Peace & Security Monitor

T H E PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR Challenges in The Mediterranean region

Issue 1 peacehumanity.org May 2021 PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR

Editors

Ambre Karoutsos Filip Šandor Kelly Demjanick Rastislav Šutek

Authors

Filip Šandor Ambre Karoutsos Pamela Dávila Anisha Maulida Geofrey Mbui Robert PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR

Challenges in The Mediterranean region

Issue 1 May 2021

Table of content

NATO-Turkey Relations: Missiles, Alliances And Energy Feuds In The Mediterranean Pamela Dávila

Palestinian 2021 Elections: Israel-Palestine Conflict And Regional Geopolitics Threatens To Derail The Elections Geofrey Mbui Robert

The UN Initiatives In Regard To The Libyan Peace Processes: Key Successes And Setbacks Ambre Karoutsos

The Legacy From The Past In Tunisia: It Is Not Just The Economy, But The Police Repression Anisha Maulida

Eastern Mediterranean Rivalry Filip Šandor PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR

Challenges in The Mediterranean region

Issue 1 May 2021

Foreword From the Libyan peace processes to the EU-Turkey tensions, the Mediterranean basin is a crucial area in geopolitics. As the EU High Representative Joseph Borrel said: “A strengthened Mediterranean partnership remains a strategic imperative for the European Union”. The EU is not the only actor investing in its relations with Mediterranean States. China, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, but also the United States and NATO have security, economic and political interests at stakes. More so, migration politics and energy resources put the Mediterranean at the heart of power struggles. PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR

Timeline

12/01/2021 Cyprus and the United Arab Emirates signed a military cooperation agreement

14/01/2021 Tunisia - 10th anniversary of Ben Ali's flight into exile. Civil unrest unfolded 19/01/2021 Libyan Envoys approved the mechanisms to select an interim government 10/02/2021 Turkey proposed alternative to solve S-400 dispute and avoid sanctions. 09/03/2021 Israel and Cyprus reached an agreement on the Aphrodite-Yishai's dispute

10/03/2021 Libya - Parliament approved the interim government 25-26/03/2021 EU summit on the resumption of bilateral talks between Greece and Turkey and the discontinuation of unlawful drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean 07/04/2021 Turkey - US sanctions entered into force 09/04/2021 US announced the deployment of warships in Black Sea and asked Turkey for permission to navigate straits of Dardanelles and Bosporus. 15/04/2021 The European Union called on Israel not to obstruct the upcoming Palestinian elections 16/04/2021 First joint meeting between Cyprus, Greece, Israel and the United Arab Emirates held in Paphos 19/04/2021 Israel and Greece signed a defence procurement 22/04/2021 19-22/04/2021 Turkey started talks with Russia on new UN Special Envoy and UNSMIL head Kubiš held batch of S-400 missiles talks in Bern to support the interim government

27-29/04/2021 Informal 5+1 meeting on Cyprus held in Geneva composed of Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, The United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and the United Nations. PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR

NATO-TURKEY RELATIONS: MISSILES, ALLIANCES AND ENERGY FEUDS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Pamela Dávila

In 2017, Turkey acquired the S-400 Triumf system to create more balance among its Member from Russia, which sparked a wave of concerns States while promoting security in the in the region, more specifically, from other NATO Mediterranean. The article will finalize with a few members—the United States being the most considerations regarding the future of Turkey vocal about it. After receiving the first lot of and NATO, to not only improve the organization’s missiles in 2019, and testing them in 2020, the US stance and mission in this particular region, but and several European States established a series also its overall work around the globe. of sanctions that have increased diplomatic tensions in the region during the first trimester of Why have tensions increased in the 2021. This and other actions taken by Turkey in Mediterranean? the past years have raised concerns about its future in NATO and the role it plays in relation to Turkey joined NATO in 1952 during its first peace and security in the Mediterranean. enlargement, but due to several historical actions within the organization, there has been a While some have called for a reevaluation of the growing sentiment from Turkey that they are membership management in NATO, it is considered as mere second-class members in a important to remember that the organization Treaty more oriented towards a Western represents one of the most cohesive and ideology, and that others States do not see its relevant security communities in the international value beyond the military realm. Moreover, system. Contrary to promoting exclusion and Turkey claims that, while it belongs to a security increasing constraints between its members, this community like NATO, its air defense capabilities article will explore the reasons why Turkey should do not equate to those of other members, and remain a key ally in NATO’s strategies for peace has constantly sought to acquire sophisticated and security in the Mediterranean, and why this is equipment from fellow NATO States in order to a suitable moment to bring Turkey closer to the ensure its own safety. Nevertheless, the country organization. has not been able to obtain it from its allies in “favorable terms”, which prompted them to look The first section will make an approach to three for alternative partners closer to their borders, current events that have contributed to an even though the US had offered on various increase in tensions between Turkey and other occasions the opportunity to buy their USS- NATO members: The purchase of the S-400 Patriot system from them. This leads to the first Triumf missile system from Russia, its support to current even to analyze in this article, the Ukraine’s accession to NATO membership—in the purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system. context of military escalation—, and the last explorations performed in Greece’s exclusive In 2017, Turkey established a deal with the economic zone (EZZ). The second section will Russian Federation to acquire the renewed S- analyze the factors that have kept Turkey close 400 Triumf surface-to-air missile system for to NATO, and those who are threatening to around $2.5 billion. This action is believed to be separate it from the organization, in order to more of a geopolitical move given the existing understand why this could be a convenient time tensions between both states after the former

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shot down a Russian fighter jet on the border purchased weapons from Turkey, and both between Turkey and Syria in 2015. Whatever the Erdogan and Volodymyr Zelensky have underlying intentions might be, the purchase was considered further joint defense strategies in the made in 2017, which raised alarms on other NATO past few months. members, especially the US, alleging the S-400 system is incompatible with NATO’s equipment While Ukraine and NATO established cooperation and that it could pose a threat to the ties in 1997 with the creation of the NATO-Ukraine organization’s intelligence—considering that the Commission, the country has not yet managed system’s implementation would require on-the- to obtain membership status but has received ground support from Russia. In this context, and ample support from Turkey in its accession to after receiving the first set of missiles in 2019, the the organization. Turkey remains a key partner in US proceeded to remove Turkey from its F-35 the struggles between NATO and Russia since it Program, despite it being a financial and retains control of the straits that connect the manufacturing member of a project that would Mediterranean and the Black Sea under the 1936 eventually grant them a considerable amount of Montreux Convention, which makes it a valuable jets for air defense. geopolitical ally in case naval ships had to be deployed in the region (Reuters, 2021). While no further actions came from either the US Considering its current close ties with Ukraine, or other NATO members during that year, things there could be room for further diplomatic changed in late 2020, when Turkey decided to relations between all parties to increase security test its newly acquired system, which prompted in the region. the US to enact economic sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries through The final issue to consider in this context is the Sanctions Act (CAATSA). The sanctions mainly historical tensions between Turkey and Greece, targeted assets of high rank officials of the which escalated in the summer of 2020 after Turkish Presidency of Defence Industries, and Turkey began explorations for fossil fuels in prohibited the “export of licenses, loans, and disputed waters. This problem has been going credits to the agency”. Since its signing in 2017, it on for decades, and while energy exploration has was the first time the CAATSA had been used as been the main trigger for actions from both retaliation against a NATO member, which does NATO members, there are still core affect its already complicated relations with disagreements between the extension of EEZs Turkey, now framed as an ‘adversary’. While there and explorations rights on said areas—an issue have been proposals for initiating talks on the that also concerns Cyprus. Turkey’s considerable side of Turkey, Joe Biden’s government remains dependence on energy imports weighed heavily firm on its decision. on its GDP in the past few years (Mercan, 2020), a fact that also makes its economy and These events have developed in the context of development more vulnerable. another major issue that concerns not only NATO, but also the European Union in general: In addition, two of the most ambitious energy The growing military tensions between Russia projects in the Mediterranean—the creation of a and Ukraine, where Turkey has stepped up in gas pipeline and the creation of the Eastern support of the latter. Earlier this month, Turkish Mediterranean Gas Forum—have been on the President Recep Tayyip Erdogan expressed he move without considering Turkey as a regional would back its territorial integrity, declarations partner, which has led to increased geopolitical that arose after the recent deployment of strains between both countries. The Greek and Russian troops in the Donbas region, a buildup Turkish foreign minister had a high-level meeting that has already been condemned by both NATO in mid April 2021, but far from reaching a joint and the EU. Moreover, Ukraine has framework for action, the representatives into a

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heated discussion over territorial claims that Nevertheless, there are factors that due favor the have left the conflict in a stalemate. relationship. In the first place, it is beyond question that both would benefit mutually. Are NATO-Turkey relations facing a point of Despite its lower air defense capabilities—vis a no return? vis other NATO members—Turkey has one of the armies with the largest military personnel in the The strains between Turkey and other NATO region, a characteristic that has been useful in members are not precise current issues; instead, NATO operations; it is also located in a strategic they have been evolving and becoming more geopolitical location between Europe and Asia, complicated as time has gone by. Considering and close to one of the most conflictive areas, the panorama in the Mediterranean, this article the Middle East. However, it is also important to considers that Turkey should remain a key consider that as vital as its position may be, partner in the global peace and security strategy Turkey does benefit from the security umbrella in the region, and that, despite present tensions, provided by NATO in the region, and that the there is ample room to avoid further distancing organization has historically provided a platform between the involved parties. for assessing many of the country’s diplomatic issues with other members—specifically, Greece. It is true that there are factors that have created In the case of the recent tensions between constraints to the relationship between both Russia and Ukraine, the use of a trusted partner parties. Turkey’s journey as a NATO member has like Turkey—who also holds the key for maritime not been problem-free, and, as mentioned in the military operations in the region—could work as a beginning, there are tensions because Turkey buffer to de-escalate the conflict. considers it is perceived as a second-class member in the organization. Events like the 2016 In the second place, there has been speculation coup attempt in Turkey created more mistrust regarding Turkey’s membership in NATO and its between both sides after President Erdogan possible closer ties with Russia after the accused the US of being involved in the purchase of the S-400 system. However, it is vital operation and some NATO countries granted to note that despite previously signed contracts, asylum to Turkish military components. Turkey and Russia are not as close as they are portrayed to be. This is one of the reasons why it Moreover, Turkey considers there has been is believed that the S-400 purchase responds to preferential treatment in regards to the a strategic move after tensions increased in 2015 acquisition of the S-400 system, given that in after Russia imposed heavy sanctions that previous years Greece, another NATO member, threatened Turkey’s economy, which were only purchased the S-300 Russian system without lifted in 2017, the year the acquisition was facing the same repercussions. negotiated.

Considering Turkey’s already tense relations with NATO—in face of the support the US, France and the United Kingdom have offered Kurd forces fighting in Syria—and internal struggles related to an increased nationalism and anti-west sentiment, there could be signs that the relationship between both parties are reaching a point of no return. This would considerably affect the peace and security strategies of NATO, and most importantly, the Mediterranean, if Turkey decided to look for more autonomy in its security.

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While both countries might have similar ruling the fact is Turkey has key geopolitical styles—and attempt to incline far from the West importance for NATO in the Mediterranean. —they also have different political goals in the Therefore, there are a couple of ideas to reflect region. For example, while Turkey and Russia upon when discussing not only the future of have stood against US policies in the Syrian Turkey in the organization, but also the future of conflict, their long-term plans vary, with the NATO itself. In the first place, considering the former being more concerned about its territorial ongoing tensions between Ukraine and Russia, integrity in relation to Kurd nationalism, and the NATO should analyze reaffirming its latter focusing on its strategic partnership with commitments with its members, and in this Assad’s regime. particular case, with Turkey, given that it could be a valuable ally as a buffer for conflict escalation. Furthermore, while the first lot of S-400 missiles Some envision giving Turkey more space for has already been delivered and tested, there are decision-making processes in the North Atlantic no indications that Russia will share any sensitive Council—predominately managed by Western information in regards to the system with Turkey, European countries—as a way to enhance beyond on-ground general support, which shows relations between both parties, to hold Turkey that there might still be a certain level of closely to its own compromises with NATO (and suspicion from Russian due to Turkey’s closeness further away from other parties like Russia), and with NATO. It is highly unlikely that Turkey will to show greater inclusion of non-traditional change sides in favor of Russia, and this should members. This strategy can be contemplated be considered as an opportunity for NATO to alongside other countries like Greece, in order to retain its key partner. offer a better balance between conflicting parties, which could in turn contribute to What can be done at this point? multilateral talks that include Turkey in energy programs in the Mediterranean, thus offering a It has been possible to observe that the relations diplomatic de-escalation of recent territorial between NATO and Turkey have presented a issues. This, in turn, would require Turkey to hold series of mishaps throughout history, and that its stance towards NATO values, something that current events have not contributed to improving could be challenging given the current position the situation. Nevertheless, both parties have (and actions) of President Erdogan; therefore, been able to sort out differences of this nature in the 2023 Turkish elections will be a crucial event the past, and 2021 should not be the exception. for both the region and NATO. While this article has focused on the behavior from NATO (and its members) that has affected The last point leads to another area of reflection: the dynamics within the organization, it is also The role of NATO in the current international worth noting that Turkey has undergone its fair system. While the organization was conceived share of actions that have decreased stability during the first years of the Cold War, the truth is levels in the region—especially its territorial issues that our contemporary society has gone way with Greece—and inside its own borders. Besides beyond the nuclear dilemma and the bipolar its overall aggressive foreign policy, the last race between the US and Russia. Rivalries event that has sparked concern from the between both countries have continued even international community is Turkey’s withdrawal after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but these from the Istanbul Convention, a concerning have developed in a completely different move that is seen as a step further from a multipolar context where there are not only other Western system President Erdogan has openly countries with a high stance in the system, but criticized before. there are also global threats to peace and security that have escaped the hands of the Despite these passive-aggressive relations, State.

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Even though NATO has moved towards creating a broader framework for action—by enlarging its membership, and creating new key alliances—its funding idea of collective defense can be a factor that is not entirely compatible in today’s context where avoiding conflict is the preferred strategy for worldwide peace and security. The recent sanctions to Turkey for the acquisition of the Russian S-400 and its aggressive foreign policy towards gas exploration in the Mediterranean, and constant pledges from Ukraine to join the security umbrella are remnants of rivalries and strategies from a bipolar structure. These events are the result of years of neglected conflict management, and create challenges to achieving full-fledged international cooperation. Rethinking alliances, the position of its Member States, and its long-term goals in the system might offer NATO a stronger stance for effective peace and security in the Mediterranean and in other regions of the world.

References

Dalay, G. (2021). Turkey, Europe, and the Eastern Mediterranean: Macias, A. (2019). US cuts Turkey from F-35 program after Russian Charting a way out of the current deadlock. [Online] Available at: missile deal. [Online]. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/research/turkey-europe-and-the- https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/17/us-cuts-turkey-from-f-35- eastern-mediterranean-charting-a-way-out-of-the-current- program-after-russian-missile-deal.html (Accessed: 21 April 2021) deadlock/ (Accessed 22 April 2021) Mercan, M. (2020). Turkey’s gas discovery could reduce energy Deutsche Welle. (2021). Turkey's Erdogan voices support for Ukraine dependency. [Online]. Available at: amid crisis. [Online] Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/turkeys- https://think.ing.com/articles/black-sea-energy-more-to-prove erdogan-voices-support-for-ukraine-amid-crisis/a-57157898 (Accessed 22 April 2021) (Accessed 21 April 2021) Reuters. (2021). Turkey says it not picking sides in Ukraine-Russia Howard, A. (eds). (2014). Foreign Relations of the United States, conflict. [Online] Available at: 1977-1980: Cyprus; Turkey; Greece. [E-book]. Washington DC: United https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/turkey-says-not-picking- States Government Printing Office. Available at: side-ukraine-russia-conflict-turkish-formin-2021-04-15/ (Accessed https://play.google.com/books/reader? 22 April 2021) id=H0v2o4MSE0gC&hl=es&pg=GBS.PP1 (Accessed: 22 April 2021) Uras, U. (2021). Analysis: Turkey’s new S-400 proposal offers olive Klaus, J. (2020). Future of NATO-Turkey relations. [Online]. Available branch to US. [Online]. Available at: at: https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/future-of-nato- https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/10/turkey-proposes- turkey-relations (Accessed 22 April 2021) model-to-resolve-s-400-dispute-with-us (Accessed 22 April 2021)

Lindgaard, J. and Pieper. M. (2020). TURKEY’S NATO FUTURE: Between Alliance Dependency, Russia, and Strategic Autonomy. [E-book]. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies. Available at: www.jstor.org/stable/resrep25197. (Accessed: 22 April 2021)

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PALESTINIAN 2021 ELECTIONS: ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT AND REGIONAL GEOPOLITICS THREATEN TO DERAIL THE ELECTIONS

Geofrey Mbui Robert

The Israel-Palestine conflict remains one of the system and create a united government that will most controversial conflicts in human history. confront the Israeli occupation. Decades of violence, peace processes, accords, and international community efforts have yielded While the international community and President little fruits. It is a conflict founded on Holocaust Mahmud Abbas sees the elections as a means trauma, Palestinian nationalism, territorial of establishing a stable government; Hamas occupation, and Gaza-Terrorist activities. The sees an opportunity to create a strong legal justification for conflict between the Israeli government that will create a new front for the military and Palestinian militants is complex as confrontation with Israel in their territorial quest. questions exist if Hamas militants act on behalf Hamas has been opposing the elections on of the Palestinian people. Further, the statehood grounds of transparency and the need to be of Palestine is contested under international law recognized as an official institution in Palestine. due to the lack of defined territory. In 2012, the UN However, the upcoming elections provide an granted Palestine a non-member observer State opportunity to unite Palestinians for a common status, a de facto recognition of Palestine as a cause which has been a challenge for Hamas. A state. Many states in the UN General assembly considerable number of the Palestinians do not recognize and accept Palestine statehood. support Hamas's provocative efforts and the use However, due to the contestation of statehood by of terror against Israel in their quest to end the some member States like Israel, Palestine is not occupation. universally recognized as a state. Voting in Jerusalem Upcoming Palestinian Elections Though President Mahmud Abbas has President Mahmud Abbas issued a decree on 15 announced the elections, key challenges persist January 2021, ordering that Palestinian elections regarding the elections. The Palestinian leader will be carried out in three phases due to security has been in power since 2005 with no elections and logistical challenges. The first phase will see being held for over 15 years. A key issue in the Palestinians choose their legislative leaders on 22 election is whether Palestinians living in May 2021; Presidential elections on 31 July 2021; Jerusalem will be allowed to vote in the and finally the Palestinian Liberation organization upcoming elections. Jerusalem City is claimed (PNC) elections on 31 August 2021. by both Israel and Palestinians with claims being founded on religious and historical grounds. The decree was welcomed by the UN who noted Israel's government has not issued a report on that the elections represent a major step toward whether it will allow elections on the disputed lasting peace in the region. Hamas also city, which was recognized by the U.S and other welcomed the degree and called for free countries as Israel’s capital city. According to Ben elections that will rebuild their Palestinian political Caspit from the Al-Monitor, Shin Ben Chief Nadav

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Argaman reportedly told the Palestinian continue pushing their war against Israel. An President that there will be no answer on electoral win in the upcoming elections would permission for Palestinian residents in East hand power to the militant jihadists ending any Jerusalem to vote until a new Israel government hopes of lasting peace in the region. Postponing comes. the elections would result in unrest that would force the Palestinian Liberation Authority (PLO) to Many of the Palestinians have been frustrated by form a government unity, which would empower the lack of progress toward a full Palestinian the militants and give them international republic which makes the President unpopular. recognition as Palestine leaders. Such a move By declaring an election, President Abbas took a would help legitimise the organization, largely major risk as the popularity of Hamas has been considered as a terrorist organization by many on the rise and the elections will return governments. Hamas leaders Yahya Sinwar and Palestinian Authority to the Gaza strip fully or in Ismail Haniyeh would be empowered on the part. Further, the elections would also provide international stage, which would be permanent Hamas with a foothold in the West Bank, where damage to the PLO. Israel views Hamas as a confrontations between protestors and authority terrorist organization that should also be isolated forces have been increasing. by international players if peace processes in the region were to progress. Going to elections at the Election Postponement and Threats to peace current level, Fatah is divided into over 30 factions with different ideologies and President Abbas has made it clear the elections approaches to the future of Palestine. With the will be postponed until Palestinians in Jerusalem division, Hamas remains united in their ideology are allowed by the Israel government to vote in which gives them an upper hand in the elections. the elections. On the other hand, Hamas was warned that delays in the upcoming elections Geopolitics and Challenges will lead to public unrest and anger that would result in more clashes between Palestinians and Israel is facing multiple challenges in the region Israeli forces and that the clashes witnessed and the internal political climate is uncertain. recently in Jerusalem would be nothing in Between March and April (2021), Hamas comparison to what is coming. Hamas views the militants in Gaza have launched rockets into elections as their biggest opportunity to takeover southern Israel, some exploding near residential Palestinian leadership and authority in their quest neighborhoods. At the same time, Israel and for ending the occupation. By winning the Syria have traded rockets multiple times. Further, elections, Hamas will be able to attend United Israel is currently in confrontations with Iran Nations meetings, as well as, reunions with where several cargo ships from Israel have been regional leaders, hence negotiating their harassed in international waters on the Red Seas demands. Hamas’ views and goals are and the Persian Gulf. The reports have forced contained in the Hamas Charter largely anti- Israel Navy to step up operations conducting Semitic and contains conspiracies on Jewish drills in the sea and warning Hezbollah Militants people particularly their quest to take over the who have been aggressive toward Israel that world. Furthermore, the Hamas Charter supports their Navy was ready to wage war against them. militant Jihad noting that all Palestinians have a After the 2020 Presidential elections, President duty against Jews who deserve all the wrath Joe Biden's strategy on the Middle East remains from Allah due to their unbelief. The reluctance clear and Israel is growing uncomfortable with by the Israel government to support the elections the potential of another new Iran-nuclear deal and allow voting in Jerusalem, is due to fears between the U.S and Iran which would allow Iran that the Hamas militants will win the elections to continue advancing its nuclear missiles, hence giving Palestine an international stage, to escalating the volatile situation in the Middle

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East. Conclusion

Recent violence broke out when young Arab men Palestinian elections provide another opportunity began throwing bottles and rocks at police after for the citizens to unite together in one voice and, barricades erected by the police in the old for the government to further their quest for an Jerusalem city were removed. Before the independent Palestinian State with internationally removal, Hamas had argued that the barricades recognized borders. However, the infighting within restricted the movement of people and were the current government threatens to hand over causing riots. the authority to Hamas, a Jihad militant group that advocates for violence and hatred toward Twelve suspects have been arrested for causing Jewish people. Tensions between Israel and Iran, violence, disturbances, and attacking police Jordan, and Syria also threaten peace in the officers. Additionally, hundreds of Arab youth region hence diverting attention and resources converged in the area and chanted ‘’with blood from the Israel-Palestine conflict. Dialogue and fire we liberate you, Palestine’’. Israel is in a between the Israel government, Palestinian vulnerable state which explains the reason for government, and Hamas are critical in ending the reluctance in supporting the Palestinian the tensions and paving way for constructive elections. progress in the peace processes in the region.

Palestinians living in Jerusalem are not considered Israeli citizens and hence have the References right to vote in the Palestinian elections. The fears Caspit, B. (2021). Israel stands alone on Iran. [online] Al Monitor: of Hamas are justified but do not give authority The Pulse of the Middle East. Available at: https://www.al- for the denial of the right to vote for citizens of monitor.com/originals/2021/04/israel-stands-alone-iran [Accessed 28 Apr. 2021]. Israel. If Palestinians want to entrust their power with Hamas, it is their democratic and human Jahshan, K.E. (2021). Palestinian Elections 2021: Reconciling Competing Motives. [online] arabcenterdc.org. Available at: right to vote for Hamas without any external http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/palestinian-elections- interference. Negotiations and goodwill are key 2021-recociling-competing-motives/. towards achieving a lasting solution for peace Mana, A., Srour, A., & Sagy, S. (2019). A sense of national coherence and stability. and openness to the “other’s” collective narrative: The case of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 25(3), 226-233. https://doi.org/10.1037/pac0000391

Nyhan, B., & Zeitzoff, T. (2017). Fighting the past: Perceptions of control, historical misperceptions, and corrective information in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Political Psychology, 39(3), 611-631. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12449

Rouhana, N. N. (2020). Decolonization as reconciliation: Rethinking the national conflict paradigm in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Rethinking Reconciliation and Transitional Justice After Conflict, 27- 46. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429432347-3

Sham, U. (2021). Israel’s Navy ready to attack Hezbollah from the sea like never before. [online] The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com. Available at: https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/israels- navy-ready-to-attack-hezbollah-from-the-sea-like-never- before-666083 [Accessed 28 Apr. 2021].

www.un.org. (2012). General Assembly Votes Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine “Non-Member Observer State” Status in United Nations | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/ga11317.doc.htm [Accessed 28 Apr. 2021].

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THE UN INITIATIVES IN REGARD TO THE LIBYAN PEACE PROCESSES: KEY SUCCESSES AND SETBACKS

Ambre Karoutsos

“In this respect, we commend the extraordinary First Civil War commitment of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya [...]”. The Arab Spring led to the end of the 41 years old Libyan regime. On 15 February 2011 in Benghazi, Since Gaddafi’s regime was ousted in a NATO- peaceful protests in support of other movements backed uprising in 2011, the country has been during the Arab Spring were violently repressed torn between factions. After 10 years of conflicts, by the Libyan government. Riots arose the peace processes led to promising results: nationwide against the Gaddafi regime, and the UNSMIL’s three-point peace plan indeed led Muammar Gaddafi decided to remain in power to a permanent ceasefire and to the creation of and intensified its repression against protesters, an unified government. As the country was the Transitional National Council (TNC) declared previously split into two regions administered a civil war on 27 February. The adoption of the separately since 2014, the announcement of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)’s agreement was saluted by the international Resolution 1970 on 26 February 2011, and community. These are nonetheless not the first Resolution 1973 created a no-fly zone and an peace negotiations: from the African Union’s arms embargo on Libya, as well as established roadmap, to the Skhirat talks, there have been the UN’s demands of a ceasefire abided by many tries to achieve what the Libyan National Conference started in April 2019.

The new interim Libyan government, approved by the Parliament on 10 March, nonetheless reinstated its commitment for reconciliation. The current Libyan Cabinet is composed of 35 members representing the different Libyan regions and constituencies, and its Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Mohammed Dabaiba confirmed its intention to follow the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum Roadmap’s 30 percent of female senior executive positions in the future. National elections should be held on the 24 December 2021. However, before that can happen, it is important to first confirm a constitutional framework. Even though these steps are crucial toward establishing a durable peace, there are indeed many hurdles to overcome.

This article will explore why Libya was deemed a ‘failed State’, by providing an overview of past peace negotiations, as well as the issues the new interim government still has to face. © Photo by BRQ Network via Flickr

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Gaddafi’s forces [3]. The implementation of this The aftermath of the First Libyan conflict. resolution led to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) airstrikes as well as the As such, none of the peace processes could murder of Gaddafi by rebel forces on the 20th of bring a durable and sustainable peace: after October 2011, thus signing the end of the Gaddafi was killed, the TNC declared the country international phase of the conflict. The African as ‘liberated’, and formed a new government. Union (AU) peace initiative, grounded in the Elections were held in July 2012, as the TNC context of the Arab Spring, aimed at influencing dissolved to let the General National Congress and mediating between the warring parties. The (GNC) in place with Ali Zeidan as its Prime AU’s “roadmap” first focused on the regime’s Minister. However, the new regime provided repression and threats against the opposition. opportunities for new political actors and remaining security forces to take control of the While the peace negotiations featured a many resources the country had to offer. Among ceasefire, humanitarian assistance and the need these, political elites from the previous regime, for a democratic transition, the national and but also tribal leaders, political Islamists, but also international context were major hurdles toward remnants of the LNA, militias, but also salamists the success of this plan. Internally, Gaddafi did and terrorist forces were present on the territory. agree to the plan but refused to leave. On the With the exception of terrorist and criminal other hand, the TNC refused the plan, and the groups, the other factions did not have any war later swung in their favour. Even though both specific legitimacy: the instaured government sides had backing, key states within the AU such was thus weak, divided, and chosen not to be as Nigeria and Ethiopia recognized the TNC and able to affect the other forces. [6] called for the AU to do the same. It is revealing of the divisions within the mediating parties: on one Second Civil War side, AU member countries did not overly support the monitoring of the ceasefire efforts, as they The second Libyan conflict that broke out on the were divided between the “Brother Leader” 25th of August 2014 was thus not a surprise [7] supporters and the others. At the NATO level, the the GNC had been replaced at the beginning of strategy adopted disregarded most of the AU’s August by the House of Representatives. plan, as the US, France and Britain, driving the UN However, some members of the former GNC policy, followed a different strategy, by instead unilaterally chose another Prime Minister, implementing the Resolution 1973. As such, the Omar al-Hasi and left for Tobruk, scinding the UN Security Council took the initiative, country in two governments. As the General marginalizing the AU’s plan. These tensions National Congress (backed by Qatar and between the two mediators had political [4] and Turkey) rejected the 2014 elections results after economical [5] consequences on the peace the Supreme Constitutional Court nullified an processes. amendment, the conflict broke out between the

[3] The Resolution 1973, passed on the 17th of March, [4] During the peace negotiations, the African Union Ad Hoc allowed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to Committee, in charge of the implementation of the intervene in Libya to “use all means necessary to protect Roadmap, was supposed to meet in Noakchoutt on the 19 civilians and civilian-populated areas”. In practice, it led to a March, on the day the no fly zone came into effect. They no fly zone over Libya, and authorized NATO to use all were only able to meet for the next meeting on the 9th of means necessary to protect civilians. As Gaddafi did not April. abide by the immediate ceasefire nor stopped the [5] Especially since the EU, itself divided over the mediating repression against civilians, NATO forces landed, process, was contributing over 12 million to the AU’s mission. transforming the conflict into a non-international conflict.

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GNA and the House of Representatives. As Tripoli was tied only created distrust from its partners was controlled by Islamist groups, the HoR [9]. established its stronghold in Tobruk, controlled by General Haftar. The Government of National As Kolber became the new head of mission of Accord was then formed between the main the UNSMIL, an agreement was found between factions in December 2015, as per the result of the parties. The Libyan Political Agreement was the Libyan Political Agreement signed after talks signed in September 2015. This was possible not in Skhirat. This accord, facilitated by the United only thanks to the change in leadership, but also Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), was to the context: the UN and the international the fruit of a year and a half of negotiations community backed the processes and between the main actors. recognised the GNA as the sole legitimate government. From these talks, a one-year The Libya Dialogue process indeed faced transitional period before legislative elections in tensions during the process, as the situation the country was agreed upon. It however did not worsened and doubts against the UNSMIL put an end to the instability within the country: threatened to derail the negotiations. Terrorist Tripoli became the capital of the GNA, but the attacks were frequent, and participated in the control of the territory remained uncertain. From instability within the country [8]. 2016 during which the GNA controlled approximately 70%, while in 2017 it was the Their timing, during the first Skhirat talks, opposite. nonetheless did not stop the negotiations. On the other hand, the LNA was gaining control over Libya remained divided between factions, more territory, launching military operations as among unrest and terrorist attacks. More so, the the end of the talks was approaching. However, gain in power of the LNA made it unlikely the this peace process was flawed from the latter would be interested in signing a peace beginning: from September 2014 onward, only agreement. That is why in 2017, the UNSMIL HoR members were consulted, leading to a launched a new peace initiative, focusing on stalemate -as both parties refused concessions prolonging the Libya Political Agreement (LPA): it made to the other. This has to do with the aimed at organizing a constitutional referendum mediating party: Leon’s negotiating style had in September 2018, and elections by the end of driven them apart, and the scandals to which he 2018 - in fact leading to the Libyan National Conference in 2019.

However, the peace agreement was far from [6] Mustafa Abdul-Jalil, in office until summer 2012, could stand in for a description of Libya’s appointed leaders bringing stability: as Haftar’s forces launched a generally: “Most Libyans agreed . . . he was a man of campaign to capture Tripoli, the LNA also principle, but it was frequently unclear what, if anything, he blocked oil fields and thus, a source of massive did”. (Winer 2019 p.10). revenues for the Libyan State. [7] One of the factors leading the way for the second libyan conflict was the lustration law. It delegitimized anyone who had worked for Gaddafi’s regime between September 1969 and October 2011. As such, it was used as a tool to remove opponents of those enacting the law. For more information, see Gaub 2015. [8] Migrants and refugees were escorted back from the EU and detained in several camps from both sides. Regarding the terrorist threat, Daesh was expanding its territory, leading to several anti-Daesh operations by [9] It has been revealed in The Guardian that the UNSMIL’s Libyans forces, backed foreign states such as the United head negotiated with the United Arab Emirates’ government States. for his personal interests.

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From the Libyan National Conference national elections on the 24th of December. onward When reviewing the mediating process, what In July 2019, the head of the UNSMIL proposed a stands out is the lack of attention paid to the three-point peace plan during the Libyan subnational level. The 2011 and 2015 negotiations National Conference. It consisted of a ceasefire, did not address that issue, thus failing to enforcement of arms embargo and an internal consider the traditional distribution of power Libyan conference composed of economic, Gaddafi had instaured [11]. As the 2017 peace military and political tracks. Despite ongoing agreements did not manage to take input from clashes near the capital led by the LNA that all of Libya’s society, they also focused toward a delayed the process, continued dialogue presidential system, without establishing clear between the parties led to a permanent guidelines for subnational authorities. It created ceasefire on 23 October 2020. tensions, as they have different priorities and interests: on one side, the country’s west is in Co-hosted by the UN and the Government of favour of a centralized system that would allow Germany, the Berlin International Conference on them to unify the country and keep control of Libya is the second step of the three-point resources mainly in the east and south, while the peace process announced in 2019. On the 19th of eastern side supports a federal system to be January 2020, the actors involved agreed on a able to participate in the country’s governance. 55-point list of Conclusions to address the issues The south remains divided over the possibility of fuelling the conflict [10], but also committed to regional autonomy or an unified state improving stop international interference. Several local services. international actors were indeed directly or indirectly aiding the two governments -some, as Challenges the new interim government will Germany itself, involved both in the mediating face. process and military aid. The new interim government, selected via a joint Regarding the political basket of the peace plan, ticket system by the Libyan Peace Dialogue the first Libyan Political Forum opened on the 7th Forum, is composed of a three-person of November to the 15th November of 2020, Presidency Council: Abdul Hamid Mohammed bringing 75 representatives of the Libyan society Dbeibah is the Prime Minister, Mohammad together. The talks ended with a roadmap to Younes Menfi as the president of the Presidency national elections, reforms to the executive Council, from the east and a former Libyan authority, as well as agreements to pursue the ambassador to Greece, Musa Koni from the dialogue over time. One year after the Berlin south and Abdullah al-Lafi from the west as Conference, the GNA and LNA agreed on setting Presidency Council members. Surprisingly, losing up an interim unified government as well as candidates conceded defeat, including the

[10] The Follow-up Committee results from the security [11] For a detailed analysis of the role of local authorities, see basket, creating a committee composed of 5 military Mikail B. (2016), STATE LEGITIMACY AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE officers from the GNA+ 5 officers selected by the LNA leader LIBYA : A READING, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Regional Haftar. The UNSC endorsed it to negotiate the monitoring Program Political Dialogue South Mediterranea, Available at: process over the ceasefire via the Resolution 2510 in https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file? February 2020. Tensions during the talks occurred due to uuid=cf1e794e-cc43-f378-c14f- attacks from the LNA over Tripoli’s ports, but the negotiations c5f7f7fd490c&groupId=282499 [Accessed 25 April 2021]. resumed.

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Haftar camp. As many politicians had joined the the HoR, are supported by the Russian military election, the process gained legitimacy. group Wagner, while Turkey, backing the GNA, deployed militants too. In the current context, Currently, the UN, via its Special Envoy of the considering the proxy dimension of the conflict is Secretary-General on Libya and Head of the crucial: NATO members - France, Greece and United Nations Support Mission in Libya Kubiš, Turkey, in particular, have indirectly clashed in focused on supporting the new executive: military operations [13]. priorities are to address the issue of migrants, refugees, detainees, as well as violations of These tensions have also impacted how to human rights and international humanitarian law conduct the negotiations, since Paris considers [12] and establish a constitutional basis, legal the LNA as one of the key actors and Ankara framework and the implementation of the does not. These inferences in the conflict are not Ceasefire Agreement. In discussions are also new: in 2013 already, the LNA was backed by preparations for the national elections scheduled Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the United Arabs for December 24, as stipulated by the Libyan Emirates, while Qatar and Turkey assisted the Political Dialogue Forum Roadmap. Unity and GNA, as the conflict reflected deeper tensions in stability are however not guaranteed by the the region. Other foreign powers such as France, peace process: crimes and human rights Italy and the United States also fueled the violations are still ongoing. conflict by providing troops and/or armament to the warring parties. As such, Libyans are critical The Libyan civil war: the international of external interference. community’s proxy war. In insight, the UN’s involvement in the conflict did In regard to factors that pushed for the peace bring key successes toward the peace plan to proceed, the LNA failing to take Tripoli in agreement. However, divisions between its June 2020 highlighted how the conflict would not members resulted in the absence of a common be solved by a military solution. The opposing strategy, frequently undermined by the party also realized how difficult it would be to members’ personal interests in the conflict. seize Haftar’s controlled territory without greater conflict in which foreign backing would only worsen the situation. The peace processes indeed have to be put in relation to international relations: not only are Daesh and other terrorist organizations still operating in the region, but foreign troops are also participating in the fighting, despite the 23 January’s deadline for their withdrawal. As such, Haftar’s forces, tied to

[12] In particular, around 625,638 migrants and refugees in [13] All part of NATO, Ankara’s actions clashed with its allies: September 2020 were trapped in Libya and suffered from not only did Turkey avoid the UN arms embargo, but it also mistreatments. instigated conflict with Greece and Cyprus. The latters have More so, mass graves have been discovered in Tarhouna. It been in conflict in Turkey over its maritime agreement with remains an object of concern for the international the GNA infringing over their Exclusive Economic Zone. The community, as armed groups continue to operate in total warships sent by Ankara to reinforce its legitimacy over the impunity. area unsurprisingly reinforced the disagreement. More so, an incident occurred between France and Turkey: the French frigate “Courbet”, part of the “Sea Guardian” operation (enforcing the arm embargo), approached three Turkish warships and a cargo vessel on June 10 2020. Targeted by the Turkish warships, Paris left the operation.

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THE LEGACY FROM THE PAST IN TUNISIA: IT IS NOT JUST THE ECONOMY, BUT THE POLICE REPRESSION

Anisha Maulida

Tunisian protesters returned to the streets a first point urged to immediately release all decade after the revolution. The protests started detainees, dismantle a repressive system of on 14 January this year, just after the tenth policies and laws, and create specialized judicial anniversary of former dictator Zine el-Abidine institutions against security agents to protect the Ben Ali’s flight into exile. The unrest lasted rights of the citizens. approximately for two months until 30 March. Tunisia’s revolution has been told as a success Despite the COVID-19 restrictions in Tunisia, the story of the Arab spring in the region. It had unrest that was provoked by a video of a police succeeded to achieve democratic government officer humiliating a shepherd in the and a peaceful political transition. However, the northwestern governorate of Siliana erupted issue of police repression has not yet been nationwide. resolved for ten years. This article will discuss the police repression in Tunisia, especially the severe Another factor leading to the protests was the protest policing style that still lasts today. worsening economic situation that has been impacted by the pandemic hence, caused a Protest and Police Repression high unemployment rate in many areas in Tunisia, including in El Kabaria. Tunisian economy Clashes between police and protesters are is highly dependent on tourism contracted by 8.8 common in many protest events. During the percent in 2020 compared to 2019 with 1 percent protest, the police should act as facilitators growth. and/or mediators, thus not treating the protesters as opponents or enemies, and vice Projected Tunisian Real GDP Growth 2019-2022 versa. In fact, both parties behaved the opposite way and a clash between the two ensued. This provided the police with a momentum to employ repressive measures in handling the protest events. Repression is conceptualized as a state or private action that is meant to prevent, control, or constrain non-institutional, collective action, including its initiation. Furthermore, repression involves the use of force and other forms of standard police and military action e.g., intimidation and direct violence. In the case of the 2021 Tunisian protest, the repressive agent Galal 12/042021 [26] Posted on Facebook by the national campaign to Throughout the episodes, the protesters had ten support social struggles. demands that were concerning not only the economic downturn but also the police repression. The demands were spread through social media, such as Facebook[26], where the

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was the police, whose tactics involved an COVID-19 until 7 March 2021. However, an illegal excessive use of tear gas as well as beatings protest due to COVID-19 cannot fully explain why when handling the protesters. The police also the police repression still exists in Tunisia. The arrested a large number of protesters following discussion can further help in (approximately 1,680 people) and hit a young explaining the repressive police phenomenon in man’s head with a tear gas canister to death. Tunisia.

In discussing police repression when handling Ben Ali and The Political Police protest events, the complex relationship or interaction between the police and the protesters Another reason for the continuing police in a protest event should be taken into account. repression in Tunisia has to do with the function Behavioral threats of protesters could lead to and professional culture of the police far before police repression, including disruptive protest Ben Ali ruled Tunisia. Tracing back to the pre- tactics and illegal protests. In Tunisia, the revolution period, between 1956 to 2011, the protesters used both disruptive and non- security apparatus had controlled Tunisia and disruptive tactics in several episodes. The police the government had enacted approximately will likely give a severe response to a protest that 1,700 legislation and most of them were involves violent tactics, such as throwing stones, promulgated in the form of presidential decrees burning tires, looting, etc. During the protest so that, the security apparatus could be events, some protesters, in fact, looted functioned to protect the regime legally. Then, supermarkets, burned tires, threw stones and when Ben Ali ruled as the president of Tunisia in Molotov cocktails to the police. As a response to 1989, which was oppressive in practice, the police this, the police fired tear gas and arrested stood for him as his principal instrument for hundreds of protesters. repressing internal dissent and the police acted as political police. It made Tunisia known as a Nonetheless, the repressive action by the police police state par excellence hence, Tunisia was in handling the protest did not only emerge in viewed as one of the most heavily policed states violent protests but also in peaceful protests. It is in the world. interesting to note that there were some episodes in which the protesters did not use Under Ben Ali’s dictatorship, demonstration was disruptive tactics, however, it appeared there regarded as a threat to the survival of the was an excessive use of tear gas and police regime, as the protesters disrupted the beating. The justification for the repressive harmonious relations between the state and policing style in handling the protests was society. The police was then characterized by a because of the COVID-19 regulations in Tunisia. mentality wholly concerned with the Prior to the first protest on 14 January erupted, maintenance of law and order and the interests the Tunisian government had announced a four- of the state’s leader. Due to the police's day lockdown regulation: the night-time curfew capacities to use oppressive measures and have from 8pm to 5am and banned gatherings. committed abuses, it became the most feared However, the Tunisians believed it was more of a and reviled institution in Tunisia. The nationwide political lockdown rather than a lockdown due to discontent over the repressive regime and its the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, many of the political police thus led Tunisia to a revolution. protesters defied the lockdown from 14 January to 17 January 2021, which made the protest itself In the 2011 Tunisian revolution, which was then considered as an illegal protest. Moreover, from marked as the first case of the Arab Spring, the 18 January 2021, the night-time curfew still came protesters had several demands to end into force and as of 14 February, the government corruption, poverty, and political repression. further extended the measures to combat

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These problems were rooted in the legacy of Ben political police, issued the White Paper on Police Ali’s regime. Similar demands were chanted Reform entitled “Security and development: again a decade after the revolution, implying towards security in the service of democracy” that those demands have yet to be met. that has never been made public, created a Moreover, after the revolution, particularly during Facebook page for the Interior Ministry, and the interim government, there were some introduced a new police uniform. clashes between the police and the civilians during which the military prevented the police Under the current Ennahda-led government, they from using violence to suppress the protesters. primarily focused on cleaning up the country's Therefore, since the revolution, repressive protest internal security apparatus. Many of the party’s policing became a customary style hence, the members, including the interior minister, Ali police reform became an important objective. Larayed, are former political prisoners who experienced severe abuses by the police and Is There Any Police Reform? have fired several high-level officials who were associated with the former regime. However, no Given the oppressive nature of Ben Ali’s major overhaul of the Tunisian internal security leadership, it made any attempts to reform the system has been undertaken so far and the true country’s internal security apparatus as a reform never happened. There is a tendency that challenge of the post-revolution period. In the Tunisian politicians avoid reforming the addition, it will be quite challenging for the police security in larger part due to the myriad of to change their professional culture and security threats in Tunisia: the attack at the characteristics from the political police that are United States Embassy, the civil war in Libya repressive and abusive to the citizen’s police that which the neighboring country of Tunisia, multiple respect the rule of law and human rights. In terror attacks, high number of Tunisians join the another way, through the police reform, it will ISIS, and the existence of Islamic extremist in the shift the police culture and characteristics from mountains bordering Algeria. Therefore, after the their task of defending the interest of an 2014 election, the Ministry of Interior has reverted authoritarian leader with a narrow range of elites to old practices involving systematic human to their task serving a broader range of political rights violations by the police, including torture. elites with a great number of interests and the As a form of counterterrorism action, the police people. has violated the rights of people suspected of committing terrorism, such as arbitrary detention Besides transforming the police culture and and torture by the police, is rarely discussed characteristics, it would also require changes on openly and only detailed in the foreign press these two levels: the legislative level and the reports. institutional level. At the legislative level, it is important to establish a clearer legal framework Due to these circumstances, the police's old for practically all areas of police work and culture and characteristics, including intimidating organization, as well as to abolish or amend the behaviour, harassment, and brutal action, repressive laws of the former regime. As at the resurrected in Tunisia. Once again, the police do institutional level, it should have a greater not provide the Tunisian people with more transparency and accountability of the police security but abusive and oppressive actions force. towards them.

There was an effort for the police reform from Conclusion the initial transitional government, such as the dismissal of 40 high-level officials from the The current repressive police action against interior ministry, dissolution of the so-called protesters cannot be justified by restrictions

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References

Africanews, 2021. Tunisians defy police to stage more anti- government rallies. [Online] Available at: https://www.africanews.com/2021/01/24/tunisians- defy-police-to-stage-more-anti-government-rallies// [Accessed May 2021].

Davenport, C., Soule, S. A. & Armstrong II, D. A., 2011. Protesting While Black? The Differential Policing of American Activism, 1960 to 1990. American Sociological Review 76(1), pp. 152-178. DOI: 10.1177/0003122410395370

Earl, J., 2011. Political Repression: Iron fists, velvet gloves, and diffuse control. Annual Review of Sociology, pp. 261-284. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.soc.012809.102609

Galal, S., 2021. Impact of Coronavirus (COVID-19) on Projected Real GDP Growth in Tunisia from 2019 to 2022. [Online] Available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/1169857/impact-of-covid-19- on-projected-real-gdp-growth-in-tunisia/ [Accessed 8 May 2021].

HRW, 2021. Tunisia: Police Use Violent Tactics to Quash Protests. [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/05/tunisia- police-use-violent-tactics-quash-protests [Accessed May 2021].

Jones, K., 2021. Protests in Tunisia conjure images of the past and questions about the future. [Online] Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/protests-in- tunisia-conjure-images-of-the-past-and-questions-about-the- future/ [Accessed May 2021]. © Photo by Dimo Fedortchenko via Flickr Lavut, L., 2016. Building Partnerships Towards a Democratic Police Force in the Post-Revolutionary Tunisia Context. Journal Deradicalization, pp. 100-152. ISSN: 2636-9849 issued by the government as a preventive Lutterbeck, D., 2013. Tunisia After Ben Ali: Retooling the tools of measure for COVID-19. oppression?, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre.

Monitoring, G., 2021. COVID-19 Pandemic - Tunisia. [Online] It has, in fact, been embedded in the Tunisian Available at: https://global- police culture and characteristics since being monitoring.com/gm/page/events/epidemic- ruled by the authoritarian government. Thus, it is 0002033.opYWG7G2jfCj.html?lang=en [Accessed May 2021]. difficult for both the government and police to Parker, C., 2021. Ben Ali’s Ghost Still Haunts Tunisia. [Online] transform into a more democratic system. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/04/tunisia- protests-arab-spring-2011-revolution-police-brutality-ben-ali- black-lives-matter/ [Accessed May 2021] The Tunisian government still has homework to end the police repression and has a chance to do so. At the very least, the government can hold special training for the police in handling protests, detention, and counterterrorism that should be undertaken in a manner that respects human rights. Otherwise, if the government continues to ignore the protesters' call for change in Tunisia, then it will be the Tunisian people who will pay the consequences of the police's repressive actions. With that, the Tunisian revolution in many ways is not over, it is just started.

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EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN RIVALRY

Filip Šandor

The ongoing territorial disputes and tensions A complicated fact is also the non-recognition of have been in the spotlight in the East- Cyprus by Turkey and its territorial water claim. Mediterranean region, especially between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus in the past few years. Since Turkey-Greece sea disputes – a dialogue the discoveries of the tremendous amount of oil amid tensions and gas in recent years, tensions rise over the frozen territorial disputes and territorial waters The geographical proximity and historical claims and real control. The situation has memory between Greece and Turkey determined implications for the stability of the whole region. several disputes. One of the critical disputes is However, as the regional power, Turkey seems to the delimitation of the territorial borders. In the set the dynamic in this geopolitical chess game mid-1990s, Greece attempted to extend in the and move the pieces against the interests of its Aegean Sea to 12 miles, but the plan failed after neighbours, particularly Greece and Cyprus, Turkey declared such a move would cause war. which make a natural reaction. The past two However, Greece approved a bill in January 2021 months showed that security development is that envisions increasing Greece's territorial crucial in these processes in the Eastern waters in the Ionian Sea from 6 nautical miles to Mediterranean. Geographically, this region 12. This legislative act signaled that Greece would connects the east and the west, and it is an not back down from rights granted by important trade route. Therefore, the interest in international law. This attempt also comes amid the region of countries such as the USA, Russia, the number of actions taken by Turkey that UK, Italy, Germany, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Iran on conducted a marine research of gas in the sharing energy resources with the Eastern disputed seas. In this situation, Cyprus is Mediterranean is increasing. On the other hand, cooperating with Greece over offshore gas Turkey, Israel, Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Lebanon, exploitation rights. Cyprus has made significant Syria, and Libya are carrying out an active policy progress in recent years in extracting and in the region. converting natural gas resources through licenses given to international companies. The main problem is in geography and geology. Cyprus strategic interests are to enhance its Since 2009, Israel, Egypt and Cyprus have made energy security and lower energy prices. a series of large-scale gas discoveries in the However, the divided island ends non- Levant Basin, where the US Geological Survey recognition of Cyprus by Turkey determined the estimated in 2010 that 122 trillion cubic feet (3.5 problems in overlapping declarations on the sea trillion cubic meters) of gas and 1.7 billion barrels zones where the gas is located. Despite the of oil lie under the seabed. Turkey claims that its tensions, the dialogue still exists and attempts to exclusive economic zone is copying the talk between Greece and Turkey were at least on continental shelf. Other East Mediterranean the program.In 2002 they began with exploratory countries claim their exclusive economic zones in talks over demarcation across the Aegean Sea. a maximum of 200 nautical miles from their However, these talks broke down in 2016. On coast. Moreover, as one of the few countries of March 16 2021, Senior diplomats from Greece and the UN, Turkey did not sign the United Nations Turkey met in Athens on exploratory talks without Convention on the Law of the Sea, making things high-ranking politicians. Finally, on April 16, Greek complicated by international law. and Turkish Foreign ministers met in Ankara to

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restore the political dialogue amid their tensions. search vessels escorted by the military vessels in They spoke about keeping the channels of the disputed sea zones. It evolves critical voices dialogue open and increasing economic not only from Greece, Cyprus but also from the cooperation. But then, at the press conference, EU. Despite that, Turkey is trying to find an ally in both ministers accused each other of maritime this dispute. Therefore, it signed the Maritime borders, migrants, and the treatment of Boundary Treaty with the Government of the minorities. This meeting also came after mutual National Accord (GNA) of Libya in 2019 and accusations concerning Greece's support to deposited the agreement to the UN in order to Kurdistan Workers' Party, what Ankara sees as drill south of the Greek islands Crete and Kurdish terrorists and Greece's charges of Turkey Karpathos. Greece has claimed that it violates its for granting citizenship to Islamic State militants. national sovereignty and is illegal under These accusations and naval-military drills are international law. Since the "Arab spring" in 2011, seen as a provocation on both sides and can be Turkey supported the attempts by the Muslim understood as leverage before meeting in Brotherhood to gain power in the respective Ankara. Despite all, they agreed to meet in countries. That is why Turkey signed the maritime Geneva to discuss in the Informal 5+UN Meeting agreement, particularly with the GNA, which is the conflict in Cyprus. partly composed of figures linked to the Brotherhood. Turkey also militarily backed the GNA in its fight with the Libyan National Arab Army (LNA) in eastern Libya backed by Egypt, UAE and Russia. Turkey's help to the government in Tripoli saved GNA from the defeat when the LNA was on the doorstep in Tripoli in summer 2020. In March 2021, after the new interim government was elected in Libya, Turkey's president met with the interim president. Furthermore, in April, the Turkish president reaffirmed a mutual maritime agreement with © Photo by Number 10 via Flickr Libyan Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah, who In that meeting in late April, Turkish Cypriots said that the deal serves both Turkey and Libya's expressed their positions that efforts to negotiate national interests. However, he is also aware of the bi-zonal, bi-communal federation have been Greece-Turkish tensions. Therefore, he expressed exhausted. They have inherent sovereign equality his willingness to establish a joint Libyan-Greek and have an equal international status. On the committee to resume negotiations to set the sea contrary, the Greek Cypriots claim that the boundary between the two countries and solution lies in a settlement based on a bi-zonal, demarcate an exclusive economic zone for oil bi-communal federation with political equality and gas drilling rights. Lastly, on May 3, the Top based on relevant UN Security Council resolution. Turkish Defence and Diplomatic politicians paid In the end, they have not yet found enough the next unannounced visit to Tripoli. common grounds to allow for the resumption of formal negotiations concerning the settlement of Greece acted promptly too, and in April were the Cyprus problem. organized several meetings between Greeks and Libyans politicians. On April 6, Greek Prime Building coalitions Minister Mitsotakis visited Tripoli to restore the bilateral relations with Libya after the new interim During the last two years, Turkey's frequent government was elected. The ties were soured activity to conduct naval drills and especially the after signing the deal in 2019 with Turkey.

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Mitsotakis noted that "it is geography that The next dimension of possible coalition block determines the framework of our bilateral seems to appear as an Eastern Mediterranean relations, and not artificial lines that somebody Gas Forum (EMGF) created in 2019. In 2020, it draws on maps". Greek Foreign Minister met with transformed into an intergovernmental Deputy Prime Minister for East Libya Hussein Atiya organisation based in Cairo that includes Cyprus, Abdul Hafeez al-Qatrani in Benghazi and noted Egypt, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan and Palestine. that Libya's parliament had not ratified the Its charter legally entered into force by March 9, maritime accord with Turkey, which Greece 2021. Excluding Turkey, it is evident that the considers has no legal force. On April 14, interim energy cooperation could be symbolised as the president of Libya Mohamed al-Menfi met with initial step in the possible future deep Mitsotakis in Athens in order to agree "on the collaboration in the region. However, there are immediate resumption of talks" between two also disputes among the Member States within countries "on the delimitation of the maritime EMFG (e.g., between Lebanon and Israel, which zones". It is clear that finding an "ally" in Libya reportedly did not resolve the maritime border both for Turkey and Greece lies in the fact that dispute during the last meeting). Libya has not a united stance on the issue and, therefore, depends on the respective person in However, after more than a decade of the interim government. negotiations, on 9 March, an agreement was reached over the natural gas field Aphrodite- Greece making its moves Yishai that lies in the territorial waters of Cyprus and Israel. According to the agreement reached In the light of the rising tensions, there are signs by the two ministers at their meeting in Nicosia, of building several blocks as an informal the companies operating on the Cypriot side of coalition against Turkey's interests in the region. the Aphrodite reservoir will start negotiations with Philia Forum can be considered a one of such a the companies operating on the Israeli side coalition considered by some as the Forum (Yishai) in order to agree upon how the Israeli putting Greece in the centre of the companies will be compensated for their share transcontinental geopolitical order. On February in the reservoir. 11 2021, Greece hosted the Foreign Ministers of Cyprus, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Iraq, UAE Another concrete step towards closer and France. Forum positioned Greece in the cooperation is seen by the Eastern middle of two geographical arcs – a horizontal Mediterranean pipeline, which represents the one from Portugal to the Persian Gulf and a plan of Greece, Cyprus and Israel to transport vertical one from the Balkans to Egypt, which the gas to Europe. connects Europe with Africa. Greece has the ambition to be a bridge between the Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf in order to change the international perception of Greece as an economic and geopolitical nuisance on the periphery of the European Union to a geopolitical centre that connects Europe, West Asia and North Africa. The members' composition of the Forum is not a coincidence. Greece and Cyprus started to cooperate with these respective members much more closely past few years to build bilateral ties against Turkey concerning the newly found gas resources in East Mediterranean. © Photo by Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών via Flickr

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On 2 January 2021, Greece, Cyprus and Israel military contracts with Egypt, Israel and Jordan, signed a deal for a 2,000-kilometre pipeline Cyprus moves towards security against Turkey. designed to move gas from the eastern Greece's bilateral military cooperation with the Mediterranean to Europe. It plans to transfer up UAE is also increasing as well as with Saudi to 12 billion cubic metres a year from offshore Arabia, which signed a deal for providing a US- gas reserves to southeast Europe. It is expected made Patriot air defence system in April. This to provide around 10 % of the EU's natural gas comes after the two countries have engaged in needs. In March, the next step was made for political consultations at the highest level last achieving this goal by the signing of an year. addendum to the Memorandum of Understanding between Israeli and Cyprus- Egypt also plays a significant role in the sea Greece corporations. Furthermore, Israel, Greece disputes, whereas it builds its coalition with and Cyprus agreed to connect their national Greece and Cyprus. Athens has signed an electricity grids through 1,500-kilometer and agreement with Cairo after 17 years of 2,000-megawatt underwater Mediterranean negotiations delimiting maritime jurisdiction as a electricity cable to provide energy security for response to the agreement signed between each of the three countries, using clean energy Ankara and Tripoli. On April 6, a tripartite sources. It plans to be completed in 2024 as the cooperation program deal was signed between deepest and longest submarine electricity cable Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus in order to strengthen in the world, co-financed by the EU. Along this military coordination between these three states. step, the "coalition" also has its military aspect as the defence ministers of Israel, Greece and It seems that Turkey, as the most powerful state Cyprus expressed their willingness to increase in this region, is in a situation when it is losing its military cooperation last year. This March, they potential partners. This situation pushes Turkey to conducted a joint naval exercise together with a disadvantageous position against Greece and France. Along with that, Greece and Israel signed Cyprus. Turkey knows it very well, and that's why a defence procurement deal in April that it is trying to improve bilateral relations with the includes a $1.65 billion contract to establish and main countries in the region. In 2013, Turkey operate a training centre for the Hellenic Air severed diplomatic ties with Egypt over the coup Force by Israeli defence contractor Elbit Systems that deposed Egyptian President Mohammed over 22 years. On the opposite side stands Morsi from the Muslim Brotherhood, and it Turkey, which protested against a new deal that considered the coup as an illegal act. However, plans to build an underwater electricity cable on May 5, the Turkish Deputy Minister of Foreign and warns the countries that they must seek Affairs met his Egypt counterpart to make the Turkey's permission launching works on the first step in improving ties. Turkey is also trying to proposed undersea power cable claimed make some positive steps towards improving transgressed Turkish territorial waters. relations with Saudi Arabia and Israel. At this point, the only country which holds its more-less However, these "coalitions" are not only one, and cooperative stance with Turkey is Libya. there are attempts to strengthen ties among It may seem that Turkey confirms its role in NATO several regional players with their interests in the by the joint drills with US military ships in Eastern region. The Greece, Cyprus and Israel Mediterranean. However, the relations with the US partnership joined the UAE in April at the Cyprus are not perfect due to the purchase of the meeting, which indicates the new era in the Russian S-400 and to the recent Biden's Middle East geopolitics after signing the recognition of the Armenian Genocide. Turkish Abraham Accords. The meeting came after President Erdogan reacted that relations signing the first military cooperation agreement between Turkey and the US had sunk to a low between Cyprus and UAE in January 2021. Having point. Furthermore, the US facilitated the Israel-

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Greece-Cyprus alliance in the Eastern France but also with Turkey. The other reason Mediterranean by the Eastern Mediterranean why the EU did not impose sanctions on Turkey Security and Energy Partnership Act from 2019. lies in the Turkish diplomatic effort, which was The situation is complicated while Greece is also composed of the willingness of Turkey to talk with a member of NATO, which provides them with Greece and of successful Turkish diplomacy with another communication channel for talking at Germany ahead of the forthcoming EU summit. least. At the same time, US President Joe Biden has urged the EU not to impose sanctions. The reaction of the EU Conclusion A crucial role in this geopolitical theatre plays the EU and its sanctions mechanism. Due to Cyprus The Mediterranean is now a multistage theatre and Greece membership in the EU, they often for demonstrating military might and engaging raise their voices to impose sanctions on Turkey in geopolitical competition. The involvement of concerning its drilling activities in disputed many countries makes the situation unclear and waters. The membership of Cyprus and Greece complicated. During the past two months, in the EU is their leverage on Turkey. However, the tensions have continued tensions mainly EU is not united on the stance on Turkey as it is between Turkey and Greece. However, both on Belarus or Russia. The differences in interests countries could come together to talk in mid- among the EU Member States are too significant April after the five years of bilateral political to impose sanctions on the EU level. This silence regarding their disputes. According to the confirms the EU-Turkey summit in late March recent development, the tensions will continue as when the EU released a joint declaration that Turkey will try to balance the EU and its interests, welcomes the resumption of bilateral talks attempting to make alliances (like Libya) or between Greece and Turkey and the improve ties with Egypt, Israel, or Saudi Arabia. discontinuation of unlawful drilling activities in the On the other hand, Greece and Cyprus' dynamic Eastern Mediterranean. foreign policy indicate a determination to secure its vital interests that are crossing with Turkey's Along with Greece and Cyprus, France and interests. In that relation, the ad hoc coalition is Austria want a more robust line against Ankara. quickly formed against Turkey and its interests. Even in April, a French research vessel The crucial would be the position of main powers accompanied by a Greek frigate conducted such as the US, France and perhaps Russia. So scientific studies in the waters recognised by far, France's place is clear, and it is providing full Turkey as its continental shelf. Turkey perceived it support to Greece. Greece has smaller as a provocative act. French president even capacities but plays with more cards: stated that the Mediterranean countries have to membership in the EU, building the coalition and create Pax Mediterranea due to "imperial strengthening ties with other key partners such regional power coming back with some fantasies as Israel, Egypt, France, the UAE, and Saudi of its own history". On the other hand, Germany Arabia. Amid financial problems and the Covid- favours giving dialogue with Ankara a chance 19 Pandemic, Turkey faces several dilemmas - first, while there exist worries about fragile when it pushes more on Cyprus and Greece, the migrant deal with Turkey. The Turkish diaspora in EU may react by sanctions. Turkey has leverage Germany also has its leverage on German in the migration question, but it is less likely to politics. Italy, Malta and Spain, are also hesitant use it. As long as the economic and Pandemic to back new sanctions while their security problems in Turkey will persist as well as the interests in Libya are similar. Moreover, Italian ENI Turkish and Greek endeavour to do more has one of the largest stakes in the region. Italy dynamic foreign policy, it can be expected to be has conducted separate military drills in the the rising dynamic in the region. Eastern Mediterranean not only with Greece and

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[18] The Ministry of Energy of Israel (2021). Another step towards [7] Anthee Carassava (2021). Greece Slams Turkey Over PKK Terror the EastMed pipeline. https://www.energy-sea.gov.il/English- Claims. Voice of Site/Lobby/Articles/Pages/Another-step-towards-the-realization- America.https://www.voanews.com/europe/greece-slams- of-the-EastMed-pipeline-project.aspx turkey-over-pkk-terror-claims

[19] Zaken D. (2021). Israel, Cyprus, Greece advance underwater [8] UN (2021). Secretary-General's Press Conference following the power cable project. Al-Monitor. https://www.al- informal 5+1 meeting on monitor.com/originals/2021/03/israel-lebanon-greece-cyprus- Cyprus.https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press- egypt-yuval-steinitz-gas-cable.html encounter/2021-04-29/secretary-generals-press-conference- following-the-informal-51-meeting-cyprus [20] Aljazeera (2021). Israel, Greece, Cyprus hold naval drill amid deepening ties. [9] Ozkan B. (2021). Turkish leader meets head of Libyan council in https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/12/israel-greece- Istanbul. Anadolu Agency. cyprus-hold-naval-drill-amid-deepening-ties https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkish-leader-meets-head-of- libyan-council-in-istanbul/2189507 [21] Bassist R. (2021). Turkey irked over Israeli-Greek project for undersea power cable. Al-Monitor. https://www.al- [10] Middle east political and economic institute (2021). Turkish monitor.com/originals/2021/03/turkey-irked-over-israeli-greek- President And The Libyan Interim PM Agree To Maintain 2019 project-undersea-power-cable Mediterranean Accord. https://mepei.com/turkish-president-and- the-libyan-interim-pm-agree-to-maintain-2019-mediterranean- [22] Reuters (2021). Israel and Greece sign record defence deal. accord/ https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-greece-sign- record-defence-deal-2021-04-18/ [11] Daily Sabah (2021). Libya’s sovereignty, unity important to Turkey: Çavuşoğlu. [23] Pitta A. (2021). ‘New era for the region’ as FMs of Cyprus, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/libyas- Greece, Israel and UAE meet in Paphos. CyprusMail. https://cyprus- sovereignty-unity-important-to-turkey-cavusoglu mail.com/2021/04/16/new-era-for-the-region-as-fms-of- cyprus-greece-israel-and-uae-meet-in-paphos/ [12] Alarabiya news (2021). Greece’s PM in Tripoli, restores diplomatic relations with Libya. [24] DefenseNews (2021). Cyprus, UAE sign first military https://english.alarabiya.net/News/north- cooperation agreement. africa/2021/04/06/Greece-s-PM-in-Tripoli-restores-diplomatic- https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast- relations-with-Libya africa/2021/01/12/cyprus-uae-sign-first-military-cooperation- agreement/

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[25] Greek City Times (2021). UAE Ambassador visits Andravida air [37] Adar S., Toygür I. (2020). Turkey, the EU and the Eastern base in southern Greece, meets with General Floros. Mediterranean Crisis. German institute for international and Security https://greekcitytimes.com/2021/04/21/uae-ambassador-visits- Affairs. https://www.swp- andravida/ berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2020C62_East ernMediterraneanCrisis.pdf [26] Reuters (2021). Greece signs deal to provide Saudi Arabia with Patriot air defence system. [38] Emmott R., Chalmers J., Gumrukcu T. (2021). Exclusive: EU halts https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/greece-signs-deal- sanctions on Turkey oil executives as ties improve. Reuters. provide-saudi-arabia-with-patriot-air-defence-system-2021-04- https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-eu-exclusive- 20/ idUSKBN2BA1K

[27] Athanasopoulos A. (2021). Cyprus meeting, Riyadh visit latest examples of regional coalitions coming together. Arab News. https://www.arabnews.com/node/1844766/middle-east

[28] Al-Monitor (2021). Egypt, Greece, Cyprus edge closer militarily, but may be risking face-off with Turkey. https://www.al- monitor.com/originals/2021/04/egypt-greece-cyprus-edge- closer-militarily-may-be-risking-face-turkey#ixzz6sgcAMho0

[29] ArabNews (2021). Egypt and Turkey to discuss steps needed to restore relations. https://www.arabnews.com/node/1853586/middle-east

[30] Evans D., Coskun O. (2021). Turkey says better ties with Cairo could boost Libya peace efforts. Reuters.https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-says- better-ties-with-cairo-could-boost-libya-peace-efforts-2021-04- 26/

[31] AP (2021). Greek, Turkish diplomats hold talks after year of strain. https://apnews.com/article/turkey-europe-athens-ankara- greece-4e151ac1668178971bb4aa2751bd87e8

[32] Financial Times (2021). US-Turkish relations at new low over Armenian genocide, says Erdogan. https://www.ft.com/content/10af597b-3acb-409d-8391- 006ad66872bc

[33] Matalucci S. (2020). EastMed Gas Forum fuels energy diplomacy in troubled region. Deutsche Welle. https://www.dw.com/en/eastmed-gas-forum-fuels-energy- diplomacy-in-troubled-region/a-55206641

[34] Kök N. E. (2021).EU Leaders Summit And The Future Of EU- Turkey Relations. Middle east political and economic institute. https://mepei.com/eu-leaders-summit-and-the-future-of-eu- turkey-relations/

[35] Kırbaki Y. (2021). Turkey pushes back French, Greek vessels out of its continental shelf. Hürriyet Daily News. https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-pushes-back-french- greek-vessels-out-of-its-continental-shelf-164062

[36] Antonopoulos P. (2020). Macron: We need to create a Pax Mediterranea to stop imperialist Turkey. Greek City Times.https://greekcitytimes.com/2020/09/02/macron-we- need-to-create-a-pax-mediterranea-to-stop-imperialist-turkey- video/

30 The Peace & Security Monitor is produced by the Platform for Peace and Humanity

The Peace & Security Monitor Issue 1 May 2021

Platform for Peace and Humanity contact: [email protected] www.peacehumanity.org