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Home , For Georgia, Georgian Dream, Giorgi Gakharia, Grigol Vashadze, Irakli Garibashvili, Nika Melia

NO. 26 APRIL 2021 Introduction

Deadlock in Political Crisis and Regional Changes Need an EU Response Franziska Smolnik, Mikheil Sarjveladze and Giorgi Tadumadze

Since the parliamentary elections in October 2020, Georgia’s government and oppo- sition have found themselves in a political deadlock. This is evidenced above all by the fact that the majority of elected opposition parties have boycotted entering par- liament. The country is not only facing domestic political challenges. The war over Nagorno-Karabakh has also changed the regional constellation. While and Turkey have positioned themselves as influential actors in the region, the EU has been barely visible. , which is the only country in the South Caucasus to have clear EU and NATO ambitions, this change is a potential threat to its pro-Western course. continues to have high expectations of the EU, which claims to be a geopolitical actor. Both the new regional context and the Georgian domestic political crisis should be an inducement for the EU to engage more with its eastern neigh- bourhood, and especially to give new impetus to its relations with Euro-Atlantic orientated Georgia.

On 6 January 2021 Georgia’s then-Prime which the opposition has decried as fraudu- Minister announced that lent – the controversy has blown up into the country would be applying to join the a national political crisis. This is primarily in 2024. In October 2020, evidenced by the fact that a large majority the deputy chairman of the Georgian of the elected opposition candidates are parliament, Kakha Kuchava, had already boycotting parliament. confidently stated that Georgia would be The Georgian government’s public an- ready for this step in 2024. The develop- nouncement of its intention to apply for ments of recent weeks and months, how- EU membership comes at a time when the ever, have raised grave doubts within the political crisis in the country has further EU. Georgian politics was burdened for rigidified. This reveals a number of con- more than 18 months by the mutual ani- clusions about the current state of EU- mosity between the governing party, Geor- Georgia relations, and especially the chal- gian Dream, and the political opposition, lenges they face. Two aspects in particular in particular the former ruling party United need to be taken into account when evalu- National Movement (UNM). Since the par- ating the current relationship: domestic liamentary elections of 31 October 2020 – politics and its interaction with foreign

policy, and the embeddedness of the rela- sight, these did not provide a clear enough tionship in the regional context, which is definition of the role of the opposition. This currently being reconfigured. has raised the question of how effective mutual institutional oversight is. The crisis was exacerbated by the arrest Domestic Political Stalemate on 23 February 2021 of the UNM Chair . The public prosecutor accuses him A Catalyst for the Crisis inciting and leading mass violence at street protests in 2019. The opposition has casti- If not its origin, then at least a substantial gated the procedure as politically motivat- catalyst of the current stalemate between ed. Giorgi Gakharia resigned as prime government and opposition were the Geor- minister over the arrest; he appears to have gian parliamentary elections of autumn been unable to impose his own view within 2020. officially won the Georgian Dream that arresting Melia would elections, with a total of 90 of the 150 seats. lead to further political escalation. How- The United National Movement took second ever, there are also structural challenges place, with 36 seats. Voting occurred over behind the current crisis. two rounds: the first by proportional repre- sentation, the second by majority voting. Structural Challenges Since all opposition parties boycotted the second round, however, Georgian Dream The Judiciary: Permanently under ran on its own. While international election Construction observation missions assessed the elections Among the most important campaign as competitive and concluded that funda- promises made by Georgian Dream in 2012 mental freedoms had been preserved over- was the slogan “restoring justice”. Beyond all, local watchdog organisations noted moral and political justice, this referred substantial deficits and irregularities. Since to the judiciary, which had been heavily the opposition views the results as fraudu- politicised and dependent on the executive lent, its representatives have refused to under the UNM government. Nine years accept their mandates as a protest. Accord- have passed, but the politicisation of ingly, on 11 December 2020 only the jurisprudence continues to be one of the elected representatives of Georgian Dream greatest challenges facing Georgia in terms took up their parliamentary activities. Since of the division of powers. According to then, the opposition has been lambasting organisations such as the national offshoot the “one-party parliament”. In its turn, the of Transparency International, Georgian Dream ruling party has condemned the boycott as came to an informal agreement before the a deliberate attempt by the opposition to 2016 parliamentary elections with the so- destabilise the country. Six elected opposi- called Clan, a group of influential judges. tion parliamentarians have now dropped This informal deal on mutual support, so the boycott and entered parliament, but the Transparency International claims, has vast majority are standing by their refusal. allowed the group of judges to extend its The current dilemma not least points influence over the whole judiciary and to debates about what the parliament’s re- given the executive greater access to the sponsibilities should be, and about insuf- former. Georgians’ lack of confidence in ficient parliamentary oversight. A lack of the judiciary is likely to be another conse- experience in effectively implementing quence: according to a 2019 poll, only oversight mechanisms has contributed to 5 percent of respondents had entire con- preventing a sound parliamentary culture fidence in the courts. Fifty-three percent of and practice from fully taking root. While those questioned believed that the courts there have been reforms in recent years were being influenced by the governing aimed at strengthening parliamentary over- party.

SWP Comment 26 April 2021

2 For the executive, influencing the judici- two parties thus left little room for alter- ary has been an effective tool for decades native forces to emerge. for pushing through its political and spe- Georgian Dream has long been domi- cific agenda, and not just under Georgian nated by the billionaire and former prime Dream. This is precisely what the opposi- minister, ; the UNM by tion currently accuses the government of in the former president . the case of Nika Melia’s arrest. Georgia’s Their respective rhetoric aims to give their ombudswoman, Nino Lomjaria, also criti- party a monopoly in the political process. cised the court’s decision: arresting Melia, Both have thus intensified the political dis- she claimed, was neither substantiated nor cord in recent years. necessary. Social media also act as tools of polarisa- tion and radicalisation of the political spec- Polarisation Prevents trum and at least part of the electorate. De-escalation Political actors use them as platforms to spread disinformation about their political The second and key domestic challenge for rivals. Moreover, the country’s most impor- Georgia is the extreme polarisation of Geor- tant television channels tend to act as gian politics and media. An electoral system mouthpieces of specific political groups. that favours the “winner takes all” principle Their reporting is not aimed at objectivity has so far reliably led to election winners but instead at popularising the political primarily being concerned with consolidat- agenda and purposes of political camps. ing their own power, to the detriment of an TV channels are by far the most significant effective implementation of the division of source of information for political news powers. In turn, this has intensified the and thus shape public opinion to a large confrontation between the governing party extent. and opposition parties, which have mobi- lised their respective constituency (and thus parts of society) against each other. In gen- Domestic Controversy and the EU eral, the prevalent political culture in Geor- gia has not been conducive to integrative The domestic confrontation also affects the principles and processes, such as a readi- relationship between Georgia and the EU. ness to compromise and accommodate, the For over 15 years, pursuing integration in establishment of coalitions, or the division Euro-Atlantic institutions has been a fun- of powers. damental orientation of Georgia’s foreign Structural causes for this political polari- policy. Since it came to power in 2012, sation can be found above all in the party Georgian Dream has continued its prede- landscape. Many parties tend to concern cessors’ foreign-policy course. Georgia and themselves only with benefiting from the the EU have been linked through an Asso- political events of the day without pursuing ciation Agreement as well as a Deep and long-term strategies and programmes. They Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) are often hierarchical and not organised since 2016. In 2017 the objective of ob- in particularly democratic ways. The two taining EU and NATO membership was largest and best-resourced parties in the written into the Georgian constitution. The country, Georgian Dream and the UNM, reforms required to implement the associa- have tried especially hard to turn the polar- tion agreement implicate a wealth of policy isation to their advantage. By presenting areas and domains. The agreement’s Pre- their respective opponent as the enemy amble states from the outset that shared and promoting this image, each has tried values such as democracy, the rule of law to position itself as the only option in the and respect for human rights are the foun- party competition. For several years, the dation stone of the association, and that

SWP Comment 26 April 2021

3 Georgia is committing to implementing and ter , moreover, declared strengthening them. on 22 February 2021, the day that his Currently, however, Brussels views the appointment was confirmed, that such deficits in Georgia’s justice system and its outside interference was unacceptable. political polarisation as the main challeng- es to any further rapprochement. In the EU’s most recent report on implementing From Facilitation to Mediation the association agreement, it calls for fur- ther efforts in these areas. Yet the EU plays an ever more important role in Georgia’s domestic controversy. A Prominent Role for the EU During a visit to Georgia in early March 2021, the President of the European Coun- The political crisis in Georgia also has a cil, , conceded that it was more specific impact on its relationship time to move from mere facilitation to with the EU. In early 2020, after an elector- active mediation. After his visit, Michel and al law reform had failed in the Georgian the High Representative ap- parliament, several Western embassies pointed Christian Danielsson, from Sweden, offered space for talks aimed at finding a to be the Personal Envoy and travel to compromise between the governing party Tbilisi for mediation purposes. The US em- and the parliamentary opposition. Today bassy continues to participate in these talks embassies of the EU, EU member states and too. Alongside the issues of whether to call the US are again active as facilitators. After new elections and release Melia, they are the parliamentary elections of October likely to revolve around reforming the 2020, they once again brought the conflict justice system and electoral law, strength- parties together for negotiations at the ening parliamentary oversight and identi- latter’s request. It is hoped that they will fying any potential for de-polarisation. end with a compromise. After two rounds of mediation ended with- However, this is a tightrope walk for out the parties reaching a compromise – the EU’s representatives, who risk getting and after a strongly worded statement by caught up themselves in the showdown leading MEPs that failure to do so will between the governing party and opposi- reflect on future EU-Georgia relations – tion, and being viewed, or turned into, a Brussels is currently mulling its next steps. part of the domestic Georgian row. In mid- December 2020, for instance, the UNM and circles close to it made accusations against Regional Reconfigurations Western diplomats. The then UNM Chair- man, , named these allega- The turbulence in Georgia’s domestic poli- tions as one reason for his subsequent with- tics coincides with significant changes in drawal from the party. In early February the neighbourhood. In the autumn of 2020, 2021 the EU ambassador attracted the dis- the escalation of the conflict over Nagorno- pleasure of Georgian Dream. He had criti- Karabakh between Georgia’s neighbours cised one of its members of parliament for Armenia and put an end to the making public the phone number of a status quo that had existed for 26 years. journalist known to be close to the UNM, Azerbaijan retook large swathes of territo- calling the act a violation of data protec- ries that had been under Armenian control tion. Members of the European Parliament since 1994. Since the trilateral agreement of felt compelled to issue a joint statement to 10 November 2020 between , Yerevan signal their support for the ambassador. and , Russian peacekeepers have In response to criticisms by the chair of the been stationed in the conflict zone. The foreign affairs committee of the Lithuanian armed confrontations also set in motion, or parliament, the new Georgian Prime Minis- reinforced, a process of regional reconfigu-

SWP Comment 26 April 2021

4 ration in which Russia and Turkey in par- could further threaten Georgia’s ambition ticular play a prominent role. How exactly to join the EU and NATO. the balance of power between the two re- gional powers in the South Caucasus stands or might develop is one of the most heavily A New Regional Context for discussed issues regarding the 44-day war. EU-Georgia Relations Observers largely agree, however, that the conflict made clear the deficiencies and All of these (potential) changes – as well weaknesses of the EU’s toolbox. Moreover, as how they are perceived and interpreted many believe that the EU’s “geopolitical locally – also concern Georgia’s relation- commission” has become an empty word, ship with the EU. The EU’s room for ma- especially where its immediate eastern noeuvre in the South Caucasus is dwindling neighbourhood is concerned. while the influence of Russia and Turkey is growing. For a long time, Tbilisi has seen Georgia and Its Volatile Turkey as a partner and precursor for Geor- Neighbourhood gia joining the EU and NATO (Turkey being a NATO member and candidate for EU Georgia is the only country in the South accession itself). Now, in late January 2021 Caucasus to have concluded an association Ankara and Tehran suggested a regional agreement with the EU and to pursue the cooperation platform in the 3+3 format. long-term objective of joining the EU and Along with Turkey and the three South NATO. It faces at least five key changes and Caucasus countries, this plans to include development prospects in its neighbour- the regional powers Iran and Russia, but hood. First, Georgia’s neighbours Russia not the EU or USA. After the Russian- and Turkey have grown in importance for Georgian war of 2008, Ankara had already its two other neighbours, Armenia and opened discussions on a similar regional Azerbaijan, in the context of the escalation cooperation format, in a 3+2 version, with- in autumn of 2020. Second, Georgia per- out Iran. This proposal was obviously never ceives a deterioration in its own security realised. However, (geo)political conditions situation. Since the stationing of Russian at the time were markedly different, and troops in Azerbaijan, Georgians are very not only in the region but also in terms of sensitive to the fact – not least in light of Turkey-EU and Turkey-US relations. Russia’s increased dominance in the Black Sea basin – that their country is now geo- An Imbalance of Supply and graphically surrounded by Russian troops. Demand Third, Tbilisi faces the question of what the consequences might be for Georgia con- For some time, there have been discussions cerning Turkey’s new role in the South within the region, but more and more often Caucasus and the development of Turkish- also among various actors in the EU, about Russian relations in the region. Fourth, the whether the EU can remain relevant to the agreement of 10 November 2020 aims to needs of the countries in its eastern neigh- reopen regional communication links, bourhood. The most recent escalation in which have been blocked because of the the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has given Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict; there are these debates momentum. Key EU deficits debates in Georgia about what impact such cited include its insufficient offers of secu- a reopening would have on its own role as a rity cooperation and its limited role as an transit country and the future it envisages actor in conflict transformation. The dis- as a regional transport hub. And fifth, the cussions also concern Georgia, which faces strengthening of Russia’s influence in the issues of national security and the unre- South Caucasus is perceived as a factor that solved conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

SWP Comment 26 April 2021

5 However, there is a certain amount of Georgia’s nor in the EU’s interests to let the tension between security cooperation and current situation become permanent. engagement in conflict transformation. Pushing ahead in both areas is not neces- sarily compatible. The EU deals with the Prospect conflicts over the breakaway de-facto states Abkhazia and South Ossetia mainly at the Both the domestic political crisis and the level of immediate parties in the conflicts changing regional environment are chal- (Tbilisi, Sukhum/i and Tskhinval/i), whereas lenges for EU-Georgian relations. The EU is Georgian actors tend to view the conflicts actively engaged in the domestic dispute at mainly through the prism of Georgian- the highest level via Charles Michel, likely Russian relations. Tbilisi considers Euro- a consequence inter alia of criticism heard Atlantic integration, ideally including secu- especially in recent months that the EU is rity cooperation, a shield against Russia, not sufficiently present in its eastern neigh- among other things. However, Georgia’s bourhood. This commitment is therefore a closer links with the EU mean that the positive sign. The majority view in Georgia latter is not perceived as a neutral conflict seems to confirm this, as instanced by state- mediator in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. ments by political actors and NGO repre- As a consequence, the EU has virtually no sentatives as well as the reporting in signif- leverage vis-à-vis them. icant media. Although the EU’s engagement in con- However, this form of participation by flict transformation remains limited, it EU representatives and EU member states in has tried – especially following the 2008 an associated partner country once again Russo-Georgian war – to expand it. To this raises a number of overarching concerns. end, it has created the EU Monitoring Mis- These include how local conflict resolution sion and the EU Special Representative for mechanisms might be lastingly strength- the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Geor- ened, what the ownership of the reform gia; co-chaired the Geneva Discussions be- process is, and what the symmetry or asym- tween the involved parties; and financially metry is in EU-Georgian relations. supported measures for conflict transfor- The EU takes on risk by becoming an mation. Simultaneously, however, the EU’s actor in the domestic confrontation, and room for manoeuvre in these areas has be- trying to help offset the deficits of Georgia’s come more complicated. It has to act in a political system at least in the short term. multidimensional conflict setting since Such an engagement does not automatical- the conflict between Georgia, the de-facto ly lead to the creation of locally embedded states, and Russia is unfolding on several offset and conflict resolution processes. It levels. The fraught relationship between the does not necessarily pave the way for the EU and Russia also limits the EU’s ability to sustainable prevention of future crises. make an impact. Moreover, if the EU does not live up to ex- Yet the current domestic political crisis pectations, that may also have a negative in Georgia is not conducive to Georgian impact on its credibility in the eyes of both politicians finding their own constructive the local elite and the Georgian people. The policy approaches. This is also true for deal- EU’s mediation activities are thus already ing with the de-facto states, among other being considered a litmus test for its overall things. At the moment, it appears that importance in the neighbourhood. What- attempts to set (foreign) policy objectives ever the outcome of the mediation may be, are being impeded by domestic politics or the EU should continue its visible interest specific power interests. Evidently domestic in Georgia’s development beyond this pro- controversies tie up so many resources that cess – merely selective attention could it lowers output. It is therefore neither in turn out to be counterproductive.

SWP Comment 26 April 2021

6 The EU has always emphasised that it is A wealth of ideas and proposals is al- in Georgia’s own interest to implement the ready on the table. Inter alia, they spring reforms decided in the association agree- from the broad consultation process that ment, since it is the country and its people the European Commission undertook in that will benefit first and foremost. This 2019 with a view to adjusting the Eastern should be true in many respects but does Partnership beyond 2020. Many of the pro- not do justice to the substantial imbalance posals can be found in the conclusions of in power between Brussels and Tbilisi, or to the Eastern Partnership Council of 11 May the added value that a rapprochement be- 2020: strengthening shared ownership, tween Georgia and the EU would have for and a made-to-measure (i.e. differentiated) the latter. Rather, the emphasis on its part- bilateral cooperation; concentrating more © Stiftung Wissenschaft ner’s self-interested goals glosses over the on common foundations, such as democra- und Politik, 2021 fact that the EU also gains when countries cy, the rule of law and good governance; All rights reserved in its immediate neighbourhood accept a agreeing on milestones and monitoring This Comment reflects large part of the EU acquis – without even mechanisms so as to structure the process the authors’ views. any current prospect of EU membership. more clearly and more transparently; When the Georgian government announced making better use of conditionality; and The online version of that it would be applying for EU accession expanding cooperation in security matters this publication contains in 2024, it was likely intending, inter alia, and conflict transformation. functioning links to other to give the laborious process of “becoming It is not, then, a lack of ideas that is pre- SWP texts and other relevant sources. EU-like” a concrete objective. The EU should venting the EU from expanding its commit- therefore not be content to limit its engage- ments in its eastern neighbourhood. The SWP Comments are subject ment in Georgia to the aim of reaching a fact that the last regular summit of the East- to internal peer review, fact- compromise to end the domestic political ern Partnership took place in 2017, and checking and copy-editing. deadlock. Beyond this, Brussels should that the date for the meeting intended for For further information on our quality control pro- reflect on the potential for future relations, this year has still not been set, rather indi- cedures, please visit the SWP taking into account its partners’ expecta- cates a lack of strategic interest on its part. website: https://www.swp- tions and needs. The EU’s credibility and The timing of the Georgian government’s berlin.org/en/about-swp/ actorness in its eastern neighbourhood announcement about its plans to apply for quality-management-for- depends not only on its own estimation of EU membership can therefore also be seen swp-publications/ its achievements, but also on how partner as a summons to the EU. The Union should SWP countries perceive and value its actions. take this opportunity to rethink its long- Stiftung Wissenschaft und The differences in the two sides’ expecta- term role in the region, and to develop a Politik tions – for instance concerning security co- new strategic vision for its relations with German Institute for operation, engaging in conflict transforma- countries there – first and foremost those International and tion, and a strategic vision for cooperation which are decidedly pro-EU and pro-NATO, Security Affairs – are problematic. And this is not a prob- such as Georgia. Otherwise the EU runs the Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 lem that will solve itself, even though the risk of continuing to lose its appeal in the 10719 Berlin EU may not wish to fully regard it as such; region. Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 after all, it is providing extensive financial Fax +49 30 880 07-100 support. Given the regional changes, rela- www.swp-berlin.org tions between Georgia and the EU could be [email protected] strained not only by the domestic crisis in ISSN (Print) 1861-1761 Georgia but also by this “expectation gap”. ISSN (Online) 2747-5107 Put more positively: both issues make it doi: 10.18449/2021C26 urgent for the EU to act to give its relations with Georgia new impetus and new drive. Translation by Tom Genrich

(English version of SWP-Aktuell 27/2021) Dr Franziska Smolnik is Deputy Head of the and Eurasia Research Division. Dr Mikheil Sarjveladze is currently a Visiting Fellow, and Giorgi Tadumadze was an intern in the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Research Division.

SWP Comment 26 April 2021

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