The Origin, Development and Perspectives of Nordic Co-Operation in a New and Enlarged European Union Bonnén, Preben; Sosted, Michael

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The origin, development and perspectives of nordic co-operation in a new and enlarged European Union Bonnén, Preben; Sosted, Michael

Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Bonnén, P., & Sosted, M. (2003). The origin, development and perspectives of nordic co-operation in a new and enlarged European Union. Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 32(1), 19-32. https://nbn-resolving.org/ urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-60128

Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC Lizenz (Namensnennung- This document is made available under a CC BY-NC Licence Nicht-kommerziell) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu (Attribution-NonCommercial). For more Information see: den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/deed.de Preben Bonnén / Michael Søsted (Aarhus) The Origin, Development and Perspectives of Nordic Co-operation in a New and Enlarged European Union

Die Voraussetzungen für eine Kooperation im Sicherheitsbereich sollten für die nordischen Länder in vielerlei Hinsicht besser sein als für ganz Europa. Es besteht dort ein Netzwerk für Kontakte und Kooperationen zwischen Regierungen, Bürokratien, nationalen Parlamenten, politischen Parteien, Handels- und Arbeitsorganisationen. Die Vereinigung „Norden“ bezieht sich auf Solidarität, gegen- seitiges Verständnis und grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit. Im Gegensatz zu anderen Formen zwischenstaatlicher Kooperation – wie SAS, Nordischer Rat, nordische Passunion, nordische Freihandelszone innerhalb der EFTA – haben es die nordischen Länder im Bereich der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik aber nicht zu einer ähnlich intensiven Zusammenarbeit gebracht. Das rührt auch daher, dass nordische Kooperation traditionellerweise innerhalb eines breiteren europäischen (und transatlantischen) Rahmens am besten funktioniert hat. Damit die nordischen Länder ihre Mög- lichkeiten innerhalb der EU besser nutzen, ist es nötig, dass sie eine entspanntere und realistischere Einstellung gegenüber der Entwicklung einer gemeinsamen europäischen Sicherheits- und Ver- teidigungspolitik entwickeln. Solange Dänemark, Schweden und Finnland jedoch ihre so genannte „kollektive“ nordische Zurückhaltung bezüglich Verteidigung beibehalten, wird es keine optimale Kooperation innerhalb der EU geben.

1. Introduction1 while Norway and Iceland have always been more oriented towards the west. Denmark, Swe- The word “Norden” is the customary term den and Finland have been more interested in used when referring to the five Nordic or Scandi- maintaining their boundaries on land, while navian countries of Northern Europe.2 Apart Norway held the Atlantic Sea as its primary area from the special situation of the Finnish-speak- of interest. ing population, language was a major unifying Norden has certain distinct features in respect factor between the Nordic peoples. Religion to issues of war and peace. The region has a (first Roman Catholic, since the 1520s Lutheran) long record of non-wars, i.e. opportunities in proved to be another unifying factor (Bonnén/ the area to wage war that have been avoided. Søsted 2002). Lesser known, but equally im- The Nordic region is what could be character- portant factors have been the shared understand- ised as a “pluralistic security community” with ing of moral values and the common set of le- stable expectations on peaceful settlement of gal principles (Wendt 1981, 11ff.). All in all, it conflicts. States within a pluralistic security is possible to speak of Norden as a group of community possess a certain compatibility of nations with a common heritage. On the other core values derived from common institutions, hand, Denmark, Sweden and Finland have tra- and mutual responsiveness to the point where ditionally found common ground and unity they entertain dependable expectations of peace- through the sharing of interests in the Baltic Sea ful change. Security communities arise out of a

ÖZP, 32 (2003) 1 19 process of regional integration characterized by fully exploited the possibilities of Nordic co- the development of transaction flows, shared operation within the European Union. On the understandings and transnational values. These contrary, Nordic co-operation is hampered by transaction flows involve the regular, institution- continuous battles of prestige and short-sighted alised interaction not only of national govern- gains between individual Nordic countries. This ments but of members of civil society as well. situation is quite astonishing considering that In this view, interaction leads to dependable there will be no better time to develop Nordic exceptions of peaceful change, where states co-operation. However, changes in Nordic se- believe that disputes among members of the curity must be understood in the context of community will not be settled by force. Secu- broader changes in the political order in Europe. rity communities, however, are not defined A central feature of these changes is that the merely be the absence of war. They are also privileged status of the state is challenged. characterised by what is called a “we-feeling” However, given their common cultural herit- or shared identity.3 age and past experiences this lack of co-opera- The common heritage transformed into wide- tion seems puzzling and raises several impor- spread Nordic co-operation in the 19th century tant questions. Why has the potential for Nor- and reached its zenith during World War I. In dic co-operation not been fully exploited, and spite of very different experiences during World what barriers exist towards Nordic co-operation War II, Nordic co-operation continued well into within the European Union? Even if Nordic co- the Cold War. But the bipolar setting of the Cold operation does not function optimally, what War provided a rather rigid framework for the steps towards co-operation have been taken, and Nordic countries which curtailed any attempts how does Nordic co-operation within the Euro- to further Nordic co-operation – especially in pean Union function today? What approach the area of security. Despite their shared values from Nordic countries can we expect in the fu- and feelings of solidarity, Nordic countries have ture? Is there going to be an extension of co- found it difficult to co-operate intensely in the operation or have we seen the best of it because field of security and defence policy. Whereas Norden has played its role? These are the main Norden appears as one unit linguistically and questions this article will address. On the fol- ethnically, the region is divided when it comes lowing pages, we will analyse the historical to security and defence issues. A telling exam- background with special focus on Nordic co- ple of this is the failure of the plans and nego- operation during the World Wars and the Cold tiations in 1948 to establish a Nordic Defence War in order to establish a framework for dis- Community. The project’s goal of a common cussing Norden in the post-Cold War system and Nordic defence arrangement proved too ambi- Nordic co-operation in the new European set- tious and, in retrospect, quite unrealistic. Soon ting. This article argues that Norden as a (sub-) after, the Cold War cast its paralysing effect on region still has a role to play and can arguably the Nordic and European security architecture, become a model when it comes to stabilizing thus making any inter-Nordic security and de- and extending informal regional co-operation. fence co-operation virtually impossible for dec- Before addressing these and other questions, it ades to come. is critical to first examine the historical back- With the end of the Cold War, the rigid bipo- ground and how it relates to the current situa- lar framework gradually dissolved and the ex- tion in and among the Nordic countries. pectations of enhanced Nordic co-operation re- surfaced. Room for manoeuvre greatly increased and many anticipated an unprecedented degree 2. The common Nordic heritage of Nordic co-operation. Indeed, co-operation did increase in several aspects, but Nordic co-op- In spite of close links of culture and kinship, eration failed to reach expectations in the one the centuries immediately after the Viking pe- area most envisaged. The Norden has not (yet) riod witnessed the emergence of three states,

20 which soon began to compete for influence position in Norden. The result was the Scandi- within the Nordic region. The three states were navian War 1675–1679 that ended indecisively, Denmark, which at that time also included the and equally little was achieved when Denmark- southern region of present Sweden (Skåne, Norway in 1709 entered into an alliance with Halland and Blekinge); Norway, including ar- Russia, Poland and Prussia, Sweden’s neigh- eas which later became parts of Sweden, as well bouring rivals. When peace finally came in as the Faeroe Islands, Iceland and Greenland; 1721, the kingdom of Sweden-Finland lost a and finally, Sweden together with Finland. For good portion of its territories, but surprisingly centuries, the frontiers of these three states were Denmark-Norway had not regained any of its fluid and serious conflicts between them were previously lost lands. Subsequently, Denmark surprisingly minimal despite numerous minor never again regained to the same extent its in- wars. In 1380, Denmark and Norway – includ- fluence within the Nordic region. ing the Faeroe Islands, Iceland and Greenland Ironically, in the years that followed there – were united under one king, a situation that appeared no alternative to these former rivals lasted until 1814. In 1389, the Danish born but to engage in active co-operation. If the Nor- Queen Margrethe of Norway, who governed dic countries wished to maintain some form of Denmark and Norway after the death of her son, independence in the larger European political King Oluf, took over Government in Sweden at arena, they had little choice but to settle their the request of Swedish nobles. differences through peaceful means. The Dan- For the first time in history, the entire Nordic ish-Norwegian Foreign Minister of the late 18th area, which eight years later came to be known century, A.P. Bernstorff, once remarked, when as the “Kalmar Union,” was united under a sin- commenting on the co-operation agreement gle political leadership. The Kalmar Union lived reached by the two powers, that “[e]verything on for 134 years. After the end of the Union in that brings Sweden and Denmark closer to each 1523, the Nordic area was divided into two pri- other is natural; all that separates them is un- mary states. The Danish-Norwegian king, who natural and unreasonable” (Bernstorff, quoted governed from Copenhagen, ruled over the ar- in Bonnén/Søsted 2002). Still, the two countries eas of Denmark, Norway, the Faeroe Islands, fought on opposite sides during the Napoleonic Iceland and Greenland. The Swedish-Finnish wars. Denmark, forced by political and eco- king in Stockholm ruled in the remaining terri- nomic circumstances, forged an alliance with tories. The rivalry between Denmark-Norway the French while Sweden allied itself with Brit- and Sweden-Finland led to a number of clashes ain for similar reasons. Russia came together covering approximately two centuries of with France in the Treaty of Tilsit (1807) and conflict. Initially, Denmark-Norway was the occupied Finland since Sweden maintained its stronger of the two political units. However, by alliance with Britain. In 1809, Finland became 1615 a more even balance between the two part of the Russian Empire as a “Grand Duchy” blocks became evident, and in the following with extensive internal autonomy. After Napo- decades the balance of power shifted in Swe- leon’s defeat at Leipzig, Sweden forced Den- den’s favour. mark to sign the Treaty of Kiel (January 1814), A series of wars between Nordic countries under which the King of Denmark ceded Nor- ensued. During the rule of King Gustav II Adolf way to the Swedish King. Following a short re- (1611–1632) and his successor Queen Christina bellion, Norway finally became a separate king- (1632–1654) of Sweden, there was pressure to dom under the Swedish Crown. expand the frontiers of the kingdom. The first In the 1840s and 1850s, partly influenced by conquest occurred during the Thirty Years War German romanticism, many people, especially in the Baltic region. On two occasions, Sweden students and liberal circles in Denmark and conquered territories from Denmark, first in Sweden, expressed sympathy for a Scandinavian 1643–45 and then in 1657–1660, both of which Union. Up to the 1860’s there was talk about a squeezed Denmark-Norway out its dominant defence union as well, but the death blow to such

21 plans was dealt in 1864 when Sweden and Den- A new phase of Nordic co-operation began mark came into disagreement over the defence in the early 1930s as a result of the global eco- of the southern border of Schleswig. In the war nomic crisis, the Nazi takeover in Germany and against Prussia and Austria, Denmark was left the growing fear of war in Europe. Meetings of alone. Along with the areas of Schleswig, Hol- foreign affairs ministers, as well as ministers for stein and Lauenburg, Denmark also lost any faith social welfare, commerce, justice and education it had held in a common Nordic security iden- became regular events among Nordic govern- tity. Indeed, there was a divergence in percep- ments. An important feature of this activity was tions of security needs between Sweden and a growing Finnish participation in Nordic co- Denmark over the German threat, with Denmark operation in the field of foreign policy. The out- far more concerned with the menace due to its break of World War II only heightened this type territorial proximity. In June 1905, the Union of co-operation. Despite fears that different re- of Sweden and Norway came to an end, bring- actions and subsequent enforced affiliations of ing independence to Norway at last (Weibull various Nordic countries during the war would 1993, 108f.). sever all ties between them, the result was quite opposite. For example, Finland was not aban- doned when the country was attacked by the 3. The two World Wars and Nordic Soviet Union. During the severe months of the co-operation Winter War, support for the Nordic cause grew deeper and stronger than ever before. Large Bitter experience taught the Nordic countries collection drives were started in all Nordic coun- that armed conflict only brought disaster and tries, despite the fact that military aid in the form economic instability, and that Nordic unity could of troops could not be provided. However, many only be achieved through co-operation and ne- volunteers went to Finland to fight in the Finn- gotiation. During World War I, Nordic co-op- ish army. eration extended into new areas resulting in With the German attack on Denmark and a greater public awareness of the situation. In Norway on April 9, 1940, Nordic co-operation many instances, the Nordic area appeared as a and relationships in general were abruptly sev- single socio-political and economic unit to many ered. External conditions for individual Nordic observers in Europe and North America. In countries differed widely, with Denmark and 1918, Finland and Iceland respectively became Norway being occupied by Germany, the Brit- sovereign states, and could thereafter make their ish occupying Iceland and the Faeroe Isles, while own contributions to furthering Nordic co-op- Sweden remained neutral. For its part, Finland eration. allied itself with Germany from 1941 to 1944 In the early post-war years, this co-operation against the Soviet Union. However, despite the was strengthened even further. A high-level many obstacles imposed by the war, Nordic soli- network was established for contact and co-op- darity flourished as never before. The emotions eration between governments, officials and na- generated by the war provided fertile soil for tional assemblies, and partially between politi- Nordic activities in the post war years. cal parties and large trade union organizations. One of the best indications of this co-operation was the practice of reserving a seat in the Coun- 4. The Norden and the Cold War cil at the League of Nations for Nordic countries, which was filled in rotation. Since 1919, All the Nordic countries realized that the dif- on a popular level the “Norden” association ficult war period made co-operation more nec- contributed to solidarity, mutual understanding essary than ever. The attempts to create a Nor- and co-operation across the frontiers, by means dic defence alliance and keep the region out of of exchange and sister-town projects (Bonnén/ the incipient Cold War failed. Due to their ex- Palosaari 2002). periences during the war, Denmark and Norway

22 joined NATO in 1949, Sweden and later Fin- Old, controversial questions appeared from time land pursued a “neutrality policy.” Finland was to time concerning the union between Denmark, bound by the Treaty of Friendship, Co-opera- Norway and Sweden that were still able to mo- tion and Mutual Assistance from 1948 with the bilize and divide public opinion. Several dec- Soviet Union, which introduced some limita- ades after 1945, disputes over records contin- tions on Finnish foreign, security and defence ued between Denmark and Norway, especially policy. The possibility of a Finnish inclusion into over the traditional and agreed upon Norwegian the Soviet system of bilateral, all-inclusive po- fishing and hauling rights in Greenland (Bon- litical and military affiliation via the treaty was nén/Metzsch 2002a). In addition, Norwegian- perceived as a threat to Swedish, Norwegian and Swedish relations focused on past military and Danish security. Nevertheless, the Nordic region political glories and accomplishments. This was developed a unique political identity in the bi- not only due to differing security policies of the polar European security order (Lodgaard 1992, two countries but also to the repercussions from 283). In contrast to the rest of the Cold War sys- ethnic and state tensions during and prior to tem, Nordic countries tried to pursue foreign World War II. As for the former relationship policy orientations which modified confronta- between Norway and Finland, Norway viewed tion, essentially limiting Soviet Union involve- “the Finnish Danger”, associated with the size- ment in Finland and US involvement in Nor- able Finnish settlement in Finnmark and Troms way (Wiberg/Wæver 1992, 23ff.). during 1850–60 as a point of contention. Instead Iceland’s accession to NATO in 1949 required of soothing fears, Finland further aggravated the neither the establishment of an Icelandic armed situation by openly calling for certain frontier force, nor the stationing of foreign troops in the rectifications on the basis of nationality. country during peacetime. However, the tower- Many factors contributed to ambivalence ing Soviet threat and growing world tension among Nordic countries, which in turn hindered caused Iceland’s leaders to think otherwise. Ice- development of a common security and defence landic officials concluded that membership in policy. One reason for this was that states in a NATO was not a sufficient deterrent and, at the way pulled out of such Nordic activities and request of NATO, Iceland entered into a defence “Nordicity” was set free for more popular en- agreement with the United States. The level of deavours such as Nordic associations. The fail- tension was therefore lower in Northern than in ure of the Nordic defence co-operation provides Central Europe and the Nordic area tried to a telling example. It was the final common state- shield itself from recurrent conflict manifesta- oriented security effort for years to come. Dif- tions on the Central Front. In the Nordic region ferent foreign policy traditions, military and there was a high enough degree of co-opera- economic differences, and the different geopo- tion, common cultural traits and “We-ness” to litical positions of countries were to make Nor- legitimise the full use of the term “security com- dic defence co-operation unthinkable for a long munity” (Deutsch 1957; Palosaari 2001). The time (Wahlbäck 2000).5 Nordic countries lim- standard explanation of the Nordic case derived ited themselves to co-operation on matters re- from this view has also had an impact on Nor- lating to economics, the labour market and other dic self-understanding (Joenniemi 1997, 193ff.). aspects of “low politics”. In contrast to the rest of the system, Nordic countries tried to pursue a foreign policy orientation, which represented a modification of confronta- 5. The alternative or limited Nordic tion, often referred to as the Nordic Balance, co-operation essentially by limiting Soviet involvement in Finland and US involvement in Norway.4 Co-operation between members of the Nor- At the same time it is worth noting impedi- dic parliaments dates back to the establishment ments to closer Nordic co-operation that were of the Nordic Interparliamentary Union in 1907. not related to the Cold War system in Europe. This was largely a club without any decision-

23 making powers or rules for admission (Balders- to the governments of Nordic countries. In or- heim/Ståhlberg 1999, 5). The Nordic Council der to become effective, the recommendations was established in 1952 with members of par- have to be enacted by parliaments of the respec- liament from Denmark, Norway and Sweden as tive countries. well as Iceland. In contrast to the “supra- It took some time before the governments of national” European Coal and Steel Community the Nordic countries established a formal co- (ECSC) which was founded at about the same operation body. The Nordic Council of Minis- time on the continent, the Nordic Council was ters was established as late as 1971 as an inter- clearly established as an “inter-state” body governmental body. The Council includes min- (Sundelius/Wiklund 2000, 325). isters from the five Nordic countries and the Finnish members of parliament joined in three autonomous areas (Greenland, the Faeroe 1955/56, after the Soviet Union agreed to re- Islands and Åland). The Nordic Council of Min- turn the Porkkala military base (near Helsinki) isters meets in some 20 different formations to Finland and thus give the country more lee- according to the topics debated (the ministers way in its foreign relations. In explaining the for education, culture, environment, agriculture, decision to parliament, the Finnish government etc.). Each country has appointed a government declared that the Nordic Council would deal member, known as Minister of Nordic Affairs, mostly with administrative, social and economic who is directly responsible under the Prime questions. Should the Council – against its es- Minister for the co-ordination of Nordic issues tablished practice – debate military questions in their country and for the Council’s activities. or discuss statements concerning the conflict Decisions made in the Nordic Council of Min- between the superpowers, the Finnish repre- isters result in accords, conventions or other sentatives would not participate in such debates forms of communal Nordic decisions, which, (Andrén 2000, 281). The Helsinki Treaty of most of the time, must be ratified in the mem- 1962 based the Nordic Council on an interna- ber countries’ parliaments. tional agreement. The reason for establishing a Some of the achievements of this intergov- legal basis was the attempt of Denmark and ernmental co-operation include the abolition of Norway to join the European Economic Com- passport controls between Nordic countries and munity. The Helsinki Treaty should secure the the establishment of a common labour market achievements of Nordic co-operation (see that has incorporated the harmonization of so- Wiklund 2000). In 1970, the self-governing ar- cial and labour legislation. Legislative harmo- eas of the Faeroe Islands and Åland got their nization has also included family law and in- own representatives in the Council, while Green- heritance legislation as well as regulations con- land got them in 1984. cerning commercial transactions. Nordic citi- The Nordic Council consists of 87 elected zens have also been granted the right to vote in members, appointed each year by the parlia- local elections if they live outside their home ments of member countries and the people’s country. In cultural areas, a number of joint representations of the autonomous areas. The Nordic institutions have been established and delegations are composed according to the par- programs to encourage co-operation between liamentary strength of the political parties in national institutions have been set up. For sci- their respective countries. Ministers of the Nor- entific co-operation, a separate Nordic Research dic countries can participate in the meetings of Council exists, funded by the Nordic Council the Nordic Council, albeit without the right to of Ministers (Baldersheim/Ståhlberg 1999, 5f.). vote. The Nordic Council is not a body with As was the case with co-operation on defence independent powers of decision-making, its policy in 1949, the good intentions for economic main tasks are the exchange of information and co-operation were destroyed at the end of the ideas among Nordic members of parliament. It 1950s. In particular, Norwegian industry op- enables parliamentarians to take initiatives that posed any attempt to create a Nordic customs are then voted on in the Council and forwarded union. The Nordic countries instead participated

24 in the creation of the European Free Trade As- its population rejected (as in 1972) EU mem- sociation (EFTA) founded in 1960 as a response bership. Thus, there remained two Nordic coun- to the establishment of the European Economic tries (Iceland which had not applied for EU Community (EEC) by those countries that could membership and Norway) outside EU integra- not or did not want to join the EEC.6 tion, whereas from January 1995 Finland and Another attempt at deepening economic co- Sweden joined Denmark in the Union. operation was made between 1967 and 1970, The membership applications and subsequent after French President Charles de Gaulle twice accessions to the EU had repercussions on Nor- vetoed British entry into the single market and dic institutions. At a special session of the Nor- with it the membership applications of Denmark dic Council in November 1991 it was decided and Norway. Whereas in earlier situations it was that Nordic countries should try to actively in- divergences between the Nordic countries that fluence the developments in Europe. In 1995, a prevented co-operation, this time it was exter- thorough reform of the Nordic Council was ini- nal circumstances that rendered impossible en- tiated. Nordic co-operation was regarded as a hanced regional Nordic co-operation and the “bridge” between the Nordic EU members and goal of a customs union.7 In contrast to issues outsiders. “Norden” would not be an alterna- of “low politics,” such as trade and the free tive to “Europe”, but a part of European co-op- movement of people, foreign affairs as well as eration (Johansson/Larsen 2000, 223). security and defence policy had traditionally An example of the influence of Nordic co- been considered off limits at Nordic Council operation on the EU policy of Nordic member meetings and in the Nordic Council of Minis- states concerned participation in the Schengen ters during the Cold War. An exception to re- Convention, which granted the free movement fraining from sensitive foreign policy issues has of persons (abolishment of border controls) for been the co-operation of the Nordic countries those EU countries that had signed and fully im- in the United Nations where they attempted with plemented it. In May 1994, Denmark applied considerable success to co-ordinate their vot- for observer status in the Schengen regime since ing behaviour in the UN General Assembly (L. it feared that controls at its border with Germany Wiklund 2000). could become an obstacle for the free movement of people. This led to a series of administrative and political contacts between the other Nordic 6. Norden after the Cold War countries. At the session of the Nordic Council in Reykjavik, February 1995, the Nordic prime The end of the Cold War removed the obsta- ministers decided that in order to maintain the cles for foreign policy and security co-opera- Nordic passport union, all Nordic states should tion. At the same time, it eliminated one of the participate in the Schengen regime. In June 1995, barriers regarded in the past to thwart both “neu- Finland and Sweden applied for membership in tral” Sweden and Finland to join the EU as full Schengen, both like Denmark with the condi- members. In October 1991, the impending eco- tion that the Nordic passport union should be nomic crisis in Sweden caused the government maintained. Iceland and Norway indicated their to abruptly change its integration policy and to interest in participation in the Schengen regime announce an imminent application for EU mem- as well. All five Nordic countries became ob- bership. Its Nordic partners were not informed servers in Schengen from 1 May 1996. Den- in advance and, especially in Finland, negative mark, Finland and Sweden signed the Acces- comments on the lack of Nordic solidarity were sion Treaties on December 1996, on the same made public (Luif 1995, 216). Finland and Nor- day Iceland and Norway signed Co-operation way later also applied for EU membership. Nor- Agreements with the Schengen countries. way as a NATO member having no political Thus, the three Nordic EU members became hurdle to pass, was nevertheless barred from full participants in the Schengen regime, accession to the EU when a small majority of whereas Iceland and Norway can fully partake

25 in the preparations for decisions, but cannot TEU that would have been detrimental to their participate in the decision making as such. With neutrality (Luif 2002, 65). this arrangement, the Nordic passport union was During the IGC, there was also co-operation preserved (Andersson 2000, 237f.; Scharf 2000, with the aim of influencing the negotiations 38). Finally, the “Schengen acquis” was put into among nongovernmental actors, including or- force (and passport controls abolished) between ganized interest groups and political parties. the five Nordic countries and the other EU mem- There have long existed cross-national networks ber states (except the Great Britain and Ireland) of interaction between such actors in the Nor- on 25 March 1991, after the Nordic states had dic area, where regional and local authorities implemented all relevant rules and regulations have established links across borders (Johans- (Hellberg 2001). son/Svensson 2002, 351; Sundberg 2001). Another significant example of Nordic “co- In April 1997, the Finnish Prime Minister, operation” in the EU could be observed during Paavo Lipponen, suggested in a letter to the the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) that led President of the European Commission, Jacques to a consolidated version of the Treaty on Euro- Santer, that the EU develop a “strategy for a pean Union (TEU), negotiated in Amsterdam Northern Dimension”. The main aim of this ini- in 1996. The Nordic countries had similar in- tiative was to create peace and stability in the terests in the IGC, all focusing on the environ- North of Europe, with one of the objectives be- ment, openness and the overall goal of prepar- ing the strengthening of (economic) relations ing for enlargement. But rather than appearing between the EU and Russia. In contrast to Fin- as a united bloc, several Nordic voices were land, Sweden supported more schemes with a heard saying essentially the same thing (Tallberg focus outside the EU, such as the activities of 2002, 460). The voices were emphasizing dif- the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS). These ferent details, so that they would not thwart each different approaches illustrate that there still other’s interests. Even if both Denmark and exist differing attitudes towards European inte- Sweden gave openness high priority, they went gration among Nordic EU member states. Finn- their separate ways: Denmark’s preparations ish politicians are much more open to a more focused mainly on making Council meetings federal EU structure, whereas in Sweden the open to the media, whereas a Swedish paper ruling Social Democrats strongly support inter- focused on access to documents (Johansson/ governmental decision-making procedures (Luif Svensson 2002, 352f.). 2002, 68f.). Nevertheless, the Northern Dimen- Good personal relations between negotiating sion and the CBSS are also expressions of the teams meant that Swedish and Finnish negotia- Nordic countries’ activities in the Baltic Sea and tors co-operated rather closely at the IGC. In their efforts for an early EU membership of the addition, the social democratic background of Baltic states. both foreign ministers led to a joint proposal on One notable area of co-operation between the so-called “Petersberg tasks”, the only ex- Nordic countries has been in the United Nations. ception to the rule of mere co-ordination among The five states largely succeeded in “speaking Nordic countries at the IGC. When the French with one voice” in the UN General Assembly, and German foreign ministers presented a pa- the exception being disarmament and nuclear per at the IGC where they suggested an inclu- weapons questions, where the three NATO sion of the Western European Union (WEU) and members and the two neutral countries often had with it a military solidarity clause (Article 5) different positions. With the end of the Cold War, into the TEU, the Finnish and Swedish foreign even these divergences disappeared. When Fin- ministers put forward a memorandum, suggest- land and Sweden joined the EU, both countries ing the insertion of only military crisis manage- adjusted their voting behaviour to the main- ment (called Petersberg tasks) into the TEU. As stream of the EU. Only in questions where there a consequence, they succeeded in preventing the was no EU consensus a distinctive stance among inclusion of a common defence clause in the Nordic countries could be established, e.g. con-

26 cerning the reform of the UN Security Coun- that the Nordic region is not fully represented cil.8 Nonetheless, the traditional informal co- in the EU. This means that Nordic countries are operation among the Nordic countries has re- split as a bloc, each with its own interests and mained confined to the United Nations. approaches towards the EU. There is no con- An important element of co-operation among sensus as to the overall picture of the EU and Nordic EU member states which is not readily this makes it difficult to co-ordinate policies. seen in the public, are the daily informal con- Adding to this situation is the fact that there are tacts among civil servants in the different min- significant differences between Nordic countries istries. These broad and deep “transnational” and themselves. Having some basic common herit- “transbureaucratic” interactions have always age does not mean that the countries have de- been a significant basis of Nordic collaboration veloped alike in all aspects; quite the contrary, (Sundelius/Wiklund 2000, 327). A research they have some very divergent characteristics. project on “EU negotiations in networks” found For example, the Swedes see themselves as a that Swedish civil servants first seek contact with traditionally great power that should have in- their colleagues in Denmark, then in Finland and fluence on the European scene, whereas the in Great Britain (Johansson 2002, 87). Danes have more of a small state approach to- The issues that still have not found their full wards European co-operation. Sweden has tra- place in the discussion among Nordics are se- ditionally relied on its own military might to curity and defence matters. In 1997 the Nordic achieve security, whereas Denmark had sought Council decided to allow defence ministers to security though alliances. In the same manner, participate in its meetings and let one of the both Sweden and Finland are countries made ministers report on these issues. But despite sev- up of relatively few, but rather large and influ- eral initiatives, the defence ministers still can- ential companies whereas Denmark is charac- not meet officially in the context of the Nordic terized by a great number of small and middle- Council of Ministers (Andrén 2000, 297). sized industries. The consequence of these disparities is a divergence in their perception of European co- 7. Norden in a new and enlarged Europe operation. This is amplified by differences in national attitudes towards European integration With this experience of Nordic co-operation as such (Hansen/Wæver 2002). Nordic EU co- both outside and within the EU in mind, one operation could also be understood as provoca- can make several conclusions regarding sub- tion by non-Nordic EU member states – there regional co-operation among EU member states. could be the fear of a “Nordic bloc”. Yet an- First, it is important to understand the character other reason why Nordic countries have not of the EU in relation to its member states. The reached a higher degree of co-operation has to EU is multifunctional and discussions engage a do with another fact, namely that Norden has broad range of questions with varying degrees become a vehicle for co-operation vis-à-vis the of importance. In addition, many issues are of a external world. Having previously been almost highly practical nature. Therefore, it is very dif- exclusively focused on internal questions, ficult for subgroups of EU countries to perma- Norden has not been transformed into a cen- nently agree on different issues, either because tralized, political and state-governed entity. One they do not have a common, consistent view of of the factors that have made it difficult to in- the issues at hand; or because the countries do tensify or deepen co-operation is perhaps the not agree on the importance of the single issue, political and economic dynamic of the European or because the cultural heritage is not regarded Union. Undoubtedly, this is an emerging chal- as that important. lenge that will increase given the fact that Nor- Turning to the more Nordic specific reasons way is not a member of the EU. as to why permanent co-ordination has not ma- Denmark’s, Finland’s and Sweden’s member- terialized, it is of primary importance to note ship in the EU means that more Nordic coun-

27 tries have focused their attention on European prime ministers agreed to send a letter to the co-operation; however, it does not render su- Spanish Presidency wherein they not only de- perfluous continued Nordic co-operation (Bon- manded a fair, general deregulation of the en- nén/Metzsch 2002b). Despite the different po- ergy markets, but also emphasized traditional litical affiliations and interests of the Nordic Nordic topics such as sustainable development countries, the member countries have consid- and gender equality in the EU (Månsson 2002). ered it a strength and an advantage to exchange Yet again, one could also notice the differences information and, if possible, to co-ordinate their among the three Nordic EU member states. policies. Perhaps more than ever for Norway, Lipponen and Rasmussen stressed the impor- as a non-EU member, the Nordic Council has tance of strengthening the European Commis- become an important vehicle as a means of in- sion to protect the smaller European states fluencing the affairs of the EU (Bonnén 2001b, against the demands of larger members, whereas 22). Although co-operation functions outside the Persson supported a larger role for the Euro- EU framework, it is also important to recognize pean Council and thus more intergovernmental that co-operation does not function optimally co-operation and less supranational integration. within the EU framework itself (Bonnén 2001c, As more and more decisions are made by 111). qualified majority in the European Council, the For a long time, there has not been any insti- voting weights of the Nordic countries are sig- tutionalised co-ordination among Nordic EU nificant. Since 1995, they together have exactly countries, such as the use of preparatory meet- the same voting weight as Germany. This situa- ings that take place between major EU coun- tion will change with the Nice Treaty, wherein tries (most often France and Germany) and the the voting weights of the three Nordic countries Benelux countries. By the same token, it has will diminish vis-à-vis Germany. But provided not been possible to identify any common un- that Norway and Iceland one day will become derstanding nor a joint Nordic voice in Euro- members of the EU, the five Nordic countries pean discussions. Nordic countries seem to pur- with a population of 22 million people would sue different agendas based on different percep- probably have 34 votes while Germany with tions of interest without any reference to their more than 80 million inhabitants would only common Nordic heritage. It took several years posses 29. This greatly increases the prospect before the three Nordic EU member states un- of Nordic influence within the European Union dertook major attempts in co-ordinating their (Bonnén 2002). positions before the most important EU meeting, that of the Heads of state and government, the European Council. There used to be prepara- 8. Concluding remarks tory “breakfast meetings” in which the up- coming agenda was discussed, to avoid any Having focused on some of the barriers to unnecessary “surprises” for Nordic partners Nordic co-operation it is of value to discuss the (Sundelius/Wiklund 2000, 342). prospects for Nordic co-operation as well. As The first serious effort at co-ordination was we have seen, the Nordic political leaders are the meeting of the Nordic Heads of state and now aware of their potential for co-operation. government that took place on 12 October 2001, The next EU enlargement (decided at the Co- in preparation for the informal meeting of the penhagen European Council, 12–13 December Heads of state and government in Ghent, 19 2002) will bring new challenges as there are, October 2001. At the reunion in Helsinki, 4 for example, prospects for a system of group March 2002, the Finnish Prime Minister Paavo presidencies. This would enhance the benefit of Lipponen, the Swedish Prime Minister Göran sub-regional co-operation and could be a cata- Persson and the Danish Prime Minister Anders lyst for more Nordic co-operation, which has not Fogh Rasmussen prepared the European Coun- yet reached its full potential. As mentioned ear- cil in Barcelona (15–16 March 2002). The three lier, in the League of Nations the Nordic coun-

28 tries shared a permanent seat in the Council The correlation in logic between the Baltic based on an agreement of rotation among them. Sea co-operation and the EU as well as the op- If the intention is to strengthen co-operation, portunity to settle security issues around the the substance and the forms of co-operation shall Baltic Sea are the reasons why Nordic coun- undoubtedly need to be changed and adjusted tries have pushed so vigorously for the inclu- according to the ongoing economic and politi- sion of Baltic states into the EU. Estonia was cal changes in Europe and to international de- included even in the first small round of enlarge- velopments in general. We have witnessed a ment negotiations agreed upon in Luxembourg long period in European affairs that has focused in 1997, so the challenge for Nordic EU mem- primarily on widening and deepening the EU. bers was to expand the negotiations to include The main challenge for Nordic countries seems Latvia and Lithuania. Denmark stubbornly to have been how they could be integrated into pushed for Latvia to be promoted in the first the new pan-European web of institutions, in- round of enlargement at the European Council stead of building a political identity by being meeting in Vienna in 1998. The attempt was not different from other European states or regions. successful, but continuing pressure from the Nordic co-operation traditionally functioned Nordic EU member states contributed to mov- best within a broader European (and transatlan- ing the matter forward, when the European tic) framework, and not in a specific Norden- Council agreed on the budget at the Berlin sum- centric sphere. For Norden to take advantages mit, just as the Kosovo crisis demonstrated that of its opportunities within the EU, the Nordic only the prospect of EU membership could once countries also have to take a more relaxed and and for all stabilise the boundaries of the Union realistic attitude towards the development of a (Friis 2000). common European security and defence policy. One lesson learned from the Nordic case is Today the Nordic countries have an opportu- that the absence of conflict and tension in poli- nity that is far from utilized. But as long as Den- tics regarding security issues makes informal mark, Sweden and Finland perpetuate the so- sub-regional co-operation in Europe possible. called “collective” Nordic reservation on de- It is also important to remember that, for the fence, optimal co-operation within the EU will Nordic countries, internationalisation begins in be long in coming. the Nordic region itself. Therefore, it must be a However, the European security architecture main priority in further European co-operation needs not only the support of the Nordic coun- that Nordic ideals are projected towards and tries, but also support from the surrounding re- promoted in neighbouring countries. Time and gion, which inevitably includes the Baltic states. history have proven that these commonly shared In relation to this region, Nordic co-operation beliefs and values form the very core of all Nor- has an important role to play as a source of in- dic policies. Undeniably, co-operation being the spiration and as a role model in the develop- most celebrated virtue of them all. ment of a coherent Baltic framework. The Bal- tic Sea has traditionally been pivotal to the whole region and the great powers of the given time, whether it was Denmark, Sweden, Germany or NOTES Russia. After the Cold War a window of oppor- tunity has opened for a more permanent order- 1 The authors wish to express their gratitude to Paul ing of the region by co-operation in the CBSS.9 Luif, Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Vi- enna, Tonny Brems Knudsen, Department of Politi- Furthermore, CBSS benefits from the fact that cal Science, University of Aarhus, Denmark and it has focussed on security issues from the be- Bjørn Olav Knutsen, Norwegian Defence Institute, ginning. It has a top-down logic much in line Oslo, for comments and contributions to this article. with that of the European Union, a central player Furthermore, a special recognition goes to John Kristen Skogan, Norwegian Institute for International in setting the dominant thinking of today’s se- Affairs, Oslo, Norway, and Teemu Palosaari, Centre curity co-operation in Europe. for European Studies, University of Helsinki, Fin-

29 land. Thanks also to Goran Pesic and Robet Momich 7 First, Charles de Gaulle’s successor, Georges Pompi- for their most important assistance in contributing dou, in 1969 opened up the prospects of expanding material to this article. the EC. Second, Great Britain had pointed out that 2 Of the five Nordic countries, Denmark, Norway, and closer Nordic co-operation within EFTA was not Sweden have been inhabited by the same Nordic- possible, and third, Finland had announced that it Teutonic race of peoples from the early beginnings could not and did not wish to participate (Brundt- of recorded history. During the main period of the land 1969, 11ff.). Viking expansions, Norse settlements were founded 8 The UN representatives of the Nordic countries meet dating to 900 A.D. on the Faroe Islands and Iceland, every week at the level of ambassadors in New York in the North Atlantic. About a century after the birth to discuss matters of common interest. The three EU of Christ, peoples of quite a different race with a dis- members inform Iceland and Norway on the posi- tinct ethnic origin and language began to move across tions of the EU member states. The meetings enable the Gulf of Finland and into the Baltic countries the representatives of the EU outsiders to introduce (Bonnén 2001a). their own ideas into the EU debate. In addition, elec- 3 The standard explanation of the Nordic case derived tions for positions in the UN are still co-ordinated from this view, known as never-ending Nordic among the Nordic countries. For the non-permanent peace, has also had an impact on Nordic self-un- seats in the Security Council there exists an informal derstanding. This view of security community, ac- “rotation scheme” among them and as a consequence companied with the lack of clearly perceived secu- almost every other two-year period there is a Nordic rity threats, has been so prevalent, dominant, rigid country represented in the Security Council (L. and all-encompassing that some analysts have noted Wiklund 2000, 256). that there actually is no need or room to investigate 9 The CBSS has a role to play as the catalyst of a secu- alternative explanations on this issue (Deutsch 1957, rity community much like Norden. 58). 4 The concept of the Nordic Balance has been developed in Norden as an analytical tool for the observa- tion of security relationships pertaining to the North- ern European region. The most common understanding of the Nordic Balance differs from normal balance-of-power concepts. Compared to central Europe REFERENCES or the Danube region a direct balance of power between any of the Nordic states did not exist. 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31 AUTHORS

Preben BONNÉN is a Research Analyst at the De- Michael SØSTED is a student at the Department of partment of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Political Science, University of Aarhus in Denmark, and Denmark, who specialises in the fields of European and currently working on his Master paper. He specialises Nordic Security and Ballistic Missile Defence. Tempo- in the fields of Europe’s Security Architecture and Nor- rary institutional affiliations: 1998 University of Aarhus dic Co-operation. Recent publications: “Norden – From (Denmark), 1999 University of Hamburg (Germany), wars to community”, Jyllands-Posten, Indblik, Aarhus 2001 Austrian Institute for European Security Policy in 2002; “Norden in the European Security architecture – Vienna, 2002 University of Aarhus. Recent publications: Perspectives and challenges, Aarhus 2003 (co-editing “Die Deutsche Einheit und Deutschland – Eine ausge- with Bonnén). bliebene Einheit?”, Regensburg 1997; “The United Na- tions – From vision to reality?”, Aarhus 1999; “Towards A Common Defence Policy for Europe – The Ways and Contact address: University of Aarhus, Department of Means To Make It A Reality”, Hamburg 2003. Further- Political Science, Bartholins Allé, DK-8000 Aarhus C; more, Bonnén has published numerous articles in promi- nent international journals dealing with European and email: [email protected] and Nordic security and defence issues. michaelsoested @hotmail.com.