Realism’, in War, (Oxford, 1994) p.161. 82
these ends’.241 As Lebow contends, the shortcoming of modern social sciences is that, as opposed to ancient philosophy, it is overwhelmingly focused on means – not ends.242 In light of these considerations, it becomes possible to better understand the contentions of some constructivists (together with neo‐liberalists) who, while accepting the existence of anarchy within the international system, deny the inevitability of war. However, these schools of thought qualify their acceptance of anarchy by arguing that regional systems (or collections of states), and to a lesser extent, the international system, have the ability to escape the worst aspects and consequences of anarchy.243 In this respect, some constructivists have suggested the possibility of an emerging Kantian or constructivist type of anarchy that is alternatively dominated by friendly behaviour, collective security and the emergence of security communities.244 Under these circumstances, the extent of cooperation along with its causes differs between alternative types of anarchy; where the norms within each system are observed as a consequence of any combination of factors including coercion, self‐interest and the legitimacy (including salience) of each individual norm.245 Where a given norm is salient then the logic of ‘appropriateness’ comes into play. As will be further discussed in the next chapter, the logic of appropriateness is the notion that rule (norm) abiding states determine their course of action based on what is deemed appropriate in the given circumstances.246
The importance of norms at all levels of analysis within IR theory should not be underestimated. Not only is there ‘agreement within a growing section of IR theorists that
241 Richard Ned Lebow, "Reason, Emotion and Cooperation," International Politics 42 (2005): p.304.
242 Ibid.
243 Ibid, p.284.
244 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics.
245 Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics, pp.24-27, Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics.
246 Barnett, "Social Constructivism," p.259. 83
“norms matter”,’247 various theorists from within political science and beyond have drawn some powerful analogies as to why norms are important and how they operate to constrain the actions of states. William Slomanson, for example, compares the issue of norm‐ compliance to motorist behaviour around traffic lights. Here, most motorists stop when the lights turn red regardless of whether a police officer is present to enforce the law. This is because the motorist understands that it is in his or her common interests to obey the rule and thereby avoid an accident.248 Mutual interest and the avoidance of anarchy are powerful factors in any consideration of whether or not norms matter – domestically or internationally. As Alex Bellamy adds, even when states breach a norm, such as the norm of non‐aggression, ‘they attempt to justify their actions in terms of other internationally held norms such as the right of self‐defence’.249
The Tiers of Integration – From Integrative Processes to Interstate Behaviour
The comments that precede this subsection do not intend to suggest that the analyst must of necessity choose between rationalism (realism and liberalism) and constructivism or that realist behaviour such as power balancing never takes place. As Lebow states, ‘[a]ll three
247 Trine Flockhart, "'Complex Socialisation': A Framework for the Study of State Socialization," European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 1 (2006): pp.89-90.
248 Quoted in: Kegley and Raymond, The Global Future: A Brief Introduction to World Politics, p.230. Similar to Nicholas Wheeler, Bellamy draws the analogy that ‘a football match, like international society, is constituted by rules. A referee is given the job of adjudicating and the players, largely, play according to those rules and recognise the role of the referee. Importantly, as only one man among 22, the referee cannot physically enforce his decisions, so compliance is voluntary. Nonetheless, the debate over whether a norm can ever be anything more than ‘persuasive’ (e.g. absolute) in relation to its effect on state behaviour is beyond the scope of the current study. The object of football is to win the game by scoring goals. Different teams adopt different tactics for doing so. Some will make extensive use of the ‘offside’ rule. Doing so involves difficult calculations about the rules and the most effective way to conduct such a strategy. The practical rules of game give the players a common language that allows them to calculate strategies based upon expectations about what it means to be successful and what the other players will do. Moreover, both teams have a vested interest in abiding by these rules and acknowledging the status of the referee because their very existence as participants in a game depends upon them doing so. Football is not football without two goals, a ball, and a variety of rules’. Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? , pp.22-23. See also: Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (London: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.23-24.
249 Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? , p.22. For a more detailed and conceptual investigation of ‘why norms matter’ based on the ‘logic appropriateness’ see T Risse, "Transnational Actors and World Politics," in Handbook of International Relations, ed. W Carlsnaes, T Risse, and B Simmons (London: Sage, 2002). 84
paradigms are relevant because there is more to the international system than is captured by a single paradigm.250 Therefore, the eclectic nature of this framework (as stated at the outset) draws the question: when do state‐actors exhibit the attributes of one school of thought as opposed to the other? Within the scholarly literature, the closest approach to this position is seen through the works of Alagappa. In Alagappa’s work, he applied the concept of ‘order’ and argued that ‘[s]panning a spectrum, it ranges from total disorder that is associated with the law of the jungle to the rule of law associated with a cohesive political community in which most people obey the law ….’251 In the context of this study, the problem with Alagappa’s concept of order is that it is more ‘descriptive’ than ‘predictive’ and/or ‘prescriptive’ in nature. Therefore, and in maintaining a synthesis with the conceptual components to the Security Community Framework, the study returns to the concept of integration, or more accurately the processes of integration, for the purpose of predicting the behaviour to be expected between the intramural relations of a collection of states – in this instance the potential security community of Southeast Asia.
For the purpose of developing the application of integration throughout the study, the notion of comprehensive integration is applied and developed to draw out the structure and forms of integration as well as the order in which the processes of integration can be expected to take place. As Figure 2.3 illustrates, and in line with the philosophical basis for the ASEAN security community proposal, the concept of comprehensive integration comprises three major foundations: economic, political, and socio‐cultural integration. Each of these three pillars are interdependent with each other and mutually reinforcing. When the level of their integration is sufficiently high, then they can be said to constitute a
250 Lebow adds that when one looks to the nature of the different regional systems throughout the globe one can see the different paradigms at play. For example, the ‘North Atlantic area, Australasia and many parts of the Pacific Rim are characterised by a high degree of cooperation. The North Atlantic is sometimes described as the core region of an expanding ‘pluralist security community’ in the language of Karl Deutsch (1957). The Middle East and South Asia, by contrast, are primarily realist in their inter-state interactions. Other regions, like Southeast Asia, Latin America and Africa, fall somewhere in between. Lebow, "Reason, Emotion and Cooperation," p.303.
251 Muthiah Alagappa, "Constructing Security Order in Asia: Conception and Issues," in Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003). 85
security community. The dotted portions of the timelines that lie beyond the green security community indicator are not to any particular timescale and represent the grey area that exists between the level of integration necessary to constitute a security community and the theoretical abstraction of being integrated. The notion that the states of a security community can be ‘integrated’ is considered a theoretical abstraction because, in reality, there can be no end to how much individuals, communities and states can be integrated into some kind of supranational entity. Further, it is not possible to become fully integrated where there is no discernable distinction between either the institutions and identities of individual units of analysis or the identity and institutions of the security community itself. In other words, the processes of comprehensive integration are considered continuous and never entirely complete.
Figure 2.3. The Pillars Underlying Comprehensive Integration
Theoretically Integrated
Non-Integration Security Community
Economic Integration
Political and Security Integration
Socio-Cultural Integration
Low Medium-Low Medium-High High
Timeline Past Future
Source: Compiled by author
In borrowing from the theories of nation‐building and internal consolidation developed in the next chapter (including the notion that nation‐building exercises eventually lead to the creation of a nation‐state), Figure 2.4 below develops an integrational sketch of the likely pathways by which a group of states may evolve from non‐integration to relative integration. In this context, because of either state‐driven initiatives (top‐down) or 86
communal driven processes (bottom‐up) a collection of states can shift forward along the spectrum of integration depicted by the figure. While each of these push/pull integrative processes can alternatively influence the other and coexist at the same time, it is contended that between any collection of states within the international system one set of processes is likely to be more dominant than the other. Further, and regardless of which is the dominant process (whether state or communally driven); the secondary group of processes can either assist or detract from the primary group. In the example of ASEAN, and regardless of whether or not all the ASEAN states wholeheartedly commit to the project of a security community in the future (as discussed in Chapter VIII), the secondary ‘communal‐driven’ process may in fact act to inhibit the pace of integration due to inter‐community tensions and rivalry – e.g. as a consequence of cultural, religious, and nationalistic divides.252 Nonetheless, should ASEAN make any progress in terms of economic, political, and/or socio‐ cultural (comprehensive) integration then, based on a consideration of ASEAN’s history together with the empirical findings in later chapters, state‐driven integration is likely to represent the dominant process within Southeast Asia for the foreseeable future.
252 By contrast, the state and communal level processes that are driving integration between the Australia and New Zealand communities are mutually reinforcing due to a compatibility of values and ideology – including culture, religion and non-antagonist nationalism. 87
Figure 2.4. The Processes behind Comprehensive Integration
Theoret ically Int egrat ed
Non-Int egrat ion Secur it y Com m unit y
1 Economic Integration and Elite-Level Identity for-
2 Political and Security Integration TOP DOWN Processes St a t e D r i v e n 3 Socio-Cultural Integration Low Medium-Low Medium-High High Integration Integrati on Past Fut ure Tim eline Past Fut ure Low High Integration Medium-Low Medium-High Integrati on 3 Political and Security Integration Bot t om 2 Economic Integration Up
1 Processes Socio-Cultural and Elite-Level Integration
Communal Driven Driven Communal Non-Int egr at ion The or e t ically Integrated
Source: Compiled by author
In building further on the empirical evidence offered by the history of Southeast Asia – together with the theoretical components discussed earlier in this chapter and Chapter III – should the dominant processes for integration be state‐driven in nature then integration is likely to be most accelerated in respect to the economic pillar. Nonetheless, the emergence of economic integration will require a degree of consensus and cooperation between the political elite of the grouping, which may also indicate an initial level of identification (collective identity) between these political elites from the outset. Due to the difficulty of differentiating between which of these two events takes place first, elite‐level collective identity formation is categorised with, and considered equal to, the process of economic integration – where state‐driven processes dominate. Thus, the increased frequency of social transactions that flow from economic integration may also accelerate the process of socialisation and thereby reinforce the collective identity of the political elite within the grouping of states. 88
Figure 2.5 below illustrates the study’s contention that at a low level of integration realist behaviour (logic of consequences) is more dominant whereas at a high level of integration states alternatively seek intra‐mural cooperation with a view to attaining absolute gain (as opposed to relative gain) where the logic of appropriateness dominates. As states move along the spectrum of comprehensive integration (to a mid‐level of comprehensive integration) then neo‐liberalist behaviour starts to emerge whereby the security dilemma is reduced through economic interdependence and cooperative security arrangements.253 As both the frequency of cooperation and the level of interdependence rise then more state actors are socialised into a ‘collective identity’ and the ‘forms’ of behaviour likely to fit within the worldview of the constructivists become more prevalent. Eventually, at an adequately high level of integration, the security dilemma is all but mitigated and an integrative peace, followed by a stable peace, emerges amidst the community of states.254
253 Alagappa, "Constructing Security Order in Asia: Conception and Issues," p.82. The next chapter will discuss the reasons why states turn to cooperation, rather than competition, and the ways in which the pathways and processes of integration, economic interdependence, and cooperative security act to alleviate the security dilemma.
254 Rikard Bengtsson defines integrative peace as a tier of integration just below that of a security community. In an integrative peace the ‘actors maintain a predominantly cooperative and positive relationship. The peace rests primarily, not on deterrence and competition in the security sphere, but rather on the identification of mutual interests, dependence, joint problem-solving and norm-governed behaviour. Such an integrative peace denotes a more positive peace than conditional peace but does not eliminate the security dilemma, as stable peace does. Although not as far reaching as stable peace, integrative peace is characterized by trust rather than distrust’. Bengtsson, "The Cognitive Dimension of Stable Peace," p.94. 89
Figure 2.5. The Impact of Integration on Inter-state Behaviour
Secur it y Com m unit y
St a t e State-Driven Comprehensive Integration Theoretically Driven Low Integration Medium-Low Medium-High High Integration Processes Fut ure
Re a list Constructivist Behaviour Dominant Realist and Li b e r a li st and Behaviour Dominant Past Competitive Behaviour Li b e r a li st Constructivist Cooperative Behaviour High Securit y Dilem m a Behaviour Behaviour Low Security Dilemma n ga ed egrat Int Past High Risk of Violence Evi d ent Evi d ent Stable Peace with Little and/or Armed Conflict to No Risk of Violence
Co m m u n a l Low Integration Medium-Low Medium-High High Integration Fut ure Driven Communal-Driven Comprehensive Integration Processes
Source: Compiled by author
For the purpose of the dissertation’s conclusion, this theory of behaviour also assists in the formation of an assessment of how a grouping of states should be characterised. Thus, where the level of comprehensive integration between states is dangerously low then the security dilemma to emerge out of such strong realist‐type behaviour and perceptions might result in the characterisation of either a war community (e.g. Israel and Palestine) or of a conflict formation (e.g. the Middle East). Likewise, and as the tiers of integration reach higher planes then the characterisation of the grouping may shift to become an economic and/or security regime followed by, eventually, the beginnings of an emerging security community – should the sum‐total of comprehensive integration continue to rise in the long‐term. While Chapter VI provides a detailed description of the various processes behind greater integration, the final subsection below contextualises the types of behaviour (and the defining criteria) to be expected from states at varying levels of high integration. This approach leads to a final conclusion of the empirical qualities necessary between and within a group of states to satisfy the defining criteria of the existence of a security community.
High Integration – the Structural Variations behind a Security Community
This subsection addresses the empirical qualities necessary for the existence of a security community and also the varying definitional labels applied to a security community within 90
the scholarly literature. To this end, Figure 2.6 below attempts visually to represent Adler and Barnett’s conception of the various security community labels that can be applied based on the integrational attributes of the security community. The problem is that Adler and Barnett’s description of the terms in this diagram is more likely to misguide rather than enlighten the reader on the structure behind a security community. For example, the authors discuss two ideal types of security community, loosely and tightly coupled.255 They then move on to what could appear to be three further levels of integration within a security community, namely nascent, ascendant and mature. The authors again discuss the various factors that establish either a loosely coupled or tightly coupled security community.256 However, this two‐fold discussion leaves the reader wondering whether a tightly coupled security community is necessary to the emergence of a mature security community or whether a mature security community is necessary before a loosely coupled257 security community can arise? Additionally, what can only be described as a subjective framework of analysis is defined by at least five subcategories. The need to simplify this criterion, as has been a stated goal of this dissertation, has been attempted by Amitav Acharya where he condenses Adler’s twenty‐eight pages into less than one.258 While Acharya’s summation may have swung the pendulum to the opposite extreme by oversimplifying the framework, Acharya does succeed in addressing some of the ambiguity left over from Adler and Barnett’s work.
255 Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," p.30.
256 Ibid, pp.56-57.
257 Let alone tightly coupled.
258 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, pp.34-35. 91
Figure 2.6. Security Community Structuralisation
Indicators A Indicators B 1. Multilatera lism 1. All indicators contained 2. Unfortified borders within ‘Indicators A’ 3. Changes in milita ry 2. Cooperative and collective planning security 4. Common definition ‘Tightly’ 3. High level of military inte- gration of threat ‘Loosely’ coupled 4. Policy Coordination against 5. Discourse and the coupled security internal threats language of security communities 5. Free movement of popula- community communities tion 6. Internationalization of au- thority Increasing 7. A mu ltiperspectival polity hierarchy of Mature Security Community ‘Dependable Expectations’ of ‘Peaceful Change’ in order of Ascendant Security Community ascending or descending levels of integration Nascent Security Community
Source: Compiled by author based on Alder and Barnett’s conceptual framework259
Following Acharya’s direction, and (in part) to alleviate the ambiguities in the work of Adler and Barnett, Figure 2.7 below represents this study’s development of a new model of the integrational hierarchy within security community structuralisation: starting with a ‘nascent security community’ and concluding with a ‘mature security community’. During the nascent phase of a security community’s evolution, there exists adequate empirical evidence to illustrate a future and sustainable course towards ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’. Such evidence is found in the existence of security community triggering mechanisms such as mutual threat perceptions, joint trade benefits, and the duplication of other organisational structures such as are found in the European Union.260 These factors will not normally occur unless there is a mergence (uniformity) in the foreign policies and national interests that exist between the various state‐actors in the grouping. In other
259 Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," pp.29-65.
260 Ibid, pp.52-53. 92
words, a nascent security community also requires that there is at least a developed sense of an entrenched elite‐level collective identity. Within a nascent security community, as with the higher tiers, there exist dependable expectations of peaceful change.
Figure 2.7. Amended Security Community Structuralisation
Indicators A Indicators B 1. Multilateralism 1. All indicators contained within ‘Indicators A’ 2. Unfortified 2. Cooperative and collective security borders 3. High level of military integration 3. Changes in 4. Policy Coordination against internal threats military 5. Free movement of population planning 6. Internationalization of authority 4. Co mmon 7. A multiperspectival polity definition of threat 5 Language and Discourse of community Mature Security Co mmunity Increasing hierarchy of ‘Dependable Expectations’ Ascendant Security Community of ‘Peaceful Change’ in paralle l with Nascent Security Community ascending levels of integration A security complex or some form of a non-integrated collection of sovereign states
Source: Compiled by author
Within the ascendant phase, one would expect to witness greater levels of interstate integration with the military (such as joint exercises, training and cooperation), a heightened sense of security between states, and the beginnings of cognitive transition towards inter‐subjective processes and collective identities encouraging ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’ (‘Indicators A’ above). Therefore, an ascendant security community will advance where there are highly dependable expectations of peaceful change and such a condition may be indicated by the existence of a long‐term peace. Peace is understood as existing only where there has been a complete absence of military conflict. A mature security community only exists where there are absolutely no foreseeable prospects of conflict as well as absolute expectations of peaceful change. 93
The threshold test applied to the characterisation of a mature security community is the same as Adler and Barnet’s notion of a tightly coupled security community; where ‘there is a “mutual aid society” providing for collective and cooperative efforts to help each other and offer joint solutions to common problems’.261 Thus, a mature security community requires the existence of substantial cooperative and collective security embracing a high level of integration between the military, joint policy coordination against internal threats, unrestricted movement of societies between states, the internalisation of authority, and a multiperspectival policy where rule is shared at the national, transnational, and supranational levels (‘Indicators B’). In the event that a security community disintegrates then the community may either form what is defined as a regional security complex (or some other ‘regional’ framework) or be absorbed into a larger regional security complex.262 The requirement of absolutism introduced in this analysis reduces the ambiguity of the framework – a framework that is already subjective in nature.
As has been illustrated by the preceding discussions, the notion of integration is central to almost every component of a security community (primary or secondary). A security community thus represents a possible end goal (but not an end state) in the process of integration. As various components to a security community are less developed and/or integrated then there is also a reciprocal reduction in the total degree of integration. Nonetheless, and as Acharya argues, at all levels of the various security community structuralisations there must be ‘a fundamental, unambiguous and long‐term convergence of interests among actors regarding the avoidance of war’.263 In building on the considerations above, the next chapter seeks to conceptualise some of the most likely processes behind the possible emergence of a security community. This approach will further assist in developing a conceptual understanding of ‘comprehensive integration’ and
261 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, p.35.
262 For a detailed explanation of the term ‘regional security complex’ see: Buzan, People, States and Fear.
263 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, p.17. 94
in providing the basis for a final determination within Chapter X over which characterisation of ASEAN best fits the empirical phenomena.
95
Chapter III
Developing a Defendable Framework: The Processes behind the Emergence of a Security Community
Chapter II outlined the major conceptual aspects for the understanding of and the empirical requirements for the establishment of a security community. In building on these considerations, the present chapter paves the way for an understanding of the key processes, issues, and challenges to the ASEAN security community project. The chapter also seeks to discern how various ideational, material, global, regional and domestic factors interrelate with one another and potentially contribute to comprehensive integration and the formation of a stable peace. Understanding the processes and pathways behind security community formation not only equips the analyst with an ability to foresee many of the obstacles to security community formation but can also aid the development of an understanding, in later chapters, of the most efficient and effective approach to resolving any possible obstacles to the realisation of the security community objective. The likelihood of ASEAN successfully responding to these obstacles is a separate issue and one that will be addressed in the concluding chapter of this study (Chapter X).
Theoretical Underpinnings to the Processes behind Security Community Formation
In agreement with Vayrynen, the explanatory power of the various paradigms in IR theory can be further enhanced through the inclusion of a societal perspective that acknowledges that state actors can also be influenced by less tangible conditions such as knowledge, trust, and predictability and also by the constituent elements of a sense of community.264 These ideational determinants can be broadly categorised under the related labels of norms and
264 Vayrynen, Stable Peace through Security Communities? Steps Towards Theory-Building (cited). 96
identity.265 While a basic definition of the meaning of ‘norms’ was provided in the introductory chapter, and a simple definition of identity was developed in the second chapter, in order to better explain the processes behind comprehensive integration, cooperation and stable peace it is necessary here to elaborate further on the role of these two concepts – especially with reference to ascertaining state interests and behaviour. As stated, norms represent the ‘standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’266 whereas identity can be more deeply understood as ‘that part of an individual’s self‐concept which derives from personal knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership’.267 At the level of the state, an understanding of ‘identity’ is important because, as Alexander Wendt has argued, the interests of an actor/state are informed by the state/actor’s identity.268 A basic comprehension of the role of identity (and thereby the fundamental interests of the state) is further important because it informs when an agent/state is likely to ‘perceive a particular norm as salient’269 – such as a norm of ‘peaceful coexistence’.
Norms and the Collective Identity of the State – the Causation behind Cooperation and Peace?
Given the central tasks of this chapter, the framework here adopts the argument of the second wave literature on norms that focuses mainly on the ability of norms to affect ‘state behaviour via domestic political processes’.270 This branch of the literature seeks to
265 Amitav Acharya and Richard Stubbs, "Theorizing Southeast Asian Relations: An Introduction," The Pacific Review 19, No. 2 (2005): p.125.
266 Hund, The Development of ASEAN Norms between 1997 and 2000: A Paradigm Shift? (cited).
267 Henri Taifel, cited in: Claire Sutherland, "Another Nation Building Bloc? Integrating National Ideology into the EU and ASEAN," Asia Europe Journal 3 (2005): p.143.
268 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): p.398. See also: Lebow, "Reason, Emotion and Cooperation," p.284. This, in turn, explains why constructivists are so deeply concerned with identity formation and change.
269 Flockhart, "'Complex Socialisation': A Framework for the Study of State Socialization," p.94.
270 AP Cortell and JW Davis, "Understanding the Domestic Impact of Norms: A Research Agenda," International Studies Review 2, no. 1 (2000): p.161. 97
ascertain the domestic salience of transnational norms via an examination of ‘changes in domestic discourses, national institutions, and state policies’.271 The question of who instigates these ‘changes’ is examined through (and partially answered by) various social theories on structure and agency. Agents are the actors in politics who have the power to exercise and display choice, reflexivity, learning and transformative capacity.272 While the central actor has traditionally been seen as the state (see below), recent literature has broadened the concept to include non‐state actors such as international organisations, non‐ governmental organisations, transnational social movements, private economic actors and epistemic communities (including civil society).273 Structure, by contrast, is the structured environment under which the agents act. The structure of a society, of a state, of a collectivity of states (e.g. ASEAN) or of an international order is determined by the examined entity’s ascertainable (or diverging) norms and identity (the ideational determinants of structure) together with its material capacities and institutions.274 In following the structurationist approach within sociological theory,275 both agents and structures are said to be mutually constitutive or, in other words, there is a continuous cycle of actors influencing structure and structure socialising actors.276
271 Kate O'Neill, Jorg Balsiger, and Stacy D. VanDeveer, "Actors, Norms, and Impact: Recent International Cooperation Theory and the Influence of the Agent-Structure Debate," Annual Review of Political Science 7 (2004`): p.162.
272 As O’Neil states, ‘In structuration theory, agency denotes the ability to choose among different courses of action, to learn from previous experience, and to effect change. Social agency sometimes depends solely on the capability of actors to make a difference in the production of definite outcomes, regardless of whether or not they intend (are aware) that these outcomes occur. Since ‘to make a difference’ is to transform some aspect of the process or event, agency in structuration theory is equated with transformative capacity’ [Emphasis by author]. Ibid.
273 Ibid.
274 Flockhart, "'Complex Socialisation': A Framework for the Study of State Socialization," p.90.
275 The terms ‘structurationist’ was originally coined by Giddens, see: Anthony Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretative Sociologies (London: Hutchinson, 1976). For a concise overview see also: Barnett, "Social Constructivism," pp.254-255.
276 Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences (Harveston: Brighton, 1979), p.359.See also: Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? , p.20, O'Neill, Balsiger, and VanDeveer, "Actors, Norms, and Impact: Recent 98
For the purpose of this framework, and as a further reflection on the question of socialisation, the collective identity of a state’s political elite transposes to become the identity of the state. In this sense, the ‘state’ is viewed as a social actor and is socialised in ‘social rules and conventions that constitute its identity and the reasons for the interests that motivate actors’.277 In addition to the theoretical and methodological arguments outlined by scholars such as Wendt, this generalisation is also important to make due to practical considerations and constraints. For example, it can be highly problematic to attempt to distinguish between political elites in power and the role of the state in the construction of foreign policy and political preferences and the sets of interstate relations that evolve because of these policies – there is some overlap between these entities. In this context, the state is considered to exist as a real entity (rather than a social abstraction)278 with the ‘capacity to do’ and/or exist ‘as an agent of something’.279
While Bellamy, inter alia, is correct in arguing that a nation‐state’s identity is constituted by a range of domestic, economic, social geographic, cultural and historical factors,280 it is argued that the collective identity of a state most strongly emerges from, and is influenced through, the collective memories of history.281 This contention is made because all of Bellamy’s factors can be understood, to one degree or another, through the lens of history;
International Cooperation Theory and the Influence of the Agent-Structure Debate," p.151, Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," International Organization 41, no. 3 (1987).
277 Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, p.23.
278 While agreeing with Flockhart’s analysis, inter alia, that the state exists as a real entity (Flockhart, "'Complex Socialisation': A Framework for the Study of State Socialization," p.92.) the framework here diverges in that it partially accepts Wendt’s contention that a state contains a social identity (or more accurately, reflects to a degree the collective identity of a state’s political elite) albeit with certain caveats such as the structural restrictions placed on the state and its political elite. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p.193--245.
279 Colin Wight, "State Agency: Social Action without Human Activity," Review of International Studies 30, no. 2 (2004): pp.275-276.
280 Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? , p.38. See also: Andrew Hurrell, "Norms and Ethics in International Relations," in Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons (London: Sage, 2005), pp.141-142.
281 Lebow, "Reason, Emotion and Cooperation," p.294. 99
as Katzenstein argues ‘[h]istory is a process of change that leaves an imprint on a state and its society’s identity’.282 The argument regarding the important role of history links back to the second chapter’s discussion of transactionalism and socialisation. Direct and numerous interactions between different socio‐cultural communities within a state over an extended timeframe ‘socialise’ the different identities in a manner where elements of the ‘part’ evolve into the collective identity of the group. In other words, socialisation becomes part of the ‘process of learning to conform one’s behaviour to social expectations’.283 This is not to suggest that the emergence of a ‘collective identity’ fully replaces any or all of the individual socio‐cultural identities (co‐cultures); to the contrary, the idea is that these individual identities may eventually become socially compatible with one another to an extent that there might emerge an identifiable collective identity.284 This process of socialisation will (and does) lead to the formation of socio‐cultural norms; a sub‐category of norms that depicts the standards of behaviour that, in the present context, prescribe the rights and obligations that the society of a given state expects its leaders to uphold – both domestically and internationally.285
282 Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, p.23. Sutherland provides two examples of the role of contrasting historical contexts on the member states of the European Union with the comparison of Britain’s ‘fateful resignation’ with Spain’s exuberant happiness’ upon joining the organisation. Sutherland, "Another Nation Building Bloc? Integrating National Ideology into the EU and ASEAN," p.144.
283 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p.170.
284 Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," pp.43-44. As Bellamy adds, but in relation to the interstate level of analysis, ‘We are not talking about transcending national [or ethnic or socio- cultural] loyalties or replacing particularlism with cosmopolitanism, an idea that is implied in much of the security community literature. Instead, what we are talking about here is the production of common identities in which ‘the category of the collective is part of the self-conception of individuals’. Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? , p.38.
285 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, pp.24-25. As Acharya contends, they are specific to a group and (as with the formation of identity) are ‘likely to reflect the historical and cultural milieu of the actors’. In relation to the contentions of the present study, a fair criticism could be directed towards the fact that in regions such as Southeast Asia (in particular) the expectations and desires at the communal level are not necessarily reflected by the policies of the elite (e.g. in the absence of democracy). At one level of analysis such an assertion would be correct but the emphasis here is on the processes that shape the ideational attributes of people and it is contended that this applies to all members of a state’s society including the elites. For example, if the state is a nation-state that has one national language then it is likely that the elite will also speak the same language. If it is a Buddhist state then it is likely that the leaders will also be Buddhist. If there is an historical mistrust of another country that is taught (or preached) for the earliest stages of 100
While the ‘norms of the social group are the structures that determine behaviour and constitute agent identity’,286 the agent has the capacity to seek ‘self‐consciously’ to construct new norms that might potentially enhance the incentives for specific forms of behaviour and also even affect the very structure of society itself.287 These changes have been conceptualised within the literature under the notion of social change which, in turn, is understood as occurring where ‘the interaction between agents and structures creates new possibilities for collective action by changing norms and institutions, as well as the evolution of existing and emergent actors (and their interactions) who are both enabled and constrained in the pursuit of their goals’.288 In this context the process of the transfer of norms, whether consciously or unconsciously, occurs mainly at the agent level.289 Thus, and in summary, the collective identity of a state (as represented by its elite) arises from the sum‐total of historical interaction – including ideas, learning and socialisation290 – at both the domestic and international levels.
Regarding the state, the ideational attributes and processes referred to above represent the collective generalisations that flow from or comprise the identity of a state and the community (or communities) that exists within its territorial boundaries. In understanding the identity of the state (as an agent) it is also important to distinguish between the collective attributes and personal motives of ‘state actors’, not only because of the reasoning discussed in Chapter II in respect of Morgenthau, but also for the purpose of carrying out
childhood) then it is also likely that the elite will be socialised to a point where they will reflect such a perception to one degree or another (e.g. Thailand and Myanmar).
286 Flockhart, "'Complex Socialisation': A Framework for the Study of State Socialization," p.96.
287 As Michael Barnet argues, ‘… no structure is so determining that it eliminates the capacity for critical reflection and the possibility that agents might knowingly attempt to transform the structure’. Barnett, "Social Constructivism," p.255.
288 O'Neill, Balsiger, and VanDeveer, "Actors, Norms, and Impact: Recent International Cooperation Theory and the Influence of the Agent-Structure Debate," p.152.
289 Flockhart, "'Complex Socialisation': A Framework for the Study of State Socialization."
290 O'Neill, Balsiger, and VanDeveer, "Actors, Norms, and Impact: Recent International Cooperation Theory and the Influence of the Agent-Structure Debate," p.160. 101
the goals of investigation – goals that aim to illustrate the overall push and pull processes behind the formation of a security community. Further, the development of a collective identity at the state level does not automatically translate into a set of circumstances that are compatible with transnational integration and collective identity formation. Such identities can in fact be either positive or negative forces in the process of security community formation.
Drawing in part on two and a half years of intensive field research in all the ASEAN countries it is argued here that the major ideational attributes relevant to assessing a state’s identity within Southeast Asia appear to include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) political ideology, (b) religion (especially where aspects of (a) or (b) contain a militant ‘missionary’ ideology), (c) culture; (d) nationalism and patriotism (particularly if they breed a culture of superiority), (e) an inferiority complex (related to or a possible consequence of (d)), (f) the degree of xenophobia evidenced by a given society, and (g) a vast range of norms – such as norms of cooperative (or competitive) behaviour and of peaceful coexistence. Other ideational factors that influence the collective identity of a state include such things as language systems, historical differences, and/or animosities and various other variables – as articulated later in the discussion on morphological compatibilities. An understanding of these ideational attributes assists in the formation of a distinction between situations when states will trust outsiders or, alternatively, perceive them as a threat.
Different states will not agree to be bonded by agreements in the absence of trust.291 The development of trust between states and/or communities entails, inter alia, a compatibility of values that does not conflict with the political and ideational survival of the other state and/or community to which interaction takes place. In the absence of any such political and/or ideational friction, frequent interactions will contribute to at least some degree ‘of identification with the other because without such association actors would be self‐
291 Charles W. Jr. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond, When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics (Colombia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), p.248. 102
contained and devoid of any … basis’ for common action.292 The existence of trust is central to the constituent elements of a community (e.g. in the form of reciprocity and altruism) as well as the formation of dependable expectations of peaceful change. In fact, Adler and Barnet place ‘trust’ alongside and equal with ‘collective identity formation’ and contend that ‘trust and identity are reciprocal and reinforcing’.293 In addition to these considerations, Waltz adds that ideational/ideological values represent a ‘system of meaning that entails the distinction between self and other in the definition of threat’.294 This is because, particularly in the case of a robust nation‐state, the totality of ideational values represents the core existence of self – the identity of the state. Therefore, ideational survival can be considered equal with political survival as an underlying basis for the formation of a state’s national interests – whether declared or otherwise.295 Furthermore, and according to this perspective, a partial definition of threat would be based on the ideational attributes of other states that are perceived as opposed to the political (and ideational) survival of the state examined.
In the absence of trust (at a low level of comprehensive integration), military expenditure is greater (because of uncertainty) and there is a lower occurrence of cooperation and cooperative arrangements. The greater sense of predictability (together with reduced perceptions of risk) to stem from the existence of trust and a transnational collective identity, also reduces the perceived costs of cooperation and integration at the political, security and economic levels. Additionally, the development of trust and a compatibility of identity (in the absence of a collective identity) between states helps to remove any
292 Vayrynen, Stable Peace through Security Communities? Steps Towards Theory-Building (cited).
293 Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," pp.37
294 Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism," International Organization 56, no. 3 (2002): p.586.
295 This has been reapplied from the contention of Alagappa that political survival is the ‘most basic goal of Asian states’. Alagappa, "Constructing Security Order in Asia: Conception and Issues," p.79. He characterizes ideational survival as one of four subservient goals to political survival. However, this characterization has limited application when applied to a theory that proposes to be of general application. For this reason the study places both ideational and political survival as equal goals forming the national interests of a state. The actual norms and premises that constitute political and ideational survival will depend on the empirical analysis of a given state. 103
ideational obstacles to a rational decision making process.296 In order to better understand the basis for distinguishing between those who are perceived as a ‘threat’ and those actors a state can ‘trust’ it is necessary to consider recent developments within social psychology on Social Identity Theory (SIT).
Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Interstate Relations
While the relationship of identity (as a component of collective identity formation) to security community frameworks has already been discussed, recent developments in the theory of identity have further developed the conceptual toolkit for a better understanding of how states will relate to one another. To this end, SIT – with its origins in social psychology – has been applied by various IR theorists for the purpose of understanding not only whether international conflict is inevitable,297 but also of the causal properties behind when two or more states will seek to cooperate. Social identity theory is social constructivism’s theory of the agent and is primarily concerned with actors (agency) rather than norms (structure).298 In the context of the theory, and because it is possible to conceive of identity as understanding oneself relative to others, it follows that a state or community’s social identity is also dependent on its relationship with others.299 Within the large body of literature on SIT it is clear that the concept of ‘social identity’ or ‘social group’ plays an important role between all sets of relations – whether that of the individual, the group or the state.
296 Further factors that build and develop trust as well as an inter-state collective identity are considered in the following two tiers of the framework. Meanwhile, the case studies examined in later chapters will consider, more specifically, the types of structural and ideational attributes of the states in Southeast Asia that have the potential to impede such a collective identity and the cooperation and integration that goes with it.
297 See the contrasting views of Mercer and Gries: Peter Hays Gries, "Social Psychology and the Identity-Conflict Debate: Is a 'China Threat' Inevitable?" European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 2 (2005): pp.256-257, Jonathan Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity," International Organization 49, no. 2 (1995): p.233.
298 Flockhart, "'Complex Socialisation': A Framework for the Study of State Socialization," pp.90 & 92.
299 Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? , p.43. 104
Similar to the notion of a collective identity, the ‘social group’ is defined as ‘one that is psychologically significant for the members, to which they relate themselves subjectively for social comparison and the acquisition of norms and values’.300 In this context, SIT argues that individuals and communities that fit within the umbrella of a collective identity (social identity) will attach a strong sense of importance to their membership of that social group. These groups utilise their acquired norms and values for the purpose of comparing and evaluating their sense of ‘self’ with other social groups comprising of contrasting collective identities.301 In other words, communities of all types (including security communities) tend to draw boundaries around themselves in order to ‘differentiate between themselves and outsiders’. Thus, the theory argues that once actors identify themselves as part of the same group then they will interact, trade and bargain with each other in terms of absolute gain. However, when dealing with actors who are identified, consciously or unconsciously, as being outside the ‘grouping’ then how they interact, trade and bargain will be conducted on the basis of relative gain (as opposed to absolute gain). According to Hemmer and Katzenstein, these ‘findings have been consistent across studies even with the flimsiest and most arbitrarily defined groups’.302
Identity is a relative phenomena. The notion of a relative differentiation between groups with differing levels of identity divergence was most recently suggested in the work of Flockhart where it was argued that:
What actually happens is that identities are constructed through complex constellations of ‘we‐groups’ in a system of social groups consisting of the ‘Self’/‘We’, placed in a hierarchical system between the ‘Other’ and what I call the ‘Significant We’. The ‘Other’ defines what the ‘Self’/‘We’ is not and what it
300 John Turner, Rediscovering the Social Group (Basil Blackwell: Oxford, 1987), p.1.Similarly, but at the individual unit of analysis, Henri Tajfel has defined social identity as ‘that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group … together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership’. Cited in: Gries, "Social Psychology and the Identity-Conflict Debate: Is a 'China Threat' Inevitable?" p.240.
301 Flockhart, "'Complex Socialisation': A Framework for the Study of State Socialization," p.94.
302 Hemmer and Katzenstein, "Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism." 105
seeks to distance itself from, whereas the ‘Significant We’ is as important (perhaps even more so) for the construction of identities, as is the other’.303
For example, in the context of democratic norms transfer within Europe, the European Union could be conceptualised as the ‘Significant We’. In this example, the ‘other’ would be represented by the contrasting communities perceived as pursuing core values at variance from those of the EU.304 The importance of the Significant We has been evidenced by a myriad of social psychology studies illustrating a fundamental desire to associate and assimilate with compatible groups (e.g. those that evidence a compatible collective identity) based on several factors: existential distress, uncertainty reduction, and desires for inclusion, belonging, and self‐esteem.305 Of these factors, self‐esteem has received the most attention. This is not to suggest that it is because individuals and/or communities seek self esteem that they associate with a group but, rather, to the extent that individuals associate with a social group they gain or lose ‘collective self esteem’ from that social group’s achievements and failures.306 These findings are relevant to ASEAN because if membership does not provide adequate self‐esteem then the members will either leave the group307 or be less influenced by its leadership and normative values.
The theory can also be applied to examine how states will relate to one another within the region and on a multilateral basis with actors exogenous to the region. For example, when a group of people in one Asian state (State A) deal with another group of people from a different Asian state (State B), then where there continues to exist adequate differences in the constituent elements of identity (e.g. language, culture, religious systems etc) then the
303 Flockhart, "'Complex Socialisation': A Framework for the Study of State Socialization," p.94.
304 Ibid.
305 Gries, "Social Psychology and the Identity-Conflict Debate: Is a 'China Threat' Inevitable?" p.241.
306 Jennifer Crocker and Riia Luhtanen, "Collective Self-Esteem and In-group Bias," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 58, no. 1 (1990): pp.62-63. These findings reflect, to a certain extent, the arguments of Wendt who suggested that a state’s desire ‘for predictability in [its] relationships with the world’ drives state actors to ‘seek recognition as an actor by others…’ Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (1994): p.385.
307 Flockhart, "'Complex Socialisation': A Framework for the Study of State Socialization," p.95. 106
relations may be best characterised as that of relative gain (competitive) and these identities will be seen to be mutually exclusive of one another. However, if the analysis is enlarged to three or more actors operating under some multilateral mechanism (e.g. the ARF) and one of the state actors is an external state (State C, e.g. the US) then relative to the external state (the ‘other’), the identities of states A and B will converge in the eyes of all parties involved. Under these circumstances, states A and B do not perceive each other as ‘others’ but as members of the same ‘We’ within a wider common identity.308 Thus, the ‘outsider’ will be competing against two states (A and B) that are bargaining as one (in terms of absolute gain). This has the practical benefit of increasing their collective bargaining power. This outcome may provide an additional ‘theoretical’ thread in the explanation of ASEAN’s formation and various occasions when the ASEAN states have responded collectively to exogenous threats and issues.309 Further, and as far as ASEAN’s security community project is concerned, the success of the proposal will be achieved ‘through the inscription of boundaries, which serve to demarcate an ‘inside’ from an ‘outside’, a ‘self’ from an ‘other’, a ‘domestic’ from a ‘foreign’.310
At the individual state unit of analysis, because of the propensity for state actors to identify with the collective identity of their own nation and to imbue their ‘national identities with positive value’, then when ‘such positivity is challenged, leading to … consequential, … relative comparisons with … salient external nations…’ a state becomes more likely to promote competition leading to ‘the rivalry of two or more groups for limited material or
308 Ibid.
309 There have been a number of occasions when ASEAN has been able to apply a unified position in response to challenges that have arisen from states exogenous to the grouping. One example pertains to the censure by ASEAN of China following its occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995 (Chapter VII). See: Dana R Dillon, Contemporary Security Challenges in Southeast Asia [Dow Jones Interactive Database] (Parameters, 1997 [cited 28 April 2002]); available from http://ptg.djnr.com, Lieutenant Michael Studeman, Calculating China's Advances in the South China Sea: Identifying the Triggers of Expansionism (NWC Review, 1998 [cited 21 October 2002]); available from http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/1998/spring/art5-sp8.htm. Another example relates to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and how this ‘galvanized ASEAN political cooperation and sustained its role as a diplomatic community’ (Chapter V). Khoo, ASEAN as A "Neighborhood Watch Group" (cited).
310 David Campbell, cited in: Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? , p.43. 107
symbolic purposes’.311 According to Gries, the occurrence of competition is a necessary precondition for the initiation of conflict. Furthermore, the development of ‘We’ identification and ‘Other’ hostility is ‘progressive and contingent rather than necessary and inevitable’.312 Thus, and as Figure 3.1 illustrates below, conflict represents the last stage in a four stage process. In this figure, the transition from stages 1 to 2 is taken as automatic but the transition between stages 2 and 3 and between stages 3 and 4 is considered progressive and contingent. It is at the juncture of these later stages that social comparison takes place and – where the identity and national interests of a state are challenged – competition will only arise at the lower levels of comprehensive integration when such comparisons are salient, consequential and zero sum.313 Further, in order for conflict to take place the ‘agents’ must not view each other as either a ‘We’ or ‘Significant We’: the challenge for ASEAN therefore becomes how it can develop a region‐wide collective identity that delivers enough trust and esteem to create a collective identity or, alternatively, a ‘Significant We’.
Figure 3.1. From Identification to Competition and Conflict
In-Group In-Group Int er-Group Int er-Group Identification Posit ivit y Com pet it ion Co n f li ct
Automatic Progressive/ Prog re ssive/ Contingent Contingent
Source: Compiled by author
Notwithstanding the exceptions listed above, in summary, and in returning to the rational actor argument (as discussed in the previous chapter), it can be argued that a state actor
311 Gries, "Social Psychology and the Identity-Conflict Debate: Is a 'China Threat' Inevitable?" p.237.
312 Ibid.
313 Ibid. Gries provides a detailed list of exceptions that could act to prevent the emergence of competition leading to hostility. Because these exceptions, such as social mobility and social creativity are subjective, ambiguous and apply awkwardly to the current security community framework, this study rejects them in favour of a return to some additional ideational considerations within the constructivist literature to build further on the discussion of norms and identity in the context of social identity theory, namely, trust and knowledge. 108
will generally make decisions based on costs and benefits in a way that is normally perceived as being rational. However, this analysis of costs and benefits and its relationship to the pursuit of national interests are informed by both material and normative concerns. For example, how a state may perceive another state’s military structure and any subsequent increase in military capability can be partially informed by how closely they both understand and identify with that other state’s elite. Where there are strong ideational differences that impact on normative behaviour the military capacity in one state may be deemed a threat and therefore a reason to increase one’s own military capability (e.g. power balancing) whereas the same military capacity in another neighbour – but one with a lower level of normative and ideational differences – may be seen as non‐threatening.
The same considerations apply to other areas and tiers of this analysis. For example, while normative and ideational factors may very well influence decisions to cooperate in the security, economic and political realms, and the pursuit of power, balances of power, and the associated security dilemma remain relevant to this security community framework at lower levels of comprehensive integration. At higher levels of comprehensive integration, the security dilemma is reduced and, eventually, mitigated. The processes contributing to how a state will act at any given moment and how it will evolve in the future are thus both material and ideational in nature (e.g. collective identity) and their sum‐total provides the basis for assessing the structure of a state and whether its structure (morphology) is compatible (for the purpose of integration) with the morphologies of other states. The necessity of a compatibility of morphologies is the subject of the discussion below.
Morphological Compatibility: Further Causation behind Cooperation
In building on the preceding arguments, and for states (together with national interests that shape foreign policies) to move beyond the types of relations and circumstances that are explained by the realist model (as depicted by a lower level of integration), there first needs to be greater compatibility between the various systems of government, economic structures, and ideational values. To this end, the study introduces the concept of a Compatibility of Morphologies (COM) as a bridge between the domestic and interstate tiers of analysis. COM seeks to further the framework’s explanation of how and when states 109
integrate and cooperate at the transnational level and in the political, security and/or economic realms. For the purpose of this framework compatible morphologies are defined as the entire set of material and ideational factors within a state that have the potential to complement (if positive), or conflict (if negative), with other categories of structures in other states with which interaction takes place. In contrast to the concept of social identity theory, but also as a complement to it, morphological compatibility is not so much concerned with actors (agency) as it is with norms and structure.
As distinct from the agency/structure concept, here the term morphology is also applied to include a far broader consideration of the compatibility of material morphologies (structures). Such considerations including political (democratic vs. authoritarian) and economic complementarities (such as income levels, extent of education and the number of skilled workers) as well as systems (open market vs. closed market). For example, at the material level of analysis a compatibility of morphologies can be seen to be necessary when two or more states attempt to integrate economically and socially (e.g. as the borders between the two states become more porous in nature). In this event – as with globalisation – the process will result in certain costs including areas of friction arising from the need to make domestic policy adjustments at both the elite and communal levels. Thus, if Singapore and Myanmar were to remove any mutual visa requirements for the purpose of work, then the current disparity in wages between the two could result (the issue of distance and transportation aside) in a sudden and massive influx of unskilled labour – along with the obvious social problems that would ensue. In this sense, it can be stated that the higher the level of structural compatibility the lower the ‘cost’ of cooperation and integration.
By contrast, the various ideational structures relevant to COM reflect the concepts articulated by the earlier components of the framework including differences and incompatibilities in norms and identity – e.g. language, culture, and religion. Thus, and at the ideational level of analysis, it can be stated that the higher the level of structural incompatibility – and the more the national interests of each state conflict (rather than complement) with one another – the greater the pursuit of power in order to coerce or manipulate the policies of weaker states to better coincide with the national interests of the 110
more powerful state. Therefore, an increase in incompatibility between the national interests of the different states (along with a reciprocal increase in the level of structural incompatibility) in parallel increases the degree to which a state’s behaviour reflects the assumptions of the realist paradigm. In this sense, and in building on the second chapter’s theory of integration, realist behaviour is caused by specific empirical factors rather than being a predestined and unavoidable fact or ‘reality’. The test of ‘structural compatibility’, therefore, represents an outsider’s assessment of the comparative differences of both material and ideational factors at the domestic levels across and between states.
Empirical Connections: From Exogenous Influences to Multilateral Cooperation and Relations
To this point, the chapter has touched on a number of the conceptual and empirical factors required to explain the processes behind comprehensive integration and the convergence of interests between the foreign policies of states necessary to such integration. The section here considers the role of exogenous influences (including globalisation) together with the role of cooperation in enhancing the security of Southeast Asia. As mentioned in Chapter II, factors exogenous to a grouping of states can act to either galvanise a regional identity or militate against its formation. Although the impact of exogenous factors is only briefly considered at various junctures throughout the remaining chapters it is important to briefly identify the manner in which exogenous factors can impact on security community formation for the purpose of presenting a relatively complete framework. However, and in correlation with the types of issues covered in the empirical chapters that follow, the second section provides a more substantial consideration of the factors motivating bilateral and multilateral cooperation while the third section considers some of the domestic factors relevant to security community formation. The arguments in the subsections below, together with the section that follows, have been structured in a way that seeks to further enhance the empirical linkages between the conceptual discussions above and their application to the empirical research agenda of later chapters. 111
Globalisation and Exogenous Pressures for Cooperation
The role of exogenous influences can be seen in the context of globalisation. According to Griffiths and O’Callaghan, globalisation ‘refers to the acceleration and intensification of mechanisms, processes, and activities that are allegedly purporting global interdependence…’ (and one could add heightened global vulnerability) as well as ‘…ultimately, global political and economic integration’.314 This broad definition, complete with the authors’ inclusion of the ‘political’, better reflects the reality in as far as ascertaining the motives behind foreign policy, cooperation and integration are concerned. For example, the globalisation of technology means that the security of a state can be penetrated by factors ranging from weapons proliferation to the internet.315
Globalisation has also dramatically increased the non‐traditional (comprehensive) threats to state security. The opportunities for business provided by globalisation, such as the revolution in information technology and communications, the porousness of state borders (thus allowing for ease of entry and exit by people, goods, capital, and information), and the accompanying economic and political changes, have also provided the same opportunities for the continued development of organised crime.316 The economic aspects of globalisation have also enhanced the vulnerability of states to the economic policies (positive or negative)
314 Griffiths and O'Callaghan, International Relations: The Key Concepts, pp.126-127. Nonetheless, there has been very little consensus on either the definition of the term or the effects of the phenomena. Capling, Considine and Crozier for example, state that ‘most commentators agree that globalisation refers to the emergence of a global economy which is characterised by uncontrollable market forces and new economic actors such as transnational corporations, international banks and other financial institutions’. Ann Capling, Mark Considine, and Michael Crozier, Australian Politics in the Global Era (Melbourne: Addison Wesley Longman, 1998), p.5. See also: David Held, Debating Globalization (Cambridge: Polity, 2005). By contrast, Jan Art Sholte states that ‘the only consensus about globalisation is that it is contested’. Jan Aart Scholte, Globalisation: A Critical Introduction (Hampshire: MacMillan Press Ltd, 2000), p.39.
315 Kacowicz, "Regionalization, Globalization, and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent or Overlapping?" p.538.
316 John McFarlane, "Transnational Crime and Illegal Immigration in the Asia-Pacific Region: Background, Prospects and Countermeasures,” (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1999), p.1, Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, [cited 30 September 2001]); available from http://www.modelun.org/naimun/bg_RO_ASEAN.html. In this respect, non-traditional security issues such as transnational crime, as exacerbated by the consequences of globalisation – provide added incentive for neighbouring states to cooperate either bilaterally or multilaterally. One example that is covered by the empirical analysis in later chapters includes the economic and social consequences of narcotics production and trafficking (Chapters IX). 112
of other major economies and economic actors. For example, and as Chapter VII will outline, the advent of greater global interdependence directly contributed to the collapse of the Indonesian economy (including the Suharto regime) and the disintegration of consensus vis‐ à‐vis regional macroeconomic policies.
In order to overcome the dilemmas presented by this global phenomenon, states have sought to reduce their security dilemma through the promotion of cooperative security (as opposed to competitive security). In this context, and as discussed in Chapter II, balance of power theorising can also become applicable as states may pursue a collective balance of power to create a ‘just equilibrium’ vis‐à‐vis potential or actual external forces and/or hegemons.317 The maintenance of this ‘just equilibrium’ is central to a balance of power where states seek to deny hegemony on a bilateral (at low integration) or regional and global basis.318 If so, then the maintenance of a balance of power vis‐à‐vis extra‐mural actors (a just equilibrium) could push a convergence in identity with regard to some foreign policy issues and form one additional motivation for the pursuit of a security community. In other words, the desire to mitigate any sense of insecurity to flow from the process of globalisation, in turn, drives a desire to cooperate and comprehensively integrate with like‐ minded and/or compatible states.
In summary: at a low level of integration, the uncertainties provided by the effects of globalisation (e.g. greater exposure to the policies and competition provided by external actors) can act to initiate the process of comprehensive integration. This is because the increased susceptibility of states to globalist forces, especially as an outcome of economic liberalisation and the interdependence that ensues, has had major repercussions at all the levels of analysis – the individual, state, regional and international system. Therefore, the emergence of a security community can be driven by exogenous actors, and the related
317 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.42.
318 Traditionally, a balance of power exists when no individual state is in a position to maintain hegemony over another state or states. This balance of power analysis can be applied at the bilateral, multilateral, regional, and global levels. Griffiths and O'Callaghan, International Relations: The Key Concepts, p.12. 113
processes of globalisation, illustrated by a greater sense of vulnerability and interdependence with exogenous security and economic actors, forces and influences – whether positively or negatively defined.319 The comments below consider some further factors in the determination of when, where and how states cooperate and, through processes of socialisation, how they eventually integrate politically and economically. These comments also consider the impact and outcome of the processes of cooperation on the security architecture of Southeast Asia.
Bilateral vs. Multilateral Relations and the Pathways to Integration
Within a region, or between a grouping of two or more states, cooperation can be generalised as taking place on either a bilateral or multilateral basis. As will be seen, amidst groupings of states that that have not progressed beyond the nascent phases of collective identity formation, or comprehensive integration more generally, bilateral initiatives (rather than multilateral) for the development of cooperation in the security and political (if not economic) realms tend to be the most common. Under such circumstances (where there is little sense of the collective good or of an obligation to reciprocate), the material benefits of cooperation would usually need to outweigh the material benefits of competition. Thus, and in the context of Southeast Asia, Amitav Acharya suggests it ‘may have been the region’s extreme diversity’ that accounts for an evident preference towards bilateralism rather than multilateralism and/or the establishment of multilateral institutions.320
319 For ASEAN, the unifying influence of various events and pressures in the international system was a point well articulated by Michael Leifer. An example of such influence was provided in the context of Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea. Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia, p.152. In fact, and as Bellamy states, a key issue that has been overlooked within the security community literature to date has been the role and impact of exogenous actors. Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? For this reason, and in building on Bellamy's work, various components of the analysis in later chapters focus on the role and influence of exogenous actors in the potential formation of a security community.
320 Amitav Acharya, Multilateralism: Is There an Asia-Pacific Way? (The National Bureau of Asian Research, 1997 [cited 2 May 2002]); available from www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/vol8no2/v8n2.pdf. This diversity applies to the economic, political, cultural and security conditions that have prevailed, and continue to prevail, at the regional and local levels. Jawhar adds, ‘It’s not ASEAN, ASEAN is an umbrella, but the real nitty gritty, and the tensions and the frictions, and the misunderstanding, the real management of conflict is done at the bilateral level …’ Interview with Dato’ Mohamed Jawhar bin Hassan, ISIS (Kuala Lumpur), 13 December 2001. 114
The level of diversity extant within Southeast Asia is a major obstacle to the convergence of common interests and a collective identity (a fact highlighted by the remaining chapters in the study). Should Acharya be correct, as is most likely the case, then the role of regional cooperation becomes even more prominent as the second wave literature on norms treats regional (and international) cooperation as ‘either an outcome of normative influence on state‐actor behaviour or a process by which particular norms are diffused to state and domestic actors… [where] the emergence of shared transnational norms and ideas … is generated by cooperation and is transmitted to domestic politics’.321 Thus, and in returning to the notion of morphological compatibility, Figure 3.2 below depicts how the greater the morphological compatibility the easier it is to agree to multilateral cooperation. In turn, the greater the frequency with which bilateral and multilateral cooperation takes place the more rapidly an ASEAN wide identity (as constituted by the aforementioned ideational attributes including the degree to which identifiable norms are entrenched) is diffused to the domestic and elite levels of each member state involved in such cooperation.
321 O'Neill, Balsiger, and VanDeveer, "Actors, Norms, and Impact: Recent International Cooperation Theory and the Influence of the Agent-Structure Debate." 115
Figure 3.2. From Morphological Compatibility to Multilateralism in Southeast Asia
Source: Compiled by author
Despite the difficulty of extending cooperation beyond the bilateral level, multilateralism has the potential to play a major role in the establishment of peace and dependable expectations of peaceful change. In the Southeast Asian example, the formation of ASEAN and the ARF has been taken to indicate an acceptance in principle (by at least a significant proportion of the elite) of the benefits of multilateralism and cooperative security. Aside from the earlier mentioned issues pertaining to trust, predictability, and compatibilities of identity and structures, the pursuit of multilateralism is generally fuelled by a further three factors. First, it indicates a desire for economic liberalism and an acceptance that economic interdependence and integration is unavoidable.322 Second, multilateralism has been and continues to be perceived as a problem solving exercise aimed at preventing and containing
322 Economic liberalism leads to interdependence and it is possible to presume that interdependent states have a self-interest in the avoidance of conflict and war amongst themselves. Wolfram F. Hanreider, "Dissolving International Politics: Reflections on the Nation-State," in Perspectives on World Politics, ed. Michael Smith and Richard Little (London: Routledge, 1998), p.143. 116
any conflict generating scenarios (historical and potential).323 Third, multilateralism can be viewed to act as a buffer against the unpredictabilities posed by the global environment.324 In the context of this third point, and as previously discussed, when a state’s elite are committed to economic liberalisation (e.g. Singapore) then the advent of globalisation (e.g. greater exposure to policies and competition provided by external actors) can be considered an additional force in the propulsion of multilateral cooperation.
At the interstate level of analysis, there are a number of additional considerations before interstate cooperation is likely to occur. Firstly, there needs to be a convergence of interests at the inter‐state level across and between the members of the grouping. This may be facilitated by common comprehensive security problems or by other extra‐mural security and economic issues that are seen as a potential threat to the comprehensive security of two or more of the states within the grouping.325 Conceptually, the linkages between non‐ traditional security and the maintenance of an adequate level of traditional security have been addressed by the neo‐functionalists and the theories of international interdependence.326 These schools of thought advocate the notion of ‘spill‐over’ between high politics (traditional security) and low politics (non‐traditional security). This belief holds that “exchanges and cooperation among independent state actors in areas of ‘low politics’ such as economics and trade could incrementally create common stakes among them in
323 Acharya, Multilateralism: Is There an Asia-Pacific Way? (cited).
324 As Acharya states, ‘in the economic arena, there were serious concerns regarding the future of the world trading system, (concerns that have largely been reduced by the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round, but which were a substantial factor behind the initial interest in APEC), the consequent fears regarding the emergence of discriminating regional trade blocs in North America and Europe, and trade tensions between the United States and Japan. These concerns have been paralleled in the security sphere by anxieties regarding the relationships among the major powers’. Ibid. (cited).
325 The qualifying reference to ‘two or more states in the grouping’ is made because this part of the discussion focuses on the initiating factors of interstate integration as opposed to the sense of loyalty and reciprocity found at higher levels of integration when a grouping of states is closer to the characterization of a security community.
326 This stemmed from Deutsch’s theory of integration in the first place. Griffiths and O'Callaghan, International Relations: The Key Concepts, p.155. 117
areas of ‘high politics’”.327 For example, the emergence of comprehensive security issues commonly perceived to exist (flowing from the domestic, regional, and international levels) can entail a convergence of interests resulting in greater cooperation – cooperation that may spill over to traditional security issues and the reduction of conflict initiators.
In returning to the considerations within the first section of this chapter, shared comprehensive security problems in themselves (especially when of a transnational nature) also facilitate social transactions reinforcing the socialisation process that takes place between state actors. Again, these social transactions facilitate a sense of collective identity leading to attempts to resolve additional comprehensive security threats resulting in a type of circular process that may explain some of the historical developments discussed within Chapter II. Perversely, and at the intra‐mural level, a degree of trust and collective identity formation may develop because of bilateral and multilateral disputes between and within a grouping of states. This is because, where mistrust exists in the beginning, initiatives can be undertaken (bilaterally and multilaterally),328 that can and do work to alleviate the level of tension as well as lessen any associated mistrust and potential for strategic miscalculation – as is shown by the example of the confidence and security building mechanisms discussed below. Indeed, the extent (frequency) of bilateral and multilateral initiatives for cooperation that takes place within a group of states represents a key process in integrating the grouping and developing a sense of community that entails trust, reciprocity, and we‐feeling.
Multilateralism has complex possibilities. Within the scholarly literature, and as mentioned in Chapter IV, there are three general categories of initiatives that can be implemented on a multilateral basis to overcome issues of mistrust and animosity: Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), Preventative Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution Procedures.329
327 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, p.32.
328 Multilateral initiatives maybe developed under the direction and support of a regional organisation such as ASEAN or the EU.
329 Desjardins, "Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures," p.5. 118
The progressive implementation of these initiatives reflects increasing levels of trust between the participant states – especially at the high end with the implementation of conflict resolution procedures. Both preventative diplomacy and conflict resolution procedures do, however, also indicate the existence of unresolved disputes or social problems in the first place. Therefore, preventative diplomacy and CRPs are evolutionary processes that in the beginning, indicate a degree of trust by at least some actors in a potential or emerging community (despite the presence of certain social problems and disagreements that may have created the need for them in the first place); but later, and through their successful utilisation, can result in the final resolution of the problems that impeded the formation of a security community during the earlier stages of comprehensive integration.
CSBMs, for their part, provide greater transparency behind government decisions and this facilitates both the process of developing trust and we‐feeling; as well as leading to a reduction in the likelihood of armed conflict.330 While ASEAN has been relatively successful in contributing to the initial phase of CSBMs (e.g. thousands of track I and II meetings between 1994 and 2003 throughout the Asia Pacific),331 later chapters will illustrate that the Association has been far less successful as far as preventative diplomacy and conflict resolution procedures are concerned. This is because a higher level of trust, collective identity formation and integration is necessary before preventative diplomacy and (later) conflict resolution procedures will come into play. The implementation of these mechanisms would be a consequence of adequate levels of collective identity formation and morphological compatibility (at the elite level at least) to reduce threat perceptions via increased trust and predictability.
330 Ibid, p.18.
331 The Dialogue and Research Monitor (DRM)331 listed close to 300 Track-One meetings that were conducted on a multilateral basis. In same period, there have been close to 450 Track-Two meetings conducted on a multilateral basis and close to 1500 on a bilateral basis. Further, of the multilateral Track-Two meetings that have taken place, it has been estimated that there have been over 15,000 participants. The DRM is located at: http://www.jcie.or.jp. 119
The Internal Consolidation of the State: The Domestic Foundation of Cooperation
In addition to interactions, transactions and thereby socialisation, the morphological compatibility of a state can be enhanced through the aforementioned process of comprehensive integration (Chapter II). Such processes can be state‐driven (agency) through a virtually unlimited number of state and regionally driven initiatives and policies. For example, the teaching of a common language can contribute to decreases in transaction costs by enhancing the compatibility of the work force and the promotion of trade and exchange at the elite level. A common language also has ideational effects by increasing, for example, the amount of communication that takes place between different ethnic and religious communities both within and across state borders. While an unlimited number of other pathways towards a compatibility of morphologies potentially exist, they can be broadly analysed according to three levels of analysis: the international system, intra‐group relations (such as cooperation and integration) and the domestic security architecture of the individual member‐states. By considering the processes that act to stabilise and simultaneously build the capacity of a state at the domestic level, this section seeks to highlight not just the major pathways but also the preconditions for identity convergence and a compatibility of morphologies for the evolution towards a security community.
Since the end goal of a security community is the impossibility of war and violent conflict, an understanding of the processes that inform a state’s foreign policy together with its morphological compatibility is important. According to Joseph Frankel’s classic formulation, the key to an understanding of foreign policy is an understanding of the national interests that inform it and this is defined as the ‘sum‐total of all national values’.332 Reynolds further qualifies the earlier discussion of ideational and political survival with a formulation based on goals, the most important of which are, ‘state survival, wealth maximisation, and the
332 This is especially so given foreign policy is defined as consisting of ‘decisions and actions which involve to some appreciable extent relations between one state and another’. Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision Making (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p.1. 120
preservation and promotion of values’.333 These foreign policy goals link back to the discussion within Chapter II on the application of traditional and comprehensive security issues; put simply, while the pursuit of traditional security at one level stems from the goal of state survival vis‐à‐vis external actors (e.g. through freedom from threats and coercion), it also implies a bottom‐up approach where there is the need to maintain an adequate level of domestic stability to ensure the continuation of state and/or regime survival. Thus, wealth maximisation, for example, can be viewed as but one example from this study’s tool‐set where the pursuit of economic security leads to a heightened sense of traditional security that, in turn, enhances the prospects for state survival or, as described in Chapter IV, national resilience.334
If the contentions above are accepted – and we add the caveat that the ‘national interests’ of the state, as opposed to foreign policy, are reflective of both domestic and external interests – then we can formulate some prediction as to the primary national interests of a given state based on the sum total of its domestic and external problems. If a state is only newly formed and its people are divided by ethnicity, religion, language (or any combination of these), then it is likely that a significant percentage of a state’s resources will be devoted to the process of nation‐building (discussed and defined below).335 If a state is dominated by an authoritarian regime, then the national interests may be further confined to the pursuit of nation‐building for the express purpose of regime‐survival – as in the case of
333 Reynolds, An Introduction to International Relations, p.49.
334 The concept of internal consolidation, as developed in this study, has some common ground with the philosophy behind ‘national resilience’ and ‘regional resilience’ and the perceived interdependence between the two ideas. Thus, while national resilience was perceived by Suharto to build regional resilience the reverse was also considered true as far as the benefits of regional resilience were concerned. As Michael Leifer stated, ‘[b]y cultivating intra-mural accord and so reducing threats among themselves, the ASEAN states would be able to devotes themselves through the instrumentality of economic development to the common cause of political stability’. Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia, p.2.
335 While a number of states continue to actively pursue ‘nation-building policies’ and the term is at times referred to in their policy statements, the concept was originally a staple concept of the development oriented political science in the 1960s and 1970s. See for example: David Ernest Apter, Choice and the Politics of Allocation: A Developmental Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971). 121
Myanmar.336 The greater the number of domestic issues and concerns that exist and shape the national interests of a state; the more this deflects from a focus on national interests understood in terms of regional and/or international goals. Thus, when Suharto and his New Order regime came to an end following the collapse of the Indonesian economy (e.g. a loss of national resilience), it was widely perceived throughout the region that Indonesia had lost its reputation and capacity to act as a leader and ‘first among equals’ within ASEAN. In order to overcome the domestic obstacles to security community formation a state needs to internally consolidate. For the purpose of internal consolidation, Figure 3.3 outlines the three primary procedural phases of ‘economic management’, ‘nation‐building’, and ‘security sector reform’.337 As with the primary components of a security community (including comprehensive integration), the procedural phases are each mutually interdependent with one another.
336 National interests can be interpreted narrowly as the national interests of the elite rather than society as a whole or, alternatively, they can be broader and more egalitarian in nature with the pursuit of what benefits the entire society of the state. This may, at times, follow a trend where states that are more democratic tend to form opinions about their national interests based on what is good for the state’s society as a whole whereas the national interests of authoritarian regimes can tend to be narrower and may be limited, or at least prioritised towards, regime survival.
337 Alagappa has since referred to a similar process called ‘state consolidation’ and this is based on the building of nations, constructing viable political systems and strengthening state capacity. Alagappa, "Introduction: Predictability and Stability Despite Changes," p.20. 122
Figure 3.3. The Internal Consolidation of the State
Normative Driven Procedural (Co mmunal Influence on State Phases Policy)
Both processes Security Economic exist to one degree Nation Building Sector Management and or another Reform Capacity
Normative Social Cohesion & Creating Collective Identity Formation (State Driven) within the State
Internal Consolidation Outward Orientation of (The Emergence of a National Policy Nation-State)
Regional Cooperation Where there is identification and morphological Comprehe nsive compatibility Int e grat io n
Source: Compiled by author
The Internal Consolidation of the State: Economic Management
In the example of Southeast Asia, the internal consolidation of some states in the region, along with the development of political legitimacy, has been largely facilitated by a ‘focus on economic development since about the mid 1960s’.338 As witnessed in Singapore, Brunei and Malaysia, economic development helps to equip the state with increased resources to be able to assist in both security sector reform and nation‐building. Security sector reform can be facilitated when the state redirects increased resources and funding towards the education and professionalisation of various state actors including the military, the police, and the various organs of government. Adequate wages and professional training can
338 Ibid, p.21. 123
further curtail corruption and facilitates the successful institutionalisation of a separation of powers in the long‐term. Of equal importance is the increased ability not only to resolve domestic security problems but also to resolve the root causes behind them. The resolution of these issues links to the concept of nation‐building and the ability of the state to provide such services as independent non‐secular education. However, and in an increasingly globalised world, the greatest challenge for states is to develop internally whilst at the same time building social structures and protective mechanisms that can cope with, and benefit from, regional and global markets and economies.
The internal Consolidation of the State: Nation-Building
The process of nation‐building is important in at least two respects. From a state perspective, it has the goal of creating domestic security (sometimes referred to as ‘state‐ building’). Also, and in the context of the scholarly literature, its purpose is to increase the number of common elements of social communication to build social cohesion and the formation of a collective identity.339 Identity is similarly central to the concept of a nation; a ‘nation’ simply defined, is a ‘body of people who feel they are a nation’.340 Deutsch takes this approach a step further by specifying that the existence of a nation requires a community organised around a particular system of social communication.341 The idea of ‘nation‐building’ is central to all three primary levels of a community or communities within a given state – the elite, middle class (bourgeois), and communal levels. In returning to the framework adopted in the first section, the identity of a state is influenced, eventually, by how the elites and society of a state have been socialised over the long‐term by various nation‐building policies. Any pluralist and unifying policies that are implemented to this end act to reinforce the collective identity of the state. These nation‐building policies, when
339 Karin von Hippel, "Democracy by Force: A Renewed Commitment to Nation Building," The Washington Quarterly (2000): p.96, Sutherland, "Another Nation Building Bloc? Integrating National Ideology into the EU and ASEAN," p.142.
340 Karklins, "The Concept of Collective Identity", p.5.
341 Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience, pp.36-37. See also: Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967). 124
combined with adequate security sector reform and sound economic management, should provide sufficient internal consolidation within the state (including social cohesion and collective identity formation) to result in the creation of a stable nation‐state.342
A nation‐state exists where the inhabitants of a state consider themselves members of one nation as constituted by the state,343 that is to say, members of a ‘Significant We’.344 As in Figure 3.3 above, internal consolidation – in addition to being aided by cooperation in the economic, political and security arenas – also has a reciprocal effect by facilitating more resources to allow for an outward orientation of a state’s national policy resulting in heightened regional participation, cooperation, and comprehensive integration. In the case of Southeast Asia, the construction of a nation‐state can be aided by other ASEAN states and the international community (especially the major powers) but in the end, the successful internal consolidation of a state ultimately depends on how the people and leaders of the state undertake, implement, and respond to the process.345 Given that in some of the ASEAN states, the internal challenges to security are greater than the external threats (e.g. in Myanmar, Indonesia and possibly Thailand and the Philippines) it is important for many of the ASEAN states to achieve further internal consolidation.346
342 Griffiths and O'Callaghan, International Relations: The Key Concepts, pp.207-208.
343 Kacowicz adds, ‘[it] is a geographically bounded legal entity under a single and recognized government, the population of which psychologically considers itself to be related, through historical, linguistic, racial, or other links’. Kacowicz, "Regionalization, Globalization, and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent or Overlapping?" p.532. See also: Griffiths and O'Callaghan, International Relations: The Key Concepts, p.209.
344 As discussed in relation to social identity theory, this does not mean a complete abandonment of other identities across and within the territorial boundaries of the state as constituted on the basis of culture, ethnicity, and religion. As stated earlier, the process only refers to the idea that the ‘category of the collective is part of the self-conception of individuals’. Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? , p.38.
345 Alagappa, "Introduction: Predictability and Stability Despite Changes," p.20.
346 Alagappa, "Constructing Security Order in Asia: Conception and Issues," p.80. As mentioned in the literature review, Tim Huxley argued that ‘weak statehood’ along with historical ethnic and geographical factors, are the key variables in the facilitation of ASEAN’s core security problems’. Huxley, Insecurity in the ASEAN Region. 125
Similar to the notion of comprehensive integration, and as Figure 6.3 also depicted, there are two methods by which the nation‐building process can occur. It can be state driven (norm‐creating), where elite‐led state policies drive the salience of norms at the communal level; or alternatively, it can be communally driven (norm‐driven) where communal groups influence and/or coerce the nation‐building polices of the state. While the nation‐building process can be advanced through any combination of these push/pull factors, a successful nation‐building process is usually highly dependent on a pluralist (multicultural) state‐driven process. A pluralist nation‐building process refers to those nation‐building policies of a state that propel a convergence of the national identities in a state. An example of one method to address any incompatibilities in the national identity of the state is an education system that recognises and promotes understanding and accommodation between the ethnic and religious communities within the nation’s boundaries. This goal might also be achieved through guarantees for religious and cultural freedom and would normally involve a complete absence of the type of opportunistic scape‐goating of individual ethnic communities previously witnessed in parts of Southeast Asia.347
The Internal Consolidation of the State: Security Sector Reform
Security sector reform, in its most simplified construction, is the aim of the state to secure ‘armed, uniformed forces that are functionally differentiated [and] professional … under objective and subjective civilian control, at the lowest functional level of resource use’.348
347 Both Myanmar and Indonesia provide good examples of a negative state-driven nation building process. In the case of Indonesia and since independence in 1949, there have been more anti-Chinese riots than in any other country within Southeast Asia. Yong Leng Lee, "Race, Language, and National Cohesion in Southeast Asia," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 11, no. 1 (1980): p.128. This is because towards the end of the 1950s the anti- communist military largely blamed the local Chinese for communist insurgencies. The Chinese communities were utilized as a scapegoat to divert dissatisfaction away from both the Sukarno and Suharto regimes. Sukarno excluded all alien Chinese from retail and rural trade and the military also repatriated many Chinese nationals. Resented for their wealth and for their alleged involvement in communist insurgencies, massive numbers of Chinese were massacred. Carl H. Lande, "Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Accommodation, and Nation-Building in Southeast Asia," Studies in Comparative International Development 33, no. 4 (1999): p.101. In the case of Myanmar, its attempts at nation-building were, and continue to be, highly exclusionary in nature with tactics ranging from alien expulsion (i.e., the Indians and Pakistanis) or through the oppression and slaughter of those who would not submit themselves to the dominate regime-defined Burmese culture and religion.
348 Michael Brzoska, "The Concept of Security Sector Reform," in Security Sector Reform, ed. Connie Wall (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2000), p.6. See also: Tim Huxley, "Reforming Southeast Asia's Security Sectors,” (London: Kings College, 2001). 126
Here, the emphasis on the lowest functional level of resource is aimed at freeing governmental resources in the direction of the other two procedural phases (nation‐ building and economic management). Nicole Ball rightly broadens the branches of security sector reform to include civil authorities as well as civil and political society.349 This is because civil authorities have the important responsibility of policy development, while elements of civil and political societies have an important role in terms of developing policy and monitoring the activities of both the security forces and civil authorities. These different actors and bodies fall under the general umbrella of the ‘democratic security family’. ‘Legal process reform’ (as a sub‐framework to security sector reform) relates both to traditional security actors and to civil authorities. Legal process reform considers the various institutions of government that regulate, control, and maintain the rule of law. Adequate legal sector reform results in a government that is more efficient and less corrupt. This in turn produces greater investor confidence and greater levels of satisfaction (performance legitimacy) within the society of a given state.
Table 3.1. Security Sector Reform Levels and Objectives Levels of Analysis Objective of the Security Sector Institutional Level Professionalisation of forces (armed forces, police, paramilitary) Minimal resource use by the Economic Level security sector (Links to the goal and pursuit of economic development). Societal level Provision of physical security for the population Taken and adapted from ‘Brief 15: Security Sector Reform’, BICC 2000, p.7
Table 3.1 above illustrates the various objectives of security sector reform at three separate sociological levels of analysis. This table, and the tiers of analysis within it, also reflects a kind of co‐dependent relationship that exists between the economic and security realms at both the domestic and regional levels of analysis. As the ASEAN elites have realised, it is
349 Nicole Ball, Towards a Conceptual Framework for Security Sector Reform [Report] (Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2001 [cited 11 April 2001]); available from http://www.iir.ubc.ca/cancaps/conf2001/savage2001.PDF. 127
difficult for economic development (at the state or regional level) to take place in the absence of domestic and regional security.350 Thus, when instability develops (whether caused by military, economic, domestic, or non‐traditional security threats) international investors lose confidence and will shift their foreign direct investment (FDI) away from the state (or region) in crisis and towards environments more ‘popularly’ considered stable – such as China.
The requirements of security sector reform, economic development and a pluralist form of nation‐building have so far implied that the existence of democracy is an important factor behind the emergence of dependable expectations of peaceful change. This study therefore accepts the contentions that stem from the Kantian notion of democratic peace (as outlined in Chapter I). However, this is not to maintain that there is a strict division between the two poles of a spectrum where democracy sits at one end as a stabilising factor and authoritarianism sits at the other end of the spectrum as an erratic and destabilising force. To the contrary, recent reports from the Political Instability Task Force argue that both full democracies and full autocracies are the most stable while states undertaking a transition from autocracy to democracy are the most likely to suffer from political instability.351 Additionally, Deutsch seems to dismiss an absolute requirement for democracy by arguing that a commonality of ‘main values’ is sufficient for a possible security community to exist. He adds that where differences in economic and political values and norms do exist, then this does not necessarily prohibit the existence of a security community so long as its members avoid the development of a ‘militant missionary attitude’.352
350 ASEAN Tackles Terrorism and Trade [Internet] (BBC News, 2002 [cited 30 July 2002]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk.
351 The PITF studies are located at http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf. See for example: Jack A. Goldstone et al., "A Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability," in Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Washington, DC: Political Instability Task Force, 2005), pp.28-29.Vayrynen similarly contends that many semi-democratic (e.g. Colombia, India, Sri Lanka, and Northern Ireland) states have suffered more from large scale internal violence than have some authoritarian states. Vayrynen, "Stable Peace through Security Communities."
352 Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience, pp.123-125. 128
However, both Kocowicz and Vayrynen argue that in non‐democratic zones where interstate wars have been absent for a substantial period then the security architecture is best characterised as one of ‘negative peace’ – e.g. where security cooperation is minimal, the security dilemma is high, and the balance of power paradigm is strongly prevalent. A potential caveat to this assessment is provided by Benson and Kugler where they contend that the most important political distinction to be made between governments is the degree of government rather than form of government. In other words, efficient governments, rather than just democratic ones, are able to avoid violence at the domestic level.353 Nevertheless, and as Barry Buzan contends in the context of Southeast Asia, while fully‐ fledged democracy may not be necessary for internal order, it is certainly a huge asset.354
In building on the considerations above, it could be stated that it is the development of political and institutional capacity and structures that are the most important factors as far as domestic stability is concerned. Nevertheless, it is the existence of a degree of democracy and/or efficiency in government that propels, or is a consequence of, the formation of such institutions and structures. The types of structures and institutions that are typically existent in democracies (or efficient governments) place certain restraints and impose normative (as well as legal‐procedural) rules on the decision‐making process in foreign and domestic policy. The evolution and development of such institutions, structures, and ideational values results in a strategic environment that is more predictable in nature. Thus, in a stable democracy unexpected regime change (e.g. by way of a coup d’état), and the changes to domestic and foreign policy that go with it (with subsequence effects on regional relations), are reduced. Democracy and the ability to peacefully eject a state leader/actor (e.g. by way of election or through a parliamentary vote of no confidence) also has a moderating affect on the type of leader in power (e.g. less radical and generally more pragmatic). This is important, because as discussed in Chapter II, it is difficult for a group of states to evolve (in
353 Michelle Benson and Jacek Kugler, "Power Parity, Democracy, and the Severity of Internal Violence," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 2 (1998): pp.198-199.
354 Interestingly, he adds, none of the western arguments for the decline of war (democracy, interdependence, institutions etc) exists in East Asia. Buzan, "Security Architecture in Asia: The Interplay of Regional and Global Level." 129
terms of comprehensive integration) towards a security community in the absence of domestic stability and the stronger and more amicable relations that ensue. As the Kantians assert, political and economic liberalism increases the probability of such an outcome.355
One final qualification should be made at this juncture. The conceptual framework takes a pragmatic rather than ‘missionary’ attitude in relation to the ‘value’ and ‘role’ of democracy. It is therefore contended that democracy, and the related issue of security sector reform, are simply additional tools which help acquire domestic stability at one level, and peaceful relations, cooperation and integration at the other. The study recognises that where there is insufficient internal consolidation, then rapid democratisation can in fact be a destabilising factor – e.g. as was evidenced through the awkward transition towards democracy in Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union.356 More broadly, the processes of economic and security sector reform (e.g. a set of compatible workplace relations laws) can enhance the morphological compatibilities of the members of a community of states. The process of nation‐building also provides a positive contribution to structural compatibility at both the material and ideational levels. In terms of the ideational contribution (within the context of structural compatibility), positive pluralist education policies (associated with nation‐ building) also contribute to the forging of common bonds and “we‐ness” across states (as opposed to policies that enhance hatred, discrimination and racism).357
The Characteristics of a Security Community and the Pathways to their Emergence in Summary
Like Southeast Asia, this security community framework is ‘multilayered, multidimensional, and multipronged’.358 The various components to this chapter, together with Chapter II,
355 O'Neal and Russett, "The Classic Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," pp.267-268.
356 Goldstone et al., "A Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability," pp.28-32.
357 Other areas of concern could include radical religious schools that explicitly or implicitly promote religious and/or racial hatred of people from competing religions.
358 Evans, Possibilities for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Track 2 and Track 1 (cited). 130
have attempted to outline some of the conceptual elements of the definition of a security community as well as the empirical factors that contribute to its emergence. What has been seen is that ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’ represents not only the end goal in the pursuit of a security community but also presents the theorist with the final and ultimate test of a security community’s existence. Likewise, and in reflecting the interdependence entailed by the notion of dependable expectations of peaceful change, the processes behind comprehensive integration are central to all the defining characteristics of a security community and it is on the formation of a mature security community that the states of that community can be said to be close to integrated.
While dependable expectations of peaceful change can exist where there is sufficient integration at the security, economic, political, and elite levels; this does not automatically translate into an amassed or cumulative status of being integrated. For example, it is foreseeable that certain transnational elements could have integrated themselves within an ascendant security community to a point where there exist dependable expectations of peaceful change; but there remain some components that are not yet integrated and therefore the overall characterisation would fall short of being adequately integrated for the purpose of a mature security community characterisation. Thus, the status of being integrated to the extent of a mature security community is an absolute test whereas dependable expectations of peaceful change can exist at a lower threshold and is relative to a pragmatic assessment of the empirical elements contributing to the comprehensive security architecture of the grouping – e.g. no remaining or potential conflict initiators. In summary, where there exist dependable expectations of peaceful change then, ipso facto, there exists (at least) a nascent security community. However, it is only when the states of the community are adequately integrated (based on the constituent elements listed in Chapter III) that they can properly be characterised as being members of a mature security community.
The processes that contribute to integration begin at all levels – that is, the domestic, state, transnational, and international levels. While there appears to be no specific law regarding the order of these processes, an analysis of the socio‐cultural history of the states examined 131
may indicate whether integration will be a natural outcome of evolution (communally‐ driven) or whether such integration must be engineered (state‐driven). Once the dominant processes for comprehensive integration have been determined then it is possible to hypothesise the order by which the processes behind comprehensive integration may emerge and/or become dominant at a given point in time – e.g. economic, political, and/or socio‐cultural. As indicated by the analysis, an increase of integration in one area can translate to a reciprocal increase between one or more alternative areas. Nevertheless, and before high levels of comprehensive integration can materialize at the transnational level, it is necessary for states to internally consolidate. Once internally consolidated, the leadership of a state will garner a greater capacity to focus on their foreign relations and will be less distracted by domestic concerns. The three processes behind internal consolidation – nation‐building, successful economic management (including capacity building) and security sector reform – are also interdependent and mutually reinforcing.
It is interesting to note that empirical investigations of the European Union, the world’s most preeminent multilateral security community, have indicated only a limited sense of collective identity at the communal level of analysis. There is however, a very strong sense of a collective identity at the diplomatic elite level and this has been a consequence of, inter alia, a multitude of social transactions over several decades which were facilitated, in part, by the processes of track one and track two dialogue. Recent international events (such as the invasion of Iraq) have shown some splits in the fabric of this identity but for the time being, the European Union does succeed in maintaining dependable expectations of peaceful change. For this reason, it is argued that a nascent security community can exist where common identities are (for all intents and purposes) confined to the elite level. The one major caveat to this statement pertains to any divergence of identity at any remaining levels of analysis (e.g. communal identities) that are so incompatible as to render it impossible for the elites to avoid (consciously or subconsciously) the impact of these divisions. Such circumstances may be a consequence of violent histories and other ideational factors including those that stem from differences in religion, culture, and ethnicity. 132
As will be evidenced by later chapters, the substantial additions to the theory of a security community offered by this study do not, however, entail an assessment that ASEAN is, or will be, a security community as a predetermined proposition. Thus, this framework is also different from some earlier works on the subject in its attempt to develop a conceptual toolkit designed to critically measure the impediments to security community formation. The approach undertaken by the remaining chapters is also designed to seek further insights on the root causes behind instability and the potential for conflict in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, and concerning the community components of the framework, the analysis is limited to the types of ideational attributes, processes, and policies that form the collective identity of the state (when it is a nation‐state) or the communities within the state. To this end, the analysis in the remaining chapters will be founded on the basis of concrete historical settings359 and aims to ascertain the collective (rather than subjective) primary ideational qualities of states and how these attributes impact on transnational collective identity formation and on the spill over effect of security community formation. Therefore, and as a first step in applying the conceptual framework above, the next chapter begins with a consideration of how the region’s history affected the nature and extent of interaction between the Southeast Asian states along with the major events that eventually contributed to the creation of ASEAN in 1967.
359 Katzenstein argues that most people in the field agree that the national identity of a state cannot be deductively stipulated but must be empirically investigated based on ‘concrete historical settings’. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, p.24. 133
Chapter IV
Turbulent Histories: The Rise of Southeast Asia and the Search for Regional Order
This chapter seeks to outline, first the empirical basis for the claim that Southeast Asia can be recognised as an identifiable region and, second, the historical factors that have led to the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in that region in 1967. The chapter commences by considering some of the demographics of the region and provides an historical synopsis of converging and diverging socio‐cultural trends throughout its history. For the purpose of understanding the extent to which a collective identity may have existed at various historical times, the section also briefly considers the nature of inter‐state relations during the pre‐colonial era. The chapter then outlines the circumstances that eventually motivated the political elite, in several of the Southeast Asian states, to pursue a regional order that embraced, at least rhetorically, multilateralism as a building block in the common pursuit of limited stability and economic advancement.
Today, Southeast Asia is one of the most diverse ‘regions’ on earth. Nevertheless, one of the earliest ‘common influences’ to collectively shape any ascertainable convergence of identity within the region was the mutual impact of colonialism and of the volatile process of achieving independence that followed. While some of the Southeast Asian states were reluctantly ‘pushed’ together in the face of domestic and international volatility, other states were ideationally, and/or ideologically, pulled away as a consequence of the emerging Cold War and the great power competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Even so, during the first two decades of independence several of the Southeast Asian states – despite periods of conflict and antagonistic intraregional relations – eventually sought to create a modus vivendi for their relations between one another. This working arrangement emerged in the hope that ‘limited collaboration’ might better equip these states to overcome some of the causes behind individual (state) volatility thus enhancing the viability of the state and, consequently, the political survival of the elites in 134
power. As will be seen, and despite several abortive attempts at multilateralism, the result was the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967.
The Emergence of Southeast Asia: Origins and Challenges
The synopsis here, for the purpose of the dissertation’s exposition on ASEAN’s security community project, has been limited to the states that constitute the current membership of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and which, in addition to Timor Leste, constitute the present‐day region of Southeast Asia.360 As is illustrated by Figure 4.1 below, the ten member states of ASEAN are currently Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. As noted in Chapter I, while the present argument does not view the existence of a region to be a precondition to the formation of a security community, the idea of a collective identity is common in the scholarly literature. Thus, and aside from matters of geographical propinquity and interdependence, scholars such as Patrick Morgan suggest that the existence of a region would also be evidenced by adequate levels of homogeneity, a degree of autonomy and distinctiveness from the global system (so that it ‘refracts’ the power of that system), and whether the people themselves (together with outside parties) perceive the ‘region’ to exist.361 In order to assess the potential for an ASEAN community, the analysis below is initially concerned with ‘perceptions of region’ and the extent of homogeneity between the communities of Southeast Asia.
360 While the notion of ‘Southeast Asia’ remains contested within the scholarly literature, this study accepts the contentions of Donald Weatherbee that, in addition to geographic proximity, a kind of declaratory ‘regionalism’ is provided through the institutional expression of ASEAN by the political elites of the region. Donald E. Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), pp.15-16. Nonetheless, the analysis below will elaborate on the definition of a region and how the notion of ‘Southeast Asia’ came into scholarly discourse.
361 Patrick Morgan, "Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders," in Regional Orders: Building Security in the New World, ed. David A. & Morgan Lake, Patrick M. (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p.26. See also: Young Jong Choi and James A. Caporaso, "Comparative Regional Integration," in Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons (London: SAGE, 2005), pp.481-482, Lake, "Regional Security Complexes: A Systems Approach," p.47. 135
Figure 4.1: The Member States of ASEAN
China Myanmar Thailand Laos Ca m b o d i a Viet nam Malaysia Singapore Br un e i South Philippines China Indonesia Sea Map Produced by Christopher Roberts
North Brunei Pacific Ocean Si n g ap o r e
Indian Ocean
Southeast Asia
Diagram by Author, October 2006
While the term ‘Southeast Asia’ can be traced as far back as the works of German writers in the late 19th century,362 and was increasingly recognised by various scholars from 1941 onwards,363 the region was first formally labelled ‘Southeast Asia’ during the Pacific War against Japan which led to the establishment of Lord Louis Mountbatten’s Southeast Asia Military Command in 1943.364 It was only from this time that the notion of ‘Southeast Asia’
362 D.G.E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia (Hong Kong: MacMillan Press, 1981), p.3.
363 Philip Charrier, "ASEAN’s Inheritance: The Regionalisation of Southeast Asia, 1941-61," The Pacific Review 14, no. 3 (2001): p.317.
364 Mary Margaret Steedly, "The State of Culture Theory in the Anthropology of Southeast Asia," Annual Review of Anthropology 28 (1999): p.434. While Anthony Reid shows that the Chinese had for centuries recognised the Southeast Asian states as the ‘Nanyang’ (‘Southern Ocean’) region, this was largely a Chinese construct and not a perception widely held within the region. Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680, vol. 1 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), p.6. In relation to Chinese conceptions of ‘Nanyang’, Wolters adds ‘the problem of “making sense” of Southeast Asian protohistory has been obfuscated by the attempts of Chinese observers early in the Christian era to do so. Because of what they took for granted about their own country, they were constrained to assume other polities, even “primitive” ones, were to exhibit a similar and irreducible minimum of features such as a “kingdom”, a “dynasty” (and “usurpations”), “concubines,” fixed space and borders, and an identifiable geographical location in the system of Asian maritime communications to and from China’. O.W. Wolters, History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives (New York: Cornell Southeast Asian Program Publications and ISEAS, 1999), p.109. 136
started to become an increasingly familiar term. As the respected historian Milton Osborne writes:
For the most part, however, neither the foreigners who worked in Southeast Asia before the Second World War, whether as scholars or otherwise, nor the indigenous inhabitants of the countries of Southeast Asia, thought about the region in general terms. The general tendency to do so came with the Second World War when, as a result of military circumstances, the concept of a Southeast Asian region began to take hold.365
Interestingly, Osborne’s perspective is supported by the survey work carried out for the dissertation where, as indicated in Figure 4.2 below, 64.9 percent of the elite respondents surveyed believed that the notion of Southeast Asia is only a modern twentieth century development. While much of the scholarly literature also supports Osborne’s perspective,366 there remain some scholars in dissent. Charrier, for instance, argues that the notion of ‘Southeast Asia’ primarily arose out of academic studies on the region (as opposed to the strategic politics of World War II) as early as 1941.367 While his work provides an enlightening historical review and addresses several issues relevant to the present study, the argument that Southeast Asia emerged as an identifiable region two years earlier than Mountbatten’s Command and primarily from scholarly activity provides little bearing on the broader issues raised by the present study.
365 Milton Osborne, Southeast Asia: An Introductory History (Sydney and Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1983), p.12, Southeast Asia: Heartland of Our Times [Internet] (ASEAN, 24 April 1998 [cited 17 October 2001]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/11834.htm. Than, Myanmar in ASEAN: Regional Cooperation Experience, p.1.
366 For example, see: Nicholas Tarling, ed., The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, vol. 1, Part 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.XVII. Shaun Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p.9. Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.6. Michael Leifer, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South- East Asia (London: Routledge, 2001), p.255.
367 Charrier argues that the ‘process by which Southeast Asia became a distinct region in the international system can be argued to have begun with the publication of J.S. Furnivall’s now largely forgotten monograph Progress and Welfare in Southeast Asia in 1941’. Charrier, "ASEAN’s Inheritance: The Regionalisation of Southeast Asia, 1941-61," p.317. Nevertheless, it is also important to note that the first historical analysis of Southeast Asia as a whole did appear until 1955 with the publication of D.G.E. Hall’s History of Southeast Asia. 137
Figure 4.1. Perceptions of Southeast Asia as a Region (Elite Sample)
Source: Compiled by author
Amitav Acharya, by contrast, suggests the existence of a pre‐colonial region‐wide pattern of inter‐state relations, a contention that, if correct, would reduce the relevance of investigating the origin of the term ‘Southeast Asia’. According to Acharya, the narrowly ‘realist’ and ‘Eurocentric’ fallacy of limiting the analysis to events since Mountbatten’s command ignores the possibility that there existed a pre‐colonial notion of ‘Southeast Asia as a region’.368 At a generalised level of analysis, there are a number of socio‐cultural and historical factors that provide support to Acharya’s contention. One of the earliest influences on the region’s customs and culture was provided by the dual influence of China and India via networks of coastal trading points that potentially date back to the end of the first millennium B.C.369 However, it is arguable that the scholarly literature has historically
368 Amitav Acharya, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp.17, 163-164. From Acharya’s perspective, the claim of a Southeast Asian region ‘… should be seen as being based as much on the construction of a regional identity as on the sum total of shared physical attributes and functional interactions among its units’. Acharya, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia, p.163.
369 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.9. 138
overemphasised the significance of the impact of these two historically great powers;370 it is also important to note in any case that the extent and depth of influence exercised by China and India varied greatly from community to community and kingdom to kingdom. The northern half of Vietnam, for example, was occupied by China for close to a millennium while relations between China and the Indonesian archipelago were primarily limited to trade and some tributary associations.371 By contrast, Indian culture exerted a good deal of influence a millennia ago especially on continental Southeast Asia but played a decidedly lesser role thereafter.372
Also in the realm of culture, Anthony Reid explains the ubiquity of certain traits including cockfighting; tattooing, penis pins, games (such as takraw and chess), betel chewing, and gong based musical systems. Reid also suggests that there were common socio‐cultural organising concepts such as bilateral kinship, female prestige, and charismatic leadership.373 However, the extent of such socio‐cultural ‘commonality’ remains contested. Wolters, while acknowledging an element of ‘cognatic kinship’ (where descent is reckoned equally through males and females), argues that the ‘ancient inhabitants of Southeast Asia were living in fairly isolated groups, separated by thick forests, and would have had powerful attachments to their respective localities’ adding that ‘[e]very center was a center in its own right as far as its inhabitants were concerned, and it was surrounded by its own group of
370 Milton Osborne, Southeast Asia: An Introductory History, 9th ed. (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2004), p.6.
371 Hall, A History of South-East Asia, p.47, J. D. Legge, "The Writing of Southeast Asian History," in The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, ed. Nicholas Tarling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.9. Milton Osborne outlines what it means to be a tributary state: ‘To be a tributary state of China did not mean that an individual Southeast Asian kingdom was ruled by the Chinese as part of some ill-defined Chinese empire. Rather, the tributary relationships were one that involved a considerable degree of give and take. The fact of being a tributary certainly involved agreement not to act contrary to Chinese interests, but the relationship also implied that China would protect its tributary’s interests against those who might challenge them…’ Osborne, Southeast Asia: An Introductory History, p.32. In recent decades historians have also sought to move beyond an analysis of simply how the different communities in Southeast were shaped by the cultural values of China and India but rather to consider the extent to which Southeast Asians, whether Burmans, Indonesian’s, Khmers etc, were able to ‘adapt these foreign ideas to suit their own needs and values’. Osborne, Southeast Asia: An Introductory History, p.6.
372 George Coedes, The Indianized States of Southeast Asia (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1968).
373 Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680, p.6. 139
neighbours’.374 Other scholars, such as Lauriston Sharp, more strongly suggest that ‘discontinuities, cultural fault lines, border s between ways of behaving confront us everywhere as we move across Southeast Asia’. Sharp points to the fact that Southeast Asia is the only part of the globe where four of the ‘great surviving human traditions’ coexist (Sinic, Indic, Islamic, and North Atlantic) which are also ‘cross‐cut by complex and intricate divisions’ such as religion and modernism versus traditionalism.375
The common elements of culture noted by Reid were a consequence of maritime trade patterns, as his analysis shows. He argues that ‘maritime intercourse continued to link the peoples of Southeast Asia more tightly to one another than to outside influences down to the seventeenth century’.376 However, Reid later concedes that in his definition of ‘region’ he is ‘consciously defining a maritime region linked by waterborne traffic, so that the hill peoples of the northern mainland will not play a large part in my story…’377 Interestingly, Acharya also qualifies the extent of unity generated through maritime trade by suggesting that it served ‘as a source of localisation’ whereby communities ‘were able to thrive independently of each other by taking advantage of both local and foreign trade’. According
374 Wolters, History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives, pp.16-17.
375 Lauriston Sharp, "Cultural Continuities and Discontinuities in Southeast Asia," The Journal of Asian Studies 22, no. 1 (1962): p.5. As Steedly adds, ‘[i]t would surely be difficult to envision an area of greater socioaesthetic range, or one that has been more profoundly shaped by exogenous forces. All the world’s great religions originated elsewhere, but with the exception of Judaism, all are prominently represented here. The same diversity of origins and breadth of dispersal can be seen in Southeast Asian art styles and techniques, technological innovations, languages and lexical elements, forms of knowledge and political authority, legal codes, and the like’. Steedly, "The State of Culture Theory in the Anthropology of Southeast Asia," p.434.
376 Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680, p.6.
377 Ibid, p.7. Reid does however add that many of the hill people were ‘linked by culture with the Thai of the coast and the central plain’. The Shan ethnic minority group within Myanmar’s borderlands would be an example of such linkages. While Steedly suggests that maritime trade routes spread ‘goods, ideas, populations, institutions, terms, and technologies’ from port cities to inland hinterland areas, the discussions below and in chapters eight and nine will indicate the limited affect this had on the formation of a common identity and thus amicable relations between the states and communities of Southeast Asia. Steedly, "The State of Culture Theory in the Anthropology of Southeast Asia," p.435. 140
to Acharya, ‘[w]ithin such a milieu, “each locality saw itself as belonging to a microcosm of the world”, rather than as part of a broader regional system’.378
Cultural differences can also be uncovered through other tiers of analysis. According to Lauriston Sharp, ‘if we move vertically rather than horizontally, we encounter in the divisions between hill and valley peoples an ethnic stratification such as is rarely found elsewhere’.379 This ethic stratification was a consequence of successive groups of immigrants from the north who ‘pushed’ the already settled but smaller and ‘less technologically sophisticated groups’ to the upland areas.380 A second factor that also exacerbated differences between highland and lowland cultures and lifestyles pertained to different farming practices that emerged. As will be discussed in the context of Myanmar (Chapter IX), wet rice technologies were adopted in the lowlands and dry rice technologies were adopted in the highlands. The comparatively greater wealth generated by the
378 Acharya, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia, p.31. Earlier in his book, Acharya also suggests that ‘trade, as the chief medium of the transmission of Indian and Chinese cultural influences, was polarising as well. Among other things, it was responsible for the division of Southeast Asia’s political economy into an inland-agrarian “hydraulic” segment (Angkor and the early Mataram), and a riparian or coastal commercial segment (Srivijaya being the most important example). Acharya, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia, p.20. In the context of communities linked by ‘waterborne traffic’, an example of such cultural differences can be seen between the Javanese and the Acehnese ethnic groups in Indonesia. While the Javanese maintain a face-saving ‘indirectness’ in their verbal communication (e.g. the avoidance of saying ‘no’) the Acehnese are much more direct and maintain higher levels of uncertainty avoidance. As Anderson states, ‘People with intolerance of ambiguity have high levels of uncertainty avoidance and seek clear, black-and-white answers’. Peter Anderson, "Cues of Culture: The Basis of Intercultural Differences in Non-Verbal Communication," in Intercultural Communication: A Reader, ed. Larry A. Samovar and Richard E. Porter (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2000), pp.265-266. These cultural differences, together with a history of conflict, had evolved despite similar patterns of exposure to Indian, Chinese, Western, and Islamic influences though more than a millennia of maritime trade. However, it is important to note that the Javanese have generally adopted and maintained a more moderate set of Islamic beliefs and customs compared to their Acehnese counterparts. In relation to conflict between the two groups, the Indonesian government has fought an insurgency movement in Aceh for several decades. The dispute was however recently revolved through a peace agreement with the provision of regional autonomy. Yudhoyono Backs Aceh Peace Deal [Internet - News] (BBC News, 2005 [cited 17 August 2005]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/asia- pacific/4155142.stm.
379 Sharp, "Cultural Continuities and Discontinuities in Southeast Asia," p.5.
380 Gary A. Fuller et al., "Measuring Potential Ethnic Conflict in Southeast Asia," Growth and Change 31, no. 2 (2000): p.307. 141
agricultural practices adopted in the lowland areas also resulted in more powerful and densely populated kingdoms.381
In regard to the task of uncovering any ascertainable common culture or, more importantly, collective identity during the pre‐colonial era, it is important to note that most anthropologists tend to identify themselves as either national or sub‐national specialists (e.g. Indonesianists or Thai scholars, Javanists or hill tribe specialists). Further, and aside from some of the cultural ‘generalisations’ listed above, specialist studies in the fields of culture and cross‐cultural communication either avoid or find it implausible to apply the more rigorous cultural indicators (such as scales of individualism versus collectivism, low context and high context, M‐Time and P‐Time, and power distance)382 to Southeast Asia as a whole. From the perspective of Mary Steedly, these patterns of scholarly research and ‘self image’ are a further consequence of ‘the region’s wide cultural span’.383 Wolters, moreover, qualifies the debate by suggesting that the existence of similar cultural features ‘did not in themselves guarantee that extensive relationships would develop across localities as a matter of course, even if their inhabitants came to recognise that they had something in common’.384
Most significantly, when considering the communities and states within Southeast Asia as a whole the differences have always far outweighed the similarities to the extent that Southeast Asia is considered to be one of the most diverse regions on earth.385As Donald Weatherbee contents, ‘[i]n fact, beyond the macro‐geographic unity of the latitude‐ longitude box, there are few qualities that we usually associate with a world region to be found in Southeast Asia. There is no regionwide identity such as race, ethnicity, language,
381 Lande, "Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Accommodation, and Nation-Building in Southeast Asia," p.79.
382 Anderson, "Cues of Culture: The Basis of Intercultural Differences in Non-Verbal Communication," pp.262- 267.
383 Steedly, "The State of Culture Theory in the Anthropology of Southeast Asia," p.434.
384 Wolters, History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives, p.17.
385 "Southeast Asia," in Encyclopaedia Britannica Reference DVD (2005). 142
religion, culture, and history such as we find in the Arab World, Western Europe, or, with the exception of Brazil, Latin America’.386Attesting to the region’s diversity is the fact that while only 9 percent (500 million) of the world’s population reside within the territorial confines of Southeast Asia,387 the peoples of the region speak about 17 percent of the world’s languages.388 While there are three major ethnic‐linguistic groups in mainland Southeast Asia and maritime Southeast Asia embraces the separate and distinct Austronesian languages,389 at a more detailed level of analysis the diversity of ethnicity and linguistic groups is staggering. Within Burma, for example, there are 142 ethnic‐linguistic ‘minority groups’ covering one third of the country’s populace.390 Meanwhile, in Indonesia there are around 300 distinct ethnic‐linguistic groups speaking 250 languages that are spread over more than 6,000 islands.391 Within the communal level surveys, as a further example, 51 different languages were identified as being spoken by the participants. Thus, as Charrier instructively asserts, in advocating a ‘regional identity’ for a Southeast Asia, scholars (such as Acharya) have ‘had to devote considerable effort to demonstrate that it had some kind of logical basis.'392
Beyond culture, and with reference to Acharya’s analysis of the pre‐colonial inter‐state relations of Southeast Asia, the earlier mentioned tributary relations with China were
386 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.9.
387 Asia Research Database [Internet] (Austrian Academy of Sciences, [cited 12 February 2007]); available from www.ardb.oeaw.ac.at.
388 Fuller et al., "Measuring Potential Ethnic Conflict in Southeast Asia," p.307.
389 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.10.
390 The New ASEANs: Vietnam, Burma, Cambodia and Laos, (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1997), p.110.
391 Building Human Security in Indonesia: Intergroup Relations [Internet] (PreventConflict.org, 2002 [cited 17 January 2007]); available from http://www.preventconflict.org/portal/main/background_intergroup_relations.php.
392 Charrier, "ASEAN’s Inheritance: The Regionalisation of Southeast Asia, 1941-61," p.321. The amount of effort required to provide some type of justification to such an argument was all the more necessary given that the ‘Southeast Asians themselves, though aware of local, ethnic and cultural identities, did not, until very recently, perceive a Southeast Asian identity’. Legge, "The Writing of Southeast Asian History," p.1. 143
coordinated through various mandalas in Southeast Asia. A mandala system, or ‘circle of kings’, involved a king who identified with divine and universal authority and who ‘claimed personal hegemony over other rulers in his mandala who were in theory his obedient allies and vassals’.393 Reflective of the earlier comments on culture, Wolters also suggests that the ‘mandalas were a phenomenon of the lowlands’ and those that that lived in the distant highlands ‘were beyond the reach of the centers where records survive’.394 For other reasons, Acharya himself concedes that both Vietnam and the Philippines ‘raise major problems in using the mandala concept as a basis of an inter‐state system’. Due to the influence of China, Vietnam has been described as a centralised bureaucratic state that is unlike the loosely integrated Indic states of other parts of Southeast Asia. In the case of the Philippines, and unlike the mandalas, power was primarily located at the local village level without tributary relations with ‘high powers’ and this may be explained by the relatively limited influence of Chinese and Indian culture in this country.395 Further, the Islamic influence on the archipelago has been a phenomenon of more recent history.
While various scholarly works regarding Southeast Asia’s mandalas provide important insight on the history of the region, the extent to which they contributed to the emergence of a regional state‐system remains contested. From the perspective of Lucian Pye, for example, prior to the arrival of the colonial powers ‘there was never a Southeast Asian system of inter‐state relations’.396 Given these considerations, a more accurate
393 Acharya, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia, p.21, Wolters, History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives, p.27.
394 Wolters, History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives, p.39. Further, and as Paul Weatley argues, ‘the Sanskrit tongue was chilled to silence at 500 meters’. Paul Wheatley, "Satyanrta in Suvarnadvipa. From Reciprocity to Redistribution in Ancient Southeast Asia," in Ancient Trade and Civilisation, ed. J.A. Sabloff (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1975), p.251.
395 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, pp.20-26.
396 Lucian W. Pye, International Relations in Asia: Culture, Nation and State, vol. 1 (Washington: The Sigur Center for Asian Studies, 1998), p.6. In relation to maritime trade links and the mandala systems Acharya, moreover, somewhat inconsistently argues that ‘while acknowledging their critical importance as analytical frameworks for studying Southeast Asia’s past, it is hard to escape the conclusion that neither the mandala management of political and territorial space nor the “age of commerce” produces an authentic and enduring 144
characterisation of the pre‐colonial nature of Southeast Asia may have been provided by the scholarly works of both Alagappa and Ganesan who suggest that two ‘security complexes’ have historically existed with one covering the continental/mainland subregion (Indochina plus Thailand) and the other the Malay/maritime archipelago.397 Of these two security complexes, the former was dominated by the competing Thai and Vietnamese struggles for the subjugation of Cambodia and Laos while the latter revolved around the relatively less intense (transactionally) relationships within the maritime security complex.398 Both within and beyond these negatively defined sub‐regional security complexes Southeast Asia was ‘rife with internal divisions and the interference of external powers’ – such as China.399 Importantly, kingdoms rose and kingdoms fell leaving the distribution of power for any one century more often than not looking completely different a few centuries later.400
Despite the embryonic nature of these two security complexes one can distinguish between them by employing a number of genres of analysis. For example, while mainland Southeast Asia (the continental security complex) is primarily characterised by a pattern of ‘dominant majorities and non‐dominant minorities’, the ethnic relations of maritime Southeast Asia can be better described as being ‘composed of an intricately related series of ethnic
basis for a regional notion of Southeast Asia’. Acharya, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia, p.32.
397 Muthiah Alagappa, Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p.77, N. Ganesan, Bilateral Tensions in Post-Cold War ASEAN, Pacific Strategic Papers (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 1999), pp.7-9. See also: Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, p.17.
398 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, p.17. Haacke similarly describes two sets of historical tributary relationships with suzerain powers. The first of these tributary relationships surrounded the Siam kingdom’s relations with the rulers of Cambodia and Laos while the second was primarily limited to ‘maritime Southeast Asia where suzerain relations can be traced back as far as the Kingdom of Majapahit. Jurgen Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp.17-18.
399 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.9.
400 As Lucian Pye states, ‘the story of Southeast Asia before the Europeans arrived was one of the rise and fall of kingdoms and dynastic wards of conquest between separate and isolated kingdoms’. Pye, International Relations in Asia: Culture, Nation and State, p.6. 145
groups’.401 As Osborne states, ‘[o]nly comparatively rarely was there a situation in which one clearly defined ethnic group dominated another minority group. Rather, territory was associated with groups of people who had a clear picture of their own identity and of their separateness from others’.402
Linguistic unity, by contrast, is an important example and component of the ‘ties that bind’. In the case of Southeast Asia, it also acts to reinforce Ganesan and Alagappa’s notion of two sub‐regional security complexes. Within the maritime security complex, variants of languages related to modern Bahasa Malay and Bahasa Indonesia (Austronesian) surfaced not just in Indonesia and Malaysia but also in Brunei, the Philippines and beyond the boundaries of the complex to include the coastal regions of Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam.403 By contrast, in mainland Southeast Asia the Tai language, although containing significant dialectical variations, is not only spoken in Thailand but also in Vietnam, Laos, western and north‐eastern Cambodia, the Shan states of Myanmar together with parts of Southern China.404 There have also been recent suggestions that the Vietnamese and Cambodia (Khmer) languages are further linked through a very distant but common ancestor.405 Further, Thai, Cambodian, and Bamar cultures were all indebted to religion and linguistic borrowings from India.406 Their political systems also evince a common historical inheritance.
401 Osborne, Southeast Asia: An Introductory History, p.66.
402 Osborne adds that ‘[t]his was true whether one talks of the Bugis seafarers of Sulawesi, the Sundanese of West Java or the Dyak tribesman of the interior of Borneo. In the geographically and often environmentally difficult world of maritime Southeast Asia the establishment of large territorial states was mostly impossible before modern times, and the survival of smaller states and of many tribal areas was the norm’. Ibid.
403 Primarily because of maritime trade relations. Ibid, p.9.
404 While much less the case today, it was also spoken in the extreme north of Malaysia. Ibid, p.7.
405 Ibid.
406 See, for example, Coedes, The Indianized States of Southeast Asia. 146
In the case of Thailand and Burma (now Myanmar), it is further important to note that during the pre‐colonial period, a significant proportion of the interactions that took place between the two countries transpired during three centuries of hostility culminating in the 1767 ransacking of the Thai capital, Ayudhya, by the Burmese.407 Meanwhile, the struggle for subregional domination between Thailand and Vietnam can be traced as far back as the 14th century when the Thai rulers, followed by the Vietnamese, effectively contested the Khmer (Cambodian) empire. By the 18th century, the Laotian kingdom had also disintegrated and Laos, together with Cambodia, became little more than a buffer between Thailand and Vietnam.408 By this time Vietnam had also absorbed the Indic and Austronesian speaking state of Champa. But for the colonial intervention of the French, it has been contended that in all likelihood both Laos and Cambodia would have ceased to exist.409 In the case of maritime Southeast Asia, and beyond broad linguistic unity, the level of interaction between kingdoms and or empires within the maritime complex varied. The Sri Vijaya empire, together with the Majapahit empire that replaced it, were only dominant over the islands of present day Indonesia while other contemporary states either did not exist (such as Singapore) or were peripheral to the dynamics of the complex (e.g. Brunei).410
Religion represents, to varying degrees, a further variable in support of a distinction between maritime and mainland Southeast Asia. In more recent times, it has also been the cause of much division between and within the communities of the two sub‐regional security complexes. As indicated by the three charts below (Figure 4.2), today mainland Southeast Asia is predominantly Buddhist (over 68 percent of respondents) while the Malay Archipelago complex, with the notable exceptions of Singapore and the Philippines – is by
407 Ganesan, Bilateral Tensions in Post-Cold War ASEAN, p.17.
408 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, p.17.
409 Alagappa, Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, p.77.
410 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, p.17. Haacke, by contrast, argues that suzerain relations in maritime Southeast Asia may be traced back to the Majapahit Empire. Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p.18. 147
majority Islam (over 72 percent of respondents).411 The exceptions to this rule (e.g. the prevalence of Catholicism in the Philippines and other religions in Singapore) represent but one of the effects of colonialism – see chart (c).412 Indicative of the influence of India within Southeast Asia, both Buddhism and Hinduism initially spread throughout the region (including the territories now within Indonesia and Malaysia) via India’s many maritime trade routes. In much of the South, but with exceptions such as Bali, Islam eventually replaced these religions.413
Figure 4.2: Communal Level Survey Responses to Religion
(a) The Mainland Subregion (Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, (b) The Maritime Subregion (Excluding Singpaore and the (c) Singapore and the Philippines - Question: What is your Cambodia and Vietnam) - Question: What is your religion? Philippines) - Question: What is your religion? religion?
4.0% 3.4% Buddhist Islam Christian Buddhist No Religion 6.7% Christian Islam Christian Buddhist 9.4% Islam Hindu No Religion 22.7% No Religion Hindu Taoist 18.1% 9.9% Sikh 73.4% 72.0% 74.8%
Charts by Author based on Data from the ‘Communal Level Survey’ Sample
While records of Muslim traders date back to the sixth century AD, it was not until the thirteenth century that Islam started to take hold; first in Aceh Indonesia, and then increasingly though much of the rest of the Indonesian archipelago spreading through to parts of Malaysia (most significantly Malacca) by the 15th century,414 and into the Southern tip of the Philippines (Mindanao) by the 16th century where it gradually spread as far north
411 Leifer, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South-East Asia, pp.77 & 141.
412 "Southeast Asia: Religions," in Encyclopaedia Britannica Reference DVD (2005).
413 However, the practice of traditional Hindu customs and practices within some of the local cultures (such as the Javanese) was only modified to an extent that would ensure that they did not conflict with moderate Islamic practices.
414 Peter Church, A Short History of Southeast Asia (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons (Asia), 2006), p.84, Hall, A History of South-East Asia, pp.221-222. 148
as the Manila region.415 The clash of religions in the post‐colonial period has not only had an impact on the level of trust extant between the different communities of Southeast Asia but, and as will be elaborated further in later chapters, resulted in discrimination and the implementation of discriminatory nation‐building policies by states (e.g. in Myanmar),416 and internal violence (e.g. in the Central Sulawesi region of contemporary Indonesia). It has also been manifest in the rise of religious based insurgency movements (e.g. Mindanao and Southern Thailand), religious inspired terrorism, and even in visions for a pan‐Islamic state,417 and thus has presented some of the strongest threats to state security in the contemporary era.418
While ethnic tensions have always existed within the region, such problems were significantly enhanced because of the large‐scale arrival of Indian and Chinese immigrant workers encouraged by colonial practices. Colonialism, moreover, not only solidified ethnic divisions by ‘orienting the colonized states towards their colonisers’419 but also complicated ethnic relations through the construction of states with territorial boundaries in conflict with the boundaries of the region’s many ethnic groups.420 The diversity of Southeast Asia also extends to its political systems, where the absence of a common ‘political culture’ has
415 Church, A Short History of Southeast Asia, pp.125-126.
416 Myanmar: Muslims Flee Myanmar [Electronic Intelligence Database] (AsiaInt Reference Library, 2004 [cited 8 November 2004]); available from http://www.asiaint.com, Andrew Selth, Burma's Muslims: Terrorists or Terrorised?, vol. 150 (Canberra: The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, 2003).
417 Report Lifts Lid on JI's Plans for Australia [Internet - News] (ABC Australia News, 2002 [cited 6 November 2002]); available from http://www.abc.net.au/news/australia/2002/10/item20021028095613_1.htm. Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, pp.32 & 34.
418 "Southeast Asia: Regional Overview,” (Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 2007).
419 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.9.
420 Fuller et al., "Measuring Potential Ethnic Conflict in Southeast Asia," p.79, Lande, "Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Accommodation, and Nation-Building in Southeast Asia." As Collins adds: The establishment of colonial states rarely resulted in the creation of a single nation-state but rather a territorial entity with many ethnic groups within it. Likewise, it was not uncommon for these states’ borders to divide groups, thus producing within a state disparate groups of people that have more in common with people in neighbouring states then they do with one another. Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, p.11. 149
resulted in political models that range from military dictatorships (e.g. Myanmar) to struggling democracies (e.g. the Philippines).421 Furthermore, and as will be touched on in later chapters, the development of the region’s political structures, together with the stability necessary for such development to take place, is also complicated by the extent of economic inequality between the communities and states of Southeast Asia. Amidst all this diversity the region continues to grapple with ‘the baggage of a conflict filled history’.422
Emerging Instability – From Colonialism to Independence to Nationalist-fuelled Conflict
Colonialism, for its part, while in effect constituting modern state formations also obstructed the emergence of an indigenous regionwide identity.423 During the height of the colonial period and prior to 1941, and with the exception of Siam (later Thailand), Southeast Asia had been divided up between France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Britain and the United States.424 The rapidity with which Japan expelled the foreign powers from Southeast Asia raised initial hopes that independence was at hand. While various promises ranging from local autonomy to independence through Japan’s proposal to implement a ‘Greater East Asia Co‐Prosperity Sphere’ were soon revealed as nothing more than hollow propaganda, Japanese discourse and the events of World War II ensured that that the process of decolonisation could not be suppressed in the years that followed.425 Nevertheless, and for a brief period after the Second World War, colonial authority was reasserted in Southeast
421 Garry Rodan, Transparency and Authoritarian Rule in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 2005), pp.2-8. See also: Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.12.
422 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, pp.12-14.
423 The actual extent of a regionwide collective identity at both the elite and communal levels is addressed in detail within Chapter VIII.
424 The United States occupied the Philippines and while a ‘commonwealth’ was created in 1935 it was not until 1946 that the Philippines attained the status of a fully independent sovereign nation. Leifer, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South-East Asia, p.29.
425 David Chandler et al., The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia: A New History, ed. Norman G. Owen (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005), pp.272-273. See also: Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.9. 150
Asia. Of the European powers, the Dutch controlled the Indonesian archipelago; the English ruled Malaya, Singapore, Brunei and Burma (later Myanmar), and the French the Indochina sub‐region. The United States, for its part, regained temporary control of the Philippines but prior to the war had already committed itself to granting independence in 1946.426
For some of the modern‐day Southeast Asian nations, nationalist sentiments and the struggle for independence from colonialism provided one of the earliest – albeit extremely limited – common‐identity‐building experiences.427 Nonetheless, such sentiments were not organised or coordinated beyond the boundaries of each individual state. In the case of Indonesia, and similar to the Philippines, the Indonesians had begun their struggle for independence during the pre‐war era, a struggle with which they succeeded in 1949.428 Meanwhile, the United Kingdom, weakened by the Second World War was unable to resist granting independence to Burma (now Myanmar) in 1948. Nearly a decade later, in 1957, independence from Britain followed for Malaya and in 1963 the British decolonised Singapore, Sarawak, and British North Borneo (Sabah) by incorporating them with Malaya into a new ‘Federation of Malaysia’. While the Kingdom of Brunei ‘reluctantly’ gained independence from Britain in 1983 (and subsequently membership in ASEAN), independence did not come so easily for the Indochinese states – Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.429 The challenge of the region’s colonial history was such that, according to Ali Alitas (Indonesia’s longest serving Foreign Minister), at the time of independence, and at least through to the formation of ASEAN, the ‘former colonies knew more about Europe than … their neighbours’.430 The independence of
426 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.6.
427 The accuracy of these contentions will be tested by the analysis of the survey data in later chapters. In the meantime see: Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p.31.
428 Church, A Short History of Southeast Asia, p.50.
429 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.6.
430 Interview with Ali Alitas (former Foreign Minister to Indonesia), 3 May 2006. Bunn Nagara, in interview, also argues that ‘all these countries in the original ASEAN had very different colonial histories, and because of this each of them knew their colonial master better than they knew each other…’ Interview with Bunn Nagara, 30 May 2006. Thanat Khoman, Thailand’s then Foreign Minister and another of the founders of ASEAN, also supports such a view. He states that ‘the separation and aloofness of the countries of this region … had resulted from colonialism when they were forced by the colonial masters to live in cloisonné etanches, shunning contact 151
Myanmar, the Indochinese states, and their eventual membership of ASEAN will be further discussed in later chapters.
As various Southeast Asian states gained independence, new internal and external security problems came to the fore. At the traditional level of security analysis, the global bipolar divisions that emerged between communism and capitalism (exacerbated further by the US policy of containment) acted to cleave Southeast Asia by creating two antagonistic camps.431 These camps were constituted by Indochina in the north, and the future ASEAN‐5 in the south.432 However, in these early years animosity was no less evident in the ‘south’. According to Narine, the experience of colonialism – to varying degrees – contributed to a worldview that saw the international system as deeply predatory.433 Thus, and in 1963, the Sukarno regime launched its konfrontasi against Malaysia in an attempt to prevent the merger of Sabah and Sarawak into the Malaysian federation – a decision that Sukarno maintained was a ‘neo‐colonialist’ plot to perpetuate British influence in the region. Meanwhile, relations in the ‘south’ were further complicated by the Philippines pressing its territorial claim to Malaysian controlled Sabah and Singapore’s ejection from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965. As regional scholars such as Yuen Foong Khong contend, at that time, peace in Southeast Asia ‘seemed anything but likely’.434
with the neighbouring countries’. Thanat Khoman, ASEAN Conception and Evolution [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1992 [cited 2 April 2007]); available from www.aseansec.org/thanat.htm.
431 Kusuma Snitwongse, "Thirty Years of ASEAN: Achievements through Political Cooperation," The Pacific Review 11, no. 2 (1998): p.183, Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, "ASEAN 10: The Political and Cultural Dimensions of Southeast Asian Unity," Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 27, no. 1 (1999): p.77, Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, pp.57-58.
432 The term ‘ASEAN-5’ refers to the original members of ASEAN: Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines.
433 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.10.
434 Yuen Foong Khong, "ASEAN and the Southeast Asian Security Complex," in Regional Orders: Building Security in the New World, ed. David A. & Morgan Lake, Patrick M. (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p.322. See also: Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia." 152
Interestingly, each of the newly independent states of Southeast Asia faced similar domestic challenges including the formidable challenge of nation building whilst simultaneously consolidating state power.435 In Indonesia, the Sudanese and other non‐Javanese communities were protesting against Javanese rule while Singapore’s membership in the Federation of Malaysia had exacerbated an alternative set of ethnic tensions that escalated to the point of the 1964 race riots in Singapore.436 With the continuation of economic imbalances between the Chinese and Malays, the incident was followed by a second set of large‐scale race riots in May 1969 in both Malaysia and Singapore.437 Aside from the earlier mentioned challenge of religious based insurgency (e.g. in Mindanao), a number of the Southeast Asian governments were also fighting ideologically based insurgencies. In the case of Burma, for example, during the 1950s the government’s loss of control to various insurgent groups (such as the Burmese Communist Party) escalated to the extent that even the capital city (Rangoon) came under the threat of falling to opposition forces.438
Malaya, which later became the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, also had to contend with what became known as ‘the Emergency’. The Emergency was a British declared state of emergency in response to the Communist Party of Malaya insurgency movement.439 These domestic insurgencies also became inseparably linked to the Cold War dynamics of the time
435 Mely Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005), p.51. See also: Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.6.
436 Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p.39. Countering Threats to Internal Stability and Security [Government Website] (Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs: Internal Security Department, [cited 17 March 2007]); available from http://www2.mha.gov.sg/mha/isd/newisd_earlyyears.html. A further incident in September 1964 was believed to have been initiated by Indonesian agents under the direction of Sukarno’s konfrontasi policy. Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in Southeast Asia: 1961-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.270.
437 Church, A Short History of Southeast Asia, p.96. Many other ethnic based riots have occurred throughout the region’s history with one of the most recent events occurring in Jakarta against the Chinese in 1998 following the economic crisis, see Chapter VII.
438 Hall, A History of South-East Asia, p.884. See also: Christopher B. Roberts, "Myanmar and the Argument for Engagement: A Clash of Contesting Moralities?" East Asia: An International Quarterly 23, no. 2 (2006): p.37.
439 Church, A Short History of Southeast Asia, p.94. For a more detailed overview of the background to the emergency and the response of the British see: Osborne, Southeast Asia: An Introductory History, pp.197-201. 153
due to their receipt, in some instances, of funding and support by China and, later, Vietnam and Laos.440 Meanwhile, the United States provided clandestine support to insurgencies within Indonesia.441 Given the then recent history of colonialism, these insurgencies were also a concern to regional leaders as they invited external intervention – as had been the case in Malaya.442 Under such conditions it is with little surprise that many scholars further characterised the region as anything but stable. Some scholars even considered Southeast Asia to be a ‘cultural shatter belt’ that was not only diverse and fragmented but also balkanised.443
In Search of a New Beginning – Tentative Steps toward Limited Cooperation amidst ‘Fragile Relations’
Due to these internal and external challenges, the maintenance of stability and the consolidation of power (domestically) became the primary strategic goals.444 In the period leading towards and beyond the formation of ASEAN, the non‐communist states of Southeast Asia, as Haacke states, ‘came to share an almost religious belief in the effects of rapid economic growth in diffusing the sources of social and political discontent within their
440 William R. Heaton, "China and Southeast Asian Communist Movements: The Decline of Dual Track Diplomacy," Asian Survey 22, no. 8 (1982): pp.797-798, Sheldon W. Simon, "The Two Southeast Asias and China: Security Perspectives," Asian Survey 24, no. 5 (1984): p.522. See also: Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p.63. For an in-depth account of the history of the Communist Party of Malaya insurgency movement see: Chin Peng, My Side of History (Singapore: Media Masters, 2003).
441 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.66. For a detailed account of such subversion as ‘foreign policy’ see: Audrey Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997).
442 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.13. On the role of the Australian forces in Malaya during the ‘Emergency’ period see: Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military Operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950-1966 (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1996).
443 Fuller et al., "Measuring Potential Ethnic Conflict in Southeast Asia," p.307. See also: Milton Osborne, Region of Revolt: Focus on Southeast Asia (Harmondworth: Penguin Books, 1971).
444 In seeming support of such contentions Bellamy argues that the ‘…paramount concern was with the consolidation, legitimisation and security of the region’s states and its ruling elites’. Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? , p.93. See also: Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.13. 154
societies’.445 However, and in order to achieve these goals, the region’s leaders first had to create a stable environment for such development and economic progress to take place. It is with these motivations and national interests in mind that prior to the formation of ASEAN a number of initiatives were launched by both regional and exogenous actors that were designed to address and constrain challenges to Southeast Asian security.
Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO)
In 1954 – and in reaction to the intervention by China in the Korean War, the defeat of the French in Vietnam, and the development of the ‘domino theory’446 – the United States, in collaboration with Britain, engineered the creation of the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (Manila Pact) on 8 September 1954 as a security instrument in its Cold War strategy of containing communism.447 In February 1955, the treaty became institutionalised in structure when a council meeting in Bangkok approved the establishment of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO).448 SEATO was largely unsuccessful as Thailand and the Philippines were the only two full regional members that it attracted.449 From the viewpoints of Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia, the organisation’s extra‐regional origin conflicted with an emerging
445 Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p.49.
446 The ‘domino theory’ was developed in an April 1952 US National Security Memorandum on America’s view of the security challenges posed by the risk communist expansion into Vietnam. The memorandum stated that ‘… in the absence of effective and timely counteraction the loss of any single country [e.g. Vietnam] would probably lead to a relatively swift submission to or an alignment with communism by the remaining countries of this group’. It was added that should Vietnam fall then ‘communist domination, by whatever means, of all Southeast Asia would seriously endanger in the short-term and critically endanger in the longer term United States security interests’. Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.58.
447 The Philippines simultaneously pushed for the creation of a Pacific Charter, an undertaking to ‘uphold the principles of equal rights and self determination under the United Nations and to try by peaceful means to promote self government and independence of “all countries whose people’s desire it and are able to under its responsibilities”; to cooperate in promoting higher living standards, economic progress and social well-being in the region; and, under the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty, to prevent any attempts in the area to subvert freedom or destroy sovereignty or territorial integrity’. C.M. Turnbull, "Regionalism and Nationalism," in The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia: From World War II to the Present, ed. Nicholas Tarling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp.275-276.
448 Leifer, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South-East Asia, p.178.
449 Donald G. McCloud, Southeast Asia: Tradition and Moderninity in the Contemporary World (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), p.15. 155
policy preference of resisting overt external influence and enmeshment in great power machinations. On this basis, they refused to become members.450 Moreover, the pressure for alliance and the containment of communism exerted by the United States on the Southeast Asian states backfired in both Burma and Indonesia. In the example of Burma, nationalist Kuomintang forces resident in the country’s Eastern Highlands, financed and supported by Thailand and the United States, not only violated the country’s sovereignty and invited intervention by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) but also affirmed for Burma’s leadership the virtue of non‐alignment and international isolation – a policy that remained for decades to come. In the case of Indonesia, the US strategy of tying aid to mutual security frameworks brought down a ‘West‐leaning government’ because of a leftist‐nationalist backlash.451
Nonetheless, and indicative of the diversity of foreign policies and threat perceptions during the early‐independence period, both the Thai and Philippine governments – in behaviour akin to a limited realism – were highly receptive to the SEATO initiative. In the case of the Philippines, its leadership had become strongly anti‐communist in response to the many challenges to domestic stability faced by the country. Thus, the Philippine government had already concluded a 1947 Military Bases Agreement (providing the US with the use of more than ten facilities) and in 1951, this agreement was followed by a mutual defence pact. Thailand, already fearful of the strategic threat of the increasingly strong Viet Minh (a communist movement to depose colonial rule in Vietnam) was further alarmed by various Viet Minh incursions into Cambodia and Laos between 1953 and early 1954. While Bangkok quickly volunteered to become the seat of SEATO because of these events, Thailand soon became disenchanted with the treaty due to perceptions that SEATO had reacted
450 As Khong states, ‘The externality that was SEATO’s purpose to contain – the spread of communism from Indochina to non-Communist Southeast Asia – was indeed the most pressing security issue confronting Malaya, Singapore, and Indonesia. But from the perspective of these new states, SEATO bore too heavily the imprint, if not imposition, of an external actor, the United States’. Khong, "ASEAN and the Southeast Asian Security Complex," p.323. It should also be noted that during this period Malaysia and Singapore continued to host foreign forces from the United Kingdom and Australia. Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military Operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950-1966. For a general discussion on the role of SEATO and its failings, see: Leszek Buszynski, SEATO - the Failure of an Alliance Strategy (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983).
451 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, pp.57-58. 156
inadequately and indecisively to further unfavourable developments in Laos.452 In retrospect, the ineffectiveness of the organisation’s response over Laos was most significantly due to diverging interests and threat perceptions that existed from the outset between both the intra‐regional and extra‐regional member‐states – including, ironically, between its founding members Britain and the United States.453
The Bandung Conference
Indicative of regional suspicions vis‐à‐vis these developments (including SEATO), Indonesia responded to the power dynamics of the time by hosting the April 1955 ‘Asian‐African Conference’ in Bandung, Indonesia. The Bandung conference provided an early indication of Indonesia’s aspiration to be the ‘chairman’ of the third world and a natural leader for Southeast Asia.454 Of the Southeast Asian governments, the Bandung conference was attended by the communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DPV) together with the neutral governments of Indonesia, Burma, Laos and Cambodia as well as America’s allies: the Philippines, Thailand, and South Vietnam. Given the nature of many of the political‐regimes present along with the overall philosophy painted by the Bandung Conference, the conference was very much governed by a significant anti‐imperialist and non‐aligned theme.455 Nevertheless, the conference was significant for the fact that twenty‐nine countries attended the deliberations, including the People’s Republic of China, and that it was the first Southeast Asia inspired initiative to seek greater cooperation and mutual understanding.456 Most
452 Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, pp.32-33.
453 Leifer, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South-East Asia, pp.178, Turnbull, "Regionalism and Nationalism," p.276.
454 N. Ganesan, "Thai-Myanmar-ASEAN Relations: The Politics of Face and Grace," Asian Affairs: An American Review 33, no. 3 (2006): p.134. For a detailed account of the conference see: George McTurnan Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955 (New York: Kennikat Press, 1972).
455 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.62.
456 Turnbull, "Regionalism and Nationalism," p.277. 157
significantly, however, the conference was important for entrenching further the legal‐ procedural norms of international society within Southeast Asia.457
Traditionally, the norms of international society, as initiated in Europe by the Council of Constance (1415),458 and further entrenched by the Peace of Westphalia (1648),459 include rex est imperator in regno suo (all leaders are equal and independent of one another); cuius regio, eius religio (no right to intervene in internal affairs because of religion); and thirdly, the concept of a ‘balance of power’ – e.g. the prevention by any means of a power rising and dominating others.460 More contemporarily, the norms of international society (alternatively understood as the Westphalian International System) have evolved to include the doctrines of non‐interference, non‐intervention and the pacific settlement of disputes – as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.461 The influence of these legal‐procedural norms can be seen in Table 3.1 below; these are the agreed upon principles of the final Bandung communiqué ‘by which nations should practice tolerance and live in peace with one another as good neighbours and develop friendly cooperation’.462
457 Bellamy argues that the general norms adopted by ASEAN, which others argue arose out of the Bandung conference, ‘are almost identical to the norms that underpin pluralist international society’. Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? , p.89.
458 Martin Wight, Systems of States (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), pp.150-152.
459 Peace of Westphalia stems from the Treaties of Osnabruck and Munster. Together they ended the devastating Thirty Years War.
460 Robert H. Jackson and Patricia Owens, "The Evolution of International Society," in The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p.54.
461 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, p.63.
462 Final Communiqué, Asian-African Conference, Bandung - Final Communiqué [Internet] (Oxford University Press, April 18-24, 1955 [cited 15 March 2007]); available from http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.co.uk/pdf/bt/cassese/cases/part3/ch18/1702.pdf. 158
Table 3.1. The Bandung Principles
1. Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations 2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations 3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small 4. Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country 5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself, singly or collectively, in conformity with the charter of the United Nations 6. (a) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve any particular interests of the big powers (b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries 7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country 8. Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties own choice, in conformity with the charter of the united nations 9. Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation 10. Respect for justice and international obligations.
Table by author based on the Principles of the Bandung as located at: http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.co.uk/pdf/bt/cassese/cases/part3/ch18/1702.pdf
Perversely, the attractiveness and readiness to accept the standard norms and principles embraced by international society was not only a consequence of volatile states struggling for security (both internal security and security vis‐à‐vis their neighbours) but also from ideals that can be attributed to a history of normative socialisation through colonial rule. Thus, it was during the colonial era that the European powers cemented into being aspects of the region’s norms for the purpose of introducing and sustaining viable legal and administrative structures. Nonetheless, and as Haacke indicates, the overarching ‘legal‐procedural norms’ – as outlined by the principles of Bandung and eventually adopted by the region’s elites – emerged both in consequence of the ‘imposed socialisation’ of the colonial powers as well as through common and ‘interlocking struggles for recognition’.463
463 Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p.19. The emergence of these norms was by no means a natural phenomenon. For the traditional rulers of the parts of Southeast Asia that adhered to Hindu-Buddhist 159
Furthermore, and as a consequence of the struggle for recognition endured by most of the participants (who were predominantly newly‐independent states), the concept of non‐ intervention, as developed at the conference, extended beyond the standard norms of international society to embrace the idea that great power intervention, for the purpose of power‐balancing, was no longer acceptable.464 As will be seen, the principle of non‐ interference (together with the other principles emboldened within Box 3.1 above) would later become central components of ASEAN’s normative framework, or what has become known as the ASEAN way. Furthermore, and while the ASEAN way would, in turn, enable the pursuit of divergent approaches to nation‐building by individual governments, the common goal that seemingly motivated each of these approaches to that task was the absolute pursuit of ‘state’ security and the continued ‘survival’ of the regimes in power. Nonetheless, and as will be demonstrated in later chapters, the norms that were eventually adopted as components of the ASEAN way have been routinely violated by the ASEAN members throughout the Association’s history.465
The FPDA, ASPAC, AMA and the Maphilindo
Over time, and in addition to SEATO, other attempts at constructing regional and extra regional security bodies and alliances included the Anglo‐Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA),466 the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC),467 the Maphilindo, and the Association of
cosmological principles, sovereignty had been traditionally conceived as a ‘divinely sanctioned right to rule the universe’ by the ‘ruler or god-king’. Under such circumstances, the notion of sovereign equality was completely alien to these traditional rulers. Ibid. See also: Steedly, "The State of Culture Theory in the Anthropology of Southeast Asia," pp.435-436.
464 Amitav Acharya, Bundung's 1955 Asia-Africa Conference and Indonesia (Opinion) [Internet] (The Jakarta Post, 2005 [cited 28 December 2006]); available from http://infid.be/kaa_1955.htm.
465 John Funston, "ASEAN and the Principles of Non-Intervention: Practice and Prospects," in Non-Intervention and State Sovereignty in the Asia-Pacific, ed. David Dickens and Guy Wilson-Roberts (Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies, China Centre for International Studies, Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 2000), pp.9-22. See also: Jones and Smith, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations: Regional Delusion, pp.71- 73, Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.62.
466 The AMDA was renamed the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement when the Federation of Malaysia was formally created in 1963. Emphasis by author. How San Khoo, The Five Power Defence Arrangements: If It Ain't Broke... [Internet] (Ministry of Defence (MINDEF), 2006 [cited 15 March 2007]); available from www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2000/Vol26_4/7.htm. 160
Southeast Asia (ASA).468 The AMDA was entered into in 1957 by Britain, New Zealand, and Australia together with Singapore, Malaysia, and the British Borneo territories. In 1971, the arrangement was succeeded by the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA).469 In contrast to the Philippines and Thailand, the alternative security arrangements sought by Singapore and Malaysia reflected a natural consequence of their colonial history being dominated by the British. The agreement was also significant for providing the basis for Commonwealth military assistance during the period of konfrontasi – discussed further below. Unlike SEATO, the FPDA survived the end of the Cold War and the member countries continue to undertake annual joint military exercises.470
Meanwhile, and in contrast to SEATO and the FPDA, the stated purpose of ASPAC (a South Korean initiative) was ‘consultation on economic and cultural matters’.471 Nonetheless, when ASPAC was formed in 1966 the United States branded it as a ‘bulwark of anti‐Communist solidarity in Asia’.472 The Southeast Asian members were Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and South Vietnam while the remaining members consisted of South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. The Council never moved beyond a few modest and carefully written statements and eventually expired seven years after its inception following the initiation of formal ties between the United States and China in 1973.473
467 Spreading Sunshine? [Internet News] (TIME, 1972 [cited 16 March 2007]); available from www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,906085,00.html.
468 McCloud, Southeast Asia: Tradition and Moderninity in the Contemporary World, p.15.
469 Carlyle A. Thayer, "The Five Power Defence Arrangements," Security Challenges 3, no. 1 (2007): p.80. See also: Kin Wah Chin, The Five Power Defence Arrangements and AMDA: Some Observations on the Nature of an Evolving Partnership (Singapore: ISEAS, 1974).
470 Khoo, The Five Power Defence Arrangements: If It Ain't Broke... (cited).
471 Spreading Sunshine? (cited).
472 A New Alliance, and More Help for Viet-Nam [Internet News] (TIME, 1966 [cited 15 March 2007]); available from www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,835789,00.html.
473 However, official diplomatic relations did not commence until 1979.Than, Myanmar in ASEAN: Regional Cooperation Experience, p.12. Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.10. 161
In the case of the ASA and the Maphilindo, they were both significant for being completely regional initiatives with a membership totally indigenous to Southeast Asia. The ASA, with the eventual goal of promoting regional economic cooperation, was officially born on 31 July 1961 with just three members – Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia. Both the Philippines and Malaysia had initially favoured an institutionalised structure modelled on the European Economic Community (now the European Union) but Thailand was against anything beyond a loosely articulated and non‐binding association. The Malaysian and Philippine governments pragmatically accepted Thailand’s preferences because, firstly, it was necessary to maintain Thai participation, and secondly, the two countries hoped this non‐institutionalised formula would be more likely to entice membership from other Southeast Asian states.474 The organisation later proved to be unsuccessful in this second goal.
Interestingly, negotiations for the ASA had in fact been initiated as far back as 1959 when a previous reincarnation, the Southeast Asian Friendship and Economic Treaty (SEAFET), had been proposed by the then Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman.475 There were however three further problems with SEAFET and its successor, the ASA. Firstly, in proposing the treaty the Tunku alienated Indonesia by refusing to incorporate and/or express support for the principles of Bandung – by then a cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy. Secondly, the Indonesians resented Malaysia’s attempted gesture of regional leadership – something Sukarno increasingly viewed as an Indonesian right.476 Finally, and again in contrast to the underlying philosophy behind the Bandung conference, the Tunku habitually ‘displayed an unfortunate tendency to mention regional economic and cultural cooperation in the same breath as he lamented the evils of communism and encouraged an ever‐vigilant opposition to
474 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.11.
475 Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p.35.
476 As Joseph Liow states, ‘[c]entral to Jakarta’s reaction to the Tunku’s foreign policy initiatives was their dislike of what they saw as a newcomer taking the initiative in an area where they considered themselves as rightful leaders; they also resented the fact that Malayan leaders could declare themselves to be ‘neutral’ while in effect showing benevolence to the West’. Joseph Chinyong Liow, "Tunku Abdul Rahman and Malaya's Relations with Indonesia, 1957-1960," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 36, no. 1 (2005): p.101. 162
it’.477 Thus, and despite many statements by the Tunku that he had no intention for SEAFET to develop into a collective security pact or defence pact, Indonesia (and others) remained suspicious of its intended purpose together with the strategic alignment of its proposed members. Accordingly, they were not in favour of the proposal.478 Due to these problems, and the continuation of diverging threat perceptions,479 Indonesia did not join the Association and the association soon ran into difficulties over the Sabah issue (discussed below) and later collapsed.480
The stated goal of the Maphilindo, by contrast, was to provide an open‐ended non‐ institutionalised framework for regional consultation on issues of common concern through the ‘spirit of consensus’.481 Importantly, the Maphilindo invoked certain Bandung principles that sought to develop the notion of regional resilience by avoiding collective defence agreements that would serve the interests of foreign powers. In so doing, the Manila accords that established the Maphilindo ‘had Sukarno’s fingerprints all over it’.482 Proclaimed in August 1963, the Maphilindo comprised of Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia but was abandoned a month later due to various animosities by the Philippines and Indonesia over the
477 Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, Regional Organisation and Order in South-East Asia (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1982), p.15.
478 Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p.35. In relation to the strategic alignment of the ASA members, both Thailand and the Philippines were members of SEATO while Malaysia was a part of the previously mentioned FPDA. Further, and according to Turnbull, the Association’s aims of ‘economic development were designed to keep communism at bay’. Turnbull, "Regionalism and Nationalism," p.287.
479 The problematic nature of diverging threat perceptions was mentioned in earlier examples within the chapter and is indicative of a low level of comprehensive integration. In the current example, Sukarno ‘sought to expunge all vestiges of colonialism from Southeast Asia’ whereas ‘the Tunku harboured no such intentions because of his perceptions of threats. Sukarno had sought to synthesise diverse trains of religious and political thought (Islam, Marxism and nationalism) in opposition to colonialism and to balance the attendant domestic political forces. By contrast, the Tunku was convinced that communists and true Malays could never co-exist’. Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p.37.
480 Thailand's Role in ASEAN: Historical Background [Government] (Thailand's Foreign Ministry, 2001 [cited 18 October 2001]); available from
481 Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in Southeast Asia: 1961-1965, p.158. Maphilindo (Wikipedia, [cited 28 March 2007]); available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maphilindo.
482 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.69. 163
formation of the Federation of Malaysia which, at the time, consisted of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak.
In the case of Indonesia, and since the declaration of martial law in 1957, the political orientation of the Sukarno‐led government had become increasingly leftist to the point where, eventually, the government had opened a parliamentary role for the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Consequently, Indonesia’s earlier principle of non‐alignment gradually evolved under Sukarno’s leadership to be primarily characterised as a fight against neo‐ colonialism and Western imperialism along a ‘Jakarta‐Phnom Penh‐Hanoi‐Beijing‐Pyongyang axis’.483 Thus, when the proposal for a new Federation of Malaysia was announced by Malaysia in May 1961, Sukarno quickly responded by denouncing the planned territory as little more than an artificial creation of the colonial powers.484 He further argued that the maintenance of Malaysia’s links to Britain – and the Anglo‐Malaysian Defence Arrangement in particular – were further evidence of a neo‐colonialist plot to maintain power in the region. Moreover, Suharto perceived the far reaching Federation of Malaysia, ‘which cut traditional links in the Malay world’, as a physical security threat to Indonesia.485
Given Indonesia’s threat perceptions, Sukarno responded by reorienting Indonesia’s policy of confrontation (konfrontasi), a policy that had previously been applied against the Dutch over its former control of Irian Jaya (Papua). This approach incorporated a combination of diplomatic coercion (e.g. the severing of diplomatic ties and challenges in the United Nations) as well as armed confrontation (including the supply of arms to Malaysian militants), in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the Federation of Malaysia, and later an independent
483 During this process Sukarno seized all the Dutch assets within the country and threatened war to seize control of the Netherlands’ Dutch New Guinea. Ibid, pp.65-66.
484 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.11.
485 According to Turnbull, such traditional links included ‘the centuries-old contacts between Sumatra and the Malay peninsula; pre-war Young Malay Union nationalism; the combination of Sumatra and the Malay peninsula into on administrative zone during the Japanese occupation; the aspirations of Ibrahim Yaacob’s KRIS movement and the Malay Nationalist Party; the shadowy concept of an Indonesia Raya, which would embrace all Malay people’. Turnbull, "Regionalism and Nationalism," p.285. 164
Singapore, within international society.486 Eventually, the failure of konfrontasi became highly apparent with the involvement of foreign forces in support of the Federation (contrast this with Indonesia’s ideal of ‘regional resilience’) together with Malaysia’s election to the United Nations Security Council. In the case of the latter event, Indonesia responded by taking the unprecedented step of withdrawing its membership from the United Nations.487
The Philippines, for its part, objected to plans for Sabah (then known as North Borneo) to be incorporated into the new Federation of Malaysia and in 1962 officially laid claim to sovereignty over Sabah. The Philippine government argued that Sabah was an inseverable component of its own territory due to it having been under the fief of the former sultan of Sulu.488 While the former Sultanate of Sulu is a part of the Philippine Republic, in September 1963 Sabah ‘opted’ to join the Malaysian federation rather than the Republic of the Philippines.489 Consequently, the Maphilindo was immediately terminated and diplomatic relations between Kuala Lumpur, Manila, and Jakarta broken.490 While some claim that the primary purpose of the Maphilindo was to ‘establish a diplomatic framework that would facilitate the peaceful resolution of disputes about Malaysia’s border’,491 given the facts of the above synopsis others argue that this Philippine initiative ‘was in fact a diplomatic device
486 Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in Southeast Asia: 1961-1965, pp.125-127. Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p.43. See also: J.A.C. Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute (Kuala Lumpur, New York: Oxford University Press, 1974).
487 Cotton, "The Domestic Sources of Regional Order in Michael Leifer's Analysis of Southeast Asia," p.211, Karl Metcalf, Near Neighbours: Records on Australia's Relations with Indonesia [Book] (National Archives of Australia, 2001 [cited 29 March 2007]); available from http://www.naa.gov.au/Publications/research_guides/guides/neighbours/chapter1.htm.
488 Turnbull, "Regionalism and Nationalism," p.285.
489 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, p.128.
490 In the case of the Philippines, diplomatic relations were cut on 17 September 1963 and not restored until 3 June 1966. Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p.36. Leifer, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South-East Asia, p.179.
491 Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? , p.92. See also: Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way, p.53. 165
through which the Philippines and Indonesia sought to frustrate or delay the creation of the Malaysian Federation’.492
Shifts in the Equation? The Sine Qua Non behind the emergence of ASEAN and the Bangkok Declaration
By the mid 1960s the limitations to konfrontasi and Sukarno’s ‘exercise in political pyrotechnics’493 had become painfully obvious. Aside from failing to undermine Malaysia’s legitimacy within international society, Indonesia had also alienated several Western governments, neglected its struggling economy, and acted contrary to the legal‐procedural norms of international society that had been reaffirmed at the Bandung conference – such as the non‐use of force. The policy of konfrontasi had also provided one of the earliest indications of the mutual dependency and vulnerability of the Southeast Asian States as Indonesian economic sanctions against Malaysia had been ‘almost as painful to Indonesia as its intended target’.494
However, Sukarno and his government did not wish to lose face and so Indonesia initially resorted to further coercive measures in order to prolong an end to konfrontasi. Thus, and between August and September 1964, a number of Indonesian military raids involving a total of more than two hundred soldiers and paratroopers took place on the Southern tip of peninsular Malaysia in the towns of Pontian and Labis.495 Moreover, further race riots occurred in Singapore the same year that some believe to have been provoked by foreign military agents from Indonesia.496 Had Sukarno thought that this would provide greater
492 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.69.
493 Michael Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy (London: Allen & Unwin/Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1983), p.99.
494 Michael Antolik, ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1990), p.19.
495 Other raids in Sabah and Sarawak also took place both before and after this time. See: Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation [Internet] (Wikipedia, [cited 30 March 2007]); available from http://www.answers.com/topic/indonesia-malaysia-confrontation.
496 Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute, pp.256-260. 166
political leverage with Malaysia then he was sadly mistaken. In the wake of these events, Sukarno secretly approached the Tunku about the possibility of a meeting with a view to ending konfrontasi in return for a ‘face saving’ plebiscite on the future of Sabah and Sarawak. The Tunku reacted coolly and Sukarno was soon denying claims by Kuala Lumpur that he had attempted to end his ‘crush Malaysia’ campaign. Consequently, armed military incursions by Indonesia into Malaysia and Singapore soon recommenced.497
Despite the continuation of violence, some of the region’s leaders interpreted the outcome as meaning that Sukarno remained in favour of ending konfrontasi but could only do so in a way that did not weaken him domestically – both in terms of popular opinion and in terms of his position vis‐à‐vis the PKI.498 However, whilst the Philippine government had been diplomatically sounding out the possibility of negotiations for a resolution under the umbrella of an Afro‐Asian Commission,499 an unexpected but major change to the subregional dynamics transpired; on 30 September 1965, several officers backed by the PKI were involved in an abortive coup attempt.500 Seeing a new opportunity to resolve the crisis the Philippines responded quickly by mustering support from Thailand and Malaysia to revive the ASA in the hope that they could entice Indonesia to become its fourth member.501 Sukarno, who at this
497 Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in Southeast Asia: 1961-1965, p.270.
498 Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute, p.269. Sukarno himself felt it necessary to vigorously deny any abandonment or weakening of konfrontasi. Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p.41.
499 This was thought by the Philippines to be more acceptable to Sukarno on the basis that it provided an ‘Asian solution to Asian problems’ without suspicions of a ‘made in Washington’ label that were raised by the Maphilindo. Further, and in the opinion of the Philippines, Malaysia could also be confident that the dispute would be resolved under the principles of consultation and by neutral participants. Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute, pp.269-270.
500 In more detail, on 30 September 1965 several military officers were kidnapped and subsequently executed. The next day, Lieutenant Colonel Untung of Sukarno’s Palace Guard launched the ‘Thirteenth of September Movement’ with the proclamation that it had prevented a coup by the those responsible for murdering the officers and had subsequently installed a ‘Revolutionary Council’ of political and military persons. As Mary Somers Heidhues writes, ‘General Suharto, Commander of the Strategic Reserve, staged a counter-coup, putting the blame for the incidents on the PKI’. Sukarno, however, never fully regained power in the wake of the incident due to the increasing power of General Suharto and his being implicated in the coup by elements of the military who were supporting General Suharto. Mary Somers Heidhues, Southeast Asia: A Concise History (London: Thames and Hudson, 2000), p.156.
501 Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p.42. 167
point was steadily losing executive power and authority to General Suharto, did not acquiesce to the idea.502 In the wake of the attempted coup in which Sukarno was deeply implicated, the country was embroiled in a violent nationwide anticommunist campaign that resulted in the deaths of many thousands – some suggest millions – of alleged communist sympathisers and ethnic Chinese.503 Given the situation of domestic instability and political transition within Indonesia, the government was incapable of pragmatically assessing and/or contributing to any initiatives for a new, or expanded, regional organisation.
In March 1966, in light of Sukarno’s growing ill health, Suharto took over executive authority for Indonesia. Eleven months later (February 1967) Sukarno, who three years earlier had been made ‘president for life’, surrendered all his remaining powers to General Suharto.504 These developments created the biggest opportunity yet for a fresh round of initiatives not only to end konfrontasi once and for all but also to consider a new attempt at multilateral cooperation for some of the Southeast Asian states. Thus, at a conference in Bangkok on 28 May 1966 – little more than two months after Suharto took executive control – both Indonesia and Malaysia declared an end to the conflict.505 Then, on 11 August 1966, the two countries signed the Bangkok Accord, which had been negotiated back in May by Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak and Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Adam Malik. In return for peace, the Bangkok Accord, together with a series of ‘secret letters’ between Sukarno and the Tunku (at the behest of Suharto), provided for a resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries. However, a complete resumption of such relations was
502 Nonetheless, when Thailand’s foreign minister, Thanat Khoman, expressed an intention in 1966 to invite Indonesia to join the ASA Malaysia objected. A year later, in 1967, Malaysia changed its position and unsuccessfully invited Indonesia to join the ASA. Ibid.
503 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.67. Actual estimates of the number killed in the wake of the attempted coup vary between 78,000 and 2 million. Metcalf, Near Neighbours: Records on Australia's Relations with Indonesia (cited).
504 Turnbull, "Regionalism and Nationalism," p.285. Sukarno died three years later on 21 June 1970.
505 An end to the violence soon followed with the last skirmishes taking place in June 1966. Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation (cited). 168
first conditional upon a face‐saving poll of the public’s will in both Sabah and Sarawak.506 Based on this agreement, elections were held in 1967 where the status quo was maintained; full diplomatic relations between the two countries were subsequently restored on 31 August 1967.507
Back in May 1966 – when Malik and Razak had met to negotiate a treaty between Malaysia and Indonesia – Thailand’s Foreign Minister, Thanat Kohman, had also been present and had discussed with his foreign ministry counterparts (Malik in particular) the possibility of greater regional cooperation.508 While not directly involved in the discussions, and still under the shadow of President Sukarno, General Suharto was in a position to ‘decisively’ influence the dialogue by pressing for a pragmatic foreign policy ‘based on regional cooperation and domestic economic development’.509 Thus, and in consultation with Indonesia, Thailand drafted and presented its proposal for a Southeast Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SEAARC). In recognition of the sensitivities of Indonesia, the proposal brought Indonesia into a potentially regional framework without producing an appearance that Indonesia had asked to join.510 However, before the prospective members could agree to the proposal, two major difficulties in the drafting of the organisation first had to be overcome.
506 Foreign Relations 1964-1968, Volume Xxvi, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines [Document Release by the Office of the Historian] (U.S. Department of State, 1968 [cited 30 March 2007]); available from www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxvi/4433.htm. See also: Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military Operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950-1966, p.318.
507 Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p.42.
508 The Founding of ASEAN [Internet] (ASEAN, [cited 1 February 2005]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/7071.htm. See also: Khoman, ASEAN Conception and Evolution (cited). Ghazali Shafie, by contrast, argues that he approached Suharto at the behest of Tun Abdul Razak (then Deputy Prime Minister) about the possibility of resolving konfrontasi. On Ghazali’s account, Suharto argued that ‘not only must we end this Confrontation but we must prepare a mechanism so that in [the] future, nobody would try to solve their problems by confrontation. So [General] Ali Murtopo [advisor to Suharto] and I were the workers and we stumbled on the idea of creating ASEAN. It took two years to talk to the others, the backroom boys talking. It didn’t happen overnight’. Santha Oorjitham, Being There: An ASEAN Architect Looks Back and Ahead [Internet - Magazine] (AsiaWeek, 1997 [cited 1 February 2005]); available from www.asiaweek.com.
509 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.12.
510 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.13. 169
The first difficulty was that the initial SEARRC proposal stated the member states were in agreement that ‘…foreign bases are temporary in nature and should not be allowed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of Asian countries…’ and ‘…that arrangements of collective defence should not be used to serve the particular interest of any big powers’.511 Given that the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand all had security relationships with major exogenous powers these two clauses proved highly controversial. The Philippines, for its part, argued that it would rather avoid any mention of ‘security related issues’ than be forced into a position of having to accept the two components advocated within the SEARC statement. As an absence of any security framework was unacceptable to Indonesia, highly complex bargaining followed until a compromise was eventually reached.512 While the final version of the agreement maintained that ‘foreign bases are temporary’, there was no reference regarding any prohibition ‘against arrangements of collective defence … [that might serve] … the interests of the big powers’.513
The second difficulty was mentioned earlier and pertained to the revival of the ASA. The ASA was the brainchild of Malaysia ‘first and foremost’514 and the Malaysian government was therefore not keen to abandon an already existent and functioning organisation. However, the Indonesians viewed the ASA as anti‐communist, anti‐Indonesian and closely aligned to the West. As Indonesia viewed itself as a leader in the ‘non‐aligned’ movement, the possibly of joining the ASA remained politically unacceptable and therefore, from the Indonesian perspective, a new organisation was necessary.515 During the negotiations that the followed, the Thai blueprint eventually morphed into what became the proposal to establish the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on 8 August 1967. The face‐saving formula
511 Jorgensen-Dahl, Regional Organisation and Order in South-East Asia, p.36.
512 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, pp.13-14.
513 The ASEAN Declaration [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1967 [cited 9 April 2007]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htm.
514 Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p.43.
515 Ibid, pp.42-43, Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.12. 170
developed for ASEAN in its final form, through the Bangkok Declaration, was one that adopted the structure and security premises of the ASA.516 Thus, at the inaugural meeting of ASEAN, Tun Abdul Razak declared ‘[w]e, in Malaysia, are extremely happy that the ideals and aspirations which led to the establishment of ASA six years ago, have now grown and have gathered another form and wider import in the birth of ASEAN today’.517
Upon ASEAN’s formation, the five members of the Association were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. At the time, both Burma (Myanmar) and Cambodia refused to join the Association.518 The evolution into existence of this grouping was by no means a natural or logical development. In addition to the sense of distrust created by konfrontasi, each of the members maintained diverging security interests (and perspectives) and, interdependent with this diversity, was that fact that relations between the member‐ states had remained highly volatile. In the case of the Philippines and Malaysia, for example, the crisis over competing claims for Sabah had not been resolved and diplomatic relations had only recently been restored as a consequence, in part, of a change of leadership in the Philippines.519 Meanwhile, relations between Singapore and Malaysia were equally troublesome, as Singapore had been ejected from the Federation of Malaysia due to irreconcilable differences over politics and diverging approaching to problematic race relations.520 Even in the case of Thailand, its government maintained a degree of
516 Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia, p.24.
517 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.13.
518 Turnbull, "Regionalism and Nationalism," p.288.
519 Diplomatic relations had in fact been restored just eight months earlier, in June 1966, for the purpose of the aforementioned reinvigoration of the ASA. Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, pp.45-46. Even beyond the Philippine government there had emerged, or were about to emerge, new leaders who were more prepared to lead a process of mutual recognition and reconciliation. Ibid, p.40.
520 On political disagreements, differences of the special status of Malays (bumiputras), and the use of Malay as a national language, see: Ganesan, Bilateral Tensions in Post-Cold War ASEAN, p.36. On the competing visions for the Federation of Malaysia based on ‘deep historical racial and political fissures’, see: Andrew Tan, Malaysia - Singapore Relations: Troubled Past and Uncertain Future? (Hull: Centre for South-East Studies and Institute of Pacific Asian Studies, 2001), p.6. See also: Albert Lau, A Moment of Anguish: Singapore in Malaysia and the Politics of Disengagement (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998). 171
apprehension over the possibility that Malaysia might want to regain the Malay territories in Southern Thailand (arbitrarily separated by colonial boundaries). Malaysia was similarly distrustful of Thailand as it felt that it had received less than vigorous cooperation from Bangkok in combating the Malayan Communist Party who had retreated to pockets along the border in the 1950s.521 Hence, and in retrospect, the actual ability of these governments to come together for the purpose of even a limited mechanism for dialogue (if not cooperation) – in spite of their differences – reflected the enormous sense of vulnerability to the numerous security threats that the individual states then faced.522
The ‘Bangkok Declaration’ and the Early Structure of ASEAN
ASEAN’s formative instrument was the ‘ASEAN Declaration’, alternatively known as the ‘Bangkok Declaration’. In line with the historical imperatives behind the organisation’s foundation, the ‘second’ of the declared intentions is to promote ‘regional peace and stability’ through an ‘abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter’.523 Nonetheless, references to ‘active collaboration and mutual assistance’ on political and security issues, along with the need for regional reconciliation, were deliberately avoided in the enabling declaration.524 For example, the ‘first’ official intention in the Declaration was the promotion of social, cultural, and economic development and cooperation.525 Meanwhile, points three
521 Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia, pp.17-18.
522 As Adam Malik also reflects ‘...considerations of national and regional security … figured largely in the minds of the founders of ASEAN.’ Adam Malik, "Regional Cooperation in International Politics," in Regionalism in Southeast Asia: Papers Presented at the First Conference of ASEAN Students of Regional Affairs (ASEAN 1) Jakarta, October 22-25, 1974 (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1975), p.162.
523 The ASEAN Declaration (cited).
524 It is interesting to note however that point three of the declaration does aim ‘... to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific administrative fields’ but again there is no mention of political and security issues. Ibid.
525 More specifically, the first aim and purpose of the Association states: ‘To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian Nations’. Ibid. 172
through seven of the declaration reiterated similar ideals concerning functional cooperation as well as enhanced trade links, the promotion of Southeast Asian studies and the need to maintain ‘close and beneficial cooperation with existing international regional organisations’.526 The limited nature of the reference to ‘regional peace and security’ can be understood through several factors including a continued lack of trust between the member‐ states,527 a desire to protect each country’s sovereignty,528 and the fear of hostile reactions from either Vietnam or China.529 Thus, the ASEAN leaders repeatedly and expressly denied that ASEAN was a security alliance or security organisation.530
Given the constraints placed on the Association at its inception, it is therefore unsurprising that the Bangkok Declaration is humble not just in its intent but also in its nature and the structures established by it. Containing less than two pages of print, the declaration did not include any program for ‘transforming objectives into realities’ and, to the extent that it referred to economic and socio‐cultural cooperation, there were no ‘concrete steps’ for implementation.531 Furthermore, the limited nature of the region’s investment in the Association’s establishment was evidenced by the fact that the signatories to the Declaration were not ASEAN leaders but, rather, deputy leaders, foreign ministers and a ‘secretary of Foreign Affairs’ from the Philippines. In terms of structure, while the document envisions
526 For example, clause 3 of the Bangkok Declaration states: ‘To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields’. Clause 4 states: to provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in the educational, professional, technical and administrative fields’. Clause 5 states: ‘To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of the problems of international commodity trade, the improvement of their transportation and communications facilities and the raising of the living standards of their peoples’. Emphasis by author. Ibid.
527 For details on how trust is still a problem in Southeast Asia see the analysis in Chapter VIII.
528 Discussed further in the next subsection and in Chapter V.
529 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.14, Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.15, Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, pp.69-70.
530 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.70.
531 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.14. 173
regular meetings of the ASEAN Economic Ministers and other subordinate committees, the highest policy‐making body was the Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers.532 Problematically therefore, the Bangkok Declaration contained no provision for meetings of heads of government and, as will be discussed in the next chapter, it would be nearly ten years before the first Heads of State (ASEAN Summit) took place.533
As noted above, the Association adopted the practical goals and institutional format of the ASA. However, as mentioned earlier, at Indonesia’s insistence the Association also adopted the declaratory aspirations that informed the rhetoric of the Maphilindo.534 Regional scholars such as Snitwongse have also interpreted the language of the Bangkok Declaration – including the members’ ‘stability and security from external interference’ – as an elite move to deepen the salience of a number of normative rules that provide the basis of what has become known as the ASEAN way. The core components of the ASEAN way are (i) consensus based decision making; (ii) a respect for national sovereignty; and (iii) the non‐interference in the domestic affairs of others.535 Such an interpretation, at least as far as the rhetoric of ASEAN is concerned, is also supported by the Declaration’s reference to the principles of the United Nations charter which, among other things, includes the principle of non‐interference536 – a well established principle of the modern Westphalian state system.537 However, as will be seen in the next chapter, the behaviour of the member states tended to reflect this normative ideal only when faced by external common threats. Historically, the limited examples of such
532 The ASEAN Declaration (cited). See also: Turnbull, "Regionalism and Nationalism," p.288.
533 Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia, p.25.
534 Ralf Emmers, "Regional Hegemonies and the Exercise of Power in Southeast Asia: A Study of Indonesia and Vietnam," Asian Survey 45, no. 4 (2005): p.650.
535 "The ASEAN Experience: Insights for Regional Political Cooperation,” (Geneva, Switzerland: South Centre, 2007), p.11, Snitwongse, "Thirty Years of ASEAN: Achievements through Political Cooperation," p.183.
536 In addition to what has already been discussed, this included that the states of Southeast Asia (albeit limited to the ASEAN-5) were ‘…determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation’. The ASEAN Declaration (cited).
537 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, p.57. 174
cohesion were further restricted as a result of the bipolar cleavages of the Cold War. Regardless of the limitations of the Bangkok Declaration, the formation of the Association was at least important for establishing a culture of consultation – whether that be at a karaoke bar or at a golf course.538 The significance of this increased dialogue as a consequence of the formation of ASEAN will be assessed in greater depth in the chapters that follow.
Further Considerations to the Sine Qua Non behind the Formation of ASEAN
Aside from the ‘official’ imperatives behind ASEAN’s foundation – and despite the highly tangible nature of the various threats to security that afflicted the Southeast Asian states at the time – there remains some debate over whether the primary motivation for the creation of ASEAN can be attributed to the realm of domestic, or of regional or of extra‐regional concerns. In reality, the divergence in the interpretation of Southeast Asia’s political history may reflect the distinctive worldviews that have been socialised within the territorial confines of each state.539 For example, one senior member from Indonesia’s foreign ministry argues that ‘ASEAN was a solution in its own merit to … the problem of bilateral conflict’540 whereas a senior member from Singapore’s Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) argues that ASEAN merely ‘brought a few countries together in the face of external threat’.541 Adding to the diversity of opinion on the matter, regional scholars such as Bunn Nagara have argued that the formation of ASEAN was primarily a response to the threats posed by domestic insurgencies and a desire, vis‐à‐vis konfrontasi, ‘that the future should not be a repeat of the past’.542 To this list of general motivations one could also add, as Donald Weatherbee contends, that the ‘desire to intensify and regularise … political contacts in a multilateral setting’ was further impelled by
538 Vatikiotis, "ASEAN 10: The Political and Cultural Dimensions of Southeast Asian Unity," p.80.
539 Of course, such worldviews could be further refined to have been socialised within the boundaries of individual ethnic and religious groups that operate/coexist within the state, the most important of which for explaining state behaviour would be the dominant ethnic and/or religious group maintaining political power.
540 Interview with the Directorate of Public Diplomacy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jakarta, 26 April 2006.
541 Interview with MINDEF, Singapore, 27 July 2006.
542 Interview with Bunn Nagara, Kuala Lumpur, Tuesday 30 May 2006. 175
an escalation of the Vietnam War (with its linkages to extramural factors) and the need to integrate Indonesia into a collaborative regional order as opposed to one that saw Indonesia acting as a potential hegemon.543
The extent to which such diversity in opinion reflects differences in the levels of understanding of ASEAN and Southeast Asia by individuals, communities, and states is considered further in later chapters. In the meantime, however, it is important to state that the common glue facilitating the formation of ASEAN was a pragmatic assessment of the aforementioned threats and challenges and especially their impact on the ability of the ruling elites to govern fragile states. In the context of this primary concern, it was the disruptive potential of the many actual and potential disputes within Southeast Asia that, by 1967, had resulted in a recognition that that unless the five governments established some form of organised dialogue to mitigate competition and future interstate conflict, then they would either fail or be delayed in their endeavours towards nation‐building and economic development. Thus, as Michael Leifer suggests, ‘regional co‐operation was not intended to serve the interest of common security through the projection of common power but through the mitigation and management of conflict and attendant economic development’.544 However, as will be seen, the maintenance of good relations between the Southeast Asian states has proven to be much more difficult in reality than much of the founding rhetoric would indicate.
It is also important to note that beyond the overarching strategic concerns of the five members (including regime survival) each of the states had more specific but divergent motivations for joining ASEAN. Singapore, while remaining intensely suspicious of Malaysian and Indonesian motives, hoped that ASEAN would help to build a regional identity for Singapore and entrench further recognition of Singapore’s sovereignty within international society.545 Similarly, the Philippines viewed ASEAN as an identity building exercise but one in
543 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.68.
544 Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia, p.6.
545 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.15. 176
which it might eventually be perceived as something other than a ‘trans‐Pacific appendage to the United States’.546 Thailand saw the formation of ASEAN as a potential basis of ‘collective political defence’ that could eventually alleviate its security dependence on the United States.547 Malaysia, for its part, hoped that ASEAN would provide a vehicle to mend regional relations, that it would provide an opportunity to become more independent in its security relations, and, in the process, fill the vacuum left by the retreat of the colonial powers.548 Finally, Indonesia viewed ASEAN as an opportunity to mend its sub‐regional relations, as a chance to exercise regional leadership, and finally to reduce the ability of external powers to interfere in the affairs of Southeast Asia.549 Again, even at the individual state level of analysis, the common theme underpinning the motivations behind ASEAN’s formation was primarily intramural in nature (despite some exogenous influences, especially the Cold War) having stemmed from the specific necessity of enhancing the level of domestic stability across and within the states of Southeast Asia.550
Conclusions
The existence of Southeast Asia as a distinct region was largely a consequence of the strategic dynamics of the Second World War and, in particular, the creation of Lord Louis Mountbatten’s Southeast Asia military command. The contemporary nature of the emergence of Southeast Asia as an identifiable region is further verified by the fact that, historically speaking, the differences amidst the peoples of the region have far outweighed the similarities and, consequently, there has never existed a pre‐colonial ‘regionwide’ collective identity. While there may have existed two sub‐regional security complexes
546 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.68.
547 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.15.
548 As Tun Abdul Razak then declared at the inaugural meeting of ASEAN, the ‘vacuum left by the retreat of colonial rule must be filled by the growth and consideration of indigenous powers – otherwise our future, individually and jointly, will remain dangerously threatened’. Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.15.
549 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.15.
550 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, p.128. 177
(albeit in a limited form), the transactions and interactions that occurred within them were frequently negative (hostile) in nature. Therefore, to the extent that any social transactions between the communities of Southeast Asia have occurred in the past, such transactions have not been of the genre necessary to generate the creation of a regionwide community (positively defined)551 including the constituent elements of trust, we‐feeling and/or reciprocity.
Aside from some cultural similarities at various levels of analysis and between various communities, the most significant community building influences within the region pertained to the few common experiences that were collectively shared, to one degree or another, by the peoples and elites of Southeast Asia in the decades since independence. Such common experiences involved the effects of colonialism and the highly volatile domestic environments that emerged in the wake of independence. In relation to the influence of colonialism, the issue is complicated by the fact that, in various respects and to varying degrees, the historical consequences of foreign rule have simultaneously divided and united the states and communities of Southeast Asia. For example, colonialism did contribute, in a limited manner, towards a greater sense of commonality and common history through mutual struggles for recognition and a familiarisation with the norms of international society. Meanwhile, however, the colonial past also had a divisive effect regarding the world‐views and identities of various states and communities (whether defined on the basis of ethnicity or religion) within Southeast Asia. The contrast in individual worldviews and strategic outlooks among political elite communities was reflected by their individual and contrasting alliances with foreign powers. Thus, and as stated earlier in the chapter, between the time of independence through to the formation of ASEAN, many of the Southeast Asian states knew more about their ‘colonial masters’ than they did about their own neighbours.
551 As previously discussed, this qualification is necessary due to the existence of negatively defined ‘communities’ within the scholarly literature, such as ‘war communities’. 178
While the impact of the region’s ‘common experiences’ should be qualified as highly limited, at least as far as the community aspects of comprehensive integration are concerned, these experiences may have arguably contributed, over time, to the emergence of a common desire to seek a degree of collaboration and multilateralism between some of the Southeast Asian states. Nevertheless, and throughout the first three decades of independence, the security architecture of Southeast Asia was most strongly influenced by mutual distrust and, in some instances, blatant hostility. Consequently, and despite the continuation of insurgencies, poor economic performance and general instability (or perhaps because of them), initial attempts to establish multilateral structures for dialogue and/or security failed. In the end, however, a degree of pragmatism – coupled with the pursuit of economic advancement, regime survival and domestic stability – meant that the non‐communist states of the ‘South’ continued to pursue the formation of a realistic and lasting modus vivendi in their relations with one another. In the absence of such a modus vivendi, the perception was that regional hostility and distrust would not only go unmitigated but would continue to detract from the implementation of those nation building policies necessary to generate greater domestic stability.
In the end, and following three decades of intra‐regional bickering and hostility, the final result was the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. The modus vivendi necessitated by the establishment of ASEAN was based on Indonesia’s philosophy of ‘unity in diversity’ where the principles of non‐interference and consensus based decision making represented central pillars to what became known as the ‘ASEAN Way’. Therefore, and as far as the proposal for a security community is concerned, the argument of this chapter suggests that any steps towards the construction of a security community will likely be ‘state‐driven’.552 Whether or not the states of Southeast Asia, under the umbrella of ASEAN, can collaborate and cooperate to the point that will witness the implementation of substantive community building mechanisms and activities are issues that will be considered and critiqued in greater detail within later chapters. Meanwhile, the
552 The various pathways to the construction of a security community were discussed in detail within Chapter II and further refined within Chapter III. 180
Chapter V
ASEAN’s Historical Record: A Critical Evaluation of the Early Search for Cooperation and a Modus Vivendi
In building on the analysis of Chapter IV, this chapter seeks to evaluate the historical performance and development of ASEAN since its inception through to the years that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. In carrying out this task, the first part of the chapter covers the Cold War period of ASEAN’s existence and seeks to illustrate how – despite an initial period of distrust, disunity and cooperative ineffectiveness – exogenous issues and threats eventually compelled the ASEAN states to seek greater collaboration and express a more unified diplomatic voice within international society. Furthermore, and to the extent that ASEAN currently has an identity, the first part of the chapter will demonstrate how such an embryonic elite‐level collective identity was seeded within the first two decades of ASEAN’s creation. As will be seen however, before such an identity building process could be initiated, a number of hurdles in the bilateral relations between some of the member states had to be overcome.
While the second part of the chapter outlines how ASEAN survived the Cold War with a heighted sense of self‐confidence and international stature, it also shows how the Association soon came to struggle with the unpredictability of a multi‐polar world; a multi‐polar world where there no longer existed an exogenously imposed sense of unity through the existence of extra‐regional threats and global bi‐polarity. Nevertheless, the Association sought to enhance its diplomatic voice on the world stage through the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum and also to consolidate its role within Southeast Asia by expanding its membership to embrace all the then independent states of Southeast Asia. The second part to the chapter concludes with a critical review of the traditional understanding of ASEAN’s normative framework as constituted at the end of the twentieth century. The foundations will then be laid for Chapter VI, which concerns the impact of Myanmar’s membership on the norms and solidarity of the ASEAN states. 181
ASEAN’s Performance: the Early Years
As discussed in the previous chapter, the states of Southeast Asia obtained independence under an environment of uncertainty, volatility, and hostility. During these formative years, the ability of the ASEAN member‐states to operate collaboratively through the structure of ASEAN was not only hampered by the continuation of internal instability and the emergence of a world increasingly bipolarised between the two superpowers USSR,553 but was also detrimentally affected by the continuation of hostile relations and potential initiators of conflict within Southeast Asia. Given these impediments, it is not surprising that in the course of ASEAN’s first decade of operation the Association struggled to achieve anything of significance within the realms of cooperation and/or integration, let alone measures for preventative diplomacy, conflict management and/or conflict resolution.
In regard to some of the major impediments to trust, cooperation and integration, the previous chapter has already drawn attention to the challenge of intra‐regional conflict as demonstrated by Indonesia’s policy of ‘konfrontasi’. While an ‘in principle’ reconciliation between Indonesia and Malaysia was necessary prior to the formation of ASEAN, in some instances the residual effects of konfrontasi did not entirely dissipate until much later. For example, the challenge of konfrontasi to intra‐ASEAN relations was such that full diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Malaysia could not be initiated until a month after the formation of ASEAN. Meanwhile, and before ASEAN could move ahead in the development of even minimal levels in cooperation and collaboration, a number of further hurdles to intra‐ ASEAN relations had first to be overcome with the most significant being the bilateral tensions extant between the Philippines and Malaysia and also between Singapore and Malaysia. While some of these issues were briefly touched on in the previous chapter they are discussed in greater detail below for the purpose of outlining the many hurdles to integration that ASEAN faced at its inception and, potentially, how such hurdles continue to affect ASEAN in more contemporary times, as discussed in later chapters.
553 Khong, "ASEAN and the Southeast Asian Security Complex," p.325. 182
Early Challenges to ASEAN Cohesion: From the Corregidor Affair to Singapore/Malaysia Relations.
Soon after ASEAN’s formation, in March 1968, the Corregidor Affair between the Philippines and Malaysia transpired. The Philippine government, under the leadership of President Marcos, had sought to pursue its claim to Sabah by funding and assisting a training camp for an intended Sabah separatist rebellion in Corregidor in 1968. While the full facts of the affair were never confirmed, in March 1968 a Filipino Muslim recruit reported to the Governor of the Cavite Province that he had survived a massacre of the intended rebels; a massacre that had been precipitated by a mutiny over demands for back‐pay.554 Soon thereafter, the plot was seemingly confirmed when the Malaysian government arrested twenty‐six Filipinos carrying small arms and explosives on a Malaysian island some thirty kilometres north of Sabah. 555
According to Ralph Emmers, the Corregidor Affair is significant in that it gave rise to ASEAN’s only example of preventative diplomacy at ‘an intra‐mural level’. In August 1968, President Suharto intervened at the second ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) with the suggestion that a cooling off period be implemented between Manila and Kuala Lumpur.556 Nonetheless, the limitations to this exercise in preventative diplomacy were soon apparent because only one month later the Philippine Congress passed a resolution (later endorsed by President Marcos) reaffirming the Philippine claim to Sabah. Not only did the two countries re‐suspend diplomatic relations, but all ASEAN meetings were cancelled until May 1969.557 Aside from
554 Marites Danguilan Vitug and Glenda M. Gloria, Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao (Quezon City: Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs, Institute for Popular Democracy, 1990), pp.9-21. The incident was reported in the Filipino press on 21 March 1968. Leifer, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South-East Asia, p.97.
555 Andrew Tan, "Intra-ASEAN Tensions,” (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000), p.27.
556 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.16. Notably, however, neither the Affair nor Indonesia’s diplomacy was mentioned in the ASEAN communiqué that followed from the meeting. See: Joint Communiqué of the Second ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (Jakarta, 6-7 August 1968) [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1968 [cited 23 April 2007]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/3691.htm.
557 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.19. 183
demonstrating the ineffective nature of ASEAN for the purpose of conflict resolution during the organisation’s formative years, the persistence of the dispute continues to detrimentally mark relations between the two countries and thereby reduce the overall sense of community and cohesiveness within ASEAN.
Meanwhile, in the years that followed Singapore’s de‐merger with Malaysia, through to well after ASEAN’s formation, relations between Singapore and Malaysia remained openly hostile and completely contrary to ‘spirit of equality and partnership’ enunciated in the Bangkok Declaration.558 Moreover, by early 1968, just six months after ASEAN’s establishment, ‘the two sides were at a point of treating each other in terms and policies more alien than their attitudes towards other countries’.559 The many factors contributing to the fractious relationship between Singapore and Malaysia included such issues as the feasibility of a common market and a common currency; the dissolution of joint stock companies such as Malaysia‐Singapore airlines; threats over the supply of potable water from Johor (Malaysia); debates over the control of a Malaysian railway line, a Malay regiment and a Malaysian naval base in Woodlands; the use of Israeli military advisors leading to the adoption of an Israeli‐ style doctrine of ‘forward defence’ and various territorial disputes.560
A further issue that had a negative impact on relations between the two countries – as touched on in the previous chapter – was the escalation of ethno‐religious divisions and the distinctive policies adopted in response to them. Not only were these ethno‐religious divides inseparably linked to the material factors considered in the preceding paragraph, but they were also interdependent with the diverging nature of the two country’s developmental strategies and conflicting approaches to nation‐building and social development within their
558 The Bangkok Declaration states that the principle aim and purpose ‘of the Association shall be … to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian Nations’ (emphasis by author). The ASEAN Declaration (cited).
559 Lau Teik Soon as quoted in Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p.47.
560 Ganesan, Bilateral Tensions in Post-Cold War ASEAN, pp.38-39. K S Nathan, "Malaysia-Singapore Relations: Retrospect and Prospect," Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, no. 2 (2002): pp.388-392, Tan, "Intra- ASEAN Tensions," p.10. 184
multi‐ethnic societies.561 The strategy behind Singapore’s plans for development was significantly informed by a sense of vulnerability over a perception that it was a ‘Chinese island in a Malay sea’.562 The Singapore leadership further responded to this sense of vulnerability by taking an abrasive and competitive tone and in the process drew ‘scathing comparison[s] with its neighbours’ and Malaysia in particular.563 In response, Malaysian policy makers and academics alike continue to draw reference to the ‘kiasu’ (must win) mentality of the Singaporeans and view such a mentality as representing the basic source of Singaporean verbal provocations.564
According to a very high profile academic in Malaysia, the problematic nature of dealing with Singapore has been exacerbated by a sense of paranoia (or, as he puts it, ‘Israeli defence force mentality’) that there are ‘threat[s] everywhere’ and this has meant that, through a ‘Forward Defence’ plan, Singapore is constantly ready and prepared to invade the Southern Malaysian state of Johor over such issues as water‐resources or, potentially, religion.565 Eventually,
561 Ganesan, Bilateral Tensions in Post-Cold War ASEAN, p.37.
562 Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Times Editions, 1998), p.23.
563 Turnbull, "Regionalism and Nationalism," p.287.
564 For example, a Deputy Vice Chancellor of one Malaysian university stated in relation to his perception of Singaporean government attitudes: ‘[the Singaporeans] must get what Malaysia is getting, this is the problem with the attitude … this is the kiasu [must win] mentality’. Interview by author, Malaysia, Friday 2 June 2006.
565 At another point in the interview the senior scholars states, ‘they [Singapore] have this defence plan, you know, forward defence into Southern Malaysia, you have read about this right. And their idea of coming in would be to take things like water, you know probably as a resource, or if there is a Muslim government in Kuala Lumpur which is considered to be hostile to Singapore. It’s that kind of thinking, I think no other country, in Southeast Asia, has any such defence plan. … they have all these Israeli advisors, and all that which would bring this Israeli kind of mentality to them, like threat[s] everywhere… so that’s why so many of them go through this military [training]. You know, even if they are in civilian life, all of them have to go through this national service, so they have this very strong military inclined way of thinking, even among the civilian government, and academia and all that, and they attract these kind of people who are inclined towards a rather, how should I put it, Christiangerian, Machiavellian, kind of thinking’. Interview with Senior Scholar, ISIS Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia), 13 December 2001. To such general sentiments a former member of the PAP and Secret Police responds ‘so, of course, when the former Indonesian president, Habibie, calls us little red dots and the Malaysians try to threaten our water, that is for Singapore evidence that it must maintain a realist mode of thinking about the world’. Interview with Retired Singapore Official, IDSS (Singapore), 5 December 2001. Many scholars have written on this aspect of Singapore’s foreign policy, for examples see: Tim Huxley, "Singapore and Malaysia: A Precarious Balance," Pacific Review 4, no. 3 (1991): p.204. Tan, "Intra-ASEAN Tensions", Tan, Malaysia - Singapore Relations: Troubled Past and Uncertain Future? Ganesan, Bilateral Tensions in Post-Cold War ASEAN. 185
however, a reprieve for the future of ASEAN soon came as relations improved marginally566 after a change of leadership in Malaysia where Tunku Abdul Rahman was replaced by Tun Abdul Razak following a loss of confidence in the politically dominant United Malays National Organisation (UMNO).567
Limited Progress in the Face of International Change: ZOPFAN
By the 1970s a degree of cordiality had emerged between the ASEAN members and, aside from the positive effects of leadership change, such cordiality was most significantly driven by several international developments with significant bearing on Southeast Asia’s security architecture. For example, Singapore and Malaysia were both forced to rethink their security alliances when Britain announced plans to accelerate its withdrawal from Southeast Asia. Then, in 1969, and in response to growing domestic opposition to the Vietnam War, President Nixon issued the Guam doctrine, a doctrine that effectively limited the military involvement of the United States in Southeast Asia. Thus was reinforced an already emerging view that the ASEAN states could no longer rely on the major powers for their own security.568 In the same year, the Soviet Union expressed an interest in the region through its proposal for an Asian ‘collective security system’; a further trend was the re‐emergence of China. Meanwhile, the ASEAN states’ development strategies increasingly needed to consider the magnitude of Japan’s economy and at the same time there were also political‐security concerns over the possible consequences of the Vietnam War spreading into Cambodia and Laos.569 During the course of the next decade, the cumulative effect of all these events reinforced the perception
566 At least enough to set aside, if not resolve, the most problematic causes of tension for the purpose of seeking ‘economic’ advancement through the use of ASEAN.
567 Tun Razak and later Hussein Onn assumed the Premiership in Malaysia. Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, pp.47-48.
568 The Nixon doctrine provided that unless there was a nuclear threat and/or attack then the United States would only provide military and economic assistance in accord with treaty commitments but that the threatened nation would maintain primary responsibility for its defence. Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.70.
569 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.19. 186
of the need for regional cooperation and thus for the development of approaches to obtain collective security under what would eventually become the umbrella of ASEAN.
ASEAN first responded to these developments by garnering sufficient consensus to sign the Declaration for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) on 27 November 1971. ZOPFAN represented the reinvigoration of Indonesia’s vision for a regional order free from foreign interference – as seen in the Bandung, the MAPHILINDO, SEAARC and the Bangkok Declaration – and followed a reassessment by the ASEAN states of the reliability of depending on foreign powers for security. A subsequent desire to construct a non‐threatening security strategy independent of the United States also became a goal.570 Associated with these considerations and reflected in the wording of the document was a desire to remove all foreign bases from the soil of the ASEAN member states. However, ASEAN never truly succeeded with this element of the ZOPFAN initiative as the document was not binding in nature; it contained no concrete steps or dates for implementation; and was sufficiently ambiguous to allow each of the ASEAN members to develop their own unique interpretation of the agreement.571 Furthermore, the ongoing Cold War (together with a continued divergence of security perspectives) meant that Thailand and the Philippines were reluctant to dispense with US bases and the security they offered while Singapore was hesitant to give up the power balancing approach that has characterised much of its foreign policy.572
The ZOPFAN declaration is further significant for being a political compromise on the part of Malaysia whose government had earlier proposed a ‘neutralisation’ policy. According to Malaysia, neutralisation involved the pursuit of guarantees from the great powers that they
570 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.70.
571 Interview with M.C. Abad, ASEAN Secretariat (Jakarta), 20 April 2006. See also: Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.22.
572 Today, the US no longer has any bases in the Southeast Asian states, this is because its current assets are more accurately defined as bunkering and re-supply arrangements as constituted in Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines. Sheldon W. Simon, "Asian Armed Forces: Internal and External Tasks and Capabilities,” (Washington: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2000). There have however been recent negotiations for the reestablishment of permanent bases in the Philippines: Scarpello, US, Philippines Weigh New Military Marriage [Internet] (Asia Times, 2006 [cited 11 August 2007]); available from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HH23Ae01.html. 187
would not pursue their disputes in Southeast Asia. The problem was that such a Malaysian policy relied on exactly what Indonesia was trying to avoid ‐ continued dependence on foreign powers for security in return for a guarantee of neutrality by the ASEAN states. As Indonesia perceived itself as a leader within the Non‐Aligned Movement (NAM) – and given Indonesia’s interpretation of, and role in, the formulation of the Bandung Principles – the pursuit of regional security via the Malaysian formula was not acceptable.573 Therefore, and aside from the preamble, the final declaration contained just two clauses with the most significant (but ambiguous) component stating that the ASEAN states were determined to ‘secure the recognition of, and respect for, Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers’.574 Nevertheless, and as a partial consequence of the continued linkage to Malaysia’s policy of ‘neutralisation’,575 both China and Vietnam responded negatively to the document with allegations by Vietnam that the ZOPFAN was merely another example of American imperialism.576
The Associative Effects of ZOPFAN: The Emerging Salience of ‘Regional Resilience’?
The ZOPFAN declaration was, however, more historically significant as a marker of the normative direction that the ASEAN states were heading and, perhaps, also of the initiative’s effect on the salience of these norms. Similar to the Bangkok Declaration, the ZOPFAN initiative articulated the continued desire of the ASEAN states to abide by the principles of the United Nations Charter. However, the preamble of the ZOPFAN document moved beyond the wording of the Bangkok Declaration by stating explicitly that the most ‘worthy aims and
573 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.19. Henderson, "Reassessing ASEAN," p.17.
574 Emphasis by author. Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration (Malaysia, 27 November 1971) [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1971 [cited 28 November 2006]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/3629.htm.
575 These linkages were not merely historical but also contained within the final draft of the ZOPFAN document. Ibid. (cited).
576 Sheldon W. Simon, "China, Vietnam, and ASEAN: The Politics of Polarization," Asian Survey 19, no. 12 (1979): pp.1172. Under the Leadership of General-Secretary Le Duan, the Vietnamese Communist Party described ASEAN as an ‘imperialist invention’ and an ‘insidious proxy’ that was not any better than SEATO. Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, pp.61-62. 188
objectives of the United Nations’ were ‘the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, abstention from threat or use of force, peaceful settlement of international disputes, equal rights and self‐determination and non‐interference in affairs of States’.577 The gradual solidification of these normative values in the Bangkok Declaration, ZOPFAN and the initiatives that followed, is partially explained by their consistency with the Suharto (New Order) regime’s philosophy and policy of national resilience (ketahanan national) that emerged in the late 1960s.578
National resilience is understood as the pursuit of national stability, independence and sovereignty on the basis of national development. Such development covers all the social, cultural, ideological, political and economic aspects of nation‐building. According to the philosophy of national resilience, the security of the state is also considered dependent on an environment that is unhampered by external and domestic security threats (including disloyalty on the part of the people). Similar to the concept of internal consolidation that was discussed in Chapter III, the ASEAN states came to believe that when a state overcame internal issues (e.g. the dangers of subversion) then it would become a more viable entity where insurgencies and ethnic separatism would be prevented from ‘infecting neighbouring states’.579
Following the reasoning behind the principle, and in the context of the Southeast Asian challenges to domestic instability, the belief is that should all the ASEAN states adopt ‘national resilience’ then the regional security environment would experience greater stability leading to ‘regional resilience’. Regional resilience would therefore, in turn, support ‘national resilience’ through the creation of stable sets of inter‐mural relations thus enhancing the
577 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration (Malaysia, 27 November 1971) (cited).
578 Leifer, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South-East Asia, p.199.
579 Acharya, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia, pp.110-111, Ralf Emmers, "Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Evolution of Concepts and Practices," in Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation: National Interests and Regional Order, ed. See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2004), p.11, Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.73. 189
ability of the regimes to focus on national development.580 Traditionally, and in line with the fundamental importance placed on the principles of sovereign equality and non‐interference, the ASEAN states have adhered to a conviction that each member state is in the best position to decide its specific path to national resilience and this has allowed examples of open ended engagement in brutal nation‐building policies without fear of counter pressure from ASEAN neighbours.581 Given the above goals and practices of the ASEAN states, it becomes somewhat less surprising that the ASEAN states saw it necessary to repeat four times their reference to the principle of ‘non‐interference’ (or a paraphrase thereof) within the ZOPFAN document.
Renewed Progress in the Face of External Volatility: The Bali Summit
The first ASEAN summit of national leaders was held at Bali in 1976 and, in some respects, represents one of the high points of ASEAN unity and functionality. At one level of analysis, the Bali summit was further motivated by growing concerns over a possible communist ‘domino effect’ following the successful reunification of Vietnam and communist victories in Laos and Cambodia in 1975.582 At another level of analysis, the Bali summit can be viewed as reflecting a growing belief in, if not occurrence of, the benefits of foreign policy unification, cooperation and integration.583 The most important initiatives announced at the summit were the establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat together with the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and the ASEAN Concord. Importantly, these agreements were the result of at least two years of negotiation with the decision for a Secretariat, together with an initial proposal by the Philippines for an actual Charter, having been agreed to by the time of
580 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, pp.129-130.
581 Hund, The Development of ASEAN Norms between 1997 and 2000: A Paradigm Shift? (cited), p.9.
582 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.23.
583 The results of the survey and interview work conducted by the author – as displayed in later chapters – will evidence that such a belief is most strongly held by regional scholars and those members of individual foreign ministries that are most closely associated (socialised) with regular ASEAN meeting and activities. 190
the seventh AMM held in Jakarta in May 1974.584 While neither the TAC nor the ASEAN Concord represented an actual legal Charter, collectively the documents are significant for acknowledging the mutual interdependence of security and for further embedding, at the rhetorical level at least, ASEAN’s principles and rules of conduct – including the peaceful settlement of disputes and the renunciation of force against one another.585
In the case of the ASEAN Concord, its primary focus was on the economic aspects of security through four areas of cooperation: basic commodities (food and energy in particular); industrial projects and plants; trade liberalisation; and joint approaches to global economic problems.586 In addition, and aside from the questionable claim that the ASEAN Concord established a ‘political identity’,587 the instrument was at least also important for having expanded ASEAN’s modus vivendi to an ‘in principle’ consideration of political cooperation – in addition to cooperation in the economic, social and cultural fields.588 In relation to security, and given the organisation’s continued concerns over the inter‐mural issues of Vietnam and China, the Concord condoned continued military cooperation on a ‘non‐ASEAN basis’ but rejected such potential cooperation on an ASEAN basis. Thus, the document reiterated ASEAN’s endorsement of ZOPFAN but this was now expressed in the context of an ‘aspiration’
584 Joint Communiqué of the Seventh ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (Jakarta, 7-9 May 1974) [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1974 [cited 7 August 2005]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/1237.htm. See also: Christopher B. Roberts, "ASEAN Charter: The Model Decision," The Straits Times, 9 September 2005.
585 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.18.
586 Declaration of ASEAN Concord (Indonesia, 24 February 1976) [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1976 [cited 22 June 2006]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/1649.htm. See also: Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.23.
587 In the context of this declaratory component (as contained in the preamble), Ralph Emmers contends that ASEAN was provided with a ‘political identity’. The problem is that his contention is likely to be interpreted as meaning something more than the simple rhetorical intention to ‘expand ASEAN cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, and political fields’. Such interpretations could be linked to the current debate over the potential legal and/or political identity that would be established by an ASEAN Charter. By contrast, the ASEAN Concord was far less ambitious. Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.18.
588 Declaration of the ASEAN Concord (Indonesia, 24 February 1976) [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, [cited 22 March 2004]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/3630.htm. 191
rather than a corporate objective. The ASEAN Concord is further important for explicitly entrenching the aforementioned policy of national resilience and regional resilience.589
In the context of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the often brutal and authoritarian nation‐building policies adopted by some ASEAN states in the pursuit of national and regional resilience – as will be seen by the detailed investigation of Myanmar later in Chapter IX – it is relatively unsurprising that the TAC sought not only to clarify but also to codify as its core principle the notion of ‘non‐interference in the internal affairs of one another’.590 For smaller states, such as Singapore, extra meaning and relevance to the importance of ‘non‐ interference’ undoubtedly emerged as a consequence of Indonesia’s ‘interference’ in and invasion of Timor Leste the previous year.591 In addition to non‐interference, the TAC also endorsed and codified several subsidiary norms, principles and purposes including:
Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations’; The right of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion’; Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; Renunciation of the threat or use of force; Effective cooperation among themselves.592
Despite the salience of the principle of non‐interference in the rhetoric (if not behaviour) of ASEAN and its members, Articles 14 and 15 of the TAC also provide for a latent contradiction – the possible formation of a High Council for the purpose of dispute resolution.593 The idea of a High Council was put forward by the Philippine government but it has never been invoked by the ASEAN members. Furthermore, and detracting from its efficacy, is an escape clause
589 Ibid. The dissertation deliberately refers to the word ‘policy’ as it is contended that this was the basis of the formation of a modus vivendi, which is the agreement to cooperate between very different political elites and political systems. See also: Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.18.
590 Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? , p.95.
591 Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p.64.
592 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (Indonesia, 24 February 1976) [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, [cited 22 March 2005]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm.
593 Ibid. 192
(Article 16) where no party to a dispute will be bound by the High Council unless they first agree to take part in such mediation.594 The final element of note in the TAC is that it is also open to accession by any state regardless of whether or not they are a member of ASEAN.
Early ASEAN/Hanoi Diplomacy in the Lead-up to the Third Indochina Conflict
As mentioned, Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam had all ‘fallen’ to communism by the end of 1975. Of these countries, the newly reunified Vietnam was by far the most militarily powerful with the potential to seek and sustain regional hegemony. Due to a continued divergence in threat perceptions and strategic outlook more generally, together with an inability to influence events within Indochina, ASEAN initially focused on a ‘policy of accommodation’ with Vietnam.595 Thus, in mid‐1975 the Association proposed the establishment of cooperative relations (but not membership) with communist Indochina.596 Vietnam however quickly rebuffed ASEAN’s call for a ‘friendly and harmonious’ relationship and alternatively sought various methods to publicly discredit the organisation.
For the purpose of discrediting ASEAN, Vietnam soon denounced the Bali Summit (along with the Association itself) urging that ASEAN should be disbanded with the allegation that it was nothing more than an extension of the US policy of containment.597 Consequently, later statements by Vietnam in 1976 were treated suspiciously and interpreted by some of the ASEAN members as an indication of support for revolutionary movements throughout the
594 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.20, Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p.50.
595 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.86, Henderson, "Reassessing ASEAN," p.19.
596 Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p.39.
597 Vietnam’s call to disband ASEAN occurred during a 1977 tour of the ASEAN countries (except Singapore). At the time, Deputy Foreign Minister, Vo Dong Giang, who was travelling with the Foreign Minister, urged that the Association be disbanded due to it being supported by the US and because two of its member-states had ‘had been fighting in South Vietnam when it was established in 1967’. Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia, p.84. See also: Ralf Emmers, "The Indochinese Enlargement of ASEAN: Security Expectations and Outcomes," Australian Journal of International Affairs 59, no. 1 (2005): p.72, Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.74. 193
region.598 Furthermore, Vietnamese objections over ZOPFAN continued. Not only did Hanoi manage to bar the inclusion of the ZOPFAN principle in the final communiqué at the 1976 Non‐Aligned Conference in Colombo but retaliated with a counter proposal for ‘genuine neutrality’.599 At the June 1978 UN Special Session on Disarmament, Vietnam simultaneously surprised and offended the ASEAN members by expressing its support for ZOPFAN whilst at the same time reinvigorating its ‘ideal’ for regional order through a renewed proposal of a ‘Zone of Genuine Independence, Peace and Neutrality’.600
Whilst wielding various ‘diplomatic sticks’, Vietnam simultaneously sought to offer several ‘carrots’ by establishing, or at least normalising, bilateral diplomatic relations with the ASEAN member states during the course of 1976.601 By 1977 however, the government of Vietnam (in an apparent about face) shifted its foreign policy position by easing the level of antagonism against ASEAN. The subsequent ‘peace offensive’ reached its pinnacle in late 1978 with a September to October tour of the ASEAN states by Prime Minister Pham Van Dong. During the lead‐up to this tour, extensive consultations took place between the ASEAN governments for the purpose of adopting a common position vis‐à‐vis Prime Minister Phan.602 Accordingly, when Vietnam pushed for a new regional order based on bilateral treaties of friendship, consistent responses were maintained amidst the ASEAN ranks with all the ASEAN parties declining Vietnam’s offer of a non‐aggression treaty.603 This diplomatic unity was indicative of
598 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.40.
599 Simon, "China, Vietnam, and ASEAN: The Politics of Polarization," p.1172. See also: Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.88.
600 Emphasis by author. Henry Kamm, "Concept of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), Originally Shunned by Communist Nations in Asia, Now Is Being Approved by China, Vietnam and the Ussr," New York Times, 22 September 1978, p.111.
601 Ramses Amer, "Regional Integration and Conflict Management. The Case of Vietnam," Asia Europe Journal 2, no. 4 (2004): p.534.
602 Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia, p.85.
603 In relation to ASEAN, Carl Thayer contends that it was ‘a sign of its growing political maturity … [that] ASEAN coordinated its response to Dong’s visit, presented a united front, and collectively agreed to individually decline the offer of a non-aggression treaty’. Carlyle A. Thayer, "ASEAN and Indochina: The Dialogue," in ASEAN in the 1990's, ed. Alison Broinowski (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp.146-147. 194
the growing cohesiveness of ASEAN in the face of the ‘common’ external threats that existed at the time. Nonetheless, these nascent levels of political cooperation were soon to be tested when on 25 December 1978 – just two months after Vietnam had pledged with ASEAN to ‘scrupulously respect each other’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity’ in the region – Hanoi then invaded Cambodia.604
The Height of Solidarity: Early ASEAN Responses to the Invasion of Cambodia
In retrospect, the diplomatic olive branches offered by Vietnam – including its non‐aggression treaties – were in fact little more than strategic components of an overall plan to invade Cambodia.605 Moreover, Hanoi’s refusal to confer with ASEAN on a multilateral basis was designed to weaken the solidarity of ASEAN – by dividing the members over strategic issues (e.g. power balancing with China) – in the hope that it could avoid or weaken any collective response by the organisation.606 Aside from the various strategic motivations behind the invasion of Cambodia, such as a sense of vulnerability to China and/or the desire to establish a Vietnamese dominated Indochina Federation – Vietnam’s overthrow of the genocidal Khmer Rouge in Cambodia arguably served a somewhat humanitarian purpose.607 Nonetheless, and
604 Joint Statement: The Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting on the Current Political Development in the Southeast Asia Region (Bangkok, 12 January 1979) [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1979 [cited 17 April 2006]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/1257.htm. In relation to Vietnam’s agreement to respect the territorial borders of Cambodia and Laos see: The Special Meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers to Assess the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam and to Consider Its Implications for Southeast Asia (Kuala Lumpur, 15 February 1973) [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1973 [cited 3 April 2006]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/5216.htm. See also: Frank Frost, "Introduction: ASEAN since 1967 - Origins, Evolution and Recent Developments," in ASEAN into the 1990s, ed. Alison Broinowski (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), p.50.
605 Thus, it was no coincidence that Vietnam had formalised its alignment with the Soviet Union with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on 3 November 1978 and ‘later supported the establishment of the exiled Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation that challenged the Pol Pot regime. Emmers, "Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Evolution of Concepts and Practices," p.90.
606 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.89.
607 While the Vietnamese government did not declare this as a motivation (in part or in whole) for its invasion of Cambodia (then Kampuchea) by 1979, the government did increasingly raise the issue of genocide for the purpose of arguing that the former Cambodian government had relinquished its moral right to rule. Vietnam further argued, somewhat less convincingly, that what was taking place within Cambodia was ‘in fact’ a revolutionary civil war against such a despotic and genocidal regime. Pao-Min Chang, "Beijing Versus Hanoi: The Diplomacy over Kampuchea," Asian Survey 23, no. 5 (1983): p.607. For a detailed account of Vietnamese policies during the period of its occupation of Cambodia and the events leading towards its eventual withdrawal, 195
to ASEAN’s credit, the Association was quickly able to muster consensus and indict Vietnam for breaching the principles of territorial sovereignty and non‐interference in the internal affairs of another state.608 While ASEAN lacked the capacity and intention to physically eject Vietnam from Cambodia, it did manage to rely on the use of consultative diplomacy for the purpose of isolating Vietnam diplomatically and denying international recognition of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) – the Vietnamese installed government in Cambodia.609
Within fifteen days of Vietnam’s invasion, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, as Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee, responded by deeply deploring the invasion, appealing for the involvement of the UN Security Council, and – in outlining the principles within the TAC (the emerging ‘ASEAN way’) – calling for a strict respect for ‘the principles of the UN Charter … and the Bandung Declaration’.610 Three days later a meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers took place in Bangkok where they demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces and affirmed the right of the Cambodian people to self‐determination.611 Following various armed incursions by the Vietnamese military into Thailand and a growing refugee crisis, the position of the ASEAN governments solidified further with the issue of a ‘joint statement’ that was reiterated in June 1980. In arguing that such incursions ‘directly affect the security of the
see: Gary Klintworth, Vietnam's Withdrawal from Cambodia: Regional Issues and Realignments (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1990).
608 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, p.58.
609 Amer, "Regional Integration and Conflict Management. The Case of Vietnam," p.535. See also: Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.97.
610 Statement by the Indonesia Foreign Minister as Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee on the Escalation of the Armed Conflict between Vietnam and Kampuchea (Jakarta, 9 January 1979) [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1979 [cited 17 April 2007]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/5215.htm.
611 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.77. 196
ASEAN member states’ the governments pledged ‘their firm support and solidarity’ in the preservation of Thailand’s ‘independence, national sovereignty, and territorial integrity’.612
To a certain extent, ASEAN was also simultaneously successful in relation to the pressure it applied on Vietnam within the United Nations. In March 1979, ASEAN first attempted to push for a UN Security Council resolution that would reflect the Association’s position over the conflict but, in the end, the initiative was vetoed by the Soviet Union.613 A change of approach proved to be more successful and in November of the same year the General Assembly of the UN adopted a draft resolution by the Association whereby the Vietnamese installed government in Cambodia (the PRK) was denied a General Assembly seat.614 Then, in July 1981, amidst a boycott by the socialist block, and in response to the urgings of ASEAN, the General Assembly held the United Nations International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK); of which the final Declaration internationally legitimised the ASEAN formula for the settlement of the Cambodian crisis.615 More specifically, the Declaration called for the withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces under the supervision of a UN peacekeeping force as well as the convening by the UN of free and fair elections to establish a new government. However, Vietnam, Laos and the Soviet Union were not involved and, therefore, its diplomatic success was more in the realm of ‘form’ than ‘substance’.616 Meanwhile, at the ground level, ASEAN initiated a trade and aid embargo617 and also sponsored a coalition of resistance fighters who were later
612 Joint Communiqué of the Twelfth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (Bali, 28-30 June 1979) [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1979 [cited 16 April 2007]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/3680.htm. On the reiteration of this position in June 1980 see: Joint Communiqué of the Thirteenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (Kuala Lumpur, 25-26 June 1980) [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1980 [cited 16 April 2007]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/3679.htm.
613 Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia, p.98.
614 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.47.
615 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.78.
616 Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia, p.116.
617 Carlyle A. Thayer, "Vietnam and ASEAN" (paper presented at the Conference on Vietnam in 2001: Prospects for Economic and Social Progress, The Kennedy Auditorium, Washington D.C., 16-17 November 2000 2001), p.4. 197
brought together by ASEAN diplomats under the umbrella of the Coalition Government for Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK).618 Thailand, for its part, granted access to China to deliver lethal assistance through its borders to the Khmer Rouge – a component of the ASEAN organised coalition in Cambodia.619
The displays of unity and the effectiveness with which ASEAN applied its collective diplomacy during the early phases of the Cambodia crisis represented the most successful period of collective diplomacy in the Association’s forty year history. ASEAN’s mobilisation of international diplomatic support together with its backing for armed Khmer resistance significantly increased the political and economic costs of Vietnamese military forces remaining in Cambodia.620 These achievements brought international respect to the Association and comprised a turning point where its diplomatic voice enlarged from covering issues in the limited realm of trade and aid to becoming a diplomatic player capable of intervening on a major issue of regional security’ – as envisioned within the Bali Summit agreements.621
The early responses to the crisis also reflected not so much a common identity or a broad‐ ranging commonality of norms (beyond non‐interference) but more accurately a common reaction to an overall sense of vulnerability to external interference that was profoundly felt by the still developing and/or newly independent members of ASEAN. According to Leifer, and aside from ‘the credibility of the Association being called into question’,622 ‘[t]he member governments were conscious, therefore, of the implications of endorsing, even by default, a
618 This coalition was formed in 1982. Amer, "Regional Integration and Conflict Management. The Case of Vietnam," p.536.
619 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.79.
620 Frost, "Introduction: ASEAN since 1967 - Origins, Evolution and Recent Developments."
621 Henderson, "Reassessing ASEAN," pp.19-20. See also: Turnbull, "Regionalism and Nationalism," p.305.
622 According to Leifer, the credibility of ASEAN was called into question primarily because the invasion of Cambodia ‘constituted a blatant challenge to the public philosophy of ASEAN…’ Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia, p.90. 198
precedent which might be applied in the future to one of their number’.623 Nonetheless, there has been a tendency by some regional scholars to exaggerate the level of actual and rhetorical solidarity and their analysis – sometimes applied through rose coloured lenses – has at times concealed (or neglected to reveal) a theme explored within this dissertation; that is the continuation of diverging strategic perceptions over both traditional and non‐traditional security threats regardless of whether they are intra‐mural or extra‐mural in nature.
‘Solidarity’ in Trouble? Diverging ASEAN Perceptions amidst Great Power Interference
Thailand’s complicity in allowing Chinese military assistance to cross through its territories in aid of the Khmer Rouge was connected to an emerging alliance between the two countries. Moreover, the alliance evinced a judgement by the Thai government that the Cambodia crisis presented an acute security threat thereby rendering, from the Thai perspective, the ‘cohesion of ASEAN’ as a subservient policy priority.624 Thailand’s alliance with China, the aim of which was to balance against and contain Vietnam and the Soviet Union, peaked with a one month long punitive attack by China against Vietnam’s northern border in February 1979. The attack was designed to alleviate the pressure Thailand was facing as a consequence of armed incursions by the Vietnamese into Thai territory but its deterrence value was weakened as the Chinese forces performed feebly against the Vietnamese defenders.625 To varying degrees, the remaining ASEAN members remained highly suspicious of China and therefore China’s armed incursion into Southeast Asia not only heightened these suspicions but also raised concerns that it could invite the possible escalation of Soviet support for Vietnam. In the end, Thailand was successfully pressured into joining an ASEAN declaration which, without naming any country, called for “countries outside [the] … region to exert utmost restraint and to
623 Ibid, p.89.
624 Ibid, p.107.
625 Vietnam claims that more than 20,000 Chinese were killed during the conflict. Further, military aid from the Soviet Union at the time meant that the Vietnamese military was superior in terms of logistics and weaponry. For example, 200,000 Chinese troops were contained by less than 100,000 Vietnamese soldiers. Grant Evans and Kelvin Rowley, Red Brotherhood at War: Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos since 1975 (London: Verso, 1990), pp.115-117. 199
refrain from any action which might lead to escalation of violence and the spreading of the conflict”. 626
Meanwhile, and contrary to Thailand’s approach, Indonesia and Malaysia were primarily concerned about the growing military strength of China and viewed Vietnam as a counterbalance to what they perceived were China’s expansionary intentions (as discussed further in relation to China’s actions over the South China Sea). The two countries responded to these threat perceptions through a March 1980 initiative by Indonesia’s President Suharto and Malaysia’s Prime Minister Hussein Onn known as the Kuantan Statement; a statement that exacerbated divisions within ASEAN. Grounded in the philosophy of the ZOPFAN, the Kuantan Statement acknowledged the security concerns of Vietnam in the Indochina region whilst simultaneously calling for an end to Soviet influence vis‐à‐vis Hanoi.627 Because the statement emerged out of differences in strategic perceptions, it never became a part of ASEAN’s official position due to the strong objections that were raised by both Thailand and Singapore.628 Nevertheless, and despite a temporary reconciliation between the ASEAN members over the Association’s ‘official position’,629 the reality was that the rift between the ASEAN members continued to grow during the course of the next three years until, in the wake of the events that followed the 1983 NAM summit in New Delhi, these rifts once again erupted into the public arena.
During the NAM Summit, both the foreign ministers of Malaysia and Vietnam privately met to discuss the possibility of informal talks outside of the ‘International Conference of Cambodia’ formula. Under a ‘five plus two’ formula the two Foreign Ministers agreed on informal talks
626 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.79.
627 Snitwongse, "Thirty Years of ASEAN: Achievements through Political Cooperation," p.88.
628 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, pp.84-85.
629 This reconciliation pertained to the aforementioned joint communiqué by the ASEAN ministers in June 1980 whereby they further called for a ‘total withdrawal of foreign forces from Kampuchea and … the emergence of an independent, neutral, non-aligned Kampuchea …, free from foreign interference’. Joint Communiqué of the Thirteenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (Kuala Lumpur, 25-26 June 1980) (cited). 200
between the ASEAN states on the one hand and Laos and Vietnam on the other.630 While Singapore and Indonesia supported the initiative, serious Chinese objections, which in turn influenced Thailand’s objection, doomed the initiative from the beginning.631 For Indonesia, the loss of an opportunity to resolve the Cambodian crisis together with the display of Chinese influence on ASEAN’s diplomacy was intolerable. The Indonesian leadership, moreover, believed that ASEAN could not benefit from bringing about the collapse of Vietnam as such an event would invite further Chinese influence in Cambodia and could indefinitely entrench the Russians within Vietnam.632 It was with these considerations in mind that Indonesia unilaterally initiated and opened its own channels of dialogue with Vietnam through a visit by Indonesia’s military chief to Hanoi in February 1984. In order to mask this breach of ASEAN unity and solidarity, the Association launched a policy for dual track diplomacy by retrospectively appointing Indonesia as its official ‘interlocutor’ with Vietnam.633
During the course of the next five years it was, in the end, Indonesian dissidence that resulted in a breakthrough regarding the structure for further negotiations.634 The Indonesian plan took the form of two ‘informal’ meetings that were ‘reluctantly’ agreed to by the remaining ASEAN members. The first informal meeting took place in July 1988 and the second in February 1989.635 Soon after ASEAN’s first informal meeting with Hanoi however, and in a sudden about face by the Kingdom of Thailand regarding its long‐term policy on Indochina,
630 Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia, p.127.
631 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, p.88.
632 Increased Chinese influence could be obtained, for example, through China’s connections with the Khmer Rouge who, at the time, were the likely group to replace any power vacuum left by a collapse of the Vietnamese armed forces.
633 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.52. See also: Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.80.
634 See, for example, the detailed historical synopsis of the five year period of negotiations as provided by Leifer: Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia, pp.128-137.
635 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.53. Cf: Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, pp.93-110. 201
Thailand’s military leadership unilaterally and without consultation announced that it wanted to turn the Indochinese ‘battlefields into marketplaces’. In the process, Thailand opened direct channels of communication to Vietnam, Laos and the PRK in Cambodia with the promise of economic benefits through the commencement of commercial trade across the borders.636 Thailand’s Prime Minister further stunned his ASEAN colleagues when only a month before the second set of ASEAN negotiations with Hanoi (and without any respect for maintaining the image of ASEAN endorsement) he undermined a decade of ASEAN diplomacy by inviting the new head of the PRK government (Hun Sen) to Bangkok; an action that resulted in Thailand’s ‘de facto’ recognition of the PRK government.637 In any event, the second set of negotiations between ASEAN and Hanoi soon faltered over the question of whether the PRK government should be dismantled prior to elections for a new government and also over the structure and functions of an international body to oversee the elections and the transition of power to follow those elections.
The Cambodia ‘Solution’ in Deadlock: The Need for Great Power Intervention
Reflecting the limitations of ASEAN’s ability to negotiate a settlement to the crisis, the peace process was subsequently enlarged at the nineteen‐nation Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC) to include Paris and Australia, with Indonesia acting as the conference’s chair. The first session of the conference ended in a deadlock and, in its wake, the agenda for a resolution to the crisis was seized by the five permanent members of the Security Council. The final Peace Accord was most significantly a consequence of dramatic changes in the great power dynamics of the globe. The Soviet Union, together with the Cold War, were in their final days and in an effort to rebuild the Soviet economy, Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the Soviet Union sought to normalise relations with China. Once the Sino‐Soviet element of the Cambodian crisis had been removed, it was far easier to form a Great Power consensus over the terms of settlement.638 Thus, on 18 August 1990, the five permanent members of the
636 Towards the end of the Cold War, Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan espoused this idea. Khoo, ASEAN on Myanmar: Creative Damage Control (cited).
637 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.106.
638 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.82. 202
Security Council adopted a framework agreement for a comprehensive settlement and this agreement was endorsed by the General Assembly just two months later on 15 October 1990.639 Despite an official end to the Third Indochina War, it remained for the United Nation’s Transitional Authority of Cambodia (UNTAC) to secure a sustainable peace within the country.640
The End of an Era, Early Post-Cold War Developments and the Necessity of Exogenous Engagement
The 1992 ‘Singapore Summit’: Sustaining ASEAN in the Wake of Conflict?
The Cambodia issue, having engaged the ‘corporate energies’ of ASEAN for more than a decade was now over and, a year later, the ASEAN members sought a new modus vivendi amongst themselves. The development of this platform for enhanced cooperation was intended to take place at the ‘fourth’ meeting of the ASEAN heads of government as convened in Singapore between 27 and 28 January 1992. In line with the ‘Singapore Summit’s’ pledge ‘to move towards a higher plane of political and economic cooperation’, the Association undertook some important steps towards institutionalising itself further. For the purpose of this institutionalisation, the significance of the ASEAN secretariat was heightened by conferring ‘ministerial status’ to the ‘Secretary General of ASEAN’ – previously the ‘Secretary General of the ASEAN Secretariat’. The member‐states also increased their diplomatic investment in ASEAN as a corporate entity by committing to undertake a formal Heads of Government meeting at least every three years along with informal gatherings in the interim.641 Symbolic of the ‘inclusive’ rather than ‘exclusive’
639 The Security Council’s program for a resolution was finally ratified in October 1991 at the second session of the PICC.
640 For detailed reviews of the effectiveness of UNTAC’s peacekeeping mission in Cambodia see: David W. Ashley, "The Failure of Conflict Resolution in Cambodia," in Cambodia and the International Community: The Quest for Peace, Development and Democracy, ed. Frederick Z. Brown and David G. Timberman (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998), James Dobbins et al., The UN's Role in Nation-Building [Internet - Book] (Santa Monica: Rand, 2005 [cited 8 August 2006]); available from http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG304.pdf.
641 The Declaration also provided an ‘intention’ to streamline and strengthen the Secretariat through the provision of greater resources. The professional staffs of the Secretariat were also to be appointed on a ‘quota system’ to ensure fair representation to all the member countries. The Summit also dissolved the previous five 203
identity which some of the ASEAN members wanted to portray, the Declaration also reaffirmed the Association’s desire to welcome the accession by other Southeast Asian states to the Association’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation642 – a further step in the process of membership expansion discussed later in the chapter.
On the economic front, the Singapore Summit announced an agreement to establish an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) by 2007.643 The AFTA built on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme (CEPT) that had been agreed to earlier in the year and the initiative represented a significant attempt to overcome the Association’s inability to increase intra‐ASEAN trade beyond fifteen percent of total member‐country trade – as symbolised by earlier but failed attempts for greater economic integration.644 Hailed as a ‘landmark’ agreement, through the ‘Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation’ AFTA was nevertheless ‘hedged with conditions, qualifications, and escape clauses so that the domestic pain that liberalised trade might cause could be minimised’.645 More compromise and concessions followed during the process of membership enlargement and progress towards further economic cooperation was all but suspended in the wake of the 1997 Southeast Asian Economic Crisis (discussed in Chapter VII).
Meanwhile, a somewhat more controversial proposal emerged during the two year lead‐up to the summit in the form of Malaysia’s plan for an East Asian Economic Group (EAEG),
ASEAN Economic Committees by tasking the Senior Economic Officials Meeting (SEOM) with the responsibility of handling all aspects of ASEAN cooperation. Singapore Declaration of 1992 (Singapore, 28 January 1992) [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1992 [cited 27 September 2006]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/5120.htm.
642 Ibid. (cited).
643 This target date for implementation was later advanced to 2003 and then to 2002.
644 Such attempts included the Preferential Tariff System (PTA) agreed to in 1977, the ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIP) in 1980, the ASEAN Industrial Complementation or Brand-to-Brand Complementation scheme (AIC/BBC) in 1981, and the ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture (AIJV) in 1983. Nattapong Thongpakde, "ASEAN Free Trade Area: Progress and Challenges," in ASEAN Beyond the Regional Crisis, ed. Mya Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), p.49. On the latter initiatives, see: Than, Myanmar in ASEAN: Regional Cooperation Experience, pp.26-29.
645 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.96. 204
which, due to international controversy, was later modified to an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). The EAEC was effectively a proposal to form a protectionist block that, notably, did not include the United States or even western actors adjacent to the territorial boundaries of Southeast Asia – such as Australia or New Zealand.646 At the time, the government of Malaysia had responded very negatively to an Australian proposal for the establishment of Asia‐Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which was subsequently formed in September 1989.647 Later, in November 1993, Prime Minister Mahathir also boycotted an informal summit meeting that had been arranged at the behest of US President Bill Clinton.648 Despite Malaysia’s argument that the initiative was a necessary response to the increasingly protectionist policy of Europe and the United States, a number of the ASEAN members rejected the exclusionary nature of the proposal.649
Nonetheless, in the wake of the economic crisis, the proposal has been said to have been revived in a reengineered form through the ASEAN Plus Three (APT or ASEAN+3) process.650
646 Consequently, and as a former Secretary General to ASEAN, writes: ‘Wags had tagged it acerbically as “a caucus without Caucasians”.’ Rodolfo C. Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the Former Secretary-General (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), p.266. The acronym EAEG has been more cynically interpreted as meaning ‘East Asia Except Caucasians’. Wolfgang Pape, East Asia by the Year 2000 and Beyond: Shaping Factors (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2000), p.20. For a relatively concise background on the history, meaning and intended effect of the EAEC, see: Yoji Akashi, An ASEAN Perspective on APEC, Working Paper (Nagoya, Japan: Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, 1997), pp.4-7.
647 At the time Malaysia’s leader, Prime Minister Mahathir, was also becoming increasingly anti-western and anti-US in his rhetoric. Akashi, An ASEAN Perspective on APEC, p.1. For detailed reviews on the emergence and contribution of APEC see also: Fedor Mediansky, "Australia and APEC," in Regionalism, Subregionalism and APEC, ed. John Ingleson (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 1997), Takashi Terada, The Genesis of APEC: Australian-Japan Political Initiatives (Canberra: Australian National University, 1999).
648 This then led to a spat between the Malaysian and Australian government over a remark by the Australian Prime Minister, Paul Keating, that the Malaysian leader was recalcitrant for not attending the summit. Philip Bowring, "A Spat for the Neighbourhood to Watch," International Herald Tribune, 8 December 1993. The Way Ahead: How APEC Can Become the Standard Bearer of World Trade [Internet] (Asiaweek, 1996 [cited 23 March 2002]); available from www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/96/1206/ed1.html.
649 Leifer, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South-East Asia, p.109.
650 Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the Former Secretary-General, pp.264-267. For a similar academic perspective see: Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.125. For an example of the reports in the media see: Sraainanar Seriegawan, ASEAN Summit 2001: Dr M's East Asian Economic Group Returns from the Dead [Newspaper] (New Straits Times, 2001 [cited 7 November 2001]); available from http://www.emedia.com.my. The ASEAN Plus Three dialogues 205
In reality, there is very little of substance that connects the EAEC with ASEAN+3; leaving such arguments resembling a vain attempt to retrospectively foster the illusion of greater levels in solidarity, consensus and collective identity formation than were the reality.651 Nonetheless, the EAEC proposal was notable in that it divided ASEAN on the economic front during a period of significant global change652 and thereby provided an opportunity for exogenous actors to work with individual ASEAN members on strengthening the APEC framework, an economic framework where ASEAN was not so firmly in the driving seat.653 Thus, and as far as the official rhetoric of ASEAN at the Singapore Summit was concerned, the ASEAN members eventually agreed to disagree and simply declared that the proposal should be studied further.654 The deferment of a decision on the matter led to a face saving formula at the 1993 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting where it was proposed in ASEAN that the EAEG should become ‘a caucus within APEC’.655 Indicative of the overzealousness with which some individuals attempt to positively portray ASEAN, the subjugation of the EAEG within APEC has been dismissed as a disingenuous ‘pretence that was quickly
actually evolved out of the Japan-ASEAN Summits that commenced on an annual basis in 1977. See: Geoffrey Miller, "Australia and an East Asian Community," Japanese Studies 26, no. 1 (2006): pp.37-38.
651 This is because the nature of the ASEAN Plus Three process is that of a completely informal consultative body for discussing broad ranging issues and has therefore not been institutionalised in any form as an economic trade block. Sanae Suzuki, "Chairmanship in ASEAN+3: A Shared Rule of Behaviour," Institute of Developing Economies Discussion Paper No.9 (2004): p.21.
652 In the case of Indonesia for example, President Suharto was keen to demonstrate Indonesia’s standing in the international community and thereby hosted a second APEC summit that started an annual pattern of summits. President Suharto had also offended Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia by rejecting his proposal for East Asia Economic Group outright and without prior consultation. Leifer, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South-East Asia, p.56.
653 ASEAN did however influence the structure of the organisation, an organisation whose decision making process is based on consultation and consensus. Furthermore, an ASEAN member chairs the summit meeting every second year. Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way, p.121.
654 Singapore Declaration of 1992 (Singapore, 28 January 1992) (cited).
655 Termsak Chalermpalanupap, Towards and East Asia Community: The Journey Has Begun [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2002 [cited 24 April 2007]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/13202.htm. See also: Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.102. 206
abandoned’;656 an especially problematic opinion given confirmation of the policy in official ASEAN documents.657
Finally, the Singapore Summit also reaffirmed (again) the desirability of ZOPFAN and, as a tangible step towards its realisation, reiterated the goal to establish a Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ). While the SEANWFZ had been mooted as early as 1971,658 the resolution to the Cambodian conflict, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the removal of US bases from the soil of Southeast Asia, had all combined to create a comparatively better and more realistic environment to reinvigorate, negotiate and implement the treaty consistent with the principles of ZOPFAN.659 In the same year, but at the 25th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, the Association reconvened a Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) ‘working group’ to move toward a final proposal for the treaty, and on 15 December 1995, the ASEAN members acceded to the final draft of SEANWFZ.660 As Leifer asserts, the
656 Rodolfo Severino, a former Secretary General of ASEAN, writes, ‘In the course of further discussions, the concept was watered down to an “East Asia Economic Caucus”. Some, rather disingenuously, presented this as meaning an East Asian Caucus within APEC, a pretence that was quickly abandoned’. Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the Former Secretary-General, p.266.
657 Furthermore, Termsak’s article, to which this paper referenced in a previous footnote, is highly credible as he is a special assistant to the current Secretary General of ASEAN. In any event, the text of the AMM’s communiqué states, inter alia, ‘The Foreign Ministers considered the Report of the Joint Consultative Meeting held in Jakarta … pertaining to “An Appropriate Modality to Complete the Elaboration of the EAEC Concept”. In this context, the Foreign Ministers consider that the ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting (AEM) would be the appropriate body to provide support and direction for the EAEC, taking into account that the prospective members of EAEC are also members of APEC. Pursuant on this, the Foreign Ministers agreed that the EAEC is a caucus within APEC’. Emphasis by author. Joint Communiqué of the Twenty-Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 23-24 July, 1993) [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1993 [cited 24 April 2007]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/3666.htm. See also: John Garofano, "Power, Institutions, and the ASEAN Regional Forum: A Security Community for Asia," Asian Survey 42, no. 3 (2002): p.442.
658 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration (Malaysia, 27 November 1971) (cited).
659 Acharya, by contrast, argues that while the Cambodian crisis needed to be first resolved for the purpose of ZOPFAN, such a development was not necessary for the purpose of SEANWFZ. Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, p.56. However, and while some debate over the proposal indeed took during the 1980s (such as at the 21st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 1988), it was not until after the Cambodian crisis that a noticeable reinvigoration of the idea in the ASEAN documents led to more substantial progress.
660 Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok, 15 December 1995) [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1995 [cited 3 November 2004]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/3636.htm. On the SOM Working Group see: Joint Communiqué of the Twenty-Fifth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (Manila, 21-22 July, 1992) [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 207
proposal for the treaty was primarily ‘symbolic’ in its significance as the signatories could continue to allow foreign powers to bring nuclear weapons and nuclear powered transport into their respective territories.661 Moreover, despite the treaty prohibiting the signatory states from manufacturing, storing or testing nuclear weapons (or allowing foreign states to use their territory for the aforementioned activities), agreement by the ASEAN members was not difficult as the signatories lacked the intention, technology and power to pursue any of these activities. Today, little has changed. Nevertheless, SEANWFZ was initially received with suspicion by the United States and China. In the case of the US, it was needlessly concerned about the passage of its nuclear warships and aircraft. However, in the case of China, its primary concern was related to an already emerging issue of actual and potential conflict; its claim of exclusive sovereignty over all the territories within the South China Sea, a claim that is discussed in greater detail in Chapter VII.
Membership Expansion – Insights and Implications
As the years progressed, ASEAN’s membership expanded. Indeed, the expansion of ASEAN to eventually embrace all the Southeast Asian states had been a vision of the Association’s founding fathers from the very beginning.662 It was believed that a larger ASEAN would be more influential and could exert a louder voice on the international stage (including APEC and the ARF). The ability to exercise a diplomatic voice ‘greater than the sum of its parts’ was also thought to provide ASEAN, along with the states of Southeast Asia, with an increased ability to influence and balance against other larger powers within the greater Asia‐Pacific region such as India, Japan and China.663 Already, at the time of ASEAN’s
1992 [cited 24 April 2007]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/3667.htm, Joint Communiqué of the Twenty-Seventh ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok, 22-23 July, 1994) [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1994 [cited 24 April 2007]).
661 Leifer, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South-East Asia, p.255.
662 For example, the Bangkok Declaration stated that membership in ASEAN was open to any and all Southeast Asian states that subscribe to its aims, principles and purposes. The ASEAN Declaration (cited).
663 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.24, Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.113. 208
formation, both Myanmar and Cambodia had been informally approached to test their interest in membership but both declined due to the international Cold War climate of the time and their membership in the non‐aligned movement.664 In the end, the first country to fulfil ASEAN’s desire for expansion was Brunei in 1984. For ASEAN, Brunei’s membership also marked an important component of reconciliation between the Southeast Asian states as both Brunei and Malaysia had endured a turbulent period of relations because of the Sultan of Brunei’s refusal to join the Federation of Malaysia back in 1960.665
Nevertheless, and given the strategic history of the region, membership expansion beyond Brunei (and the maritime security complex) remained impossible until the 1990s and the end of the Cold War. Finally, it was the resolution of the conflict in Cambodia that removed the last historical constraints over enlargement and the ASEAN members subsequently moved quickly in performing the formalities necessary to achieve an Association with a region‐wide constituency (with the notable exception of Timor Leste which was not then independent). The first of the CLMV countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) to join the Association was Vietnam in 1995. The economic costs of the War in Cambodia, along with a dogmatic implementation of socialist policies within Vietnam, had so weakened the economy that the position of the Communist Party itself was in danger. Consequently, and aside from adopting a more conciliatory approach regarding the Cambodian issue (discussed earlier), at the sixth national congress the Vietnamese government adopted a policy of pursuing market driven economics under the banner of doi moi (renovation).666 A
664 Than, Myanmar in ASEAN: Regional Cooperation Experience, p.17. Myanmar withdrew from its membership of the non-aligned movement in 1979 in protest over Cuba’s chairmanship of it. Burma Prime Minister Arrives in Jakarta [Internet - News] (Reuters News, 1987 [cited 18 August 2005]); available from www.factiva.com.
665 Further, and following a 1962 rebellion in Brunei, Malaysia had provided refuge for key leaders behind the rebellion whilst remaining publicly outspoken over Brunei’s undemocratic system of government along with its continued reliance on Britain for security. Turnbull, "Regionalism and Nationalism," p.306. For a detailed discussion of the less than amiable relations that existed between Brunei and Malaysia prior to Brunei’s membership in ASEAN, see: Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, pp.69-84.
666 Carolyn L. Gates, "The ASEAN Economic Model and Vietnam's Economic Transformation: Adjustment, Adaption, and Convergence," in ASEAN Enlargement: Impacts and Insights, ed. Mya Than and Carolyn L. Gates (Singapore: ISEAS, 2001), pp.322-323. 209
reassessment by the Vietnamese government of its ‘national interests’, as depicted by doi moi, also generated a new strategic outlook that was more compatible with the ASEAN members states and the overarching ‘economic’ precepts to which the Association itself was committed on.667
For similar reasons, Laos was also able to become a member of ASEAN a few years later in 1997. To this day, the ruling Laotian People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP), remains a fully fledged communist party that as with the regime in Myanmar, maintains an absolute monopoly on political power. Nevertheless, in 1986 Laos also began experimenting with free market reforms (but with relatively less commitment compared to Vietnam) and, following the close of the Third Indochina War, the party’s leadership became more open to the idea of membership in ASEAN and the international recognition and aid such membership might result in.668 While Myanmar acquired membership in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999, the decision to admit these two countries was not entirely unopposed. In the case of Cambodia, some ASEAN states were concerned about political instability whereas with Myanmar there were concerns about its record of human rights abuse. While the next chapter discusses the impact of Myanmar’s membership on ASEAN in considerable detail, the challenges that emerged over the admission of Cambodia are discussed briefly in the few paragraphs below.
Cambodia had been expected to join ASEAN in 1997 with Myanmar and Laos. In order to facilitate this event the country had acceded to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 1995, was attending the annual meetings of foreign ministers as an observer, and had also joined the ASEAN Regional Forum. At the time, in circumstances similar to those within Myanmar, Hun Sen, originally under Vietnam’s patronage,669 had already been resorting to draconian measures in order to consolidate his power – such as the expulsion from parliament
667 Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? , p.113.
668 Chandler et al., The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia: A New History, pp.495-496, Leifer, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South-East Asia, p.22.
669 Who, in line with the results 1993 democratic elections held by UNTAC, was forced into a fragile coalition with Prince Norodom Rannaridh as the First Prime Minister and Hun Sen as the Second Prime Minster. Church, A Short History of Southeast Asia, p.29. 210
of the Finance Minister for seeking to eliminate corruption and the imprisonment of the Foreign Minister on false ‘conspiracy to assassinate’ charges. However, these events did not significantly concern the ASEAN states.670 What did concern ASEAN however was the political embarrassment, along with the complete disregard to the interests of ASEAN, caused by Hun Sen’s instigation of a violent coup just weeks prior to the scheduled ceremony for Cambodia’s membership in ASEAN.671 The ‘un‐ASEAN‐like squabble [that erupted] over admitting Cambodia to the Association’ eventually resulted in a decision to delay Cambodia’s accession to ASEAN indefinitely.672
To ASEAN’s initial credit, the Association continued to recognise Prince Norodom Rannaridh as a joint leader in the Cambodian government and put forth a proposal for a caretaker government to oversee the elections that had been planned to take place in 1998. Hun Sen, however, dismissed the ASEAN proposals and in alluding to the ASEAN principle of non‐ intervention, ‘bluntly told the organisation to stay out of Cambodia’s internal affairs’.673 Despite a compromise agreement being reached between Hun Sen and ASEAN – where Hun Sen would hold elections in May 1998 and in return ASEAN would no longer demand the restoration of Prince Rannaridh to power – the advent of the economic crisis (as discussed in Chapter VII) undermined ASEAN’s political leverage. Consequently, Hun Sen reneged on his agreement whilst attacking ASEAN for preaching to Cambodia about democracy and issues of
670 After all, and according to Shaun Narine, both the political parties in power within the country ‘were happy to assist ASEAN businesses in getting licenses to exploit timber, textile manufacturing, and tourism, and they may even have facilitated illegal trade in weapons, drugs, and prostitution’. Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.117.
671 The surprise attack resulted in more than a hundred FUNCIPEC and security officials being killed. Chandler et al., The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia: A New History, p.490. See also: Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.25.
672 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, p.145.
673 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.118. In January 1998 Hun Sen added, ‘other things, like economics, they can teach us, but on the subject of democracy and human rights, they must not teach us’. Sorpong Peou, Diplomatic Pragmatism: ASEAN’s Response to the July 1997 Coup [Internet] (Conciliation Resources, 1998 [cited 25 August 2007]); available from http://www.c-r.org/our- work/accord/cambodia/diplomatic-pragmatism.php. For a detailed account of the events see: MacAlister Brown and Joseph J Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, 1979-1998 (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998). 211
human rights when it could not even look after its own affairs.674 In any event, Hun Sen’s power was further consolidated and the country continued to back away from the democratic institutions that the United Nations had attempted to install several years earlier. As far as the current political direction of the country is concerned, a senior academic connected to the Hun Sen government aptly summarises the sentiments of the political elite:
Hun Sen can ensure that security is good with no internal fighting and no coup d’état. However, there is a dilemma between democracy and authoritarianism. For example, there is a strong authoritarian element in both Malaysia and Singapore but it is because of this that the two countries are stable. Democracy destabilises the country … We are a weak state and we need stability more than anything else.675
At a practical level, the decision to embrace the remaining Southeast Asian states as members of ASEAN bore an implicit obligation to support the political infrastructure of the new members and to facilitate an improved capacity to comply with the administrative, political and normative responsibilities of membership. The challenges in so doing were immense and were aptly exemplified through the problems of language and communications that ASEAN then faced in bringing the new members into the fold. As General Jose Almonte, former presidential advisor to Ramos, states, ‘in Laos only 32 people [spoke] English, not enough to join the hundreds of meetings we in ASEAN organise every year’ and so ASEAN had to resolve the problem by having countries, such as the Philippines, bring government officials from Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia to Philippines and teaching them English in preparation for membership.676 However, and while the ASEAN‐6 undertook such ‘training and assistance programmes’, the advent of the economic crisis in midst of membership expansion took ‘its
674 Peou, Diplomatic Pragmatism: ASEAN’s Response to the July 1997 Coup (cited). In July 2008, Hun Sen had successfully pressured the Cambodian National Assembly to revoke Prince Rannaridh’s parliamentary immunity and immediately pursued criminal charges against the prince including a 30-year jail sentence and a fine of US$50 million. See also: Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.118.
675 On the issue of corruption the same interviewee stated, ‘Corruption is in any country that is poor. You cannot live anywhere that is corrupt and live among corrupt leaders and not be corrupt yourself. A certain amount of corruption is ok as long as the country moves forward’. Interview by author, Phnom Penh, 25 July 2005.
676 Interview with General Jose Almonte, Former Presidential Advisor to Ramos (Manila), 16 November 2006. 212
toll on the commitment of the ASEAN‐6 to the newer members’ and the assistance provided became less than what was needed.677
The enormity of the assistance required by the core (original) ASEAN states in facilitating even a nominal integration of the CLMV countries is illustrated by Figure 5.1 below. This chart outlines the economic gap that separates the core members from the CLMV members in 1997 and in 2005.678 Such economic gaps have not only tested the ideal of equality in ASEAN’s economic decision‐making process but have also raised further questions over the level and extent of assistance that should be provided along with the extent to which ‘special dispensations’ should be afforded to ASEAN’s so‐called ‘second‐tier members’.679 The issue of special dispensations had specific relevance to AFTA as membership expansion had not only complicated the approach to its implementation but had also prolonged the proposed schedule for its realization. Furthermore, the CLMV countries have been hesitant in granting most‐favoured‐nation status to their ASEAN counterparts, have been reluctant in the production of lists for the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) program, and have often failed to meet deadlines regarding tariff reductions along with the removal of nontariff barriers.680 Equally significant, and from the perspective of the new members, was an expectation that membership would produce ‘political credibility and legitimacy’ with collateral benefits to ‘internal stability and economic development’.681 However, the advent of the economic crisis seriously undermined ASEAN’s ability to deliver on these fronts. Thus, and in the absence of any material benefits, the new member‐states – particularly Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam – were quick to express a preparedness to return to an antagonistic
677 Carolyn L. Gates and Mya Than, "ASEAN Enlargement: An Introductory Overview," in ASEAN Enlargement: Impacts and Implications, ed. Mya Than and Carolyn L. Gates (Singapore: ISEAS, 2001), p.4.
678 It is important to note that the economic crisis (discussed in Chapter VII) did not affect the recorded levels of GDP in Southeast Asia until 1998.
679 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.92.
680 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.121.
681 Gates and Than, "ASEAN Enlargement: An Introductory Overview," p.11. 213
strategic alignment against ASEAN of the kind that was evident during the Cold War era.682 Rather than a desire for membership based on the solid foundation of ‘identification’ with a significant We (ASEAN), during their early years of membership the CLMV countries demonstrated a loyalty narrowly based on competitive assessments of their own national interests with little regard to the ‘collective’ good of ASEAN.
682 As Leifer states, ‘…one important indication of a reversionary fragmentation within ASEAN was the little reported separate meeting in Vientiane last October [1999] among the heads of government of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. They stressed the need to further strengthen their traditional solidarity which recalled the political polarisation of Southeast Asia during the height of the Cambodian conflict during the 1990s’. Michael Leifer, "The Political and Security Outlook for Southeast Asia" (paper presented at the 2000 Regional Outlook Forum, Singapore, January 2000), pp.3-4. 214
Figure 5.1. Per Capita GDP-PPP in ASEAN for Years 1997 and 2007
$30,000 $25,000 $20,000 $15,000 $10,000 $5,000 $0
Philippine Cambodi Singapore Brunei Malaysia Thailand Indonesia Vietnam Myanmar Laos s a Per Capita GDP‐PPP (1997) $24,600 $18,000 $11,100 $8,800 $4,600 $3,200 $1,700 $1,190 $1,150 $715 Per Capita GDP‐PPP (2005) $28,100 $23,600 $12,100 8,300 $3,600 $5,100 $2,800 $1,700 $1,900 $2,200
Per Capita GDP‐PPP (1997) Per Capita GDP‐PPP (2005)
Graph by author based on statistics supplied by the Strategic Asia Database
At the political and normative level of analysis, the impact of membership expansion has received substantial scholarly interest based on perceptions that the lack of long‐term socialisation between the political elite of the original ASEAN member‐states and the new member‐states has increased the normative gap as well as the divergence in the strategic interests that exists between the ASEAN states. Increases to the level of divergence between the member’s respective strategic outlooks have, in turn, rendered the possibility of reaching a consensus and maintaining political cohesion over political, economic and security challenges even more difficult.683 In relation to this normative gap, one can recall that all the original member states (except Thailand) were from what had been characterised as a
683 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.28, Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.101. 215
nascent maritime security complex. While the collective identity forged by the historical interactions within the complex prior to independence was negligible, as a coincidence of history all of these states, in the course of the past half century, have had a ‘shared anti‐ communist ideology, experiences with communist insurgency, and security bonds with the west’.684 As far as these shared elements of ‘modern history’ are concerned, the chapter has already indicated their impact on threat perceptions and on the pursuit of security through the economic aspects of internal consolidation. Consequently, the impact of membership enlargement is an issue that will continue to be considered at various points in later chapters. In the meantime, however, the next section examines the motivations behind, and the benefits and consequences of, another form of expansion: exogenous engagement through the ASEAN Regional Forum.
Further Expansion through Exogenous Engagement: From Dialogue Partners to the ASEAN Regional Forum
The push and pull nature of the many global and extra‐regional considerations ASEAN had to contend with – such as the impact of the United States, and of China and also the dispute regarding the South China Sea – acted to reinforce the perceived necessity of enhancing ASEAN’s diplomatic voice beyond the realm of Southeast Asia. Indeed, and through ASEAN’s expansion and the institutionalisation of formal structures for engagement with the great powers, it was hoped that ASEAN could further increase its influence over China, for example, and thereby mould its behavioural norms to more closely conform with the principles of the ASEAN way. To this end, and in response to such developments within ASEAN, Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir often proclaimed the success with which ASEAN had engaged China over such concerns as the South China Sea and other potential causes of tension.685 In theory, at least, such ‘success’ was a consequence of several initiatives for expanded dialogue since ASEAN’s inception.
684 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.92.
685 Dillon, Contemporary Security Challenges in Southeast Asia (cited). Some regional scholars have similarly proclaimed that ASEAN has successfully engaged China. See for example: Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.106. 216
Initiating the development of what became a spider‐web in extra‐regional channels for dialogue was ASEAN’s launch of the Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) in 1978. The PMC is a collective forum where carefully scripted dialogue takes place with various states that are considered to be of particular significance, politically and/or economically, to the bilateral relations of individual ASEAN members.686 These states, known as ASEAN’s ‘official dialogue partners’, are Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Canada, the Republic of Korea, China, India, Russia, the United States and the European Union.687 Meanwhile, and reflective of the importance of opening a potential gateway to the vast import and export markets in Europe,688 in 1978 the Association established the ASEAN‐EU Ministerial Meeting (gathering every two or three years) and, with some overlap, sought to further advance its dialogue with Europe through the establishment of Asia‐Europe Meeting in 1996.689 ASEAN has also launched other initiatives in response to instability and economic vulnerability, such as the ASEAN 10 plus 3 together with the ‘Asian Cooperation Dialogue’ (ACD) in 2002.690 Nonetheless, it would be difficult to deny that the most significant structure for exogenous
686 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.100.
687 Chairman's Press Statement for the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conferences (Kuala Lumpur, 27 July 2006) [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2006 [cited 1 May 2007]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/18593.htm. There are two phases for dialogue within the PMC. The first phase is the ASEAN plus 10 closed lunch session between the ASEAN foreign ministers and their foreign ministry counterparts or representatives thereof. The second phase is represented by bilateral meetings between ASEAN and the individual dialogue partners.
688 Approximately 2.3 billion people or thirty-seven percent of the world’s population live within the ASEAN and European countries accounting for US$14.8 trillion or forty-six percent of global GDP. Further, the combined value of trade in goods amounts to US$2,718 billion or forty-three percent of world trade. ASEM: Opportunities and Challenges for Asia-Europe Cooperation [Electronic Intelligence Database] (AsiaInt.com, 2004 [cited 23 November 2004]); available from http://www.asiaint.com/arl/arl4763.asp?action=print, EU Falls Short on Myanmar [Electronic Intelligence Database] (Jane's Intelligence Digest, 2004 [cited 23 November 2004]); available from http://jid.janes.com, Anuraj Manibhandu, "Burma Comes out with Win at ASEAN," Bangkok Post, 12 October 2004.
689 ASEM was initiated by Singapore while Thailand hosted the first Summit. It now has thirty-nine members including all the ASEAN and EU states along with Japan, South Korea and China. The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM): Overview [Internet] (Europa, 2005 [cited 12 October 2005]); available from http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/asem/intro/index.htm.
690 Discussed further in the next chapter. 217
dialogue throughout Asia and beyond has been the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994.691
During the lead up to the formation of the ARF the viability of ASEAN’s image as a leader in regional engagement, consultation and dialogue was soon put to the test due to a number of competing proposals that emerged from non‐ASEAN states to address the many security issues afflicting the Asia Pacific. As far back as 1986, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev first broached the idea of an Asia‐Pacific regional security conference loosely based on the Helsinki conference prototype. In the years that followed as many as seven alternative proposals for multilateral security dialogue emerged from regional leaders. Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, for example, also suggested the creation of a Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia‐Pacific loosely modelled on the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). When the ASEAN states rejected this suggestion, Evans then proposed that the aforementioned ASEAN APC be utilised to consult on ‘extra‐regional’ security issues. Despite the inherent advantage of the PMC maintaining ASEAN’s leadership within any such expanded dialogue the ASEAN members also rejected this alternative during the course of its deliberation over the earlier CSCA proposal.692
By 1990, and as a result of initiatives within the ASEAN ISIS network,693 the ASEAN states were becoming increasingly open to the idea of expanding the agenda of its PMC meetings. However, ASEAN’s intention to display prowess for leadership by engineering an expanded dialogue encountered a significant obstacle when Japan, with support from South Korea and Australia, pre‐empted ASEAN’s plans by publicly suggesting exactly what ASEAN was going
691 The ARF is also relevant to the discussion as it represents a significant test of the ability of ASEAN to exercise a collective voice vis-à-vis exogenous issues and actors; a review of its performance will therefore contribute to an overall assessment of the scope of solidarity, cohesiveness, and community extant within ASEAN.
692 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.102.
693 Institute of Strategic Studies (ISIS). The findings and recommendations of ASEAN ISIS were summarised in the following report: "A Time for Initiative: Proposals for the Consideration of the Fourth ASEAN Summit,” (ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies, Canada-ASEAN Center, 1991). 218
to announce – the use of the PMC as an enlarged mechanism for security dialogue.694 Consequently, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Ali Alitas, expressed his reservations about the proposal almost immediately after Japan’s announcement.695 Interestingly, the United States also expressed its opposition.696 Nonetheless, the momentum to commence a regional forum for security dialogue was such that ASEAN was faced with only two options: either seize the initiative and maintain a leadership role within the forum or, and in learning from the example of APEC, provide states exogenous to the region with the opportunity to develop an alternative structure that could prove to be in conflict with ASEAN’s normative and operational preferences. In the end, the ASEAN states opted ‘to claim the process in the hope that they could channel rather than resist the momentum’.697 Thus, and within days, the ASEAN members decided to formally accept the ‘Japanese proposal’ with the Filipino Foreign Secretary, Raul Manglapus, adding that ‘it is already a reality that security has become a proper topic for discussion within the PMC’.698
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was thus established in 1994 and has been characterized as an embryonic venture in multilateralism that involves an annual assembly of the Foreign Ministers from each of the member states.699 The ARF membership encompasses all the Southeast Asian states along with the United States, Canada, Russia, New Zealand, the European Union and a further twelve states from greater Asia – Bangladesh, China, India,
694 Kalimullah Hassan, "Support for ASEAN Security Forum Plan," The Straits Times, 23 July 1991.
695 Yang Razali Kassim, "Dialogue Partners Call for Forum on Regional Security," Business Times Singapore, 23 July 1991.
696 This was reflective of a desire to maintain its influence throughout the region via a hub and spokes system of bilateral treaties, alliances, and relationships. "The ASEAN Experience: Insights for Regional Political Cooperation," p.14, Evelyn Goh, "The ASEAN Regional Forum in the United States East Asian Strategy," The Pacific Review 17, no. 1 (2004): p.47.
697 Michael Antolik, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: The Spirit of Constructive Engagement," Contemporary Southeast Asia 16, no. 2 (1994): p.120.
698 Kalimullah Hassan, "ASEAN "Yes" To Talks on Regional Security," Straits Times, 24 July 1991.
699Evans, Possibilities for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Track 2 and Track 1 (cited), Michael Leifer, "The ASEAN Regional Forum,” (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), p.53. 219
Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, North Korea, Papua New Guinea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Timor‐Leste and the United States.700 Sri Lanka was approved for admission to the ARF at the Fourteenth ARF meeting. While the official purpose of the ARF was to ‘foster … dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern’,701 the necessity of so doing was very much a consequence of the perceived instability that emerged from the new multi‐polar security order;702 a security order that was no longer determined by the competing bi‐polar hegemonies of the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War.
In the context of this multi‐polarity, political elites were concerned that the allegiance of individual states would become more fluid in nature and the dominance of traditional restraints against the coercive actions of other major powers (such as China on the South China Sea), together with the ‘cost’ of such coercive measures, was considered to be at risk of fading or disappearing almost entirely. The foreclosure of the Cold War, moreover, meant that there was no longer a clearly defined threat to which the ASEAN states, and indeed the Asia Pacific states, ‘could organise regional alliances’.703 As the Cambodia crisis inter alia demonstrated, and regardless of how inadequate ‘historical’ displays of a collective diplomatic voice may have been, the existence of common external threats represented the
700 Asian Foreign Ministers Welcome East Timor to Top Security Forum [Internet] (East-Timor, 2005 [cited 14 October 2006]); available from http://www.etan.org/et2005/july/24/30asian.htm, Chairman's Statement of the Thirteenth ASEAN Regional Forum (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 28 July 2006) [Internet] (ASEAN Regional Forum, 2006 [cited 12 February 2007]); available from https://www.aseanregionalforum.org/PublicLibrary/ARFChairmansStatementsandReports/tabid/66/Default.aspx .
701 Chairman's Statement: The First Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (Bangkok, 25 July 1994) [Internet] (ASEAN Regional Forum, 1994 [cited 2 May 2007]); available from https://www.aseanregionalforum.org/PublicLibrary/ARFChairmansStatementsandReports/ChairmansStatement ofthe1stMeetingoftheASE/tabid/201/Default.aspx.
702 The Singapore government, which was to host the Fourth ASEAN Summit where the ARF was approved, was further illustrative of such perceptions with its avocation that the proposal should be considered at ‘the summit as one of several ideas on how the group should adapt to the new world order’. Yang Razali Kassim, "Plan for Political, Security Dialogue Wins Support," Business Times Singapore, 24 July 1991.
703 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.102. 220
most elementary ‘glue’ binding the ASEAN states together. In the absence of this common bond there were concerns that the future viability of ASEAN was at stake.
More specifically, and in relation to the major powers who were the most active and influential in Southeast Asia, there were a further two political imperatives that motivated the ASEAN states. In the case of the United States, the ASEAN states wanted to develop a mechanism to help maintain the security involvement of the US in Southeast Asia for the purpose of providing a ‘non‐threatening’ balance to the rise of Chinese power. Related to this consideration is the second political imperative whereby ASEAN hoped to successfully engage China via a functional commitment to a comprehensive network of multilateral relations.704 Therefore, and as Narine surmises, ‘the ARF may represent a non‐traditional, diplomatic approach toward managing a traditional security problem, in this case the emergence of a rising, revisionist power in China’.705 Thus, by the 1990s it had become clear to the ASEAN states that in the pursuit of regional resilience they could no longer hope to isolate themselves from great power interference but, in the best possible scenario, could attempt to manage how those powers interacted and influenced the security environment.706
Given these considerations, ASEAN quickly worked to claim a proprietary role within the ARF and at the inaugural meeting, the speeches of various ASEAN leaders explicitly sought to reinforce ASEAN’s claim to a central role in this then nascent structure for dialogue.707 In the final communiqué of the meeting, the Chairman’s statement referred to the 1992 Singapore
704 Goh, "The ASEAN Regional Forum in the United States East Asian Strategy," p.47, Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy.
705 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.112.
706 Michael Leifer, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Model for Cooperative Security in the Middle East,” (Canberra: Department of International Relations, ANU, 1998), p.1.
707 Thailand’s Deputy Foreign Minister, for example, pointedly declared that ‘ASEAN will always have the driver’s seat’. Meanwhile, Singapore’s Foreign Minister, Shanmugam Jayakumar, contended that ‘the process whereby ASEAN has developed gives valuable lessons for us when we [ASEAN] steer the ARF in subsequent years’. Leifer, "The ASEAN Regional Forum," p.36. 221
Summit as the declaratory origin of the initiative708 and confirmed the endorsement of Brunei Darussalam (by this time the sixth ASEAN member) as the chair of the next ARF meeting.709 Furthermore, the chairman’s statement also referred to the success with which ASEAN had lobbied all the participants to endorse ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation ‘as a code of conduct governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic instrument for regional confidence‐building, preventative diplomacy, and political and security cooperation’.710 The in principle (rhetorical) acceptance of various ASEAN norms – including non‐interference and the peaceful resolution of disputes – that became a requirement of membership in the ARF was quickly championed by some scholars as a successful CSBM that would moderate the risk of armed conflict within the greater Asia Pacific.711
In the lead‐up to the second meeting of the ARF, the ASEAN states had quietly worked away on a concept paper that would outline in greater detail not just the purposes of the ARF but also its institutional development. When the concept paper was presented to the delegates at the ARF, it allocated a ‘pivotal role’ to ASEAN and further declared that ‘ASEAN had undertaken the obligation to be the primary driving force of the ARF’.712 To ASEAN’s good repute, and given that no regional alternative was viable, the remaining dialogue partners
708 The Singapore Declaration stated that ‘ASEAN should intensify its external dialogues in political and security matters by using the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conferences (PMC)’. Singapore Declaration of 1992 (Singapore, 28 January 1992) (cited).
709 Ibid.
710 Chairman's Statement: The First Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (Bangkok, 25 July 1994) (cited).
711 Jorn Dosch, "PMC, ARF and CSCAP: Foundations for a Security Architecture in the Asia-Pacific,” (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1997), p.2. See also: Derek Da Cunha, "Southeast Asian Perceptions of China's Future Security Role in Its "Backyard"," In China's Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development, ed. Richard H. Yang and Jonathan D. Pollack (RAND, 1998), Dillon, Contemporary Security Challenges in Southeast Asia (cited).
712 The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1995 [cited 2 May 2007]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/3693.htm. 222
accepted ASEAN’s appointed role in the ARF and its leadership within the organisation was subsequently cemented for the foreseeable future.713
In relation to the normative and institutional structure of the ARF, the second ARF meeting adopted most of the recommendations made by the ASEAN Concept Paper. Mirroring the process of consultation within ASEAN itself, one of the paper’s guidelines for future meetings included the statement that ‘they will be based on prevailing ASEAN norms’ and therefore ‘decisions should be made by consensus after careful and extensive consultations’.714 The Concept Paper also confirmed that there should be an annual Ministerial Meeting for the ARF and that such meetings would follow the normal ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), thus replacing the PMC. In entrenching ASEAN’s leadership role further, the meetings were to be chaired by the host country (the ASEAN chair) rotating as per the ASEAN system. Non‐ASEAN states would not chair the ARF. The concept paper argued that the member states of the ARF should not establish a Secretariat and during the early phases of its existence there should be no institutionalisation of the forum. Not only was the substance of these recommendations adopted at the second meeting of the ARF but the normative and operational framework proposed by ASEAN was actively supported by China because it enabled China to benefit from engagement without any significant risk of pressure to either its domestic or foreign policies.
During the early years of the ARF, ASEAN’s engagement with China was not without disadvantages. A further recommendation in the concept paper, but one that was not
713 Having said that, some of the non-ASEAN ARF members have expressed the view that the ASEAN Regional Forum is little more than a transitional phase before an Asian Regional Forum will be established. Some of these non-ASEAN member-states have also complained of having been treated like second-class citizens within the ARF. Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.111.
714 The paper adds that ‘[t]he ARF should also progress at a pace comfortable to all participants. The ARF should not move “too fast for those who want to go slow and not too slow for those who want to go fast”.’ The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper (cited). Shaun Narine’s quotation of the Concept Paper (namely, ‘meetings will have no formal agenda and approach sensitive security issues in an oblique and non- confrontational manner) never occurred in either the concept paper or the communiqué of the ASEAN chairperson. This statement has been incorrectly cited in the following articles and books: Shaun Narine, "ASEAN and the ARF: The Limits of the ASEAN Way," Asian Survey 37, no. 10 (1997): p.964, Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.105, Shaun Narine, "Institutional Theory and Southeast Asia: The Case of ASEAN," World Affairs 161, no. 1 (1998): p.37. 223
adopted in its entirety by the ARF, pertained to an outline of a three‐tier process in security multilateralism: confidence building measures, preventative diplomacy and conflict resolution procedures.715 However, in order to engage China and maintain consensus, concessions had to be made and one of these was a modification (no doubt symbolic) of the third and final goal for the institutionalisation of the organisation – namely, the development of conflict resolution procedures – towards the more ambiguous and less institutionalised goal of an ‘elaboration of approaches to conflict’.716 Furthermore, the ARF is structurally designed to function, or at least appear to function, on an ad hoc basis in order to accommodate resistance by the PRC to the institutionalisation of ARF activities.717 Meanwhile, and in spite of the ARF member’s declarations to accept the principles of the TAC, the Mischief reef incident in the South China Sea (Chapter VII) occurred between the first and second meeting of the ARF. Aside from undermining the credibility of China, the incident has been raised by scholars who have questioned the ability of the ARF to socialise its non‐ASEAN members into displaying more acceptable and orderly conduct.718
The negative consequences of ASEAN’s attempts to be accordant with Chinese concerns has been compounded by an already existent aversion to institutionalism in any shape or form; a preference system that is a natural consequence of diverging political systems and the principles of the ASEAN way that evolved out of the accommodation of such differences. Thus, and despite the achievement of bringing China into a multilateral forum, the ARF has
715 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) [Internet - Pamphlet] (Foreign Affairs and Trade: International Security Division, 2001 [cited 23 March 2002]); available from http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Fact Sheet [Internet] (Auswartiges Amt, December 2001 2002 [cited 18 June 2002]); available from http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de, The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper (cited).
716 Chairman's Statement: The Second Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (Brunei Darussalam, 1 August 1995) [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1995 [cited 2 May 2007]); available from https://www.aseanregionalforum.org/PublicLibrary/ARFChairmansStatementsandReports/ChairmansStatement ofthe2ndMeetingoftheASE/tabid/199/Default.aspx, Leifer, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South-East Asia, p.62.
717 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.106.
718 Leifer, "The ASEAN Regional Forum," pp.55-56. See also: Robyn Lim, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: Building on Sand," Contemporary Southeast Asia 20, no. 2 (1998), Narine, "ASEAN and the ARF: The Limits of the ASEAN Way.", Jusuf Wanandi, "Boost ARF - and Security," Asiaweek, 31 July 1998. 224
been criticised as little more than a ‘talk shop’ for great powers to have informal discussions about whatever is important to them at the time.719 Four parallel criticisms of the ARF include the extreme diversity of the ARF membership; the impact of its weak institutionalism; its ASEAN‐style reliance on consensus; and the way in which it defines political stability, human rights and regional security.720 Finally, it has been claimed that through the avoidance of controversial but vital issues, it has been easier to obtain consensus on relatively peripheral and less controversial matters so that, yet again, an aura of success can be maintained.721
Nonetheless, the very fact that the ARF continues to operate thirteen years from its inception is indicative that it has served the national interests of an adequate number of the member states to a sufficient level based on an overall cost‐benefit calculation.722 In regard to the activities that have contributed to its success, whether actual or perceived, a significant component has been the implementation of CSBMs, examples of which include:
[T]he distribution of Defence Policy Statements; the publication of defence White Papers; the preparation of annual submissions to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the circulation of member submissions to ARF members; engagement in bilateral security dialogues, high‐level defence contracts, and defence training exchanges since 1995; and participation in arms control, disarmament, and non‐proliferation activities such as Comprehensive
719 "The ASEAN Experience: Insights for Regional Political Cooperation," p.14, Paul Dibb, "Confidence Comes from Cooperation," The Australian, 5 June 2002, Garofano, "Power, Institutions, and the ASEAN Regional Forum: A Security Community for Asia," p.502. Barry Desker further claims that it was due to this perception, that the ARF was nothing more than a ‘talk shop’, which the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, skipped the 2005 meeting of the ARF. Barry Desker, Is the ARF Obsolete? Three Moves to Avoid Irrelevance [Commentary] (Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2006 [cited 5 May 2007]); available from http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/IDSS0652006.pdf.
720 Henderson, "Reassessing ASEAN," p.71.
721 Jones and Smith, "The Changing Security Agenda in Southeast Asia: Globalization, New Terror, and the Delusions of Regionalism," pp.279-283, Shigekatsu Kondo, East Asian Strategic Review (Tokyo: National Institute for Defence Studies, 2000), pp.32-34.
722 Dominik Heller, "The Relevance of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for Regional Security in the Asia- Pacific," Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 1 (2005): p.124, Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, "Neither Scepticism nor Romanticism: The ASEAN Regional Forum as a Solution for the Asia-Pacific Assurance Game," The Pacific Review 19, no. 2 (2006): p.220. 225
Test Ban Treaty, Chemical Weapons Convention, Convention on Conventional Weapons, Biological Weapons Convention, and Nuclear Non‐Proliferation Treaty.723
While the number of these confidence building measures developed by the ARF during its thirteen years of existence remains impressive, the problem is that the ASEAN way prohibits the establishment of enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance. Furthermore, the CSBMs promoted by the ARF remain at a rather ‘primitive level’ where they neither include ‘measures that seriously expose the capabilities of military hardware and software, nor those that necessitate significant policy coordination among the militaries of the member states’.724 Aside from the shallow and declaratory nature of these CSBMs, the other challenge faced by the ARF under ASEAN’s leadership has been the failure to progress beyond the first phase of confidence building to the implementation of any real mechanisms for preventative diplomacy or an elaboration of any substantive approaches to conflict – let alone actual conflict resolution.725 Examples of the security issues that the ARF have been unable to successfully address, let alone resolve, have included China/Taiwan relations; North and South Korea, the Haze, and the Indonesian backed violence in East Timor.726 Dibb argues that the failure to obtain consensus on more difficult issues is also because, despite several proposals, the ARF does not provide for an annual meeting of
723 Confidence and Security Building Measures: ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) [Internet] (Bureau of Political- Military Affairs, 2000 [cited 26 June 2002]); available from http://www.state.gov/wwww/global/arms/bureau_pm/csbm/fs_000626_arf.html. See also: Chairman's Statement: The Third ASEAN Regional Forum (Jakarta, 23 July 1996) [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1996 [cited 5 May 2007]); available from https://www.aseanregionalforum.org/PublicLibrary/ARFChairmansStatementsandReports/ChairmansStatement ofthe3rdARF/tabid/196/Default.aspx.
724 Kawasaki, "Neither Scepticism nor Romanticism: The ASEAN Regional Forum as a Solution for the Asia- Pacific Assurance Game," p.224. Leifer, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South-East Asia, p.62.
725 Heller, "The Relevance of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for Regional Security in the Asia-Pacific," p.130. The ARF did develop a definition of preventative diplomacy that was adopted at the eighth ARF on 25 July 2001 and by 2005 had ‘recommended’ that the ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group Meetings ‘address’ preventive diplomacy issues. ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2001 [cited 3 February 2007]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/3742.htm, "The Twelfth ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Security Outlook,” (Vientiane, Laos: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2005), 15.
726 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.107, Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.151. 226
Defence Ministers.727 While not a part of the ARF framework, through the annual Shangrila Dialogue organised by Britain’s IISS, defence ministers from the Asia‐Pacific countries have met annually since June 2002. While proposals to bring such dialogue into the realm of the ARF have repeatedly failed, the Southeast Asian defence ministers (except Myanmar) did at least meet under the ASEAN framework for the first time in May 2006.728
As new regional institutions have developed, along with the occurrence of new regional crises, there have been growing questions about the continued relevance of the ARF. Already various regional analysts, such as Jusuf Wanandi and Barry Desker, have made calls to extend a leadership role for the ARF beyond ASEAN by inviting non‐ASEAN members to co‐chair the meeting. They argue that this would provide external powers with a greater stake in ensuring the success of the regional organisation. Barry Desker adds that further initiatives could include the development of an ARF Secretariat; the de‐linking of the ARF meeting from the AMM and PMC; and the elevation of the ARF to include Summit meetings that would incorporate the participation of the leaders of all the member countries.729
Normative Values and the ASEAN Way in Historical Context
As was summarised at the conclusion of Chapter IV, the norms that inform ASEAN’s modes of interaction have become known as the ASEAN way and can be stated in the form of three principles: (i) consensus based decision making; (ii) respect for national sovereignty; and (iii) the non‐interference in the domestic affairs of other states. While some analysts have somewhat cynically translated the ASEAN way to mean little more than simply ‘leave us alone’730 the reality is somewhat more complex. Thus, the principles of the ASEAN way do
727 Dibb, "Confidence Comes from Cooperation." An issue that was also raised by Stephen Leong, the deputy director of ISIS Malaysia. Interview with Stephen Leong, ISIS-Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur), 13 December 2001.
728 Joint Press Release of the Inaugural ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (Kuala Lumpur, 9 May 2006) [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2006 [cited 18 August 2006]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/18414.htm.
729 Desker, Is the ARF Obsolete? Three Moves to Avoid Irrelevance (cited), Wanandi, "Boost ARF - and Security," p.59.
730 Rowan Callick, ASEAN Trapped in a Burmese Daze [Electronic Database - Factiva] (Australian Financial Review, 2005 [cited 21 April 2005]); available from www.factiva.com. 227
not mean that the ASEAN states are apathetic towards each other or that they are never involved in the internal affairs of another member but, rather, (i) the avoidance of public criticism; and (ii) the provision of support ‘if an elite is threatened by internal rebellion’.731 Consequently, the idea of helping neighbouring governments and ‘acting as a mutual support group … is very much the essence of ASEAN’732 and, as Alan Collins adds, such normative rules have that practical effect that security is considered to be very much synonymous with domestic stability.733
Furthermore, and given the consensus (previously noted) that each state should decide its own pathway to obtaining national resilience, any cooperation between the member‐states was to be at all times mutually beneficial and of mutual interest with an absolute assertion of sovereignty as well as an unqualified right of veto. This socio‐cultural aspect of ASEAN’s normative behaviour is understood as a process of consensualism. In order to adhere to a process of consensually based decision‐making, the ASEAN states have also ‘traditionally’ had an aversion to any form of integration between national governments – also viewed as a contravention of non‐interference – as this would have demanded the transfer of at least some degree of national sovereignty to the supranational level. As has been seen throughout the chapter (e.g. in the diplomatic arrangements of ZOPFAN, SEANWFZ, the ASEAN Concord and AFTA), these foreign policy outlooks have resulted in a traditional avoidance of cooperative security (e.g. no ASEAN based military cooperation) and legally binding rules and treaties (e.g. SEANWFZ).
Within the confines of non‐interference and consensus, several more diplomatic practices have guided ASEAN relations. For example, the requirement of consensus implies a process of gradualism, the outcome of which has been progress at a rate no faster than the lowest common denominator where only the minimum collective agenda is pursued.734
731 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, p.141.
732 John Funston, "ASEAN: Out of Its Depth?" Contemporary Southeast Asia 20, no. 1 (1998): p.27.
733 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, p.141.
734 Kondo, East Asian Strategic Review, p.30. 228
Additionally, the procedural norms of informality and confidentiality (or alternatively quiet diplomacy and silent peer pressure) has meant that consensus was to be obtained informally and ‘outcomes’ were understood as the only legitimate information to be communicated to the public. Differences of opinion in proceedings that took place prior to the organisation’s attainment of consensus were to be kept confidential.735 Further, because of membership expansion Weatherbee suggests that there is now an even lower common denominator as encapsulated by such states as Myanmar and the limitations over what such a military dictatorship would agree to.736 Consequently, and as will also be illustrated in later chapters, the principles of consensus and non‐interference were useful in order to cloak certain faults in the normative behaviours of the organisation. This meant that ASEAN could continue to be perceived as having at least the ‘aura’ of an organisation that was more successful than may otherwise have been the reality.
In addition to the factors above, and as declared within the TAC, the principle of non‐ interference also embraces the concepts of sovereign equality, freedom from external coercion, ‘the settlement of disputes by peaceful means and a renunciation of the threat of force’.737 Traditionally, non‐interference has also involved a strong predilection for foreign policy patterns of decentralised decision making, informality and bilateral negotiation. Because of these factors, inter alia, the principle of non‐interference has increasingly become the subject of criticism from academics and politicians,738 and may be viewed as a major limitation on the scope, level and potential for regional cooperation. In particular, Jones and Smith contend that the principle of non‐interference has made the ASEAN way
735 Simon Tay, The Future of ASEAN: An Assessment of Democracy, Economies and Institutions in Southeast Asia [Internet] (2001 [cited 18 June 2002]); available from http://www.cdi.anu.edu.au/downloads/asean.pdf.
736 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.93.
737 Cotton, Crossing Borders in the Asia-Pacific: Essays on the Domestic-Foreign Policy Divide, p.31.
738 It is important to note however that the criticism of the principle of non-interference has been more limited in the ranks of politicians – or political elites – within Southeast Asia. The only proponents of change to the principle from within the region have come from the seemingly more democratic nations of the Philippines and Thailand. 229
characteristically contradictory.739 The organisation’s position on these ‘non‐negotiable’ principles conveniently overlooks definitive lapses in the organisation’s (or its members) adherence to the same self‐declared principles. Examples of such contraventions include Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor and in the politically motivated delay in admitting Cambodia because of domestic issues when such domestic issues were declared as not being relevant to the question of membership in the case of Myanmar.740 Another contradiction was evidenced by ASEAN’s inconsistency in upholding the principle of neutrality (as expressed in ZOPFAN) when ASEAN aligned itself against Vietnamese hegemony in Indochina.741 By aligning itself in support of China and the US, the member states of ASEAN demonstrated that they would only remain neutral when it was convenient, and within their self‐interests to do so.
Further, and as Jones and Smith correctly assert, the Association’s repeated practice of contradicting, neglecting or ignoring its so‐called ‘inalienable principles’ whenever convenient, has resulted in an organisation that is best characterised by an ASEAN style of self‐deception that was most memorably defined by George Orwell as ‘the capacity of holding two contradictory views in one’s mind simultaneously and accepting both of them’.742 Finally, it is also important to highlight the fact that despite claims of a ‘collective view‐point’ being encapsulated by the ASEAN way, the security arrangements of Southeast Asia have never represented or emerged from collective approaches to security. Instead, the dominant form of security throughout Southeast Asia’s history has always been on the
739 Jones and Smith, "The Changing Security Agenda in Southeast Asia: Globalization, New Terror, and the Delusions of Regionalism," p.275.
740 Anthony L. Smith, Strategic Centrality: Indonesia's Changing Role in ASEAN (Singapore: ISEAS, 2000), p.275, Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.92.
741 Cotton, Crossing Borders in the Asia-Pacific: Essays on the Domestic-Foreign Policy Divide, p.32.
742 Jones and Smith, "The Changing Security Agenda in Southeast Asia: Globalization, New Terror, and the Delusions of Regionalism," p.275. 230
basis of bilateral arrangements and approaches.743 Further evidence to reinforce this point will be presented in later chapters.
Conclusions
Throughout the period covered by the chapter, the ASEAN way had been proclaimed as a major tool utilised in support of security and economic development.744 It was argued that various issues of instability in the regional and domestic security environments of the Southeast Asian states necessitated this distinctly regional approach to decision making, human rights and democracy as encapsulated by the principles of national and regional resilience. Conveniently, and perhaps even necessarily, the ASEAN unity in diversity approach – which stems from the norm of consensualism – allowed for, and indeed justified, the existence of a variety of regimes ranging from soft‐authoritarian to military dictatorships.745 The Philippines and its catchcry chant of ‘people power’ was viewed as an exception – even an abrogation – to the normative values of the region.746 In truth, however, it was economic growth and ‘performance legitimacy’ that was the means (rather than the end) upon which state and transnational security was to be grounded.
While the chapter has only briefly touched on how the ASEAN way has potentially hindered the comprehensive integration (and institutionalisation) of ASEAN, the analysis provided a more extensive consideration regarding some of the behavioural patterns that underpin the strategic outlook of the ASEAN states. Through the examples of the Cambodian settlement,
743 Nishikawa, "The "ASEAN Way" And Asian Regional Security," p.44.
744 Constance See, ASEAN Is Floundering [Internet] (Center for Defence Information, 2000 [cited 9 September 2001]); available from http://www.cdi.org/asia/fa120100.html. David M. Jones and Michael Smith, The Strange Death of the ASEAN Way [Internet - Magazine] (Australian Financial Review, 2002 [cited 8 July 2002]); available from http://www.singapore-window.org/sw02/020412a5.htm.
745 As James Cotton suggests, ‘[d]espite claims that the entry of new members required them to accept the “regional code of conduct”, it is difficult not to conclude that the most significant outcome of the enlargement episode was the realisation of the proposition that “ASEAN’s expansion may enhance regime security in new members”’. Cotton, Crossing Borders in the Asia-Pacific: Essays on the Domestic-Foreign Policy Divide, p.33.
746 Tay, The Future of ASEAN: An Assessment of Democracy, Economies and Institutions in Southeast Asia (cited). 231
the regional response to the end of the Cold War, and the evolution of the ARF, the chapter evidenced the continued and inseparable interdependence of ASEAN with the outside world. The dynamics of the Cold War, together with the ‘communist threat’ (domestically and internationally), resulted in the strongest period of diplomatic unity witnessed in the history of the Association. Nevertheless, such unity soon deteriorated as a consequence of diverging threat perceptions and strategic interests. Various clashes in strategic alignments were first evident in relation to Thailand’s limited alignment with China; an alignment that was to the discontent of the remaining ASEAN members including, in particular, Malaysia and Indonesia. The divergent threat perceptions held by Indonesia and Malaysia soon led towards alternative policies in pursuit a limited recognition of the strategic interests of Vietnam for the purpose of balancing against China.
The limitations to regional resilience, along with the necessary impact of exogenous powers to the security architecture of Southeast Asia, were also evident in relation the formation and development of the ASEAN Regional Forum. While the creation of the ARF, along with the maintenance of a proprietary role within it, is a credit to the diplomatic effectiveness of ASEAN (relative to its humble beginnings), it must also be recognised that the development of the ARF was primarily a ‘reactive’ response to the ambitions and initiatives of exogenous actors – such as Japan and Australia. Further, some of the initial aspirations for institutionalisation and conflict resolution within the ARF had to be moderated due to a growing influence by China and its desire to maintain the status quo regarding the procedural norms of ASEAN. Given these events, inter alia, the various initiatives undertaken by ASEAN in an attempt to marginalise the influence of foreign powers – such as ZOPFAN and SEANWFZ – were primarily symbolic in nature. Further, by the turn of the century, the extent of diplomatic investment by ASEAN in its engagement with foreign powers can be interpreted as reflecting a growing recognition that ASEAN could no longer seek to deny their influence but could, at best, hope to guide the manner by which such powers interacted and cooperated with ASEAN and its member‐states.
Through the Bali Summit, and the Singapore Summit that followed, ASEAN did undertake some steps towards the institutionalisation of ASEAN by way of more regular summit 232
meetings and the creation of a Secretariat in Jakarta. However, these initiatives did not detract in any way from the sovereignty of the member‐states and consequently the Secretary General still possesses no executive authority as far as the decision‐making processes of the organisation are concerned. Furthermore, the Singapore Summit, via the proposal for AFTA, effectively cemented ‘economic cooperation and integration’ as an official component of ASEAN’s agenda. The history of the region indicates that the modus vivendi between the ASEAN states during the early decades of the Association’s existence was based on a very low level of comprehensive integration. Historically speaking, the only factor to provide a basis for collective diplomacy has been common perceptions of threat. However, and due to the lack of integration between the states of Southeast Asia, the emergence of such common perceptions occurred only rarely and was primarily limited to traditional security interventions of a military nature (e.g. the breach of Thailand’s territorial integrity by the Vietnamese army).
The expansion of ASEAN’s membership, moreover, further impeded the pace of integration and marginalised the ability of the ASEAN states to garner consensus on important security and economic issues. Further – in a manner similar to the events that precipitated the formation of ASEAN – the motivations that informed the decisions to join ASEAN were not derived from any deep‐seated sense of ‘community’ but, rather, were based on pragmatic assessments over the material benefits such membership could potentially deliver. While each of the CLMV countries have generated various complications regarding the potential for interest harmonisation and foreign policy coordination, the most significant challenge to such cooperation has been the military dictatorship in Myanmar. Consequently, the next chapter is devoted to an analysis of the manner by which the Myanmar government has impeded the level of cohesion between the region’s political elite with associated consequences for the continued primacy of the ASEAN way.
233
Chapter VI
The Myanmar Membership Crisis: Further Tests to Elite Cohesion and the ASEAN Way
This chapter focuses on the international relations of ASEAN and the manner by which Myanmar challenges the cohesion and modus operandi of the Association. As will be seen, the long term failure of ASEAN to either induce substantial change within Myanmar or to mitigate the transnational consequences of such instability, has forced some elites within ASEAN to test the operational boundaries of the non‐interference principle. Furthermore, the chapter will demonstrate that the pinnacle of this normative challenge occurred during the period leading towards Myanmar’s scheduled chairmanship of ASEAN. The chairmanship crisis that ensued has not only provided some of the most robust evidence to indicate the practical limits and functional restraint of the ASEAN way, but has also revealed the institutional and ideational basis for disunity within ASEAN. Thus, and as the data in later chapters will further substantiate, a loss of faith in the ASEAN way by some of the member‐ states has, in turn, exacerbated the divide between elements of the political elite who want to reform the Association (typically from democratic states) and those who wish to retain the status quo (typically from either authoritarian or quasi‐authoritarian regimes). Given the fundamental nature of the principle of non‐interference for the operation of the organisation, the continuation of these normative divisions will – over the mid to long‐term – also inhibit the emergence of an elite level collective identity. In order to contextualise the analysis, the section below outlines the motivations behind those who supported the eventual membership of Myanmar in ASEAN and the traditional manner by which ASEAN and its member states have subsequently conducted their relations with Myanmar.
Myanmar’s Membership in ASEAN: Historical Motivations and Implications
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the membership of the CLVM countries had been in the sights of ASEAN’s founding fathers from the very beginning and the Association had 234
approached both Myanmar and Cambodia in the lead up to its formation but both countries had declined to express any interest. Less known is the fact that in 1987, and in seeking an end to decades of diplomatic isolation, Myanmar itself sounded out the possibility of membership with ASEAN. However, the Foreign Ministry officials in Jakarta (who Myanmar approached) were only lukewarm in their response and suggested that the organisation might only be prepared to go as far as providing ‘observer status’.747 Following a limited change in leadership because of the 1988 protests (Chapter IX), the issue of Myanmar was temporarily put aside. Nonetheless, given the regime’s refusal to accept the election result, along with several more years of instability with transnational consequences, first Thailand, and then ASEAN, started to reconsider their relations with (and policies toward) Myanmar.
While Thailand has practiced a policy of ‘constructive engagement’ with Myanmar since 1988, it was not until 1991 that its policy was officially declared and articulated.748 According to Les Buszynski, the development and conceptualisation of constructive engagement by Thailand had two purposes. As a political device, ‘it was a means of ensuring Thailand’s security as well as economic interests’. However, as a diplomatic device ‘it was designed to deflect international attention from Thailand’s cooperative policy in relation to SLORC’ (Myanmar’s ‘State Law and Order Restoration Council’) with the justification that there would be a subsequent improvement to the behaviour of the regime.749 Consequently, with Myanmar’s possible membership in mind, ASEAN adopted Thailand’s policy in 1994. In the same year, Thailand’s new Foreign Minister (Prasong Soonsiri) invited the Foreign Minister of Myanmar (U Ohn Gyaw) to attend the ASEAN summit meeting in Bangkok as an ‘observer’. A year later, the Myanmar government (now called the State Peace and Development Committee) responded by publicly revealing an intention to accede
747 Burma Prime Minister Arrives in Jakarta (cited).
748 An unofficial policy of ‘constructive engagement’ was commenced at a bilateral level by the Thai government as far back as 1988. However, it was not until August 1991 that Arsa Sarasin, Thailand’s Foreign Minister at the time, formally coined the policy constructive engagement. Capie and Evans, The Asia Pacific Security Lexicon, p.120.
749 Leszek Buszynski, "Thailand and Myanmar: The Perils of Constructive Engagement," Pacific Review 11, no. 2 (1998): pp.290-291. 235
to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). As a goodwill gesture, the junta released Aung San Suu Kyi from six years of house arrest shortly before an ASEAN meeting in Brunei. At least at the rhetorical level, this gesture was seen by some elites to support the virtues of ASEAN’s constructive engagement policy. By 1996, Myanmar had become an official observer in ASEAN and a member of the ARF.750 Despite the protests of the European Union and the United States, the country was admitted as a full member in July 1997.751
Amidst ASEAN’s political elite there were several reasons for wanting Myanmar to become a member of the Association752 and some of these – including arguments of ‘geographic proximity, cultural similarities and [a] comparable security situation’ – dated back to when ASEAN first approached Myanmar over the possibility of membership.753 Further, and as discussed in Chapter V, following the fall of the communist bloc new opportunities and new challenges emerged. On one hand, for example, the previous ‘ideological divide’ between the ASEAN‐6754 and the CLVM countries (the Indochina states plus Myanmar) had been
750 N. Ganesan, "Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World," in Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, ed. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor, and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), p.45, Maung Aung Myoe, Neither Friend nor Foe: Myanmar's Relations with Thailand since 1988 - a View from Yangon (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2002), p.5, "Quality of Partnership: Myanmar, ASEAN and the World Community.", Aung Zaw et al., "Challenges to Democratization in Burma: Perspectives on Multilateral and Bilateral Responses," (Ottawa, Canada: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2001), pp.41-42.
751 Myanmar Dissidents Urge ASEAN to Investigate Thai Border Conflict [Electronic Database - Factiva] (Agence France Presse, 2001 [cited 5 February 2002]); available from www.factiva.com.
752 At the individual state level the motives for wanting to admit Myanmar into ASEAN were as broad and diverse as the region itself. In the case of Indonesia, it held an historical appreciation of Myanmar’s membership in the non-aligned movement and it’s replication of Indonesia’s dual function (dwifungsi) and territorial system for the military (which legitimated a role for the military in domestic politics). Malaysia and Indonesia were also concerned about influencing the country’s treatment of its minority Muslims. Malaysia was further interested in the ‘politically defining moment’ of following the original plan of admitting the remaining candidate countries at the same time. By contrast, and according to Ganesan, Singapore was primarily concerned with developing a policy of engagement that would lead to ‘economic reform’ and a more favourable climate for foreign investment. Ganesan, "Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World," p.45.
753 Zaw et al., "Challenges to Democratization in Burma: Perspectives on Multilateral and Bilateral Responses," p.38.
754 For a while, ASEAN became known as the ASEAN-6 due to its membership enlargement to include Brunei. Some scholars still apply the term in recognition of a belief that these ‘earlier’ members are the states where the ASEAN way and levels of mutual understanding have been most entrenched. The extent to which such contentions are true is tested more substantially within Chapters 8 through to 10. 236
removed resulting in the Thai proposal to change the Indochinese ‘battlefields into marketplaces’.755 On the other hand, the perception of a ‘China threat’ emerged and this was compounded by China’s growing strategic and military liaison with Myanmar that will be discussed in Chapter IX. In reaction, some of the member‐states hoped that the admission of Myanmar into ASEAN would lessen the country’s dependence on China and thereby weaken China’s influence on it.756 A decade later, it appears the policy has had only limited success as Myanmar’s economic, political and military dependence on China has, overall, increased since Myanmar became a member in 1997.757
A further rationale, at least amid certain members of ASEAN’s elite, was the desire to pursue the formation of a unified economic (and perhaps political) block under the auspices of an ‘ASEAN‐10’. The looming economic blocs of Europe (the EU) and the Americas (NAFTA) further motivated this response as there was the fear that Southeast Asia could, in the future, be afflicted by ruinous trade restrictions in their most important export markets.758 Enlargement was also considered to work well with ASEAN’s ambitions for economic integration as symbolised through AFTA and an associated desire to increase investment incentives. ASEAN’s intention to establish a regional community, as well as its justification of an ASEAN‐10, was echoed by the then President of the Philippines, Fidel Ramos, who stated
755 Towards the end of the Cold War, Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan espoused this idea. Khoo, ASEAN on Myanmar: Creative Damage Control (cited).
756 Derek Da Cunha, Renewed Military Build-ups Post-Asian Crisis: The Effect on Two Key Southeast Asian Bilateral Military Balances [Internet - Journal Article] (ISEAS, 2001 [cited 20 October 2002]); available from www.iseas.edu.sg/ipsi32001.pdf., p.4.
757 Bill Tarrant, ASEAN Shrugs Off Pressure, Says Will Admit Burma [Internet - News] (Reuters, 1997 [cited 11 April 2004]); available from www.factiva.com. This is a view shared by Sukhumbhand Paribatra but to which he adds that because of Myanmar’s geographical proximity to China it was in the interests of both China and the SPDC that their relations should grow and this is regardless of whether or not Myanmar was to become a member of ASEAN. "A Regional Perspective on Burma: An Interview with M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra," Irrawaddy, July 2004.
758 For an example see: Zaw et al., "Challenges to Democratization in Burma: Perspectives on Multilateral and Bilateral Responses," p.39. 237
that ‘progress towards a Southeast Asian community would add considerable weight to ASEAN – in its influence in the world and in dealing with big powers’.759
As previously discussed, and prior to Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN, concerns over Myanmar’s human rights records had been raised but such concerns were most strongly expressed by the relatively more democratic member countries of Thailand and the Philippines and the issue attracted intense debate within these countries.760 By contrast, Malaysia (under the leadership of Dr. Mahathir) was one of Myanmar’s greatest supporters and insisted that it be admitted as a member of ASEAN.761 While past publications have included Singapore – in addition to Malaysia and Indonesia – as another supporter for admitting Myanmar as a member,762 more recent statements either contradict this ‘view’ or represent a Singaporean attempt to rewrite history.763 In 2005, the position of Singapore’s government was that it was one of the states ‘against’ expansion on the basis that Lee Kuan Yew considered even this degree of nascent integration to be economically ‘premature’.764
Meanwhile, by lobbying for Myanmar’s exclusion, the West further motivated the drive for membership expansion as this stimulated both nationalist and anti‐colonialist sentiments (at least at the rhetorical level) where the leadership of the time did not want to be seen to bow to Western pressure. Further, some members defended the choice by arguing that this
759 Emphasis by author. Snitwongse, "Thirty Years of ASEAN: Achievements through Political Cooperation," p.191.
760 Cotton, "Regional Order and the over-Determination of Regional Institutions in the Asia-Pacific", p.3.
761 Myanmar May Give up ASEAN Chair to Uphold Common Interests: Singapore's Yeo [Internet - News] (Channel News Asia, 2005 [cited 12 August 2005]); available from www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/154494/1/.html.
762 Zaw et al., "Challenges to Democratization in Burma: Perspectives on Multilateral and Bilateral Responses," p.43.
763 As General Almonte states: ‘The main advocates of Myanmar’s inclusion in ASEAN were Mahathir and Suharto. Singapore was always there, they were not pushing as hard but they were behind it. The comments you mentioned is just a case of Singapore trying to rewrite history. They were always there but I never noted pressure from them, I didn’t hear them object either’. Interview with General Almonte, Former Chief Advisor to President Fidel Ramos (Manila), 16 November 2005.
764 Myanmar May Give up ASEAN Chair to Uphold Common Interests: Singapore's Yeo (cited). 238
was a continuation of constructive engagement and it was inclusion, rather than exclusion, that would most likely modify Myanmar’s conduct through the imposition of ASEAN norms and practices. As General Jose Almonte states in interview: ‘There were real requests from outside the region to prevent Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN but for us the issue of inclusion transcends human rights considerations. At [the] formation [of ASEAN] the original idea was one Southeast Asia and this was instructed [sic] by the gradual balkanisation of the region since the sixteenth century as a consequence of colonisation’.765 Therefore, some of the political elite hoped that the ASEAN Way and its ‘constructive engagement’ principle might succeed in modifying the behaviour of the SPDC and nudge it towards political reform and greater stability.766 Nevertheless, and as was demonstrated in a later consideration of domestic instability and its transnational consequences (Chapter IX), this was a hope that did not come to fruition.767
Given the protests by the West in the lead up to Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN, the position undertaken by some of the governments in Europe was not unexpected. Nevertheless, there were (and continue to be) serious economic, political and security factors explaining why ASEAN could not entirely ignore the policy positions of both the EU and the US. In part, this is because of the organisation’s political and economic ties to the West, connections that have been strengthened through ASEAN’s formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM). In the case of the ARF, its continued viability is important to ASEAN due to it being the principle multilateral security forum in the Asia‐Pacific.768 This, in turn, provides ASEAN with a sounding board where it
765 Interview with General Almonte, Former Chief Advisor to the President Fidel Ramos (Manila), 16 November 2005.
766 Terence Chong, Myanmar Question: ASEAN Dilemma [Internet - News] (The Straits Times, 2005 [cited 19 August 2005]); available from www.factiva.com.
767 Mya Than and Tin Maung Maung Than, "ASEAN Enlargement and Myanmar," in ASEAN Enlargement: Impacts and Implications, ed. Mya Than and Carolyn L. Gates (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), p.252.
768 In recent years however, APEC seems to have expanded its economic role to now include an increasingly open discussion of security issues. To date however, the broadening of the security agenda in APEC has not resulted in any tangible impact on the security architecture of the region. 239
can attempt to influence the foreign policies of a number of the world’s major powers including US, the EU, Russia, China and Japan.769 By contrast, ASEM is primarily important as a potential gateway to the vast import and export markets in Europe.770 Approximately 2.3 billion people or thirty‐seven percent of the world’s population live in the ASEM countries and the group accounts for US$14.8 trillion or forty‐six percent of global GDP.771
While the agenda of ASEM was initially dominated by trade issues, the Seoul Summit expanded cooperation to engage with the regional concept of comprehensive security in response to such problems as environmental degradation, human rights, transnational migration and crime, the trafficking of persons, and international terrorism.772 As the previous chapter illustrated, all these issues (with the possible exception of terrorism) are relevant in the context of Myanmar. As will be seen, the importance of ASEAN’s international stature in these two organisations has exacerbated the vulnerability of the organisation to pressure by the EU and the United States vis‐à‐vis Myanmar. Equally important, the presence of a military dictatorship within ASEAN, not to mention the existence of a number of other semi‐authoritarian states in the group, is a major stumbling block to interest harmonization and policy coordination in both ASEM and the ARF. Finally, and reflective of the extent of damage to ASEAN’s international stature generated by the issue, the West responded with unmasked cynicism and a number of the European
769 ASEAN maintains a strong diplomatic position within the forum because it holds the chair and the forum operates under the organisation’s norms and principles.
770 ASEM was initiated by Singapore and Thailand hosted the first Summit. It was launched in 1996 and now has 39 members including all the ASEAN and EU states along with Japan, South Korea, and China. The Asia- Europe Meeting (ASEM): Overview (cited).
771 The ASEM countries also account for a combined value of trade in goods amounting to US$2,718 billion or forty-three percent of world trade. ASEM: Opportunities and Challenges for Asia-Europe Cooperation (cited), EU Falls Short on Myanmar (cited), Manibhandu, "Burma Comes out with Win at ASEAN."
772 The ASEM process has resulted in enhanced cooperation between NGOs in both Asia and Europe. One such organisation, the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) was established in 1997 and seeks to contribute to improved socio-cultural understandings by way of cultural, intellectual, and people-to-people exchanges. ASEM: Opportunities and Challenges for Asia-Europe Cooperation (cited), EU Falls Short on Myanmar (cited). 240
governments declared their intention to treat the whole of ASEAN according to its lowest common denominator: Myanmar.773
Meanwhile, and in the wake of a violent coup in Cambodia (Chapter V),774 the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim, called on ASEAN to consider implementing what he referred to as ‘constructive interventions’ and ‘constructive involvement’ before emerging problems within the region ‘erupt into full‐blown crises’.775 Although these comments sparked substantial debate within ASEAN, soon thereafter severe forest fires within Indonesia created a dehabilitating ‘haze’ throughout much of the maritime security complex; then, a few months later, the Asian economic crisis erupted. The cumulative effect of these developments divided the member‐states and greatly weakened the stature of ASEAN. As will be further elaborated in the next chapter, these events also weakened ASEAN solidarity over the continued application of the principle of non‐interference. Thus, and given the extent of international condemnation of Myanmar together with a decade of constructive engagement that reaped little by way of a tangible result, the Thai government concluded that domestic issues with regional consequences could no longer be ignored. In 1998, Dr. Surin Pitsuwan (Thailand’s then Foreign Minister) argued that the ASEAN countries should be prepared to ‘intervene’ in a country’s domestic affairs ‘in the form of peer pressure or friendly advice, when a matter of domestic concern poses a threat to regional stability’.776
773 ASEAN: Is Myanmar the First Crack in Solidarity? [Internet - Intelligence Database] (Stratfor, 2004 [cited 8 December 2004]); available from www.stratfor.biz.
774 As Acharya states: ‘In a startling commentary, Ibrahim acknowledged that “[o]ur non-involvement in the reconstruction of Cambodia actually contributed to the deterioration and final collapse of national reconciliation”.’ Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, p.118.
775 Capie and Evans, The Asia Pacific Security Lexicon, p.92.
776 Herman Kraft, "The Principle of Non-Intervention: Evolution and Challenges for the Asia-Pacific Region," in Non-Intervention and State Sovereignty in the Asia-Pacific, ed. David Dickens and Guy Wilson-Roberts (Wellington: Center for Strategic Studies, 2000), p.23. 241
The primary challenge of the ‘constructive intervention’ initiative to the non‐interference was not so much in that it encouraged other ASEAN members to intervene in each other’s internal affairs but from the fact that it raised the prospect of the ASEAN states publicly criticising each other for the purpose of achieving change to the domestic and foreign policies of another member‐state.777 Consequently, the concept of ‘constructive intervention’ proved to be highly controversial and, with the democratic exception of the Philippines, a subsequent Thai Foreign Ministry proposal to soften the label to ‘flexible engagement’ was quickly rejected by the remaining ASEAN states.778 While Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia took the lead in rebutting the concept at the Thirty‐first ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 1998, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Ali Alitas, initiated some face‐ saving diplomacy that led to what was eventually coined ‘enhanced interaction’.779 However, the label enhanced interaction has never appeared in any of the official documents of ASEAN.780
Nevertheless, and despite ASEAN’s rhetorical approval of (together with Western support for) enhanced interaction, the Association was ill‐equipped to make the normative leap due to a majority concern that enhanced interaction would be disruptive to good relations in the region. Thus, for a while, the ASEAN member‐states retreated from it so that the boundaries of ‘enhanced interaction’ were rarely tested.781 This led some regional analysts to criticise
777 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, p.144.
778 Ganesan, "Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World," p.46.
779 Kondo, East Asian Strategic Review, p.36. Additionally, in an interview with Dr. Kanala Khantaprab (Advisor to Deputy Prime Minister, Advisor to Defence Minister, Advisor to Deputy House Speaker), she also advocated the concept of enhanced interactions and stated ‘both sides must be able to exchange views … and be able to talk frankly’. Interview with Dr. Kanala Khantaprab, Government of Thailand (Bangkok), 26 December 2001.
780 Indicative of the sensitivity of the subject, the idea or policy of ‘enhanced interaction’ does not appear in any of ASEAN’s formal documents. Only two unofficial documents within the ASEAN domain (website) refer to it. One was a speech by former Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alitas, in January 2004 and another at a UN- ASEAN Conference again in 2004 (February). Interesting, ASEAN’s ‘Myanmar’ crisis had already started by the time these two documents had been published on the ASEAN website. Source: Web based ‘domain’ search for the term ‘enhanced interaction’ by Author as at October 2005.
781 Jurgen Haacke, ""Enhanced Interaction" With Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with Its Diplomatic and Security Culture?" Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 242
the organisation further by claiming that ‘enhanced interaction’ was just another example of the broad range of meaningless rhetoric to be announced by the organisation.782 However, and as some of the original members began to climb out of the depths of the regional economic crisis, the political and normative gaps between the members became more apparent. Given these developments, along with the relatively united position of the West, some states sought to exert pressure on some of the newer members in order to strengthen ASEAN’s international stature and to ensure that their own national‐interests be served. In the pursuit of these purposes, the challenge of Myanmar prompted political elites to test and even push some of the organisation’s operational boundaries. The continued influence exerted by exogenous actors, along with the manner by which further movements for normative change emerged, are some of the key focal points of the section below.
Contemporary Membership Challenges to ASEAN’s Stature and Elite Level Cohesion
Early in the present decade, there were but a few instances where a small number of elites in ASEAN attempted to press the SPDC towards reform. In December 2001, for example, sixteen congressional representatives from the Philippines crossed party lines to sign a ‘manifesto of support’ for the National League of Democracy.783 Then in 2002, at the ARF ministerial meeting in Brunei – and after welcoming what the ministers ‘termed’ improvements in Myanmar's ‘national reconciliation process, unity and economic progress’ – the ‘ministers expressed the hope that the government of Myanmar would take steps in
2 (2005): p.190. See also: Herman Kraft, "The Principle of Non-Intervention and ASEAN: Evolution and Emerging Challenges,” (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2000), Ramcharan, "ASEAN and Non-Interference: A Principle Maintained?" Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no. 1 (2000).
782 As Anthony Smith argued, ‘this compromise wording barely covers the fact that there remains division over how far this interaction should go’. Anthony L. Smith, "Indonesia's Role in ASEAN: The End of Leadership?" Contemporary Southeast Asia 21, no. 2 (1999): p.250. See also David M. Jones, "Regional Illusion and Its Aftermath," Policy 19, no. 3 (2003): pp.37-44, Jones and Smith, "The Changing Security Agenda in Southeast Asia: Globalization, New Terror, and the Delusions of Regionalism," p.275, Jones and Smith, The Strange Death of the ASEAN Way (cited), See, ASEAN Is Floundering (cited).
783 "Solons Cross Party Lines," ABS-CBN, 11 December 2001. 243
further consolidating such progress’.784 While the statement did not criticise the SPDC directly, it did imply that ASEAN was aware of the multi‐faceted consequences should Myanmar fail to initiate concrete steps towards the realisation of democracy.785 Nevertheless, the degree to which Myanmar challenged the function and operative norms of ASEAN would not become fully apparent until mid 2003 with the Joint Communiqué of the 36th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (Phnom Penh).
A month earlier, the Black Friday incident occurred where Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters were violently attacked by what would appear to have been agents of the government. Aung San Suu Kyi was subsequently returned to house arrest ‘out of concern for her safety’ and has remained there ever since.786 Reflecting the unsatisfactory nature of the SPDC’s explanation to ASEAN for these events, the Minister’s statement explicitly referred to the incident and ‘… urged Myanmar to resume its efforts of national reconciliation and dialogue among all parties concerned …’ so as to lead to a ‘peaceful transition to democracy’. Added sting was imparted with the assertion that ASEAN ‘looked forward to the early lifting of restrictions placed on Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD members’.787 Notwithstanding the difficulty of obtaining consensus over the communiqué,788 the statement was significant in as far as it refers specifically to political
784 Jim Gomez, ASEAN Regional Forum Urges Myanmar to Continue Reforms, Democratisation [Electronic Database - Factiva] (Associated Press, 2002 [cited 3 November 2005]); available from www.factiva.com. Also located at: http://www.burmalibrary.org/TinKyi/archives/2002-07/msg00011.html.
785 ASEAN, Chairman's Statement: The Ninth Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum [Internet] (Bandar Seri Begawan, 31 July, 2002 [cited 2 November 2005]); available from www.aseansec.org/12661.htm. At the same meeting the EU foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, also criticised the SPDC government and (despite the release of hundreds of political prisoners including Aung San Suu Kyi) argued that there was still a need for faster political reform. ASEAN Pressures Burma to Make Democratic Reforms [Internet - News] (ABC News, 2002 [cited 23 September 2002]); available from www.abc.com.au.
786 Simon Montlake, Burma's 'Black Friday' [Internet - News] (BBC, 2004 [cited 22 November 2004]); available from http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk.
787 ASEAN also reaffirmed its ‘continued support for the efforts of the UNSG Special Representative Tan Sri Razali Ismail. ASEAN, Joint Communiqué of the 36th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting [Internet] (Phnom Penh, 16- 17 June, 2003 [cited 18 October 2005]); available from www.aseansec.org/14833.htm.
788 Mark Baker, Turmoil in Burma Splits ASEAN [Electronic Database - Factiva] (The Age, 2003 [cited 21 April 2005]); available from http://www.factiva.com. 244
issues in the country.789 Further, the declaration signalled to the junta (and the ASEAN membership) that there were limits to how far a state could hide behind the non‐ interference principle if the issue had direct and deleterious consequences for the remaining member‐states of the organisation.
The communiqué was followed by some unilateral initiatives from Indonesia and Thailand. In the case of Indonesia, it sent its former foreign minister, Ali Alitas, to Yangon in an attempt to secure Suu Kyi’s release, though this strategy was unsuccessful.790 Jakarta then proposed invoking the ASEAN Troika mechanism to break the political and reform deadlock in Myanmar.791 The idea of an ASEAN Troika had been inspired by ASEAN’s previous intervention in Cambodia and was established as an informal and non‐binding mechanism to mediate disputes at the ASEAN Summit held in Manila on 28 November 1999.792 The idea to apply the Troika mechanism for the first time, which was supported by the Philippines and Malaysia, involved sending a three‐state delegation to Yangon to discuss a political solution to Aung San Suu Kyi’s return to house arrest and the continued breakdown of dialogue between the political interest groups within the country.
789 Soon after, and in reflecting on the significance of the event, the Foreign Minister of Thailand asserted that ‘… ASEAN’s willingness to talk about the matter showed it had reached another stage of maturity’. Bhanravee Tansubhapol, Rangoon Tackled over Suu Kyi [Internet - News] (Bangkok Post, 2003 [cited 9 November 2004]); available from http://www.dassk.org/contents.php?id=172.
790 Isagani De Castro, Burma Crisis Casts Pall over Integration [Electronic Database - Proquest] (Global Information Network, 2004 [cited 9 August 2004]); available from http://proquest.umi.com.
791 Troika is a Russian term that translates as ‘three’. The idea of the troika was to have the current chair, the previous chair and the next chair of ASEAN mediate over a dispute. ASEAN, Chairman's Press Statement on ASEAN 3rd Informal Summit [Internet] (Manila, Philippines, 28 November 1999, [cited 28 July 2007]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/5300.htm.
792 Sheldon W. Simon, "Southeast Asia," in Strategic Asia 2001-02: Power and Purpose, ed. Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg (Washington: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2002), p.283. ASEAN Troika [Internet] (Department of Foreign Affairs Thailand, 1999 [cited 8 July 2002]); available from http://www.nepo.go.th/inter/asean/asean-sec/as_troika.htm. As discussed in Chapter VIII, the ASEAN troika is composed by the foreign ministers of three countries, namely the country that had chaired the previous year’s AMM, the present chair of the AMM, and the country scheduled to chair it the next year. Kondo, East Asian Strategic Review, p.35. 245
Myanmar, however, avoided the Troika by opting ‘for bilateral crisis diplomacy’ with selected neighbours such as China, Japan and Thailand. For the SPDC, the advantage of this approach was that at the bilateral level the leadership would have the opportunity to gain concessions and understanding from those of its neighbours more inclined to adopt face‐ saving formulae. Meanwhile, and a month later, Thailand utilised the opportunity of the Asia‐Europe Meeting to present its own diplomatic initiative which became known as the ‘Bangkok process’. This five‐step ‘roadmap’ provided a process for reconciliation and democratic reform in Myanmar. While the SPDC did eventually agree to participate in the process, it seems such consent was provided with the prior knowledge that Khin Nyunt would announce the earlier mentioned seven‐step roadmap to democracy. Thus, the ‘Bangkok process’ was doomed from the very beginning.793
Given Dr Mahathir’s traditional position on ASEAN’s norms, it was with considerable surprise for analysts in the region that he announced that ASEAN should, as a last resort, consider expelling Myanmar if it continued to detain Aung San Suu Kyi and failed to implement political reform.794 According to Kavi Chongkittavorn however, Malaysia had a number of state‐centric motives for threatening to directly interfere in the domestic policies of Myanmar. Two of these reasons were to do with the failure of the junta to support the policies of Malaysia itself: the SPDC had upset Malaysia by backing the US‐led war in Iraq and took offence at the fact that Myanmar did not support its drive to establish an ASEAN+3 Secretariat.795 However, and indicative of how ‘intolerable’ Myanmar’s situation had become to ASEAN’s international stature Mahathir’s statement also served as a further
793 The SPDC did uphold its commitment to attend one meeting organised via the ‘Bangkok Process’ but other than to announce the reconvening of the national convention it made no concessions during this time. Haacke, ""Enhanced Interaction" With Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with Its Diplomatic and Security Culture?" p.194.
794 Statement on the 28th of July 2003. Should ASEAN Kick out Burma [Internet - News] (The Irrawaddy, 2003 [cited 9 November 2004]); available from http://www.irrawaddy.org.
795 Kavi Chongkittavorn, "ASEAN Must Reflect before Axing Burma," The Nation, 22 July 2003. 246
warning (in addition to the ASEAN’s earlier communiqué) that the SPDC would now have to defend its record on its own – it could no longer rely on ASEAN to perform this role.796
In response to the diplomatic manoeuvring of Khin Nyunt and his announcement of a road‐ map for democratic transition on the 30th of August; ASEAN significantly weakened its stance over Myanmar at the ninth ASEAN Summit (the Bali Summit, October 2003) by providing the leadership with unconditional ‘understanding and support’.797 It seems that compromises over the statement were made, in part, to allow other member‐states to achieve what they deemed to be the ‘greater priority’ of negotiating an agreement over Indonesia’s Bali Concord II and the ASEAN Security Community project. In this regard, Indonesia was worried about the Myanmar issue distracting from what it considered a major development that would ‘take the organisation’s regional cooperation one step higher’.798 Similarly, at the 37th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in June 2004 (Jakarta), the Foreign Ministers Communiqué maintained a conciliatory approach towards Myanmar despite reiterating the continued application and relevance of the 36th AMM Joint Communiqué.799 Thus, Megawatti Sukarnoputri, the Indonesian President at the time,
796 Ibid. Indeed, a former Malaysian diplomat and UN Special Envoy to Myanmar stated that the circumstances behind Mahathir’s statement illustrated the intolerability of it all. ‘ASEAN is very embarrassed by one member and has the right to demand standards of behaviour in terms of governance’ he added. UN Envoy Backs Malaysian PM’s Warning on Myanmar [Electronic Database - Factiva] (Agence France Presse, 2003 [cited 22 August 2005]); available from www.factiva.com. Malaysia, proud of the initial achievements by its former Ambassador and now Special Envoy for the United Nations, Razali Ismail, would also have been muffled by the later rebuttals he received from Yangon. Yangon further insulted Malaysia by not allowing him back in the country for more than a year from June 2004. During the July 2005 ASEAN meeting in Vientiane, Razali was also refused an audience with the Burmese Foreign Minister, Nyan Win. Yeni, Image Conscious Burma [Internet - News] (The Irrawaddy, 2005 [cited 30 September 2005]); available from www.irrawaddy.org/aviewer.asp?a=4853&print=yes&c=e.
797 The statement also said that ‘the Leaders welcomed the recent positive developments in Myanmar and the Government’s pleaded to bring about a transition to democracy through dialogue and reconciliation’. ASEAN, Press Statement: By the Chairperson of the 9th ASEAN Summit and the 7th ASEAN + 3 Summit [Internet] (Bali, Indonesia, 7 October, 2003 [cited 12 August 2005]); available from www.aseansec.org/15260.htm.
798 As Umar Hadi from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Indonesia stated, ‘ASEAN needs to make sure that this very issue [of Myanmar and Suu Kyi] … will not steal the attention, both of ASEAN member countries themselves and the international community, about the important issues that will be addressed in the summit’. De Castro, Burma Crisis Casts Pall over Integration (cited).
799 ASEAN, Joint Communiqué of the 37th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting [Internet] (Jakarta, 29-30 June, 2004 [cited 18 August 2005]); available from www.aseansec.org/16193.htm. 247
declared ‘…we gladly note that a member of the ASEAN family, Myanmar, has added its voice to the cause of promoting democracy’.800 Further, and just in case the organisation’s solidarity was in question, the ministers contradicted the earlier communiqué by re‐ pledging their commitment to the ‘cardinal principle of non‐interference within the spirit of the ASEAN family’.801
Interestingly, at the July 2004 ARF Meeting (which immediately followed the AMM) the United States – in a possible response to ASEAN’s approach – pressured the Association over the Myanmar issue. Ignoring the official agenda for the meeting, for two days Colin Powell, then US Secretary of State, demanded that the junta release Aung San Suu Kyi.802 On the same occasion the European Union, for its part, raised the stakes by threatening to boycott the October ASEM summit unless the SPDC was ejected or made political concessions before it was allowed to participate.803 The conservative elements within ASEAN held firm and the Association responded by rejecting these demands, with Thailand’s foreign minister asserting that ‘[t]here should be no demands; there should be a good understanding’.804 ASEAN argued that Myanmar’s inclusion was a matter of principle and its
800 Indonesia Signals Soft Line on Myanmar as ASEAN Ministers Start Meeting [Internet - News] (Bernama, 2004 [cited 9 July 2004]); available from http://www3.bernama.com/bernama/v3/news.php?id=76687.
801 They added, ‘Asia is fortunate because democracy is neither being imposed nor just a mindless imitation of Western systems’. ASEAN Goes Soft on Myanmar [Internet - News] (DAWN, 2004 [cited 9 July 2004]); available from www.dawn.com/2004/07/01/int14.htm.
802 ARF Meeting Ends with No Progress on Myanmar Issue [Internet - News] (The Jakarta Post, 2004 [cited 9 July 2004]); available from www.thejakartapost.com.
803 Kim Chew Lee, ASEAN and EU Thrash out Myanmar Problem [Internet - News] (The Straits Times, 2004 [cited 9 July 2004]); available from http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg, Jane McCartney, North Korea, Myanmar in Limelight at Asia-Pacific Talks [Internet - News] (ABC News, 2004 [cited 9 July 2004]); available from http://www.abcnews.com. The issue was further complicated by the fact that, until this point in time, the Summit had been attended by the EU’s original fifteen members and the ASEAN-5 members together with Vietnam (in addition to China, Japan, and South Korea). When the EU wanted to expand this to include its ten new member-states, ASEAN, in turn, insisted on including its three newest members: Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos. ASEM: Opportunities and Challenges for Asia-Europe Cooperation (cited), EU Falls Short on Myanmar (cited).
804 10 ASEAN Nations Reject EU Effort on Myanmar [Internet - News] (International Herald Tribune, 2004 [cited 20 April 2004]); available from http://www.iht.com/cgi/bin/generic.cgi?template=articleprint.tmplh&ArticleID=515631. 248
domestic politics should be kept separate from ASEM membership. ASEAN further threatened to veto the accession of the new EU members should Myanmar’s participation be rejected by the EU. The EU eventually compromised on its demands and agreed to Myanmar’s participation so long as it was attended by someone lower than the ‘head of state/government level’.805 The ASEM Meeting continued as planned. 806
Western pressure, together with genuine concern by political elites in some of the more democratic states over the human rights situation, did contribute towards what one Philippine official described as an ‘intense debate’ by ASEAN over the issue of a draft statement and whether or not to renew calls for the ‘release of Aung San Suu Kyi’ at the eleventh meeting of the ARF in July 2004.807 Eventually, however, the consensus that emerged was in favour of a more moderate statement where ‘…the Ministers underlined the need for the involvement of all strata of Myanmar society in the ongoing national convention. The Ministers urged Myanmar to take every action that will add substance to the expression of its democratic aspiration.’808 While Aung San Suu Kyi was not mentioned in the final document, references to ‘Myanmar[‘s] society’, the ‘national convention’ and ‘democratic aspiration’ (in particular) continue to be indicative of an organisation now more prepared to ‘interfere’ on the internal affairs of a member state than it was a few years prior. Despite ASEAN’s growing impatience and somewhat more assertive nature, Myanmar continued to demonstrate little of a Deutschian sense of ‘we‐feeling’ and/or ‘reciprocity’; subsequently, the country refused to receive a visit by the Indonesian President’s special
805 ASEM 5 Summit in Hanoi [Internet] (Europa, 2004 [cited 12 October 2005]); available from http://europa.eu- un.org/articles/fr/article_3860_fr.htm.
806 As Anuraj Manibhandu notes, ‘Undeservedly, Burma is probably the biggest winner. Without lifting a finger – while other Asians and Europeans fretted over its record and eligibility – it has been inducted into another respectable club, seven years after joining the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’. Manibhandu, "Burma comes out with Win at ASEAN."
807 ARF Meeting Ends with No Progress on Myanmar Issue (cited).
808 Ibid. (cited), ASEAN, Chairman's Statement: The Eleventh Meeting of ASEAN Regional Forum [Internet] (Jakarta, 2 July, 2004 [cited 15 October 2005]); available from www.aseansec.org/16246.htm, ASEAN Goes Soft on Myanmar (cited). 249
envoy (Ali Alitas) on the Myanmar issue.809 Indonesian confidence (and indeed ASEAN confidence) in Myanmar would undoubtedly have been further dampened with the discovery of a listening device at Indonesia’s embassy in Yangon.810
As far as the Association’s traditional support for the SPDC was concerned, in retrospect the Singaporean Foreign Minister commented that ‘subsequent developments in Myanmar undermined our position. … Unless the Myanmar authorities handle the situation carefully, ASEAN’s credibility and cohesion would be jeopardised’.811 Certainly, ASEAN’s return to a reiteration of the non‐interference principle at the 37th AMM was criticised by some as having sent the wrong message to the junta.812 Time added weight to the criticism given the arrest and the usurping of Khin Nyunt’s Prime Ministership only a few months later.813 From an ASEAN perspective, his removal stunned the organisation as it was executed without any warning or consultation. Consequently, several leaders took exception over this course of events in Myanmar. Thus, the Foreign Minister of Malaysia, Syed Hamid Albar, argued that the image of ASEAN had been further dented by these events and added, ‘I think it has hurt us because of the suddenness of the thing. All of us were caught by surprise that there is a change of leadership and the news that he has been arrested because of corruption and put under house arrest’.814
809 James Cotton, The ASEAN Dynamic - the Road to a 2020 Security Community Passes through Yangon [Internet - Commentary] (ASEAN Focus Group, 2004 [cited 16 October 2004]); available from www.aseanfocus.com/asiananalysis/article.cfm?articleID=769.
810 Ibid. (cited).
811 Nick Cumming-Bruce, Malaysia Pressures Myanmar for Change [Internet - News] (International Herald Tribune, 2005 [cited 23 March 2005]); available from http://www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file=/articles/2005/03/22/news/burma.html.
812 "Quality of Partnership: Myanmar, ASEAN and the World Community."
813 The circumstances surrounding this event are discussed in detail in Chapter IX.
814 ASEAN’s Image Hurt by Shakeup in Myanmar, Malaysia Says [Factiva Database] (Asian Political News, 2004 [cited 25 October 2004]); available from http://global.factiva.com. 250
In view of the deteriorating circumstances inside Myanmar, the Europeans reinvigorated their push to confront Myanmar directly through, in this instance, the issue of a critical statement on its human rights record at the ASEM summit in October 2004.815 Again, ASEAN resisted the pressure and in the end, the organisation agreed to a short statement calling on the junta to lift its restrictions on political parties with no reference to Aung San Suu Kyi.816 Indicative of Europe’s frustration over its earlier mentioned compromise allowing Myanmar to participate at the Summit, together with the weakness of the statement to which the ASEAN leaders were prepared to agree, the EU strengthened its sanctions regime only days after the Summit’s conclusion.817 In a possible attempt at damage control over the growing divide between ASEAN and the West and shortly before the Vientiane Summit that was to follow, Hassan Wirayuda, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, flew to Myanmar in order to be updated on the future policies of the junta and to voice Indonesian concern over Khin Nyunt’s removal.818 However, President Than Shwe was not prepared to meet with him and he was forced to meet with the country’s new Prime Minister, Lt. General Soe Win, instead.819
Despite the unwillingness of the SPDC to provide ASEAN with anything by way of a concession or conciliatory statement, ASEAN maintained its support for the SPDC at the
815 The EU wanted the statement to include a demand for Aung San Suu Kyi’s immediate release, an end to all action against the National League for Democracy and the renewal of the national convention in order to progress further with political reform in the country. ASEM 5 Summit in Hanoi (cited), Manibhandu, "Burma comes out with Win at ASEAN."
816 EU Falls Short on Myanmar (cited), Manibhandu, "Burma Comes out with Win at ASEAN."
817 These included an expansion of its visa restriction against the leadership (above the rank of Brigadier General) and those who are connected or benefit from it, a ban on investment by member-states with the junta and the freezing of the overseas assets of the SPDC leadership. EU Falls Short on Myanmar (cited), Marwaan Macan-Markar, Asia-Europe Summit Ignores Top Burmese Dissident [Internet - News] (Inter Press Service, 2005 [cited 11 October 2005]); available from www.factiva.com.
818 Indonesia Voices Concerns to Yangon [Electronic Intelligence Database] (AsiaInt.com, 2004 [cited 23 November 2004]); available from http://www.asiaint.com/arl/arl14923.asp?action=print, Indonesian Foreign Minister Visits Myanmar after Regime Shakeup [Internet - News] (The Jakarta Post, 2004 [cited 13 November 2004]); available from http://thejakartapost.com/detaillatestnews.asp?fileid=20041110162916&irec=4.
819 Indonesia Voices Concerns to Yangon (cited). 251
November Vientiane Summit and any discussion of the issue was deliberately avoided. Thus, the final Summit statement contained no reference to Myanmar.820 Soe Win did hold private discussions with certain ‘select’ colleagues but this informal brief apparently provided little in terms of potential concessions or positive insights.821 Despite having escaped formal censure by the organisation, Myanmar chose the occasion to announce that that they would continue to detain Aung San Suu Kyi for another year.822 In response, a number of leaders from the older ASEAN states (including Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines) individually issued some gentle statements of concern.823
With ASEAN’s inability to negotiate change over Myanmar in mind, the United States renewed its call for the country to step down from its Chairmanship in 2006 by declaring that ‘the US has made clear that the situation in Burma has complicated our dealings with ASEAN’. The Malaysian government, in a return to a more conservative position, challenged this statement and suggested that the US should not issue threats to ASEAN in relation to Myanmar’s human rights record. Five months later, in May 2005, and undeterred by previous objections to its interference, the US again reiterated its concern that Myanmar’s chairmanship would threaten ASEAN‐US relations.824 For the first time since the ARF was
820 ASEAN, Chairman's Statement of the 10th ASEAN Summit [Internet] (Jakarta, 29 November, 2004 [cited 19 August 2005]); available from www.aseansec.org/16632.htm. See also: Haacke, ""Enhanced Interaction" With Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with Its Diplomatic and Security Culture?" p.195, Noporn Wong-Anan, ASEAN Quiet on Myanmar Democracy Issue - Communiqué [Internet - News] (Reuters, 2004 [cited 18 August 2005]); available from www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=worldNews@storyID=6932804.
821 Haacke, ""Enhanced Interaction" With Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with Its Diplomatic and Security Culture?" p.195.
822 Ibid.
823 Zaraidah Ibrahim, Myanmar Hogs Spotlight for the Wrong Reason [Internet - News] (The Straits Times, 2004 [cited 1 December 2004]); available from http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg/sub/storyprintfriendly/0,5578,288042,00.html?
824 US Deputy Secretary of State, Robert Zoellick, stated, ‘I did express our concern about how it would hinder our dealings with ASEAN if Burma were the chair, but I recognise that’s a decision for the ASEAN countries to make. … Burma’s role puts severe limitations on what the US can do, so I can’t go beyond that at this point, we’ll see what ASEAN decides to do’. ASEAN-US Ties at Risk If Myanmar Becomes Chair, Says Top US Official [Internet - News] (Agence France Presse, 2005 [cited 5 May 2005]); available from www.factiva.com. 252
launched, the United States’ Secretary of State (in this instance Condoleezza Rice) was absent from the meeting. In her place was the Deputy Secretary of State, Robert Zoellick, and in view of the previous warnings by the US, this was interpreted in some quarters as a response to frustration in relation to the continued plan by ASEAN to permit Myanmar to hold the chair.825 Further pressure was added when the United States subsequently suggested a possible withdrawal of developmental assistance throughout the region should Myanmar chair the Association.826
Given these circumstances, by the time of the 2005 ASEM summit the future of the organisation’s relations with major western powers seemed to be at stake. Further, Myanmar had done little, if anything, to assist its ASEAN partners to reach a satisfactory compromise with either Europe or the United States. For a number of the ASEAN nations Myanmar’s continued defiance together with the interrelated threat to US relations (including economic assistance) was a pill too large to swallow. Consequently, consensus between the ASEAN delegates shifted back in the direction of a position akin to the 36th AMM Communiqué with the demand (in combination with their European counterparts) that Myanmar undertake ‘democratic dialogue’ with all parties and reengage with UN special Envoy, Razali Ismail.827
Despite one scholar’s claim that the more strongly worded statements by ASEAN reflected a voluntary response to ‘norms of human rights and democracy’ throughout Southeast
825 Myanmar, Accountability to Top ASEAN Meeting in Laos: Diplomats [Internet - News] (Channel News Asia, 2005 [cited 12 August 2005]); available from www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/159251/1/.html, Rice May Skip ASEAN Talks Amid Myanmar Concerns [Internet - News] (Channel News Asia, 2005 [cited 12 August 2005]); available from www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/154050/1/.html.
826 Salim Osman, Myanmar May Not Chair ASEAN [Electronic Database - Factiva] (The Straits Times, 2005 [cited 5 May 2005]); available from www.factiva.com.
827 Yeni, Image Conscious Burma (cited). In December 2004, and through unofficial channels of communication, Myanmar was warned that any pledge towards democracy would only be considered credible when followed by the actual release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest. Haacke, ""Enhanced Interaction" With Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with Its Diplomatic and Security Culture?" p.196. 253
Asia,828 it was more likely a consequence of international pressure, together with the economic and transnational security consequences of instability in Myanmar, that motivated the ASEAN states to apply the idea of ‘enhanced interaction’ in this instance. This is because the political diversity of the grouping together with the continued prevalence of human rights violations in some countries such as Laos and Vietnam translates to a hesitance over any modification or abandonment of rules of behaviour that have been historically perceived to support and/or maintain their respective elites in power.829 Further, international pressure on the organisation was only effective due to a continued dependence by some ASEAN states on trade and security relations with the West. In this sense, ASEAN cannot entirely escape the need to attempt to maintain its international stature as a diplomatic community.830
In response to US concerns over Myanmar’s potential chairmanship, Ernst Bower, a former US‐ASEAN Business Council president and business consultant, summarised the significance of the situation with the statement that ‘we are facing an unwelcome scenario in 2006 whereby ASEAN’s global profile could be severely damaged by Myanmar’s chairing of the grouping. Such damage would come at a time when it can be least afforded – when markets are bouncing back, foreign direct investment is returning to the region and intra‐regional trade is growing nicely.’831 In view of these circumstances, the next section focuses on the normative impact of the chairmanship crisis that emerged between 2004 and 2005. Interestingly, while the influence of the West continued to play a major role in the
828 Hiro Katsumata, Why ASEAN Criticised Myanmar [Internet - News] (Asia Times, 2003 [cited 10 October 2005]); available from www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/EF25Ae02.html.
829 A detailed discussion of the motives behind the ASEAN way was provided in Chapter V. The absence of human rights and democratic reform in some states also links back to the author’s theory on the ‘internal consolidation of the state’ in Chapter III. As stated there, until a majority of the ASEAN states achieve internal consolidation (with sufficient levels of domestic stability, economic development, and security sector reform) then any preparedness to modify the principle of non-interference will be dominated by a ‘concern about what will happen if they were on the receiving end of such intervention?’ Interview with Aileen Baviera, Department of Asian Studies (Dean), University of the Philippines, Manila, 17 November 2005.
830 Khoo, ASEAN on Myanmar: Creative Damage Control (cited).
831 Myanmar, Accountability to Top ASEAN Meeting in Laos: Diplomats (cited). 254
behaviour of ASEAN, elites from the legislative branches of several ASEAN governments also played an active role in the push for change in both ASEAN and Myanmar.
The ‘Chairmanship Crisis’, Solidifying or Detracting from the ASEAN Way?
There is a Japanese proverb about a house being so unprepared that, ‘when the robber came, the residents first had to make the rope they needed to catch him with’.832 This certainly rings true when one examines ASEAN and its last minute debate over the chairmanship crisis. On the basis of alphabetical rotation, Myanmar was due to take the helm in 2006 including the hosting of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), the ASEAN Post‐Ministerial Conferences (PMCs) and the ASEAN Regional Forum.833 The extent of the forthcoming diplomatic crisis seemed to catch many unawares and in the process, a series of conflicting signals and statements emerged. Indicative of the continued desire to maintain good relations with ASEAN’s western dialogue partners; a former Thai diplomat previously based in Myanmar argued that ‘if Myanmar has not changed by then [2006], it could prove very embarrassing for ASEAN, because its partners in the West would not attend the meeting’.834 The same diplomat articulated what he thought was the greatest threat of all; that ‘it could even result in the break‐up of ASEAN’.835 In the context of these concerns, together with the human rights situation within Myanmar, by June 2004 calls from activists and NGOs to disqualify the country from ASEAN had escalated836 to the level
832 Yukio Okamoto, "Japan and the United States: The Essential Alliance," The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 2 (2002): p.66.
833 While the written rules of ASEAN dictate that the members are to elect the chairman, such rules have never been invoked. Instead, a convention has emerged where the chair follows alphabetical rotation. Senior officials suggested however that had Myanmar not stepped aside then as a last resort, these ‘official’ rules could have been applied as a formal based to block Myanmar’s chairmanship of ASEAN. Cumming-Bruce, Malaysia Pressures Myanmar for Change (cited).
834 Marwaan Macan-Markar, Malaysian MPs Criticise Burmese Junta [Internet - News] (Mizzima News, 2004 [cited 9 July 2004]); available from www.mizzimma.com/archives/news-in-2004/news-in-jun/09-jun04-17.htm.
835 Ibid. (cited).
836 "A Regional Perspective on Burma: An Interview with M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra." 255
of government throughout the older and more globalised members. As will be seen, and in deference to the opinion of Jurgen Haacke,837 by 2006 the Chairmanship issue had become one of the greatest obstacles to elite level solidarity in recent decades.
On 8 June 2004, Malaysian parliamentarians from both sides of the House and from both Houses of Parliament united to create the first cross‐party caucus in Malaysia through the formation of the Malaysian Parliamentary Pro‐Democracy Myanmar Caucus.838 This caucus was formed due to Myanmar’s impending chairmanship of ASEAN and a realisation that, consequently, the ‘region was about to encounter a major diplomatic crisis which would potentially have grave implications for the region’s political and economic future’.839 Consequently, the caucus was designed to push Myanmar towards greater democracy and to start this process it articulated a number of demands. First, the caucus requested the immediate release of all political detainees;840 and second, it called upon ‘the Myanmar government to respect ASEAN and international opinion and return to the mainstream of responsible international norms and behaviour’.841 In a display of how far it was prepared to interfere in the domestic affairs of Myanmar, it then invited the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (an exiled opposition party) for talks.842 Meanwhile, a
837 Haacke, ""Enhanced Interaction" With Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with Its Diplomatic and Security Culture?" pp.198-200.
838 Myanmar - Suspend from ASEAN If No Progress in 12 Months [Internet] (Democratic Action Party, 2004 [cited 9 July 2004]); available from http://www.dapmalaysia.org/english/2005/Sept05/lks/lks3650.htm.
839 These comments were made by Zaid Ibrahim, the Chair of the Malaysian Caucus. Mr. Ibrahim further justified the creation of the caucus by stating: ‘We do not anticipate that ASEAN’s bilateral and multilateral ties will be jeopardized by accommodating these international waves of change. Within the region, we feel that ASEAN parliamentarians should initiate the birth of dialogue and understanding on regional issues of common concern to them such as the problem of migrant workers, environmental pollution caused by uncontrolled open fires, territorial disputes, human rights abuses, the spread of narcotics and diseases such as HIV, to name a few’. Zaid Ibrahim, ASEAN: Time to Interfere [Internet - Commentary] (The Irrawaddy, 2005 [cited 30 September 2005]); available from www.irrawaddy.org/aviewer.asp?a=4581&print=yes&c=e.
840 Malaysian MPs Launch Myanmar Democracy Push [Internet - News] (Reuters, 2004 [cited 9 July 2004]); available from http://in.news.yahoo.com/040608/137/2diyz.html.
841 Ibid. (cited).
842 Malaysian Caucus Expresses Desire to Work with Burmese Opposition [Internet - News] (Democratic Voice of Burma, 2004 [cited 22 June 2004]); available from http://english.dvb.no/print_news.php?id=1303. 256
public announcement from the Prime Minister’s Department stated that Prime Minister Badawi had in ‘no uncertain terms’ warned Khin Nyunt ‘that something must come out of this’ roadmap for democracy. Within two days, the group successfully called for other parliamentarians throughout ASEAN to join them.843
The ASEAN Inter‐Parliamentary Caucus was subsequently formed in November 2004 and initially comprised of parliamentarians from Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia and Cambodia. Despite the release of some political (and other) prisoners in compliance with one of the demands (whether intentionally or not), the Caucus issued a collective statement calling for the abdication of Myanmar’s Chairmanship of ASEAN and the suspension of its membership in ASEAN.844 The group believed this position was necessary due to continued lack of progress over democratic reform and political openness.845 The preparedness by some elites to interfere (albeit below the leadership level) was not, however, region wide. In the same month, Thailand’s Prime Minister Thaksin threatened to walk out of the November 2004 Vientiane Summit should that gathering refer to ethnic violence in Southern Thailand (Chapter VII). He justified his threat on the basis that this would amount to interference in Thailand’s internal affairs.846 The timing of this statement eventually handicapped ASEAN’s ability to censure Myanmar at the summit.
In March 2005, and in the wake of a resolution unanimously approved by the Philippine Senate calling for ASEAN to bar Myanmar from the Chairmanship,847 leading members of
843 Myanmar - Suspend from ASEAN If No Progress in 12 Months (cited).
844 ASEAN: Is Myanmar the First Crack in Solidarity? (cited).
845 Ibid. (cited).
846 This is also evidence of the nascent or even embryonic nature of the so-called democracies within Southeast Asia. This was in stark contrast to the more democratic and transparent nature of the previous administration in Thailand and shows just how rapidly the form of governance and foreign policy outlooks of individual ASEAN states can change.
847 Malaysian Prime Minister Defends Blocking of Anti-Myanmar Motion in Parliament [Internet - News] (Channel News Asia, 2005 [cited 8 August 2005]); available from http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/145145/1/.html. 257
the Caucus (in a meeting with Prime Minister Badawi), proposed a parliamentary motion that would have Malaysia ‘formally’ demand the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and the speed up of democratic reform.848 In the event that these demands were not met, Nazri Abdul Azizi stated that the ‘members of parliament will make a [further] motion urging ASEAN to suspend Myanmar from taking the chair of ASEAN next year and until changes are carried out’.849 The ASEAN Inter‐Parliamentary Caucus proposed similar and additional motions for debate in the legislatures of Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand. However, and indicative of the continued limitations to normative change at the leadership level, the parliamentary debate was blocked by Prime Minister Badawi a few days before its scheduled commencement.850 One of the drafters of the motion, government lawmaker and parliamentarian Zaid Ibrahim, argued that the delay was a ‘step backward’ and suggested ‘that there must have been pressure from the [Myanmar] regime’.851 More likely, or in addition, the postponement and later cancellation was a consequence of ‘unofficial signals’ by the SPDC that it would voluntarily abdicate its seat as the Chair of ASEAN. In view of these factors, the pressure by Malaysia – when combined with that of the international community, and of the other ASEAN members, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines – may have borne fruit and produced temporary relief to the crisis.
A week after the statement by government lawmakers in Malaysia and amidst allegations of a further chemical weapons attack against minority insurgents,852 Singapore’s Prime
848 Malaysia to Press for Myanmar to Be Denied ASEAN Chair: Report [Internet - News] (Channel News Asia, 2005 [cited 29 March 2005]); available from http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/print/138635/1/.html.
849 Cumming-Bruce, Malaysia Pressures Myanmar for Change (cited).
850 Malaysian Prime Minister Defends Blocking of Anti-Myanmar Motion in Parliament (cited).
851 Malaysian Parliament Delays ASEAN Chairmanship Debate [Electronic Database - Factiva] (Oster Dow Jones Commodity Wire, 2005 [cited 5 May 2005]); available from www.factiva.com.
852 William Hollingworth, Myanmar Denies Using Chemical Weapons on Karen Soldiers [Electronic Database - Factiva] (Kyodo News, 2005 [cited 5 May 2005]); available from www.factiva.com, Jessica Le Masurier, Myanmar 'Used Chemicals' on Rebels [Internet - News] (CNN, 2005 [cited 25 April 2005]); available from http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/04/21/myanmar.rights/index.html, Myanmar, Accused of Using Chemical Weapons, Maintains Right to ASEAN Chair [Electronic Database - Factiva] (Today, 2005 [cited 5 May 2005]); available from www.factiva.com. 258
Minister Lee Hsien Loong also took a diplomatic trip to Yangon where he stated that ‘in an interdependent world, developments in one ASEAN country could impact on ASEAN as a whole’.853 A few days later, Singapore’s foreign ministry reiterated this opinion with the more direct statement of ‘what happens in Myanmar affects ASEAN as a whole’.854 Prime Minister Lee stated that the ASEAN ministers would discuss the chairmanship issue ‘behind closed doors’ during its Cebu (Philippines) retreat in April.855 Cambodia also supported Lee’s call856 and there was a notable shift in the position of Indonesia where it suggested that it would be better for Myanmar to resolve its domestic preoccupations prior to assuming the chairmanship.857 Nevertheless, at the retreat, the ASEAN foreign ministers soon became deadlocked over the issue after the Burmese foreign minister, Nyan Win, criticised the US and the EU for their pressure over the chairmanship stating, ‘that is their attitude, not ours. We can decide ourselves because we are an independent country’.858 Unsurprisingly, it appears that consensus over the issue remained unobtainable as some members including Laos and Cambodia (who by this time had shifted to the more conservative end of the policy spectrum) wanted to maintain a strict adherence to the principle of non‐interference,
853 Singapore PM in Talks with Myanmar Leaders [Internet - News] (Bernama, 2005 [cited 4 April 2005]); available from http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v3/printable.php?id=126881.
854 MFA Says What Happens in Myanmar Affects Whole of ASEAN [Internet - News] (Channel News Asia, 2005 [cited 29 March 2005]); available from http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/print/139115/1/.html.
855 ASEAN to Discuss Myanmar's Political Situation Next Month [Internet - News] (Channel News Asia, 2005 [cited 29 March 2005]); available from http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/135627/1/.html.
856 Tansubhapol, Rangoon Tackled over Suu Kyi (cited).
857 Haacke, ""Enhanced Interaction" With Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with Its Diplomatic and Security Culture?" p.196.
858 Impasse over Myanmar at ASEAN’s Minister's Retreat in Philippines [Internet - News] (Channel News Asia, 2005 [cited 24 April 2005]); available from http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/142049/1/.html, Connie Levett, Burma Sits Tight on Chairmanship in Face of Criticism [Internet - News] (Sydney Morning Herald, 2005 [cited 24 April 2005]); available from http://www.smh.com.au. 259
stating the concern that to take away the chairmanship would ‘set a very bad precedent for ASEAN’.859
Meanwhile, the first ‘official’ visit by Soe Win, Myanmar’s new Prime Minister, to his ASEAN counterparts occurred in April 2005 but was confined to the relatively less democratic belt of Indochina – Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia.860 The selection of ‘who to meet with’ was reflective of Myanmar’s angst over the divisions between the ASEAN member‐states regarding Myanmar and of their respective level of adherence to the principle of non‐ interference. Interestingly Laos, often viewed as the strongest of Myanmar’s remaining ASEAN supporters (and certainly the most authoritarian) was also one of the first foreign nations to send dignitaries to visit Myanmar after Khin Nyunt’s removal from the Prime Ministership in October 2004.861 During this period of Thaksin’s administration, Thailand had also shifted significantly in its foreign policy back to a position that more strongly favoured ‘constructive engagement’ in its relations with Myanmar. Thus, on March 27 the Thai foreign minister announced that Thailand would not support a further motion to be tabled by Malaysian MPs that called for Myanmar to release Aung San Suu Kyi and to speed up political reforms or risk losing the chairmanship.862
Nevertheless, by late April and at the sidelines of the Asian‐African Summit, the first signs of a more conciliatory approach by the SPDC started to become evident. At the Summit and
859 Myanmar May Give up ASEAN Chair to Uphold Common Interests: Singapore's Yeo (cited). See also: Haacke, ""Enhanced Interaction" With Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with Its Diplomatic and Security Culture?" p.196.
860 Myanmar PM to Visit Three Southeast Asian Countries [Internet - News] (China View, 2005 [cited 5 April 2005]); available from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-04/04/content_2783909.htm. Given that Cambodia’s main opposition leader is living in exile in Thailand, and in taking into account the evidence garnered during a research trip to Cambodia in July 2005, the author is of the opinion that the country is currently democratic in name but not substance.
861 Ibid. (cited).
862 The newly installed Thai diplomat added that ‘Thailand will not get involved in Malaysia’s campaign. We have to be very careful’. Thailand Will Not Join Campaign to Suspend Myanmar from Chairing ASEAN [Internet - News] (Channel News Asia, 2005 [cited 29 March 2005]); available from http://www.channelnewsasia/stories/afp_asiapacific/print/139084/1/.html. 260
during a second round of talks with Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Myanmar’s Foreign Minister expressed awareness by the SPDC of the ‘collective interests of the regional grouping and said that Myanmar does not want to be an obstacle in ASEAN’.863 Despite growing reservations by Thailand over the direction that the ASEAN group was taking, the Thai government was assigned the task of applying diplomatic pressure on Myanmar to find a ‘face‐saving’ solution that would include the SPDC’s relinquishment of the ASEAN chairmanship. Consequently, Thailand’s foreign minister, Kantathi Supamongkhon, announced that they had ‘impressed upon Myanmar the concerns of the international community’.864 Signals that the approach had been successful were soon evident as the SPDC later conveyed a more conciliatory message to Singapore that they would ‘take into account the interests of ASEAN as a whole’ and make an announcement over their decision at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in July.865 Confirmation over the possibility of a face saving solution also came from M.C. Abad Jr., an ASEAN Secretariat spokesperson, who admitted at the time that the ‘issue of [the] future ASEAN chairmanship is high on the agenda of the Foreign Ministers [Meeting and] … it is a matter that [the] ASEAN members take seriously.’866
Nonetheless, and despite having successfully managed to instil an element of division between the political elite over the issue of how best to respond to Myanmar, the SPDC eventually decided in favour of ASEAN’s ‘international’ interests and at the AMM (July 2005) announced that it would forgo its chairmanship of ASEAN. The face‐saving reason provided by Lao Foreign Minister, Somsavat Lengsavat, was that Myanmar needed ‘to focus on the
863 Osman, Myanmar May Not Chair ASEAN (cited), Philippines May yet Assume 2006 Chairmanship of ASEAN [Electronic Database - Factiva] (Asia Pulse, 2005 [cited 5 May 2005]); available from www.factiva.com.
864 Philippines May yet Assume 2006 Chairmanship of ASEAN (cited).
865 Myanmar May Give up ASEAN Chair to Uphold Common Interests: Singapore's Yeo (cited).
866 Myanmar, Accountability to Top ASEAN Meeting in Laos: Diplomats (cited). 261
national reconciliation process’.867 The SPDC’s relinquishment of the Chair came in the face of a host of benefits that the country could have expected through the chairmanship. These included additional funding for infrastructure, business opportunities and investment along with a potential (albeit limited) rhetorical boost to the government’s credibility.868 While a diplomatic victory for ASEAN in some contexts, the Myanmar crisis remains an issue for ASEAN because the question of Myanmar’s chairmanship in ASEAN after 2006 has not been resolved. In the words of ASEAN’s Secretary General, Ong Keng Yong, ‘it was decided that Myanmar could come back anytime they like to resume the chair but that has created for us, as the secretariat, an uncertainty.’869 Further, Myanmar’s abdication of the ASEAN chairmanship meets only one of the demands by the ASEAN Inter‐Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus.870 As a press release by the Caucus states, the country’s resignation of the chair ‘should not be seen as an excuse to ignore the urgent need for political reforms in Myanmar. Domestic instability in Myanmar will continue to afflict ASEAN long after this debate on Chairmanship is over’.871
867 Burma Will Not Take ASEAN Chair [Internet - News] (BBC News, 2005 [cited 12 August 2005]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/4715283.stm, Myanmar Gives up ASEAN Chairmanship [Internet - News] (Channel News Asia, 2005 [cited 12 August 2005]); available from www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/159895/1/.html.
868 Arguably, the only legitimacy gained by the government may have been at the domestic level but this is perhaps even more important to the Generals than any outside acts of affirmation. Kylie Morris, ASEAN’s Face Saving Solution [Internet - News] (BBC News, 2005 [cited 12 August 2005]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/4719713.stm.
869 ASEAN Leadership Uncertain after Myanmar Skips Turn [Internet - News] (Reuters, 2005 [cited 13 October 2005]); available from www.factiva.com, Morris, ASEAN’s Face Saving Solution (cited).
870 On the 26th of September 2005, legislators from Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines requested that ASEAN set a deadline for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners by September 2006 or be suspended from the organisation. To date these demands have not been met by ASEAN. Lawmakers Want ASEAN to Suspend Myanmar [Internet - News] (The Straits Times, 2005 [cited 28 September 2005]); available from www.factiva.com, Myanmar Should Be Suspended from ASEAN [Internet - News] (Hindustan Times, 2005 [cited 27 September 2005]); available from www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_1501342,00050004.htm.
871 Statement by Teresa Kok, Secretary of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Caucus (AIPMC) and Member of Parliament Malaysia, see: Teresa Kok, On the Occasion of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), Laos, 26-29 July 2005 [Press Statement] (ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Caucus on Democracy in Myanmar, 2005 [cited 15 October 2005]); available from www.aseanmp.org/media/ps_260705.html. 262
Conclusions
As reflected in a number of examples in this chapter (including the refusal to receive Ali Alitas), the importance Myanmar places on its membership in ASEAN is somewhat less than the remaining ASEAN states would likely hope for. As will be discussed in Chapter IX, this state‐of‐affairs is at least partially explained by the alternative and substantial benefits (normative and material) that China provides to the SPDC. The detached nature of Myanmar’s relations with ASEAN (in recent times) has further reduced the ability of ASEAN to implement change and influence the domestic environment of Myanmar. Likewise, the chapter demonstrated the rarity by which Myanmar has bowed to the collective interests of ASEAN (the proposed community of states), with such occurrences emerging only in the wake of substantial pressure at the intramural and extramural levels. The narrow and self‐ interested pursuit by the SPDC of its own regime interests with little regard for ASEAN reflects behaviour that is most adequately explained by the realist paradigm. At this low level of integration the political elite of Myanmar do not identify with any sense of an ASEAN community.
At the regional level, this chapter has also shown that through to 2003 there had been a growing divide between the policies of ASEAN and two of its dialogue partners – the US and the EU – over the appropriate approach to take vis‐à‐vis Myanmar. Neither of the policies adopted on either side of the divide have produced a satisfactory result as far as a resolution to the domestic crisis in Myanmar is concerned. Despite ASEAN’s attempt to bridge the divide through a greater preparedness to publicly criticise and coerce Myanmar towards making political concessions and implementing political reform, the success of this new direction has thus far been limited to temporary delay in assuming the Chairmanship. The partial victory achieved by ASEAN in pressuring Myanmar to abdicate its chairmanship has not been without costs. The more conservative states within the organisation undoubtedly remain concerned that any departure from the principle of non‐interference could result in a de facto permission to comment on issues of instability and human rights in their own countries. Concern over the potential for such normative change informed the contradictory behaviour of ASEAN in its relations with Myanmar until it became absolutely clear in 2005 that the consequences of inaction on the chairmanship issue would outweigh 263
any potential division over the application of non‐interference – at least in the short to mid‐ term.
However, in the wake of the chairmanship crisis a senior official within the Singapore foreign ministry claimed that by mid 2006 the ASEAN states had lost any unified position over the issue of Myanmar including, in particular, the question of referring Myanmar to the Security Council.872 The ability to maintain a common foreign policy position is an important component to any sense of we‐feeling and reciprocity as required by the community component of a security community. Until the political situation in Myanmar improves, it is likely that Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN will continue to test the capacity of the organisation to synthesise the foreign policies of its member‐states. In order to resolve this problem, along with the political rift over ‘how to govern’, the more authoritarian members of ASEAN will have to enhance their structural capacity to pursue policies that will develop the level of morphological compatibility extant between them (especially through the pursuit of mutually compatible democratic and market oriented political systems). Until such a morphological compatibility emerges, it will also be difficult for the ASEAN states to collectively implement the types of policies necessary to establish an ‘integrated’ security community.
The political and normative rifts discussed above can also be attributed to more general disparities between the national identities of the ASEAN states. As will the be discussed in Chapter VIII, these disparities have already exacerbated the difficulties entailed in negotiating the ASEAN Plan of Action for a Security Community and the drafting of the ASEAN Charter. In Chapter VIII, some linkages will also be drawn specifically to the impact of variables such as travel, knowledge, ethnicity, and religion.873 In the meantime, the next
872 Interview with former Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Singapore), 30 June 2006.
873 This dissertation has already provided some examples of how competing nationalisms can negatively affect relations between two countries. For example, see Chapter IX and the section regarding Myanmar’s relations with Thailand or, alternatively, the basis of historical animosity between Singapore and Malaysia that was outlined earlier in Chapter V.
264
chapter builds on the analysis by examining a broad sample of the remaining challenges that ASEAN has faced in recent years and reviews the effectiveness of its responses. It also considers how these challenges have affected regional perceptions, the extent of inter‐state cohesion and the continued relevance of the ASEAN way.
265
Chapter VII
Contemporary Challenges: ASEAN, a Fragile Institution or a Stable Foundation?
Aside from the institutional challenge of Myanmar, many other multifaceted uncertainties and challenges have arisen since the end of the Cold War. Some of these challenges have been associated with transformations in the power balances, strategic relations and alliances in the region. More tangible difficulties also arose in regard to economic management, domestic stability and other comprehensive security issues including environmental degradation and pollution, transnational crime and human security. While it is not possible to cover all the issues that afflict ASEAN and its security environment, the present chapter does attempt to provide a broad sample of some of the most problematic issues that have recently affected the level of comprehensive security extant in Southeast Asia. Consequently, the first section provides a synopsis of the character of ASEAN’s response to territorial and resource disputes in both the South China Sea and in the Sulawesi Sea. In regard to the South China Sea, while the ASEAN members initially attempted to collectively coordinate their responses through the multilateral framework of ASEAN, China has effectively managed to exploit a regional tendency to pursue national interests at the expense of the region’s collective interests. The recent eruption of hostility between Malaysia and Indonesia regarding competing claims in the Sulawesi Sea provided a second example of such competitive behaviour.
The second section considers the impact of terrorism and insurgency on regional cohesion. As will be seen, while the Southeast Asian states have been diplomatically active in the context of terrorism and the threat of transnational terrorist networks, the ASEAN members have been unable to muster any collective response to the continued instability generated by regional insurgencies. Moreover, the delicate nature of the issue is indelibly interdependent with considerations of ethnicity and religion that, in turn, have also exacerbated regional animosities. The propensity for regional governments to follow 266
contradictory pathways in the formulation of foreign and economic policy is also demonstrated through an analysis, in the third section, of the 1997 haze and economic crisis. In the context of these two issues, the absence of practices of ‘reciprocity’ and the frequency with which the ASEAN states opt for ‘beggar thy neighbour’ policies has also negatively influenced the extent of regional cohesion, trust and cooperation. As components of the next chapter will reinforce, the prospects for comprehensive integration between the states and communities of Southeast Asia will remain limited until such practices change.
Oil and Maritime Resources: The Most Significant ‘Potential’ Conflict Initiators Today?
As James Cotton suggests, the South China Sea represents one of the most critical traditional security issues to negatively affect the security architecture of Southeast Asia today.874 Due to the landlocked nature of the South China Sea, it has been referred to as a ‘geopolitical lake’ and a significant component of its strategic significance pertains to its role as a Sea Lane of Communication (SLOC).875 In connecting with the Straits of Malacca, Lombok and Sunda, the South China Sea SLOC is one of the world’s busiest waterways with over 100,000 merchant ships and 3.96 billion barrels of oil passing through its waters annually.876 The second element to the South China Sea’s strategic significance pertains to the immense wealth of natural resources within its waters. The South China Sea subregion contains a rich combination of fertile fishing beds, natural gas, oil and minerals. Over five million tons of fish are extracted from the area each year and this represents twenty‐five percent of the protein needs of Southeast Asia’s 500 million people. Further, Chinese
874 Cotton, Crossing Borders in the Asia-Pacific: Essays on the Domestic-Foreign Policy Divide, p.34.
875 Yong Leng Lee, Southeast Asia: Essays in Political Geography (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1982), p.122.
876 Guoxing Ji, "Rough Waters in the South China Sea: Navigation Issues and Confidence Building Measures," in Asia Pacific Issues (Hawaii: East-West Center, 2001), p.2, Tarique Niazi, "The Ecology of Strategic Interests: China's Quest for Energy Security from the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea to the Caspian Sea Basin," China and the Eurasia Forum Quarterly 4, no. 4 (2006): p.106, World Oil Chokepoints [Internet] (Energy Information Administration, 2004 [cited 30 August 2007]); available from http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/choke.pdf. 267
scholars speculate, somewhat optimistically, that there exists between 105 billion and 213 billion barrels of oil in the area.877 Additionally, these authorities estimate a further 2,000 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas and 1,200 tcf within the territorial confines of the Spratly Islands alone.878 By the turn of the millennium, the sum‐total of all these resources had been estimated to be worth over US$1 trillion; a figure that is now likely to be far higher given the current price and shortage in oil supplies.879
It is in light of this strategic importance that official Chinese objections over the SEANWFZ treaty (Chapter V) can be better understood. Aside from the land within the established territorial borders of each signatory, the ambit of the treaty also includes each country’s continental shelves and 370 kilometre Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Consequently, the Chinese government was concerned that its own claims to the maritime sub‐region might be prejudiced should it accede to SEANWFZ.880 From the Chinese perspective, inter alia, the problem was further compounded by the fact that, and as illustrated by Figure 7.1 below, Taiwan (Taipei), Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia are all claimants to either all or parts of the waters, shoals, reefs and islands (including the Paracel and Spratly islands) within the South China Sea. To this list, one can also add the de facto embroilment of Indonesia as the Chinese claim reaches as far South as Indonesia’s own Exclusive Economic Zone, continental shelf and the Natuna Gas Field.881
877 Kuan-Hsiung Wang, "Bridge over Troubled Waters: Fisheries Cooperation as a Resolution to the South China Sea Conflicts," The Pacific Review 14, no. 4 (2001): pp.534-536. See also: Steven L Rundle, Regional Security Issues Southeast Asia (Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, 2000 [cited 25 May 2002]); available from http://ptg.djnr.com. See, ASEAN Is Floundering (cited).
878 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.134.
879 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.85.
880 Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok, 15 December 1995) (cited).
881 Studeman, Calculating China's Advances in the South China Sea: Identifying the Triggers of Expansionism (cited). Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.84. Thus, and by including these elements of Indonesian territory, China’s claim actually extends beyond most understandings of what constitutes the ‘South China Sea’. Christopher Roberts, China and the South China Sea: What Happened to ASEAN’s Solidarity? [Commentary] (Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2005 [cited 2005 26 April]); available from http://www.ntu.edu.sg/idss/. 268
Figure 7.1. Competing Claims in the South China Sea Region
‘South China Sea Tables and Maps’, located at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/schinatab.html
Meanwhile, the most noteworthy and volatile outcome to stem from the strategic significance of the South China Sea has been the manner by which individual territorial claims have been hotly defended in recent decades. Thus, and in the midst of a dogmatic pursuit of national interests (with little regard for the collective interests of the region), skirmishes have occurred between the Philippines and Vietnam (1998 and 1999) and between Taiwan and Vietnam (1995). Meanwhile, larger scale confrontations have taken place between China and Vietnam (1974, 1988, 1992, and 1994) as well as China and the 269
Philippines (1995, 1996, 1997 and 1999).882 The bloodiest conflict over the islands occurred between the PRC and Vietnam in 1988 when Chinese and Vietnamese forces clashed at Fiery Cross Reef near Johnson Island. During the hostilities, the Vietnamese lost up to three vessels and seventy‐seven crew members.883 While the occurrence of hostile actions has declined in frequency during the past decade, the level of competition and diplomatic manoeuvring to maximise each claimant’s share over the discovery of any potential resources has not.
In 1992, China reasserted its claim to exclusive sovereignty over the entire subregion via the enactment of its Law of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone of the People’s Republic of China. In an attempt to repress any escalation of the potential for future armed conflict and simultaneously avoid alienating China, ASEAN, without naming any individual party, called for the exercise of restraint over the matter by issuing its Declaration on the South China Sea. In its attempt to ‘seize the political agenda’ the declaration effectively put Beijing on notice that a ‘unified ASEAN position was emerging from which ASEAN would view the bilateral issues through regionalist eyes’.884 Furthermore, the Declaration reiterated various ASEAN principles including the ‘non‐use of force’ along with the ‘resolution of disputes by peaceful means’. The Declaration also urged the claimants, ‘without prejudicing the sovereignty and jurisdiction of countries having direct interests in the area’, to explore greater cooperation in several fields – such as ‘navigation’ and cooperation against ‘piracy’ and ‘illicit drugs’ – but, notably, did not discuss the exploration of natural resources. Finally, the declaration also reiterated ASEAN’s aim to have all parties accept and abide by the principles of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as a basis for establishing a regional ‘code
882 South China Sea Table and Maps [Internet] (Energy Information Administration, March 2002 [cited 28 August 2002]); available from http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/schinatab.html.
883 John W. Garver, "China's Push through the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and Nation's Interests," The China Quarterly, no. No.132 (1992): p.1013. See also: Dillon, Contemporary Security Challenges in Southeast Asia (cited), Christopher B. Roberts, "The ASEAN Security Community Project: The Prospects for Comprehensive Integration in Southeast Asia," The Indonesian Quarterly 34, no. 3 (2006): p.284.
884 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.136. 270
of international conduct’.885 While the six ASEAN members agreed to the declaration,886 ASEAN was not successful in its attempt to acquire China’s acquiescence to the Declaration – the PRC had other plans.
In 1995, China occupied Mischief Reef – a set of islands also claimed by the Philippines. China’s occupation of Mischief Reef was well within the Philippine’s claimed Exclusive Economic Zone but because of the low capacity of the Philippines navy, diplomacy (including the use of aerial photography similar to the illustrations below) was the only course of action available. To ASEAN’s credit, the Association was quickly able to muster a degree of solidarity over the issue by censuring China for its actions and to reiterate its call for restraint based on the spirit of the Association’s Declaration of the South China Sea.887 In spite of this diplomatic achievement, a year later the Philippine navy was allegedly subjected to a ninety minute fire fight with three Chinese navy vessels and, by 1998, China had upgraded its facilities further – as illustrated by Figure 7.2.888 One analyst contended that the withdrawal of US navy forces from Subic Bay was a likely factor in explaining the actions and growing assertiveness of the Chinese ‘People’s Liberation Army’ (PLA).889 Jeanie Henderson adds, and interdependent with the problems discussed later in the chapter, that ‘the timing of the move also seemed calculated to capitalise on ASEAN’s difficulties at the time of the economic crisis’.890
885 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea (Manila, 22 July 1992) [Internet] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1992 [cited 28 August 2002]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/1196.htm.
886 Brunei Darussalam had joined ASEAN in 1983.
887 Henderson, "Reassessing ASEAN," p.59.
888 Zalmay Khalilzad et al., The United States and Asia: Toward a New US. Strategy and Force Posture [Internet - Book] (RAND, 2001 [cited 2 August 2002]); available from http://www.rand.org/cgi- bin/Abstracts/ordi/getabbydoc.pl?doc+MR-1315.
889 Ibid. (cited).
890 Henderson, "Reassessing ASEAN," p.61. Indeed, its entry into the WTO and the hosting of the Beijing Olympics in 2008 may have provided the international community with China’s ‘good behaviour’ during the immediate future however the arms acquisition patterns of PLA indicate that it is preparing for the possibility of more than simply homeland defence. In its pursuit of greater blue water capacity, and while China’s strategic ambitious will most likely be directed towards the possibly scenario of having to forcibly acquire Taiwan, such 271
Figure 7.2. Chinese Structures at Mischief Reef (Areas 1 & 2)
‘Keeping an Eye on the Islands: Remote Monitoring in the South China Sea’, located at http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/title.htm
In the wake of these events, a growing sense of disunity developed amongst the ASEAN claimants over negotiations for the implementation of an actual ‘Code of Conduct’. Further, China was duly able to provoke such displays of disunity by exploiting ASEAN’s incapacity to find a resolution, or at least a détente, over their mutually contradictory claims.891 Thus, and by 2002, negotiations for a ‘Code of Conduct’ had stalemated and in its place, the claimants signed a non‐binding communiqué known as the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. As regional analyst Barry Wain explains, ‘disunity developed on the ASEAN side between Vietnam and Malaysia … In the end, you had the sad spectacle of China, which initially rejected the ASEAN approach to a code of conduct, being more enthusiastic about the final declaration than the ASEAN side’.892 Consequently, and in August 2003, China forged a deal with the Philippines (which Vietnam reluctantly joined later) for petroleum exploration in the area. The lack of solidarity that resulted in this bilateral, and later trilateral approach, has left other claimants, such as Malaysia, out in the cold.893
a scenario would likely see a return to a much more assertive and coercive China in its diplomacy over the South China Sea – especially in the event of proven greater oil and natural gas reserves.
891 Cotton, Crossing Borders in the Asia-Pacific: Essays on the Domestic-Foreign Policy Divide, p.34.
892 Email correspondence with Barry Wain, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore), 22 March 2005.
893 The comments here, and for much of the section above, have also been published, in one form or another, within the following articles by the author: Roberts, China and the South China Sea: What Happened to 272
Meanwhile, the South China Sea was not the only regional maritime issue to provoke discord and hostility in recent years. In March 2005, and in the wake of ASEAN’s declaration to become a security community, tensions pertaining to the maritime boundaries between Malaysia and Indonesia vis‐à‐vis the Ambalat offshore oil block (in the Sulawesi/Celebes sea) came to a head. On March 3, Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, ordered his military to secure Indonesian sovereignty over the disputed area. The gunboat diplomacy that ensued – including the deployment of several naval vessels and four F16 fighter jets from Indonesia against two naval vessels by Malaysia – put at risk the possibility of armed conflict between the two countries.894 Not only did anger quickly flood the media, albeit for a brief period of time, but at one point during the incident a crowd gathered outside the Malaysian embassy in Indonesia and shouted the historical konfrontasi catchphrase of ‘Crush Malaysia’.895 Such statements are indicative of the difficulties that await ASEAN in the course of any attempt to overcome historical memories (and animosities) for the purpose of forging an ‘ASEAN community’. Meanwhile, however, at the political elite level the most senior politicians, by and large, attempted to placate their domestic constituencies through conciliatory statements where, for example, the Malaysian Foreign Minister declared that ‘both sides agree that the situation should be cooled down and wish to use an entirely diplomatic approach…’ adding that ‘[s]ince long ago a spirit to resolve to solve [such problems] cooperatively has been apparent among ASEAN’s members’.896
Meanwhile, and beyond the Sulawesi Sea and South China Sea issues, the possible emergence of Chinese hegemony in the region is also a concern in relation to the ASEAN security community proposal. Amidst China’s almost uninterrupted economic growth,
ASEAN’s Solidarity? (cited), Roberts, "The ASEAN Security Community Project: The Prospects for Comprehensive Integration in Southeast Asia," pp.284-286.
894 Bill Guerin, Sulawesi Sea Row Dredges up Defences [Internet] (Asia Times, 2005 [cited 4 October 2006]); available from www.atimes.com, Clive Schofield and Ian Storey, "Energy Security and Southeast Asia: The Impact on Maritime Boundary and Territorial Disputes," Harvard Asia Quarterly 9, no. 4 (2005): p.36.
895 Emmerson, "Security, Community, and Democracy in Southeast Asia: Analysing ASEAN," p.175.
896 Ibid. 273
averaging close to ten percent per annum, China was able to increase its military expenditure by 155 percent between 1990 and 1999.897 Similar rises to China’s defence expenditure have continued through the present decade and in early 2007 Beijing announced a further 17.8 percent increase for the 2007 Fiscal Year.898 These increases, combined with the type of weaponry and armaments that China has acquired, have evidenced an apparent intention to obtain blue water naval capacity. While such actions by China do not necessarily prohibit dependable expectations of peaceful change in Southeast Asia (as it is an actor exogenous to the grouping), China has mustered the potential to splinter any sense of collective identity in elite level strategic relations.
China’s ‘ping pong diplomacy’ and stated ‘territorial ambitions’ should have highlighted the need for a common understanding and foreign policy in Southeast Asia’s relations with China, however, and to the contrary, the past few years have evidenced a division in the region’s foreign policy responses. Vietnam, for example, only agreed to the earlier mentioned joint exploration with China and the Philippines of parts of the South China Sea because, according to one Vietnamese foreign ministry official, it felt it could no longer expect solidarity and support from ASEAN.899 Meanwhile, Vietnam had already started to hedge its bets by improving its relations with both India and the US and on four occasions has permitted visits by US Naval ships; the most recent visit occurred in July 2006 with the arrival of two US Navy ships (USS Patriot and USS Salvor) to the Saigon Port in Vietnam’s southern Ho Chi Minh City.900 By contrast, both Thailand and the Philippines have recently
897 China’s annual averages for its ‘defence budget’ increases were 7.11 percent during this period. Statistics based on raw data supplied y the NBR Strategic Asia Database, located at http://strategicasia.nbr.org/.
898 Jon Grevatt, "China Unveils 18% Rise in Defence Budget,” (Jane's Defence Industry, 2007).
899 Interview with senior government official, Vietnamese Foreign Ministry, July 2005.
900 Esther Schrader, U.S. To Realign Troops in Southeast Asia (LA Times, 2003 [cited 1 June 2003]); available from http://www.latimes.com, Two U.S. Warships Arrive in Vietnam [Internet News] (China View, 2006 [cited 3 January 2007]); available from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-07/01/content-4780488.htm. 274
entered into various agreements to increase military and economic cooperation with (and greater aid from) China.901
Figure 7.3. Perceptions of Unity in the Event of Chinese Coercion
Source: Compiled by author
Nonetheless, and contrary to concerns privately expressed by many political elites in interview, Figure 7.3 above indicates that more than 64 percent of the ‘elite level survey’ participants believed that the ASEAN members would unite at the diplomatic level to condemn China should it, in the future, breach the Declaration of Conduct on the South China Sea by – and without provocation – forcibly occupying further islands within the maritime subregion. Interestingly, and reflective of the perceived limitations to the potential security role for ASEAN (and its member’s military capabilities) was the fact that not one of the respondents felt that the ‘ASEAN member countries would [or could] be completely
901 Joint Statement of the Kingdom of Thailand and the People's Republic of China on a Plan of Action for the 21st Century [Internet - Declaration] (Thai Embassy Washington DC, 1999 [cited 11 September 2002]); available from http://www.thaiembdc.org/pressctr/pr/jtthsch99.htm. Roberts, "The ASEAN Security Community Project: The Prospects for Comprehensive Integration in Southeast Asia," p.286. 275
united in … [providing] a military response against China’s occupation’. Still, given the vast resources and the subsequent stakes involved in the South China Sea, the fact that there has not been more significant hostility to date is an achievement in itself. The extent to which this outcome can be further accredited to the ASEAN way and dependable expectations of peaceful change (e.g. as symbolised by the ‘non‐use of force’ principle), will be the subject of further analysis in the next chapter.
Amity and Enmity through Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia
The Challenges of Terrorism and Insurgency to the Security Architecture of Southeast Asia
The political, military and strategic realignments taking place in Southeast Asia are not only a consequence of increased Chinese hegemony but are also an outcome of terrorism and its influence on global security. For Southeast Asia, moreover, terrorism is a transnational force that has affected virtually ‘every dimension of Southeast Asia’s multilateral interactions’ including the strategic, political, economic and cultural realms.902 The substantial impact of terrorism on the region’s strategic security architecture has been largely driven by the ‘war on terrorism’ waged by the United States. In the process, Washington’s international dealings with the states of Southeast Asia have become a foreign policy priority given the argument that the region is the second front on terror.903 Consequently, the bipolar nature of the divisions being created by the Bush administration’s ‘with us or against us’ approach to terrorism has not been seen since the pinnacle of the Cold War era. This has the associated risk of exacerbating further the identity gap between the ‘we’ and ‘other’ that already exists because of divergent social and religious histories within Southeast Asia.904
902 Ralf Emmers and Leonard C. Sebastian, "Terrorism and Transnational Crime in Southeast Asian International Relations," in International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, ed. Donald E. Weatherbee (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005), p.156.
903 Ibid.
904 The terms ‘we’ and ‘other’ stem from Social Identity Theory (SIT). For a detailed outline of the meaning and applicatio n of the theory see Chapter III. 276
A broad outline of the region’s ethnic, cultural and religious differences was provided in Chapter IV and, as a consequence of this history, later discussions referred to various race riots in Malaysia and Singapore between the Chinese and Malays during the 1960s. Given the continuation of ethnic minority discontents within both countries,905 the potential for identity based animosity to re‐emerge though violence in the street should not be underestimated. For example, had Singapore and Malaysia failed to cooperate in successfully arresting 21 militants in December 2001 (who were planning ‘to detonate seven truck bombs at American, British, Australian and Israeli targets in Singapore’), then the subsequent loss of life and damage to local economies could have panned out negatively for race relations within and between the two countries.906 In this regard, Lee Kuan Yew, former Prime Minister and current Minister Mentor of Singapore, has already warned of the growing separateness that exists between the Islamic and non‐Islamic communities of Singapore.907 The divisive nature of the subject of terrorism, and the various policies of individual states in response to it, was further epitomised in a recent survey conducted by the Straits Times. Within this survey 39 percent of Malaysians chose the word ‘hate’ to describe their feelings towards the US and 83.5 percent expressed negative attitude
905 This contention is based on substantial consultation with the major ethnic groups in both Singapore and Malaysia at both the elite and communal levels during the course of the past six years.
906 Speech by Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the Chinese New Year Gathering at Cairnhill Community Club on 17 February 2002 [Email] (Mita News, 2002 [cited 18 February 2002]), Lee Kuan Yew, Home-grown Islamic Terrorists [Commentary by Minister Mentor] (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005 [cited 1 July 2007]); available from http://app.mfa.gov.sg/pr/read_script.asp?View,4361,. See also: James Cotton, "Southeast Asia after 11 September," Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 1 (2003): p.149. According to Jones and Smith however, Singapore’s self-proclaimed discovery of this terrorist network was not discovered by the Singaporean intelligence services. To the contrary, the terrorist plots were only uncovered because of a ‘fortuitous discovery of a video application for funding sent to Al Qaida found in Kabul rubble that once housed the jihadist equivalent of the Ford Foundation’. Jones and Smith, The Strange Death of the ASEAN Way (cited).
907 Address by Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the 1st International Institute for Strategic Studies Asia Security Conference on Friday, 31 May 2002 at Shangrila Hotel [Speech Report via Email] (Mita News, 2002 [cited 1 June 2002]), John Burton, Fears over Singapore's Racial Harmony [Internet News] (Financial Times, 2002 [cited 14 January 2002]); available from http://www.ft.com. Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong also raised such concerned and expressed, by way of an anecdotal example, how a family friend of a civil servant, having heard the news of various arrests of Islamic militants within Singapore, proclaimed that ‘henceforth, she would not get into the same lift with a Malay’. Speech by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, at Dialogue with Community Leaders on Impact of Arrest of Jemaah Islamiah Operatives, 28 January 2002, 8.00 PM [Email] (Mita News, 2002 [cited 29 January 2002]). 277
towards America.908 Given these perceptions, the strong alignment of Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines with the US, along with Thailand’s hardline approach to Muslims in its ‘Southern’ provinces, one can easily see the divisive potential of terrorism and the ‘war on terror’ for the states and communities of Southeast Asia.
Nevertheless, and despite the actual (and/or potential) divisions generated by the war on terror, the survey work conducted within the region, as partially displayed by the two charts below, indicates a relatively unified position (at both the communal and elite levels) that terrorism is perceived to be an issue that impacts on the entire world or, in the very least, the countries within Southeast Asia.909 The level of unity amidst the region’s political elite regarding the ‘general’ threat of terrorism (as displayed in the chart below), along with the sense of urgency in combating terrorist organisations and their cells, was likely solidified by the two Bali bombings.910 At the grassroots (communal level of analysis), perceptions over the mutual relevance of the terrorist issue were likely to have also been strengthened by the fact that such attacks on Southeast Asian soil also had associated consequences over several relatively tangible issues such as trade, investor confidence, and tourism along with the more specific issues of employment, personal security and wellbeing.911
908 Carolyn Hong, "Muslims First, Malaysians Second," The Straits Times, 21 August 2006.
909 As illustrated within Appendix 7.1, these contentions were equally applicable on a country-by-country analysis of the ‘communal level survey’ data. However, and within this data, there was one notable ‘minority’ opinion which may lend some further support to the claims made by the ‘Straits Times survey’ discussed later in the paragraph. In the case of Malaysia, 27.16 percent of the communal level respondents believed that terrorism is a concern that only affects the ‘the US and its allies. In Indonesia, by contrast, just 2.78% of Indonesian respondents believed that ‘terrorism is a concern that affects the US and its allies’ only. The surveys in both countries were conducted on behalf of the author by citizens of each country and each of the surveyors were Muslim.
910 Carlyle A. Thayer, "New Terrorism in Southeast Asia," in Violence in Between: Conflict and Security in Archipelagic Southeast Asia, ed. Damien Kingsbury (Melbourne: Monash University Press and ISEAS, 2005), p.53. Until these bombings, together with the eruption of coordinated attacks and widespread violence in Southern Thailand, a number of countries, including Indonesia and Thailand in particular, had been in what could be characterised as a state of ‘public self-denial’ over the presence of terrorist networks within each state’s territorial borders.
911 Asian Development Outlook 2003 Update [Report] (Asia Development Bank, 2003 [cited 23 September 2006]); available from www.adb.org. 278
Figure 8.4. Communal and Elite Perceptions Regarding Terrorism
(a) Communal Respondents: Please circle the answer that best fits your belief on (b) Elite Respondents: Please circle 'one' answer that best fits your belief on the the following question: 'Do you personally believe that terrorism is a concern tha following question: 'Do you personally believe that terrorism is a concern that affects ...' affects ...'
0 . The entire world 8 The entire world 1 4.21% 7.94% % All of Southeast All of Southeast Asia Asia 2.42% Your country Your country 5.65% Other countries in 16.84% Other countries in Southeast Asia Southeast Asia Other countries Other countries outside 1.05% outside Southeast Asia 10.63% Southeast Asia The US and its 67.03% 4.21% The US and its allies 68.42% allies All of the above 4.21% Don't know 4.98% Don't Know 1.05%
Source: Compiled by author
For the people of Indonesia, for example, the consequences of terrorist attacks were witnessed firsthand in relation to the micro‐economy of Bali. Within Bali, and until October 2002, tourism accounted for forty percent of Indonesia’s tourist earnings and directly employed forty percent of the island’s population.912 By January 2003, however, tourism in Bali had dropped by close to fifty percent in the space of a year.913 Reduced economic performance also reduces the resourc es that can be utilised by Southeast Asia’s governments (such as the Republic of Indonesia) to maintain domestic security. Moreover, poor domestic security, the absence of secular education, high unemployment and low standards of living, all contribute to the appeal of radical terrorist ideology. Heightened problems of terrorism and insurgency, and the ethnic violence that might ensue,914 add to this vicious cycle and further marginalise the ability of a given state to look beyond its
912 Dr Stephen Sherlock, "The Bali Bombing: What It Means for Indonesia,” (Canberra: Department of the Parliamentary Library, 2002), p.11.
913 Edwin Mooibroek, Tourists Still Shun Bali [Internet News] (Radio Netherlands, 2003 [cited 1 June 2003]); available from http://www.rnw.nl/hotspots/html/bal030411.html.
914 Such as between the Christians and Muslims in Central Sulawesi. "Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims,” (Jakarta: International Crisis Group, 2001), p.10. 279
borders and implement initiatives for heightened regional cooperation, security and economic development.
The need to internally consolidate (whilst addressing issues of democracy and state legitimacy) within the states of Southeast Asia can be seen in the fact that it is the structurally weaker and economically poorer states that have struggled most in relation to terrorist activities and to the insurgencies and separatist movements which terrorist groups have at times exploited.915 In the context of these weaker states, and even in the absence of interference by transnational terrorist organisations, the various insurgent groups that have operated within the territorial boundaries of these states have often engaged in ‘a range of militant activities, including conventional and guerrilla warfare, many of which fall into the broad category of “terrorism”’.916 In the case of Indonesia, and in the wake of the economic crisis and the instability that followed,917 the country has also had to contend with other terrorist attacks in its capital918 along with several hotspots for religious and/or ethnic based
915 As Joseph Liow states, the continued challenge of securing the legitimacy of the state by all the communities within its territorial confines is not so surprising given the history of ‘nation-state formation since the end of the Second World War’ (as discussed in the previous two chapters of the dissertation). Joseph Liow further argues that ‘internal conflicts are rooted in domestic structures and processes (or, more appropriately, flaws and shortcomings in them), even though they increasingly experience an undeniable transnational “overlay” that has come about because of globalisation and the information revolution’. Joseph Chinyong Liow, "Internal Conflicts in Southeast Asia: The Nature, Legitimacy, and (Changing) Role of the State," Asian Security 3, no. 2 (2007): p.73-74. As mentioned earlier, the relevance and challenge of internal consolidation is considered in detail within Chapter VII. For an in depth discussion of the role of democracy to combating at least some of the ‘causal’ grievances that lead to terrorism see: Timo Kivimaki, "Can Development and Democratisation Address the Root Causes of Terrorism in Southeast Asia," The Pacific Review 20, no. 1 (2007).
916 Damien Kingsbury, "Southeast Asia: A Community of Diversity," Politics and Policy 35, no. 1 (2007): p.11. The long-term existence of such insurgency movements is important to keep in mind because, ‘[c]onsidering some of the analysis that has been produced by the cottage industry of terrorism studies since … [September 11], one gets the impression that internal conflicts in Southeast Asia were a post-September 11 phenomenon…’ Liow, "Internal Conflicts in Southeast Asia: The Nature, Legitimacy, and (Changing) Role of the State," p.74.
917 The economic crisis and its consequences will be discussed in detail later in the chapter.
918 For example, the bomb blasts at the JW Marriot Hotel in August 2003 and the Australian Embassy in September 2004. Massive Blast at Jakarta Embassy [Internet - News] (BBC News, 2004 [cited 22 July 2007]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3639922.stm. 280
violence in various other locations within the country such as the Maluku Islands (1999‐ 2001), Madura in Kalimantan (2000‐1) and more recently in central Sulawesi.919
In Malaysia, by contrast, its relevance to the issue is predominately limited to the country being a source of Islamic militancy rather than a victim of it;920 a phenomena that may evidence that it is on the verge of achieving a higher level of state capacity and internal consolidation (through economic wealth, education etc) relative to some of the neighbouring states. Meanwhile, the Philippines continues to suffer from both communist (e.g. the New People’s Army) and Islamic (e.g. Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf Group) insurgencies921 and in Laos there remain occasional but limited occurrences of violence by ethnic minority groups with the most recent episode involving an alleged, albeit foiled, plot by Hmong Rebels to purchase weaponry – including Stinger surface‐to‐air missiles – in the US for the purpose of usurping the Communist government in Laos.922 In the case of Myanmar, as a further example, while it has not yet been a major source of terrorist activities beyond its own borders923 (despite claims to the contrary by its
919 "Southeast Asia: Regional Overview." While violence is unlikely to return to Aceh in the wake of a peace agreement in August 2005 together with the first direct elections of a regional governor for the Aceh province that followed in December 2006, separatist elections in Papua (March 2006), for example, led to protests that resulted in the death of five Indonesian security force members. Ex-Rebel 'Ahead' in Aceh Election [Internet News] (BBC News, 2006 [cited 26 January 2007]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia- pacific/6169303.stm, "Southeast Asia: Regional Overview."
920 Emmers and Sebastian, "Terrorism and Transnational Crime in Southeast Asian International Relations," p.165.
921 Other terrorist and insurgent groups within the Philippines include the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB), and the Bangsamoro Army (BMA). "Terrorist and Insurgent Groups Table: Southeast Asia,” (Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, 2007).
922 Richard S Ehrlich, Loose Tongues Foil 'Laos Plot' [Internet - News] (Asia Times Online, 2007 [cited 18 June 2007]); available from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IF08Ae01.html, Nine Charged over Laos 'Coup Plot' [Internet - News] (Aljazeera.Net, 2007 [cited 6 June 2007]); available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/50EBCDC7-AF67-45D5-80BA-61918EAC8AB0.htm. Ganjanakhundee Supalak, Laos Welcomes US' Arrest of Hmong General [Internet - News] (The Nation, 2007 [cited 7 June 2007]); available from http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2007/06/05/headlines/headlines_30036051.php.
923 Within the country however is a very different story. In May 2005, three days before the author arrived in Yangon for a field trip, three bombs went off in the capital city. Amy Kazmin, Burma Accuses Foreigners of Bomb Attacks: Speculation over the Perpetrators of Three Explosions in Rangoon Has Reached Fever Pitch, Says Amy Kazmin [Electronic Database - Factiva] (Financial Times, 2005 [cited 8 August 2005]); available from http://www.factiva.com, Rebels Deny Myanmar Bomb Attacks [Internet - News] (CNN, 2005 [cited 8 August 2005]); available from http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/05/07/myanmar.blasts/index.html, Two 281
government924) Chapter IX will outline how one of the poorest countries in Southeast Asia has been subject to more than half a century of civil war and insurgency.
Finally, within Thailand, and since the commencement of the ‘war on terror’ by the United States, the separatist movement in the ‘South’ has re‐emerged with the consequence of wide‐scale violence925 involving estimates of the existence of as many as 3,000 militants.926 More recently, on the eve of 2007, there was a coordinated bomb attack in the Thai capital of Bangkok but it is unclear whether the attacks were conducted by Southern militants or opponents to the new government as a consequence of the military coup which occurred earlier on 19 September 2006.927 Nonetheless, by the beginning of 2007, the violence in Southern Thailand had become so pervasive that the newly installed military government was considering the implementation of Sharia Law in the predominantly Malay (Muslim) provinces of Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani.928 The comments made by the Prime Minister
Dead, 16 Wounded in Myanmar Market Blast [Internet - News] (Channel News Asia, 2005 [cited 5 May 2005]); available from www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/144674/1/.html.
924 Cem Oztuk, Myanmar's Muslim Sideshow [Internet - News] (Asia Times Online, 2003 [cited 29 June 2007]); available from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/EJ21Ae01.html. There is however some evidence to suggest that two insurgency groups from Myanmar, the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) and the Rohingya Nationalist Organisation, attended a meeting initiated by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (Jema’ah Islamiyah’s spiritual head), in 1999 to form the Rabitatul Mujahidin. Emmers and Sebastian, "Terrorism and Transnational Crime in Southeast Asian International Relations," p.158.The Rabitatul Mujahidin (Mujahidin Coalition) is an alliance of regional militant groups. For an in-depth outline of the issue, see: Selth, Burma's Muslims: Terrorists or Terrorised?
925 Army Raids Islamic Schools in Southern Thailand [Internet News] (China View, 2004 [cited 28 September 2004]); available from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-09/13/content_1974941.htm, Deep South: Severe Security Decree Mulled [Internet - News] (The Nation, 2004 [cited 2 December 2004]); available from http://www.nationmultimedia.com, Emergency Law to Replace Martial Law in Thai South by June: PM [Internet - News] (Channel News Asia, 2005 [cited 8 August 2005]); available from http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/148011/1/.html.
926 Shinworakornol Nakarin, South Militants Number 3,000 [Internet - News] (The Nation, 2006 [cited 3 January 2007]); available from www.nationalmultimedia.com/2006/06/23/national/national_30007121.
927 Thai Police Detain 15 Suspects over New Year's Bombings in Bangkok [Internet News] (Channel News Asia, 2007 [cited 14 June 2007]); available from www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/southeastasia/view/253678/1/.html, Thailand Bombers Were "In Uniform": Defence Minister [Internet News] (Channel News Asia, 2007 [cited 28 March 2007]); available from www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/250656/1/.html.
928 For example, in August 2006 twenty-one banks were simultaneously struck by small bomb attacks. A spate of killings including government workers and rubber tappers also took place in October 2006. By this time, and 282
were also likely to be an attempt to invoke a ‘softer image’ after the harsh approach by the former Thaksin government resulted, in one instance, in the death of 84 Thai Muslims as a result of suffocation whilst being detained in overcrowded military trucks.929
The Impact of Southern Thailand Violence and Ethnic Discontent on Relations between Thailand and Malaysia
The violence in Southern Thailand has also had associated consequences for Thailand’s relations with Malaysia. Here, once again, the history of colonialism resulted in territorial boundaries being drawn that, in this instance, split the Malay communities (and families) between Malaya and Southern Thailand.930 Thus, according to James Wise, a former Australian High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, when the 84 Muslims were killed in Southern Thailand ‘…the depth of feeling was very high’ within the political elite of Malaysia and the Malaysian government immediately called for its Foreign Minister to hold talks in Bangkok.931 However, as a consequence of the abrupt and highly defensive manner by which Prime Minister Thaksin responded, together with a general distrust of Malaysia by the
since January 2004 when the problem in the South re-emerged, over 1,500 lives had been lost to the violence. More Unrest in Southern Thailand [Internet News] (BBC News, 2006 [cited 5 January 2007]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/6058646.stm, Southern Thailand Hit by Wave of Bombs [Internet News] (BBC News, 2007 [cited 5 January 2007]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia- pacific/5300776.stm. In Southern Thailand Sharia law is already in place for family issues such as divorce. For more details on this and the Thai governments consideration of the proposal to implement Sharia law more generally see: Thailand Considers Sharia Law in Troubled Muslim South [Internet News] (Channel News Asia, 2007 [cited 14 June 2007]); available from www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/254544/1/.html.
929 Thailand's Premier Creates Panel to Probe 84 Deaths [Internet - News] (Bloomberg.com, 2004 [cited 5 November 2004]); available from http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=71000001&refer=asia&sid=afK7.wzPEjD8. Thai Protestors Die in Custody [Internet - News] (BBC News, 2004 [cited 5 November 2004]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-2/hi/asia-pacific/3954587.stm. The nature of the incident was such that it resulted in a rare intervention by Thailand’s king who called for a softer approach over the issue. Thai King Intervenes to Ask Government to Soften Southern Approach [Internet - News] (Channel News Asia, 2004 [cited 5 November 2004]); available from http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/114677/1/.html.
930 Interview with Dato’ Mohd Annuar Bin Zaini, Malaysia National News Agency, Wednesday 24 May 2006.
931 Interview with James Wise, Australian High Commission (Kuala Lumpur), 23 May 2006. 283
Thais,932 it was not long before relations deteriorated further and Thaksin alleged that the militants in Southern Thailand were being trained in jungle hideouts in Kelantan Malaysia.933
In response to public expressions of ‘shock’ and subsequent ‘denials’ by the Malaysian government over the claims, the Thai government, a few days later, announced that it had photographic ‘proof’ of the Malaysian camps.934 Despite the photos being exposed in the media as nothing more than ‘old sports‐day school photos from Thailand’s southern Pattani Province’,935 and Thaksin later backing away from these allegations claiming that they had been distorted by the media,936 the official position maintained by some members of the political elite in Thailand is that there remains bone fide evidence of the Malaysian government’s complicity in supporting insurgents in southern Thailand. Thus, according to one Major‐General in the Thai police force, ‘…right now we know Malaysia is supporting insurgents. Their Minister of Defence came out and all these people were meeting in
932 Interview with Dr. Corrine Phuangkasem, (Bangkok), 20 February 2006. Further, respected scholar Kusuma Snitwongse supports such sentiments and suggests that ‘Malaysia would have no problem at all if Thaksin kept his mouth shut, I think that there is a latent distrust of Malaysia among some in the military …’ adding ‘I think the Thais have distrust of Malaysia, I don’t know why, but well, anyway, I don’t think we have a choice, we need to maintain good relations with them’. Interview with Kusuma Snitwongse, Chulalongkorn University (Bangkok), 23 February 2006. The extent to which Thais and Malaysians trust/distrust each other will be further examined in relation to the survey data within Chapter IX.
933 Rebels Trained in Malaysia, Says Thaksin [Internet - News] (The Straits Times, 2004 [cited 20 December 2004]); available from http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg/sub/storyprintfriendly/0,5578,291447,00.html?
934 On the subject, Thailand’s then Deputy Interior Minister Sutham Saengprathum said ‘there are pictures which are relatively clear and can be accepted as evidence in court. If the Malaysian government wants to see them, we can oblige’. Thai 'Proof' of Malaysia Camps [Internet - News] (BBC, 2004 [cited 22 December 2004]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/hi/world/asia-pacific/4114091.stm, Thai Government Claims Proof of Malaysian Militant Camps [Internet - News] (ABC, 2004 [cited 22 December 2004]); available from http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200412/s1270163.htm.
935 Vaudine England, Malays Reject Accusations They Aid Thai Separatists [Internet News] (International Herald Tribune, 2005 [cited 1 July 2007]); available from http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/05/news/malaysia.php.
936 As Mr. D. Rajayah, Principle Assistant Secretary in the Policy Division of the Ministry of Defence stated in interview, ‘…in the past there have been some media reports adverse to us and we have asked [the] Thais to provide us with some evidence … what they did have were old photos and not genuine and the Thais retracted … and I think the Thais understood our position’. Interview with Mr. D. Rajayah, Principle Assistant Secretary – Policy Division, Ministry of Defence (Putrajaya, Kuala Lumpur), 29 May 2006. See also: Thailand's Most- Wanted Muslim Separatist Arrested in Malaysia: PM [Internet News] (Channel News Asia, 2005 [cited 28 January 2005]); available from www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/print/129350/1/.html. 284
Langkawi, we had photographs that they were doing it. Were they supporting it [at the meeting]? We don’t know, maybe indirectly, but they knew because we had photographs and so they didn’t come out and say anything [in response]’.937
By August 2005, the heavy handed nature by which Thai security forces had responded to the insurgency problem under Thaksin’s leadership also resulted in 131 Thai Muslims fleeing across the border into Malaysia and declaring themselves as ‘refugees’. On this issue Thaksin also responded defensively and hostilely to Malaysia’s hesitance to return the people to Thailand against their will under circumstances where, as the Malaysian Foreign Minister described, there is ‘no denying that the situation in Thailand is still not safe, it is still not stable’.938 Thaksin further argued that Malaysia’s acceptance of these people, together with the involvement of the UNHCR, represented ‘interference in the domestic affairs of Thailand’.939 To these comments the Malaysian Government responded ‘we will not release them to Thailand except if we have an assurance that their human rights are not being infringed upon by the Thai government’ and that any final decision about the Thai
937 Interview with Major General, Thai Police (Bangkok), 22 February 2006. Similarly, earlier in April 2005 (but after the ‘training camp allegations), Thai authorities had claimed that various border channels had been ‘made clear’ for ‘insurgents to enter Thailand and carry out terror attacks’. Such allegations were also denied by Kuala Lumpur. Security Alert: KL Denies It Cleared Border [Internet News] (The Nation, 2005 [cited 24 April 2005]); available from http://www.komchadluek.net/breaking/read.php?lang=en&newsid=54639.
938 Diplomatic Stalemate: KL Says It Won't Release 'Refugees' [Internet] (The Nation, [cited 11 October 2005]); available from http://www.nationamultimedia.com, Malaysia Risks Row with Thailand [Internet] (BBC News, [cited 12 August 2005]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/.
939 Interview with Dr. Corrine Phuangkasem, Thammasat University (Bangkok), 20 February 2006. During the interview Dr. Corrine stated: ‘Every time that there is clash then [the] Thai government always blame[s] Malaysia. Last incident when 131 Thai Muslim went into exile into Kalimantan in Malaysia and at that time the relationship quite strained because the government blame Malaysia for accepting these people and that it was instigated by them to move over there by saying cannot live in Thailand because not safe and say might be executed by government. UNHCR tried to help 131 people who moved to Kalimantan, and the PM said interfering into Thai domestic problems. He said interfering, he shouldn’t say that because their duty … People criticise that in the past Thailand accepted refugees because they come to Thailand to seek protection and we give them humanitarian assistance, when Thai people go to Kalimantan and get protection then say interfering, so people say he does not think about good reputation in the past. In terms of foreign affairs the PM intervene too much and sometimes he doesn’t realise all the important factors, like Malaysia is now chairman of the organisation of the Islamic conference and Indonesia chairman of the NAM group, and Malaysia might be the coming chairman and so should be on good terms with Malaysia because quite influential’. 285
refugees by Malaysia would be based on the rule of law and the principles of human rights.940
The delicate balance between Thailand’s treatment of Malays and the level of security extant within Southern Thailand became even harder to maintain following accusations that Thailand was spying on Malaysia (October 2005),941 plans to end dual citizenship by Thailand (October 2005),942 and the detainment of six Malaysian soldiers alleged to have crossed into a southern province of Narathiwat Thailand (February 2006).943 Thus, and according to Anthony Davis, an in country researcher from Jane’s Intelligence, by August 2005 relations between Thailand and Malaysia had reached the point of being at their worst in the two country’s history.944 Consequently, the tension spilled over into military cooperation where, according to one Major General from the Thai military, even the pretence of diplomatic cordiality was abandoned during one meeting at the Akademi Tentera Malaysia (Military Academy of Malaysia) leading to the temporary cancellation of a military officer exchange program between the two countries.945 Regardless of the
940 Diplomatic Stalemate: KL Says It Won't Release 'Refugees' (cited).
941 Malaysia Steps up Security at Thai Border after Alleged Spying [Internet] (Channel News Asia, [cited 12 January 2006]); available from http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/174836/1/.html, Southern Unrest: PM: Spy Charge a Misunderstanding [Internet] (The Nation, [cited 12 January 2006]); available from http://www.nationmultimedia.com.
942 Thai 'Smart' ID Cards Aim to End Dual Citizenship with Malaysia [Internet] (Channel News Asia, 2005 [cited 2 February 2006]); available from http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/172191/1.html. In relation to this issue, a Major General in the Thai Military states: ‘… when [you] talk conflict between Thailand and Malaysia, you know that we have dual nationality, when you make a problem you can go to Malaysia until it calms down. Thailand wants one nationality, but Malaysia doesn’t agree. PAS has resisted this because they get the vote. They control the state along the border’. Interview with Major General, Thai Military (Bangkok), 18 February 2006.
943 Six Malaysian Soldiers Detained in Southern Thai Province [Internet News] (Bernama, 2006 [cited 18 March 2006]); available from www.bernama.com/bernam/v3/printable.php?id=181570.
944 As Anthony Davis states: ‘[Southern Thailand] … is a domestic issue that is exacerbating long-standing bilateral tensions. It is opening up old wounds and rubbing salt in it. Six months ago Thai/Malaysia relations were worse than they ever had been. You can blame both sides [for this]’. Interview with Anthony David, Jane’s Intelligence (Bangkok), 15 February 2006.
945 As the Major General stated, ‘Every year we send officers to the national defence college [in Malaysia] on exchange. Last year we sent officers to it and we were greeted by only a Colonel and a Lieutenant Colonel. Worse, we were there for two hours and were not offered any refreshments. This was very bad. We had a bad 286
authenticity of the various allegations made by either of these two countries vis‐à‐vis the Southern Thailand issue, the ‘actual occurrence’ of the comments strongly detract from any sense of ‘we‐feeling’, mutual understanding and reciprocity that would be expected within a potential Southeast Asian security community.
The Limitations to Counterterrorism Cooperation in ASEAN
Given the politically sensitive nature of terrorism, and an associated ambiguity in any distinction between terrorist activities and domestic insurgency, the ability of ASEAN to undertake concrete and collective responses to the issue was handicapped from the very beginning. Nonetheless, at the discursive level ASEAN has managed to forge agreement over a significant number of initiatives in as far ‘transnational terrorist networks’ are concerned. Soon after the September 11 terrorist bombings in New York, ASEAN issued its ‘Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism’ at the November 2001 Summit. The primary emphasis in the declaration was on strengthening ‘comprehensive’ cooperation against terrorism at the bilateral, regional and international levels.946 Several months later, in May 2002, a special foreign ministers meeting more specifically identified such activities as extradition law enforcement, airport security, bomb detection, the formation of national anti‐terrorist units and the sharing of intelligence as areas for greater cooperation.947 To this list, the eighth ASEAN summit suggested measures against money laundering and the financing of terrorism.948 Later, in negotiating the November 2004 Vientiane Action Program, the ASEAN states agreed to work towards ‘concluding an ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement,
feeling about how we were received. This year we did not send anyone. We did send one to Vietnam’. Interview with Major General, Thai Military (Bangkok), 18 February 2006.
946 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism [Internet News] (ASEAN, 2001 [cited 22 July 2004]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/5318.htm.
947 Emmers and Sebastian, "Terrorism and Transnational Crime in Southeast Asian International Relations," pp.165-166.
948 David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith, "Making Process, Not Progress," International Security 32, no. 1 (2007): pp.170. 287
an ASEAN convention on counter terrorism, and the establishment of an ASEAN extradition treaty originally envisioned in the 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord’.949
While ASEAN has forged other agreements regarding counterterrorism efforts and activities, the ASEAN way remains a constraint and consequently none of the agreements incorporate any legally binding commitments for participation. For example, while a decision for intelligence sharing at an ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting in 2002 was described as a ‘watershed’ for ASEAN cooperation, only Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines joined the agreement. As James Cotton states, Thailand decided the proposal merited further study, and Singapore refused at that stage to participate’.950 Despite such problems, several interlocutors have contended that intelligence sharing has been one of the strongest areas of cooperation as far as terrorism (and transnational crime) are concerned but this has been primarily limited to bilateral exchanges.951 Further, a possible consequence of the challenge in separating issues of ‘terrorism’ from domestic insurgencies’ was seen in the difficulty that arose over forging a definition for terrorism. When the ASEAN leaders were unable to agree on a common definition the Home Affairs Minister from Singapore argued that he did ‘not believe that having a common definition will hamper cooperation among ASEAN countries’ adding that it was more important for ‘ASEAN to implement practical measures to address the scourge’.952
949 ASEAN, Vientiane Action Programme [Internet] (2004 [cited 10 December 2004]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/VAP-10th%20ASEAN%20Summit.pdf. See also:
950 As Cotton adds, ‘the “new ASEAN’s” – Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia – were also absent from the accord’. Cotton, "Southeast Asia after 11 September," p.154.
951 Interview with Ju Hon, Singapore Ministry of Defence, 27 July 2007; Interview with Dr. Chap Sotharith, Director CICP (Phnom Penh), Monday 25 July 2005; interview with Kao Kim Hourn, Deputy Foreign Minister, 30 July 2005; interview with Kamarulnizam Abdullah, University Kebangsaan Malaysia, Monday 29 May 2006; roundtable interview with The National Defence College of the Philippines (Manila), 24 November 2005.
952 "Singapore Believes in Action Rather Than Defining Terrorism," Organisation of Asia-Pacific News Agencies, 21 May 2002. Abdullah Badawi, then Deputy Prime Minister, added that while the ASEAN ministers ‘may not be able to agree on a definition of what terrorism is, but I hope this will not stop or derail our efforts to fight terror wherever it lurks’. "ASEAN Fails to Define Terrorism but Vows to Cooperate," Kyodo News, 21 May 2002. 288
Anti‐terrorist cooperation has also emerged in connection with extra‐regional organisations and actors. Aside from a number of initiatives within APEC and the ARF (including agreement to freeze the financial assets of terrorist organisations)953 the United Nations adopted a ‘broad‐based series’ of counterterrorism obligations as articulated by Resolution 1371 in 2001.954 Nevertheless, the most significant counterterrorist role continues to be carried out by the US and the most prominent example of its standing on the issue is seen in the case of the Philippines. In January 2002 the US sent 1,200 troops to support the Philippine government against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Later, in December 2002, an additional 150 US special force troops were sent to the Philippines for the purpose of training the Philippine military in counterterrorism operations.955 Counterterrorism cooperation between the two countries has also involved the joint coordination of airstrikes by the Philippine air force against a cluster of municipalities in Southern Maguindanao (e.g. November 2004, January 2005, and April 2005).956 Furthermore, in 2005 the US doubled its aid to the Philippines.957 While the Philippines’ relationship with the US did not appear to be a significant problem in the course of conducting interviews throughout the region there may be less tangible and associated consequences at the communal level such as those indicated in the Straits Times survey above.958 In any event, the fact that the most
953 Brendan Pereira, Accord on Measures to Block Terror Funds [Internet News] (The Straits Times, 2002 [cited 1 August 2002]); available from www.straitstimes.asia1.com.sg.
954 Ogilvie-White, "Non-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism Cooperation in Southeast Asia: Meeting Global Obligations through Regional Security Architectures?" Contemporary Southeast Asia 28, no. 1 (2006): p.4.
955 Damien Kingsbury and Clinton Fernandez, "Terrorism in Archipelagic Southeast Asia," in Violence in Between: Conflict and Security in Archipelagic Southeast Asia, ed. Damien Kingsbury (Melbourne: Monash University Press and ISEAS, 2005), p.49.
956 Kit Collier, "Terrorism: Evolving Regional Alliances and State Failure in Mindanao," in Southeast Asian Affairs 2006 (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006), p.36.
957 US Doubles Its Aid to Philippines [Internet News] (China View, 2006 [cited 3 January 2007]); available from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-07/10/content_4815292.htm.
958 Having said this, Professor Rolando Talampas argues that ‘for a long time the Philippines was a sore thumb in the grouping because of US bases in the country’. Interview with Rolando Talampas, University of the Philippines (Manila), 14 November 2005. 289
significant assistance comes from outside the region indicates the limitations to regional resilience and an associated capacity for the ASEAN states to manage their own security.
The Regional Haze and Economic Crisis: Impact and Challenges to the Function and Solidarity of ASEAN
Expressing the Limitations to ASEAN: The ‘Haze’ and Intra-ASEAN Reactions
Back in 1997 however, and at the beginning of the period which this chapter addresses, one of the most significant challenges to reveal the limitations to environmental management,959 to intra‐regional cooperation, and to any sense of mutual reciprocity, was the advent of massive fires in Sumatra and Kalimantan known as the ‘haze’ of 1997‐98.960 The haze soon spread from Indonesia to as far as Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei together with parts of Thailand and the Philippines (and Australia) burning an estimated two million square miles or eight million hectares (an area roughly 120 times the size of Singapore).961 While incidents of the haze had also occurred prior to the occasion, and in more recent years, the 1997‐98 episode was the most acute in terms of economic costs and, in some localities, life threatening health consequences.962
By the time the crisis reached its peak in 1998, the level of air pollution in Sarawak (East Malaysia) had reached critical levels and at times the residents of Kuching, for example,
959 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.26, Stuart Harris, "Asian Multilateral Institutions and Their Response to the Asian Economic Crisis: The Regional and Global Implications," The Pacific Review 13, no. 3 (2000): p.503.
960 Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way, p.208, James Cotton, "The "Haze" Over Southeast Asia: Challenging the ASEAN Mode of Regional Engagement," Pacific Affairs 72, no. 3 (1999): p.331.
961 Cotton, "The "Haze" Over Southeast Asia: Challenging the ASEAN Mode of Regional Engagement," p.332. See also: Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.272.
962 Cotton, Crossing Borders in the Asia-Pacific: Essays on the Domestic-Foreign Policy Divide, p.2. At the time of a 2006 episode of the haze, the extent of pollution endured by the region between 1997 and 1998 was still considered the worst. Yvonne Yong, The Worst of Singapore Haze Is over, Say NEA [Internet News] (Channel News Asia, 2006 [cited 23 January 2007]); available from www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/238782/1/.html. 290
could not see more than a few meters during the peak of the day.963 Furthermore, the financial losses to industries such as tourism and air travel, along with ascertainable and immediate health costs, have been estimated to range from anywhere between $1 billion964 to $4.5 billion965 to $9 billion.966 While the extent of destruction to forest and plantation resources can also be estimated, the extent of endangerment to species (e.g. the orang‐ utan communities in Kalimantan), the impact of increased erosion, and the deterioration of sanitary water for human consumption have been far harder to estimate.967 However, as will be seen, significant challenges for ASEAN also emerged in relation to regional solidarity and the ASEAN way.
Even before the particular ‘haze’ episode in focus here, ASEAN had attempted to respond to the problem of ‘transboundary pollution’. Indeed, ASEAN has now sought to deal with the issue for three decades starting with the ‘ASEAN Environment Program 1’ in 1977; the ASEAN Senior Officials on the Environment (ASOEN) in 1989; and through other instruments including the Kuala Lumpur Accord on Environment and Development in 1990 along with the 1992 Singapore Summit (Chapter V).968 According to ASEAN, the cumulative effect of all
963 Cotton, Crossing Borders in the Asia-Pacific: Essays on the Domestic-Foreign Policy Divide, p.3.
964 Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way, p.208.
965 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.170. James Cotton also cites the same figure but points out that this particular estimate was likely to be based on ‘conservative assumption’ with $3.1 billion being for fire damage and $1.4 billion for the actual cost of the haze. Cotton, Crossing Borders in the Asia- Pacific: Essays on the Domestic-Foreign Policy Divide, p.3.
966 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.273.
967 Cotton, Crossing Borders in the Asia-Pacific: Essays on the Domestic-Foreign Policy Divide, p.3.
968 ASEAN, Foreword: ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution [Internet] (Jakarta, June, 1995 [cited 18 July 2007]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/8939.htm, Cotton, "The "Haze" Over Southeast Asia: Challenging the ASEAN Mode of Regional Engagement," p.342. 291
these declarations was to identify the ‘issue of transboundary pollution’ as being ‘among the major environmental concerns of ASEAN’.969
More significantly however, and following an episode of the haze in 1994, ASEAN sought to develop a comprehensive plan of strategies and policies at both the regional and domestic levels through agreement over the Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution in June 1995. The proposed measures in the agreement included, inter alia, increases to national capabilities in combating forest fires, the transfer of technology and knowledge sharing, and the construction of a regional mechanism to coordinate cooperation on fire fighting.970 As Shaun Narine states, and as typified by so many of the ASEAN initiatives, while the logic behind the principles and ideas in the agreement was sound, there was no mechanism to enforce implementation. Thus, the advent of 1997‐1998 forest fires not only provided a clear demonstration of the inadequate level of follow‐up regarding the ‘plan’ but also revealed the limitations to ASEAN’s ability to implement change within its member‐states and to positively affect the comprehensive security architecture of Southeast Asia more generally.971
In Indonesia for example (the principle cause of the haze), while there existed laws to regulate and punish the use of fire for the purpose of land clearing, many of the business leaders who contravened these laws also held strong connections with the government (including President Suharto). Given the extent of corruption entrenched within the country, together with a lack of capacity (internal consolidation) to combat the activities of illegal loggers, attempts to compel the enforcement of Indonesia’s laws (at the domestic and
969 Consequently, the issue was also addressed in the 1992 Singapore Resolution on the Environment and in the 1994 Bandar Seri Begawan Resolution on Environment and Development. ASEAN, Foreword: ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution (cited).
970 ASEAN, ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution [Internet] (Jakarta, June, 1995 [cited 18 July 2007]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/8938.htm. A noteworthy limitation to the document however is seen by ‘the avoidance of any mention of the promotion of foreign conservation or protection as a means of minimising the generation of smoke’. Cotton, "The "Haze" Over Southeast Asia: Challenging the ASEAN Mode of Regional Engagement," p.343.
971 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.171. 292
regional levels) did not bear fruit.972 The manifest inability of the Indonesian government to manage the issue was further illustrated by the continuation of extensive timber concessions and the Indonesian government’s active encouragement to convert previously forested areas into oil plantations, a process that is most cheaply achieved by burning.973 Equally significant, and indelibly interdependent with the considerations above, was an apparent lack of will on the part of the Indonesian government to address the issue. As C.P.F. Luhulima, a Senior Fellow of the Centre for Security and International Studies in Jakarta, aptly summarises, ‘[t]he problem with the haze is that it is always going northwards, never southwards, so Jakarta is never under a haze problem, that is why the interest is not big here’.974
Nevertheless, during the early stages of the crisis the ASEAN members continued to uphold the ASEAN way by avoiding public criticism (to an extent where Malaysia even suppressed media reports).975 The intra‐mural diplomacy that ensued resulted in the adoption of yet another agreement entitled The Regional Haze Action Plan in December 1997. Similar to the 1995 ASEAN plan, the new agreement also sought to implement preventive measures and regional monitoring mechanisms and to enhance fire fighting capability. However, and in the absence of mechanisms to enforce implementation, the 1997 plan once again provided little by way of tangible benefits in mitigating the causes behind the haze. In the end, it was the failure of ASEAN to implement real change, together with the perceived lack of will to follow through with its commitments to ASEAN, which provided the real test to ASEAN solidarity.
972 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.273.
973 Cotton, Crossing Borders in the Asia-Pacific: Essays on the Domestic-Foreign Policy Divide, p.4.
974 Interview with C.P.F. Luhulima, Senior Fellow – Centre for Security and International Studies (Jakarta), 26 November 2001. James Cotton similarly argues that ‘Indonesia, the pivotal actor in ASEAN, when forced to choose between regime solidarity and regional concern took the former option’. Cotton, "The "Haze" Over Southeast Asia: Challenging the ASEAN Mode of Regional Engagement," p.342.
975 Cotton, Crossing Borders in the Asia-Pacific: Essays on the Domestic-Foreign Policy Divide, p.19. The Malaysian government was so alarmed by the public reaction to the haze that it also terminated ‘routine air quality announcements’. Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.273. 293
Over time, however, the ideal of ‘quiet diplomacy’ (associated with the ASEAN way) was increasingly violated. Through the Singaporean Ministry of the Environment, the Singaporean Centre for Remote Imaging, Sensing and Processing (CRISP)976 had been providing the Indonesian government with satellite imagery of the fires raging in Sumatra and Kalimantan. By 1998, and indicative of the exasperation of the Singaporean government regarding a lack of progress, the Singaporean government directed CRISP to provide irrefutable evidence of the extent and location of the forest fires to the public (and thereby added pressure on Indonesia) by openly publishing its imagery on the internet.977 The provision of such an open attempt to ‘bypass the regime’ and directly ‘influence the Indonesian public’ was a clear contravention of ASEAN’s modalities where the principle of non‐interference (discussed in Chapter V) inhibits implied and/or overt acts of such public criticism.978
Since the 1998‐99 occurrence of the haze, various incidents of ‘transboundary pollution’ continued to afflict the Southeast Asian maritime security complex on an almost annual basis including in 2000, 2002, 2004, 2005 and 2006.979 ASEAN has, correspondingly, continued to announce new agreements aiming to increase the level of state capacity along with the level of cooperation between the relevant ASEAN states in the hope that it could address, or at least mitigate, the causes behind the problem. While there was talk in 2007 regarding an endorsement by the ASEAN ministers of a ‘draft agreement on forest fire handling’,980 the most substantial agreement from the present decade was widely held to be the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze as endorsed in June 2002. Once again, the
976 Located at the National University of Singapore.
977 Cotton, "The "Haze" Over Southeast Asia: Challenging the ASEAN Mode of Regional Engagement," p.349.
978 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, p.142, Cotton, "The "Haze" Over Southeast Asia: Challenging the ASEAN Mode of Regional Engagement," p.349.
979 Malaysia Haze Triggers Emergency [Internet] (BBC News, [cited 12 August 2005]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/410660.stm, Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.273, Yong, The Worst of Singapore Haze Is over, Say NEA (cited).
980 ASEAN Ministers Endorse Draft Agreement on Forest Fire Handling in RI [Factiva Electronic Database] (LKBN Antara, 2007 [cited 19 July 2007]); available from http://global.factiva.com. 294
agreement repeated the preventive measures contained in the declarations of 1995 and 1997 and called for the establishment of an ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze Pollution Control.981 While the agreement was hailed by the UNEP as ‘a potential model for tackling transboundary issues worldwide’,982 and despite being ratified by six countries and coming into force in November 2003, through to mid 2007 the target of the agreement, Indonesia, had still not ratified the instrument into domestic law.983 As a consequence of a continued lack of will to place regional interests above national interests, by July 2007 the region’s media was once again awash with reports of a fresh occurrence of the haze.984 Further detracting from the measurable level of solidarity within ASEAN is the fact that Indonesia did not hesitate to engage in a blame‐game by alleging that the cause of the current occurrence of the haze was primarily a consequence of Malaysian business activity in Indonesia.985
Further Indicators of ASEAN’s Limitations: The Economic Crisis of 1997-1998
During the period of the 1980s and 1990s, the Southeast Asian nations experienced unprecedented levels of economic growth.986 In part, this was a successful consequence of a change in the macroeconomic policies of Southeast Asia from Import Orientation
981 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.274.
982 Cotton, Crossing Borders in the Asia-Pacific: Essays on the Domestic-Foreign Policy Divide, pp.22-23, Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.274.
983 "Malaysia Hopes Indonesia Will Ratify Haze Agreement," Bernama, 29 June 2007.
984 Baradan Kuppusamy, Southeast Asia: Slash-and-Burn Farming Fills Sky with Smoke [Factiva Electronic Database] (Inter Press Service/Global Information Network, 2007 [cited 19 July 2007]); available from http://global.factiva.com, "Rebuke Them for Inaction," New Straits Times, 13 July 2007.
985 The statement was made by the Indonesian consul-general in Penang, Moenir Air Soenanda. He argued that such Malaysian based companies were responsible for the spate of illegal logging and open burning activities. As one reporter states: ‘It’s always like this when the haze season arrives – Indonesian officials would blame foreign companies for causing the haze; Malaysian ministers would respond by saying that none of the Malaysian companies are involved and amid all the hot air, the forests continue to burn and the smoke is blown across the border to the neighbours’. "Indonesia in a Haze over Hotspots," New Straits Times, 10 July 2007.
986 Mely C. Anthony and Dennis Hew, ASEAN and ASEAN+3 in Postcrisis Asia [Internet] (NIRA Review, 2000 [cited 20 June 2002]); available from http://www.nira.go.jp/publ/review/2000autumn/hewanthony.pdf, Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.3. 295
Industrialisation (IOI) to Export Orientation Industrialisation (EOI) so as to replicate the performance of the Japanese economy during the 1960s and 1970s. Until the time of the crisis, the ‘tiger economies’ of Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore consistently achieved greater than ten percent per annum increases in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, and as Figure 5.8 in Chapter V illustrated, the economic gap between the core ASEAN countries and the periphery states (Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia) had been evident even before the onset of the crisis. Nevertheless, by 1993 the World Bank had singled out the Asian Tigers as models for long‐term economic development and published a book entitled The East Asian Economic Miracle.987 At the peak of Asian growth, some had anointed the next millennium as the ‘Pacific Century’.988 However, the combined effect of the haze and the economic crisis meant that by ‘the end of 1998, this picture of ASEAN was hardly recognizable’.989
Within Southeast Asia, the economic crisis commenced with Thailand’s devaluation of its currency (Baht) in May 1997. As a consequence of the fall in exports, as well as the borrowing of massive amounts of foreign currency to finance property development within Thailand, the size of Thailand’s current account deficit ballooned and many investors (including Wall Street) assessed the Thai currency to be overvalued.990 Immediately after the government floated the Baht, speculators moved in. While not an ASEAN initiative, the ASEAN central banks initially tried to defend the Baht (with funds provided by the Bank of Thailand) in May 1997. However, it was not long before ‘all evidence of practical solidarity disappeared’.991 The speculators then moved to the other states within Southeast Asia
987 World Bank, 1993.
988 Jones and Smith, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations: Regional Delusion, p.225, Terry Young, Re-Assessing the Health of the Asian Tigers: Reform & Recovery Offer Hope [Internet] (The Graziadio Business Report, 2002 [cited 19 August 2002]); available from http://gbr.pepperdine.edu/001/tigers.html.
989 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, p.140.
990 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.144.
991 M. Wesley, "The Asian Crisis and the Adequacy of Regional Institutions," Contemporary Southeast Asia 21, no. 1 (1999): p.55. 296
whose similar characteristics (including shared trade deficits) suggested that their currencies might also be vulnerable to speculative attacks.992 As Figure 8.5 illustrates below, the crisis spread quickly and within a few months practically all the ‘liberalised’ economies within the region (the original ASEAN members except Singapore) had been ravaged by the effects of the crisis.993
992 Gregory W. Noble and John Ravenhill, "Causes and Consequences of the Asian Financial Crisis," in The Asian Financial Crisis and the Architecture of Global Finance, ed. Gregory W. Noble and John Ravenhill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.3. Chandler et al., The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia: A New History, p.394.
993 Garry Rodan, Kevin Hewison, and Richard Robison, "Theorising Markets in Southeast Asia: Power and Contestation," in The Political Economy of Southeast Asia: Markets, Power and Contestation, ed. Garry Rodan, Kevin Hewison, and Richard Robison (New York: Oxford, 2006), p.15. 297
Figure 8.5. Level of GDP in Southeast Asia during the Economic Crisis (US$ Billions)
Statistical information supplied by NBR Analysis, located at http://www.nbr.org994
The advent of the economic crisis has been explained, through varying degrees of emphasis, by taking into account domestic, regional and global factors.995 As to which of these factors were the most important and how they, in turn, impacted on the remaining variables has been a subject of considerable debate.996 From the perspective of the International
994 Statistics on GNP for Myanmar were unavailable throughout the period referred.
995 Cotton, Crossing Borders in the Asia-Pacific: Essays on the Domestic-Foreign Policy Divide, p.43.
996 Peter Dauvergene, "The Environment in Times of Crisis: Asia and Donors after the 1997 Crisis," (Canberra: AusAid, 1999), p.15, Kanishka Jayasuriya and Andrew Rosser, "Pathways from the Crisis: Politics and Reform in Southeast Asia since 1997 " in The Political Economic of South-East Asia: Markets, Power and Contestation, ed. Garry Rodan, Kevin Hewison, and Richard Robison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp.258-259, Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, pp.139-140. 298
Monetary Fund (and the ‘Washington establishment’) the crisis was a result of structural deficiencies such as weak corporate governance, poor standards of disclosure, lack of transparency, corruption and crony capitalism.997 An alternative perspective holds that the economic fundamentals behind the affected Asian states were sound despite the various trade difficulties experienced at the time. Therefore, and within this perspective, the real causation behind the financial crisis was ‘investor panic’ which had itself been a consequence of failed banking regulation systems at both the state and international levels.998 However, and while some scholars, such as Narine, claim that the weight of the evidence ‘most strongly supports’ the latter scenario, they do concede that various structural inadequacies and institutional weaknesses outlined by the IMF played some role in the contagious effect of financial ruin in Southeast Asia.999 Moreover, it is also important to acknowledge at least the possibility suggested by Smith and Jones that a regional tendency to blame the crisis on the policies of the IMF, subsequent cultural insensitivities and exogenous actors (including the US and related ‘Jewish conspiracies’) may also have ‘… served the interests of regional governments [and] … thus enabled the largely unaccountable East Asian political class to evade blame for their own culpability in causing the meltdown’.1000
997 "Environmental Implications of the Economic Crisis and Adjustment in East Asia,” (East Asia Environment and Social Development Unity, World Bank, 1999), p.2.
998 Within this perspective, and as Narine states, ‘East Asia opened itself up to the free flow of international capital while lacking the proper instruments needed to regulate and control that capital. The Asian countries adopted the wrong domestic policies, but their greatest mistake was in allowing excessive financial liberalisation, something they were encouraged to do by many of the same Western states and Western-based financial institutions that pinned responsibility for the economic collapse solidly on Asian business practices’. Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.140.
999 Other scholars, however, specifically blame the institutional and structural weaknesses within the Asian states themselves as being the cause of the crisis. As Weatherbee states: ‘Through the advent of the economic crisis ‘the structural inadequacies and institutional weaknesses that had been concealed by high growth rates were starkly revealed’. Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.96. Jones and Smith further argue that the advent of the economic crisis finally exposed the ‘myth of the strength of the Asian developmental state’. Jones and Smith, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations: Regional Delusion, p.113.
1000 Jones and Smith add that ‘[l]ikewise, western scholars and Asian scholar-bureaucrats also had a vested interest in reinforcing this developing climate of blame in order to conceal their own analytic failure to foresee the crisis’. Jones and Smith, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations: Regional Delusion, p.147. 299
Regardless of the cause of the crisis, one certainty is the fact that the economic crisis resulted in immediate (and devastating) political and economic consequences to which ASEAN was not designed to respond and, thereby, was incapable of providing any meaningful assistance to facilitate the recovery of its member economies.1001 Thus, within twelve months, the level of currency depreciation for those countries affected by the crisis had ranged from 39 percent (e.g. the Malaysian ringgit) to as high as 84 percent (e.g. the Indonesian rupiah).1002 Furthermore, at the peak of the crisis, the World Bank estimated that Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand had lost $115 billion in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) while others have outlined how the equivalent of eighteen percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) vanished from Southeast Asia (and Korea) within a period of seven months.1003 Further, Indonesia’s per capita GDP (with PPP) in 2005 (US$3,200) still remained lower than before the impact of the economic crisis in 1997 (GDP with PPP US$4,600).1004 The economic crisis also bankrupted reserves and led to a weakening of the financial and property markets, declines in consumption and manufacturing, high inflation, high unemployment, mass labour migration and political unrest.1005
The political unrest that occurred in the wake of the crisis soon led to regime contestation within Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. In the case of Thailand, Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh was forced to resign for failing to adequately respond to the downward spiral of his country’s economy and a perceived inability to properly negotiate with the IMF. Meanwhile, and within Malaysia, the policy prescriptions of the Deputy Prime Minister,
1001 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.26. Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.166, Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.96.
1002 Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way, p.204.
1003 Jones and Smith, "Making Process, Not Progress," p.160.
1004 The same can also be said for Thailand where in 1997 the GDP (PPP) was US$8,800 but by 2005, it remained at just $8,300. See Figure 5.5 in Chapter V.
1005 Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way, p.204, Ganesan, "ASEAN: A Community Stalled?" p.122, Jones and Smith, "Making Process, Not Progress," p.160. 300
Anwar Ibrahim, became increasingly incompatible with those of Prime Minister Mahathir and the strain of the economic crisis resulted in a full scale political crisis. Thus, Anwar’s calls for an end to ‘crony capitalism’ were received as a direct attack on the Prime Minister’s powerbase and Mahathir responded by sacking Anwar from Cabinet amid charges of ‘abuse of office, corruption and sexual misconduct’.1006 Nevertheless, and in terms of regime contestation, the most spectacular consequence of the economic crisis was what took place in Indonesia.1007 The legitimacy of the thirty year rule of President Suharto’s New Order regime had been grounded in continued economic success and growth, otherwise coined as ‘performance legitimacy’.1008 Aside from the earlier mentioned decline to the value of the Rupiah, some estimated that the average standard of living had been reversed by as much as three decades and that the rate of real unemployment had reached as high as twenty to thirty percent.1009
The economic severity of the crisis soon led to anti‐Chinese rioting, exacerbated by the scape‐goating of some political elites,1010 and culminated in massive student protests against the regime which, inter alia, eventually forced Suharto’s resignation as president in May 1998.1011 A year later, Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah wrote that the fall of the
1006 Rodan, Hewison, and Robison, "Theorising Markets in Southeast Asia: Power and Contestation," p.16. In relation to the charges see: Chandler et al., The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia: A New History, p.421.
1007 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, p.1.
1008 Amitav Acharya, "Transnational Production and Security: Southeast Asia's 'Growth Triangles'," Contemporary Southeast Asia 17, no. 12 (1995): p.260.
1009 Smith, Strategic Centrality: Indonesia's Changing Role in ASEAN, p.30.
1010 Such violence included the looting of Chinatown in Jakarta. The scape-goating that occurred at the time was in fact merely a single episode of a long history of such measures for diverting anger away from the political regime in power. In the present instance, it was a consequence of remarks by Indonesian Generals (from the Suharto New Order regime) blaming local Chinese for the flight of capital to destinations such as Singapore. Indonesia Alert: Economic Crisis Leads to Scape-goating of Ethnic Chinese [Internet] (Human Rights Watch, 1999 [cited 30 July 2002]); available from http://www.hrw.org/press98/feb/indo-a11.htm. Interestingly, and since independence in 1949, there have been more anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia than in any other country in Southeast Asia. Nicholas Tarling, Nations and States in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.128.
1011 Suresh Unny et al., "The Next Battle," Far Easter Economic Review, 20 November 1998, p.18. For an historical background on the event in the context of democratic reform see: John T. Dori, "Promoting Democracy and Economic Reform in Indonesia,” (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1999). 301
New Order regime would, in retrospect, also be interpreted as the end of the Indonesian armed forces sense of ‘invulnerability’.1012 However, the fall of the regime was more than just that. Within Indonesia, the event soon led to a political commitment to reformasi (the reform era) and a marked turning point towards the implementation of a very real sense of democracy within the country.1013 As will be discussed in the next chapter, Indonesia’s newfound democratic system of governance has resulted in a very different approach to foreign relations including a fresh interpretation of the future of regional integration and the ASEAN way.
While Indonesia was, and continues to be, the most severely affected by the economic crisis, the crisis worsened relations between the ASEAN member states and also impacted on the continued salience of the ASEAN way.1014 Indeed, the two issues are interdependent. For example, the arrest of Anwar Ibrahim soon resulted in ‘public criticism’ by Thai officials along with the leaders of the Philippines (Estrada) and Indonesia (Habibie).1015 The extent of the contravention by the leaders of the Philippines and Indonesia is aptly summarised by Collins:
Estrada made a series of public comments about Malaysia’s political and judicial procedures, and he raised the prospect of boycotting the APEC summit that was held in Kuala Lumpur. Habibie also refused to rule out boycotting the summit and only agreed to attend after Anwar was released from detention.
1012 Major General Agus was the Assistant for General Planning to the Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian National Military (TNI) and the son of former Vice-President Umar Wirahadikusumah. Douglas Kammen, Akhir "Kedigdayaan" Abri? [Conference] (University of Canterbury, 1999 [cited 7 April 2002]); available from http://www.infid.or.id/oldconf/1999/Douglas.htm.
1013 The extent of Indonesia’s embrace of democracy brought one scholar to assert by 2007 that the ‘only bright spot for democracy in the region was Indonesia where the post-Suharto democratization process continued to move forward in the third year of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s government’. Donald E. Weatherbee, "Southeast Asia in 2006: Déjà Vu All over Again," in Southeast Asian Affairs 2007, ed. Daljit Singh and Lorraine C. Salazar (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), p.6.
1014 However, as discussed in previous sections and in Chapter VI, the economic crisis is just one of a number of contemporary events challenging the salience of the ASEAN way and, in particular, the principle of non- interference.
1015 Etel Solingen, "ASEAN Cooperation: The Legacy of the Economic Crisis," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 5, no. 1 (2005): p.15. 302
Both presidents met Anwar’s daughter Nurual Izzah, who led protests against Mahathir, and stated their support for Anwar, with Estrada exhorting her to tell her father “not to waver, because he is fighting for a cause, the cause of the Malaysian people”. Such actions were clearly at odds with the principle of non‐ interference. Not only were ASEAN members criticising another member over its handling of an internal problem, but they were also giving tacit support to the opposition’.1016
While a ‘greatly angered Mahathir’ initially protested against ‘unwarranted interference[s] in Malaysia’s internal affairs’, the Malaysian government soon resorted to several more aggressive measures.1017 In the case of Indonesia, Malaysia questioned the legitimacy of the President Habibie’s leadership while, in the case of the Philippines, security exercises were cancelled and there were even suggestions of possible support for insurgency movements in Mindanao.1018 Malaysia further raised the possibility of blocking work permits for Indonesians and Filipinos and warned the Thai Foreign Ministry that any critical comments within the Thai press could also negatively affect intergovernmental relations with Malaysia.1019 At the time, Surin Pitsuwan, Thailand’s Foreign Minister, responded by stating that the Malaysian government should not regard countries making ‘constructive remarks’ on the nation’s political situation as ‘enemies’ as such ‘criticism and comments [are] … being made out of our friendship [and] … will help the Southeast Asian region as a whole’.1020
The economic crisis had also contributed to a decline in other aspects of regional relations leaving the impression that the ‘only shared regional value’ was recourse to a Darwinian notion of survival of the fittest.1021 For example, various exchanges of insults between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia in the wake of the crisis carried racist undertones while
1016 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, p.145.
1017 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, p.145.
1018 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.169.
1019 Solingen, "ASEAN Cooperation: The Legacy of the Economic Crisis," p.15.
1020 "Be Calm over 'Remarks', Surin Urges Malaysian Government," The Nation, 19 October 1998.
1021 Jones and Smith, "Making Process, Not Progress," p.161. 303
Malaysia and Singapore also returned to jousting over their longstanding territorial disputes along with other issues related to the economic crisis. Furthermore, Malaysia forced the closure of a facility in Singapore trading shares with Malaysia (the Central Limit Order Book) and the massive losses that ensued from panic selling primarily affected Singaporeans (who owned 90 percent of the shares).1022 Singapore, for its part, withheld US$5 billion in loans to Indonesia allegedly in protest against Habibie’s leadership. Meanwhile, tensions over the Spratly islands remerged between Malaysia and the Philippines (Malaysia having built further structures on its reefs) and Thailand’s relations with Myanmar also worsened over ‘border disputes, refugees and the drug trade’.1023
The economic crisis also impacted on other aspects of the region’s comprehensive security. As illustrated by Figure 7.3 for example, most of the ASEAN states were forced to cut their security and defence budgets, suspend arms procurement programs, and reduce allocation for defence research and development.1024 The constrained budgets of the Asian states also affected the amount of money available to combat transnational crime including ‘drug interdiction, opium poppy replacement crops, and cooperative regional responses.1025 Also,
1022 Ahmad and Ghosal acknowledge that while ‘[r]elations between Malaysia and Singapore have always blown hot and cold … the economic crisis undoubtedly exacerbated the tensions within that relationship … and has introduced an element of uncertainty as to whether they can be resolved amicably. Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Baladas Ghoshal, "The Political Future of ASEAN after the Asian Crisis," International Affairs 75, no. 4 (1999): p.763. Other issues to generate tension between Singapore and Malaysia in the wake of the crisis included a move by Singapore to have its Customs, Immigration and Quarantine (CIQ) complex for Malayan Railways moved to Woodlands as well as the prohibition against Singaporean military aircraft entering Malaysian airspace, the supply of water to Singapore, and the criticism of Mahathir along with criticism of the efficiency and operation of the Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA) in Sepang. Ibid.
1023 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, pp.169-170.
1024 Christopher. B Johnstone, Asia-Pacific Security in a Time of Economic Recovery [Conference] (Report from the Biennial Conference of the Asia-Pacific Center: Asia-Pacific Centre, 1999 [cited 30 September 2001]); available from http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Report_Biennial_99.html.
1025 Alan Dupont, "Transnational Crime, Drugs, and Security in East Asia," Asian Survey 39, no. 3 (1999): p.449. 304
as Emmers and Sebastian state, the social impact of the economic crisis likely enlarged the ‘possible pool of recruits to crime’.1026
Figure 7.3: Defence Expenditure by Country (1996-2001)
6000
5000
Philippines 4000 Singapore Thailand 3000 Vietnam
US$ (Millions) US$ Indonesia 2000 Malaysia
1000
0 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Statistical information supplied by NBR Analysis, located at http://www.nbr.org
As mentioned in Chapter V, the timing of the crisis could not have been worse as far as membership expansion was concerned. During this critical juncture, and in the course of dealing simultaneously with domestic agendas, the core ASEAN states became considerably more introverted and this detracted from the implementation of policies that would enhance the morphological compatibility of the CLMV countries in the political, economic and normative realms.1027 Meanwhile, even the original ASEAN members responded differently where Singapore, for example, accelerated the pace of trade liberalisation and economic reform1028 while Malaysia acted against the advice of the IMF by imposing
1026 Emmers and Sebastian, "Terrorism and Transnational Crime in Southeast Asian International Relations," p.172.
1027 Ganesan, "ASEAN: A Community Stalled?" p.122.
1028 ‘In December 1998 the ASEAN summit adopted the Hanoi Plan of Action and the Statement on Bold Measures. These documents prescribe an acceleration of tariff cuts in the ASEAN Free Trade Area and a special 305
currency control mechanisms.1029 In the case of the CLVM countries, they initially interpreted the economic crisis as a warning and therefore a justification for tightening political controls and restraining the pace of trade liberalisation.1030 Consequently, as one Ministry of Defence official explained in interview, ‘the new ASEAN countries, particularly Laos and Cambodia and perhaps Myanmar, [have been] a little bit like rabbits caught in the headlights of globalisation’.1031 While the economic crisis generated substantial structural pressures for liberal market reform with the CLVM countries, some scholars continue to argue that the extent of pressure fell short of ensuring such reforms would be inevitable.1032
In regard to the planned development of a regional identity, a crucial observation regarding the behaviour of the ASEAN states in the wake of the crisis was the degree to which the economic policies of some ASEAN states followed a narrow pursuit of national interests at the expense of the collective interests of ASEAN.1033 In the case of Singapore, for example, the economic crisis and the extent of regional disunity that ensued exacerbated a perception that ASEAN would be incapable of multilaterally representing Singapore’s needs in regard to trade and investment liberalisation. Consequently, and rather than seek to strengthen ASEAN, Singapore took the lead in pursuing discriminatory bilateral trade agreements with some twenty‐two having been completed or under negotiation by
measure for promoting the liberalization of Investment. Among other things, the Hanoi Plan of Action explicitly states the necessity of reviewing ASEAN’s organizational structure’: ASEAN Foreign Ministers Continue Meeting in Hanoi [Internet News] (Radio Australia News, 2001 [cited 25 July 2001]); available from http://www.abc.net.au/ra/newsdaily/s334936.htm, Kondo, East Asian Strategic Review.
1029 While the controversial policy may have ‘salvaged the authority of then Prime Minister Mahathir ... the unpredictable policy environment severely dented Malaysia’s credibility among foreign investors’. Jones and Smith, "Making Process, Not Progress," p.160.
1030 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.166.
1031 Interview with Ministry of Defence (Singapore), 27 July 2006. Furthermore, and in relation to Myanmar, a former ambassador in the country explained that the country’s leadership always seemed to learn the wrong lessons from major events in Southeast Asia and this was especially the case in relation to the economic crisis. Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 September 2005.
1032 Jayasuriya and Rosser, "Pathways from the Crisis: Politics and Reform in Southeast Asia since 1997 ", p.259.
1033 Jones and Smith, "Making Process, Not Progress," p.161. 306
2006.1034 The limitations to solidarity on the economic front were reinforced when Thailand, and then Malaysia (but to a more limited extent), soon followed Singapore’s example.1035 As Christopher Dent summarises, the manner and form by which these ASEAN states have pursued bilateral trade arrangements has been ‘more likely to bring division rather than inclusion to regional community building endeavours in Southeast Asia over the long run’.1036 Further, the overlapping ‘noodle bowl’ of bilateral FTAs will likely disadvantage the poorer members by facilitating ‘trade diversion’ along with a reduction to the efficiency of trade through raised administrative costs and the absorption of additional resources.1037 A snapshot of the mentality of some regimes in the region was provided by Thai Prime Minister Thaksin in respect to his negotiations for a Thai‐US FTA. In a 2006 address to local and foreign business leaders the Prime Minister argued that ‘… we will be at a huge disadvantage to others if we lose our access to the US market, as other countries will pursue their own deals. We need to move now, before we have no more room to move’.1038
1034 Weatherbee, "Southeast Asia in 2006: Déjà Vu All over Again," p.22. Further, by 2007 over 183 FTAs had been negotiated, or were in the process of negotiation, with the countries from the broader East Asia region. Praduma B. Rana, "East Asian Regionalism," in Regional Outlook: Southeast Asia 2007-08, ed. Asad-ul Iqbal Latif and Poh Onn Lee (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), p.73.
1035 John Ravenhill, "The New Bilateralism in the Asia Pacific," Third Word Quarterly 24, no. 2 (2003): p.300. See also: Mari Pangestu, "Southeast Asian Regional and International Economic Cooperation," in International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Regional Autonomy, ed. Donald E. Weatherbee (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), p.208.
1036 Christopher M Dent, "The New Economic Bilateralism in Southeast Asia: Region-Convergent or Region- Divergent," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 6, no. 1 (2006): p.110. A respected trade economist from Malaysia, Mohammed Ariff, similarly suggests that by undermining the ‘spirit of solidarity’ in ASEAN the FTA will negatively influence ASEAN’s goal to establish an economic community. Separate FTAs Undermine ASEAN Spirit of Unity: Scholar [Internet News] (People's Daily Online, 2007 [cited 27 July 2006]); available from http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200607/12/print20060712_282121.html.
1037 Rana, "East Asian Regionalism," p.73, Weatherbee, "Southeast Asia in 2006: Déjà Vu All over Again," p.25. In addition to regional scholars, criticism of the proliferation of bilateral FTAs by the Southeast Asian countries has also come from the Secretary General of the World Trade Organisation, Michael Moore, and from APEC’s Executive Director Tran Trong Tan. Jaya Prakesh, Trade Agreements Key Strategy for Singapore [Internet News] (AsiaTimes, 2006 [cited 17 February 2006]); available from www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HB14Ae01.html, Rana, "East Asian Regionalism.", Hans van Leeuwen, APEC Takes Steps to Untangle Asia's Free-Trade 'Spaghetti Bowl' [Internet News] (Bloomberg.com, 2007 [cited 15 November 2006]); available from http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601082&sid=asuFQ25gf0k8&refer=canada#.
1038 Tony Allison, Thailand, US Inch Ahead on Trade Accord [Internet News] (Asia Times, 2006 [cited 22 November 2006]); available from www.atimes.com. 307
Conclusions
The issues overviewed in this chapter raise some serious caveats against the possibility of ASEAN becoming a security community in the foreseeable future. The disunity and rivalry that emerged in the wake of the economic crisis, along with divisions over the haze, further detracted from ASEAN’s credibility and the level of a collective identity extant at the elite level. At this critical juncture, the admission of Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia as members of ASEAN simultaneously increased the material and normative divides between the impoverished and wealthy member‐states. The haze also provided an example of how cooperation between the ASEAN states regarding transnational issues and problems is primarily limited to combating problems that ‘equally’ affect the states involved. In this instance – and given that the haze in Indonesia always travels north to Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand (and not south to Jakarta) – Jakarta’s response was primarily limited to rhetorical declarations of intent.
Alan Collins argues that the economic crisis and regional haze most significantly revealed that the modus vivendi between the ASEAN leaders was limited to ‘a loose arrangement of states that have agreed not to make the difficult task of nation building harder by criticizing one another’.1039 However, the reality is that not even Collins’ hypothesis has been feasible when the national and security interests of the ASEAN member states have been significantly challenged. Public criticisms regarding human rights (e.g. the issue of the arrest of Anwar Ibrahim), Indonesia’s failure to respond to the haze, actions by Malaysia and Thailand over the Southern Thailand insurgency, and the 2005 Sulawesi Sea incident represent but a few examples where the ASEAN way (and the ideal of quiet diplomacy) has been contravened. Regional disagreements, particularly in regard to resources and territorial disputes (e.g. in the South China Sea and the Sulawesi Sea), have also indicated that the non‐use of force principle is primarily limited to situations where the parties concerned agree to maintain the status quo regarding their competing claims. Thus, the example of the Sulawesi Sea incident indicated how the Southeast Asian states are willing to
1039 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, p.151. 308
threaten the use of force (with the risk of subsequent escalation) where one party to a dispute acts in the absence of consent by the other. Under such conditions a security community cannot be said to exist.
While it is not possible for this chapter, or indeed the dissertation, to cover the complete spectrum of ASEAN’s declarations and agreements, it is apparent that the majority of declarations covered by the analysis thus far have been high in ambition but low in implementation. As long as the ASEAN countries continue to abide by the principles of non‐ interference and consensus based decision making, then implementation will remain a problem and the organisation may risk maintaining little more than a ‘declaratory’ reputation. Given these considerations, along with the inability of the ASEAN states to unilaterally protect themselves from the uncertainties of a relatively more globalised world, a growing proportion of the region’s political elite have viewed it necessary to empower ASEAN with an increased capacity to respond to future comprehensive security challenges. However, the development of such a capacity will not only require greater material capabilities (e.g. through the level of funding for the Secretariat) but, more problematically, a degree of institutional reform and even normative change. As will be seen in the next chapter, given the authoritarian dispositions of some of the ASEAN members, the implementation of such change remains highly problematic.
179
next chapter will continue from where this chapter ended by reviewing the historical performance of ASEAN from its inception through to the immediate post‐Cold War period.
309
Chapter VIII
Contemporary Evaluations: Institutional Developments, State Behaviour, and Regional Perceptions
We envision the entire Southeast Asia to be, by 2020, an ASEAN community conscious of its ties of history, aware of its cultural heritage, and bound by a common regional identity.
(ASEAN Vision 2020)1040
Some academics have seized on the various security and ideational challenges presented in the preceding chapters as presenting prima facie evidence against the possibility of a security community. Certainly, the lack of interest harmonisation and policy coordination that has often characterised the behaviour of the ASEAN member‐states is indicative of a low level of comprehensive integration where the type of competitive behaviour predicted by the realist paradigm (discussed in Chapter II) is likely to be more prominent. Notwithstanding these considerations, the first section of this chapter will outline the cumulative effect of recent challenges (such as the economic crisis) on the level of motivation for economic integration, cooperation and institutional change. While a desire to reform the modus operandi of ASEAN was initially constrained to the economic realm, the second section outlines some of the factors that have led to a more comprehensive approach to regional integration including the 2003 proposal to create a security community.
Having outlined the crux of the ASEAN member’s goals and intent, and having discussed several caveats over the extent to which the second Bali Concord represents a commitment to real change in ASEAN, the third section seeks to provide a rudimentary assessment of some of the key indicators of security community formation according to the ‘we‐feeling’
1040 ASEAN Vision 2020 (cited). 310
approach. Here, the section most significantly focuses on a combination of the survey data and interview material collated for the purpose of the dissertation. The fourth and final section of the chapter continues to analyse the survey data for the purpose of measuring the extent of interaction, knowledge and affinity between the societies of Southeast Asia. While recent ‘statements of intent’, as enunciated through ASEAN, may indicate a desire for ASEAN (and the Secretariat) to have a more significant role in shaping and maintaining the region’s economic and security architecture, the research conducted indicates an emerging divide between the progressive and conservative members of ASEAN regarding the extent and appropriateness of such reform. As will be demonstrated, the internal consolidation of the Southeast Asian states will be a prerequisite to continued progress regarding cooperation and integration between the ASEAN states. Until such a ‘compatibility of morphologies’ emerges, these institutional and ideational divides are likely to continue.
The First Frontier of Reform: The Pursuit of Greater Economic Cooperation and Integration
Notwithstanding the various limitations of ASEAN outlined in previous chapters, over time the impact of the economic crisis did appear to ‘galvanise regional thinking’1041 to the extent that there emerged a ‘distinctively intergovernmental structure’ involving a complex array of meetings and summits for the purpose of formulating collective policies in response to regional problems.1042 In order to facilitate these developments and to assist in the formulation of policy (particularly on the economic front) the Secretariat needed to be strengthened. Some of the measures included the addition of a second Deputy Secretary‐ General (DSG), a staff increase from sixty‐four to ninety‐nine, and an enlarged mandate for the Secretary General. However, to date the ASEAN leaders have refrained from providing
1041 Richard Stubbs, "ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism," Asian Survey 32, no. 3 (2002): p.450. In the context of such contentions Singapore’s ambassador-at-large, Tommy Koh, also advocated that the crisis ‘stimulated a new sense of East Asian regionalism’. Cited in Dirk Nabers, "The Social Construction of International Institutions: The Case of ASEAN + 3," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 3, no. 1 (2003): p.122.
1042 Jones and Smith, "Making Process, Not Progress," p.156. 311
the Secretariat with any form of supranational capacity.1043 Furthermore, scholars such as Narine claim that the Secretariat remains underfunded, understaffed, and incapable of handling its increased responsibilities.1044
Aside from attempts to strengthen the Secretariat, one of the first developments to take place within ASEAN in the wake of the Economic Crisis was the enunciation of the ASEAN Vision 2020. This declaration was set out by the heads of government at the Kuala Lumpur Second Informal ASEAN Summit in December 1997. In line with the economic and social emphasis provided by the ‘Singapore Summit’, the Vision 2020 pledged ‘to forge closer economic integration’ and establish an ASEAN community ‘bound by a common regional identity’ via a ‘concert of Southeast Asian nations’.1045 Despite being overshadowed by the continued effects of the economic crisis (and the soured relations that ensued),1046 a year later the initiative led to the adoption of the Hanoi Plan of Action and the Statement on Bold Measures at the sixth ASEAN Summit (the Hanoi Summit) in December 1998.
The declared purpose of the Hanoi Summit was to commit members to a ‘higher plane of regional cooperation in order to strengthen ASEAN’s effectiveness in dealing with the challenges of growing interdependence within ASEAN and its integration into the global economy’.1047 Thus, the Hanoi Plan of Action (HPA) that was adopted at the Summit was the first in a series of plans attempting to realise these goals together with the goals of the
1043 Ibid, p.159.
1044 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.162.
1045 ASEAN Vision 2020 (cited). The Vision 2020 originated from Mahathir’s Wawasan 2020 in 1991, which aimed to achieve development through the resolution of economic and social problems. Malaysia’s intention was immediately demonstrated at a conference on ‘ASEAN Towards 2020’. Sueo Sudo, "Forging an ASEAN Community: Its Significance, Problems and Prospects," in GSID Discussion Paper No.146 (Nagoya: Nagoya University, 2006), p.5.
1046 The ASEAN Vision 2020, moreover, coincided with the crisis rather than being a consequence of it.
1047 Ha Noi Declaration of 1998 [Internet] (ASEAN, 1998 [cited 18 February 2006]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/686.htm. 312
ASEAN Vision 2020.1048 The associated Statement on Bold Measures aimed to increase the liberalisation of trade in services, accelerate the implementation of AFTA for the ASEAN‐6 from 2003 to 20021049 and also sought, via the implementation of a framework agreement on an ASEAN Investment Area (AIA), to develop special incentives and privileges for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).1050 The need to address the issue of FDI reflected a growing concern regarding the flow of FDI to China at the expense of the region.1051 The Hanoi Summit was also significant for agreement to formalise meetings under the ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, South Korea and China) arrangement.1052
The first APT heads of government ‘informal summit’ had, however, occurred earlier in 1997 following various meetings between government representatives of the ASEAN member states and its three Northeast Asian counterparts (China, Japan and the Republic of Korea) between 1996 and 1997 to deal with issues stemming from the Asia‐Europe Meeting (ASEM). Today, the APT Summits take place on an annual basis. The drive for greater East Asian integration led to the exposition of a number of ideas that could facilitate greater economic resilience and stability including Japan’s proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). The AMF proposal had originated in Japan during the early stages of the economic crisis but quickly found support within some of the ASEAN elite, such as the former Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alitas, who argued that the idea should be ‘vigorously
1048 Namely, to create an ASEAN that is outward looking; living in peace, stability, and prosperity; bonded together in partnership in dynamic development; and consisting of a community of caring societies.
1049 Speech by Minister George Yeo, at the AFTA Seminar, 31 January 2002, 1.45 Pm [Email] (Mita News, 2002 [cited 31 January 2002]).
1050 ASEAN, Hanoi Plan of Action [Internet] (1998 [cited 21 March 2004]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/8754.htm.
1051 ASEAN Tackles Terrorism and Trade (cited), Southeast Asia Said to Be Facing Serious Crisis [Internet News] (ABC, 2001 [cited 6 November 2001]); available from http://www.abc.net.au/ra/newsdaily/s409252.htm.
1052 Jones and Smith, "Making Process, Not Progress," p.163. 313
pursued’ within the ASEAN Plus Three Framework.1053 The AMF proposal, however, was eventually shelved due to resistance from the IMF, the US, China and South Korea.1054
A second development within the APT process concerned the South Korean idea of an ‘East Asian Community’ mooted at the November 1998 APT Summit and reiterated by Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in January 2002.1055 While the idea of an East Asia Community, through the APT format, raises memories of EAEG proposal by Mahathir (Chapter V), in this instance ASEAN advanced the concept through the establishment of an East Asian Vision group and its report ‘Towards an East Asian Community’. The ‘Final Report of the East Asia Study Group’ in 2002 led to a number of recommendations including the formation of an East Asia Summit and an East Asia FTA.1056 While the East Asia summit has since been established,1057 a formal Japanese proposal at the August 2006 Economic Ministers Meeting to start negotiation in 2008 for a sixteen nation FTA (including Australia, India and New Zealand) was unenthusiastically received by the ASEAN leaders.1058
Meanwhile, and in place of the failed proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund, the APT Finance Ministers adopted the Chiang Mai initiative which incorporated an expansion of both the ASEAN Swap arrangement and ASEAN surveillance process so that they now included Japan,
1053 Ali Alitas, 'ASEAN Plus Three' Equals Peace Plus Prosperity (Singapore: ISEAS, 2001), p.3.
1054 Both the IMF and the US wanted to protect their status and dominance within the international political economy while China and South Korea were primarily concerned about the regional ambitions of Japan. Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, pp.176-177, Stubbs, "ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism," pp.448-449.
1055 Pangestu, "Southeast Asian Regional and International Economic Cooperation," p.214. In the case of Prime Minister Koizumi, he advocated that east Asia should be a ‘community’ that ‘acts together and advances together’ and, in borrowing from a phrase coined by Michael Leifer, contended ‘that East Asia as a whole can be greater than the sum of its parts’. Jones and Smith, "Making Process, Not Progress," p.153.
1056 Pangestu, "Southeast Asian Regional and International Economic Cooperation," p.214.
1057 The first East Asia Summit was held in December 2005 and the second in January 2007. The East Asia Summit, Cebu, 2007: Issues and Prospects [Internet] (Parliamentary Library (Parliament of Australia), 2006 [cited 21 July 2007]); available from http://www.aph.gov.au/library/intguide/fad/eastasia_summit2007.htm. See also: Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the Former Secretary- General, pp.269-274.
1058 Weatherbee, "Southeast Asia in 2006: Déjà Vu All over Again." 314
China and South Korea.1059 In the case of the ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA), it has operated in a limited capacity between the original five ASEAN members since 1977.1060. The arrangement seeks to protect against ‘currency speculators’ (one of the ‘causes’ of the economic crisis) by providing assistance with short‐term liquidity problems through loans and/or credits from the currency reserves of the ASEAN central banks. Upon its creation, there was a total facility of US$100 million but because of the Chiang Mai Initiative, this was expanded to US$1 billion.1061 By early 2007, the Chiang Mai initiative had also led to the establishment of sixteen bilateral swap arrangements (BSAs) between ASEAN and the plus three countries to the value of US$75 billion.1062 However, to date ASEAN has been unable to gain consensus on incorporating the more substantial bilateral arrangements under the multilateral ASEAN Surveillance Process. Other developments to stem from the Chiang Mai initiative included more regular meetings of the ASEAN finance ministers,1063 an exchange of information on short‐term capital movements within East Asia as well as dialogue on the type of reforms needed between the APT member states.1064
The ASEAN Surveillance Process has been described as a collective early warning and monitoring system (based on the G7 model) that seeks to facilitate greater transparency as well as the supervision of macroeconomic policies and financial regulation. The ASP framework provides for a ministerial level exchange of views relating to issues of economic development.1065 While the ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP) was enlarged at the Chiang
1059 However, and according to Mari Pangestu, efforts are underway to multilateralise the arrangements. Pangestu, "Southeast Asian Regional and International Economic Cooperation," p.214.
1060 ASEAN, Memorandum of Understanding on the ASEAN Swap Arrangements [Internet] (Kuala Lumpur, 5 August, 1977 [cited 31 August 2007]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/1388.htm.
1061 Dennis Hew, "Economic Integration in East Asia: An ASEAN Perspective," in UNISCI Discussion Papers (UNISCI, 2006), p.55.
1062 Rana, "East Asian Regionalism," pp.73-74.
1063 Pangestu, "Southeast Asian Regional and International Economic Cooperation," p.195.
1064 Stubbs, "ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism," pp.449-450.
1065 Recent Developments in ASEAN Economic Integration [Internet] (ASEAN, 1999 [cited 8 August 2002]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/print.asp/file=/general/publication/as_ei.htm. 315
Mai meeting, the idea had originated from the Manila Framework Agreement developed by the US (as a counter proposal to the Asian Monetary Fund) and presented at the November 1997 Finance and Central Bank Deputies’ Meeting in Manila.1066 In line with US policy preferences, the mechanism was designed to ‘complement’ the global surveillance system of the IMF and the proposal was subsequently endorsed at the 1997 APEC meeting in Vancouver.1067 Interestingly, the exact role of the IMF was never clarified.1068 Nevertheless, in February 1998 the ASEAN finance ministers agreed to pursue the establishment of the mechanism under the joint coordination of the Asian Development Bank and ASEAN Secretariat.1069 The final framework for the ASP was agreed by the ASEAN finance ministers at a special meeting in Washington on 4 October 1998.1070
The implementation of the ASP was not without problems. The formation of the mechanism was initially delayed due to doubts by Singapore (inter alia) regarding the capacity of the Secretariat to manage it while Indonesia and Malaysia expressed concerns over the extent of information they would have to provide.1071 As the system of monitoring takes place on
1066 ASEAN, Joint Ministerial Statement of the Special ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting [Internet] (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 1 December, 1997 [cited 7 August 2007]); available from www.aseansec.org/6333.htm, Barry Eichengreen and J. Bradford DeLong, Between Meltdown and Moral Hazard: The International Monetary and Financial Policies of the Clinton Administration (Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley and NBER, 2001), p.42.
1067 According to Serge Berthier, this development provided the final deathblow to Japan’s proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund. Serge Berthier, The Only Way for ASEAN: Interview with Rodolfo Severino [Internet] (ASEAN, [cited 22 June 2007]); available from www.aseansec.org/3346.
1068 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.162.
1069 ASEAN, Joint Press Statement of the 2nd ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting [Internet] (Jakarta, Indonesia, 28 February 1998, [cited 2 August 2007]); available from www.aseansec.org/6335.htm.
1070 The framework agreement provides for the strengthening of cooperation via the following four objectives: (1) exchanging information and discussing economic and financial development of Member States in the region; (2) providing an early warning and a peer review process to enhance macroeconomic stability and the financial system in the region; (3) highlighting possible policy options and encouraging early unilateral or collective actions to prevent a crisis; and (4) monitoring and discussing global economic and financial developments which could have implications on the region and propose possible regional and national level actions. Terms of Understanding on the Establishment of the ASEAN Surveillance Process [Internet] (ASEAN, [cited 22 March 2007]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/739.htm.
1071 Solingen, "ASEAN Cooperation: The Legacy of the Economic Crisis," p.13. 316
the basis of ‘peer review’, the success of the mechanism is dependent on both honest exchanges and accurate assessments. As no consensus has emerged over the cause of the 1997 economic crisis its capacity to deliver insightful predictions preventing future crises is questionable. Inadequate levels of capacity in some ASEAN states combined with a lack of access to the types of information necessary for effective monitoring are also problems that continue to plague the process.1072
Nonetheless, and for the purpose of both ASEAN’s goals and the investigative tasks of the study, Schwartz and Villinger claim that ‘intraregional trade as a percentage of the region’s total trade is perhaps the best measure of ASEAN’s economic integration’.1073 The most prominent initiative designed to produce such trade patterns has been the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA). As mentioned above, the deadline for the ASEAN‐6 to implement the AFTA was brought forward to 2002. By early 2007, the core ASEAN countries had achieved the tariff target of zero to five percent for 98.5 percent of the goods covered by the agreement.1074 Further, the ASEAN‐6 states had agreed to eliminate tariffs completely by 2010 and the CLVM countries were scheduled to join in a tariff free zone among all the ASEAN members by 2015.1075 While these figures and developments provide some support to Narine’s claim that AFTA is gradually ‘becoming a more institutionalised and effective regime’,1076 there remain some significant problems regarding implementation. For example, the extent of products covered by the preferential tariff rates still falls short of previous agreements. Meanwhile, a number of the ASEAN members (Malaysia and Thailand in particular), have sought to add an extensive number of products to the AFTA exceptions
1072 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.163.
1073 Adam Schwarz and Roland Villinger, "Integrating Southeast Asia's Economies," The McKinsey Quarterly, no.1 (2004): p.40.
1074 "ASEAN: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)," Thai News Service, 16 April 2007.
1075 Vandoren, "Regional Economic Integration in Southeast Asia," Asia Europe Journal 3, no. 4 (2005): p.522.
1076 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.165. 317
list. Aside from Petrochemicals in the Philippines another major problem remains a twenty percent tariff on automotive exports to Thailand.1077
Most significantly, the actual impact of AFTA on the patterns of intra‐regional trade has remained marginal at best. Since AFTAs inception (1993) through to 2005, the share of intra‐ ASEAN exports as a percentage of total ASEAN exports had increased by only 3.6 percent.1078 Further, and to the extent that intra‐ASEAN trade has increased, such increases have been more a consequence of structural changes, the opening of markets and economic growth than they have been a consequence of cooperation schemes and economic integration within ASEAN.1079 As Hadi Soesastro states, ‘only a very small percentage of intra‐ASEAN trade … utilises the lower AFTA preferential rates’.1080 Some of the reasons advocated by Soesastro include an absence of dispute settlement mechanisms, lack of enforcement mechanisms, the cost and ambiguity of the Rules of Origin (ROO), excise duties, customs procedures and discriminatory quality control measures.1081 Meanwhile, an increasing amount of time and effort has been directed by the ASEAN countries, especially Thailand and Singapore, to the negotiation of FTAs with external trading partners.
1077 Jones and Smith, "Making Process, Not Progress," p.166, Malaysia and Thailand at Odds over Auto Imports [Internet News] (Channel News Asia, 2007 [cited 3 January 2007]); available from www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific_business/view/226127/1/.html, Solingen, "ASEAN Cooperation: The Legacy of the Economic Crisis," p.14.
1078 In 1993, intra-ASEAN exports constituted 21.4% and by 2005, they had reached 25%. Jones and Smith, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations: Regional Delusion, p.138. Joint Media Statement of the Twentieth Meeting of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) Council [Internet] (Kuala Lumpur, 21 August 2006, [cited 15 May 2007]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/18682.htm. Indicative of the difficulty of getting accurate statistics on the subject the ASEAN webpage above states that the percentage of intra-regional exports in 2004 was 24.3% while another ‘ASEAN webpage’ quotes 22.50% for the same year (www.aseansec.org/17773.htm). The discrepancy is repeated in a further four ASEAN web pages.
1079 Pangestu, "Southeast Asian Regional and International Economic Cooperation," p.200, Rana, "East Asian Regionalism," p.75.
1080 Hadi Soesastro, "Accelerating ASEAN Economic Integration: Moving Beyond AFTA," in CSIS Working Paper Series (Jakarta: CSIS, 2005), p.2.
1081 Ibid. See also: Jones and Smith, "Making Process, Not Progress," p.165, Pangestu, "Southeast Asian Regional and International Economic Cooperation," p.201, Solingen, "ASEAN Cooperation: The Legacy of the Economic Crisis," p.14. 318
Notwithstanding these problems, the ASEAN economies have performed well in recent years. While Chapter V outlined how the GDP of both Thailand and Indonesia had not yet returned to their pre‐economic crisis levels, the percentage of real GDP growth for ASEAN as a whole averaged 5.68 percent for (2001‐2005) and reached a very impressive 6.1 percent growth rate for 2006.1082 Meanwhile, a study prepared by PricewaterhouseCoopers indicated a 48.8 percent surge of FDI to US$38.1 billion in 2005. This figure exceeded the previous 1997 record of US$34.1 billion despite the continued diversionary effect of the Chinese and Indian economies.1083 Less impressive, however, has been the high levels of foreign debt maintained in 2006 by some of the ASEAN countries including the Philippines (US$54.06 billion), Malaysia (US$57.77 billion), Thailand (US$57.83 billion) and Indonesia (US$130.4 billion).1084 The level of debt in the region increases the amount of dependence on aid (e.g. from the World Bank) and thereby subjects state policies to greater exogenous influence (and interference). Thus, and through an examination of a number of variables, including debt and the associated influence of international financial institutions (IFIs), Mark Beeson argues that the region’s ‘autonomy is now constrained and policy preferences shaped by a range of external factors’.1085 The extent of such exogenous influence contrasts starkly with the continued goal of regional resilience that has been a significant factor in motivating decisions (and especially statements of intent) to integrate and cooperate at the regional level.
1082 The IMF forecasts a similar growth rate of 5.6 percent for 2007. ASEAN-10 Fact Sheet [Internet] (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2007 [cited 3 August 2007]); available from http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/asean.pdf.
1083 Study: Southeast Asia Hits New Inward-Investment Record [Internet News] (ABS@CBN Interactive, 2007 [cited 3 January 2007]); available from www.abs-cbnnews.com/storypage.aspx?StoryID=47989. Nonetheless, the fact that ASEAN is increasingly finding itself caught between the rising economic giants of China and India has played a role in motivating the pursuit of economic integration. Weatherbee, "Southeast Asia in 2006: Déjà Vu All over Again," p.21.
1084 Estimates for Year 2006 provided by the CIA World Factbook located at: www.cia.gov. See also: Indonesia 'Declines Debt Freeze' [Internet] (BBC News, 2005 [cited 13 March 2005]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4204803.stm.
1085 Mark Beeson, "South-East Asia and the International Financial Institutions," in The Political Economy of Southeast Asia: Markets, Power and Contestation, ed. Garry Rodan, Kevin Hewison, and Richard Robison (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2006), p.252. 319
Meanwhile, ASEAN has obtained agreement during the course of the past decade on many other proposals and initiatives including, but not limited to, the E‐ASEAN Framework Agreement, the ASEAN Development Fund, the Asian Bond Market Initiative, the ASEAN ‘Plus’ economic agreements and, in 2002, the Singapore proposal to create an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC).1086 While the next section will discuss the AEC in the context of the proposal for an ‘ASEAN community’, for the purpose of the analysis here it is insightful to refer to the 2006 ‘Report of the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter’. In the report the eminent persons group reflected that ‘ASEAN’s problem is not one of lack of vision, ideas or action‐plans. The problem is one of ensuring compliance and effective implementation’.1087 In regard to the issue of ‘implementation’ the analysis, here, must of necessity return to the principle of non‐interference.
The continued operation of the principle of non‐interference has been attributed as a reason why several of the economic initiatives have either been dismissed as ‘too complicated’ or have required a ‘level of coordination and cohesion that ASEAN had deliberately avoided in the past’.1088 In the case of the ASM, for example, the disclosure of information is strictly voluntary and concerns have been raised that honest exchanges of information under the peer review process may be interpreted as a contravention of the ASEAN way.1089 Likewise, the ASEAN Action Plan on Social Safety Nets also failed to take off as it was designed to address ‘domestic social welfare concerns’ in each of the member‐ states and this too would have risked compromising the principle of non‐interference.1090 However, and notwithstanding these concerns, several of the initiatives mentioned here – along with agreement on a dispute settlement mechanism enabling the adoption of legally
1086 Vandoren, "Regional Economic Integration in Southeast Asia," pp.521-525.
1087 "Report of the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter,” (Jakarta: ASEAN, 2006), p.4.
1088 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.164.
1089 Anthony and Hew, ASEAN and ASEAN+3 in Postcrisis Asia (cited), Pangestu, "Southeast Asian Regional and International Economic Cooperation," p.195.
1090 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p.164. 320
binding decisions regarding trade disputes1091 – represent a normative development in as far as they require coordinated action through cooperative enterprises which, in turn, requires a degree of transparency and dialogue vis‐à‐vis the domestic policies of the ASEAN member‐states.1092 At various junctures throughout the remainder of the chapter, the extent and manner by which the ‘ASEAN way’ has evolved in recent years will be considered further. Meanwhile, and in the context of such normative change, the next section addresses recent political initiatives and developments leading to the goal to establish an ASEAN Community (including an ASEAN Security Community).
The Second Frontier of Reform: Political Developments amidst Contending Visions of ASEAN
… The days have passed when we can say that the troubles of one country can be isolated and that the internal affairs of one country are no concern of its neighbours…
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi1093
Aside from a degree of instrumentality on the economic front, in the initial years that followed the economic crisis there were only a handful of initiatives that attempted to deal with traditional security concerns. Given the volatile history of interstate relations and the limited nature of the modus vivendi by which the political elite cooperate with one another, issues such as territorial disputes, border incursions and tacit support to insurgency movements have been considered too controversial to be handled under the multilateral forum of ASEAN. Consequently, where individual ASEAN states have not been able to resolve their disputes bilaterally or through international mechanisms – such as the
1091 While the establishment of a Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) was initially proposed by ASEAN in 1996, in 2004 the ASEAN members reached agreement on a Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement ‘with detailed rules and procedures, modelled after the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, governing possible disputes amongst ASEAN members’. Vandoren, "Regional Economic Integration in Southeast Asia," p.523.
1092 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, p.150.
1093 Cited in: Erik Martinez Kuhonta, "Walking a Tightrope: Democracy Versus Sovereignty in ASEAN’s Illiberal Peace," The Pacific Review 19, no. 3 (2006): p.337. 321
International Court of Justice or the Permanent Court of Arbitration1094 – then the Southeast Asian states have largely agreed to sweep controversial issues under the carpet.1095
Nevertheless, various events (including the continuing Myanmar problem, the haze and the economic crisis) impelled a realisation by some of the region’s political elite that institutional change cannot be limited to the economic realm.1096 According to this line of thought, the achievement of economic development, and the domestic stability that ensues, are mutually interdependent with political and security cooperation. Furthermore, it follows that such cooperation is unlikely to mature significantly before the transnational disputes of the region are resolved. Consequently, tentative steps have been undertaken during the course of the past decade to provide a platform for the ASEAN states to resolve
1094 While a dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia over the Litigan and Sipidan islands was resolved in favour of Malaysia by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague, the outcome resulted in a nationalist backlash within Indonesia and arguably contributed to the gunboat diplomacy in the Sulawesi Sea that was discussed in the previous chapter. Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, pp.130-132. A dispute between Malaysia and Singapore over the Predra Branca islet (Pulau Batu Putih), Middle Rocks, and South Ledge have also been referred to the ICJ but the ICJ will not hold public hearings over the issue until November 2007. Court Ruling on Singapore Strait Islet [Internet News] (BBC News, 2007 [cited 22 October 2005]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2642187.stm, The World Factbook: Malaysia [Internet] (Central Intelligence Agency, 2007 [cited 9 August 2007]); available from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/my.html.
1095 As Kwa Chong Guan states in interview, ‘You know the famous metaphor that we have in ASEAN, that we do not resolve any conflicts, we merely sweep them under the carpet and that in time we may have a very lumpy carpet, but at least we still got a carpet to stand on’. Interview with Kwa Chong Guan, RSIS (Singapore), 5 December 2001. See also: Markus Hund, "From 'Neighbourhood Watch Group' to Community? The Case of ASEAN Institutions and the Pooling of Sovereignty," Australian Journal of International Affairs 56, no. 1 (2002): p.119.
1096 As Umar Hadi, the Director of Public Diplomacy in Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs states, ‘the point is that we look at the cooperation side, that economic cooperation is much more developed, compared to other fields, especially in the fields of political and security [cooperation], and when we reflect on ourselves, in Indonesia, what happened in 1998 with reformasi, yes we did have an economic crisis, but we did not develop our political life quite enough, so we didn’t put our energy into political development as much as we put our energy into economic performance, so when [such] performance fails then you get chaos. So we put that into ASEAN, when you have very progressive cooperation in economics, in the economic sector, but you don’t balance it with enough cooperation in the political and security field, then one day, you end up with disfunctioning institution. As I said, politically speaking we have a liberal democracy in the Philippines and then on the other hand we have a military Junta. So in essence, we want to balance or we need to balance the two, cooperation in economics and the cooperation in political and security matters’. Interview with Umar Hadi, Director of Public Diplomacy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Jakarta), 26 May 2006. 322
their differences. In this regard, the two most prominent initiatives through to 2003 were the ASEAN Troika and the High Council.
In the case of the ASEAN Troika (troika being Russian for ‘three’), the platform for its existence was adopted at the Third ASEAN Informal Summit held in Manila on 28 November 1999.1097 In the event of its operation, the troika would comprise the foreign ministers from three countries, namely the minister that had chaired the previous year’s ministerial meeting, the minister presently chairing it, and the minister scheduled to chair it the year after.1098 While its self‐declared purpose is for ASEAN to ‘address more effectively and cooperate more closely on issues affecting peace and stability of the region’,1099 the ASEAN Troika maintains an informal structure and Clause 2.3 of its protocol states that it shall carry out its work in accordance with ‘the core principles of consensus and non‐interference’.1100 Having no binding authority and no mandate to be initiated unless all parties to the dispute agree, the ASEAN Troika is best characterised as a further CSBM or perhaps, a weak form of preventative diplomacy rather than a conflict resolution mechanism.1101
Meanwhile, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) signed on 24 February 1976 (alternatively known as the Bali Treaty), provides for the earlier mentioned ASEAN norms of friendship, good neighbourliness, non‐interference in the internal affairs of one another, and peaceful settlement of differences or disputes. In the context of the last principle, it also provides for the establishment of a mediatory High Council. In light of the aforementioned notion of constructive intervention, and in citing events regarding the South China Sea dispute as an example of the need for conflict resolution, at the 1998 Hanoi Summit
1097 The first use of the Troika was in relation to ASEAN’s experience in ‘intervening’ in Cambodia in 1997-98. Simon, "Southeast Asia," p.283.
1098 Kondo, East Asian Strategic Review, p.35.
1099 ASEAN, Chairman's Press Statement on ASEAN 3rd Informal Summit [Internet] (Manila, Philippines, 28 November 1999, [cited 28 July 2007]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/5300.htm.
1100 ASEAN Troika (cited).
1101 Simon, "Southeast Asia," p.283. 323
President Estrada (Philippines) proposed rules of procedure to give effect to the High Council.1102 Three years later, and with surprisingly little pomp and ceremony, the rules of procedure were finally established at the 2001 AMM.1103 Like the ASEAN Troika, the High Council is only designed to operate on the basis of mutual consent and its decisions are non‐ binding. Consequently, the High Council represents only a weak form of preventative diplomacy rather than a mechanism for conflict resolution.1104
The inability of the ASEAN member states to agree to legally binding and institutionalised mechanisms for conflict resolution has left several territorial disputes in Southeast Asia unresolved. These territorial disputes include, but are not limited to, Pedra Blanca Island (Pulau Batu Putih), the Philippines Sabah Claim, the Ambalat oil block (Sulawesi/Celebes Sea), and the South China Sea (Chapter VIII).1105 The inability of ASEAN to resolve inter‐state territorial disputes, and to also move forward on a cooperative basis in the political and security realms, was reinforced by further challenges to the security architecture of the region. While the dissertation has already referred to various domestic insurgencies, and the next chapter will discuss recent skirmishes along the border between Thailand and Myanmar, other challenges to which the ASEAN states have faced include the 2004 tsunami;1106 the increased prevalence of disease (including SARS, bird flu and AIDs);1107 and
1102 Kondo, East Asian Strategic Review, p.34. It is important to note that the Philippines were not the first ASEAN country to advocate the utilization of a High Council. Indonesia had previously proposed that the council take up the question of the islands of Sipidan and Litigan over which Indonesia and Malaysia were in dispute. The proposal was rejected.
1103 Rules of Procedure of the High Council of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia [Internet - Declaration] (ASEAN, 2001 [cited 28 August 2002]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/print.asp?file=/amm/hanoi03.htm.
1104 Rule 8 states, inter alia, that the High Council will require written confirmation that all parties to the dispute agree to the process of the High Council and further, rule 19 provides that all decisions of the High Council ‘shall be taken by consensus at a duly convened meeting’. Ibid. (cited).
1105 Roberts, "The ASEAN Security Community Project: The Prospects for Comprehensive Integration in Southeast Asia," p.283.
1106 'Hundreds Feared Dead' in Burma [Internet - News] (BBC News, 2005 [cited 5 January 2005]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4145489, Indonesia Proposes Region-Wide Disaster Response Team after Tsunamis [Internet] (Channel News Asia, 2005 [cited 24 April 2005]); available from http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/141997/1/.html. 324
also the transnational consequences of crime (e.g. illicit narcotics, money laundering, people and arms trafficking).1108 In the context of such considerations Umar Hadi, the Director of Public Diplomacy to Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reflects on the Bangkok Declaration ‘as a solution to a given problem in a given time...’, but argues that today ‘we need to reflect on whether this solution, is still valid, or is still workable for another set of problems …’.1109 From the Indonesian perspective, at least at the rhetorical level, ‘a new political and security blueprint’ was needed in order to equip ASEAN with an enhanced ability to respond to the challenges of the ‘new world’.1110
As a consequence of these considerations it appears the Indonesian Foreign Ministry sought advice from Rizal Sukma, a scholar from CSIS in Jakarta, regarding the direction Indonesia should take during its chairmanship of ASEAN in 2003. In building on a Singaporean proposal for an economic community the previous year,1111 Rizal Sukma suggested that the
1107 Bird Flu in Vietnam Shows Great Signs of Human-to-Human Infection [Internet - News] (Channel News Asia, 2005 [cited 8 August 2005]); available from htp://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/148306/1/.html, Singapore Presents Assistance Package to Help Indonesia Combat Bird Flu [Internet] (Channel News Asia, [cited 06 March 2006]); available from http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/180495/1/.html, Southeast Asia Eyes Network for Bird Flu Drug [Internet] (Channel News Asia, [cited 07 March 2006]); available from http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/183449/1/.html. On the issue of AIDS see: Drugs and HIV/AIDS in Southeast Asia - Reducing HIV Vulnerability from Drug Abuse [Internet] (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2005 [cited 28 September 2005]); available from http://www.unodc.un.or.th/drugsandhiv/default.htm.
1108 Kusuma Snitwongse and Suchit Bunbongkarn, "New Security Issues and Their Impact on ASEAN," in A New ASEAN in a New Millennium, ed. Simon Tay, Jesus Estanislao, and Hadi Soesastro (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2000), pp.148-162. For a more comprehensive overview see: Alan Dupont, East Asia Imperilled: Transnational Challenges to Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
1109 Interview with Umar Hadi, Director of Public Diplomacy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Jakarta), 26 May 2006.
1110 Sukma, "Towards an ASEAN Security Community." This was the original paper circulated to the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. An almost exact replica was published on the internet several months later, see: Rizal Sukma, The Future of ASEAN: Towards a Security Community [Seminar Paper] (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations, 2003 [cited 24 August 2003]); available from www.indonesiamission-ny.org/issuebaru/Mission/asean/paper_rizalsukma.PDF.
1111 At the eighth ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh (2002), ASEAN agreed to consider Goh Chok Tong’s proposal for an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) with the intention of accelerating ‘economic integration’ in line with the ASEAN Vision 2020. ASEAN, Press Statement by the Chairman of the 8th ASEAN Summit, the 6th ASEAN + 3 Summit and the ASEAN-China Summit [Internet] (Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 4 November 2002, 2002 [cited 2 October 2004]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/13188.htm. 325
Indonesian government should ‘reclaim its strategic centrality’ by proposing the establishment of a security community. Informed by the scholarly writings of Deutsch, Acharya and Leifer, Sukma drafted a concept paper which he presented to the Indonesian Foreign Ministry on 20 March 2003.1112 The Foreign Ministry then drafted what has been termed Indonesia’s ‘Non‐Paper on ASEAN Security Community’ and circulated it along with various modified versions at several ASEAN meetings. These meetings included a Senior Officials Meeting (13‐14 June 2003); the 36th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Retreat in Phnom Penh (16 June 2003); a special SOM Meeting in Bogor, Indonesia (4‐6 August 2003); and another SOM meeting in Surabaya, Indonesia (26‐28 August 2003).1113 During the course of these meetings the Philippines government wanted to include, by way of a complement, a socio‐cultural pillar within the proposal.1114 Consequently, the negotiations that took place during these meetings culminated in an agreement at the 9th ASEAN Summit (Bali) in October 2003 to create an ‘ASEAN Community’.
The structure of the ASEAN Community is to be based on three pillars: political and security cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio‐cultural cooperation. In the words of the Bali II Concord these pillars ‘are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability and shared prosperity in the region’. The three pillars were collectively labelled the ‘ASEAN community’ or the ‘Bali Concord II’. The scheduled date for implementation has since been accelerated to 2015.1115 The preamble to the second Bali
1112 Sukma, "Towards an ASEAN Security Community." As Sukma states in interview, the proposal ‘owes a lot to the concept as developed by Deutsch and Amitav [Acharya], and after presenting it to the Foreign Minister here I presented a modified version in New York. Have been working on this even though it has been watered down, massaged, but the intellectual rules had to be found, and I looked at Leifer who talked about a political community in the 80s’. Interview with Rizal Sukma.
1113 Interview with Rizal Sukma, CSIS (Jakarta), 21 April 2006. For confirmation of the dates of these meetings and, in some instances, elements of the content, see: Track 1 - Governmental Meetings [Internet] (Dialogue and Research Monitor, 2003 [cited 9 August 2007]); available from http://www.jcie.or.jp/drm/2003/track1.html.
1114 Interview with Pratap Parameswaren, ASEAN Secretariat, Tuesday 25 April 2006. Interview with Dr. Chookiat, Director, Institute of Security and International Studies (Bangkok), 16 February 2006.
1115 The goal to establish an ASEAN community has since been accelerated to 2015. ASEAN, Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015 (cited). See also: "The Politics of Speed: An ASEAN Community by 2015," The Nation, 28 November 2006. 326
Concord reaffirmed the principles of the Bangkok Declaration, ZOPFAN, the TAC, the ASEAN Concord and SEANFWZ. The preamble also acknowledged the need to effectively and urgently address the challenge of ‘translating ASEAN cultural sensitivities and different economic levels into equitable development opportunity and prosperity, in an environment of solidarity, regional resilience and harmony’. In the context of these considerations, but also reflecting the growing impatience of Singapore and Thailand over the pace of economic liberalisation,1116 the proposal for an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) has the end goal of producing a ‘single market and production base’ within ASEAN.
In the case of the ASEAN Socio‐Cultural Community (ASCC) many of the goals are more pragmatic than might otherwise be inferred from the name. Reflective of a need to address some of the transnational comprehensive security issues that were mentioned in preceding paragraphs, the goals of the ASCC include an intention to ‘intensify cooperation in the area of public health, including the prevention of diseases, such as HIV/AIDs and SARS…’ The ASCC also aims to raise the ‘standard of living of disadvantaged groups and the rural population’ and seeks ‘the active involvement of all sectors of society, in particular women, youth, and local communities’. The pillar also mentions the need to enhance the level of interaction between certain groups of elite (such as ASEAN Scholars, artists and the media) for the purpose of (among other things) cultivating the ‘people’s awareness of ASEAN’ and the creation of a ‘regional identity’. The pursuit of increased interaction and the development of a ‘regional identity’ along with similar statements in related documents, such as ‘the shaping and sharing of norms’,1117 have clearly been informed by the academic literature on security communities and constructivist theories in general.1118
1116 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.108.
1117 ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action [Internet - Declaration] (ASEAN Secretariat, 2004 [cited 6 December 2004]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/16827.htm.
1118 Interview with Rizal Sukma, CSIS (Jakarta), 21 April 2006. M.C. Abad from the ASEAN Secretariat adds ‘… the theoretical side, that is the heart of it, its building a community with a common identity, a common outlook, that is the heart of the theoretical basis of a security community’. Interview with M.C. Abad, ASEAN Secretariat (Jakarta), 20 April 2006. More specifically, Jones and Smith argue that the ‘Bali Concord II redescribes the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in language that could be found in many undergraduate course outlines in international relations. Consequently, the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) subscribes “to the 327
Meanwhile, the proposal to establish an ASEAN Security Community (ASC) has been the subject of significant attention within the scholarly literature with a mixture of critical and positive appraisals.1119 Similar to some of ASEAN’s former instruments and declarations the ASC ‘aims to bring ASEAN’s political and security cooperation to a higher plane to ensure that countries in the region live at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment’.1120 As with the scholarly literature on a ‘security community’ (Chapter II), the ASC states that the members ‘shall rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra‐regional differences and regard their security as fundamentally linked to one another and bound by geographic location, common vision and objectives’. The declaration maintains ASEAN’s concept of ‘comprehensive security’ but, in order to avoid controversy, specifically states (somewhat inconsistently) that the concept is not representative of a desire to form a ‘defence pact, military alliance or a joint foreign policy’.
The proposal for an ASC was also significant for the fact that it declares a commitment to a ‘democratic environment’ and in specifically raising maritime issues (e.g. piracy and the South China Sea) argues that as ‘these concerns are transboundary in nature … [they should] be addressed regionally in a holistic, integrated and comprehensive manner’. Nonetheless, and as the Principle Assistant Secretary to the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, many of the goals and targets within the ASEAN Community pillar had formed the basis of
principle of comprehensive security”. It explores “innovative ways to increase its security and establish modalities … which include, inter alia, the following elements: norms-setting approaches to conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace building”.’ Jones and Smith, "Making Process, Not Progress," p.158.
1119 For examples see: Cotton, The ASEAN Dynamic - the Road to a 2020 Security Community Passes through Yangon (cited), Emmerson, "Security and Community in Southeast Asia: Will the Real ASEAN Please Stand Up?", Donald K Emmerson, "What Do the Blind-Sided See? Reapproaching Regionalism in Southeast Asia," The Pacific Review 18, no. 1 (2005), James R. Ferguson, "ASEAN Concord II: Policy Prospects for Participant Regional "Development"," Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 3 (2004), Haacke, ""Enhanced Interaction" With Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with Its Diplomatic and Security Culture?.", Michael E. Jones, "Forging an ASEAN Identity: The Challenge to Construct a Shared Identity," Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 1 (2004), Nicholas Khoo, "Deconstructing the ASEAN Security Community: A Review Essay," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 4 (2004), Roberts, "The ASEAN Security Community Project: The Prospects for Comprehensive Integration in Southeast Asia.", Smith, "ASEAN’s Ninth Summit: Solidifying Regional Cohesion, Advancing External Linkages."
1120 Emphasis by author. 328
previous ASEAN commitments in one form or another.1121 Further, the extent to which ASEAN could successfully implement concrete measures to realistically address the aspirations expressed by the second Bali Concord was to be tested in the immediate months that followed Indonesia’s negotiations on how best to implement the ‘ASEAN Security Community’.
Indonesia’s aspiration over the new direction it envisioned for ASEAN was most holistically stated in its February 2004 Draft Plan of Action for a Security Community. The plan of action contained 75 concrete steps to support its achievement along with concrete dates for implementation and the most significant proposals are listed in Table 8.1 below.1122 According to Rizal Sukma, despite his recommendation that the Indonesian proposal narrow its focus to the commitments eventually adopted in the final ‘ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action’ and the subsequent ‘Vientiane Plan of Action’ (e.g. greater cooperation on transnational security issues), the Indonesian Foreign Ministry insisted on including a proposal for a regional peacekeeping force, a regional commission on human rights along with a focus on the related theme of democracy. These ideals represented such a radical departure from the traditional modus operandi of ASEAN that the language had to be significantly watered down with the dates and the plans for a peacekeeping force along with a human rights commission being removed in order to obtain consensus.1123
Table 8.1: Select List of Relevant Proposals contained in the ASEAN Security Community Draft Plan of Action CATEGORY ACTIVITIES TIME LINE Political Development 1. Developing a just, democratic and harmonious environment in By 2017. ASEAN:
1121 Interview with Ilango Karuppannan, Principle Assistant Secretary (Policy Planning), Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Monday 22 May 2006; Also: Interview with Corrine Phuangkasem, Associate Professor, Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, 20 February 2006.
1122 Department of Foreign Affairs, "ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action (Draft)" (Jakarta, 13 February 2004).
1123 Christopher B. Roberts, The 'ASEAN Charter': A Crossroads for the Region? [Commentary] (IDSS, 2005 [cited 19 September 2005]); available from http://www.idss.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/IDSS602005.pdf, Roberts, "ASEAN Charter: The Model Decision." 329
Anti-corruption campaign: strengthening legal Continuously infrastructure, capacity building, and concrete cooperation in asset recovery. 2. Promotion of human rights of ASEAN Peoples: By 2006 Developing and ASEAN Charter of Rights and By 2006 Obligations of Peoples; Establishment of an ASEAN Regional Commission on By 2006 human rights; Protection of vulnerable groups, including the By 2006 eradication of trafficking in persons especially women and children. 4. Resolution of outstanding land, sea, and air space boundary By 2010 issues through delimitation and demarcation: Identification of all boundary problems; By 2005 Resolution of bilateral/trilateral boundary delimitation By 2010 and demarcation; Development of borders regime to facilitate people’s From 2004 movement, border trade, and border security. Conflict Prevention 3. Enhancing cooperation on non-traditional security issues: Enhancing the role of the AMM on Transnational Crimes (AMMTC) as the main implementing body dealing with transnational crimes, including terrorism; Ensuring border security with regard to traditional From 2005 border crossing; Strengthening ASEAN’s capacity to prevent and control By 2005 the spread of communicable diseases; Establishing a regional framework to combat smuggling, By 2006 illegal logging and illegal trade of natural resources. A drug free ASEAN. By 2015 Conflict Resolution 2. Developing a Regional Peacekeeping Arrangement Establishing an ASEAN Peace Keeping Force (standby By 2012. arrangement) and its deployment mechanism.
Source: ‘ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action’ (draft as of 13/02/2004).
In the context of ASEAN’s proposal to establish a security community, the final Plan of Action for a Security Community was endorsed later in 2004 and much of its content was repeated in the November 2004 Vientiane Action Programme. Within these documents the five key components to the development of an ASEAN security community regard (a) political development; (b) the shaping and sharing of norms; (c) conflict prevention; (d) conflict resolution; and (e) post‐conflict peace‐building.1124 In their final form, the five components can be best understood as a statement of intent rather than a structured agreement with concrete commitments for implementation. Thus, the final structure remained inside the boundaries of the ASEAN way as traditionally interpreted.
1124 For details see: ASEAN, Vientiane Action Programme (cited), ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action (cited). 330
Nonetheless, statements of intent set expectations for results and so negotiations for agreement over the implementation of mechanisms for conflict resolution and post conflict peace building have been ongoing. According to the Deputy Director‐General of the ‘ASEAN Department’ in Laos’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, implementation in regard to the latter two components of the ASC remains difficult due to ‘different political systems, cultures, religions, and the level of comfort or trust…’1125 In order to overcome the problems of implementation caused by ASEAN’s current modus operandi, many of the political elite interviewed within Southeast Asia have pinned their hopes on negotiations for an ASEAN charter intended to provide the Association with a legal identity and a more institutionalised and binding framework for operation.1126 While the Southeast Asian nations had returned to a debate over a human rights commission and have since reached ‘rhetorical agreement’ on its establishment, the proposal for a mechanism that would change the institutional structure of ASEAN from a consensus based organisation to a vote based organisation was struck down in July 2007.1127 Nonetheless, the extent to which the charter will change ASEAN’s method of operation (and thereby the ASEAN way) currently remains unknown as agreement over the final format of the charter is only scheduled to occur in November 2007, in time for endorsement by the region’s leaders at the next ASEAN Summit.1128
The contentious nature of the original proposal and the draft plan of action that followed were, in part, demonstrated by the level of cynicism voiced within the ASEAN Secretariat and also by individuals from several of the ASEAN states. Thus, according to one senior official in the ASEAN Secretariat, the proposal was perceived as so unfeasible that he
1125 Interview with Songkane Luangmunithone, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Vientiane, Laos), 13 July 2007.
1126 Roberts, The 'ASEAN Charter': A Crossroads for the Region? (cited), Roberts, "ASEAN Charter: The Model Decision."
1127 A proposal that would provide for punishment through sanctions and/or cancellation of membership has also been rejected. Raju Gopalakrishnan, Southeast Asia Group Urges Democracy in Myanmar [Internet News] (Canada.com, 2007 [cited 30 July 2007]); available from www.canada.com, Southeast Asian Group at Odds over Human Rights Commission [Internet News] (International Herald Tribune, 2007 [cited 30 July 2007]); available from www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=6879963.
1128 Jim Gomez, ASEAN Agrees to Human Rights Commission [Internet News] (The Irrawaddy, 2007 [cited 30 July 2007]); available from www.irrawaddy.org. 331
interpreted it as an excuse for Indonesia to walk away from ASEAN by demanding agreement over something which it knew the other member‐states would reject.1129 Beyond the Secretariat, and while the most common perception of the motivation behind the Indonesian proposal regarded the idea that it was an attempt to regain Indonesia’s image as the leader of ASEAN,1130 some more cynically suggested that it had been induced by the United States for the purpose of its ‘war on terror’.1131 Furthermore, Indonesian assurances that it had consulted extensively throughout the region were dismissed by several foreign ministry spokespeople in other countries who complained that the proposal had been rushed through and imposed in a very ‘un‐ASEAN like manner’. Despite the initial cynicism articulated through the various interviews above, a positive statistic to arise from the elite sample (Figure 9.1 below) was the fact that 75.9% now believe (rhetorically at least) that the security community proposal will ‘benefit Southeast Asia and its people’. Nonetheless, such optimism needs to be qualified by the fact that 42.1% of the respondents from government thought that a security community could exist amidst the possibility of armed conflict.
1129 In detail, the ASEAN Secretariat Official stated that ‘… and here the Secretariat was also a bit surprised when they saw the so-called draft, and we were having our debates trying to interpret the Indonesian initiative, because after having spent more than a decade here I more or less know what is feasible and what is not. I was the one asking the question, I asked myself, because either the drafter of the concept had no clue of what is possible in ASEAN or there were talks for sometime of Indonesia leaving ASEAN out of frustration, we asked ourselves is this the excuse that Indonesia would use, if the rest reject, then it would leave ASEAN?’. Interview with senior official in the ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, April 2006.
1130 Interview with Dr Chookiat Panaspornprasit, Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies (Bangkok, Thailand), 16 February 2006. Interview with M.C. Abad Jr., ARF Unit Director (ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta), 20 April 2006. Interview with Luan Thuy Dong, Director of the Southeast Asian Studies Center, Institute of International Relations (Hanoi, Vietnam), 7 July 2005.
1131 Various scholars and government officials from Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam suggested the idea that the proposal did not originate from Indonesia. 332
Figure 8.1. Elite Level Perceptions on the ‘Security Community’
Source: Compiled by author
Thus far, the analysis seems to indicate that a dichotomy is emerging between the leaderships in Southeast Asia over the future direction of ASEAN. The more democratic states of Indonesia and the Philippines have most strongly pushed for reform of the institutional and normative structures in ASEAN. At one point the Philippines even suggested that ASEAN should be remodelled in the image of the European Union. To this suggestion Singapore responded ‘you can’t turn a frog into a prince overnight’.1132 On average, the countries most strongly against reform in ASEAN are Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar.1133 Meanwhile, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand sit somewhere in the middle of the spectrum.1134 However, and unsurprisingly, Singapore has been the most
1132 Interview with ASEAN Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Hanoi), 13 July 2005.
1133 ‘Brunei was very vocal in its objections against the Indonesian Plan of Action. The first objection of Brunei was on the issue of a regional peacekeeping force. This was first brokered by Indonesia because of its experience over East Timor. Both Malaysia and Brunei objected to this because of issues of sovereignty’. Interview with Jose Cenabre and Jesse Pascasio, Philippine Navy Headquarters (Manila), 22 November 2005. According to the Deputy Foreign Minister of Cambodia, ‘we were not in favour of the proposal for regional peacekeeping because we don’t want to interfere in the internal affairs of another state. States can utilize their own peacekeeping centres and that’s fine but we couldn’t agree on a formal regional peacekeeping force’. Interview with Kao Kim Hourn, Deputy Foreign Minister of Cambodia (Phnom Penh), 30 July 2005.
1134 As Herman Kraft states, ‘On the security community project, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore were together in the middle. Indonesia and the Philippines wanted more while Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Myanmar wanted to maintain the status quo. Meanwhile, Brunei remained silent. Vietnam might be keen over legally binding issues in relation to the South China Sea but not on ASEAN as a more binding arrangement’. 333
progressive in regard to integration within the economic sphere while Malaysia, according to Sukma, was relatively open to the idea of sanctions in the case of gross violations of human rights.1135 In developing the analysis, the next section will provide a quantitative examination of the survey data collated for the dissertation. In particular, the analysis seeks to ascertain various trends in elite and communal perceptions (including areas of convergence and divergence) in regard to such issues as economic, political and security integration and cooperation, the continued salience of the ASEAN way along with the extent of trust and dependable expectations of peaceful change throughout Southeast Asia.
From the Collective to the Divergent: Regional Perceptions, Affinity and Trust
Convergence and Divergence in Economic Perceptions
The effectiveness of ASEAN is very much determined on the basis of a sector by sector analysis. For example, as the first section of the chapter indicated ASEAN has been quite proactive in regard to initiatives designed to implement greater economic integration and cooperation. While the extent of intra‐ASEAN trade remains fairly low relative to other regional groupings such as NAFTA or the European Union,1136 the potential benefits to arise from economic liberalisation and integration – in terms of the intra‐ASEAN perceptions evinced by the survey data – is the most encouraging component likely to motivate potential cooperation. Thus, and when asked the question, ‘on average, will economic liberalisation benefit or disadvantage your country?’, 67.44 percent of the region’s elites answered that economic liberalisation would ‘benefit’ their country. Similarly, 77.78 percent of elite level respondents believed that their own national economy was either compatible with the
Interview with Herman Kraft, University of the Philippines (Manilla), 15 November 2005. Mr. D. Rajayah from the Ministry of Defence in Malaysia adds ‘Singapore was not keen on a peacekeeping force. So there was no commitment to have multilateral defence ties’. Interview with D. Rajayah, Principle Assistant Secretary – Policy Division, Ministry of Defence (Kuala Lumpur), 29 May 2006.
1135 Interview with Rizal Sukma, CSIS (Jakarta), 21 April 2006.
1136 Intra-ASEAN exports in 2001 were 1.4 percent of total world exports compared to 19 percent for NAFTA and 36% for the EU. Intra-ASEAN trade out of total ASEAN trade is around ¼ compared to ½ in NAFTA and 60% in the EU. Pangestu, "Southeast Asian Regional and International Economic Cooperation," p.199. 334
economic structures of all the ASEAN states or at least the ASEAN states who were already structurally defined as a ‘market economy’ (Figure 8.2). However, and reflective of various member state divisions over the merits of the ASC proposal that were outlined in the previous chapter, when asked whether the formation of an ‘economic community’ (the economic pillar) through economic liberalisation would overcome the main problems the member states would likely face as a consequence of economic liberalisation, 65.48 percent of regional elites were either ‘undecided’ or answered ‘no’ to the question.
Figure 8.2. Elite Perceptions on Economic Integration
In relation to your country's economy with the economies of all the remaining ASEAN countries (an economic community): do you believe that your Will the formation of an ASEAN 'economic community' through economic national economy is compatible with the economic structures of some or all integration help overcome these problems? of the other nine ASEAN states? Yes, easy to Yes integrate with all No the ASEAN Undecided economies 18.89% Yes, easy to integrate with market 32.22% economies but 34.52% 2.22% not others Yes, easy to 48.81% integrate with closed economies but not others 45.56% No, my country isn't compatible 16.67% with other economies
Source: Compiled by author
In terms of ‘perceptional divergence’ vis‐à‐vis the economic components of the elite survey, the statistics reveal some support for a potential hypothesis that there exists a kind of core and periphery in any nascent levels of elite level identity between the original ASEAN members and the newer member states. As indicated by Table 7.1 below, and quite unsurprisingly, when the Thai, Singaporean, Malaysian, Indonesian and Filipino respondents were asked if they believed that their national economy was compatible with ‘the economic structure of some or all of the other nine ASEAN states’1137 between eighty and one‐
1137 The full question within the ‘elite level survey’ (Part A, Question 1) reads as follows: ‘In relation to the integration of your country’s economy with the economies of the remaining ASEAN countries (an economic community): do you believe that your national economy is compatible with the economic structures of some or all of the other nine ASEAN states?’ 335
hundred percent of the elites within those countries responded either it would be easy to integrate with all the economies of the ASEAN states1138 or that, in the very least, it would be easy to integrate with those countries that have a market economy (survey response (b)1139). Similarly, on average there was a ‘positive score’ of 67% for the original member states over whether or not they believed that economic liberalisation would disadvantage or benefit their country (Q.A2 in the table below).1140
Table 8.2. Overall Summary of the Divergence/Convergence in Economic Perceptions1141 Q.A1: Q.A2: Q.A4: The Overall Perceptions of Consequences Formation of Position on Compatibility of an Economic the Economic Liberalisation Community Pillar Malaysia Positive Positive (73%) Positive (57%) Positive (100%) Singapore Positive (80%) Positive (87%) Neutral (64%) Positive Indonesia Positive (82%) Positive (60%) Neutral (40%) Positive The Positive (85%) Positive (39%) Neutral (47% Positive Philippines Thailand Positive (83%) Positive (75%) Neutral (55%) Positive Myanmar Negative Positive Neutral Neutral (67%) (100%) (100%) Vietnam Positive (80%) Positive Neutral (60%) Positive (100%) Laos Negative Neutral (67%) Neutral 67%) Negative (67%) Cambodia Negative Positive (50%) Negative Negative (83%) (60%)
1138 Survey response (a). This response reads in full as: ‘Yes, it will be easy to integrate with the economies of all the ASEAN states’.
1139 Survey response (b). The response within the survey reads as ‘Yes, it will be easy to integrate with those countries that have a market economy but not with others’.
1140 Figure based on standardised percentages; that is the average percentage of the aggregated data for each of original member-states (Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines). The original question within the ‘elite level survey’ (Part A, Question 2) reads as follows, 'On average, will economic liberalisation benefit or disadvantage your country?’
1141 Brunei has been excluded from the table as, despite best attempts to the contrary, there were not enough respondents to provide any statistically significant/relevant results on the questions in this table and subsection. For statistical details of the data, see Appendix 8.1. 336
By contrast, between 67% and 83% of respondents within Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia responded negatively to the question as to whether or not they perceived their country to be compatible with the economies of the remaining ASEAN countries. While Vietnam, Cambodia and Myanmar all indicated that their country would benefit from economic liberalisation (Q.A2), the Laotian respondents were primarily neutral (unsure) about the consequences of economic liberalisation. However, and in terms of an overall position assessed for each country (calculated on the basis of the sum‐total of the positive/neutral/negative assessments for the three economic question), Vietnam was the only example amidst the newer member‐states to maintain a ‘positive’ ranking overall. Finally, and also reflective of the various divisions over the ASEAN security community raised in the previous chapter, was the fact that Malaysia was the only ASEAN state to respond positively to the question of whether or not ‘the formation of an ASEAN “economic community” through economic integration [would] help overcome these problems’.1142 Furthermore, and reflecting the salience of the idea that economic integration is beneficial throughout the Malaysian elite sample, Malaysia was the only country to respond positively in all three questions within the economic segment of the survey.
Convergence/Divergence over Transnational Security and Foreign Relations
As discussed in the previous chapter, within both the elite and communal samples there was a strong convergence of perception in regard to the relevance and impact of terrorism throughout Southeast Asia. Figure 8.3 below also visually displays a relative uniformity of interests at the individual state level. In all the ASEAN countries except Brunei, Malaysia and Myanmar, between 80% and 94% of respondents indicated that terrorism is a concern that variously affects their own country, the entire region or the entire world. While a significant proportion of respondents in Myanmar (64.3%), Brunei (66.7%), and Malaysia (61.7%) also indicated that the issue of terrorism was at least relevant to their own country, the three
1142 60% of the Cambodian elite level respondents answered ‘negatively’ while all the remaining ASEAN states were primarily neutral (undecided) over the question. The original question in the elite level survey read: ‘Will the formation of an ASEAN “economic community” through economic integration help overcome these problems?’ 337
countries contained some statistically noteworthy deviations. In the case of both Myanmar and Malaysia a relatively higher proportion of respondents were, arguably, more cynical with 27.2% of Malaysians and 28.6% of Myanmarese indicating that terrorism was a concern that solely affected the United States and its allies. In the case of Brunei, 33.3% of respondents felt that the problem of terrorism was limited to ‘other’ states in Southeast Asia. This latter figure may represent a number of factors including the extent of religious homogeneity within the country along with a relatively strong level of internal consolidation and a subsequent reduction in the risk of exposure to terrorist threats within Brunei.
Figure 8.3. Communal Perceptions on the Significance of Terrorism
Source: Compiled by author
Within the comprehensive security architecture of Southeast Asia, the limitations to common threat perceptions are readily apparent when one looks beyond the narrowly defined fear of ‘terrorist acts’. The previous chapter, for example, has already discussed the limitations to cooperation and positive inter‐state relations when ‘terrorist acts’ have a connection with ethnic based insurgency (e.g. Southern Thailand). As a possible consequence of differences in the level of economic development, security sector reform and state capacity, charts (a) and (b) in Figure 8.4 below outline the relative divergence regarding the extent to which ‘transnational security issues’ are perceived to affect each of the ASEAN member‐states. Within the communal sample (chart a) the respondents from 338
Vietnam, Malaysia, Myanmar and Brunei considered themselves the least affected by transnational crime while the respondents from Indonesia and the Philippines considered themselves the most affected by transnational crime. Interestingly, a comparison of the results between the communal respondents (chart a) and the elite respondents (chart b) shows a statistical correlation in the case of only some of the countries. For example, the elite respondents from Myanmar and Vietnam also considered themselves to be marginally affected by transnational crime while the elite Filipino and Indonesian respondents reflected the results of the communal sample by considering their country to be relatively strongly affected by transnational crime. As far as the statistics for the remaining countries within the two samples are concerned, the differences between the two samples might be explained by a number of factors including the relatively smaller sample size in the elite sample (e.g. Brunei), a greater awareness by elites regarding the consequences of transnational crime (e.g. Thailand), and potential bias within the elite sample due to self censorship and/or the consequences of providing an answer contrary to what would be perceived as ‘acceptable’ by the political elites in power (e.g. Laos).1143
1143 In the case of Brunei, there was only one respondent. In the case of Thailand, the elite respondents indicated that their country was more affected by ‘transnational crime’ than that of their communal level counterparts. In the case of Laos, the reverse was true. For details see Appendix 8.2. 339
Figure 8.4. Elite and Communal Perceptions on Transnational Crime
Source: Compiled by author
Naturally, there is also a significant divergence in perceptions regarding the categories of transnational crime that most affect each of the Southeast Asian states. As illustrated by Figure 8.5 below, within the communal level sample, the respondents were asked to select the categories of transnational crime that had the greatest impact on their country.1144 In the case of the Myanmarese respondents, the highest percentage of response was obtained for the category of ‘money laundering’ (31.6%) while ‘terrorism’ was the most popular response for the Indonesian (36.9%) and Filipino (39.3%) respondents. Meanwhile, the category of ‘people smuggling’ received the highest percentage of responses within Cambodia (31.8%) and Vietnam (46%). Finally, the highest percentage of respondents that viewed the category of ‘narcotics’ as the greatest threat was seen in the cases of Thailand (35.4%), Malaysia (38.5%), Laos (44.9%) and Brunei (75%). The level of divergence regarding perceptions of threat (comprehensively defined), acts to negate the emergence of a commonality of interests between the political elite that might lead to greater levels of
1144 The respondents were provides with the following five options: (a) people smuggling; (b) money laundering; (c) terrorism; (d) narcotics; and (e) other. 340
cooperation and thereby socialisation. The previous chapter, for example, outlined how Indonesia is yet to ratify the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze as Jakarta (the heart of government) has been less affected by the consequences of the haze than some of its ASEAN neighbours (e.g. Singapore and Malaysia).
Figure 8.5. Categories of Transnational Crime that Impact the Most
Source: Compiled by author
There exists a similar pattern of diverging perceptions regarding the positive/negative nature of the roles played by Japan, China and the United States in Southeast Asia. Within the communal level sample, Figure 8.6 below outlines the percentage of ‘yes’ responses on whether or not each of the three major powers ‘play a positive role’ in their region. Interestingly, in several countries it appears that Japan has overcome much of its historical baggage from WW2 with more than 60% of respondents in Laos, Vietnam, Indonesia and Cambodia indicating that it plays a positive role in the region. Despite considerable amounts of aid having been provided to Myanmar during the course of the past half century it would appear that Japan’s historical wartime role in the country has not been so easily forgiven by 341
the Myanmarese as only 23.1% of respondents from Myanmar believed that Japan plays a positive role in the region. While China fared reasonably well in Laos, Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia, more negative perceptions were particularly evident in Cambodia where 47.1% of respondents answered that China does not play a positive role in the region. Here again, history continues to mark its influence as the support provided by China to the genocidal Khmer Rouge during the Third Indochina War has likely influenced the answers of the respondents from Cambodia. Meanwhile, out of the three powers that the respondents were questioned about it was the role of the United States that was the most critically perceived in the region with an average of only 39.05% of respondents (from all ten of the ASEAN countries) indicating a belief that America played a positive role in the region. Again, the region’s history may have influenced the respondent’s answers to the question as the most critical category of survey participants were from Laos where 74.2% were either ‘unsure’ or felt that America did not play a positive role. Meanwhile, 41.2% of the Indonesian sample specifically stated that the United States did not play a positive role in the region.
Figure 8.6. Communal Perceptions of Japan, China and the United States
70% Does Japan play a positive role in your region?
60% Does China play a positive role in your region?
50% Does America play a positive role in your region? 40%
66% 65% 66% 64% 64% 61% 30% 58% 59%
50% 51% 51% 49% 49% 43% 41% 41% Percentage Answering 'Yes' 20% 39% 39% 35% 34% 33% 29% 31% 31% 26% 24% 23% 10%
0% Laos Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Myanmar Vietnam Cambodia Singapore Thailand What is your country of citizenship?
Source: Compiled by author 342
The data discussed above provides some support to the notion that history (through examples of positive and negative interaction) continues to influence the long‐term shape of perceptions and thereby collective identity formation (including social identity theory1145) within the different communities of Southeast Asia. To varying degrees, Figure 8.7 below indicates a further differentiation of perception between the communal and elite perceptions. Thus, within the elite survey sample, it is interesting to note that when asked a slightly different question (e.g. ‘Does American foreign policy play a positive role in your region?’) there was an increase in the percentage of ‘Yes’ responses of between 19.8% and 29.8% for the respondents from Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. China and Japan also averaged better scores within the elite survey sample. Interestingly, the elite respondents from Myanmar were only prepared to answer the question on Japan while the single government respondent from Brunei only answered the questions on Japan and China but left the question on the US blank.
1145 As stated in Chapter III, Social Identity Theory (SIT) considers how different communities relate with each other based on absolute gain (the ‘We’ groups) and relative gain (the ‘Other’ groups). Here, the analysis of perceptions regarding ‘foreign powers’ forms but one of many ‘factors’ contributing to an overall system of identification, the sum-total of which may either contribute to or detract from the emergence of a collective identity. As discussed in the conceptual chapters, other factors that may contribute to the emergence of a collective identity include knowledge, trust and the frequency of interaction (which may lead to socialisation). 343
Figure 8.7. Elite Perceptions of Exogenous Foreign Policies
Does Japan's foreign policy play a 100 postive role in your region? Does China's foreign policy play a positive role in your region? Does American foreign policy play a 80 positive role in your region?
60
100 100 100 % % %
84% 86% 40 82% 73% 71% 71% 68% 67% 67% 67% 67% 58% Percentage Answering 'Yes'
47% 43% 43% 43% 20 42% 42%
29% 29% 27% 25% 27%
14%
0 Myanmar Philippines Laos Indonesia Cambodia Brunei Malaysia Vietnam Singapore Thailand What is your country of citizenship?
Source: Compiled by author
While the potential for bias within the elite sample may account for the higher ‘average’ of positive perceptions it would also be interesting for a future study to examine how shifts in the proportion of ethnic and religious groups represented within the political elite of a state (e.g. Singapore) may affect the patterns of ‘perceptions’ relevant in the ‘we‐feeling’ approach to security community formation. In the meantime however, and in the context of the entire communal sample (819 surveys), an examination of the data split on the basis of religion revealed no significant statistical deviation in regard to perceptions of foreign powers. Meanwhile, an examination of the data split on the basis of ethnicity corroborated the results above with Laotians and the Chinese Singaporeans, for example, holding the most favourable perceptions regarding the role of China.1146
Regional perceptions on the role of major exogenous actors also led to a second insight regarding the ‘we‐feeling’ approach to security community formation. The strategic alignments of the region help to reveal not just the extent but the ease with which the
1146 For further details, see the pie charts and graphs listed in Appendix 8.2. 344
Southeast Asian governments are likely to identify with one another. As Chapter IV alluded to, the extent to which the ASEAN states were originally aligned towards their colonisers had long‐term consequences for regional cooperation and trust. With these considerations in mind the elite level survey was also constructed in a manner that tested such perceptions by asking each of the elite respondents to rank, in order of importance, their ‘country’s three greatest strategic allies’. The results of the survey responses are listed in Table 8.3 below and further details of the analysis are provided in Appendix 8.3.
Table 8.3. Strategic Allies by Overall Rank1147
Country Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Singapore United States (20%) Indonesia (12.5%) Australia (12.5%) Malaysia Indonesia (28.21%) Brunei (23.08%) Thailand (20.51%) Indonesia United States (20.68%) Malaysia (13.79%) Japan (13.79%) The Philippines Indonesia (20.34%) United States (13.56%) Singapore (13.56%) Thailand Singapore (22.58%) Malaysia (19.35%) United States (12.90%) Cambodia Malaysia (16.67%) Singapore (16.67%) China (11.11%) Myanmar * Laos (33.33%) Malaysia (33.33%) Thailand (33.33) Laos Vietnam (35.71%) China (21.42%) Cambodia (14.28%) Brunei * Malaysia (33.33%) Singapore (33.33%) Indonesia (33.33%) Vietnam Laos (33.33%) China (16.67%) Singapore (16.67%)
Source: Compiled by author
The strategic importance of the United States (e.g. Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand) and China (e.g. Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam) is not surprising given the dissertation’s discussion of the region’s history in chapters four and five. Beyond these historical alignments however, the figures were fairly favourable as far as the prospects for political integration and cooperation were concerned. Only Singapore and Indonesia listed
1147 The ranks were calculated on the basis of total frequency for all three responses within the survey. Where there are more than one response with equal frequency then the rank was weighted against the ‘respondents’ preference for rank. See Appendix 8.3 for details. Note: As stated in Chapter 1, and due to the difficulties of obtaining data from elites in the more authoritarian countries, there are ‘insignificant’ samples for Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia. Therefore, where the frequencies for rank repeat then a rudimentary assessment of rank has been determined by the actual preferences for rank listed by the comparatively small sample of respondents within those countries. 345
two non‐ASEAN states as a part of their three most important strategic allies and in the case of Myanmar, Brunei and Malaysia only ASEAN states fell within the top three rankings.
Interestingly, two government respondents from Laos alternatively listed Cuba and Russia in their top three rankings. Meanwhile, a Singapore respondent (academic) listed Myanmar as one of Singapore’s three most important strategic allies. Finally, when the responses were ranked in terms of the total percentage of each country listed as a strategic ally, the Philippines was the least recognised state receiving only 1% of the total number of responses while other countries such as China and Australia received respective scores of 8% and 6% (see Appendix 8.3 for details). In regard to the Philippines, the statistical analysis in later sections will provide further evidence in support of Donald Weatherbee’s contention that the Philippines has historically been, and continues to be, an outlier to the region.1148 Meanwhile, and as will be seen below, the data is far less equivocal in regard to an emerging divide between elite level perceptions regarding the principle of non‐interference and the possibility of diplomatic interventions in the internal affairs of other ASEAN member states.
Convergence/Divergence in the application of the ‘ASEAN Way’
Chapters four and five outlined how various principles including non‐interference, national and regional resilience, and an absolute right of sovereignty emerged in the context of what has been labelled the ASEAN way. The chapters that followed outlined how various events in the region, such as instability in Myanmar, the haze and the economic crisis have entrenched a belief, within some branches of the ASEAN elite, of the limited effectiveness of ASEAN in the absence of normative change. Thus, and in 2002, Thailand’s deputy foreign minister, Sukhumbhand Paribatra, maintained at a conference entitled ‘ASEAN in the New Millennium’ that ASEAN would eventually have to give up its ‘sacred’ tradition of non‐ interference in each other’s affairs, ‘otherwise regional integration will not be able to move forward’.1149 As the second section in this chapter also contended, the proposal for a
1148 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p.11.
1149 Quoted in: Solingen, "ASEAN Cooperation: The Legacy of the Economic Crisis," p.16. 346
security community and an ASEAN charter reflect, to varying degrees, a growing acceptance of the necessity for such change by some of the region’s political elite. Consequently, it is with little surprise that the region’s elite were significantly divided over the question of whether the principle of non‐interference is as important now as it was a decade ago. As illustrated by Figure 8.8 below, 46.7% of elite respondents for this question answered ‘yes’, 39.13% ‘no’ and 14.13% were ‘unsure’. Significantly, 54.84% of the ‘elite sample’ envisioned circumstances ‘where some ASEAN member‐states could be justified in diplomatically intervening in the internal affairs of another member‐state or states’. Further, the percentage of those who questioned the continued prevalence of ‘non‐interference’ rose to 51.43% when narrowed to the ‘academic respondents’ and 66.67% of these respondents also envisioned that ‘diplomatic interventions’ could be justified (see Appendix 8.4).
Figure 8.8. Non-Interference and ‘Diplomatic Interventions’
Source: Compiled by author
The difficulty of obtaining ‘bias‐free’ data on the more ‘sensitive’ questions in the survey was evident in the context of questions on ‘democracy’ and in a later investigation of perceptions regarding the ‘principle of non‐interference’ and ‘diplomatic interventions’. For example, out of the entire elite survey sample 69.89% of respondents indicated that they lived in a democracy, 88.04% said that democracy was important to their country’s stability, 347
and 95.70% said that democracy was personally important to them.1150 Figure 8.9 below shows the percentage of ‘Yes’ responses in the elite survey sample divided on the basis of ‘citizenship’ (country). Here, even the more authoritarian countries of Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar indicated ‘Yes’ response rates of between 60% and 100% for all three questions on the issue of democracy. The most notable exception displayed in the data below was the case of Cambodia where only 14.3% of the elite Cambodian respondents indicated that they lived in a democracy. Interestingly, the single ‘government’ respondent from Brunei was not prepared to provide a response on the first and third questions while all the three respondents from Myanmar answered ‘yes’ to all three of the democracy questions.
Figure 8.9. ‘Democracy’ as an Indicator of ‘Elite Sample’ Bias
Source: Compiled by author
1150 For details see Appendix 8.5. 348
Given these considerations, a statistically valid illustration of the influence of perceptions regarding democracy on normative change in ASEAN is somewhat problematic. Nonetheless, the data above suggests relatively less ‘bias’ within the minority group of elites who indicated ‘no’ to whether or not they lived in a democracy. Consequently, some verification of this hypothesis is provided by the nature of their responses to the question of ‘non‐interference’. As indicated by Chart (a) in the Figure 8.7 below, within this ‘group’ of respondents the percentage who answered that the ‘principle of non‐interference’ was no longer as important as it was a decade ago’ rose from 39.13% to 53.33%. Similarly, as in Chart (b) below, when the case study was further filtered to include only those individuals who indicated that ‘yes, democracy is important to them’ and that ‘no, they do not live in a democracy’ the percentage of respondents who questioned the continued prevalence of non‐interference rose to 56%.
Figure 8.10. The Influence of ‘Democracy’ on Normative Perceptions
Chart (a): Do you believe that the Principle of Non-interference is as important Chart (b): Do you believe that the Principle of Non-interference is as important now as it was a decade ago? now as it was a decade ago? Do you believe that you live in a democracy?: No Is democracy important to you personally?: Yes, Do you believe that you live in a democracy?: No 60 60
50 50
40 40
30 30 Percent
53.85% Percent 56.00%
20 20 30.77% 28.00% 10 10 15.38% 16.00%
0 0 Yes No Unsure Yes No Unsure
Source: Compiled by author
While some of these statistics may lend support to Donald Emmerson’s claim, that the greatest challenge to ASEAN’s identity lays in the possible emergence of a democratic/authoritarian divide,1151 such an ideational divide is also illustrated through a
1151 Emmerson, "Security, Community, and Democracy in Southeast Asia: Analysing ASEAN," p.177. In a similar context, Etel Solingen has also argued that ‘the growing gap between democracies and non-democracies’ 349
further ‘qualitative’ analysis of elite perceptions regarding the proposal for a security community. In this regard, another officer from the ASEAN Secretariat explained that (as with SEANWFZ) there have been two interpretations of the meaning of democracy.1152 This is illustrated in the account of a senior scholar from the Institute of International Relations within Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs who stated that ‘the Bali Concord does not mean a common concept of democracy … it was [advocated] in relation to the political development of the region’.1153
In regard to a possible dichotomy (and ambiguity) regarding the interpretation of recent ASEAN agreements and the subsequent commitment that they require, it is informative to note the reflections of a scholar from the University of Brunei Darussalam. In a paper presented to the 2007 Asia Pacific Roundtable Conference in Kuala Lumpur, Haja Sainah Haji Saim commented that ‘as members of ASEAN, we need to know into what agreement our country has entered; in what sort of agreement our country has signed; … However we are not transparent enough and not knowledgeable enough’.1154 As Noel Morada states, ‘there is a disparity in conceptions about the meaning of an ASEAN Security Community, it means different things to different people and we even wonder if some of the newer states even fully understood what they were signing onto when they agreed to the ASEAN Security Community’.1155 Meanwhile, a retired Admiral from Indonesia somewhat more cynically
in the region ‘has also brought issues of intervention to the fore’. Solingen, "ASEAN Cooperation: The Legacy of the Economic Crisis," p.16.
1152 Interview with M.C. Abad Jr., ARF Unit Director (ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta), 20 April 2006.
1153 Interview with Luan Thuy Dong, Director – Southeast Asian Studies Center, Institute of International Relations (Hanoi, Vietnam), 7 July 2005. Another researcher within the IIR added the caveat that the ‘Indonesian version of democracy has to be limited to social harmony’. Interview with Nguyen Nam Duong, Institute of International Relations (Hanoi, Vietnam), 7 July 2005.
1154 Dr. Hajah is a professor at University Brunei Darussalam. Hajah Haji Saim Sainah, "The ASEAN Socio- Cultural Community: How Best to Achieve It?" in 21st Asia Pacific Roundtable Conference: Strengthening Comprehensive and Cooperative Security in the Asia Pacific (Kuala Lumpur: ISIS Malaysia, 2007), p.3.
1155 Interview with Noel Morada, University of the Philippines (Manila), 18 November 2005. 350
argues that a ‘security community means different things to different people; to increase your security is to decrease my security’.1156
While it may be true that recent references to ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’ and other developments (such as Myanmar) reflect an evolution in the norms of ASEAN,1157 the collective picture generated by the survey data, interviews and general research indicates that such a phenomenon has unevenly developed. Thus, as is indicated in the previous section, the strongest advocates of change have been the more democratic countries (e.g. the Philippines and Indonesia) while the relatively less democratic countries (such as Brunei, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar) have been the most critical of such change.1158 Some insight on the thinking on the authoritarian side of the divide was provided by the Director of the Cambodian Institute of Cooperation and Peace, Dr. Chap Sotharith, who argues that ‘there is a dilemma between democracy and authoritarianism. For example, there is a strong authoritarian element in both Malaysia and Singapore but it is because of this that the two countries are so stable … The Centre for Human Rights has been preaching democracy, freedom of speech and the empowerment of the people. But again, how do you
1156 Interview with Admiral Sunardi (Jakarta), 4 May 2006. A professor from Malaysia, Dato Zakaria Ahmad, raises another element of ambiguity within the ASEAN Security Community project: ‘So we know the ASEAN security community is not meant to be a defence pact or a defence alliance. But what we don’t know is [what] … it doesn’t do. Where would the five power defence arrangement be allowable within the notion of a security community, does it mean that they are free to have relationships with external governments like between the US and Singapore or between Myanmar and China?’ Interview with Dato’ Zakaria Ahmad, Help University College (Kuala Lumpur), 27 May 2006.
1157 Katsumata, Why ASEAN Criticised Myanmar (cited).
1158 According to Herman Kraft, ‘on the security community project, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore were together in the middle. Indonesia and the Philippines wanted more while Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Myanmar wanted to maintain the status quo. Meanwhile, Brunei remained silent. Vietnam might be keen over legally binding issues in relation to the South China Sea but not on ASEAN as a more binding arrangement’. Interview with Herman Kraft, University of the Philippines (Manila), 15 November 2005. By contrast, Jose Cenabre and Jesse Pascasio from the Philippine navy stated that ‘Brunei was very vocal in its objection against the Indonesian Plan of Action. The first objection was on the issue of a regional peacekeeping force’. This was fist brokered by Indonesia because of its experience over East Timor. Both Malaysia and Brunei objected to this because of issues of sovereignty’. Interview with Jose Cenabre and Jesse Pascasio, Headquarters Philippines Navy (Manila), 22 November 2005. 351
empower farmers? How do they know what is in the interests of the country and its people?’1159
The Key Foundations in the Test of a ‘Community’: The Extent of Trust and Perceptions of Long-term Peace in Southeast Asia
Various differences in perception over economic cooperation and integration, comprehensive security, strategic orientations, normative values and level of value placed on democracy have a cumulative effect on the degree to which different states and communities identity with each other. The development of a collective identity can be understood as even less likely given the divergent and turbulent histories many of the Southeast Asian states have endured. These considerations notwithstanding, the conceptual framework in chapters two and three outlined how the emergence of a security community would be reflected in a significant level of trust and the relinquishment of the use of force to resolve differences. Given these considerations both the communal level survey and the elite level survey sought to examine perceptions of trust throughout Southeast Asia. The elite level survey, moreover, also sought to examine perceptions regarding the likelihood of conflict during the course of the foreseeable future.
On the issue of trust, when the participants in the communal survey sample were asked whether they believed that they ‘can trust all the countries in Southeast Asia to be good neighbours’ 37.47% responded ‘yes’. Of some concern however was that 36.09% were ‘unsure’ while 26.44% answered ‘no’ to the question.1160 As indicated by the graph below, the three countries where the respondents trust the region the most were the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. In the context of the ‘No’ responses, the three countries that were the most distrusting were Myanmar, Singapore and Indonesia.1161 However, the most
1159 Sotharith adds that the security community ‘proposal contained many sensitive issues such as democracy and human rights. It is difficult for a one party country’. Interview with Dr Chap Sotharith, Director of the Cambodian Institute of Cooperation and Peace (Phnom Penh, Cambodia), 25 July 2005.
1160 For details see Appendix 8.4.
1161 As stated in Chapter I under the section entitled ‘Research Approach’ the small sample for Myanmar was obtained from Myanmarese expatriates working in Singapore. Whether or not they have been socialised into a sense of trust by local interactions and the media remains an open question. 352
disconcerting statistics arose from the respondents within the elite survey sample. When forced to provide only a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to the question of ‘trust’, 59.79 percent of regional elites said that they couldn’t trust other countries in Southeast Asia to be ‘good neighbours’. Furthermore, when the sample was split between the ‘government’ respondents and the ‘academic’ respondents it was the academics who were the most cynical with 66.7% answering ‘no’ to the question of trust while 55.26% of government respondents answered ‘no’ to the same question.
Figure 8.11. Trust throughout Southeast Asia
Source: Compiled by author
In building on the discussion of ‘trust’, the existence of ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’ is the defining element of a security community and thereby the putative end goal (and end result) of the evolutionary process of transnational integration. Regarding the likelihood of conflict, the responses within the ‘elite sample’ are mediocre at best. When asked whether there were any circumstances where one could envisage armed conflict between two or more ASEAN states, 50% of the total respondents for the elite sample 353
below responded ‘no’ while 22.34% responded ‘yes’ and a further 26.66% were ‘unsure’. Figure 8.12 below outlines the percentages on the same question divided by the respondent’s country of citizenship. While an element of bias may account for the more positive responses in the case of Laos, Myanmar and Brunei, it is interesting to note that the perception of the highest risk of conflict was evident for the respondents from Cambodia (29%), Thailand (42%) and Singapore (47%).1162 Given the level of bias evident in response patterns for earlier questions (e.g. democracy), it is likely that the level of fear regarding the potential for conflict within the region is in reality somewhat higher.
Figure 8.12. Elite Perceptions over the Risk of Conflict
Source: Compiled by author
1162 The Singapore sample was limited to academics as all the government officers approached by the author refused to participate in the survey. Only one government officer from Brunei responded to the elite survey. 354
Deutsch envisioned that in order for a security community to emerge there would first need to be tangible evidence that the members of the community have given up any preparedness to resort to armed violence in the event of disagreement.1163 Consequently, patterns of military expenditure and the undertaking of weapons modernisation programs are informative regarding the ‘threshold test’ of dependable expectations of peaceful change. While the previous chapter outlined how military expenditure initially declined in the wake of the economic crisis, in more recent years a number of the ASEAN states have started to increase their military budgets in the pursuit of military modernisation programs. As illustrated by Figure 8.13 below, sustained increases to the level of military expenditure have been particularly prevalent in Myanmar, Vietnam and Singapore. Interestingly, it was the Singaporean respondents who maintained the highest levels of distrust and, secondly, amongst whom the highest percentage suggested the possibility of armed conflict in Southeast Asia during the course of the next twenty years.
1163 Regional analyst Amitav Acharya also defines a security community as necessitating ‘(a) strict and observed norms concerning non-use of force, with long term prospects of war avoidance; (b) no competitive arms acquisitions and war-planning within the grouping; (c) institutions and processes (formal or informal) for the pacific settlement of disputes; and significant functional interdependence, integration and cooperation’. Amitav Acharya, "A Regional Security Community in Southeast Asia?" Journal of Strategic Studies 18, no. 3 (1995): p.180. 355
Figure 8.13. Southeast Asian Defence Expenditure (US$ Millions)
9,000 8,000
7,000 Singapore 6,000 Myanmar 5,000 Indonesia Millions 4,000 Vietnam
US$ 3,000 Malaysia 2,000 Philippines 1,000 Thailand ‐ 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Statistical information supplied by NBR Analysis, located at www.nbr.org and the ‘Military Balance’1164
While a proportion of the defence expenditure in Southeast Asia has undoubtedly been motivated by continued domestic instability and local insurgencies1165 not all increases in the figure above can be attributed to such domestic intentions.1166 Singapore, for example, does not have any significant internal threats other than an occasional concern regarding domestic terrorist plots (Chapter VII). Yet one of the most prominent issues for potential conflict raised by the analysis in previous chapters relates to Singapore’s somewhat
1164 "East Asia and Australasia," The Military Balance 107, no. 1 (2007).
1165 In relation to the impact of internal security concerns to defence expenditure in some countries see: Sheldon W. Simon, "Southeast Asia's Defence Needs: Change or Continuity?" in Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernisation in an Era of Uncertainty, ed. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Seattle, Washington: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005).
1166 See for example, the arguments of Hartfiel and Job who contend, inter alia, that ‘[t]here are indeed competitive arms acquisition processes underway among Southeast Asian states, for sustaining technological dominance (on Singapore’s part) and/or numerical equivalence’. Robert Hartfiel and Brian L. Job, "Raising the Risks of War: Defence Spending Trends and Competitive Arms Processes in Southeast Asia," The Pacific Review 20, no. 1 (2007): p.15. See also: Desmond Ball, "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia- Pacific Region," International Security 18, no. 3 (1994): pp.78-112, "East Asia and Australasia," pp.335-336, Andrew Tan, "Force Modernisation Trends in Southeast Asia,” (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2004). 356
turbulent relationship with Malaysia. It is in light of this history that Singapore has officially implemented the strategy of ‘Total People’s Defence’. The core element of this strategy is the deterrence of Malaysia incorporating a five pronged approach including psychological defence, social defence, economic defence, civil defence and military defence.1167 Further, Singapore now maintains the reputation of owning the best trained and most equipped defence force in Southeast Asia. By 1998, it had reputedly developed the capacity to mobilise 323,000 active and reservist troops in less than six hours.1168 Furthermore, Singapore’s total defence strategy embraces a policy of ‘forward defence’ where, in the event of war, Singapore would aim to secure the water supply in the Malaysian state of Johor and seek to disable the Malaysian armed forces in ‘a brutal and fearless pre‐emptive strike’.1169
Naturally, traditional security threats are not the only issues generating distrust and animosity within the region. For the purpose of understanding some of the causal elements to such distrust and considerations regarding the ‘risk of conflict’, a qualitative analysis of the interview material is, again, insightful. In the context of Thailand, for example, some of the issues raised by the interlocutors as contributing to regional animosity included problems with border demarcation, the burning of the Thai embassy in Cambodia,1170 the history of Thailand’s removal of the ‘Emerald Buddha’ from Laos,1171 Thai customs procedures and unrealistic quality control restrictions against Cambodian goods.1172 In the case of Singapore, by way of another example, some of the complaints regarded continued
1167 Singapore Fact Sheet Series: Defence [Internet] (MITA Publications (Singapore Government), 2002 [cited 26 August 2002]); available from http://www.mita.gov.sg/bksdfc.htm.
1168 Tan, "Intra-ASEAN Tensions," p.195.
1169 Huxley, "Singapore and Malaysia: A Precarious Balance," p.204.
1170 Interview with Ekapong Rimcharone, Office of the National Security Council (Bangkok), 20 February 2006.
1171 Interview with Major General Supaluck Suvarnajata, Army Specialist (Bangkok), 18 February 2006.
1172 Interview with Lay Vannak, ASEAN Department, Office of the Council of Ministers (Phnom Penh), 29 July 2005. Interview with Sisowath Chanto and Ou Virak, Pannasastra University (Phnom Penh), 30 July 2005. 357
problems over the construction of a new bridge between Malaysia and Singapore,1173 Singaporean land reclamation projects, allegations that Singapore is protecting economic criminals from Indonesia,1174 and allegations that it is complicit in smuggling and sea piracy through the re‐registration of stolen ships.1175 More broadly, and in relation to immigrant workers, for example, elites in the Philippines complained about the treatment of Filipino workers in Singapore1176 while Indonesians complained about the treatment and deportation of their workers from Malaysia.1177
Aside from the continued influence of history on regional perceptions, a common complaint was the frequency of recourse to self‐interested behaviour at the expense of the collective interests of the region.1178 For example, a very senior Foreign Affairs spokesperson from Cambodia complained in interview that ‘one thing that really upsets us is that whenever there is any disagreement, whenever there is a difference of opinion, then Thailand marches its troops and tanks right up to our border and then points them at us. What kind of neighbour does that?’1179 These comments were made in the context of continued territorial disputes with Thailand and were also likely influenced by the propensity of Thai troops to shoot Cambodians illegally crossing the border into Thailand for work.1180 A
1173 Interview with Rahmat Mohammed, Duty Vice Chancellor University Technology Mara (Kuala Lumpur), 2 June 2006.
1174 Interview with Admiral Sunardi, (Jakarta), 4 May 2006. Interview with Interview with Ikrar Nusu Bakti, LIPI, 2 May 2006
1175 Interview with Ikrar Nusu Bakti, LIPI, 2 May 2006.
1176 Interview with Aileen Baviera, University of the Philippines (Manila), 17 November 2005, Interview with Ross Quisao, Department of Labour and Employment (Manila, Philippines), 23 November 2005.
1177 Interview with Ikrar Nusu Bakti, LIPI, 2 May 2006. Interview with Dick Sofjan, UNDP (Jakarta), 2 May 2006.
1178 Interview with Lay Vannak, ASEAN Department, Office of the Council of Ministers (Phnom Penh), 29 July 2005. Interview with Maj. General Krekphong Pukprayrura, Thai Police (Bangkok), 22 February 2006.
1179 Interview with senior foreign affairs spokesperson, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Cambodia), 30 July 2005.
1180 On the issue of Cambodian workers, Chap Sotharith stated ‘ten Cambodian’s have been shot by Thailand’s border guard when trying to cross for work this year alone’. Interview with Chap Sotharith, Director of the Cambodian Institute of Cooperation and Peace (Phnom Penh), 25 July 2005. 358
further factor that may also explain the level of mistrust in the region is a tendency of political elites (from most ASEAN states) to pander to their domestic constituencies at the expense of regional relations. In regard to such tactics, there needs to be greater emphasis on long‐term collective gain (cooperation) rather than a short‐term pursuit of self‐interests and competitive behaviour. However, implementing effective change to the historical patterns of behaviour of the region’s elite is easier said than done. As the next section will evidence, at the communal level of analysis there is only a low level of knowledge regarding ASEAN and the Southeast Asian region. In the absence of an integrated regional identity segments of the political elite will continue to benefit from practices of scape‐goating ‘other’ ASEAN states along with their ethnic and religious communities. The challenges facing ASEAN in its pursuit of a security community was aptly summarised by a government officer from Cambodia in the following manner:
From my point of view it is very hard to build this security community because there is a lack of trust between ASEAN members and also a distinct lack of military transparency. Some members increase expenditure on their military every year even though there is no apparent threat but once you increase expenditure then weaker states feel a distinct threat from these expanding states. Some ASEAN countries want a blue sea navy. This is the case with both Indonesia and Thailand. Can we be a security community if we don’t feel that ASEAN is secure? In this region the countries put first their own national interests and regional interests are a distant second place.1181
Knowledge and Interaction at the Grassroots Level of Analysis
As a consequence of the investigative tasks and the nature of the research conducted, much of the analysis has focused on questions of security and on the political and economic relations of Southeast Asia. As the conceptual framework in earlier chapters noted, in the long‐term bottom‐up (communal driven) processes may also contribute to the emergence of a security community and in this regard the frequency and quality of interactions between individuals within Southeast Asia at the grassroots level is an important consideration for
1181 Interview with Lay Vannak, ASEAN Department (Cambodian Council of Ministers) 29 July 2005. 359
investigation.1182 While a larger study might focus more significantly on the nature of grassroots interaction the section here seeks to provide a rudimentary assessment of some of the basic indicators in regard to the extent of communal level integration. It is also hoped that some of the data outlined below will also help to further contextualise other components of the analysis in the dissertation.
In December 2005 a survey of ‘ASEAN’s citizens and residents’ was conducted on a collaborative basis between several regional papers with some of the results including the suggestion that 60.3% of the respondents believed that they identified with one another and that 40% of the respondents had travelled to other countries in region.1183 In response to these extraordinary results, the Jakarta Post declared that ‘[t]he poll shows that some four decades after ASEAN’s formation in 1967, a distinctive regional spirit is emerging among the peoples of the region’.1184 However, as K. Kesavapany, the Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, reflects, ‘… my own feeling is that the consciousness is there among the ruling elite in capital cities. Much more needs to be done to integrate the places elsewhere’. He later adds that the ‘ASEAN countries also have to agree on a set of core values so that everyone knows what the grouping stands for. I am afraid that a lot more work needs to be done before one can, with all honesty, say that ASEAN integration is well and truly in place’.1185
1182 However, the issue of trust at the communal level was dealt with in the previous section.
1183 People in Region See Common Identity [Internet] (The Star Online, 2005 [cited 27 December 2005]); available from http://thestar.com.my. According to a Straits Times article regarding the ‘Asiapoll’ ‘over 1,000 English-speaking, urban respondents were polled in one-to-one interviews, via email and over the phone from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. In Singapore, a larger sized representative sample of over 400 people was conducted by this newspaper’s research department’. Shefali Rekhi, "ASEAN Identity Getting Stronger, Says Regional Poll," The Straits Times, 5 December 2005.
1184 Emphasis by Author. "Being ASEAN Citizens," The Jakarta Post, 12 December 2005.
1185 Yasmin Lee Arpon et al., "ASEAN’s Quest for an Identity Gains Urgency," The Straits Times, 5 December 2005, Isagani Yambot et al., "Quest for Identity," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 18 December 2005. 360
The fact that the majority of the ‘communal level’ survey data came from ASEAN’s capital cities1186 means that the research conducted for the present dissertation is also very likely to be skewed towards individuals with greater interaction and awareness of ASEAN. Nonetheless, the level of knowledge and interaction within the region indicated by the survey data does appear to be relatively more realistic. For example, while Figure 8.14 illustrates that 52.05% of respondents considered themselves to have either a ‘very good’ or ‘reasonable’ knowledge of ASEAN, 38.37% of respondents indicated that they didn’t really know what ASEAN does and 8.29% stated that they had never heard of the Association prior to participating in the survey.
Figure 8.14. Communal Level Knowledge of ‘ASEAN’
Source: Compiled by author
More specifically, and while no individual country had a significant frequency (or mode) of response for the option that ‘they knew ASEAN well’, the countries who felt they ‘understood ASEAN reasonably well’ (as calculated by ‘mode’) were Laos (41.9%), Cambodia
1186 92.1% of the respondents lived in a city of 20,000 people or more. 361
(42.5%), the Philippines (52.3%), Indonesia (52.3%) and Vietnam (52.8%).1187 The countries with the highest frequency of responses for those who ‘didn’t feel that they really knew what ASEAN does’ (but had at least heard of the Association) were Myanmar and, somewhat surprisingly, Thailand (35.4%), Singapore (50.8%), Malaysia (56.1%), and Brunei (58.3%).1188 Further, and in contrast to the level of knowledge displayed in Vietnam (inter alia), a Straits Times ‘straw poll’ found that only 12.5% of Singaporean teenagers ‘knew what the acronym ASEAN stood for and could name the 10 countries in the grouping’.1189 To varying degrees these figures provide added weight to the importance of ASEAN’s plan to implement a greater level of education about the organisation in the schools of Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, and on a positive note, 29.26% of respondents felt that the Association can most appropriately be described as a body that ‘maintains friendly relations between states’ while a further 32.59 percent considered ASEAN to be an organisation whose role embraces all four of the positive categories listed within the chart.
Meanwhile, when asked ‘which of the following countries form a part of your region?’ the survey participants demonstrated only a moderate ability to differentiate between the Southeast Asian countries and the countries outside the region (Figure 8.15 below). Further, at a level of analysis where the data has been separated by ‘country’, what is most interesting is that the notion of region within the survey sample is yet to extend beyond the neighbouring countries of each respondent. For example, with Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, a ‘Yes’ score of 60% was only reached in the case of their neighbouring (contiguous) countries. Meanwhile, the countries that demonstrated the narrowest understanding of ‘region’ (where the percentage of ‘yes’ responses did not reach 50% for
1187 For details see Appendix 8.6.
1188 These results, in particular, were somewhat contrary to what was expected. Whether or not the respondents within some of the countries of the first group somehow felt more inhibited to express a lack of knowledge regarding ASEAN due to, for example, cultural considerations (such as a loss of face) could potentially be an issue that a later study could investigate further.
1189 Peh Shing Huei, "Forge ASEAN Identity? Make Membership Worthwhile First," The Straits Times, 16 December 2005. 362
any of the ASEAN countries) were Brunei, Myanmar and the Philippines.1190 By contrast, the broadest notion of the ASEAN region was ingrained within Singapore and, somewhat surprisingly, Vietnam. Applying the benchmark response rate of 60%, the Singaporean respondents envisioned Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and Thailand as a part of their region while the Vietnamese participants listed all the ASEAN countries as a part of their region.1191
Figure 8.15. Communal Perceptions of ‘Region’
Source: Compiled by author
1190 In the case of Brunei, the most significant response was provided in relation to Malaysia where 26% of participants believed the country to be a part of their region. For Myanmar, the highest response rates were in relation to China (43%) and Thailand (50%). Meanwhile, and in the case of the Philippines, 46% listed Malaysia, 39% Indonesia, 40% Singapore, 37% Thailand and 30% Vietnam.
1191 For further details see Appendix 8.7. 363
In relation to interactions and transactions, a key component of the theoretical philosophy that informed the ASEAN project, 49.3 percent of respondents within the author’s ‘communal survey’ had previously travelled to another ASEAN country. Further, in relation to the drivers behind interaction, a relatively positive result was the fact that 51.2% of respondents had family and 49.6% had friends in ‘other countries’.1192 An outline of the results for all three categories of questions (on a country‐by‐country basis) is provided in graph below. Here the results reflect the geographical location of some of the ASEAN capital cities. In the case of Brunei, Singapore, and Laos, their capital cities border with other ASEAN states and inter‐state travel is therefore cheap and convenient by way of land transport and/or ferry. As stated in the research approach section the Myanmarese respondents were expatriates working in Singapore and as such the fact that only 64% indicated they had travelled to other countries is somewhat of an anomaly. The lower percentages in the ‘yes’ responses for the remaining countries is, in turn, a consequence of their capital cities being more isolated from neighbouring states. The one exception to this pertained to the Filipino respondents with over 80 percent indicating that they had family in other countries. This is a natural consequence of the Philippines being the largest exporter of labour in Southeast Asia.
1192 See Appendixes 8.8 and 8.9 for further details. 364
Figure 8.16. Travel, Family and Friends in Southeast Asia Terrorism
Source: Compiled by author
An understanding of the frequency of interaction provides further enlightenment on the potential for bottom‐up processes to contribute to the development of an ASEAN community. As mentioned, 49.3% of respondents had previously travelled to another country. However, of the respondents who had travelled to other ASEAN countries, only 37.8% (18.63% of the total sample) indicated that they would usually conduct such travel on (at least) an annual basis.1193 Figure 8.17 below has divided the responses on the basis of country of citizenship and displays the percentages for the respondents who had selected the option that they expect to travel only ‘1‐5 times’ in their life. The data indicates the citizens in Malaysia (66%), Cambodia (68%), Indonesia (69%), Thailand (72%) and Vietnam (76%) anticipate fairly infrequent interaction
1193 However, and in contrast to these figures, the AsiaPoll survey stated that 43.4% of their respondents planned to travel to another ASEAN country in the next six months. People in Region See Common Identity (cited). 365
with other ASEAN citizens on the basis of international travel. Further, there appears to be only a loose connection (if at all) between the frequency of travel and the level of trust in the region. In the case of both Thailand and Indonesia, the low frequency of interaction corresponds with a high level of trust. However, Malaysians also indicated a low frequency of travel but they maintained one of the best response rates for ‘trust’ in the region. Meanwhile, the Singaporeans indicated that they are one of the most frequent categories of travellers but they simultaneously represented the second highest group for the category of ‘distrust’.
Figure 8.17. Percentage of ‘Infrequent’ International Travellers
Source: Compiled by author
The communal level survey also examined the frequency of newspaper readership along with how regularly the respondents watched the news on television. The statistics in Figure 8.18 below have been split on the basis of citizenship and displays the percentage of respondents 366
who indicated that they viewed the news on television and/or read a newspaper ‘usually on a daily basis’. On the question of newspaper readership the respondents from Myanmar, the Philippines and Laos maintained the lowest percentages while the respondents from Myanmar, Brunei and Cambodia were the lowest regarding the frequency of viewing the news on television. These figures do not seem to indicate a statistically significant effect on the level of trust and knowledge in the region. For example, while the Malaysians participants indicated a fairly strong exposure to both newspapers and television news, they indicated a perception of ‘region’ that did not extend beyond their immediate neighbours. Further, while the Indonesian respondents were significantly exposed to ‘news’ in the regional media, they were the most ‘distrusting’ respondents in the survey sample.1194
Figure 8.18. Television News and Newspaper Readership Patterns
Source: Compiled by author
1194 For details see Appendix 8.10. 367
Two primary observations arise out of the analysis in this section. The first is that the level of interaction within the region does not seem to have any significant positive correlation with the categories of ‘trust’, ‘the knowledge of ASEAN’, or ‘perceptions of region’. The ambiguity of the figures calls for further research and a larger sample on the role of various facets of regional interaction. In the meantime, some factors that may explain the data include the limited focus in local news services on events in the region,1195 the particular countries respondents travel to (not just the frequency of travel), and the nature and quality of interaction (e.g. positive or negative). Moving beyond theories of transactionalism and/or socialisation, the second set of observations is relatively more concrete in as far as the implications to the existence of a community are concerned. Firstly, the participants in the survey did not indicate any significant understanding of a ‘Southeast Asian’ region and the level of knowledge on ASEAN was also marginal given that the sample primarily came from people in the Southeast Asian capitals. Secondly, the period of membership in ASEAN has not positively affected the ascertainable levels of affinity, kinship and trust extant within Southeast Asia. How these observations connect with the broader picture presented by the chapter are considered in the conclusion below.
Conclusions
While the first section outlined a number of limitations to the extent of economic cooperation and integration in the region thus far, the economic pillar still remains one of the most likely areas for success in the future. Not only will the Southeast governments acquire greater ‘performance legitimacy’ (and thus regime security) by advancing the level of economic wealth, but economic cooperation and integration does not immediately entail the types of political reform that might necessitate democratic change and/or the relinquishment of power. Given the authoritarian status of most of the ASEAN member governments, the principles of non‐interference and consensus‐based decision making will likely remain in place for the foreseeable future. At best, in the forthcoming ASEAN Charter
1195 The nature of this problem was raised by Noel Morada. Interview with Noel Morada, University of the Philippines (Manila), 18 November 2005. 368
the ASEAN members may agree to a ‘legally binding’ decision making processes but, again, the continued application of ‘consensus’ will ensure that no ASEAN member will be forced to implement agreements that are contrary to their own national interests. Simply put, before consensus and non‐interference can officially be overruled, the modus operandi currently in place dictates that there must first emerge a ‘consensus’ regarding such change.
Nonetheless, a significant proportion of the regional elite indicated that they no longer believed the principle of non‐interference to be as important as it was a decade ago. Further, and while the democratic states of the Philippines and Indonesia have been the most significant exemplifiers of normative change and political reform within ASEAN, the statistics from the survey data also revealed that elements of the elite in many of the remaining ASEAN countries have also been socialised towards accepting a more active involvement by the ASEAN states in each other’s internal affairs (under appropriate circumstances). However, such perceptions have not uniformly emerged in each country and in some members (e.g. Myanmar) such views would likely represent the opinion of an extreme minority.
Beyond the normative perceptions of the region’s elite, the chapter tested Deutsch’s theory of transactionalism and also examined whether there was any correlation between the frequency of ‘transactions’ (e.g. travel and foreign friends) and the level of knowledge about ASEAN and the Southeast Asian region. During the course of this rudimentary assessment there appeared to be little correlation between the factors examined. Nonetheless, the extent of regional knowledge and the degree of identification between the communities of Southeast Asia indicated by the sample was relatively low for the purpose of the community component of the security community framework. Moreover, the majority of people from the communal survey sample either did not trust or were unsure whether they could trust all the countries in Southeast Asia to be ‘good neighbours’. At such a low level of socio‐ cultural integration (together with an associated absence of affinity and kinship) misunderstandings and misperceptions regarding other states and communities are likely to be more prevalent. Under such circumstances, the region’s elite may (and have) benefited 369
domestically from the generation of negative images (scape‐goating) regarding ‘other’ communities in Southeast Asia (e.g. in the case of Malaysia and Singapore).
Perceptions of trust are also relevant to testing the existence of, or potential for, the emergence of a security community. Importantly, the lowest levels of trust were demonstrated within the elite survey sample with 56.79% of respondents indicating that they could not trust all the Southeast Asian countries to be good neighbours. Even more significantly, the question in the elite survey regarding perceptions of whether or not the respondents could envisage armed conflict in the region (during the course of the next twenty years) directly links to the threshold test of dependable expectations of peaceful change. Here, the fact that half the elite sample were either unsure or could envisage armed conflict falls short of satisfying even the threshold test for a security community. The absence of dependable expectations of peaceful change was also affirmed by regional patterns of military expenditure along with the behaviour and policies of some member states. Just which of the scholarly characterisations of ASEAN corresponds best with the contemporary phenomena, along with the potential for the ASEAN states to overcome the regional impediments to security community formation, forms the subject of analysis in Chapter X. Meanwhile, the next and final substantive chapter returns to the issue of Myanmar but this time in the context of its domestic security environment and the challenge of implementing positive change.
370
Chapter IX
Continued Volatility: Myanmar and the Challenge of Domestic Disorder
As has been argued, the ‘successful’ outcome of the ASEAN proposal to become a security community would be the establishment of a ‘secure’ region where the communities and states of Southeast Asia would exhibit the extent of trust, reciprocity, and cooperation evidenced by the nascent security community of the European Union. Already, Chapter VI provided a substantial review of the challenge of Myanmar’s membership to intra‐ASEAN cohesion, its modus operandi, and international stature. Here, further evidence will be cited to support the contention that no other country challenges ASEAN’s project for a security community more than the example of Myanmar. Consequently, the current chapter primarily focuses on the domestic security environment of the country along with the transnational consequences of domestic instability and weak political structures. The case study is of a nation plagued by the consequences of half a century of instability, poor governance and civil war. Despite considerable pressure from, and attention by, the international community, Myanmar’s economy continues to slide into ruin, the Generals remain in power and the many ethnic minority groups are routinely subjected to some of the worst human rights abuses imaginable. Myanmar is the crucial case study for the security community project.
In relation to the various domestic issues contributing towards instability and poor governance, and in line with the investigative tasks of the study, the first part of this chapter seeks to lay the groundwork for a deeper understanding of some of the empirical and institutional dynamics behind instability in Myanmar. Interdependent with this approach is an analysis of the ‘domestic’ consequences of instability and of the prospects for change. The analysis is further designed to provide some understanding of the linkages between history, instability, ethnic conflict and human rights abuse within the country. Part A concludes with the implementation of the 1989 ceasefire regime between the government 371
and various ethnic armies. Part B focuses on the prospects for internally driven change including such developments as the National Convention and the Roadmap to Democracy, indications of political fractures within the government and the subsequent potential for a coup d’état and the potential role of the oppositions parties along with civil society. Finally, Part C commences with a consideration of the exogenous implications of domestic instability including the transnational issues of HIV/AIDs, refugees, illegal migrants, human trafficking and illicit drugs. Later sections maintain the ‘inter‐state focus’ by examining how the case studies of Myanmar’s bilateral relations with Thailand and China demonstrate a propensity for exploitation in the absence of any sense of community, for the pursuit of self‐ interest at the expense of the region’s collective interests and, most importantly, they also show the continued potential for armed conflict between the states of Southeast Asia.
The necessity of the approach undertaken within this chapter also arises from, and is complemented by, the conceptual components in Chapter III which discussed the need for each member of a potential security community to consolidate internally. The successful internal consolidation of Myanmar, in addition to freeing the resources of the state for the purpose of regional integration, would assist in removing any destabilising transnational factors that have the potential to compromise the comprehensive security of Southeast Asia. The analysis of Myanmar’s internal security environment is also necessary because it provides important background material to inform a preliminary assessment here, and an overall assessment in the next chapter, of the extent to which Myanmar presents an obstacle (both material and normative) to ASEAN’s security community project. Finally, the analysis here of the internal dynamics of the state, together with the perceptions and actions of its leadership, provides an important understanding of the ‘interests’ of the state ‘without which, no theory of international relations can be adequate’.1196
1196 Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, p.14. 372
Part A. The Evolution and Consequences of Domestic Instability and the Prospects for Internal Change
The Challenge of Myanmar’s History to Stability and Change
Broadly speaking, Myanmar underwent three historical phases in its embryonic unification as a single country. During the first phase, parts of Myanmar were inhabited by small settlements as far back as 11,000 years ago. These Palaeolithic and Pro‐Neolithic groups settled along the Irrawaddy Valley and the eastern part of the present‐day Shan State. In the second phase, and between the first century BC and the ninth century AD, the Pyu, speakers of the Tibeto‐Burman languages and followers of Sarvastivada Buddhism, established city‐ kingdoms at Halingyi, Mongamo, Sri Ksetra, and Binnaka. By the eight century, Pye, the former capital of the Pyu, had fallen to the Mons and in the ninth century the Pyu vanished from historical records as a discrete people. The third and final phase in the establishment and incomplete unification of Myanmar was the rise of the Bamar (Burmese) civilisation. Initially, the Bamar established themselves in the northern dry zone, with a small settlement in the present day city of Pagan; eventually they institutionalised Theravada Buddhism as the principal religion throughout much of the country.1197
While the Bamar and their monarchy, at various stages through history, had managed to unify the hub of modern day Myanmar,1198 the country’s ethnic minority groups remained relatively distinct from the Bamar in ‘language, culture, patterns of production, and political traditions’.1199 These differences, together with the tensions that ensued, were further exacerbated by the Bamar’s control of the lush and fertile soil in the lowlands which provided them with the resources sustaining comparatively larger, wealthier and more
1197 Hall, A History of South-East Asia, pp.151-181.
1198 King Anawrahta first unified the hub of modern day Myanmar in 1057 with a central kingdom centred in Pagan. By this time, the Bamar had also institutionalised Theravada Buddhism as the principal religion throughout much of the country.
1199 Than, Myanmar in ASEAN: Regional Cooperation Experience, p.7. See also: "Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority Politics,” (Bangkok/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2003), p.2. 373
hegemonic kingdoms.1200 The lack of integration between the various ethnic identities of Myanmar also contributed to the country’s vulnerability to colonisation by the British Empire.1201 For the purpose of colonisation, and later to maintain control, the British favoured and recruited the Karen, Kachin and Chin ethnic‐groups into the colonial army and administration1202 and this policy fostered ‘minority demands as well as majority resentments’.1203 The level of mistrust and antipathy to emerge between the various ethnic groups in Myanmar degenerated further following the alignment of the Bamar with the Japanese during World War II and the many atrocities against the ethnic minorities that ensued.1204 By the time Myanmar had gained independence in 1948, these ethnic rivalries contributed to the fragmentation of the British installed political system and hampered the stability of the newly independent government.
During the early phase of independence, various initiatives were implemented in an attempt to placate some of the ethnic minority groups. In February 1947, and one month after an accord for independence from the British, the Panglong Agreement was signed.1205 This ‘declaration of intent’ facilitated the granting of autonomy to the Shan, Kachin and Chin provinces. However, the declaration fell well short of covering the 142 ethnic and linguistic
1200 Lande, "Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Accommodation, and Nation-Building in Southeast Asia," p.79.
1201 Robert H. Taylor, "Pathways to the Present," in Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, ed. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor, and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), p.4. Having said this, and during the time when the British imperial forces had initially set up headquarters at the Royal Mandalay Palace, biographer George Scott enquired ‘how far the does the British empire exercise its authority?’ to which the British commander replied ‘as far as the front gate’.
1202 "Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority Politics,” (Bangkok/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2003), p.2. Martin T. Smith, "Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches," in Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, ed. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor, and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), p.64.
1203 Tarling, Nations and States in Southeast Asia, p.29.
1204 "Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority Politics,” (Bangkok/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2003), p.2.
1205 "Burma Briefing: Issues and Concerns,” (Bangkok: Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma, 2004), p.8. 374
groups that comprise one third of the country’s populace.1206 Shortly thereafter, General Aung San, then leader and Prime Minister of Burma, along with the majority of his cabinet, were assassinated under the direction of U Saw. As a leader, General Aung San had been relatively successful in accommodating the needs of the ethnic minorities and the loss of his statesman like presence dealt a severe blow to the unification of Myanmar. Despite this setback, the Government managed to unanimously pass its first constitution on 24 September 1947.1207 While the constitution emphasized the need to accommodate and placate ethnic differences (in line with the approach of General Aung San)1208 a major flaw was the fact that it lacked any mechanism for ethnic representation of the Mon, Chin or Rakhine peoples.1209
In the absence of Aung San’s strong and charismatic leadership, and despite the new Constitution, the domestic stability of Myanmar rapidly declined. First, the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) boycotted the 1947 democratic elections and went underground. Then, in March 1948, and within three months of independence, several thousand members of the newly formed army (Tatmadaw) defected to the BCP. The effect of these events culminated in the Government losing control over the greater part of the country with even Yangon itself soon in threat of falling from Government control.1210 It is in light of this background, and following a further ten years of instability, that in 1958 U Nu ceded
1206 The New ASEANs: Vietnam, Burma, Cambodia and Laos, p.110.
1207 Hall, A History of South-East Asia, p.882. The KNU, however, boycotted the vote and this move may have contributed to the fact that the Karen state, eventually created in 1952, only embraced around twenty-five percent of the Kayin people at the time. Smith, "Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches," p.66.
1208 Camilla Buzzi, Burma - Twelve Years after 1988 [Internet - Report] (Democratic Voice of Burma, 2002 [cited 11 December 2004]); available from http://english.dvb.no/e_docs/143transition1.htm.
1209 Smith, "Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches," p.66.
1210 Hall, A History of South-East Asia, p.884. Martin T. Smith, "Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches," in Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, ed. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor, and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), p.66. As Taylor adds, ‘by the end of the first year of independence, the KNU had also gone into revolt, taking many of the ethnic minority troops which had previously been part of the colonial armed forces underground with it’. Taylor, "Pathways to the Present," p.15. 375
authority to General Ne Win (then army chief of staff) and his ‘caretaker’ military government. In 1960 democratic elections were held and U Nu’s party was returned to office. The win, however, was not without costs. Despite the economic improvement during the two‐year reign by the military, support for U Nu came partly because of the publics’ rejection of the repressive means of the military and this reaction was a complete surprise to its leaders (an experience to be repeated in 1990). Further, U Nu’s promotion of himself as an ‘ideal Buddhist ruler’, together with the practice of Buddhism as a state religion, increased the ideological divide between the Bamar and the various ethnic minority groups (some followers of alternative religions).1211
In 1962, General Ne Win launched a military coup, placed U Nu under house arrest and soon suspended the 1947 constitution. Claiming legitimacy under the semblance of a need to unify and stabilise Myanmar, Ne Win established the ‘Revolutionary Council’ under which he ruled for a further twenty‐six years. Through this Council the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’ was proclaimed and the economy nationalised, all independent newspapers and foreign owned enterprises were banned, and he attempted to isolate the country from external great power influence through membership in the non‐aligned movement.1212 In the immediate years that followed, Ne Win undertook an assimilationist approach to nation‐ building where Bamar became the only permitted medium of instruction in the new (compulsory) primary education system.1213 While government sponsored human rights abuses had occurred prior to this time (such as forced relocations in Bago), this marked the beginning of a new era where the independence of the judiciary, the rule of law, the rights
1211 This was achieved via an amendment to the national constitution in 1961. It is also relevant to note that the people from one of the largest ethnic minority groups, the Shan, are primarily Buddhist. Lande, "Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Accommodation, and Nation-Building in Southeast Asia," p.92.
1212 "Burma Briefing: Issues and Concerns," p.9, Timeline: Burma [Internet - News] (BBC, 2004 [cited 22 November 2004]); available from http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk. ‘The “Burmese way to socialism” was a blend of Buddhism, nationalism and Marxism’. Than, Myanmar in ASEAN: Regional Cooperation Experience, p.62. Myanmar withdrew from the non-aligned movement in 1979 in protest over Cuba’s chairmanship of it. Burma Prime Minister Arrives in Jakarta (cited).
1213 The nationalization of the majority of private schools took place between 1963 and 1964. Neil Englehart, "Is Regime Change Enough for Burma," Asian Survey 45, no. 4 (2005). Perhaps a better alternative to nation or state building in such a multi-ethnic context would be cultural pluralism and diversity. Karklins, "The Concept of Collective Identity", p.3. 376
of the individual and the equality of all were no longer viewed as necessary features of the polity.
In 1987, and following several years of deterioration in the economy, the government demonetised the majority of its bank notes. This pushed the economy to the brink of bankruptcy and many people lost their savings.1214 For several months widespread resentment mounted until it reached boiling point with the Red Bridge incident in March. On this occasion, dozens of peaceful student protestors were killed by the authorities and this sparked additional protests throughout the nation that eventually led to Ne Win’s resignation.1215 Despite Ne Win’s downfall, many segments of society believed the regime remained little more than a ‘fox in sheep’s clothing’ and the level of public protest did not decline. On the auspicious date of 8.8.88, tens of thousands of people, including a broad spectrum of Myanmar’s ethnic diversity, launched demonstrations (not always peaceful)1216 throughout the country to demand, if not a democratic system of governance, then at least a change of government. However, suspecting the involvement in the protests of the BCP – and/or Western backed groups – and lacking both the intellectual and institutional capacity to engage hostile elements through any means other than coercion, the junta responded with unrestrained violence and thousands were killed and imprisoned in the process.1217
1214 Tin Maung Maung Than, "Myanmar: Military in Charge," in Government and Politics in Southeast Asia, ed. John Funston (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), p.206. Although, and as Mya Than argues, the ‘1987 demonetization of currency notes was just the spark. Other factors include the deteriorating economy since the 1962 military takeover, the transformation to a market-oriented system from the socialist system in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, economic reform in China, the success of the ASEAN economies in the region, and the People’s Power victory in the Philippines’. Than, Myanmar in ASEAN: Regional Cooperation Experience, p.70.
1215 July 23, 1988. "Burma Briefing: Issues and Concerns," p.9.
1216 While many of the demonstrations were peaceful, there were a few notable exceptions. One instance involved the lynching of suspected military intelligence officers and informers. This heightened the sense of fear within the military about what might happen to them all should they lose control of the state. Widespread looting also started and some attacked troops with improvised weapons such as jinglees (darts made from sharpened umbrella or bicycle spokes dipped in poison and fired from a sling shot type contraption). Englehart, "Is Regime Change Enough for Burma," p.633.
1217 Taylor, "Pathways to the Present," p.21. 377
On 18 September 1988, and in response to an increasingly marginalised leadership and the mounting chaos and lawlessness that ensued, a group of officers calling themselves the ‘State Law and Order Restoration Council’ – with the ominous acronym of SLORC – reinstated government control in central Myanmar and announced plans for multi‐party elections.1218 It was at this point that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of ‘independence founder’ General Aung San, entered the stage and formed the National League for Democracy (NLD). Despite her arrest and disqualification from the elections, the NLD won 392 (or eighty percent) of the 485 parliamentary seats.1219 The SLORC, stunned by the result, refused to recognize the vote and thereby demurred in handing over power to the government‐elect. Under the new name of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) they remain in power to this day.
The Consequences of History: From Poverty to Human Rights Abuse
The imprint of poverty stamped by Myanmar’s history of political instability and civil war, together with the economic and diplomatic isolation that followed,1220 has rendered the former rice bowl of Asia the second most underdeveloped country in Southeast Asia.1221 However, not even this categorisation of poverty adequately reflects the stark reality on the ground. In Myanmar, the constant cloud of ethnic conflict and instability has resulted in a distribution of poverty that is uneven and ethnically based. In the Kokang, Wa, and Shan ethnic minority areas, a GDP per capita of under US$100 means that, these marginalised
1218 Englehart, "Is Regime Change Enough for Burma," p.634.
1219 According to Robert Taylor, the actual percentage of the vote was sixty-two percent. Taylor, "Pathways to the Present," p.22.
1220 Such isolation was initially the choice of the country’s leadership but within a few years of ‘opening up’ to the world, for a complex set of reasons including the government’s response to the 1988 democracy process, such isolation has largely been imposed by the West during the course of the past two decades.
1221 The United Nation’s ‘Human Development Index’ ranks Myanmar just above Laos. International Cooperation at a Crossroads: Aid, Trade and Security in an Unequal World [Human Development Report 2005] (United Nations Development Programme, 2005 [cited 1 February 2006]); available from http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/, p.141. By contrast, in 1987 Myanmar was contentiously ranked by the United Nations as the least developed country in the World. In 2003, a further United Nations study ranked Myanmar the poorest country in Asia in terms of Purchasing Power Parity. 378
groups are not only the poorest in Asia but among the poorest in the world.1222 Many more ethnic groups live in these frontier areas – areas that border with Thailand, Laos, China, India and Bangladesh – and it is here that the worst consequences of instability and poverty can be found with the government itself acknowledging the loss of more than a million lives to ethnic violence.1223 The consequences of these dynamics, together with a collapsed health system, have been dire to say the least. Compared with an average life expectancy in Singapore of 81.53 years; the average life expectancy in Myanmar is just 55.8 years of age.1224
Myanmar’s history has also contributed to a situation where the country’s leadership have maintained one of the worst human rights records in the world. For example, and in the midst of fighting several insurgency movements for more than half a century, the government has been accused of having resorted to the use of chemical weapons, such as at Kawmura (north of Mae Sot) as seen in Figure 9.1 below, on five separate occasions between 1985 and 2005.1225 The Tatmadaw has also, at least until recently,1226 forcibly
1222 Smith, "Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches," p.73. Laos, by contrast, is the country ranked as the most underdeveloped by the UN but its GDP per capita in 2004 was estimated to be US$402. Laos Factsheet [Internet - News] (DFAT, 2005 [cited 2 February 2006]); available from www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/laos.pdf.
1223 Comments by General Saw Maung, the former head of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (the precursor to the current SPDC). Martin T. Smith, Ethnic Groups in Burma: Development, Democracy and Human Rights [Internet - Report] (Anti-Slavery International, 1994 [cited 22 November 2005]); available from http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/Ethnic_Groups_in_Burma-ocr.pdf., p.28.
1224 Figures based on 2004 ‘Census Bureau’ data as cited in: Strategic Asia [Electronic Database] (National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005 [cited 4 February 2006]); available from http://strategicasia.nbr.org/.
1225 The use of these weapons, if the allegations are correct, appears to have been directed primarily against the Karen and Kachin insurgent groups. The most recent incident in the reported use of chemical warfare pertains to a number of Mustard gas shells that were fired into another Karenni Army base at Nya My (near Mae Hong Son) on 15 February 2005. Field trip by Author with Professor Desmond Ball, 3-24 June 2005. See also: Desmond Ball, "Security Developments in the Thailand-Burma Borderlands," Australian Mekong Resource Centre Working Paper No. 9 (2003).
1226 Interview with government spokesperson, Yangon, May 2005. According to one government spokesperson, the government was better able to restrain the regional military divisions from recruiting child soldiers because there was no longer a need to continue to expand the number of personnel in the military. While many might (understandably) question the authenticity of such comments, the fact that the size of the Tatmadaw has remained relatively stable for the better part of the past decade does lend some credence to its validity. 379
recruited children on a large scale to fulfil government quotas in its effort to develop a strategic (numerical) advantage in the fight against insurgent armies.1227 These children are also recruited because they are apparently more obedient and well suited to guerrilla warfare – where their small size and agility enables them to reach places other soldiers cannot.1228 Further, in some rural areas and where the father in a family is absent (for whatever reason); at least one of his children must take his place to fulfil additional labour quotas imposed by the government.1229
Figure 9.1. Chemical Weapons Attack Site at Kawmura
Source: Photograph by author, 6 June 2005.
1227 Burma: Demobilize Child Soldiers [Internet - News] (Human Rights Watch, 2004 [cited 8 December 2004]); available from http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/06/04/burma8734_txt.htm. Others sources claim the total number to be closer to 50,000 (as opposed to the Human Rights Watch estimate of 70,000) and that this number is the total for both government and opposition armies. Marianne Bray, Child Soldiers in Myanmar's Front Line [Internet - News] (CNN, 2001 [cited 15 December 2004]); available from http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/06/12/myanmar.childsoldiers.
1228 Ibid, Christina Fink, Living Silence: Burma under Military Rule (Bangkok: White Lotus, 2001), p.145.
1229 Child Soldiers Global Report [Internet - News] (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2004 [cited 15 December 2004]); available from http://www.child-soldiers.org/regions/country.html?id=146. 380
Meanwhile, the more broadly defined conundrum of ‘forced labour’ affects all age‐groups in Myanmar and such people are used for various purposes ranging between infrastructural projects to porters for the Tatmadaw.1230 In the case of the latter, these porters have been exploited as human‐minesweepers and human‐shields (during the course of battle against ethnic rebels).1231 In interview, one individual connected to the SPDC argued (by way of a justification) that the government had attempted to stop the practice but the military found it ‘simply too difficult to function without porters’. He conceded that while the military does try to pay its porters, the practice continues to involve ‘some form of coercion’.1232 By the turn of the millennium it was estimated that over 800,000 were being forced to work on a weekly basis, in one form or another, with little to nil monetary compensation.1233
The SPDC has also been complicit in the forced displacement of persons. Between 1996 and 2004 more than 2740 villages were thought to have been ‘destroyed, relocated or abandoned’ with a resultant 526,000 villagers being displaced in the eastern border alone.1234 In some instances these displacements have been carried out to satisfy contractual obligations with Thai and Chinese logging companies1235 and in the process
1230 Conditions in Burma and U.S. Policy toward Burma for the Period September 28, 2004 - March 27, 2005 [Internet - Government Report] (U.S. Department of State - Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 2005 [cited 5 April 2005]); available from http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rpt/43970.htm.
1231 Marianne Bray, Child Soldiers in Myanmar's Front Line [Internet - News] (CNN, 2001 [cited 15 December 2004]); available from http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/06/12/myanmar.childsoldiers, Thai Army Hands Back 17 Porters to Burmese [Electronic Database - Factiva] (Reuters, 2004 [cited 15 December 2004]); available from http://global.factiva.com.
1232 Interview with government spokesperson, Yangon, May 2005.
1233 "Burma Slammed over Forced Labour," BBC News, 17 June 1999.
1234 Burma: Displacement Continues Unabated in One of the World's Worst IDP Situations [Internet - Report] (Global IDP Project, 2005 [cited 6 November 2005]); available from http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/wSummaryPDFs/D58726D644D5A8B2C1256 ECC00278E9B/$file/Burma_summary.pdf. It was estimated that around 160,000 villagers were displaced because of this activity between 2002 and 2004. Vaclav Havel and Bishop Desmond M. Tutu, "Threat to Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in Burma,” (DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary, 2005), p.16.
1235 "A Conflict of Interests - the Uncertain Future of Burma's Forests,” (London: Global Witness, 2003), pp.10- 11.” David I. Steinberg, "Myanmar: The Roots of Economic Malaise," in Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, ed. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor, and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), p.92.A 381
villagers have been reported to have been variously raped, tortured, and/or executed.1236 The occurrence of rape in the absence of judicial penalty extends beyond the realm of displaced persons and the ethnic minorities. While the 750 cases of rape in the Karen and Shan states that have been documented in recent years account for a higher incidence within the borderlands;1237 a recent report by the Women’s League of Burma details a pattern of sexual violence throughout the country.1238 Perhaps most disconcerting of all are reports of frequent extra‐judicial killings by the SPDC and its agents. In the Shan state alone, eighty‐two such murders were reported between June 2003 and August 2004.1239 Various occurrences of such crimes have been recorded on video and obtained through various means including Thai intelligence intercepts.1240
There remain many more people and dissidents who rather than being killed have been detained as political prisoners. Even after taking into account the release of 249 political prisoners on the 6th of June 2005, the government continued to hold an estimated 1,100 political prisoners including journalists, teachers, lawyers, politicians, student leaders, monks, writers and poets as well as NLD (and other) opposition leaders and members.1241 Further, and since this time, many hundreds of the former Military Intelligence (MI) officers
1236 Denis Gray, War in Burma Gets Even More Brutal: Refugees and Rebels Tell of Growing Violence and Repression by the Military [Electronic Database - Factiva] (1990 [cited 15 December 2004]); available from www.factiva.com.
1237 The 750 cases of rape were derived from the sum-total of two separate reports. For further details see: "Rape of Shan Women a Grave Concern," The Nation, 12 August 2002.
1238 See: System of Impunity: Nationwide Patterns of Sexual Violence by the Military Regime's Army and Authorities in Burma [Internet - News] (The Women's League of Burma (WLB), 2004 [cited 22 November 2005]); available from http://www.womenofburma.org/Report/SYSTEM_OF_IMPUNITY.pdf.
1239 "Burma Briefing: Issues and Concerns,” (Bangkok: Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma, 2004), p.77.
1240 Burma - Military Mass Murders Alleged [Electronic Database - Factiva] (Periscope Daily Defence News Corporation, 2005 [cited 22 November 2005]); available from www.factiva.com. Further video footage of this together with the rape of children was obtained through research partly funded by the Dutch government: Burmese Army Accused of Killings [Internet - News] (BBC News, 2005 [cited 22 November 2005]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4121936.stm.
1241 Larry Fine, UN Panel Presses Myanmar on Rights Abuse, Rape [Electronic Database - Factiva] (Reuters News, 2005 [cited 22 November 2005]); available from www.factiva.com. 382
implicated in the purge of Khin Nyunt’s ‘followers’ have either been imprisoned, placed under house arrest or warned that they are at risk of detention in the future should they carry out any ‘suspicious’ activities.1242 It has been widely alleged that many of these political prisoners have been routinely subjected to torture and ‘pro‐democracy activists’ who have not been arrested are frequently harassed.1243 Not all harassment however is related to politics as one dissident, for example, reported to the author how a sixteen year old girl had been detained and tortured for more than forty‐eight hours because she had played music in the street without a permit.1244
Nevertheless, in terms of frequency and scale, the human rights situation appears to be at its worst within the ethnic minority areas that are subject to continued ethnic conflict or an absence of central government authority. Even the government itself has acknowledged the loss of over a million lives to ethnic conflict and the extent of such violence during the course of more than half a century has been described as representing ‘slow genocide’.1245 Therefore, and in areas where ethnic conflict remains, it would seem natural to expect that any resolution of such conflict by way of a ceasefire would act to enhance human security. However, based on the review of the literature and the research conducted in the field, and aside from an overall reduction in the number of deaths as a consequence of ethnic fighting, it appears that the situation within these remote borders has not improved. The reasons for this are discussed below.
1242 Bertil Lintner, Myanmar Payback Time [Internet News] (Asia Pacific Media Services Limited, 2005 [cited 11 July 2007]); available from http://www.asiapacificms.com/articles/myanmar_payback/, Myanmar [Report] (Amnesty International, 2005 [cited 11 July 2007]); available from http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/mmr- summary-eng.
1243 Edith M. Lederer, Myanmar Is Holding More Than 1,100 Political Prisoners, U.N. Human Rights Investigator Says [Electronic Database - Factiva] (Associated Press Newswires, 2005 [cited 29 September 2005]); available from www.factiva.com.
1244 Interview by Author, Yangon, June 2005.
1245 Anton La Guardia, Burma's 'Slow Genocide' Is Revealed through the Eyes of Its Child Victims British Research Tells of Murder, Rape, Starvation, and the Systematic Destruction of Villages as Military Junta Forces More Than a Million Ethnic Minority People to Live in the Jungle [Electronic Database - Factiva] (The Daily Telegraph, 2005 [cited 22 November 2005]); available from www.factiva.com. 383
The Insurgency Movements and the Marginal Impact of the Ceasefire Regime
The protracted nature of ethnic conflict in Myanmar – now the world’s longest ongoing civil war – had been intensified by the limited ability of Ne Win’s military regime (and that of subsequent leaders) to integrate the insurgent groups into the mainstream political and legal processes of the state. By 1989, more than twenty‐five separate organizations were in armed revolt against the regime and ten of these controlled so‐called ‘liberated’ zones.1246 Given these revolts, and the bloody protests for democracy a year earlier, the SPDC’s grip on power remained precarious. In order to reconsolidate its power, the SPDC undertook a strategy of mending its relations with the leaders of several insurgent groups. The SPDC’s reconsolidation of power commenced with the signing of formal ceasefire arrangements with the Communist Party of Burma and its splinter factions – the Kokang and Wa.1247 These early ceasefires provided the Tatmadaw with the opportunity to focus on the remaining (smaller) insurgency groups including an alliance of ethnic groups under the umbrella name of the National Democratic Front (NDF). By 1991 several of the weaker members of the NDF had given up their struggle against the SPDC and through to 1995 the Kachin Independence Organisation, the New Mon State Army and the Karenni National Progressive Party had followed suit. In 2006 the total number of ceasefire groups had accumulated to around seventeen.1248 However, in the case of several of these ceasefire arrangements smaller
1246 The New ASEANs: Vietnam, Burma, Cambodia and Laos, (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1997) p.7. Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment believes this figure to be closer to thirty. Internal Affairs, Myanmar [Electronic Intelligence Database] (Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 2004 [cited 8 November 2004]); available from http://www4.janes.com.
1247 Kyaw Yin Hlaing, "Myanmar in 2004: Why Military Rule Continues," in Southeast Asian Affairs 2005, ed. Kin Wah Chin and Daljit Singh (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005), p.7.
1248 Tin Maung Maung Than, "Myanmar: Challenges Galore but Opposition Failed to Score," in Southeast Asian Affairs 2006, ed. Daljit Singh and Lorraine C. Salazar (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006), p.192. However, and reflective of the difficulty of distinguishing between fact and fiction, as early as December 2004 Amnesty International claimed that that there were actually 24 ceasefire groups that had been recognised by the SPDC. Report 2005: Myanmar [Internet] (Amnesty International, 2005 [cited 19 June 2007]); available from http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/mmr-summary-eng. 384
splinter factions formed and these new factions have continued their fight against the government.1249
One of the problems with the ceasefire regime, as implemented by the SPDC, is that the government provided many of the early ceasefire groups – such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) – with a level of autonomy far beyond what was necessary for good local governance. The power accorded to many of the early ceasefire groups was reflective of the desperate determination of the leadership (at the time) to survive mounting instability and growing international isolation.1250 The autonomy afforded by the SPDC included an implicit licence to engage in large‐scale narcotics manufacturing throughout much of the borderlands. In the case of the UWSA, profits from illegal activities (including the narcotics industry) have been directed, in part, to an expansion of its armed forces to 21,000 personnel – nearly double the number when the ceasefire was signed.1251 Today, the success and scope of its operations have earned it the dubious reputation of being the world’s principle armed narcotics producer.
The UWSA is now the de facto security force along the Thai/Myanmar border.1252 Improved relations between the SPDC and UWSA also stretch to the economic realm. The SPDC has invited many of its UWSA commanders to invest in Myanmar’s mainstream economy
1249 Ball, "Security Developments in the Thailand-Burma Borderlands," p.8.
1250 By contrast, and at the other end of the spectrum, many of the smaller and less powerful insurgent groups that joined the ceasefire regime were compelled to surrender their arms and while they may have received varying degrees of limited economic and political support they were granted little to no autonomy. For these groups what took place was more akin to surrender rather than a ceasefire. "Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority Politics," p.8.
1251 At the time of the ceasefire, its force size was estimated to be between 12,000 and 15,000. United Wa State Army (UWSA) [Intelligence Database] (Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2005 [cited 29 September 2005]); available from www.janes.com. Anthony Davis, Myanmar - Ethnic Breakdown [Internet - News] (Asia Week, 2000 [cited 2 March 2003]); available from http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/magazine/2000/0204/nat.thai.box.html.
1252 The extent of the SPDC’s dependence on, and relations with, the UWSA is aptly reflected by the fact that various Tatmadaw battalions (No.227 and No.330) have conducted joint military exercises with the UWSA. Former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt presided over the opening ceremony for the joint exercises. Desmond Ball, "Security Developments in the Thailand-Burma Borderlands," Australian Mekong Resource Centre Working Paper No. 9 (2003): p.13. 385
thereby opening the doors to widespread money laundering.1253 State immunity for the production of narcotics has also extended to the DKBA whose soldiers have been trained, financed and armed by the SPDC for the purpose of using them in military operations against the Karen National Union.1254 Given that the goals (and strategy) of the SPDC were largely limited to the reconsolidation of power in central Myanmar; the ceasefire regime has done little to improve the quality of life for people in the country’s borderlands.1255 Nonetheless, while the UWSA and DKBA are guilty of committing the same human rights abuses that were discussed in the context of the SPDC and Tatmadaw above (such as human trafficking);1256 the same can be said for some of the remaining insurgent groups who are still technically at war with the central government.1257
From the perspective of the SPDC, the key dilemma in 1989 was how to maintain the unity of the country whilst maintaining power; and to this end, it was the implementation of the ceasefire regime that was considered the best available option. Furthermore, the ceasefire movement, together with the SPDC’s agreement to undertake democratic elections in 1990,
1253 Money Laundering in Burma [Internet - News] (The Irrawaddy, 2004 [cited 28 August 2005]); available from www.irrawaddy.org, United Wa State Army (UWSA) [Intelligence Database] (Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2005 [cited 29 September 2005]); available from www.janes.com.
1254 Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) [Intelligence Database] (Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2005 [cited 29 September 2005]); available from www.janes.com.
1255 Kyaw Yin Hlaing, "Myanmar in 2004: Why Military Rule Continues," in Southeast Asian Affairs 2005, ed. Kin Wah Chin and Daljit Singh (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005), p.248. The only tangible benefits for the ethnic minority people’s in consequence of the ceasefire regimes relate to two developments. The first has been an overall reduction to the body count and the second relates to the improved situation in the areas now under central government control and therefore not subject to regional autonomy arrangements with ethnic minority groups. An exploration of some of the government-controlled areas, as conducted by the author, revealed that many of the people were relatively healthy (with adequate food security) and free from substantial interference. Field trips by Author, June 2004 and May 2005.
1256 Some groups have also been involved in the smuggling of small arms. "Myanmar: Aid to the Border Areas,” (Yangon/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2004), p.12.
1257 The non-ceasefire groups documented to have committed human rights abuses include, but are not limited to, the Karen National Union, the Karenni National Progressive Party, the Shan State Army South and the New Mon State Party. Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar: Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar [Report] (United Nations, 2003 [cited 5 February 2006]); available from http://www.ncgub.net/Int'l%20Action/UNGA%202003%20Report.pdf., p.17. 386
reflected the relative strength, at the time, of the democracy movement as led by the NLD. Unfortunately, the success of the ceasefire regime has since provided the government with the opportunity (and resources) to all but crush the NLD and thus its ability to form an effective alternative government.1258 Today, even if the government can improve on the degree of comprehensive security extant through central Myanmar, the biggest dilemma will be how to increase the level of comprehensive security existent in both the ‘autonomous zones’ and remaining insurgent areas. The only possible avenue for successfully accomplishing this task without committing a direct breach of the ceasefire arrangements appears to be through the stated goal of a new constitution that would allow for the imposition of laws and civil administration by an elected government with a country‐ wide mandate.1259 Nonetheless, and regardless of whether effective measures to combat human rights abuse will require a breach of the ceasefire agreements (and the autonomy granted by them), the ability and desire of the government to implement them will only arise from an increase in the capacity of the SPDC’s political institutions and security sector apparatus over the mid to long‐term. The implementation of a new constitution and the prospects this presents for change is the subject of Part B below.
Part B. A Country in Crisis – Internal Dynamics, Responses and Opportunities for Change
Given the historical components of this analysis, the prospect for managed change is interdependent with the long‐term viability of the regime. On the one hand, while many
1258 Due to the oppressive actions of the junta, the SPDC is now ‘a shell of its former self’. "Myanmar: Sanctions, Engagement or Another Way Forward?” (Yangon/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2004), p.21. A further consequence of the pressure applied by the SPDC has been greater disunity within the NLD and other political parties in support of democracy. Aside from Aung San Suu Kyi, the remaining members of the NLD Central Executive committee are now in their seventies and eighties and this may have contributed to the inability of the NLD itself to engage and, where necessary, compromise with the government. Roger Mitton, How Things Look on the inside - the Democracy Party Is Not Fully United [Internet - News] (Asiaweek, 1999 [cited 15 October 2005]); available from www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/99/0716/nat5.html. See also: Suu Kyi's Party Hit by Resignations, Blames Junta [Web Page] (OneIndia, 2006 [cited 2 January 2007]); available from http://www.greynium.com.
1259 In relation to the importance of a new constitution, and as a government spokesperson stated in interview, ‘… one term in the [ceasefire] agreement states that once the constitution is resolved then there will be a single government. So in my opinion, to resolve the Wa issue we need to resolve the constitution’. Interview with government spokesperson, Yangon, May 2005. 387
regimes throughout history have naturally evolved towards improved governance, in the case of Myanmar, this has not happened. On the other hand, should the regime collapse what prospect is there of maintaining national unity and a better alterative taking its place? In Myanmar, there appears to be a complex relationship between ‘regime choice’ and ‘regime capacity’. In the previous section the regime chose to enter into ceasefire arrangements with various insurgent groups but was initially limited in its capacity (and/or desire) to envisage and negotiate the type of agreement necessary to bring economic, political and social benefits to the country – other than those that directly flow from an end to conflict with the government. The regime has also reacted through other choices and policies. The narrative here considers additional examples of how the government has responded to instability and looks to some of the factors, including those linked to the capacity of the state, that have influenced the outlook and decision making processes of the SPDC. The arguments in this section will then help to develop a preliminary assessment of the prospects for internally driven change.
The National Convention and the Roadmap to Democracy
Following the 1988 protests – and given the continuation of widespread ethnic violence and an economy in ruins – the SPDC was forced to innovate in order to maintain its grip on power. It did so through the implementation of two related strategies. The first was the earlier mentioned ceasefire regime and the second was the reconvening of the national convention to draft a constitution in order (as the rhetoric of the SPDC would have it) to establish democracy.1260 The second strategy, the national convention, has been technically in ‘process’ (if not ‘progress’) since 1993.1261 While some believe that the national convention represents little more than a stall tactic to avoid handing power to the NLD, the official purpose behind it is to formulate a ‘new’ constitution that will act as a precursor to
1260 The implementation of a ceasefire regime was necessary to the success of the national convention because the latter could not be legitimately undertaken without the participation of the majority of the country’s political organisations and their militant wings.
1261 Burma to Relaunch Democracy Talks [Internet - News] (BBC, 2004 [cited 24 November 2004]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4035955.stm. 388
the establishment of ‘democracy’ in Myanmar.1262 However, the process stalled in 1996 when the NLD boycotted the convention with the accusation that the junta had been ‘manipulating the political process’.1263
In November 2003, the situation momentarily appeared to take a turn for the better when former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt announced plans to reconvene the convention in May 2004. To this end, he articulated a seven point ‘roadmap’ on change and democracy to which the completion of the national convention was to be the first of these ‘seven steps’.1264 Should the government’s blueprint be successfully carried out, the national convention would then decide on a draft constitution followed by a national referendum (as the second step) to adopt it. The government then proposes to hold ‘free and fair elections’ through a tiered system of national and regional legislative assemblies (pyithu huttaw) where ‘a modern, developed and democratic nation’ can be formed. As the plan goes, the legislative assemblies would then elect the state leaders and form the government and ‘other central organs’ of state power. Shortly after the announcement of the roadmap, twenty‐nine NLD members were released from prison and a further five leading members released from house arrest.1265
Despite the seemingly logical detail contained within the proposal and all the fanfare that surrounded it – both within Myanmar and ASEAN – it was not long before the limited capacity of the state to implement reform was again apparent. For example, shortly before the national convention reconvened, the SPDC closed all the NLD’s regional offices. Because of this repressive policy, together with the continued detention of Aung San Suu Kyi, the
1262 Political Situation of Myanmar and Its Role in the Region [Internet - Government Report] (Myanmar Information Committee, 2004 [cited 17 September 2004]); available from http://www.myanmar- information.net/political/english.pdf.
1263 Kate McGeown, Hopes Fade for Burma's Democracy [Internet - News] (BBC, 2004 [cited 22 November 2004]).
1264 Ibid. (cited).
1265 K. Kesavapany et al., Regional Outlook: Southeast Asia 2006-2007 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), pp.36-37. 389
NLD once again boycotted the process.1266 As the editor for the Irrawaddy, Aung Zaw, states ‘without the NLD, the convention [lacked] … any form of credibility’.1267 A few months earlier, General Bo Mya, from the Karen National Union (KNU), entered into talks with Senior General Than Shwe about the possibility of a formal ceasefire agreement. Despite the formation of an ‘in principle’ agreement, the signing of a formal ceasefire arrangement was never realised and consequently the KNU, together with the Shan National League for Democracy, did not attend the national convention.1268 The absence of the KNU represented another significant blow to the process as it maintains a guerrilla force of around 7,000 people.1269 Perhaps the final and ultimate blow to this process was the ouster of Prime Minister Khin Nyunt in October 2004. As the initiator of the roadmap for democracy and the primary driver behind the ceasefire regime he was considered, by a number of regional analysts, as one of the best hopes for change within the SPDC.1270 The culmination of these events provided the EU and the US with more than enough fuel to publicly display their scepticism over the likely success of the roadmap for democracy.1271
1266 Chairman Tin Oo also remains in detention.
1267 Peter Lloyd, Doubts as to Aung San Suu Kyi's Release for Burma Convention [Internet - News] (ABC, 2004 [cited 18 August 2004]); available from http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2004/s1101576.htm, Kate McGeown, Hopes Fade for Burma's Democracy [Internet - News] (Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's Pages, 2004 [cited 9 August 2004]); available from http://www.dassk.org/contents.php?id=764.
1268 Larry Jagan, Truce with Rebels Would Give Yangon Junta a Boost [Internet - News] (Asia Times, 2004 [cited 20 December 2004]); available from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/printN.html, McGeown, Hopes Fade for Burma's Democracy (cited). However, the ouster of former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, to which the KNU had been negotiating with, has raised fears that that the Burmese Junta may depart from its recently conciliatory approach. Simon Montlake, Burma's Disoriented Rebels [Internet - News] (BBC, 2004 [cited 12 November 2004]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/3981735.stm.
1269 Anthony Davis, Ethnic Breakdown [Internet - News] (Asia Week, 2000 [cited 2 March 2003]); available from http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/magazine/2000/0204/nat.thai.box.html.
1270 Since this time, for example, fighting between the Tatmadaw and the KNU has recommenced and the possibility of a ceasefire with the KNU has been called into question. Border Clashes: Burmese Troops Attack KNU Camps [Internet - News] (The Nation, 2005 [cited 22 January 2005]); available from www.nationmultimedia.com, Myanmar: KNU Ceasefire Collapses [Intelligence Database] (AsiaInt, 2005 [cited 19 January 2005]); available from www.asiaint.com, Myanmar: KNU Says Peace Process in Danger [Internet - News] (AsiaInt, 2005 [cited 19 January 2005]); available from www.asiaint.com.
1271 The impact and influence of ASEAN’s two dialogue partners is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 390
The Yangon Bombings and ‘Rumours’ of a Related Coup
For the foreseeable future it is only in relation to the stability of the regime that there is ‘limited’ hope for change in terms of leadership (but not necessarily change in terms of the form of governance). In May 2005, three coordinated bombings took place in Yangon. While speculation as to the cause has varied from disgruntled rogue elements of insurgent groups to individuals formally in Myanmar’s Military Intelligence, a less known possibility is that the source of the bombings may have come from a faction within the Tatmadaw itself. The information passed to the author is that, in part, a faction was disgruntled about missing out on a contract for trade and the three bombs, including one targeting a Thai Trade delegation, were sent as a warning to the central government. Therefore, and considering the recent removal of the MI, the bombings may indicate that the leadership of the armed forces, together with that of the SPDC, may not be as cohesive and united as their propaganda would have the public believe.1272
Then, just three months after the bombings, reports of a possible coup emerged (22 August 2005). While they turned out to be a hoax reportedly orchestrated by the junta in an attempt to pre‐empt and/or prevent an actual coup; the event seems to add weight to the hypothesis that all is not well within the junta. In fact, General Than Shwe was flown to a Singaporean hospital on 26 August. Interestingly, before seeking medical assistance the leader was reported to have approached his astrologer for guidance (as Bamar custom dictates) and it was here that the idea of feigning a coup was hatched in order to address Than Shwe’s concerns over instability in the regime.1273 Nevertheless, any potential disunity within the regime provides little hope for future stability and reform in the foreseeable future. Given the removal of many or all of the actual or potential reformists close to the pinnacle of leadership (such as Khin Nyunt); a change of leadership would most likely result
1272 Fieldtrip with Professor Des Ball to Thai-Myanmar Border, June 2005.
1273 Myanmar: Staged Unrest Risks Creating the Real Thing [Electronic Intelligence Database] (Stratfor, 2005 [cited 22 October 2005]); available from www.stratfor.com. 391
in one conservative and inwardly focused dictator intent on little more than maintaining his power being replaced by another of the same quality and virtue.
Grassroots Corruption in the Government and Tatmadaw
Throughout Southeast Asia – and indeed many other parts of the globe – issues of corruption and poor governance have been, and continue to represent, a major challenge to real security sector reform. In the case of Myanmar, corruption is systemic and reaches from the lower echelons of the bureaucracy and military through to the leadership itself. At the ground level, low ranking officers and rank‐and‐file soldiers are paid less than a dollar a week to work for either the Tatmadaw or the government’s proxy forces – such as the former insurgent armies of the DKBA and the UWSA.1274 Under these circumstances corruption, bribery and narcotics trafficking (discussed later), have become difficult flames to put out. For many, such corrupt practices, including rent seeking, are necessary for the survival of the individual, the family or both. The problem has been further compounded by infrequent wage increases that are too insufficient to compensate for inflation rates as high as 53.7 percent (2002).1275 Thus, the dilemma becomes how to implement security sector reform and improve governance in Myanmar without first improving the economic capacity of the state. This predicament reflects the problem of satisfying the requirements of the internal consolidation phases of security community formation (e.g. nation‐building, security sector reform and economic management) as hypothesised in Chapter III.1276
1274 Until recently, a standard private’s salary was less than fifty cents a month but the government funded an increase to military salaries though money printing which has in turn contributed to massive inflation rates. "My Gun Was as Tall as Me: Child Soldiers in Burma,” (Human Rights Watch, 2002), pp.64, 79-80. For an overview of the salary and conditions of life in the ethnic minority armies (whether subject to a ceasefire arrangement or not) see pages 110-159.
1275 While the inflation rate was 52.8 percent in 2003 it subsequently dropped to its lowest level for fifteen years in 2004 (17.8 percent). Data provided by CIA World Fact book, located at http://strategicasia.nbr.org.
1276 Entitled, ‘Further Developments to the Framework: The ‘Processes’ behind the Emergence of a Security Community!’ 392
Elite Level Isolation and Xenophobia
At the elite level, the situation is equally complicated. Given the obscene nature of many of the human rights transgressions committed in the country, it can be difficult to avoid the temptation to categorise all the members of the SPDC as anything other than ‘malevolent’. Yet, analytically speaking, it is difficult to deny that the previously mentioned influences of history, together with poor state capacity, have contributed (and continue to contribute) to the type of unstable environment where such human rights abuses flourish. This history has also resulted in various psychological consequences for the leadership. For example, after a brief period of failed democracy following independence the leaders reacted to the country’s history of colonisation by immersing the polity in socialist ideology for close to three decades. To this end, the regime and its people were largely isolated – socially, economically and politically – from ASEAN and the rest of the world.1277 These factors have contributed to a ‘siege mentality’ and a related paranoia of both neo‐colonialism and western conspiracies that have aggravated and exacerbated (beyond the realm of logic) a long‐term animosity to outside interference.1278 Such is the extent of this animosity that it departs from rational and/or logical behaviour and is not to be located within the psychological and normative boundaries of the remaining ASEAN members.
Related to this trend, or perhaps exacerbated by it, is the fact that the country’s leaders are some of the least educated in the world.1279 This lack of education together with the xenophobia that stems from it – particularly in the realm of diplomacy and political leadership – has created a world‐view swamped in conspiracy theories and paranoia. For example, and in discussion with one ‘relatively’ well‐educated senior representative of the
1277 One only has to visit the country and see such things as the majority of men wearing traditional Bamar dresses (longyi) to realise how entrenched the traditional customs and way of life remains; it is as if the country has been untouched by the forces of time. Field trips by Author, June 2004 and May 2005.
1278 Donald M. Seekins, "Burma and U.S. Sanctions: Punishing an Authoritarian Regime," Asian Survey 45, no. 3 (2005): p.448.
1279 Louise Williams, Burma Falls Back into Grip of One of the World's Least Educated Military Cliques [Electronic Database - Factiva] (The Sydney Morning Herald, 2004 [cited 8 November 2004]); available from http://global.factiva.com. 393
SPDC, the author was told that Aung San Suu Kyi is only really liked by people outside the country – ‘Most people within the country hate her’. In relation to matters outside Myanmar it was later stated that ‘we believe … the [former] Foreign Minister of Thailand, [Dr.] Surin Pitsuwan is a puppet of the CIA and he was recruited by them when doing his university studies in the United States’.1280 Perhaps most enlightening of all has been the shifting of the capital of Myanmar from Yangon to Pyinmana, 400 kilometres to the north, for what has been reported to be a fear of a possible invasion. Construction has already commenced on a ten square kilometre area complete with a planned thirty meter high national headquarters, bunkers, tunnels, a military hospital, airstrip and golf‐course.1281 Under these circumstances it is highly unlikely that the regime will have the capacity to reform itself and, therefore, attempts to isolate it will only maintain the status quo – an issue discussed further later in the chapter.
The Prospects for Internal Reform and the Opposition Parties
Given that the education system within the country is fast collapsing – responsibility for which rests with both the regime and the international community1282 – the prospects for the regime being replaced by a new, improved and more educated leadership have become
1280 Dinner discussions, May 2004. As discussed in Chapter VI, Dr. Surin Pitsuwan (when foreign minister of Thailand) advocated the policy of constructive engagement and was one of the more vocal voices in ASEAN to speak out against the Myanmar regime and the atrocities it is alleged to commit. Dr Pitsuwan was recently nominated as the next Secretary General of ASEAN.
1281 Larry Jagan, Burma: Fearing Invasion, Junta Plans a New Capital in the Hills [Internet - News] (Inter Press Service, 2005 [cited 1 September 2005]); available from www.factiva.com, Myanmar's Junta Pondering Leaving Yangon for Somewhere "Safer": Analysts [Internet - News] (Agence France Presse, 2005 [cited 1 September 2005]); available from www.factiva.com. While Myanmar may have witnessed the intervention of the United States in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, there is little (if any) rational basis to believe the United States or any other foreign power would commit an inordinate amount of resources to invade or even strike at the Junta. This is especially the case given that it maintains very little strategic importance to any of the major powers outside the greater Asian region (that is, aside from China and India). Whether or not it should be perceived by other countries to have little strategic value is a separate matter for a separate debate.
1282 As a national average (worse in the ethnic minority areas), only one in two children will finish primary school and only about thirty-five percent enrol in high school. Data supplied by UNDP website, located at http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/. Further, and in the Wa state for example, illiteracy is estimated to be as high as ninety percent. Smith, "Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches," p.59. These figures and the impact of international isolation and a refusal to provide aid are discussed further in Part B, Section 3. 394
much starker. Those who had pushed for or at least been open to reform have been variously removed from positions of influence, retired or ousted from power. As was mentioned earlier, one of the most notable examples occurred with the removal of the country’s former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt on the 17th of October 2004. Khin Nyunt was considered by some – arguably and relatively speaking – to be one of the more moderate leaders and the one most open to reform as well as negotiation and compromise with the ethnic minority groups.1283 He had established many links throughout the region and was especially well connected in China. He was also in charge of the comparatively more educated and sophisticated (but overtly corrupt) Military Intelligence (MI) division of the Tatmadaw. Despite his power and position as Prime Minister, his removal was executed efficiently and without recorded protest. President Than Shwe provided only a few hours notice for the operation to regional Tatmadaw commanders where they were first put on high alert and then, within a few hours, ordered to arrest all mid to high‐ranking officers in the MI.1284
Equally disturbing is that any opportunity to return to office the representatives of the NLD elected in 1990 is fast coming to an end. Many have passed away and in the case of the Central Executive Committee of the NLD the remaining seven to eight members are now aged in their seventies and eighties.1285 Further, the NLD is now only a ‘shell of its former past’ due to the oppressive actions of the junta.1286 Throughout the country hundreds of members of the NLD have been variously arrested, placed under house arrest or have
1283 For example, in a meeting with two members from the Sasakawa Peace Foundation it was stated that all of their contacts were with people formally connected to Khin Nyunt and his Military Intelligence. Since the removal of the military intelligence, the only connection they have is now with the Myanmarese ambassador in Tokyo. Christopher Roberts, "The Argument for Engagement: A Clash with the Predominant 'State' Morality" (Nanyang University, Singapore, 19 October 2005).
1284 Field trip by author with Professor Des Ball, Thai/Burma Border, June 2005.
1285 Mitton, How Things Look on the inside - the Democracy Party Is Not Fully United (cited), The 'National Convention' [Internet - News] (The National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma and the Members of Parliament Union, 2004 [cited 19 January 2006]); available from http://www.ncgub.net/NCGUB/NCGUB%20NewsDesk%207%20May%202004.doc.
1286 Myanmar: Sanctions, Engagement or Another Way Forward? [Report] (International Crisis Group, 2004 [cited 20 May 2004]); available from www.crisisweb.org, p.21. 395
disappeared (under mysterious circumstances) during the course of the past decade.1287 By contrast, the presence of civil society in Myanmar is surprisingly strong and has been growing rapidly in recent years. A report by Save the Children (in the process of publication) was able to survey an amazing 64 non‐governmental organisations (NGOs) and 455 community based organisations (CBOs) on which many segments of Myanmar depend.1288 These NGOs and CBOs present a valuable opportunity for the international community and ASEAN to provide aid and engage at the societal level. However, as promising as these developments are there remains little to no prospect that political change will occur as a consequence of a sustained and coordinated campaign by civil society in Myanmar. Expression of thought is now tightly controlled in the universities and educational institutions that continue to operate, and any elements ‘disloyal’ to the regime (at least publicly) have long since been removed from positions of influence.
The human rights violations (outlined in the various sections above) represent, in all likelihood, little more than a small sample of the true totality of abuse that afflicts the citizens of Myanmar.1289 More than anything else, it is this history of ethnic tension and insurgency that continues to contribute to domestic instability in Myanmar today. Such instability destroyed a fledgling democracy and resulted in the implementation of measures by the government that were both desperate and inappropriate in nature. The long‐term leadership by the military destroyed the comparative economic advantage that Myanmar enjoyed at the time of independence and severely dented the development of a
1287 For an in-depth review of the status of individual members of the NLD in recent years that have suffered this fate see: Myanmar: Justice on Trial [Report] (Amnesty International, 2003 [cited 13 November 2005]); available from http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa160192003.
1288 Email correspondence with Andrew Kirkwood, Save the Children (Programme Director), 22 September 2005. In the interim see: Jean A Blake, Helping Hands in Myanmar [Report] (Yale, 2005 [cited 22 November 2005]); available from www.yale.edu/seas/helpinghands.doc.
1289 Having said this, and for the purposes of methodology and a related need to dismiss possible concerns over interviewee bias, it is difficult to verify exactly how good or bad the situation is in the borderlands until the Government of Myanmar allows independent inspection organisations throughout its border areas. This was a dilemma recognised in a recent report by the United Nations. Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar: Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar (cited). 396
professional civil service within the country. Furthermore, the lack of education throughout the leadership has contributed to a xenophobic worldview ridden in paranoia that has drastically hampered both the ability of the regime to respond to domestic crises and also its ability to engage with ASEAN (and the international community). The inability to engage foreign actors on the international stage has, in turn, further isolated the members of the regime and its civilian branches of government by reducing the opportunity for foreign training, education and cultural and professional exchanges.
The history of Myanmar also has normative and institutional consequences for ASEAN’s security community project. As one ICG report states, ‘arms have been the primary means used not just in the pursuit of power, but also to settle differences over state policy and direction’.1290 The ease with which the different ethnic groups (including the Bamar) have historically resorted to violence is akin to Adler and Barnett’s definition of a ‘war community’.1291 If a security community is defined, in part, by the identities of its respective members then the existence of a member‐state with a cultural tendency to resolve differences through violence and/or coercive means is a serious obstacle to the successful accomplishment of ASEAN’s goals. Consequently, and as will be further elaborated within Part C below, the government, along with its military, continue to undertake both domestic and international polices that exacerbate instability and isolate the country internationally. Therefore, in order to reinforce the concerns raised by this concluding analysis, and with the internal dynamics of Myanmar in mind, the next section will commence by considering the material impact that domestic instability has had on the comprehensive security architecture of ASEAN itself. As stated previously, this approach will contribute to a final determination regarding not only of the degree to which Myanmar inhibits ASEAN’s security community project but also provides the basis for an understanding of how ASEAN might resolve issues related to Myanmar in the future.
1290 The report further states that ‘[i]t was no coincidence that thousands of pro-democracy activists fled to the border to take up arms against the government or that many exile groups have put their main hope for change on another popular uprising. Myanmar: Sanctions, Engagement or Another Way Forward? (cited).
1291 Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," p.34. 397
Part C. ASEAN’s Comprehensive Security Environment under Myanmar’s Shadow
In spite of Myanmar’s ‘in principle’ support for a security community, the method of rule by the country’s military regime (and the domestic instability that is a consequence of it) presents a direct challenge to the ability of Southeast Asia to integrate into an ASEAN style security community. This is because the achievement of the proclaimed ‘security community’, along with the level of integration it presupposes, is beholden to the nature of inter‐state relations within the organisation.1292 These inter‐state relations are challenged, both directly and indirectly, at two levels by the situation in Myanmar. At one level, Chapter VI demonstrated how Myanmar challenges elite level cohesion (collective identity formation) and the operative norms of ASEAN (such as non‐interference). At another level, both traditional and non‐traditional security threats challenge the region’s security architecture and the potential formation of a security community. In a complement to this analysis, Part C deals with the second level of analysis by focusing on two interdependent issues. The first section considers how Myanmar challenges the comprehensive security of Southeast Asia while the second section investigates the manner in which various states – through their bilateral relationships with Myanmar – have enhanced and/or detracted from the security architecture of the region.
The Impact of Transnational Crime and Domestic Instability on the Comprehensive Security of Southeast Asia
There are several issues of human security and transnational crime that afflict ASEAN as a consequence of domestic instability, bad governance and poor state capacity in Myanmar. They include the trafficking of narcotics, money laundering; the spread of HIV/AIDS, environmental degradation, the rise and flow of refugees and the associated problem of human trafficking. Additionally, the issues of narcotics production, human trafficking and money laundering, in particular, are reflective of transnational criminal communities that
1292 Cotton, "Regional Order and the over-Determination of Regional Institutions in the Asia-Pacific", p.2. 398
can operate across state boundaries.1293 In the context of Myanmar, and in addition to the aforementioned factors, globalisation has exacerbated the opportunity for, and the impact of, these transnational criminal activities. The comparative rise in the level and extent of transnational crime has occurred as a consequence of a revolution in information technology and communications, the marginalisation of state borders (thus allowing for the entry and exit by people, goods, capital, and information), and the accompanying economic and political changes throughout the region.1294 While some of these criminal communities, such as the DKBA and the UWSA, were initially formed on the basis of political ideologies; such ideology has long since been replaced by a self‐interested quest for wealth through illegal endeavours. Nowadays, Myanmar’s criminal communities know no boundaries – not legal, cultural, religious, or moral.1295
As will be seen below, the impact of these criminal activities has been pervasive and multifaceted. While the examination here discusses several transnational security issues, the primary focus of the investigation is on the issue of narcotics. This issue has been chosen because it most appropriately exemplifies the interdependent dilemma of maintaining comprehensive security at the regional level in the midst of continuing corruption and poor state capacity at the domestic level. The analysis of narcotics production and trafficking sets the scene for a brief outline of some additional transnational security issues that have also negatively affected ASEAN and, in particular, its member‐state of Thailand.
1293 Within the United Nations, this is categorised and defined as ‘transnational organised crime’. See: www.unodc.un.or.th/crime/.
1294 John McFarlane describes transnational criminal communities as ‘… organised crime groups that have a home base in one state, but operate in one or more host states where there are favourable market opportunities’. McFarlane, "Transnational Crime and Illegal Immigration in the Asia-Pacific Region: Background, Prospects and Countermeasures," p.1. While some academics and NGOs have argued that globalisation has brought the countries of Southeast Asia together, others have contended that globalist forces have the potential to tear them apart. Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia (cited). However, while acknowledging the role of globalisation as a challenge to ASEAN’s security community project, an in-depth examination of its impact – other than some occasional comments – is beyond the scope of this particular study.
1295 John McFarlane and Karen McLennon, "Transnational Crime: The New Security Paradigm,” (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1996), p.2. 399
Narcotics Production and Trafficking
Myanmar – infamous for its historical role in the Golden Triangle’s opium trade – has had a mixed record in recent years. While Myanmar is currently the second largest global producer of opium, Figure 9.2 is indicative of the success of recent eradication programs in reducing the level of opium production – a consequence of cooperation between Myanmar’s government, the UN and other international agencies. The 352 tons of opium produced in 2004 was the product of 44,200 hectares of opium planted area and of this approximately 41,000 hectares (or 92.8%) were in the Shan borderlands.1296 While some credit can be directed towards the proactive ‘elements’ of the SPDC who actively cooperated in the fight against opium production,1297 the reduction is also explained, in part, by a shift in manufacturing by the country’s criminal organisations to the production of Amphetamine Type Stimulants (ATS) or methamphetamines.1298
1296 Myanmar: Opium Survey [Internet - News] (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 2005 [cited 11 September 2005]); available from http://www.unodc.org/pdf/myanmar/myanmar_opium_survey_2004.pdf., p.2 By contrast, US intelligence estimates that less than 1% of opium is now grown outside the Shan borderlands. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Drug and Chemical Control (Volume 1) [Report] (United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2005 [cited 27 September 2005]); available from http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/., p.300
1297 The author has made this distinction because in the context of Myanmar it is dangerous to perceive the government and its military branches as acting solely as one unified body. While unity is an often self-declared and cherished principle within the Tatmadaw, the previous chapter outlined a small sample of factors that indicated the junta to be anything but unified. Further, and while the conservative elements within the government may have consolidated their positions in power for the moment, this does not mean that there are no longer any pro-reformists in the government.
1298 Havel and Tutu, "Threat to Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in Burma," p.27. 400
Figure 9.2. Opium Production in Myanmar
2,000 1,676
1,500 1,097 Tons 1,000 810
500 370 312
0 Y1997 Y2001 Y2003 Y2004 Y2005 Metric Tons 1,676 1,097 810 370 312
Source: Compiled by author from UNODC statistics, located at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/Myanmar_opium‐survey‐2005.pdf1299
According to Desmond Ball, the production methods for these methamphetamines, alternatively known as Ya‐Ba (the Thai term for ‘crazy drug’), have become alarmingly sophisticated. Organizations such as the UWSA have now constructed mobile narcotic convoys where one truck will house the drug laboratory and others will individually and/or collectively accommodate the generator, storage and supply facilities. These mobile units (together with the relative ease of production) have rendered detection and anti‐trafficking measures much more difficult and have contributed to a massive rise of production in recent years.1300 While highly problematic to trace, various bodies including US intelligence organizations estimate that by 2004 total production had reached as high as eight‐hundred
1299 The figure for 2005 was an estimate by the UNODC over the total potential production for the year.
1300 Interview with Des Ball, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (ANU), November 2004. Field Trip with Professor Des Ball to the Thai/Myanmar Borderlands, May 2005. See also: International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Drug and Chemical Control (cited), p.303. Other factors that contribute to the popularity in producing and promoting methamphetamines include the fact that ‘there is no dependence on growing seasons; no large workforce is required; necessary chemicals are easily obtained; it is easy to locate laboratories near consumer markets; and there is a high profit return on their investments’. Methamphetamine: The Current Threat in East Asia and the Pacific Rim [Internet - Report] (US Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, 2003 [cited 26 September 2005]); available from http://www.dea.gov/pubs/intel.htm. 401
million tablets – more than double the production in 2003.1301 An equally worrying trend to emerge in Myanmar since 2002 has been the further diversification of ATS production to include the more expensive varieties such as Ecstasy and Ice – crystallized methamphetamine (alternatively known as Shabu).1302 Despite the recent success in reducing the production of opium, the combined production of opium and ATS means that Myanmar continues to rank as the world’s number one ‘narco‐state’.1303
The SPDC has had a mixed record in combating the scourge of drug production within its territory. Despite intensive interviews and research by the author, the question of whether the recent reduction in opium production is best explained by the actions of the SPDC or a consequence of other factors (such as a combination of drought, reduction in demand, and diversification into other narcotics production) remains a matter for debate. What can be said is that, on balance, the evidence does seem to suggest that at least elements of the SPDC and the Tatmadaw have directly benefited from opium and methamphetamine production.1304 For example, since the implementation of the government’s ceasefire regime some of the leading drug traffickers in Myanmar have in fact enjoyed good relations with certain SPDC generals – including ousted Prime Minister Khin Nyunt. Various Tatmadaw battalions (No.227 and No.330) have even conducted joint military exercises with the UWSA and Khin Nyunt presided over the opening ceremony on this occasion.1305
1301 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Drug and Chemical Control (cited), pp.104 & 300. In 2001, the level was around 600 million tablets per annum. Interview with Rodney Tasker, FEER (Bangkok), 18 December 2001.
1302 Ecstasy labs have also been uncovered in Indonesia and Malaysia. Hanna Ingber, 'Club Drug' Trend Worries Thai Officials [Internet - News] (The Irrawaddy, 2005 [cited 30 September 2005]); available from www.irrawaddy.org, Grant Peck, Asian Amphetamine Producers Are Diversifying, Say Experts [Internet - News] (The Irrawaddy, 2005 [cited 30 September 2005]); available from www.irrawaddy.org.
1303 Ball, "Security Developments in the Thailand-Burma Borderlands," p.8.
1304 Certainly, distinguished and well-informed academics such as Desmond Ball and Alan Dupont are convinced of the involvement of the SPDC in the narcotics industry. For example, see: Dupont, "Transnational Crime, Drugs, and Security in East Asia," p.439.
1305 Ball, "Security Developments in the Thailand-Burma Borderlands," p.13. See also: Desmond Ball, "Burma and Drugs: The Regime's Complicity in the Global Drug Trade,” (Canberra: The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (ANU), 1999). International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Drug and Chemical Control (cited). 402
The historical relationship and assistance provided to the former rebel leader and ailing drug‐lord Chang Chifu (Khun Sa) since his 1996 surrender is also well documented.1306 Meanwhile, and at the ground level, there have been reported cases of farmers being forcibly coerced by the Tatmadaw to cultivate opium.1307 However, and given the internal dynamics outlined in the second chapter, the involvement by the lower ranks of the Tatmadaw in illicit narcotics and any associated corruption is an unfortunate and inevitable consequence from the poor wages and the incapability of the government to implement security sector reform as discussed in Part B of this chapter.
At the elite level, and despite reports that certain generals and top military brass (even family) have been recalled from their regional postings in Myanmar due to corrupt dealings and placed in administrative positions within Yangon,1308 the SPDC as a whole also continues, at least indirectly, to benefit from the narcotics industry by way of its support for the UWSA and the DKBA. As discussed previously both the DKBA and the UWSA have become the de facto security force of the SPDC along the Thai/Myanmar border. Also, and to avoid the complete collapse of its economy, the SPDC opened the doors to widespread ‘money laundering’1309 by formulating a no questions asked policy and inviting Wa businesspeople – many UWSA commanders – to invest in Myanmar’s mainstream economy. The Wa have since set up businesses in Yangon, Mandalay, Kengtung, Tachilek and
1306 For a particularly informative historical account of the evolution of the opium trade in Myanmar and the Golden Triangle including the relationship between Chang Chifu and the government of Myanmar see: Bertil Lintner, The Golden Triangle Opium Trade [Internet - Paper] (Asia Pacific Media Services, 2000 [cited 18 April 2005]); available from www.asiapacficms.com/papers/. On Chang Chifu’s surrender and its effect on narcotics production see: Sudha Ramachandran, War or No War, Drug Trade Flourishes [Internet - News] (Asia Times, 2004 [cited 20 December 2004]); available from http://www.atimes.com.
1307 Havel and Tutu, "Threat to Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in Burma," p.27.
1308 Interview with Andrew Selth, SDSC (Canberra), March 2004.
1309 Indeed, money laundering is on the rise globally, see: Money Laundering on the Rise, Poll Finds [Internet News] (Toronto Star, 2004 [cited 28 September 2004]); available from http://www.thestar.com. For a detailed and relatively up to date discussion on the meaning, application and impact of money laundering in Southeast Asia see: Peter Lilley, "The Asian Money Laundering Explosion," in Fighting Corruption in Asia: Causes, Effects and Remedies, ed. John Kidd and Frank-Jurgen Richter (Singapore: World Scientific, 2003). 403
Lashio.1310 Meanwhile, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) – understood to have commercial relations with the UWSA in the production of ATS – depends almost entirely on the support of Myanmar’s government for their salaries, uniforms, food, ammunition, fuel and artillery support.1311 Additionally, and as revealed during an interview in Yangon, one Bamar (connected to the junta) conceded that the SPDC does possibly benefit ‘indirectly’ through the tax revenue generated by the SPDC from the narcotics industry.1312
The challenges presented by the complacency of the government in the narcotics industry are transnational in nature. UWSA tablets have been seized in the ASEAN countries of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore. According to Thai officials, up to eighty percent of the methamphetamines tablets that are consumed in Thailand are from Myanmar1313 and this has contributed to in excess of 250,000 addicts in Thailand.1314 Consequently, in 1998 the Thai government declared the influx of narcotic substances to be the nation’s principle security threat.1315 The Thai government’s threat perceptions directly resulted in the establishment of two task forces – the Task Force 399 and the 3rd Army’s Pha Muang Task Force – to combat the issue.1316
1310 United Wa State Army (UWSA) (cited). For an overview of money laundering events in Myanmar see: Money Laundering in Burma (cited).
1311 Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) (cited).
1312 Interview by Author, (Yangon), May 2005.
1313 Methamphetamine: The Current Threat in East Asia and the Pacific Rim (cited).
1314 Tom Fawthrop, Thai-Myanmar Ties: Drug Lords Cash In [Internet - News] (Asia Times, 2003 [cited 5 December 2004]); available from http://www.atimes.com. A more recent publication (report) estimated that there are between 400,000 and 500,000 addicts in Myanmar. See: Havel and Tutu, "Threat to Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in Burma," p.29.
1315 Ball, "Security Developments in the Thailand-Burma Borderlands," p.6, Desmond Ball, "Security Developments in the Thailand-Burma Borderlands,” (Sydney: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (ANU), 2003), p.2.
1316 Ball, "Security Developments in the Thailand-Burma Borderlands," p.3. 404
Human Trafficking
The issue of human trafficking has transnational costs and effects that, if anything, appear to be growing in significance throughout Southeast Asia. Within the ASEAN nations, both the points of origin and points of destination present a challenge to the comprehensive security of Southeast Asia. As a point of origin, Southeast Asians are trafficked from Myanmar (as well as Vietnam and Cambodia) to destination countries including Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand. In the case of Thailand, with a trade in humans to the value of 100 billion baht every year it is now the largest destination country in ASEAN.1317 According to the United Nations, between half a million and four million people are trafficked each year globally and this figure has grown to in excess of 200,000 in the Asia‐Pacific.1318 Welfare groups have said that the number of people being trafficked into Thailand is now rising by as much as twenty percent per year and of this, at least 10,000 a year are impoverished Myanmarese women and children who, in many instances, are forced into prostitution and/or slave labour.1319
HIV/AIDS
The spread of HIV/AIDS is a growing concern that is linked to both intravenous drug use and the sex industries of Southeast Asia – particularly Thailand and the countries in the Indochina belt. According to the UNODC, an estimated twenty‐four percent of all intravenous drug‐users in Myanmar are infected with HIV/AIDS.1320 Infection rates are highest in the ethnic minority areas and, more specifically, in the mining areas where such
1317 Asia Takes Aim at Growing Child Sex Trafficking [Internet - News] (Express India - Reuters, 2004 [cited 18 December 2004]); available from http://www.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=38184.
1318 Binh Minh Ho, Six Asian Nations Act to Stop Human Trafficking [Electronic Database - Factiva] (Reuters, 2005 [cited 4 April 2005]); available from http://ezproxy.libadfa.edu.au.
1319 "Children on the Edge: Protecting Children from Sexual Exploitation and Trafficking in East Asia and the Pacific,” (UNICEF, 2002), p.36.
1320 At a global level, ten percent of all HIV infections are a consequence of the unsafe injection of drugs. Drugs and HIV/AIDS in Southeast Asia - Reducing HIV Vulnerability from Drug Abuse (cited). 405
drugs are more readily available.1321 An alarming link to recent increases in HIV/AIDS prevalence rates throughout Southeast Asia is the fact that as much as fifty percent of intravenous drug users in the region share their injecting equipment.1322 Figure 9.3 below lists the Southeast Asian countries with the worst HIV/AIDS prevalence rates. As can be seen, Myanmar is second only to Cambodia. While a significant proportion of the rate in Cambodia and Thailand can be attributed to their respective sex industries; the figures have undoubtedly been exacerbated by the transnational effects of Myanmar’s narcotics industry.1323
Figure 9.3. HIV/AIDS Prevalence Rates in Thailand and the CLVM
3.00% 2.60% 2.50%
2.00%
1.50% 1.20%
1.00% 0.80% 0.40% 0.50% 0.10% 0.00% Cambodia Myanmar Thailand Vietnam Laos HIV/AIDS Prevalance Rate 2.60% 1.20% 0.80% 0.40% 0.10%
Source: Compiled by author from statistical information supplied by the UNDP, located at http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/.
1321 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Drug and Chemical Control (cited). ‘In 2001, 50% of injecting users in Thailand were infected with HIV … 76% in Malaysia and 65% in Vietnam’. Drugs and HIV/AIDS in Southeast Asia - Reducing HIV Vulnerability from Drug Abuse (cited).
1322 Havel and Tutu, "Threat to Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in Burma," p.29.
1323 Chris Beyrer, Drug Use and HIV/AIDS in Burma [Electronic Database - Expanded Academic ASAP] (The Lancet, 1999 [cited 7 December 2004]); available from http://web6.infotrac.galegroup.com. 406
Refugees and Illegal Migrants
The picture below (Figure 9.4) shows a very small segment of Thailand’s Mae Lah refugee camp which houses 50,000 (mainly Karen) refugees.1324 The decades’ long refugee crisis is a consequence of extreme poverty throughout the borderlands together with many of the factors that were discussed in chapter two – such as the harshness of forced village relocations, crop destruction, forced labour and the continuation of ethnic conflict. In June 2003 the number of official Myanmarese refugees in Thailand reached 143,4741325 with estimates of additional illegal migrants in Thailand ranging between 600,000 and 1.2 million.1326 Aside from the economic costs of the crisis, the continuation of this transnational movement of people has fuelled the problem of human trafficking and its associated costs – including the earlier mentioned rise in HIV/AIDS rates. Many of the illegal migrants have also carried other infectious diseases including, for example, an outbreak of Anthrax in July‐September 2002. Meanwhile, over 50,000 ethnic minority women from Myanmar are estimated to currently work in Thailand as prostitutes.1327 Further, the problems of human trafficking and refugees are also interdependent with, and emanate from, the earlier discussion of human rights abuse and instability.
1324 Field trip by Author with Professor Des Ball, June 2005. It is located just east of Thailand’s border with Myanmar (behind the mountain) and is approximately 100 kilometres north of Mae Sot but south of Mae Hong Son. According to Des Ball, the refugees are treated reasonably well and the author can confirm that they are provided with basic facilities such as power and television as well as such things as basic schooling.
1325 Ball, "Security Developments in the Thailand-Burma Borderlands," p.12. Others seem to have come up with less concise but understated estimates of around 120,000. See for example: Smith, "Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches," p.58.
1326 Interview with Ekapong Rimcharone, Office of the National Security Council (Thailand), June 2004. Within the scholarly literature, this figure has varied depending on this source of information. For a representative sample of the estimate see: Ball, "Security Developments in the Thailand-Burma Borderlands," p.9.
1327 Ibid, p.12. 407
Figure 6.4. Thailand’s Mae Lah Refugee Camp
Source: Photograph by author, June 2005.
The transnational security challenges raised in this section detract from the overall level of comprehensive security experienced by the ASEAN states and Thailand in particular. Further, some of these transnational security issues – such as refugees, illegal migrants, human trafficking and HIV/AIDS – are causally linked to human rights abuse and the need for internal consolidation. However, other issues such as the complicity of the SPDC in the narcotics industry have additional consequences for ASEAN’s security community project in as far as the defining criteria of a sense of community are concerned. For example, the involvement of the government (directly or indirectly) in the narcotics industry evidences a complete disregard for the interests and security of Thailand (and the ASEAN states more generally). Meanwhile, and as discussed in the theoretical chapters of this dissertation, actions that reflect a degree of ‘we‐ness’, reciprocity, and long‐term mutual interest are necessary to substantiate the existence of a collective identity. Therefore, the leadership’s involvement with, and indifference to, the transnational consequences of narcotics production within the country renders it implausible to consider the actions of Myanmar as reflecting an appropriate sense of an ASEAN wide community – now or in the foreseeable future. 408
Indicative of the interdependence between the security and community components of the framework, the focus by the SPDC on short term gains without regard to the interests of the community (ASEAN) – as evidenced by any potential involvement in the narcotics industry – also detracts from a potential finding of dependable expectations of peaceful change. The junta’s disregard for the interests of the community is problematic because dependable expectations of peaceful change necessitate a level of integration where states (and their leaderships) demonstrate a capacity to sacrifice the short‐term gains of the country (within reason) for the long‐term interests of the grouping (the security community). Therefore, the current actions by Myanmar’s leadership are more akin to a narrow and amoral pursuit of the regime’s interests (e.g. pursuit of power) as predicted by realist assumptions at a ‘low’ level of integration with its ASEAN ‘partners’ (Chapter II). Consequently, and in the absence of some kind of elite‐level ideological membership in an ASEAN community, Myanmar cannot be ‘depended’ on to restrain the use of coercion and/or force during a conflict of interests. As will be seen, the absence of dependable expectations of peaceful change and any shared sense of a collective identity are further typified by, and exacerbated through, the nature of its bilateral relations with other states – both in Southeast Asia and beyond.
Myanmar’s Friends – the Incongruity of its Bilateral Relations with Southeast Asian Security
In consequence of several factors including economic and diplomatic isolation, strategic location and a defiant determination to maintain power within the country, the SPDC has, on many an occasion, made international headlines over its bilateral relations in the Asia‐ Pacific. Of the countries with which it has the closest relations – be they diplomatic, military, economic or otherwise – several stand out and these include: Singapore, India, Russia, Japan, Thailand, China and latterly North Korea. Given the limitations of time and space this section largely limits its analysis to relations with China and Thailand as both are representative of a material pursuit of national interests. By reflecting on the conceptual framework advanced in Chapter II, this section will illustrate how such behaviour is a further challenge to ASEAN’s security community project. As will be seen, these relationships also dampen the prospects for political reform in Myanmar, further impeding ASEAN’s project. A few preliminary comments in relation to Myanmar’s alternative strategic relationships are 409
justified given the degree to which they inform elite‐level behaviour on the one hand, and exacerbate the divisions in the foreign policy (and thereby collective identity) of the ASEAN member‐states on the other – a topic that had been discussed in Chapter VI.
Singapore remains one of the biggest sources of FDI in Myanmar and while this is not problematic in itself, some of its military aspects are at least compromising.1328 Numerous reports suggest that Singapore has not only supplied some of Myanmar’s weapons in the past but it was the first to do so in the wake of the killings that were a consequence of the government’s response to the protests of 1988.1329 Jane’s Intelligence also lists Singapore as a possible supplier of landmines to the country1330 and added weight to this concern was provided by a former Singaporean intelligence officer who confirmed that Singapore did, at least until the beginning of the new millennium, manufacture landmines and that they were for the explicit purpose of export.1331 Meanwhile, the majority of Myanmar’s more standard munitions – such as ammunition – now come from North Korea due to their low cost of production. However, more recently, in April 2007, Myanmar formally restabilised
1328 Both Thailand and Singapore are two of the four largest sources of FDI for Myanmar. Myanmar Factsheet [Internet] (DFAT, 2005 [cited 2 February 2006]); available from www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/myanmar.pdf. Additionally, Singapore and Malaysia both have extensive investments in the tourism and hotel industry. Ganesan, "Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World," p.47.
1329 William Ashton, Burma Receives Advances from Its Silent Suitors in Singapore [Intelligence Database] (Jane's Intelligence Review, 1998 [cited 22 October 2005]); available from www.janes.com, Andrew Selth, Burma's Secret Military Partners, vol. no. 136 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2000), pp.27- 29.
1330 Other weapons, armaments and military equipment that have been supplied by Singapore include 1 BAeS Dynamics Bloodhound Mk II SAM system; 3 Scorpion radars; arms manufacturing plant and equipment; mortars and ammunition; 84 mm recoilless gun ammunition; automatic rifles; small arms ammunition; computers and electronic equipment; radars and communications equipment and raw materials for arms manufacture. Procurement - Myanmar [Intelligence Database] (Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Southeast Asia, 2005 [cited 17 January 2006]); available from www.janes.com.
1331 He based his contention on that fact that he has seen Singapore government posters advertising the manufacture and sale of military munitions and ‘landmines’ were one of the pictures featured in the poster. He added that the Singapore military does not receive any training in the use of landmines and therefore it can be implied that the purpose of manufacture is solely for export. Discussions with Author, Singapore, September 2005. Further, Singapore, like Myanmar and Vietnam, is not a signatory to the international agreement against landmines. Myanmar Now the Region's Black Spot for Hidden Peril [Internet - News] (South China Morning Post, 2002 [cited 19 January 2006]); available from http://www.banminesusa.org/archives/newsletters/75_may_20_02.html. 410
diplomatic relations with North Korea1332 and had been previously accused of pursuing a nuclear relationship with that country, an accusation which it strongly denies as a ‘false and disconcerting alarm’.1333 What seems relatively certain however is that in 2002 Myanmar entered an agreement with Russia to supply a 10‐megawatt nuclear reactor1334 and while the agreement was temporarily suspended due to a dispute over payment1335 a new agreement regarding the nuclear reactor, together with Russia’s commitment to establish a ‘nuclear physics and biotechnology’ research centre, was signed on 15 May 2007.1336 India on the other hand, has become concerned with the strategic implications of Myanmar’s relationship with China and subsequently sought, as a counterbalance, to engage and assist the country (economically, militarily and politically) through its ‘Look East’ policy. Most recently, India’s look east policy resulted in the country snubbing the US arms embargo against Myanmar and, in a manner similar to Thailand and China, has also undertaken an exploitative pursuit of energy deals regarding Myanmar’s natural gas reserves.1337
1332 Burma-North Korea Ties Need Scrutiny: Renewal of Relations between These Two Pariah States Raises Fear of a Shift in Regional Balance of Power [Internet News] (The Nation, 2007 [cited 11 July 2007]); available from http://nationmultimedia.com/2007/04/29/opinion/opinion_30032952.php.
1333 Myanmar Rejects Ties with North Korea [Intelligence Database] (Stratfor, 2004 [cited 19 January 2005]); available from www.stratfor.biz.
1334 To be located in its central lowlands at a cost of between twenty-five and thirty-five million (USD). Bertil Lintner, Myanmar Gets a Russian Nuclear Reactor [Internet - News] (Asia-Pacific Media Services Limited, 2002 [cited 14 September 2002]); available from http://www.asiapacificms.com/artciles/myanmar_nuclear/.
1335 Armed Forces, Myanmar [Intelligence Database] (Janes Sentinel Security Assessment - Southeast Asia, 2005 [cited 22 October 2005]); available from www.janes.com.
1336 Russia and Myanmar Sign Intergovernmental Agreement on Nuclear Research Center in Myanmar [Internet News] (SKRIN, 2007 [cited 11 July 2007]); available from www.skrin.com. Moscow Website Provides More Details of Plans to Build Nuclear Reactor in Burma [Factiva - Electronic Database] (BBC News, 2007 [cited 11 July 2007]); available from http://global.factiva.com, "Russia to Build Atomic Plant for Burmese Junta: Going Nuclear," The Guardian, 17 May 2007.
1337 Bruce Loudon, India to Snub US on Burma Arms Embargo [Internet News] (The Australian, 2007 [cited 14 June 2007]); available from www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21101933-2703,00.html. 411
Exploitation and Self-Interest in Thailand’s Relations with Myanmar
Given Myanmar’s proximity to Thailand, the two countries have had a long history of interaction. However, these relations have not always been cordial or indeed peaceful. People in Thailand continue to hold historical memories of a ‘Burmese’ attack on its Kingdom in the 18th century.1338 Centuries later, and in the midst of the Cold War, Thailand also had to contend with an ideologically opposed and Chinese funded BCP inside Myanmar’s border. In reaction to these threats, as part of a larger strategy to contain the spread of communism, the Thai government implemented a buffer zone policy by supporting, directly and indirectly, the insurgent armies in Myanmar along the border.1339 While this buffer zone was a source of considerable tension, the prevalence of the military within each country’s leadership did assist in the emergence of some close and ‘mutually beneficial’ relations at the individual level.1340
For a time, and as the threat of communism to the Thai government became more remote, Thailand downplayed the role of the buffer zone. However, following the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia the Kingdom’s threat perceptions over Myanmar once again increased and the buffer zone policy was reinforced. The combination of economic and military aid from China, together with the formation of a ceasefire arrangement with one of the most powerful insurgent groups (the UWSA), resulted in massive increases to the power and size of the Tatmadaw during the late eighties and early nineties. The remaining insurgency movements (the stalwarts of the buffer zone) thus became threatened and, subsequently, were either forced to join in the government’s ceasefire regime or rendered ineffectual through a series of successful military campaigns by the Tatmadaw.
On several occasions both the Tatmadaw and various insurgent groups have encroached on Thailand’s territory for the purpose of launching an assault from the rear (in the case of the
1338 Ganesan, Bilateral Tensions in Post-Cold War ASEAN, p.17.
1339 Myoe, Neither Friend nor Foe: Myanmar's Relations with Thailand since 1988 - a View from Yangon, p.37.
1340 Ganesan, Bilateral Tensions in Post-Cold War ASEAN, p.19. 412
former) or to find safe haven (in the case of the latter). The strategic advantage of these border incursions has been exacerbated by the mountainous and inaccessible nature of the terrain along Myanmar’s border with Thailand. Consequently, on several occasions, Thailand’s armed forces intervened and a number of armed skirmishes have taken place between the Thai military and both the Tatmadaw and insurgent groups.1341 As recently as July 2006 the Tatmadaw fired at a Thai military helicopter1342 and the Thai army, for its part, has as recently as May 2002 fired shells at the Tatmadaw when elements of it (together with the UWSA) crossed into Thailand’s territory while in battle against the Shan State Army.1343 A few months prior, in March 2002, the government backed UWSA fired upon Thai soldiers who were securing the area for a special visit by Queen Sirikit of Thailand.1344 Mortar fire was subsequently exchanged by both sides and Thai villagers had to be evacuated as stray rounds threatened their safety.1345 In spite of the deleterious impact on local and sub‐regional trade the border was immediately closed for five months.1346 Within
1341 Larry Jagan, Burma Drums up Border Tension [Internet] (BBC News, 2002 [cited 3 July 2002]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/asia-pacific/newsid_2081000/2081589.stm.
1342 The Tatmadaw ‘supposedly’ mistook the helicopter as being from the Shan State Army. Sattha Subin Kheunkaew Cheewin, "Army to Protest at 'Hostile Act' after Chopper Comes under Fire," Bangkok Post, 11 July 2006, Foreign Minister Protests Burma over Border Shooting [Internet News] (The Nation, 2006 [cited 3 January 2007]); available from www.nationamultimedia.com/2006/07/13/headlines/headlines_30008633.php, "Myanmar Military Admits Soldier Shoots Thai Copter Unintentionally," (Organisation of Asia-Pacific News Agencies, 2006).
1343 Aung Hla Tun, Myanmar Says Thailand Dishonest on Border Fighting [Internet - News] (The Karen Organisation, 2002 [cited 18 October 2003]); available from http://www.karen.org/news/wwwboard/messages/1567.html.
1344 Border Tension on the Burner Again [Internet - News] (The Nation, 2002 [cited 5 December 2004]); available from http://www.rebound88.net/sp/ngb/sverbal.html.
1345 For the Thai’s, ‘Queen Sirikit’s inability to travel freely in her own kingdom was an affront to national dignity’. Robert Horn, Border Disorder [Internet - Magazine] (Time Asia, 2002 [cited 5 December 2004]); available from http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/printout/0,13675,501020617-260746,00.html.
1346 Thai-Burmese Border Reopens [Internet - News] (BBC, 2002 [cited 19 October 2002]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2328799.stm, Thailand, Myanmar Reopen Border Checkpoints [Internet - News] (Japan Today, 2002 [cited 19 October 2002]); available from http://japantoday.com/e/?content=news&cat=7&id=234513. The Thai/Myanmar border had also been closed the previous year because of Thailand being accused of firing artillery shells into Myanmar in support of Shan rebels (the SSA). Thai-Burmese Relations 'Improve' after Visit [Internet - News] (BBC News, 2001 [cited 8 November 2004]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1527507.stm, Thailand, Myanmar Officials to Meet over Border Conflict [Dow Jones Interactive Database] (Agence France-Presse, 2001 [cited 6 June 2001]); available from http://ptg.djnr.com. 413
thirty‐six hours of the border’s reopening, security had to be tightened as six bombs were found alongside Thailand’s Tak province in the Myanmar town of Myawaddy.1347 Meanwhile, Territorial disputes have also remained an issue of concern. For example, in March 2003 the SPDC demanded that Thailand withdraw thirty‐two troops that were stationed on a strategic mountain in Doi Lang – both governments claim this area as their own territory.1348
The negative consequences of long‐term ethnic conflict in Myanmar have extended far beyond the traditional security realm of territorial disputes and border incursions. In 1999, between five and a dozen men from the ‘Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors’ group seized control of Myanmar’s embassy in Bangkok for twenty‐six hours and held approximately forty people hostage.1349 The SPDC was subsequently outraged when the Thai government complied with the dissidents’ request for helicopters and safe passage on condition that the hostages were released.1350 Then, in January 2000, Thai security forces stormed a hospital in the Ratchaburi Province where patients, visitors and staff had been held hostage by another insurgent group called ‘God’s Army’. Investigations by the Thai government later found a connection between this insurgent group and those responsible for the embassy incident a
1347 Thai-Myanmar Border Shocked after 6 Bombs Found after Reopening [Internet - News] (Xinhua, 2002 [cited 19 October 2002]); available from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2002-10/17/content_599768.htm. A year later (May 2003) a number of bombs exploded in the border town of Tachilek a few hundred meters from the Thai city of Mae Sai. Thaksin: Border Explosions Not to Affect Thai/Myanmar Relations [Electronic Database - Expanded Academic ASAP] (Xinhua News Agency, 2003 [cited 8 November 2004]); available from http://web6.infotrac.galegroup.com.
1348 Burma Demands Troops Leave Doi Lang [Internet - News] (The Nation, 2003 [cited 9 November 2004]); available from http://www.nationmultimedia.com/page.arcview.php3?clid=4&id=75213@usrsess=1.
1349 Busaba Sivasomboon, Myanmar Embassy in Thailand Stormed [Internet - News] (The Washington Post, 1999 [cited 18 October 2003]); available from www.washington.com/wp- srv/aponline/19991001/aponline095635_000.htm, Thailand Security Forces Storm Hospital, Kill 10 Myanmar Rebels [Dow Jones Interactive Database] (The Grand Rapids Press, 2000 [cited 5 May 2002]); available from http://ptg.djnr.com.
1350 Charlotte Bevan, Bangkok Siege 'Stank of Conspiracy' [Internet - News] (BBC News, 1999 [cited 8 March 2006]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/466938.stm. 414
year prior. This connection, inter alia, resulted in new and less accommodating policies by the Thai government vis‐à‐vis the insurgency movements.1351
Relations between the two countries have also been hampered by competing nationalisms and seemingly irreconcilable differences between their national identities. For example, in 2002 relations took another turn for the worse when various Myanmarese newspapers criticised the Thai monarchy, a faux pas that is difficult to forgive within Thai society and culture. Thailand immediately demanded an apology and blacklisted two SPDC journalists.1352 The SPDC responded to the demand by denouncing Thailand’s harbouring of insurgents and, to this end, organised a rally of 20,000 anti‐Thai supporters near Thailand’s border.1353 Anthony Davis (Jane’s Intelligence) argues that ‘there is [a] real ongoing potential for the Thai and Burmese military to kill each other, to clash, to kill not just in ones or twos but at a company or battalion level’.1354 Whether or not such a scenario eventuates, the fact of the matter is that there has been conflict in recent years. As the appropriate level of integration necessary to the existence of ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’ requires a ‘degree of consistency and evolution towards a situation of actual and anticipated peace between nations’; both Myanmar and Thailand mutually exclude each other from any ‘joint’ membership in a potential security community.1355
1351 This fringe group is led by 12-year-old boys who claim to have mystical powers that make them invincible. Thailand Security Forces Storm Hospital, Kill 10 Myanmar Rebels (cited).
1352 'New Low' for Thai-Burma Relations [Internet - News] (BBC News, 2002 [cited 1 July 2002]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/asia-pacific/newsid_2071000/2071493.stm, Thailand Blacklists Myanmar Journalists [Internet] (The Straits Times Interactive, 2002 [cited 2 July 2002]); available from http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg.
1353 Tens of Thousands Rally in Burma [Internet - News] (Radio Australia News, 2002 [cited 5 December 2004]); available from http://abc.net.au/ra/newstories/RANewsStories_571088.htm.
1354 Interview with Anthony Davis, Janes Intelligence (Bangkok), 15 February 2006.
1355 As discussed by the conceptual framework in Chapter II. See, in particular, the sections on ‘security’ and ‘integration’. 415
Notwithstanding the continued risk of conflict between Thailand and Myanmar, through to the time of Prime Minister Thaksin’s ouster (through a military coup in October 2006),1356 the impact of these transnational comprehensive security issues on relations between the two countries has not been as negative as one might expect. Firstly, there was an initial (albeit limited) improvement to their bilateral relations as a consequence of an SPDC initiative to selectively grant ‘logging concessions’ to key political and military figures including General Chavalit – then Commander in Chief of the Thai Armed Forces and Deputy Prime Minister during the period of Thaksin’s administration.1357 These deals resulted in a massive increase in logging along the Thai‐Myanmar border through to 1993 and this development – in conjunction with the earlier mentioned hostage taking by ‘God’s Army’ – marked a turning point towards the demise of Thai support for Myanmar’s ethnic minority groups and their opposition to the SPDC.1358
The most significant improvement to relations between the two countries flowed from the entry of Thaksin Shinawatra as Prime Minister of Thailand. Thaksin’s administration was quick to publicly criticise the previous Chuan government with the claim that its tough policies had put the Thai/Myanmar relationship in danger. One of these criticisms pertained to the Chuan government’s policy of suspending all high‐ranking state visits to Myanmar. Nonetheless, and despite Thaksin’s initial goodwill gesture of sending the Thai premier to Yangon, it took at least a year for relations between the two countries to thaw.1359 It was at this time that the SPDC announced three preconditions to the establishment of affable relations. The conditions raised by the SPDC, to which Thaksin agreed, consisted of (1) the
1356 Thai PM Deposed in Military Coup [Internet News] (BBC News, 2006 [cited 21 September 2006]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5361512.stm.
1357 For example, Professor Des Ball describes the Deputy Prime Minister as a man who ‘boasts of his good relations with the junta in Rangoon. He had earned a nickname as the ‘logger Chavalit’ in the late 1980s, when as Chief of the Army he had arranged a deal with the Burmese whereby Tatmadaw troops could enter Thailand to attack the border strongholds of the ethnic insurgents from the rear, and in return Thai logging companies were given access to forests in Kayin [Karen] State, which they then stripped bare with heavy machinery’. Ball, "Security Developments in the Thailand-Burma Borderlands," p.7.
1358 "A Conflict of Interests - the Uncertain Future of Burma's Forests," p.12.
1359 Border Tension on the Burner Again (cited). 416
removal of the Thai army chief General Surayud Chulanont; (2) the removal of the commander of the 3rd army;1360 and (3) an end to all “provocative operations” along the border by Task Force 399.1361 Later, in September 2003, Thaksin also directed his government ‘to consider banning foreign dissidents who seek to use Thailand as a base for opposition struggles against neighbouring governments’.1362 Then, in early 2005, the Thaksin government, on the grounds of ‘national security’, ordered at least 3,000 Burmese refugees to leave Bangkok and to move into one of three border‐camps currently in operation. No mobile phones or electronic devices are allowed in these camps rendering it difficult for political activists to operate.1363
Amidst allegations of corruption due to his rapid rise from policeman to multibillionaire;1364 Thaksin further sought to improve bilateral relations by increasing Thailand’s economic links with (and exploitation of) Myanmar. Thaksin’s ThaiCom‐2 and ThaiCom‐3 Satellites now provide Myanmar with telecommunication services including satellite TV, telephone and internet.1365 In pursuit of his security agenda he also ended the previous administration’s ‘back to the barracks’ policy so that, according to Professor Des Ball, in 2002 more than fifty Generals (2‐3 Star) visited Myanmar for the purpose of conducting (possibly corrupt)
1360 This patrols the Chiang Mai region of Northern Thailand.
1361 Fawthrop, Thai-Myanmar Ties: Drug Lords Cash In (cited), Marwaan Macan-Markar, Thailand Accused of Dancing to Myanmar's Tune [Internet - News] (Asia Times, 2004 [cited 5 December 2004]); available from http://www.atimes.com.
1362 Thailand Reconsiders Security Policy [Electronic Intelligence Database] (Stratfor, 2004 [cited 8 November 2004]); available from http://www.stratfor.biz.
1363 Burma Refugees Miss Thai Deadline [Internet - News] (BBC News, 2005 [cited 2 April 2005]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/4400797.stm, Simon Montlake, Burma Refugees Face Thai Deadline [Internet - News] (BBC, 2005 [cited 4 April 2005]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/4396051.stm, Thailand Uproots Burmese Refugees [Internet - News] (Sydney Morning Herald, 2005 [cited 24 March 2005]); available from http://www.smh.com.au.
1364 Until recently, he was the owner of Thailand’s monopolised multibillion-dollar telecommunications industry. Discussions with Professor Des Ball, Thai/Myanmar Border Field Trip, June 2005.
1365 Ball, "Security Developments in the Thailand-Burma Borderlands," p.7. 417
business dealings.1366 Thailand’s newfound restraint against anything that might provoke hostility in its relations with the SPDC also extended to what has been claimed to be an ally of the junta, the United Wa State Army. Given that it now controls much of the 850 kilometre frontier with Thailand some analysts have argued that this de facto relationship has already had the effect of increased drug trafficking across the border.1367
The cordial nature of recent relations between Thailand and Myanmar has also had a number of repercussions, positive and negative, for the comprehensive security of Southeast Asia and ASEAN’s Security Community project. For example, increases in the level of illicit drug production and trafficking through the border into Thailand, as a consequence of the former Thaksin administration’s pursuit of self‐interests, has the potential to affect all the ASEAN countries. Given the broad ranging activities of the many criminal communities within Myanmar, any strengthening of the position of these communities will likely also increase the impact of other categories of transnational crime (e.g. people trafficking and smuggling) with associated affects on such issues as the spread of disease (e.g. HIV/AIDS). Whether or not the newly installed military government in Bangkok will implement positive change with respect to its foreign policy (and relevant domestic policies) is an issue which is still unclear. In recent articles some Thai commentators talk about a ‘possible shift of Thai policy toward Rangoon’1368 but the reality is that the current leadership has sent mixed signals. While there has been some talk of Thailand returning to a policy in support of the ethic Shan people (and implicitly the Shan State Army),1369 official statements by Thailand regarding its push for ‘democratic reform’ in Myanmar have been very low‐key. The new
1366 Discussions with Professor Des Ball during Thai/Myanmar Border Field, June 2005.
1367 Fawthrop, Thai-Myanmar Ties: Drug Lords Cash In (cited).
1368 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, "Key Issues in Myanmar Politics,” (Bangkok: Thai News Service, 2007).
1369 "Thailand: Fighting Drugs Easier Now That Thailand Is No Long Eager to Please Myanmar (Burma),” (Bangkok: Thai News Service, 2007). 418
Prime Minister, Surayud Chulanont, has refused to give details, for example, about any pressure that has been placed on Yangon to secure the release of Aung San Suu Kyi.1370
Meanwhile, the increased economic interdependence between the two countries and the removal of other contentious factors by the Thaksin administration has meant that the prospect for armed conflict had, at least until recently, been reduced; a relatively positive development when compared to the fairly frequent occurrence of armed conflict along the border as little as four years ago. However, somewhat less positive is the fact that the basis of such an argument may change on a whim depending on any new directions that the military government in Thailand may take or in the event of a military coup or leadership change within Myanmar along with any instability that might follow. As the once democratic example of Thailand illustrates, and in the absence of adequate political institutions to moderate leadership behaviour, the potential and unpredictable threat of leadership change – peaceful or otherwise – is a major obstacle to any finding of dependable expectations of peaceful change between the two countries over the mid to long‐term. Further, the lack of consistency in relations between the two countries and the short‐term nature of any evolution towards a ‘situation of actual and anticipated peace’ excludes Myanmar from being able to satisfy the framework’s threshold test for the existence of a security community.
The China Factor: The Strategic Implications of Myanmar’s Relationship with China.
The SPDC needed to enhance the power of the Tatmadaw for the purpose of strengthening its ability to implement its ceasefire regime and to defeat the remaining insurgent groups through armed encounters (in the event that an insurgent group remains unwilling to negotiate). To this end, the SPDC desperately needed an ally that would readily provide it with adequate funding, munitions and armaments. While China had the potential to meet the government’s needs in this context, the long history of animosity between the two
1370 Thai PM Presses Myanmar for Reform [Internet News] (Channel News Asia, 2006 [cited 23 January 2007]); available from www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/243203/1/.html. 419
countries presented an obstacle to the formation of constructive relations. An opportunity to end this historical enmity emerged with implementation of a ceasefire arrangement with the formerly Chinese backed BCP. Following initial diplomatic talks designed to normalise relations between Myanmar and China, the SPDC soon found that China was a more than willing sponsor and ally of the regime.1371 China’s eagerness to support its comparatively weak and impoverished neighbour can be partially attributed to the strategic opportunity thus presented to enhance its access (military and economic) to both the Indian Ocean and to the Malacca Straits.1372 A further point of strategic importance for China is the existence of relatively vast energy resources within Myanmar where, for example, it currently has proven reserves of 115 million barrels of oil along with 314.4 billion cubic feet of natural gas. In addition, there remain large off‐shore areas that have yet to be explored.1373 Given China’s own energy shortage the plentiful supply of natural resources in Myanmar render it highly important for China to maintain its strategic influence.
Upon the normalisation of relations between the two countries, China almost immediately rewarded the Tatmadaw with an initial supply of military equipment estimated to be in the order of between US$1.2 billion and US$1.5 billion for the period between 1990 and 1994.1374 This assistance has since been boosted to US$2 billion with acquisition emphasis
1371 Myanmar: The Future of the Armed Forces [Internet - Report] (International Crisis Group, 27 September 2002 [cited 21 October 2002]); available from http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/asia/burma_myanmar/reports/A400782_27092002.pdf.
1372 Vijai Nair, Why India Is Wary About China (vol.1, Issue 9) [Internet - Journal] (The Jamestown Foundation, 2001 [cited 20 August 2002]); available from http://www.china.jamestown.org/pubs/view/cwe_001_009_004.htm.
1373 According to newspaper sources, China believes that there may be as much as 3.2 billion barrels of oil and 2.46 trillion cubic meters of gas. Myanmar: India and China Compete to Support Economy [Intelligence Database] (AsiaInt Reference Library, 2004 [cited 5 January 2005]); available from www.asiaint.com.
1374 Andrew Selth, "Chinese Military Bases in Burma: The Explosion of a Myth,” (Brisbane: Griffith Asia Institute, 2007), pp.3-6. China's External Affairs: Relations with Myanmar [Intelligence Database - Jane's] (Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 2005 [cited 22 October 2005]); available from www.janes.com. Additional armaments included fighter aircraft, artillery, antiaircraft guns, and missiles. Da Cunha, "Southeast Asian Perceptions of China's Future Security Role in Its "Backyard"," pp.117-118. In relation to claims of a further $2 billion in assistance, see: Nair, Why India Is Wary About China (cited). 420
being on ‘helicopters, assault rifles, patrol boats and armoured vehicles’.1375 For the purpose of enhancing its strategic access to the Indian Ocean and the Malacca Straits, China also refurbished four of Myanmar’s naval bases; installed new coastal radar systems;1376 and constructed a large electronic surveillance establishment on Coco Island.1377 It has been reported that other Chinese facilities have also been installed and these are located at Ramree Island south of Sittwe in the Rakhine state, Zadetkyi Kyun (St Mathews Island) off the Tanintharyi coast and Hainggyi in the Ayeryarwady River estuary near Pathein.1378 Further, through exploiting a combination of aid and trade benefits, the SPDC has managed to almost double the size of its armed forces to just under half a million personnel.1379 China has also supported Myanmar through the supply of aid and soft loans to the country. In 2003 for example, China provided Myanmar with USD200 million in loans and agreed to write of an unspecified number of the country’s debts to China.1380
Given the level of aid provided by China to Myanmar, the bilateral relations between the two countries may – more than any other factor – explain the continued survival of the regime. As illustrated by the charts below, international political and economic isolation
1375 In the period of 2001 through to 2003 there were a further four shipments of weapons reported. Ganesan, "Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World," p.50.
1376 Jonathan S. Landay, What Nuclear Tests Mean for China and the Rest of Asia [Internet] (Christian Science Monitor, 1998 [cited 3 September 2002]); available from http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/landay.htm.
1377 China-Burma-India Intelligence [Internet] (Voice of America, 2002 [cited 3 September 2002]); available from http://www.fas.org/irp/news/1998/05/980521-prc3.htm, Sudha Ramachandran, Myanmar Plays Off India and China [Internet - News] (Asia Times, 2005 [cited 25 August 2005]); available from www.asiatimes.com. There have also been claims that the Chinese funded road and bridge projects to provide a military corridor through to the coast so that Myanmar can be used as a ‘launching pad’ for any relevant military operation or assault. Myanmar: The Future of the Armed Forces (cited). Having said this, Andrew Selth argues that the ‘great coco island base’ is largely a myth. He does however concede the possibility that there was a large Chinese SIGINT base installed in the early 1990s but later dismantled or, as a more likely scenario, that there is a small radar station that may have received occasional technical support by the Chinese. Selth, "Chinese Military Bases in Burma: The Explosion of a Myth," p.10.
1378 Ganesan, "Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World," p.50.
1379 Da Cunha, Renewed Military Build-ups Post-Asian Crisis: The Effect on Two Key Southeast Asian Bilateral Military Balances (cited).
1380 Ian Holiday, "Rethinking the United States’ Myanmar Policy," Asian Survey 45, no. 4 (2005): pp.615-616. 421
have also enhanced the significance of China as a trade partner for Myanmar.1381 While China currently ranks third in terms of Myanmar’s exports, at 28.5 percent it is now first in relation to imports. This is largely due to the ability of China to supply comparatively cheaper consumer goods. The economic (and cultural) influence of China is most significant in the upper quadrants of the country from Mandalay city through to the North and East of the country along the border with China. In 2003 bilateral trade between Myanmar and China exceeded US$1 billion and a set of agreements for economic cooperation were approved in March 2004.1382 The dominance of China in Myanmar’s foreign relations was further exemplified by Than Shwe’s actions following Khin Nyunt’s dismissal as Prime Minister. In the aftermath of the dismissal he almost immediately undertook a diplomatic visit to China (in preference to ASEAN) to justify the actions of the SPDC.1383 Nevertheless, Myanmar is aware that it needs to balance its strategic relations with China against other relationships such as with India and with Russia.1384 However, in practice, the capacity of the SPDC to maintain an appropriate strategic balance between its major partners is highly limited.
1381 From 1996 to 1999 Singapore was the biggest exporter to Myanmar (at around 30% of total imports) but thereafter China took its place. Analysis based on data supplied by the Strategic Asia Database, located at: http://strategicasia.org. See also: Ganesan, "Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World," p.36.
1382 China's External Affairs: Relations with Myanmar (cited).
1383 Soe Win, the new Prime Minister, also visited China a week later but did so only after a visit to India reflecting both the comparative inconsequentiality of Southeast Asia for the leadership and the need to diversify the country’s dependence on ‘major’ powers within the greater Asia Pacific Region. Myanmar: India and China Compete to Support Economy (cited), Myanmar: Soe Win Heads to China [Electronic Intelligence Database] (AsiaInt Reference Library, 2004 [cited 8 November 2004]); available from http://www.asiaint.com.
1384 For example, Myanmar has sought to increase its economic and military relations with India. Myanmar has also attempted to diversify the destinations from which it receives military equipment to include Russia. In 1999 it received a squadron of Russian Mi-17 helicopters and in 2003 it obtained at concessionary rates a squadron of Mig-29s. In 1999 it further turned down a Chinese offer for USD200 million in military credits. External Affairs, Myanmar [Electronic Intelligence Database] (Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Southeast Asia, 2005 [cited 29 May 2005]); available from www.janes.com. In May 2005, Myanmar and India had commenced a feasibility study on building a deep-sea port in the southern Tanintharyi division. India to Study Possibility of Building Deep-Sea Port in Myanmar [Internet - News] (People's Daily Online, 2005 [cited 29 March 2005]); available from http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200503/22/print20050322_177762.html. 422
Figure 9.5. Myanmar’s Major Import and Export Partners
Myanmar's Main Import Partners Myanmar's Main Export Partners
Others Others, 34% 22.30% China, 28.50%
Malaysia, United 4.50% Kingdom 4% Republic of Thailand Japan 5% Korea, 36% 7.20% China 6% Singapore, Thailand, 19.40% India 15% 18.10%
Source: Compiled by author from the statistics of DFAT (Australia), located at http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/burma.pdf
China is further important to Myanmar through an ideational and normative compatibility (and/or complementarity) that provides significant psychological support, and guidance, to the SPDC. The importance of such support was demonstrated by immediate declarations by China that the placement of Myanmar’s ‘political repression and human rights violations’ on the UN Security Council’s official agenda was ‘preposterous’.1385 China was similarly supportive in relation to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Myanmar and North Korea1386 and the material and ideational influence of China can now also be seen in relation to the prospects for democracy within Myanmar. Given the level of support from China (along with support from India and Russia), and in the wake of a continued deadlock over the Roadmap to Democracy, by June 2007 there were suggestions that the junta was in the process of considering an alternative political model based on the style of government in China.1387 In relation to the attractiveness of such a model, the Generals in Myanmar
1385 China Infuriated by UN Move to Examine Myanmar Relations [Internet News] (Channel News Asia, 2006 [cited 16 September 2006]); available from www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/print/230698/1.html.
1386 China Welcomes North Korea, Burma to Improve Relations [Factiva - Electronic Database] (BBC Monitoring Newsfile, 2007 [cited 4 July 2007]); available from http://global.factiva.com.
1387 Larry Jagan, Burma: Generals Express Interest in Chinese-Style Government [Factiva - Electronic Database] (Inter Press Service, 2007 [cited 11 July 2007]); available from http://global.factiva.com. 423
have undoubtedly been impressed by the continued ability of China to maintain and seek to enforce a strict adherence to the principle of non‐interference without any detrimental effects on economic relations.
On the issue of non‐interference, China has also consistently remained firm in its position that the sovereignty of Myanmar should not be compromised through international pressure and this policy has, in turn, impeded ASEAN’s ability to compel change in the country.1388 China’s position also serves its own national interests through the avoidance of any potential criticism (at least within ASEAN) over its own human rights abuses including as a source of potential instability in the future. The importance to China of ensuring that ‘non‐ interference’ remains adhered to throughout Southeast Asia was seen at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in the Laotian capital on 26 July 2005. Following the announcement that Myanmar had decided to relinquish the chair, China’s foreign minister Li Zhaoxing broke protocol and left the meeting, thereby boycotting the ARF assembly he was to attend immediately afterwards. He then flew to Yangon where discussions were hurriedly organised with President Than Shwe and Prime Minister Soe Win. The official excuse provided by the Foreign Minister for his early departure was that Myanmar was ‘the only country in ASEAN that I’ve never seen’.1389
Myanmar’s relationship within China presents a number of challenges to change and reform in Myanmar. For example, the natural resources and level of food security within Myanmar have enabled the military regime to survive for decades with only limited dependence on the outside world. Therefore, the aid, trade and armaments provided by China satisfy a significant proportion of the regime’s relatively modest requirements. In other words, the aid China provides, together with its diplomatic support for Myanmar, has directly increased the probability of the SPDC remaining in power for the foreseeable future. Further, the
1388 Ganesan, "Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World," p.36.
1389 Chinese Cuts Short ASEAN Visit, to Travel to Myanmar [Electronic Database - Factiva] (Associated Press Newswires, 2005 [cited 28 July 2005]); available from www.factiva.com, Chinese FM Visits Myanmar [Internet - News] (China View, 2005 [cited 12 August 2005]); available from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005- 07/27/content_3274198.htm. 424
material benefits that Myanmar gains from China are greater than the sum‐total sourced from ASEAN. The greater significance of China, relative to ASEAN, will significantly handicap any future attempt by ASEAN to push for improved governance within Myanmar.
In relation to the prospect for political change, while Myanmar’s relations with some ASEAN states continue to provide some leverage it has been inconsistently applied. By contrast, China’s unswerving adherence to the principle of non‐interference has contributed towards an ideological endearment of Myanmar with China. Given the form of governance in China, this alone presents a major challenge to positive change in the future. Another problem in the implementation of political change within Myanmar is its high level of strategic importance to China. Thus, and bearing in mind the significance China places on the non‐ interference principle, it is highly unlikely that ASEAN could, in the future, rely on China to cooperate in any multilateral strategy to apply substantive pressure on Myanmar towards reform and improved governance.
Conclusions
This chapter has considered the historical implications and contemporary challenges of domestic instability in Myanmar. As a consequence of this research it is contended that while Southeast Asia – through ethnic, religious and political diversity – suffers from destabilising dynamics in several of its countries, no other ASEAN country is as unstable and challenging to ASEAN’s goals as is the case of Myanmar. Therefore, the early components of the chapter focused on the factors behind, and the consequences of, such instability. These factors suggest that there is little to no likelihood of an improvement to the situation within Myanmar in the absence of external assistance. While a complex set of specific recommendations over how to assist Myanmar in the process of internal consolidation is beyond the scope of this thesis,1390 it is sufficient to state that ASEAN, as the principle
1390 The author has, however, provided a comprehensive account regarding the issue in the following publication: Roberts, "Myanmar and the Argument for Engagement: A Clash of Contesting Moralities?" See also: Christopher Roberts, Myanmar and the Argument for Engagement: A Clash of Contending Moralities? [Working Paper] (IDSS, 18 March 2006 [cited 18 March 2006]); available from http://www.idss.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP108.pdf. 425
organisation responsible for the comprehensive security of Southeast Asia, has a responsibly to seek a constructive role in facilitating positive change within Myanmar. While such a role has proven to be beyond the reach of the Association thus far, ASEAN’s proposal to establish an ASEAN Community and the nature of negotiations for an ASEAN Charter (including in principle agreement on the establishment of a human rights commission) indicates a desire by a growing proportion of the political elite to play a more proactive role in the realization of such change.
The degree of regional integration necessary to satisfy the threshold test for the existence of a nascent security community is challenged by the existence of both actual and potential traditional security threats. Myanmar’s bilateral relations with Thailand have been strained for centuries and armed skirmishes over ethnic conflict and territorial disputes have occurred through to recent years. All armed conflict has the potential to escalate and the intermittent conflict along the Thai/Myanmar border should not be considered an exception to this rule. As has been shown, the Thaksin administration (in a possible realisation of this risk) had been determined to forge better relations with its neighbour. As the level of economic interdependence between the two countries grew and Thai support for the insurgent movements and refugees declined (the moral implications notwithstanding), the risk of armed conflict between the two countries also declined at least through to the time of Thaksin’s ouster from government. However, and as stated in Chapter II, a low risk of armed conflict does not equate to dependable expectations of peaceful change. In order to satisfy the framework’s threshold test, over the long‐term there will need to be a complete end to the insurgency movement and ethnic conflict together with the development of stable and mature political institutions and processes throughout Southeast Asia.
The collective picture generated by the two chapters on Myanmar has also challenged the likelihood of the existence of a community between the elites of Myanmar and its remaining ASEAN counterparts. As also discussed in the conceptual framework to the dissertation, there are a number of characteristics necessary to the establishment of a common sense of community and these include the existence of a collective identity together with a sense of ‘reciprocity whereby there is a degree of long‐term interest’. As unfortunate as the history 426
of Myanmar is, it is apparent that the first goal of the leadership in the country is to pursue and maintain power regardless of the subsequent costs to its people and the region. This struggle to preserve power has existed not just between the political parties or the ethnic groups but within the SPDC itself. Hence, where limited opportunities for greater stability, reform and prosperity have arisen, such prospects have been crushed the moment they have threatened the elites at the pinnacle of power. The most recent example pertained to Khin Nyunt and his growing popularity with the leadership of countries such as China together with his arguable success over the ceasefire agreements and the ‘roadmap for democracy’. Under circumstances where the maintenance of power for individual elites has become more important than stability and reform, then it will be more probable that the leadership will continue to act contrary to the interests of ASEAN. In this regard, the government of Myanmar cannot be said to participate in the formation of a potential ASEAN elite‐level community.
The chapter also considered a non‐exhaustive list of the transnational security challenges that have afflicted, to varying degrees, the states of Southeast Asia. These challenges largely arose from an inadequate level of internal state consolidation which, in turn, was exacerbated by long‐term domestic instability. While the direct impact of these non‐ traditional security threats to ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’ is marginal, their existence indirectly affects ASEAN’s security community project in at least two respects. In the first instance – and in line with the dissertation’s conceptual framework – the transnational consequences of instability illustrated in the chapter will continue to divert valuable resources in Thailand away from the pursuit of regional integration. In the second instance, the continued existence of these transnational security issues also evidences the low level of ‘security integration’ within the ASEAN states where they have been unable to cooperate and formulate the measures necessary to resolve these non‐ traditional security challenges.
The low level of integration amongst the ASEAN states was further illustrated by recent developments in Myanmar’s relations with Thailand and with China. For example, the Thaksin administration’s amoral and self‐interested pursuit of trade with Myanmar had 427
compromised the potential of Thailand to join ASEAN in a common position should the organisation wish to take a tougher stance vis‐à‐vis Myanmar. As Chapter VI outlined, there were a number of instances regarding the issue of Myanmar’s chairmanship of ASEAN where the Thaksin administration had demonstrated an atypically conservative position in its normative stance within ASEAN. Whether or not the new administration in Thailand will reveal a capacity to be an entrepreneur as far as ASEAN’s norms and principles are concerned remains to be seen. In as far as Myanmar’s relations with China are concerned, the collective identity that is emerging between the two countries has been at the expense of Myanmar’s capacity to identify with ASEAN collectively. The transference of a sense of community towards China and away from ASEAN, together with its economic dependence on China, is sufficient in degree to question the loyalty of Myanmar to the group and thus whether it can be depended on to support ASEAN in the event of a serious conflict of interests (with or without the potential for violence) between China and any of the ASEAN states. Regardless of how improbable this hypothetical scenario may appear, the actual existence of circumstances where a state might be anticipated to side with an exogenous actor under circumstances of coercion and/or armed conflict, and in a manner that would fundamentally conflict with the interests of the grouping (community of states), is the antithesis of the conditions required for a security community.
Meanwhile, and perhaps in realisation of these transnational consequences and their impact on the association’s international stature as a diplomatic community, Chapter VI indicated how ASEAN, with an occasional step backward, started to take a tougher stance over Myanmar. At various times the group’s leaders publicly commented on the internal affairs of the country, made various ‘generalised’ demands regarding what the leadership had to do, and, eventually, exerted pressure on Myanmar’s leadership to relinquish its scheduled chairmanship of ASEAN. Thus, in light of the mounting regional consequences to arise out of the combined effects of transnational insecurity and international pressure, ASEAN was left with little choice but to depart from a strict adherence to its historical principle of non‐interference and move towards the application of constructive intervention or, in its lesser form, enhanced interaction. 428
Notwithstanding the positive aspects of these developments, the ability of ASEAN to continue to implement the type of reform that would be indicative of a higher level of integration – rather than a realist agenda limited to the pursuit of material interests – remains in question. As Martin Ott states, the problem is that in the past much of the impetus for ‘constructive engagement’ by some states – such as Singapore and Thailand – has grown out of the perceived and burgeoning economic opportunities in the country.1391 Reflective of this calculation is the fact that Singapore and Thailand are two of the four largest contributors of FDI to Myanmar.1392 So long as the primary factors that motivate some member‐states in the organisation are ‘material’ – as opposed to the type of ‘ideological’ or ‘ideational’ considerations that might be interpreted as reflecting a shared sense of community or collective identity1393 – then the normative evolution necessary to satisfy the constituent elements of a security community (as defined in chapters two and three) will be highly problematic. Under an environment where the foreign policies of states are primarily driven by the pursuit of self interest (with little regard for the consequences of such actions) then the collective group of states will fundamentally operate under an environment of mutual suspicion.1394 These conditions further challenge the prospect of garnering a collective policy position regarding the implementation of binding mechanisms to address the diverse range of comprehensive security challenges in Southeast Asia.
1391 Martin Ott, “From Isolation to Relevance” in Burma: Prospects for Democratisation, (Washington: Brookings Institute Press, 1998) p.79, cited in: Zaw et al., "Challenges to Democratization in Burma: Perspectives on Multilateral and Bilateral Responses."
1392 Myanmar Factsheet (cited). Additionally, Singapore and Malaysia both have extensive investments in the tourism and hotel industry. Ganesan, "Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World," p.47.
1393 As opposed to any region-wide principles for, and value of, democracy and human rights.
1394 Such an environment has been witnessed by the author’s interviews with a diverse range of policy makers and academics in Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. During the course of this time key interviewees in Cambodia spoke of the ‘selfish actions’ of Thailand; Malaysian’s have commented on the militant nature of Singapore complete ‘with a paranoid Israeli defence force siege mentality’; and the Philippines question the integrity behind Malaysia’s claim to the Sabah. 429
Chapter X ASEAN’s Security Community Project: Retrospect and Prospects
Back in 1984, Donald K. Emmerson wrote ‘what’s in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet. Some names like “rose”, acknowledge what exists. Others, like “unicorn”, create what otherwise would not exist. In between lie names that simultaneously describe and invent reality. “Southeast Asia” is one of these’.1395 Not only does this analogy aptly encapsulate the contested nature of ‘Southeast Asia’ as a region, but also in many respects, it equally applies to the character of ASEAN. As stated at the outset of the dissertation, ASEAN has been stamped with many different labels ranging from an ‘imitation community’ to a ‘security community’. Of these characterisations, the latter has been the most controversial. In 1998, Amitav Acharya wrote that the ‘ASEAN experience somewhat blurs the distinction between a nascent, ascendant, and mature security community. Several characteristics of a mature security community are present in Southeast Asia’.1396 In his 2001 book, Acharya is somewhat more circumspect when he argues that ‘ASEAN fits the concept of a “nascent security community”, although its progress towards the ascendant or mature level looked more promising in the early 1990s than in the later part of the decade’. Yuen Fong Khong adds that the only remaining question ‘is whether enough of the ASEAN spirit can be retained to nurture the nascent pluralistic security
1395 Donald K Emmerson, ""Southeast Asia": What's in a Name?" Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 15, no. 1 (1984): p.1.
1396 According to Acharya, these characteristics included 'multilateralism, discourse and language of a community, cooperative (but not collective) security, and policy coordination against threats’. He then qualifies his earlier characterisation by stating: ‘But to describe ASEAN as a mature security community will be inaccurate in the absence of a high level of military integration, common definition of external threat, and unfortified borders’. 430
community that has been so helpful in providing a modicum of order of the ASEAN states’.1397
In response to these contentions and the associated debate, the dissertation has attempted to delineate the character of ASEAN by way of an investigation of a broad spectrum of historical events and contemporary challenges. As a complement to this approach, extensive fieldwork has also been undertaken involving over 100 in‐depth interviews and two separate designs of survey work with a total of 919 participants. The exacting nature of the critique provided in this chapter (and in the body of the work) has been invited by the relatively high and ambitious benchmark set by ASEAN in its declaration to forge an ASEAN community along the lines of the European Union by 2015. While the introductory chapter provided a comprehensive outline of the limitations to the research, it is important to review some of the most important aspects of these limitations. Neither the elite level survey nor the communal level survey designs were random in nature. The elite level survey is best described as a purposive sample. The communal level survey, by contrast, can be more accurately described as a cluster sample where the majority of the participants were sampled in a random fashion within each capital city but the selection of the location (e.g. the capital city of each ASEAN country except Myanmar) was performed on a non‐random (purposive) basis.1398 Further, while the survey samples were reasonably large for the purpose of the present study and the time and funds available, the surveys are also best considered as a pilot study that is only ‘indicative’ of regional opinions and perceptions. Having said this, the contribution of the elite survey sample is significant as the security
1397 Khong, "ASEAN and the Southeast Asian Security Complex," p.339. These claims have been made by scholars indigenous to the region despite Alan Chong characterising such thoughts as belonging to ‘[m]ainstream western observers of the region…’ that have ‘consensually developed an obsession with empirical problems of building coherent states and nations as the logical framing for the embryonic international relations of the region’. His main point being that the scholarly literature on the region remains theoretically biased in favour of western viewpoints and there is an inadequate level of indigenous theorisation due to indigenous students also being socialised into westernised theoretical and conceptual thought processes. His contentions are somewhat reminiscent of the ‘Asian values’ debate that emerged in the 1990 and was driven by less than democratic leaders such as Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore. Alan Chong, “Southeast Asia: Theory between Modernisation and Tradition,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 7, no. 3 (2007): p.397.
1398 Phillips W. Shively, The Craft of Political Research (New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2005), pp.100-101. 431
community proposal is an ‘elite’ project and the participants in the survey ranged from senior foreign ministry officials, to defence officials, to senior scholars and relevant NGO groups and journalists. All of these participants were citizens of Southeast Asia and the results from the survey provide the first empirical indication of the level of convergence and divergence in elite perspectives on those important security and economic issues that are fundamental to the ASEAN identity.
For the sake of clarity, the analysis below has been divided into four interdependent sections, each of which addresses the key components that must be present if a security community can be said to exist. In so doing, initial sections of the critique below lead to a brief assessment, by the end of the chapter, of how ASEAN should presently be characterised and, in turn, how far ASEAN needs to progress along the spectrum of the characteristics of comprehensive integration (outlined in Chapter II) before it can reach its official goal of becoming a security community. In the process of this analysis, some scholarly claims are validated while others are rejected. In particular, this chapter repeatedly refers to the contentions of Amitav Acharya as, having published a number of items on the issue of ASEAN as a security community, he is the most prominent advocate of this mode of analysis.
The Extent of Community and the Challenges to Cohesion in ASEAN
In a 1999 article, Acharya acknowledged that the development of a regional identity may not necessarily conform to the “facts” of geography, history, culture, or politics…’ and warns that the ‘notion of Southeast Asia as a homogenous culture or geographic entity can indeed be overstated’. However, he also argues that ‘its claim to be a region should be seen as being based as much on the construction of a regional identity as on the sum total of shared physical attributes and functional interactions among its units’. He later adds that Southeast Asia’s ‘… social and political identity, derived from the conscious promotion of the regional concept by its states, societies, and peoples, is what makes it a distinct idea in the latter part 432
of the 20th century’.1399 In a 2001 publication, and in quoting Leonard Andaya, Amitav Acharya states that ‘Southeast Asia is no longer simply a term of convenience. Southeast Asians themselves now think regionally’.1400 However, given the analysis in previous chapters the accuracy of these contentions is questionable. The communal survey sample, for example, indicated only a very nominal appreciation of a Southeast Asian region or, perhaps more accurately, an ASEAN region. While just over half the respondents indicated either a reasonable or very good knowledge of ASEAN, the overall picture generated by the survey results did not indicate the actual existence of a region‐wide identity; at least not of a level that would support the potential existence of a regional security community now or in the near future. As will be discussed below, the nature of inter‐state relations in Southeast Asia, together with the current levels of intra‐mural trust (as indicated by the survey data), present a significant challenge to the emergence of a region‐wide collective identity and sense of community.
Some components of the survey data also placed a significant caveat against the possibility of a normative divide between the ASEAN members based on the period of their respective membership in the Association. The Vietnamese respondents, for example, provided the highest response rates for the survey option that they knew ASEAN ‘reasonably well’. Given that Vietnam is one of the newer members in ASEAN it was also interesting to note that the Vietnamese respondents held the broadest conception of an ASEAN region with more than sixty percent of the respondents correctly asserting that each of the ASEAN countries formed a part of ‘their region’. At the elite level of analysis, however, various questions on economic liberalisation and integration indicated a normative divide that loosely corresponded with each member’s period of membership in ASEAN. Nonetheless, on the specific question of ‘whether economic liberalisation would benefit their country’ the majority of respondents from all the ASEAN countries (except Laos) indicated ‘yes’. Further, the analysis in chapters five, seven, and eight indicated that it has been far easier to obtain
1399 Emphasis by author. Amitav Acharya, "Imagined Proximities: The Making and Remaking of Southeast Asia as a Region," Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 27, no. 1 (1999): p.73.
1400 Acharya, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia, p.9. 433
consensus regarding economic cooperation than cooperation in the political realm. As Chapter V indicated in relation to the ideal of ‘national resilience’, a key motivator behind economic cooperation has been attainment of ‘performance legitimacy’ and the security such legitimacy provides to the political elite in power.
Acharya also states that, ‘[i]n the case of ASEAN, the intersubjective and symbolic notion of community preceded the formal process of integration and functional linkages. It developed despite low levels of interdependence and transactions, and the existence of substantial cultural and political differences among its members.’1401 In a separate publication he states, ‘[w]hile the social and cultural diversity among ASEAN’s members made it difficult to speak of a common cultural identity, socialisation processes developed around the ASEAN Way did contribute to the development of a degree of what Deutsch would call the ‘we feeling’ in ASEAN’.1402 While some components of the ASEAN way are discussed later, it is difficult to reconcile the ‘symbolic notion of community’ or Deutsch’s version of ‘we‐feeling’ with the patterns of behaviour illustrated by the analysis in the preceding chapters or, indeed, the levels of trust indicated by the survey data. As was discussed in chapter two, the notion of a ‘community’ involves three co‐dependent components. The first is the presence of a collective identity involving a ‘we‐feeling’ whereby the members consider themselves a part of one group. The second is the existence of direct and frequent interaction (the transactionalist approach). Finally, the third is that there exists a practice of ‘reciprocity’ between the states and people of the Security Community. It is contended that the nature of both elite and communal level relations in Southeast Asia fails to satisfy all three components of the test as to whether or not a community exists.
In the case of ‘practices of reciprocity’, for example, the patterns of behaviour among the ASEAN states indicate that the political elite are primarily interested in pursuing their own short‐term interests regardless of how this may compromise the collective interests of
1401 Acharya, "Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia," p.218.
1402 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, p.202. 434
ASEAN. The pursuit by Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia of bilateral free trade arrangements are a case in point. Another example was provided regarding the South China Sea dispute, Vietnam and the Philippines having unilaterally entered into agreements with China for the joint exploration of natural resources. The existence of a community would also be indicated by a reasonable level of trust between the members. On the issue of trust, the respondents from both the elite and communal samples indicated relatively low levels of trust. Equally important was the fact that the most distrusting categories of respondents (at both the elite and communal levels) were from Indonesia and Singapore – two of the original ASEAN members. Thus, and at this point in time, it seems that both the frequency and quality of interaction between the communities of Southeast have not been of the quantity or type to generate adequate levels of trust for the purpose of the communitarian component of a security community.
At the elite level of analysis, a lack of mutual identification can also be ascertained concerning the nature of the region’s exogenous relations. Because of this shortcoming, Tobias Nischalke argues that that the ASEAN members ‘see relations with outsiders as more relevant to their security than relations with ASEAN’ and thus ‘at the bottom line, security is guaranteed through outside alliances, not collective security with ASEAN partners’.1403 The contrast in the ASEAN member’s respective security alliances exemplifies the level of divergence between the strategic interests and worldviews of the Southeast Asian states. In relation to the intricate ‘spider web’ of bilateral alliances, countries such as the Philippines are strongly connected to the United States while others, such as Myanmar, are highly dependent on China. As Nischalke adds, ‘to make this point clear, an association with outside powers does not a priori contradict the concept of collective identity, because it would be conceivable for ASEAN to collectively join forces with outsiders. However, in
1403 Tobias Nischalke, "Does ASEAN Measure Up? Post Cold War Diplomacy and the Idea of Regional Community," The Pacific Review 15, no. 1 (2002): p.109. 435
ASEAN’s case it is clear that intra‐ASEAN security relations are subordinate to those with outside powers’.1404
Cooperation and the ASEAN Way
It is important to acknowledge that the formation of ASEAN was primarily a consequence of the negotiation of a modus vivendi that was necessitated by widespread volatility in the region’s security architecture and an associated desire by the political elite to ensure their own survival and the survival of their regimes. In this regard, the advent of cooperation and displays of unity were limited to common perceptions of threat whether derived from intra‐ regional sources or extra‐regional sources. Nevertheless, on balance, exogenous threats such as Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia have probably played the most significant role in compelling a real sense of unity at the diplomatic level. However, such moments of unity and cohesion were generally short‐lived as competing interests soon led individual members down alternative and often conflicting paths in their foreign policies. For example, there is a strong scholarly consensus (with a few notable exceptions)1405 that the peak of ASEAN solidarity occurred during Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia. However, and as Chapter V discussed, such solidarity was primarily limited to the immediate years following the invasion. Once it became apparent that ASEAN’s diplomacy was unlikely to find a quick resolution to the crisis, one by one the ASEAN states started to breach the official position of the Association.
Nevertheless, and despite considerable obstacles, Indonesia has traditionally taken the lead as a norm entrepreneur in ASEAN and has sought to mitigate the influence of exogenous powers through the interdependent concepts of national and regional resilience. Indelibly linked to the ASEAN way, these two concepts inform the implementation of ZOPFAN and
1404 Ibid.
1405 For example, and similar to components of the analysis in Chapter V, Jones and Smith suggest that the Association was only able to legitimise itself during the Cambodian crisis because its actions and diplomacy coincided with superpower interests. David M. Jones and Michael L.R. Smith, “The Changing Security Agenda in Southeast Asia: Globalization, New Terror, and the Delusions of Regionalism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24 (2001), p275. 436
SEANWFZ. However, these instruments are more accurately viewed as representing symbolic declarations and (as noted) many of ASEAN states remain as dependent as ever on foreign aid, economic trade, and security. Meanwhile, the putative ASEAN way has been the subject of significant scholarly attention. Concerning the notion of consensus, Amitav Acharya suggests that ‘the value place upon consensus in Southeast Asia’s pre‐colonial inter‐state system contrasts with the emphasis in European inter‐state relations on the use of force’.1406 While the scale of conflict between the European states has far outweighed any of the historical occurrences of armed conflict in Southeast Asia, it is also important to note that the Southeast Asian kingdoms lacked the capacity for large‐scale war and the destruction associated with it. Further, the historical record shows that mainland Southeast Asia was relatively more prone to extended warfare, and it is thus questionable that the Malay principles of consensus extended to Myanmar’s invasion of Thailand or to the constant raids and battles between Thailand and its Laotian, Khmer and Vietnamese neighbours.
Amitav Acharya advocates the view that a ‘fairly consistent pattern of adherence (notwithstanding occasional exceptions) to and practice of norms such as non‐interference itself became part of the ASEAN identity’. He adds that ‘ASEAN’s consultative process, including the frequent meetings and other forms of multilateral interaction, gradually led to the development of “an institutional culture” which helped ASEAN “to avoid and control conflicts”’. He also believes that ‘[i]t also fostered a common feeling of regional belonging and led to claims about institutional exceptionalism underpinning constructs such as the ASEAN way’.1407 Some component claims in these statements correspond with findings in
1406 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, p.202.
1407 Ibid. Alan Chong expresses a similar viewpoint stating that ‘[w]henever an ASEAN member practices in the presence of another member-state, or an extramural power, a specific trait of the “ASEAN way” and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the identity of both the member and its collective are confirmed’. He later adds that ‘… ASEAN’s normative dimension ought to be acknowledged for erecting not only a minimalist pacific community on the intergovernmental level, but also transnational confidence-building epistemic communities that have also to deal with both the social fallout of economic globalisation and transregional Islamic radicalism’. Chong, “Southeast Asia: Theory between Modernisation and Tradition,” p.416. 437
the body of the dissertation. Certainly, the principle of non‐interference is strongly associated with ASEAN’s identity but the extent to which it can be asserted that this has assisted in the emergence of an identity among the political elite of ASEAN is tentative at best. As will be discussed further below, the survey results demonstrated an emerging normative divide between the democratic and non‐democratic members of ASEAN. Moreover, the survey data on the issue of trust, when combined with the qualitative analysis of the interview material, cast a significant shadow over Acharya’s contention that the ASEAN way has ‘fostered a common feeling of regional belonging’. Notwithstanding these limitations, the ASEAN way has undoubtedly served a valuable purpose in allowing the regional governments to collaborate despite considerable differences (and even incompatibilities) in their worldviews and strategic orientations. As Ferguson states, ‘it is clear then that the organisation does not have strong mechanisms to enforce norms on its member governments, nor institutionalised means of conflict resolution. However, the process based nature of ASEAN, and its person‐to‐person dialogue have allowed a slow evolution of a regional agenda where no consensus had existed previously’.1408
Despite Nishikawa suggesting that ‘various claims regarding the “Asian” and the “ASEAN way” of security management seem to have gained acceptance among Asian leaders’,1409 the salience of ASEAN’s norms has always been in question. The analysis in the dissertation indicates that that the adherence by the member‐states to the so‐called cardinal principle of non‐interference has been transient at best and only to the extent where there have been little to no material costs. Some examples of such interferences raised by the dissertation included Singapore’s response to the haze, various accusations over the Southern Thailand insurgency, and the bickering that arose in the wake of both the arrest of Anwar Ibrahim and the economic crisis. Indeed, Nicholas Khoo states the opposing view: ‘after all, one could argue that the prevalence of a contrary norm, namely interference in other states’
1408 Ferguson, "ASEAN Concord II: Policy Prospects for Participant Regional "Development"," pp.399-400.
1409 Nishikawa, "The "ASEAN Way" And Asian Regional Security," p.43. 438
affairs, appears to be a regularised pattern of behaviour in Southeast Asia’.1410 However, ASEAN’s vigorous response to foreign objections against Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN does appear to suggest that ‘ASEAN functions best as a community if regional norms are challenged by outsiders’.1411 Nevertheless, the extent to which the political elites have ‘rhetorically’ accepted ASEAN’s guiding principles may more accurately reflect an inability to agree on alternatives that are more effective rather than a genuine preference to maintain the status quo, at least within some quarters of ASEAN. Thus, and given the analysis in Chapter VIII, Indonesia’s ‘draft plan of action’ for a security community can be interpreted as evincing an element of dissatisfaction amongst some of ASEAN’s political elite regarding ASEAN’s modus operandi, the current level of institutionalisation, and ASEAN’s ability to manage comprehensive security issues in Southeast Asia.
Security, ‘Dependable Expectations of Peaceful Change’, and ASEAN as a Nascent Security Community
Yuen Fong Khong argues ‘that the sense of collective identity central to the building of security communities did not originate from intensive economic interaction or interdependence. The lack of success in economic cooperation during ASEAN’s first decade was more than made up by achievements in political security cooperation. It is here that the inklings of a regional consciousness or solidarity may be found’.1412 The historical review in chapters four and five provided little evidence to suggest that a ‘collective identity’ had emerged during the first decade of ASEAN’s existence because of ‘achievements in political security cooperation’. To the contrary, both Malaysia and Singapore were embroiled in tumultuous bilateral exchanges, and relations between the Philippines and Malaysia were not much better (e.g. as shown by the Corregidor Affair). By the end of the first decade of ASEAN’s existence, the level of enmity between the ASEAN states had declined and ASEAN
1410 Khoo, "Deconstructing the ASEAN Security Community: A Review Essay," p.40.
1411 Nischalke, "Does ASEAN Measure Up? Post Cold War Diplomacy and the Idea of Regional Community," p.110.
1412 Khong, "ASEAN and the Southeast Asian Security Complex," p.328. 439
undoubtedly contributed to this state‐of‐affairs by providing increased opportunities for dialogue and an associated sense of comradeship between some of the ASEAN leaders. However, during this period of ASEAN’s history only a few ASEAN summits took place and only infrequent and tentative connections had been established below the leadership level – such as between the foreign ministries.
Meanwhile, Estrella Solidum is equally enthusiastic in her impression of the role ASEAN has played in maintaining the region’s security. From her perspective security was ‘the enjoyment of the ASEAN values of peace, economic, social and cultural development, cooperation, political stability, and regional stability and progress’.1413 By her account, the causal properties behind such success had been generated by such artefacts as ASEAN’s entities and gatherings (such as the ARF, the Secretariat, Summits and Track Two dialogue), various ASEAN documents (such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the Hanoi Plan of Action), and, again, the ASEAN way.1414 While various institutions in ASEAN have undoubtedly generated frequent intra‐elite interaction (thereby contributing to a level of socialisation), it is questionable whether ASEAN and the level of security in the region are causally linked to deep‐rooted values of political stability, and a belief in the need for social and cultural development and peace. Chapter IX demonstrated that Myanmar is far from being stable and other countries in the region (such as Indonesia) have also been subject to instability in recent times. Nor has it been possible to find substantial evidence to support the idea that that ASEAN has positively contributed to social and cultural development. For example, one can recall that the ASEAN Action Plan on Social Safety Nets failed to be implemented due to the level of interference it would require in each member’s internal affairs (Chapter VIII). As far as the security community project is concerned, the extent to which ASEAN has contributed to the security of the region is also questionable.
1413 Estrella. D. Solidum, The Politics of ASEAN: An Introduction to Southeast Asian Regionalism (Singapore: Times Media, Eastern Universities Press, 2003), p.202.
1414 Ibid, pp.203-204. 440
As stated earlier in the dissertation, the emergence of ASEAN has assisted its member states to shelve but not resolve various territorial disputes in Southeast Asia. Two of the most problematic territorial disputes in recent times are in relation to the South China Sea and to the Ambalat offshore oil block in the Sulawesi Sea. In the case of the former, armed skirmishes have occurred between the Philippines and Vietnam as recently as 1999. In the case of the latter, the gunboat diplomacy between Indonesia and Malaysia in 2005 generated a very real risk of armed conflict. Meanwhile, the Thai military fired shells at Myanmar’s Tatmadaw in March 2002 and as recently as July 2006 the Tatmadaw fired at a Thai military helicopter. Due (paradoxically) to the ASEAN way, as well as to a continued lack of trust, and to the continuation of competitive behaviour (at low integration), attempts to institutionalise conflict resolution mechanisms (such as the High Council) have thus far been unsuccessful.1415 Further, the relatively high level of concern raised by respondents from some countries (such as Indonesia and Singapore) over the risk of armed conflict renders recent patterns of military expenditure intelligible. Equally problematic is that Singapore’s forward defence policy represents a contingency plan for the possibility of war with Malaysia. As Acharya himself concedes, ‘the persisting tendency among ASEAN members to engage in contingency‐planning and war‐oriented resource mobilisation against each other suggests important limits to community‐building…’ in Southeast Asia.1416 Given these considerations, ‘expectations of peaceful change’ in Southeast Asia are therefore not ‘dependable’.
The Character of ASEAN and the Prospects for a Security Community in the Future
ASEAN is not currently a security community in any form. To claim otherwise is to detract from the value and meaning of the concept as conferred by Karl Deutsch and his associates
1415 Nishikawa by contrast, argues that ‘the idea of a security community’ can be illustrated, to a certain degree, by the region’s dispute settlement mechanisms’. Nishikawa, "The "ASEAN Way" And Asian Regional Security," p.43.
1416 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, p.216. 441
exactly half a century ago. Here, it is worth rehearsing components of Deutsch’s original definition where, from his perspective, ‘a security community is a group of people which become “integrated” … By integration we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of community” and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a “long” time, dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among its population’.1417 At all levels of analysis, there is a lack of integration between the ASEAN states and there is little sense of a community even when the analysis is limited to the political elite of the region. The risk of war is not only perceived as possible by a disconcerting percentage of elite in some countries, but is regarded as an active contingency as is shown by the military policies of various states in Southeast Asia. Given these considerations, ASEAN is better characterised, following Tim Huxley, as a ‘limited security regime’.1418 As stated in Chapter I, Ralph Emmers defines a regime as ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision‐making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’.1419 At the rhetorical level of analysis, the ASEAN states satisfy Ralph Emmers’ definition of a security regime in the full sense of the term. However, given the inconsistent manner by which the ASEAN states abide by their self‐declared principles, norms, rules, and decision‐making procedures, Tim Huxley’s notion of a limited security regime remains valid today.
The title of a 2004 article by Professor James Cotton stated that ‘the road to a 2020 security community passes through Yangon’.1420 Indeed, the challenge of Myanmar to ASEAN’s project for a security community is so substantial that two chapters addressed the issue. While Chapter VI focused on how Myanmar has affected the norms and cohesion of ASEAN, Chapter IX considered the security environment within the country and the associated
1417 Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience, p.5.
1418 Huxley, Insecurity in the ASEAN Region, p.81.
1419 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p.2. See also: Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, p.7.
1420 Cotton, The ASEAN Dynamic - the Road to a 2020 Security Community Passes through Yangon (cited). 442
effects thus generated on the comprehensive security architecture of Southeast Asia. Myanmar, more so than any other ASEAN member, exemplifies the basis of the current stalemate concerning the implementation of true institutional and normative reform in ASEAN. Given that the decision‐making processes of ASEAN continue to be based on the principle of consensus, it is impossible to imagine that the leaders in Myanmar (among others) would agree to any provisions that could be used against their government – such as a legally binding human rights commission or the implementation of ‘decisions by majority vote’. The proposed ASEAN Charter, to the extent that it incorporates these or similar measures, is thus fated to impracticality. As Jones and Smith state:
Consequently, any attempt to modify the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation meets with resistance. This was evident when democratizing Indonesia, which chaired the grouping in 2004, put forward the outline for a genuine ASEAN security community that would both promote human rights, democracy and transparent communication and also create a regional peacekeeping force. Rather than grasping the opportunity offered by such a bold approach to security dilemmas confronting the region, member states, instead, regarded the Indonesian initiative suspiciously, construing it as an unacceptable bid by Indonesia to assert itself over the rest of ASEAN’s membership.1421
In the context for the considerations above, ASEAN’s current difficulties are indelibly interdependent with a growing divide between the democratic and authoritarian regimes of Southeast Asia. Until all the ASEAN states internally consolidate, and an associated compatibility of morphologies emerges, significant interest harmonisation and policy coordination (beyond statements of intent) will be unlikely to occur. Given that the analysis in the dissertation has indicated a lack of trust, intramural threat perceptions, and a low overall sense of community, there is little potential that ASEAN will be able to achieve its goal of a security community by 2015. To the contrary, and in order to avoid the trappings of disillusionment, it should be accepted that the process of embedding a sense of
1421 As Jones and Smith also suggest earlier on the page, ‘[t]o address transnational problems, however, requires transnational strategies, which in turn require a major re-evaluation of the TAC which, inter alia, imposed upon signatories acceptance of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. Ironically, of course, this is the source of the Association’s attraction to the grouping’s least democratic members, from developed Singapore and Malaysia, to poverty-stricken and authoritarian Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, as well as to those in the emerging ‘ASEAN Plus Three’ forum, like China’. Jones and Smith, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations: Regional Delusion, p.227. 443
community (and regional identity), if it continues to be pursued, would more likely occur over the course of several decades.
444
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