The Rise of Insurgent Groups in the Middle East: The Case of the Islamic

State in Iraq and Syria

Senior Thesis

By

Soma Ako Jangi Burhan

Submitted in Partial fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the degree of

Bachelor of Arts

In

International and Economic Relations

State University of New York

Empire State College

2021

Reader: Max Hilaire

Statutory Declaration / Čestné prohlášení

I, Soma Ako Jangi Burhan, declare that the paper entitled:

The Rise of Insurgent Groups in the Middle East: The Case of the Islamic State in Iraq and

Syria

was written by myself independently, using the sources and information listed in the list of references. I am aware that my work will be published in accordance with § 47b of Act No.

111/1998 Coll., On Higher Education Institutions, as amended, and in accordance with the valid publication guidelines for university graduate theses.

Prohlašuji, že jsem tuto práci vypracoval/a samostatně s použitím uvedené literatury a zdrojů informací. Jsem vědom/a, že moje práce bude zveřejněna v souladu s § 47b zákona č. 111/1998

Sb., o vysokých školách ve znění pozdějších předpisů, a v souladu s platnou Směrnicí o zveřejňování vysokoškolských závěrečných prací.

In Prague, 27.04.2021 Soma Ako Jangi Burhan

2 Acknowledgements:

I would like to express my gratitude to my mentor, Dr. Max Hilaire, whose guidance and assistance has played a fundamental role in helping me write my senior thesis. Without his help this research would not have been possible. His expertise has allowed me to better comprehend the concept of global peace & security and armed conflicts in the complex world we find ourselves in today.

I am exceptionally thankful for Dr. Iveta Hlouchova who has played an influential role in my education and has been very encouraging through my journey to complete my senior thesis. The time she has taken to answer countless questions and shared her expertise on this topic has been a great asset which I will forever be grateful for.

I would like to thank Professor Oscar Hidalgo-Redondo who has been an excellent lecturer and adviser throughout my course of pursuing my bachelor’s degree. I will evermore be grateful for the knowledge he shared in the classroom and motivating me to work my hardest in the course of my studies.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my lovely parents for their endless encouragement throughout my academic journey. Without their love and support I would not have been able to be where I am today.

3 Abstract:

The aim of this senior thesis is to study the rise of insurgency groups in the Middle East with a particular focus on the emergence and development of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The pivotal approach in this research is to study the variety of factors which have set a ground to answer the question of What has cultivated insurgent groups in the Middle East? by mainly analyzing the phenomenon of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria to gain more perspective of how non-state actors have developed into the international security threat in contemporary politics.

The research on the topic was conducted by studying both historical and recent events and how they have been a part of advancing contemporary insurgency in the region. The paper analyzes the prospects through various perspectives by studying the national history of Iraq and Syria, looking at the domestic politics of Iraq and Syria, analyzing foreign policy of foreign countries on Iraq and Syria, examining the situation from a legal approach, and assessing the rise and downfall of the abrupt global war against ISIS. Following these examinations, the study explores the global impact and aftermath of the war and what the future of ISIS as well as contemporary insurgency may evolve into.

Keywords: ISIS, Caliphate, Iraq, Syria, Insurgency, Terrorism, War

4 Table of Contents

Introduction: ...... 6

Methodology: ...... 10

I. Historical Emergence ...... 11

II. Regional Politics and Religious Extremism ...... 21

III. U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Iraq and Syria ...... 28

IV. The War Against ISIS ...... 34

V. The Status of Declaration of the Caliphate ...... 40

VI. The Humanitarian Crisis Following the Demise of ISIS ...... 48

VII. Conclusion ...... 54

Bibliography: ...... 58

5 Introduction:

What is the reason behind the rise to extremist groups in the middle east? Why are they centered in the Middle East? What made Islamic state of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) recruitment efforts more successful in comparison to their predecessors? Questions such as these regarding the core issue of insurgent groups in the Middle East have only risen with their increasing developments. The answers to these questions will be better understood when analyzing the background of how a group like ISIS was cultivated and how they prevailed. Islamic Insurgent groups’ presence in the

Middle East have a long-recorded viability of playing an active role in regional conflicts which consequently had devastating ramifications. Foreign interference and the enforced political leverage by the West have played a dominant role in stimulating and encouraging conflicting insurgent groups to develop in Iraq and Syria, especially with the history of various occurrences of military intervention which were not in accordance with international law.

ISIS is no exception to any insurgent predecessors but has rather magnified the possibilities for radical non-state organizations which is why it has become an unlikely phenomenon in the realm of international relations. The declaration of ISIS as a Caliphate by the former caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in 2014, was when the organization was at its peak. The logistics, manpower, capital, and worldwide domination in terms of influence which ISIS had established when they declared Raqqa, one of Syria’s largest cities, as their capital was unprecedented and at the time an underestimated threat to international peace and security (Mohamedou, 2018).

The central problem which became prominent as a result of ISIS’s prevalence was the humanitarian crisis it led to. At the peak of their governance, millions of civilians lived under the

6 area occupied by ISIS and most of them in need of humanitarian assistance (Lafta, Al-Nuaimi &

Burnham, 2018). People who were not able to flee their homes before their cities were seized lived in fear for their lives without any human rights. Religious and ethnic minority groups were massacred, enslaved, raped, and forcefully converted to their ideology (Mohamedou, 2018).

Human trafficking was also used as a method of warfare among many other practices by ISIS, where they would exchange women and young girls as sex-slaves (Mohamedou, 2018).

The ever-escalating barbaric direction ISIS was taking eventually led to the influx of refugees flowing into Europe in 2015, in which four million of them were coming from Syria (Human

Rights Watch, 2020). The European refugee crisis came with national security implication and economic repercussions. The migration of the refugees to the north came with significant concern by the international community as it could pose as a great threat for international security and the potential for the conflicts to spill over to the borders of the west. In addition to making state borders more vulnerable to menace, it caused an economic drain for the countries who accepted high numbers of refugees, most of those were hit with an unanticipated fiscal spending shock which will have long lasting effects on their economies (Ruist, 2015).

These substantial repercussions of contemporary religious extremism are also present in the region they were cultivated in, more so than any other threat which the west’s political stability could ever be jeopardized by. Even if the war is over and the weapons are gone, the ideology still perseveres. The principles of the Islamic State begin from a strong religious belief, belonging, and what they have believed to be their truth—an alternative worldview lead by their faith originating from a Salafi interpretation of the Qur’an. The fundamental conviction is much

7 deeper than any political standing and has a much more personal weight to it. ISIS fighters did not only combat in the name of their own belief, but as servants to a much higher power—God

(Mohamedou, 2018).

Their commitment to creating a resilient and ineradicable state required the followers to procreate and teach the future generation their philosophy to broaden their agenda (Mohamedou,

2018). The aftermath of this specific approach to building the Islamic State’s consequences can clearly be understood as insoluble when, for example, examining the situation of a refugee camp such as Al Hol in Syria (Teller, 2019). Al Hol has now become home to ISIS brides and ISIS offspring, and will evidently become one of the biggest issues which the international community will have to deal with in the near future. The children are brought up by young and radicalized mothers in appalling living conditions, without any effort to deradicalize through rehabilitation (Teller, 2019).

Al Hol is currently housing more than 80,000 former members of the Caliphate which is guarded by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), but they have been unable to hold power over the residents inside the camp or enforce any structure (Oehlerich, 2020). The question of where the future of these displaced people lie is uncertain, but it is without a doubt that the phenomenon of contemporary insurgent groups such as ISIS will leave a devastating imprint globally even after the collapse of the Caliphate. The toughest component of defeating ISIS never was and never will be the aggression or the shift of the geopolitical state of the Middle East, but rather to triumph over the battle against an ideology.

8 The main objective of this final project will be to study the rise of insurgent groups in the Middle

East and to examine the unprecedented contrast in modern insurgency which evidently only became present following the phenomenon of ISIS. The focus will be on the shift that the 21st century insurgency groups have taken in comparison to those of their predecessors and analyzing their legitimacy to declare their own state in accordance with the international law. The research will present information about the political landscape through history and the emergence of insurgency groups, particularly in Iraq and Syria, while analyzing different organizations and their influence on modern terrorism. The paper will further scrutinize the impact of the U.S foreign policy in the region as well as the domestic politics of Iraq and Syria which have all played a role in galvanizing the reach of ISIS and the contemporary methods which were used to fortify the group. Also, the weight of the war which was experienced from 2014 until the present and explore the future of the region following the immense humanitarian crisis which came as a direct consequence of the conflict.

9 Methodology:

To conduct a quality research on the situation of insurgency groups in the Middle East and the case of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and to answer the question What has cultivated insurgent groups in the Middle East? this paper has approached the procedure by doing a critical analysis by using qualitative analysis on qualitative and quantitative research.

This essay will take the form of an empirical case study of the socio-political landscape which terrorist organizations are fostered and developed in.

All of the resources used to conduct this senior thesis are in the English language. The resources used to conduct this senior thesis are in large part academic work published in academic journals, government websites, databases of IGOs, books, reports, and articles. Due to the fact that the main focus of the study is the case of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria the case is relatively recent and still developing at a time this research was conducted, therefore, there is information in this senior thesis which is referenced to articles from news outlets. The numbers and development of the political case in Iraq and Syria is rapidly evolving and developing, therefore there is information in this senior thesis which is prone to fluctuate.

10 I. Historical Emergence

The emergence of insurgent groups in the Middle East resorts back to decades of political tension and instability in the region. The contemporary Middle East and its never-ending conflicts is mainly due to the partition plan of the Fertile Crescent by the western powers, France and Britain in particular, who fabricated the modern outline for the map in the Middle East. The secret Sykes-Picot agreement which was settled between the brit Sir Mark Sykes and the French diplomat François Georges-Picot in 1916 is the basis of the borders present today, which were to be used as a strategy by France and Britain to implement their influence in the Middle East after the fall of the Ottoman Empire (Dodge, 2016). This is one of the biggest oversights executed by the European powers who were blinded by greed and were oblivious to the political, ethnic, and religious landscape of the region.

While there have been short periods of stability in the region over time, the countries which evidently became home to ISIS have not experienced purely peaceful and democratic regimes since the creation of their states. The foundation of Iraq and Syria was formed by the French and

British mandates in early 1920s, and the multiple regime changes which has led to the current configuration of both countries were always dominantly affected by foreign influence—and still are today (Maoz & Yaniv, 2013). Syria was transformed from a kingdom to a federation, a

United Arab Republic, and at last to what now prevails as the Republic of Syria (Mufti, 1996).

The uprisings from the Ba’athist parties in the Middle East created a new era of pan-Arab movement in which Hafez al-Assad led a coupe against civilian party leadership in Syria and assumed the role as President in 1970 (Mufti, 1996). Syria has been locked into a dictatorship for

11 fifty years which was succeeded by Hafez al-Assad’s son, Bashar al-Assad, following his death in 2000 (Maoz & Yaniv, 2013).

The political construct in Iraq resembles that of Syria quite closely. Iraq has subsisted through periods as a kingdom, an Arab federation, a republic under Ba’athist leadership, and to the modern republic of Iraq (Marr, 2012). Iraq suffered over 20 years of adversity under the dictatorship of Ba’athist party in Iraq’s leader Saddam Hussein, until his demise in 2003 after the controversial U.S. invasion in Iraq (Marr, 2012). The modern Republic of Iraq is a result of the

Coalition Provisional Authority which was the transitional government in Iraq established by the

U.S. and the United Nations, they created the framework for what is now the existing government (Marr, 2012). It is difficult to justify the independence and sovereignty of Iraq considering the heavy influence foreign actors have had in the current constitution and current leadership. The same goes for Syria as the constant interference in their state affairs led to the revolts in an attempt to overthrow what they did not believe was a legitimate Syrian government.

The rise and popularity of the Ba’athist parties in the region contributed to the Islamist uprising which were composed of a series of revolts and armed insurgencies by Islamic fundamentalists, mainly members of the Muslim Brotherhood, between 1976 and 1982 in an attempt to dissolve the secular Ba’athist movement (Lefevre, 2013). These insurgencies were only the beginning of the presence of Islamic terrorism in the Middle East. Extremists militant organizations gained the most momentum at the end of the 1980s with the formation of Al-Qaeda during the Soviet-

Afghan War when the afghans rose to fight the Marxist ideology (Lefevre, 2013). Shortly after

12 the extremist-Salafist ideology spilled over to the Arab world creating insurgencies who pledge their allegiance to Al-Qaeda (Lefevre, 2013).

Al-Qaeda’s influence in the formation of ISIS is significantly important in comparison to those organizations prior to their formation because they waged the first contemporary jihad (Lefevre,

2013). There should be great emphasis on the word contemporary because jihad’s meaning in the

Quran has been interpreted very differently by Islamic scholars through the years, and it is still widely debated between Muslim historians and terrorism experts whether or not the contemporary understanding of Jihad can truly be justified by the Quran (Venkatraman, 2007).

Regardless of the verbatim definition of jihad, Al-Qaeda’s emir Osama Bin Laden carried out the first jihad against the atheist soviet communists who invaded a Muslim country in 1979 (Lefevre,

2007), and this created tension for Islamists who were already prevalent in Afghanistan and is said to have "amplified the jihadist tendency from a fringe phenomenon to a major force in the

Muslim world" (Commins, 2009 p. 174.).

While there was constant tension within the Middle East and Al-Qaeda in the mid 1990s right after the Gulf War, their ideology and maneuvers were still very much present. The Jordanian

Salafi-jihadists, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, founded the Islamic organization called Jama'at al-

Tawhid wal-Jihad in 1999 which established a large part of the foundation which would then become what is known to the world as ISIS (Hashim, 2018). Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad carried out operations through Jordan with connections in Iraq and Afghanistan but played a significant role against the 2003 U.S. led Iraq Invasion (Hashim, 2018). Between 2003 and 2004 they settled base in Iraq and notably started to recruit more foreign and Iraqi fighters, most of them being of

13 Iraqi decent and former members of Al-Qaeda backed organization Ansar al-Islam (Hashim,

2018). Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad carried out orders for kidnappings, suicide bombings, and guerilla attacks in the Iraq region was a very present actor in destabilizing Iraq throughout the

Iraqi Insurgency (Hashim, 2018). Abu Musab al-Zarqawi changed the name of the group in 2004 to Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn which is the official name they used to pledge allegiance to Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda (Hashim, 2018).

Following the assassination of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006 near Baghdad, Abu Ayyub al-

Masri was designated as the leader of Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn and became the official leader of the division Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) (Hashim, 2018). AQI remained as a presence in the region and were the main force behind the new phenomenon the Islamic State of

Iraq (ISI) established in 2006, which was a declaration of a state compromised of six of Iraq’s

Sunni governorates which consists of Baghdad, Al Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, and

Nineveh as the component of their self-proclaimed nation (Hashim, 2018). Abu Omer al-

Baghdadi was pronounced the leader of ISI and Abu Ayyub al-Masri as the Minister of War, while the notion of creating a sovereign Sunni state governed under the Sharia Law had been constituted, at the time the ISI did not have control over the governorates they claimed to govern

(Hashim, 2018).

AQI and ISI consistently carried out attacks from the beginning of their emergence, and most of the missions included bombing government buildings and attacks on civilians (Hashim, 2018).

The U.S. military were one of the main forces counteracting AQI and ISI and carried out multiple missions jointly with Iraq intelligence and military. Early in 2010 a joint U.S.-Iraqi raid

14 was carried out which neutralized both Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, and this began the renewed era of what ISI was about to become (Hashim, 2018). Abu Bakr al-

Baghdadi was announced as the new leader of ISI in 2010, and there was a resurrection of the discourse ISI had originally intended to become (Hashim, 2018). One of the most prominent steps Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took to revive ISI in its declining state was recruiting highly experienced military men and positioning them as high ISI officials, many of the new members had formerly been fighting the U.S. army in the Iraq Invasion and were acquainted with skilled

U.S. military tactics which gave the organization some leverage on the battlefield (Hashim,

2018).

The plans to expand ISI beyond Iraqi borders at the time formally began when the Arab uprising movement, which is now referred to as the Arab Spring, reached Syrian territory and started the

Syrian Civil War in 2011. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took the increased instability and political tension in the region as an opportunity, and appointed ISI member Abu Mohammad al-Golani who had Syrian origins to establish a Syrian wing of Al-Qaeda in Syria (AQS) which adopted the name Al-Nusra Front (Hashim, 2018). The group started gaining momentum very early on as they were in an unconventional way fighting beside the masses in with the mutual objective to overthrow Bashar al-Assad’s regime, but instead of democracy they wanted to replace the regime with an Islamic State (Cafarella, 2018). Many of the members of Al-Nusra Front were released prisoners who were believers of the extremist-Salafist-jihadist ideology or sympathizers, Abu

Mohammad al-Golani tactically reached out to the Islamists who were released from the prisons operated by the Syrian government, one prison in particular was Saidnaya Prison (Cafarella,

2018).

15

The impetus for the declaration of an aligned Islamic state of Iraq and Syria was when the Syrian city of Raqqa was lost to opposition coalitions of the government, and Al-Nusra Front and ISI began moving their headquarters there (Hashim, 2018). Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi wanted to merge the two entities to create a united Islamic state, but Abu Mohammad al-Golani has other intentions and rejects the idea proposed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi by pledging his loyal allegiance to Al-Qaeda who were not supporters of declaring a Caliphate (Hashim, 2018). Abu

Bakr al-Baghdadi’s aspirations for the Islamic haven were achieved when ISIS conquered Raqqa and officially declared it as the capital city of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in 2014

(Mohamedou, 2018).

It is undisputable that origin of insurgency groups is not limited to historical struggles in domestic politics of Iraq and Syria, but also the concurrent foreign interference in the region which became more effectively visible following 2003 in Iraq and after 2011 in Syria. Countries such as Turkey, Iran, Russia, U.S., and the Gulf States have all impacted the configuration of the terrorism which exists today in various different ways by pursuing nothing but unstable relations with the countries (Çitlioğlu, 2020). Any country with weak national security inevitably becomes a sanctuary for illegal activity. The interference in the politics by these other actors vary from each country as well as the approach they have taken. Gaining political influence, weakening opposing political parties, for financial gain, among other considerations have all been a factor of interest for third parties to meddle in the conflicts.

16 Turkey’s relationship with Syria and Iraq has always been stringent since the fall of the Ottoman

Empire and the rise of nationalism in the two countries, which eventually spilled over to hostile relations following the rise of the Ba’ath and Kurdish nationalism on the Turkish border (Mark

Dohrmann & Robert Hatem, 2014). Until the turn of the 21st century the relations were stringent, and Turkey at one point began building dams for the Tigris and Euphrates rivers (Mark

Dohrmann & Robert Hatem, 2014). Later, the Syrian Ba’ath gave refuge to the Kurdish nationalists who have always been a security threat to the Turkish borders, and Turkey has been carrying out military operations on its border with northern Iraq since the 1970s against Kurdish separatists (Mark Dohrmann & Robert Hatem, 2014). The issue with Iraq has increased when the two countries have not seen eye-to-eye in regard to Kurdish recognition since Iraq has granted the population semi-autonomous power in the region, but Turkey yet refuses to acknowledge them as anything but insurgency groups (Soguk, 2015). The main Turkish issue is that it still partially sees Syria and Iraq as part of its own empire and sees growing instability in the countries as an opportunity to re-gain territorial control, especially of Al Bab and Mosul, which they believe is an inherent territorial right taken from them (Çitlioğlu, 2020) (Cantenar &

Kozera, 2021).

Iran shares a very large border with Iraq but yet has uncongenial relations with each other which began over the Shatt al-Arab river (El Azhary, 2012). With disregard to any treaty over the territorial dispute, the conflict escalated with the Shi’ite power that controlled Iran after the

Iranian Revolution and the discord with Iraq’s Sunni Ba’ath party leader—Saddam Hussein, and the conflict eventually developed into the eight-year Iran-Iraq War in 1980-1988 (El Azhary,

2012). Despite the fact that both Iraq and Syria were under Ba’athist rule at the time, Syria was

17 in support of Iran during the war. Unconventionally, Syria was also the first Arab state to recognize Khomeini’s government after the Iranian Revolution and saw it as an opportunity to strengthen their position against Israel (El Azhary, 2012). The relationship with Syria was also an opportunity for Iran to expand the Shi’ite Crescent to gain political influence all the way through to Lebanon were Hezbollah has a strong presence (Barzegar, 2008). This led to the creation of an alliance between the countries known as the Axis of Resistance (Mohseni&

Kalout, 2017). The alliances are solely strategic because destabilization by insurgency groups in

Iraq means that Iran will have greater opportunity to be dominant over their border, and the instability in Syria leads to Assad’s regime being more dependent on Iran’s support which would increase Iran’s political influence.

Russia’s relationship with Iraq and Syria is quite different as they have historically had closer ties to Syria and established a strong foundation in the country, while the relationship with Iraq has been more distant especially because of their close proximity to Iran and the U.S. influence in Iraq. Nevertheless, the relationship between the USSR and Iraq’s Ba’athist regime became quite cooperative from the 1970s until the turn of the century as Russia provided Iraq with military support as well as intelligence even when there were sanctions imposed on Iraq (Taylor,

2003). The focus of Russia, however, remains to keep close ties with Syria as there is both strong political and economic interest for them (Çitlioğlu, 2020). Syria has been one of Russia’s biggest weaponry exports and has a very large presence in the petroleum industry there, where various

Russian state-owned oil companies are working (Çitlioğlu, 2020). Instability in Syria would make the country’s government more dependent on Russia as an ally which would be favorable as the Russian on-ground presence would be neighbors with the U.S. presence in Iraq. It would

18 also mean that Syria requires more arms to be imported from Russia as well as the possibility of

Russia to increase their control over the petroleum in the country.

Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy toward Syria were positive ever since Hafez Assad came to power with the Ba’ath party in the 1970s, and in return Syria supported Saudi Arabia by joining the

U.S.-led international coalition for the liberation of Kuwait during the Gulf War (Berti &

Guzansky, 2014). Saudi Arabia remained supportive of Assad’s endeavors even through the

Syrian Civil war only disagreeing with the influence Syria has allowed Iran to have over the country (Berti & Guzansky, 2014). Similarly, so, Saudi Arabia had close relations with Iraq’s

Ba’ath party since the 1970s and were only strengthened after the Iranian revolution where both

Iraq and Saudi Arabia felt threatened by the Shi’ite regime coming to power (Takeyh, 2010).

Saudi Arabia even financially lent assistance to Iraq during the eight-year long Iran-Iraq War even though they claimed to remain politically neutral during the conflict (Takeyh, 2010). The relationship’s dynamic between the countries changed following Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait where Saudi Arabia took the actions of Iraq as a direct threat to Saudi Arabia’s security

(Halliday, 1991).

Saudi Arabia, like Qatar, is an ally of the U.S. and have refrained from putting too much political fuel into the fire of conflicts post-2000s in both Iraq and Syria (Brussels International

Center, 2017). However, Qatar’s relationship with Iraq and Syria has never been congenial.

Qatar’s resistance towards the countries first began in during the gulf war when they clearly positioned themselves in opposition to Iraq, and after that have openly been a destabilizing factor to both Iraq and Syria (Çitlioğlu, 2020). Even though Saudi Arabia and Qatar are both allies of

19 the U.S. they have both been accused of state-sponsored terrorism through financially aiding rebel groups and Islamic terrorists in Iraq and Syria since the beginning of the Syrian Civil war

(Çitlioğlu, 2020). While SA has denied the claims multiple times and has serious allegations against Qatar of the criminal activities they allegedly conducted, Qatar has remained as a central villain in destabilizing the countries (Brussels International Center, 2017).. The involvement of the Gulf States is advantageous in the sense that it would give them political gain which is why the Gulf States also approach their agendas with an individualistic approach instead of a bloc.

The Middle Eastern region, Iraq and Syria in particular, has never experienced even a swift period of peace and stability whether it has been geopolitical, regional security, or economic solidity. It was built on a rocky foundation and has since not ceased any opportunity to rebuild itself—even when the countries have there have been external factors such as foreign interference which has precluded them to be able to stand up with complete sovereignty. Both

Iraq and Syria’s economic and regional security has been dependent on foreign involvement. The

U.S. has definitely been the most prominent actor in the contemporary politics of the region and has very strong foreign policy directed towards Iraq and Syria. The case of U.S.’s role in the region will therefore be discussed separately in another chapter.

20 II. Regional Politics and Religious Extremism

Political repression is one of the greater issues that both Iraq and Syria were and are still facing.

Iraq’s current government formed post-2003 as well as Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian government since 2000 have faced multiple protests and actions of dissatisfaction from the population of both countries. Neither government has shown promising representation to all citizens of the country, which is why the internal political dynamic has always been precarious. There is a clear pattern that political repression and misrepresentation are two strong factors that promote insurgency and extremism in a nation. On the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by Transparency

International and the Global Freedom scores by the Freedom House, Iraq and Syria rank as two of the worst assessed countries. Iraq scores 21/100 on the CPI scale as a highly corrupt country, and similarly so Syria scores 14/100 on the CPI scale (Transparency International, 2021). On the

Global Freedom ranking, Iraq has been evaluated with a 29/100 score, with only 16/40 Political

Rights, and only 13/60 in Civil Liberties (Freedom House, 2021). Syria has been given an estimated 1/100 score in Global Freedom Ranking where their Political Rights are limited to -

3/40, and their Civil Liberties only at 4/60 (Freedom House, 2021).

The political landscape of Iraq is determined first and foremost by its demographics as it is ethnically and religiously diverse. The majority of Iraq’s population, consisting of 39 million people, are of Arab background and speak the Arabic language, and the second most spoken language is Kurdish whose Kurdish population are mainly situated in the north and northeastern part of Iraq (Vahid, 2015). The three predominant groups of people are Sunni Arabs, Shi’ite

Arabs, and the Kurds (Vahid, 2015). The majority of the population are Shi’ite Arabs. Political tension between these three groups have a long historical present and is still one of the biggest

21 issues today (Barkey &Laipson, 2005). The foundation of Iraq’s current government has been set up in a way to mainly divide the power between the three influential groups and prevent one from having too much authority over the others, which was the case of Saddam Hussein’s

Ba’athist dictatorship (Sassoon, 2012). With such domestic divisions inside a country, particularly in a fragile situation like the state Iraq is in, civil unrest should not be unexpected but rather anticipated—especially in the form of radical extremism to draw attention.

Syria is set up differently than is Iraq because of the al-Assad family who religiously belong to the Shi’ite sect of Alawites have been the authoritative government since 1971 (Sinkaya, 2020).

Alawites do not only not represent the majority of the 17 million people in Syria, but it is not even the largest sectarian group (Balanche, 2015). The rest of the country’s ethnic and religious demographic is composed of people who identify as Sunni, Shi’ite, Christians, and Kurds among other minorities (Balanche, 2015). The elitist dictatorship of current president Bashar al-Assad began to crack following the beginning of the Syrian Civil War in 2011 which was a part of the

Arab Spring uprisings (Balanche, 2015). The uprising began when protestors began to call for the removal of al-Assad from his position and reform the Syrian government (Corstange & York,

2018). The Ba’athist government had strong support from both Russia and Iran which is why

Bashar al-Assad remain somewhat stable in his position and is still the official head of the country (Çitlioğlu, 2020). There were quite a few factions inside of Syria who were part of the war and this is fundamentally what presented ISIS with the opportunity to build their own state and flowed over the border of Iraq (Carpenter, 2013). The war was domestically mainly fought by the Syrian government’s army, Turkey backed Syrian forces, the Kurdish Rojava SDF, and

ISIS apart from all the foreign involvement which later became belligerents of the conflict

22 (Carpenter, 2013). While the conflict in Syria remains more complex than ever, the war achieved nothing but more damage. The Syrian government is still the same a decade after the beginning of the war, but the difference is that the state of the country is in ruins.

Both in Iraq and in Syria, the overall population of the countries are composed of more than 50% being under the age of 25 years old (The World Factbook, 2021). With the severe economic crisis Iraq has been facing since the beginning of the war with ISIS and the economic repercussion of the war that Syria is facing, more than half the population is falling into a state of despondency due to the fact that there are no job opportunities or in some cases regions are lacking proper accessibility to education (Yousif, 2020) (Suliman & Khwanda, 2020). The prime generation of the countries who will be people with hope to rebuild the countries into better ones are having to deal with some of the toughest patch that Iraq and Syria are facing. The economic situation and the abundance of opportunity is not something that was generously presented to the population before the detrimental conflict, but the situation is only falling into a greater depression. The instability and the large amount of internally displaced persons (IDP) that are essentially relying on government’s aid or employment for their livelihood (Lichtenheld &

Schon, 2021) (Shanks, 2019). What is visible is that there is a pattern of less educated, traumatized, exhausted, and poverty-stricken generation who are intended to be one of the most crucial generations as they have to rebuild war torn countries back up.

The demographic trends and the lack of job opportunity for the youth in Iraq and Syria is a motive behind the rise of domestic terrorism as they see no other alternative (Adelaja & George,

2020). Without political representation or support from the existing governments, youth may

23 seek out to join a group where they feel as if they are heard and a community of belonging— which is what an organization such as ISIS provided. With the promise to dismantle the government, recognize the undemocratic and unjust system to lower class citizens, and promising a life in a state built on the basis of the Qur’an it becomes illusion which appeals to the majority demographic of a country (Mohamedou, 2018). Members of ISIS who travelled to settle down in the Islamic State were promised to be financially supported by their so-called state for their dedication to the organization and “jobs” they would fulfill to build the state (Homeland

Security Committee, 2016). Many members were youths who saw this as the light at the end of the poverty tunnel they were destined to live through. A greater opportunity and the chance to achieve something by serving their faith which otherwise seemed to be unattainable in their actual circumstances.

Religion itself is an integral factor in societies in the Middle East, despite whether the constitution defines the country as secular or religious, the matter of faith is present in all forms of administrations across the region (Lewis, 2010). In Iraq the state religion of Islam was established as the state religion, while in Syria even though the country is constitutionally defined as a secular state religion has been a structural issue (Fox & Sandler, 2005). After the decades of the al-Assad family’s governance who are part of the minority Alawite sect of Shi’ite

Muslim, the majority of Syrian’s did not feel represented by their government as this minority ruling house were favorable only to their small elite percentage (Sinkaya, 2020). This lack of representation shows a direct link to the rise of different sects and heads of communities domestically. Sectarianism of different groups evidently became clearer as the Syrian Civil War escalated—especially sympathizers of the Sunni majority of the country which is why the

24 uprisings against one government opened a pandora’s box of never-ending ethno-religious disputes (Balanche, 2018). There are many religious leaders, especially Islamic ones of different sects, who are constantly involved in domestic politics of both Iraq and Syria as representatives of their groups of people (Balanche, 2018). The words of religious authority go beyond those of politicians which is why they have superiority in the political affairs in the region, and this proves how a persona such as Abu Bakr al Baghdadi can manipulate substantial masses of people to betray their nationalities and trust him to rebuild a new one.

ISIS used the influence of religion in the region to their advantage for the recruitment process and building a large number of sympathizers. The main approach which ISIS used was to promote religion and their propaganda through various media (Nacey & Bogatinov, 2018).

Islamic radicalization through the approach that the organization was taking is a conversion phenomenon which has not been seen in any contemporary political propaganda before. One of the main methods used was by completing the methods of a recruiting manual called “A Course in the Art of Recruiting” written by Abu Amr Al Qaidi (Warius & Fishman, 2009). The manual is meant for people who are willing to perform one of their duties called a da’wa which is to individually recruit or convert someone to their faith (Warius & Fishman, 2009). By using these methods ISIS members have taken upon themselves to completely brainwash sympathizers and non-believers to strong followers of their ideology. Some of the recommendations for a successful recruitment process is for the recruiter to stay in close personal contact with the target, to approach non-religious individuals, people who are young and in isolating situations such as students and beginning the approach through subtle explanation of the religion of Islam and

25 gradually develop the conversations to the jihadist ideology, so it does not scare the target away

(Warius & Fishman, 2009).

ISIS used tactics such as social media because it allows them to have a wider range of communication with a larger audience which would not have been possible at the same magnitude where they to approach people any other way (Denning, 2010). ISIS is aware of the significance of the usage of media in their mission which is why they have a dedicated wing called Al Hayat Media whose priority is to work the tactics, which they escalated it by creating an app which was free for download to be able to have direct contact and be given updates straight from their center (Awan, 2017). Through their platforms, one of their most effective tools has been to release videos of different types. Most videos are of them spreading the message of ISIS ideology with the ambition of recruiting international audience to their mission by talking in various languages (Irshaid, 2014), and some other videos are propaganda to depict their world in a different light by having ISIS members distribute sweets to children and visiting injured members in the hospital (Lucas, 2014). In other cases, there have been violent pictures of beheadings on Twitter along with using language to portray an illusion of being great and undefeatable (Klausen, 2015) (Awan, 2017).

The main tools used for propaganda, recruitment drivers, and other types of engagement were through videos, images, chatrooms, websites, and use of social media (Awan, 2017). The main focus was on two social media websites which were Facebook and Twitter, because they are consistent social media platform which people use often and is a tool people use to keep up with news and can stay connected and interactive through liking and commenting on posts, and the

26 national background of some of the offenders were not only operating from the region in which

ISIS has claimed borders but also in countries such as United Kingdom, United States, Australia,

Pakistan, Indonesia, Egypt, Germany, Canada, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and among others (Awan,

2017).

27 III. U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Iraq and Syria

The U.S. has often, through its foreign policy history, been accused of supporting oppressive regimes in one way or another. Whether it has been militarily, by providing weaponry, financial aid, or pursuing economic deals. There have been various wars where U.S. sales of weapons to autocratic regimes who use them against their citizens have been uncovered, which was the case during the Iran-Iraq war between 1980-1988 (Friedman, 1993). The U.S. provided billions of

USD worth of support to Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist dictatorship through various channels like providing top-tier intelligence, military training, weaponry, and other forms of support against

Iran (Friedman, 1993). The issue at this time was that the U.S. directly played a role in strengthening Saddam’s regime who were at the time domestically campaigning a genocide against the Kurdish population in Northern Iraq, and indirectly trained them for the invasion of

Kuwait in 1990 only two years after the end of the Iran-Iraq war (Adib-Moghaddam, 2006).

There is a similar pattern which is visible with Syria following 2013 in which the U.S. when a

C.I.A covert action program contributed more than a billion USD to Syrian rebel groups to fight against the Assad Regime (Mazzetti, Goldman, & Schmidt, 2017). Apart from supporting oppressive regimes in the past, sending support to non-governmental military rebel groups can be just as problematic when sending deadly weaponry and other reinforcements unattended as it would be difficult to predict what purpose the weapons would be used for and the certainty of their future is unknown. Once the financial aid and the weaponry has entered the country, the calculations must consider that it will be there to stay. In case of the defeat of the rebel groups, the reinforcements may just as well end up with the government of Syria or a more threatening insurgent group such as ISIS. This would become a worst-case scenario as the weaponry could

28 be used against the same country which provided it in the first place, which in this case would be the U.S.

The U.S. interest in Iraq and Syria has been an individualistic approach for increasing their political domination in the Middle East without regard to the future of either country (Modigs,

2003). One of the biggest issues that came along with the U.S. military interference is that it was a short-sighted plan without considering the future foreseeable repercussions of what it would mean to retract their forces as well. The U.S. position in Iraq has given them immense leverage over their long-time adversaries Iran and Russia (who is a close ally of Syria) (Connable,

Campbell & Madden, 2016). During the Iran-Iraq war, even though Iraq was being reinforced and strengthened by the aid of the U.S. it was still coming from an individualistic agenda which was to weaken Iraq—It would only be fair to call Iraq a proxy of the U.S. in its simplest form

(Friedman, 1993).

For the U.S. to stay and set base in Iraq through their multiple military bases, by being a very present factor for the demise of the Ba’ath regime, being the commanders of the Coalition

Provisional Authority which was the transitional government in Iraq, as well as the board of the

Coalition Provisional Authority electing members to draft the current Iraqi constitution shows the importance of the U.S. in modern Iraqi politics and the dependency of Iraq on the U.S. for stability (Rayburn, 2014). The current democratic federal government of Iraq has never been self-governing or fully sovereign away from U.S., which inherently makes it close to impossible for the U.S. to retract itself from Iraq at this point without foreseeable chaos in the country as well as the threat of Iran becoming a dominating political power in Iraq’s domestic politics

29 (Rayburn, 2014). Iran’s influence is currently only restrained due to the U.S. presence, and once the presence is gone the power will sway over from Tehran through Iraq also strengthening a visible presence in Syria as well (Connable, 2020). The only disadvantage Iran has with

Hezbollah in Syria and Lebanon as of now is that there is not a direct bridge from Iran through

Iraq to them without the threat of the U.S, but without the U.S. presence that disadvantage will no longer be an issue of concern (Connable, 2020).

The presence of Russia in Syria has also been a cause for U.S. being in Iraq as the situation has turned into a new quasi-cold war between the east and the west repeating itself. The retraction of the U.S. from Iraq would give Russia more leverage to expand their political strategy across the

Middle East, and the situation seems to have escalated into a rivalry between the two superpowers above everything else (Connable, 2020). The U.S. foreign policy operates in a “The enemy of my enemy is my friend” strategy when forming alliances. It is apparent that that this was the only reason for alliance with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, and it is also more recently the case for the alliance with Saudi Arabia for instance (Friedman, 1993). The relationship the

U.S. has with Israel has strained the possibility for the U.S. to be able to create unconditional bilateral relations, so these relationships such as the one with Saudi Arabia are only alliances for convenience (Cohen-Almagor, 2018). Even though Saudi Arabi is considered to be a close ally to the U.S., the tensions and indifference are certainly also there from the Saudi Arabian side as there has been various documentation of indirect Saudi Arabian support for ISIS through various channels even though this clearly opposes the benefit of the U.S (Cohen-Almagor, 2018).

30 One of the greatest weaknesses the western powers have is that they continuously undermine the complexity of Middle Eastern geopolitics and domestic affairs when analyzing the apparatus as well as the political personalities. They underestimated Saddam Hussein when arming him during the Iran-Iraq War and did the same when they were somewhat unconcerned of Bashar al

Assad’s accession as Syria’s new ruler in year 2000 (Friedman, 1993) (Polk, 2013). The rationale for having an apathetic attitude toward the former Ba’athist dictator’s, Hafez as-Assad, son was because of his education at medical school and integration into western society when he moved to the United Kingdom to continue his postgraduate education as an ophthalmologist

(Rafizadeh, 2013). His wife, Asma al-Assad, is also a highly educated woman who was raised in the United Kingdom and graduated from King’s Collage London (Von Der Stein, 2013). What was seemingly a young and enlightened family man who would access the presidential position in Syria became one of the worst ordeals the Middle East would suffer (Rafizadeh, 2013). The west put a lot trust in the president, as did the British, when it came to reforming the Ba’athist

Syrian state as it had been since the 1970s (Makovsky, 2001). Bashar al-Assad had somewhat congenial relations with both the French and British as he has attended state visits in the countries until the beginning of the Syrian Civil War in 2011 (Hinnebusch, 2008) (Gambill,

2003).

This is a repetitive pattern which can also be recognized with the similar cases with Mubarak in

Egypt and Salman in Saudi Arabia (Hassan, 2015). Undermining the situations have always soon after fired back in opposition to the U.S. in future sociopolitical endeavors. For instance, the caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was imprisoned by the U.S. after being arrested in Fallujah, Iraq in

2004 and was later released as a low-risk prisoner after being reviewed by the release board

31 (Eaton, 2016). Camp Bucca in Southern Iraq has housed thousands of Iraqi inmates following the

2003 invasion, and at one-point Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was detained at that very prison (Arango,

& Schmitt, 2014). Had there been understanding of his position within the Salafi-Jihadist community and the fabrication of the new anti-American extremist jihadist movement that was becoming more popular in the region, the extent to where these prisoners would later achieve could have been hindered. The release of thousands of other extremists who were detained in

U.S. camps in Iraq that would later join insurgency groups is one of the biggest ramifications of the military intervention in Iraq (Arango, & Schmitt, 2014). The framework agreement between

Iraq and the U.S. was that the U.S. would detract all its troops from Iraqi soil by the end of 2011, which would also mean that the U.S. held prisoners would be released if they were not detained under Iraqi arrest warrants (Mason, 2009). The situation created a menacing political vacuum in the region.

Iraq’s dependency on the U.S. for internal and external security through its military reinforcements which have been present since the birth of the modern Republic of Iraq is what the country’s moderate stability is contingent on. The U.S. did not follow through with the original strategic framework which was the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement to retract all its troops in 2011, but if they did the country could possibly disintegrate into chaos and anarchy— now more so than before the emergence of ISIS (Sowell, 2019). The origination of the Caliphate demonstrated how conditional Iraq’s security is on American fortification to retain its sovereignty. A three-state Iraq is a de facto reality with the Sunni-Shi’ite-Kurdish territory which could recklessly develop into becoming three autonomous regions (Kirmanc, 2013). The division of the country and the instability it would bring to the region will create a more comfortable

32 haven for initiating insurgency as there would even be domestic greed for separation within the three-state “solution”. The governorates of Nineveh, Kirkuk, and Basra will persistently become reason for conflict due to the territorial dispute which even currently exists on the regions

(Frantzman, 2016) (Hanauer & Miller, 2012) (Askari, 2013). While the U.S. presence is greatly opposed by Iraqi nationalists, it has been the glue for stability and protection at the same time.

One plausible solution for reducing American presence in Iraq and decreasing its assertive foreign policy for the future is by creating a transitional replacement of the on-ground troops then slowly detracting them as well. Introducing a United Nations peacekeeping mission would be a feasible solution by having them begin to take over U.S. military troops positions and replace them with blue helmets. The role of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Iraq in this case would then be directed at protecting civilians and counteracting the possibility for geopolitical disintegration. There are various complications coming forward as this idea may be presented as well, the question would firstly be how the public would accept the shift in military intervention as the blue helmets would also bring in foreign militia. Following the public issue would be the perception of Iraq’s neighboring countries and other external threats toward the evident weakening of military capability from within the country as it would unquestionably become more vulnerable. Lastly the risk during the transfer of power and handing over the responsibility to United Nations peacekeepers when their capability of being successful in the role is uncertain. The uncertainty comes from controversial record peacekeeping missions have had in the past such as the failures in Somalia between 1992-1995, Rwanda in 1994, and

Srebrenica in 1995 due to their limitations as an intergovernmental organization (Peter, 2015).

33 IV. The War Against ISIS

The war against ISIS has been a global battle which called for armed intervention to both Iraqi and Syrian soil. While there is a long history of dispute over the legitimacy of armed intervention by foreign military forces in the region, the intervention to assist the belligerents fighting against

ISIS can be justified under jus ad bellum criteria. When the concept of war, in general, is divided into three different categories consisting of national self-defense, collective self-defense, and humanitarian intervention it can be concluded that the case of the war against ISIS can be justified under all three (Tesón, 2016). The grounds which make intervention in these three categories to fall under the notion of jus ad bellum is that the objective is to protect people and civilians from the aggressor, which in this case was from the horrendous systematic crimes committed by ISIS during the war. The spread of ISIS increasingly expanded geographically following the official declaration of Raqqa as the capital of the Caliphate in the beginning of

2014 and began a substantial operation from their hub in which they were eventually successful in occupying highly populated key cities both in Iraq and Syria (Mohamedou, 2018).

The Islamic State was thriving at its peak between the beginning of 2014 up until the end of 2015 when they almost had full territorial control over Raqqa, Aleppo, and Idlib in Syria as well as the city of Kobani whose majority population is of Kurdish ethnic background (Wilson Center,

2019). Significant cities in Iraq which were at one-point part of the Caliphate includes Iraq’s second largest city Mosul and stretched control over to Fallujah, Tikrit, Hawija, and Sinjar which was home to the minority Yezidi population who fell victim to genocide committed by ISIS

(Wilson Center, 2019). The brutal and impetuous shift in the region’s geopolitical lay out increased tension and an unpredictable future of the lengths the Caliphate would be able to

34 expand to. There were threats and multiple terrorist attacks projected at the west including the

U.S., Belgium, and France (Tesón, 2016). The widespread defeat the organization were able to attain under the rule of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi was unprecedented to say the least, and it was obvious that the local forced in Iraq were unable to secure the battle against ISIS alone and therefore to accept foreign intervention on national soil was unquestionably the necessary direction to take and to deal with the consequences which could follow the decision after the war.

The establishment of the U.S. led global coalition to defeat ISIS completely changed the trajectory of war. The strengthening of the coalition which in its foundation was established in cooperation with the Kurdish Peshmerga and the creation of the SDF as the main belligerent allies to conquer the Caliphate has set a new caliber for the extent of how experimental modern warfare can be characterized as (International Crisis Group, 2019). Unlike preceding warfare where foreign countries have intervened in war to defeat insurgency, the cost of this war in comparison to the scale of it could have been considerably less. Based on research, there is lack of any official document which specifically calculates of the cost of the war against ISIS in Iraq and Syria between 2014-present is yet to be published by the U.S. government. However, the utilization of training local troops and the use of on-ground forces to increase armed forces in numbers meant that the need to deploy external soldiers were significantly less than preceding wars (International Crisis Group, 2019). The efforts were instead projected at deploying teams of special forces to train the on ground local fighters, and the capital which may have otherwise been spent on deployment was instead spent on increased ammunition and intelligence to

35 strengthen the coalition. The reliance on each other’s assets and advantages within the coalition strengthened the will for cooperation to successfully defeat the Caliphate.

There were some focal events which became the turning point of the path ISIS were initially ascending in. Defeating ISIS in the city of Kobani whose people had suffered tremendous civilian loss and been left with a city in ruins was the beginning of victory and hope against the terrorist organization, and conquering the insurgent group in Kobani is a symbolic step in the timeline of the rise and fall of ISIS (Wilson Center, 2019). At the Caliphate’s peak when the organization were most resilient, they seemed to be invincible and impossible to penetrate the territory ISIS was claiming. In January of 2015, after a four-month long campaign to recapture

Kobani under ISIS control the military operation was successful with the help of the U.S and the coalition (Wilson Center, 2019). This was the first step toward recouping territory and was a promising step to fall back into the geopolitical outline which was there before ISIS. This also validated the potential of the coalition in this exceptional contemporary warfare.

After a great triumph in Syria, there was still a long way to go with the ongoing battle. The next largest turning point, which considerably weakened ISIS position and the domination of the

Caliphate, was the liberation of Mosul in Iraq (Wilson Center, 2019). At its peak, there was a point where the Islamic State was controlling a third of Syria and close to half of Iraqi territory

(Wilson Center, 2019). Mosul was the most populated territory which they had occupied, and while much of the military and residents had fled the territory there were still more than half a million people who were forcibly living under the Islamic State (Wilson Center, 2019). Seizing

Mosul was victorious not only because of the control over the inhabitants, but also the

36 availability of resources and the advanced infrastructure which was now at their disposal. Over the first three months of 2017, the Iraqi forces, Kurdish Peshmerga, and the coalition are successful in securing most parts of the city and become the most present force in Mosul (Wilson

Center, 2019). The Iraqi Prime Minister, Haider al Abadi, declared victory over ISIS in Mosul in

July 2017 (Wilson Center, 2019). Losing such vast territory very shortly after their rapid prosperity only symbolized the weakness and the unsustainability of the Caliphate.

The loss of Raqqa, the true nucleus of the Islamic State, was the final large hit to diminish the stability of the Caliphate in regard to its territorial fortune. The global effort to launch a military campaign to liberate Raqqa took four months until October of 2017 when the U.S. backed SDF forces announced that they secured Raqqa from the Islamic State (Wilson Center, 2019). This was a magnificent step and where the Caliphate truly fell into rumbles. While Raqqa was still under the control of ISIS the operations were administered from the center of the Caliphate with high level unforeseen intelligence (International Crisis Group, 2019). Once the heart of their operations was no longer under their control, it is when there was a prominent shift in the strategy ISIS was operating by toward global domination. Having operated at a state-level position was no longer the case, and the demise of ISIS can clearly be analyzed once they began operating as an insurgency group again. Carrying out attacks not only in their own territory, but smaller and less substantial devastations scattered across various regions as a defense mechanism. There are cases of suspected ISIS members attempting to carry out attacks in the

Philippines, Morocco, Honduras, Nigeria and Indonesia among other locations (Wilson Center,

2019). The Islamic State claimed responsibility for 92 attacks in eight different countries beginning after their loss of Raqqa (Wilson Center, 2019).

37

The ISIS’s foundation was based on the ideology and belief in Salafi-Jihadist interpretation of

Islam (Mohamedou, 2018). While the followers and members may be devoted to the ideology, the first caliph of ISIS was an admirable symbolic figure for followers of the movement. Abu

Bakr al Baghdadi’s role as the caliph should not be undermined, and it could be assumed that has the caliph been another persona the direction of ISIS could have somewhat taken a different shape. Once the territorial control of the Caliphate declined, the central leaders of the movement were in hiding (Wilson Center, 2019). The operation to eliminate Abu Bakr al Baghdadi was successfully accomplished with the Joint Special Operations Command who were able to shadow his location through air raid. The initial death of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi was due to an explosion with his own suicide vest, in which he killed two of his children who were there with him in hiding in the city of Idlib, Syria (Macario,2019). The death of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi in October

2019 is what can be considered as the primary event which led to the demise of ISIS as it was known. Even though the position of the Caliph was quickly replaced with Abu Ibrahim al-

Hashimi al-Qurashi, ISIS has yet to revive back to its secure position (Callimachi & Schmitt,

2019).

The declaration of the defeat against ISIS is problematic and there needs to be strong emphasis made on the fact that this were not simply a one-man-show of the Caliph. The territory which was secured back to Iraq and Syria could easily be lost again the same as the first time around.

The loss of the leader significantly weakened the organization, but it did not bring it to its demise. While the U.S., the coalition, and the local forces in Iraq and Syria have more experience—so does the organization. The ISIS sleeper cells, camps, prisoners, along with

38 sympathizers globally are still a colossal threat to global peace and security which is essential not to be ignored. The most difficult factor of the war against ISIS was not the initial war itself, but the aftermath of the conflict and being able to avert resurgence. A successful campaign against a terrorist movement does not defeat terrorism itself, therefore it can be safe to say that ISIS, while relatively silent since 2019 to 2021 is still a threat to resurrect again as a highly experienced insurgency group. At this stage, it is crucial that there is a global effort which is aimed at working toward rehabilitation of the remainder detained former members and to strategize a gamer plan for a future reemergence.

39 V. The Status of Declaration of the Caliphate

There is no concrete checklist for the criteria for statehood to be eligible for the right to sovereignty under international law. There has been various treaties and conventions in attempt to define the concept of what makes a territory a state and the responsibility that comes with it such as the Peace of Westphalia (1648), Montevideo Convention (1933), and the Declaration on

Rights and Duties of States (1949) for instance. However, the reality is that the origin of states and their political positions are not all the same but instead the issue is too complex and multidimensional in each individual case where the conventions and international law can only measure as vague guidelines until proven otherwise. The right of ISIS in accordance with international law to declare the Caliphate as a state is a rather controversial issue considering the immense threat they have constituted to the international community and the immeasurable human rights violations they have committed.

The United Nations Security Council stated as part of UNSC Resolution 2249 (2015) adopted on its at its 7565th meeting that:

“Determining that, by its violent extremist ideology, its terrorist acts, its continued gross

systematic and widespread attacks directed against civilians, abuses of human rights and

violations of international humanitarian law, including those driven on religious or ethnic

ground, its eradication of cultural heritage and trafficking of cultural property, but also its

control over significant parts and natural resources across Iraq and Syria and its

recruitment and training of foreign terrorist fighters whose threat affects all regions and

Member States, even those far from conflict zones, the Islamic State in Iraq and the

40 Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh), constitutes a global and unprecedented threat to

international peace and security,” (UN Security Council, 2015).

The state-like features of the Caliphate which have been achieved by ISIS has in some ways projected the Islamic State as a de facto-nation even if they did not hold de jure status

(Danckwardt, 2016). For one, the international community including the United Nations Security

Council have handed them the recognition as a state since they do refer to the Caliphate as the

Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (Tomuschat, 2015). Many would define the concept of statehood being composed of four essential components which includes territory, population, authority and sovereignty—all of which ISIS possesses except for the last component (Jubenkanda, 2016).

However, it would be inherently difficult for ISIS to have a place within the international community as they have no adherence to basic international law or human rights as they have violated almost all components of International Law which are required by states to respect as part of their responsibility.

Apart from breaching international law, the foundation of ISIS is violating multiple articles of the Iraqi constitution including Article 7 Section 1: “Any entity or program that adopts, incites, facilitates, glorifies, promotes, or justifies racism or terrorism or accusations of being an infidel

(takfir) or ethnic cleansing, especially the Saddamist Ba’ath in Iraq and its symbols, under any name whatsoever, shall be prohibited. Such entities may not be part of political pluralism in Iraq.

This shall be regulated by law”, along with Article 23 Section 3: “Ownership of property for the purposes of demographic change is prohibited” and Article 29 Section 4: “All forms of violence

41 and abuse in the family, school, and society shall be prohibited” among other articles

(Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005).

The case of Kosovo’s secession in 2008 and their journey toward self-determination can arguably be said to have established an effective precedent for separatist movements’ including the case of ISIS. There are various justifications which both argue for and against whether or not the case of Kosovo should be considered to have established a new possibility which minority groups can refer to when seeking self-determination or whether each situation is simply a sui generis case where precedents cannot justify their circumstances (Ker-Lindsay, 2013). To reference Kosovo as a precedent can essentially be dangerous as it could encourage other minority groups to seek independence, however, the case itself is exceptional. There are various controversial cases like the one of Kurds of Iraq, Turkish Cypriots, or Tamils of Sri Lanka who have yet to become sovereign, but if they did so by using Kosovo as a precedent the question of why the Caliphate cannot similarly be recognized as a sovereign state would arise (Ker-Lindsay,

2013).

What could separate the argument of self-determination of ISIS from the case of Kosovo is that the core issue with the partition of Kosovo had its roots in ethnic conflict instead of the separation being based solely on religious indifference (Bhaumik, 2006). The Islamic State’s whole population do not necessarily call their occupied territory their home, but many members who have joined and strive for the establishment of the Islamic State have relocated to the territory (Hashim, 2018). Additionally, citizens of Kosovo formerly experienced a wide range of war crimes and crimes against humanity as victims of Serbia during the Kosovo War (Freedman,

42 2000). In the case of ISIS, while they may be separatists, they are not minority victims but are instead perpetrators of bringing harm upon other minorities and those who do not follow their belief of righteousness (Mohamedou, 2018). These factors make it inherently difficult for the same states who were for the separation of Kosovo to be able to similarly sympathize with the secession of the Caliphate from Iraq and Syria. Provided that they had prevailed, even with their forceful military efforts, as a non-religious and secular insurgency group with a political agenda instead of it being faith based then the narrative, especially from the west, could have been different.

While the Caliphate falls short on their rights to declare statehood, their economic model has generated more income than most countries. The financial infrastructure of ISIS was one of the biggest perplexities in the beginning of the rise of the Islamic State because of the way that they were displaying their massive expenditures and commodities they had, the international community began questioning whether or not there was a greater force funding the organization.

The wealth of the organization was unexpected the same way the economic abilities of a non- state actor at their magnitude were unprecedented (Homeland Security Committee, 2016). There were various ways in which ISIS were self-funding through different methods. Imposing total sanctions and embargos on the organization could not limit the skillfully strategized monetary schemes which they carried out. Some of the methods were because they were strategically located and lucky that they had been able to take control over natural gas and oil fields and pipelines in Iraq and Syria which opened up the opportunity for them to exploit the natural resources in the largest black market for oil and gas (Homeland Security Committee, 2016).

43 The natural resources would be smuggled to sellers through Syria, Turkey, and Iraq through particular smuggling routes through trucks (Homeland Security Committee, 2016). There was a lot of suspicion that Bashar al-Assad’s government were directly dealing with ISIS for oil deals and coming to agreement to exchange natural resources in return for oil in regions such as Deir ez-Zor (Homeland Security Committee, 2016). It is suspected that at one point the organization was receiving up to $4 million in revenue per day only from their oil deals (Homeland Security

Committee, 2016). Apart from natural resources, the organization also began to gather historical artifacts of Syria and Iraq such as cuneiforms, manuscripts, walls, and statues in the black markets (Homeland Security Committee, 2016). UNESCO protected sites with valuable relics were destroyed and torn apart, and it is estimated that ISIS were able to receive around $100 million for conducting these endeavors (Homeland Security Committee, 2016).

Other forms of reliable monetary generators which builds up ISIS’s financial infrastructure includes kidnapping and human trafficking. For a terrorist organization to demand ransom was not a new occurrence which arose with ISIS but has been a common practice with groups such as

Al-Qaeda and smaller insurgencies beginning in Iraq around 2004 (Al-Marashi, 2004). It is estimated that ISIS has collected millions of USD in ransom demands, where they would put a price tag over a $1 million for a western hostage, and between $500 and $200,000 for local hostages (Homeland Security Committee, 2016). Paying ransom to ISIS to free hostages was frowned upon by the international community as it would encourage more kidnappings and collecting more capital, but yet there were many attempts to free hostages by their national countries (Homeland Security Committee, 2016). Another commerce which had its own market inside the Islamic state was the huge human trafficking and sex slave markets where kidnapped

44 girls of all ages were put display to be traded (Besenyö, 2017). Young girls between the ages of 1 to 20 would be sold for less than $200, and those over the age of 20 had a price tag of less than

$100 (Besenyö, 2017). There have also been various reports conducted by the state department which leads traces of financial aid to ISIS to some of the Gulf Countries such as Saudi Arabia,

Qatar, and Kuwait through donations and illicit business deals (Homeland Security Committee,

2016).

Looking at the Caliphate and statehood through the lens of a classical realism opens up a new outlook on the complexity and multidimensional paradigm which emerged with ISIS. Analyzing the circumstances of the Islamic State through realism establishes the most understanding to their approach to power politics. Political realists conclude that the most important actor in the political sphere is the state, and the state is focused on two main factors which is power and their national interest above all else. The Leviathan, written by Thomas Hobbes, can explain the political structure which ISIS adopted which is that in order for a state to be successful they only require to have one ruler (or one Leviathan) to achieve inner peace and harmony, where in this case Abu Bakr al Baghdadi took the role of the Leviathan in the Caliphate as he was announced as the first caliph of ISIS (Hobbes, 1968) (Mohamedou, 2018).

The classical realist theorist Hans Morgenthau (1948) theorized realism by establishing six main principles which he believes the paradigm is set on (Morgenthau, 1948). The first principle is that states are required to set forth laws for the people which are understood and able to be followed, where in the case of the Islamic State the laws established were based on Sharia Law derived from the Quran which definitely aligns with the faith and understanding of the people.

45 The second principle emphasized the importance of connecting national interest with a power dynamic, where the Caliphate’s interest was in its origin to expand their territory across the

Levant to gain more political power and leverage. The third principle explains that the concept of national interest is an objective goal which is not affected by time or place, which in the case of

ISIS was that the objective was to establish a region to live with pure Salafist-jihadist beliefs and invoke fear on to those who were unwilling to do so. Morgenthau explains in his fourth principle that international moral principles cannot be a one-fits all system applied to every state but has to be rather flexible to suit the certain place and time, in which the Islamic State were convinced that the laws of Islam and the way of life of the Caliphate were the most adept to the political landscape of Iraq and Syria at the time considering that their extremist behavior was the approach taken by the state. (Morgenthau, 1948)

The fifth principle of Hans Morgenthau states that a state’s moral objectives are not comparable to a set of international moral laws to govern the whole world where in the case of ISIS they have proven to completely disregard any form international law or moral code in their reality.

Morgenthau’s last point emphasizes that while politicians must adhere to law and ethics in reality their political compass comes before all else, in which there was an obvious oversight of law and ethics in the position of establishing the Caliphate but were instead focused on projecting the position of their political compass. Analyzing the standpoint of the Caliphate’s position on statehood and the meaning of power gives insight on the pattern of the objectives and evolvement of their illustrated state but at the same time brings out a new lens of being able to look at a non-state actor through classical realism whose focal point revolves around statehood.

Nevertheless, ISIS has created a grey space for new paradigms in international relations to be

46 developed as no paradigm of political science can explain the framework of ISIS—the territory of the case of ISIS is a phenomenon with a theory of its own. (Morgenthau, 1948)

47 VI. The Humanitarian Crisis Following the Demise of ISIS

Aside from the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by ISIS, there has been a dreadful humanitarian crisis which inevitably occurred as a result of the war. Millions of civilians have had to flee their homes after seeing their cities and villages fall into rumbles. The war has caused a great demographic change in both Iraq and Syria, as well as the countries which have accommodated refugees. Apart from the issue regarding IDPs, the sustainability of maintaining refugee camps and capability of the temporary role of the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is of great concern. Looking at the situation from a contrasting perspective, the more compelling issue is the unresolved issue of the ISIS camps housing thousands of former members of the Caliphate who are not being repatriated back to their countries and have become a burden on the already debilitated region. Questions surrounding the imprisonment and trials of ISIS members also arise including the necessity for ad hoc tribunals. The global efforts of the coalition to combat the terrorist organization proved to be successful, so it is without a doubt that the aftermath requires an equivalent exertion to rebuild the devastations that followed the conflict.

The current crisis for IDPs in Iraq began early in 2014 alongside the hostilities operated by ISIS.

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Iraq where the number of

IDPs and returnees have been documented since April 2014 to February 2021, it can be assessed that the number of returnees is currently higher than IDPs (International Organization for

Migration, 2021). At its peak, the number of IDPs registered in a month inside Iraq reached

3,343,776 people in February 2016 and is down to 1,205,767 by February 2021 (International

Organization for Migration, 2021). The first time the number of returnees were documented by

48 IOM in Iraq was in April 2015 which is also the lowest number at 116,850 people (International

Organization for Migration, 2021). The number of returnees in February 2021 is documented at

4,851,816 people (International Organization for Migration, 2021). These numbers demonstrate that the future for these people could be optimistic with the right facilitations and assistance.

Similarly, in Syria, the large figures of IDPs began by the end of 2013 and beginning of 2014

(International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2020). The data found for the IDP situation is

Syria is less reliable than that found for Iraq and the dependable statistics found have gathered information until the year 2019. Finding accurate numbers of returnees in Syria was unattainable as the data available were published via unreliable or unknown sources. Comparatively to Iraq,

Syria additionally had a higher number of refugees leaving the country relative to the number of

IDPs. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) The number of IDPs in Syria were as high as 7,600,000 people in 2014 and was still at a significantly high number in

2019 with 6,450,000 people (International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2020). While the date shows that the number of new displacements inside the country have notably become less, the situation of IDPs in Syria is currently the world’s largest displacement crisis as of 2019

(International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2020).

The European refugee crisis reached its critical phase in 2015 when many populated regions in

Syria had become catastrophic war zones or fallen under the Caliphate’s territory (Heisbourg,

2015). The large influx of refugees migrating to Europe through the Mediterranean Sea flooded

European countries with a line of trouble (Heisbourg, 2015). One of the biggest challenges were the economic models of the countries and their capability to provide shelter and for the state to

49 financially sustain the sudden large number of people flowing in (United Nations, 2020). The state’s ability to allocate resources toward arranging new plans and strategies to integrate the population also took a strain on the governments (United Nations, 2020). There were over a million arrivals of refugees seeking asylum only in 2015, and the number of the total arrival of refugees in Europe between 2015 and the end of 2019 is close to two million people (Bierbach,

2019). The largest percentage of the immigrants came from Syria and the influx has decreased significantly each year since 2015 as ISIS territorial control also diminished (Bierbach, 2019).

The questions regarding the security issue comes right after as many of the refugees were undocumented and male, the possibility that some of these asylum seekers were former or even active members of ISIS could go undetected. The public opinion in many of the countries who accepted refugees were polarizing and there was an ambivalent attitude to whether or not the stay for the refugees should be temporary or if there should be instant guidance provided for them to integrate faster into the new cultures (United Nations, 2020).

Many of the asylum seekers who had fled ISIS crossed to Europe illegally through the sea route which was with boats through the Mediterranean Sea (UNHCR, 2015). Greece and Italy took the burden to become a transit station as many of the boats coming in illegally, if not sunken, would bring their journey to an end mainly at the coast of these two countries which had become a transit zone (Heisbourg, 2015). Because the main reason for the migration was because the people were fleeing war and conflict, even though illegal, their refugee status would be protected under international law. This truly became a crisis not only for the receiving countries but also for the high death toll which came as a result of the boats loading people above its capacity and taking dangerous routs to avoid detection which became a more deadly journey for some than the

50 war zone they were fleeing. It has been estimated that there have been more than 20,000 deaths in the Mediterranean Sea as a direct consequence of boats not making it to their intended destination—this created a new crisis within the humanitarian crisis that were already overwhelming (ANSA, 2020).

Syria is currently facing one of the most peculiar and difficult situations with the circumstances of the displacement camps which are housing thousands of former ISIS members, majority of which are children and the rest mostly women, under rough circumstances (Oehlerich, 2020). Al

Hol camp has become one of the greatest concerns of how to address the aftermath of the war and the fear of ISIS resurgence. The settlement which was a displacement camp to begin with has evolved into an illegal quasi-prison for accomplices of ISIS with horrendous living conditions (Oehlerich, 2020). There are two positions when analyzing the crisis of Al Hol. The first one is from the perspective is considering the danger of ISIS resurrecting stronger from inside the camp considering that there have not been any programs or intention to rehabilitate the current residents. Most of the foreign women inside Al Hol have had their citizenships revoked which means they no longer have a place to go home to, and the children born inside of the caliphate are still undocumented and do not carry citizenship of any country (Oehlerich, 2020).

Al Hol’s population has surpassed its capacity at 80,000 residents and is growing a new generation of being raised surrounded by Salafi-jihadist ideology and no proper access to education or healthcare (Oehlerich, 2020) (De Azevedo, 2020). The second perspective is the issue of the imprisonment of women and children without a fair trial or factual ground to be detained (De Azevedo, 2020). The camp is guarded by SDF surrounding fence and control what goes in and out the camp. Human rights organizations have shown concern over the fact that this

51 detainment is unlawful, and the living conditions fall under human rights violations (Human

Rights Watch, 2021). The overall situation is problematic and needs to be resolved sooner than later.

The prosecution of ISIS fighters in court is still pending. There are various different directions of court that could institute legal proceedings against the war criminals such as taking action domestic courts in Iraq and Syria, establishing ad hoc tribunals for ISIS fighters, or taking the cases in front of the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Solis, 2015). However, in this case, with the large number of perpetrators, the best way to go through with legal proceedings is through the process of an ad hoc tribunal. Sweden, Germany, France, United Kingdom, and the

Netherlands have proposed and taken steps to discuss the possibility of initiating the process for tribunals since 2019, but still have not established one with success (Swedish Ministry of Justice,

2019). Even though labeled as terrorists and many of which have committed horrendous war crimes and crimes against humanity, Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him” and this right should not be taken from anyone. At the same time, bringing the perpetrators to justice and for them to punished by law is also for respecting the dignity and redress for those who have suffered as a result of their actions.

A promising international agreement to fight terrorism globally to prevent any insurgency group beforehand from being able to escalate to a position where they become an international threat to global peace and security. Prior to the emergence of ISIS, Al-Qaeda and its subsidiaries working

52 under its umbrella on an international level were one of the biggest threats to the international community. What ISIS executed in less than a decade went far beyond what Al-Qaeda carried out in three decades. The humanitarian crisis on an international level went far beyond what could have been imagined as an aftermath of a war against a non-state actor. The case for ISIS and its repercussions must be studied and be set as a precedent to avoid future events from taking place again. The aftermath of the conflict, even though defeat ISIS has been declared, is still a very present force in the region and abroad. A new generation is growing from the trauma with the weight to recover and rebuild countries in shambles.

53 VII. Conclusion

Historically the social, economic, political, and religious landscape in the Middle East has naturally become a foundational factor to why insurgent groups more often than not are fostered in the region. The instability of the Ba’athist governments both in Iraq and Syria have played a pivotal role in driving militant-radical insurgents to the surface by implementing an absolute form of governance and repressing political or religious freedom. Non-representative governments encourage rebellion which was most definitely the case in both Syria and Iraq but at different timelines. In a region where religion, especially Islam, is an integral element in the culture and determinant of the society’s moral code it is inherently oppressive to hinder people to freely practice faith. The advancement toward the insurgency of Islamic extremism in Iraq and

Syria is directly correlated to the Ba’athist regime in the countries as the advancement mainly began under the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s, which then has developed into more factions and variety of sects interpreting Islam.

Non-representative governments have already proven to be failing forms of governance for an extremely diverse and multidimensional reason, where at the same time religious indifference is one of the principal causes of conflict. With western military intervention in Iraq during the First

Gulf War and the Iraq Invasion in 2003, there is a built up to a dilemma inside the country’s population weighting nationalism and seeing their state become more vulnerable to the west.

With the Coalition Provisional Authority, the U.S. led transitional government, there was a sudden outburst of insurgency and terrorism threatening the national security of the country as what was clearly occurring was that the government of Iraq had transitioned from absolute

Ba’athist state which lacked representation to one established on the basis of western principles.

54 Their role in the Middle East with attempts to achieve peace have been unsuccessful and instead become a fuel motivating more uprisings. While this had been a step to attempt to democratize

Iraq, it has also increased its vulnerability to collapse and become more dependent on western interference even for domestic peace and stability. The longer this governmental structure is in power, there will be an increasing bubble of insurgency whose aim is to successfully complete a coup d'état to rid foreign interference. With the weakening state of the countries, there are cases such as Iran where religious movements have successfully been able to overthrow governments, which is similar to the power and momentum the insurgency groups have gained over the course of a short time.

It would be a deceptive to claim that ISIS has been defeated after studying the situation we can come to the conclusion that the war against ISIS is not war only countering an enemy but instead a dangerous ideology that can prevail. To defeat ISIS there needs to a global effort to rehabilitate remaining members and sympathizers in order to eliminate the ideology. I believe it is extremely important to emphasize the fact that the ideology of ISIS is a wrongful interpretation of the Qur’an based on Salafist-jihadist extremism and is absolutely not representative of all Muslims. The banishment or boycotting of Islam as a religion would not be a rightful solution. There also needs to be a united global effort fighting tradeoffs from the war and preparing to overcome the foreseeable confrontation with ISIS sleeper cells. The best approach for the international community is to focus on HUMINT sources from the intelligence gathered around the organization to constantly stay updated on identifying key figures, goals, financial operations, and the movement of the sleeper cells. Countries which are suspected to be accomplices of terrorism by aiding or financially supporting ISIS need to be held accountable.

55

During the war against ISIS there was a phenomenon of the evolvement of non-state actors threatening global superpowers such as the U.S., the situation should absolutely not be undermined and whether or not this will become a conventional new threat within international politics in the future is plausible. States are no longer the most important actors in international relations. The case of ISIS should become a model studied to prevent such turbulent threats which were experienced by this terrorist organization and how to address extremism and insurgent groups in the future. Unfortunately, Iraq and Syria have a long way to go to achieve democracy and peace without the threat of insurgency. All issues which gave ISIS its rise to power such as the political repression, extreme interpretation of religion, lack empowerment, youth unemployment, cultural intolerance, and human rights abuses are still very much present in modern Syria and Iraq. It is difficult to pin-point what exactly motivates people to willingly want to join such a movement as there were numerous members recruited from western countries where they had more opportunities and better quality of life, but it can be concluded down to two main reasons. The first one being the socio-economic situation and the political landscape as discussed which fosters these groups. The second reason being that people join with the motivation to have a sense of belonging and becoming a part of a community.

Depending on the perspective studying the political landscape in Iraq and Syria the attitude can be contrasting, but overall, foreign intervention has never been an enticing notion for any country due to the repercussions which follow. Iraq and Syria’s sovereignty has equally been violated.

The global and especially the U.S.’s efforts to help win the physical war against ISIS was an essential requirement to reach the state where the Caliphate came to its demise, but Iraq and

56 Syria lack the infrastructure and resources to rebuild the consequences and be able to overcome the aftermath of the war by themselves. If it is in the western powers’ intention to implement democracy in Iraq and Syria there needs to be an equal amount of effort to be put into rebuilding all of the different facilities and components of the state, the same effort which was expressed during the war.

57 Bibliography:

Adelaja, A., & George, J. (2020). Is Youth Unemployment Related to Domestic Terrorism?. PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM, 14(5), 41-62. Retrieved 17 March 2021.

Adib-Moghaddam, A. (2006). The Whole Range of Saddam Hussein's War Crimes. Middle East Report, (239), 30-35.

Al-Marashi, I. (2004). Iraq’s Hostage Crisis: Kidnappings, Mass Media, and the Iraqi Insurgency. Middle East Review of International Affairs, 8(4), 1-11.

ANSA. (2020, March 9). Over 20,000 migrant deaths in Mediterranean since 2014. InfoMigrants. https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/23295/over-20-000-migrant-deaths-in- mediterranean-since-2014-iom.

Arango, T., & Schmitt, E. (2014, August 11). U.S. actions in IRAQ Fueled rise of a rebel. Retrieved March 13, 2021, from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/11/world/middleeast/us-actions-in-iraq-fueled-rise-of-a- rebel.html

Askari, H. (2013). Conflicts—Territorial and Resource (Oil, Natural Gas, and Water) Disputes. In Conflicts in the Persian Gulf (pp. 87-115). Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Awan, I. (2017). Cyber-Extremism: Isis and the Power of Social Media. Society, 54(2), 138–149. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-017-0114-0

Balanche, F. (2015, May 14). The Alawi Community and the Syria Crisis. Middle East Institute. https://www.mei.edu/publications/alawi-community-and-syria-crisis.

Balanche, F. (2018). Sectarianism in Syria's civil war. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Barkey, H. J., & Laipson, E. (2005). Iraqi Kurds and Iraq's future. Middle East Policy, 14(4).

Barzegar, K. (2008). Iran and the Shiite crescent: Myths and realities. Brown J. World Aff., 15, 87.

58 Berti, B., & Guzansky, Y. (2014). Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy on Iran and the Proxy War in Syria: Toward a New Chapter?. Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, 8(3), 25-34.

Besenyö, J. (2017). The Islamic State and Its Human Trafficking Practice. Entrul De Studii Strategice De Apărare Şi Securitate, (3), 15-21. Retrieved 19 March 2021, from.

Bhaumik, S. K., Gang, I. N., & Yun, M. S. (2006). Ethnic conflict and economic disparity: Serbians and Albanians in Kosovo. Journal of Comparative Economics, 34(4), 754-773.

Bierbach, M. (2019, December 31). Migration to Europe in 2019: Facts and figures. InfoMigrants. https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/21811/migration-to-europe-in-2019- facts-and-figures.

Brussels International Center. (2017). Qatar and Terrorism: A Dangerous Game. Brussels International Center, 1-4.

Cafarella, J. (2018). Jabihat al Nusra in Syria. Institute for the Study of War. Available at: [Accessed 8 April 2020].

Callimachi, R. and Schmitt, E. (2019). ISIS Names New Leader and Confirms al-Baghdadi’s Death. [online] Nytimes.com. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/31/world/middleeast/isis-al-baghdadi-dead.html [Accessed 22 March 2021].

Cantenar, Ö. F., & Kozera, C. A. (2021). Fighting ISIS in Syria: Operation Euphrates Shield and the lessons learned from the al-Bab Battle. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 1-32.

Carpenter, T. G. (2013). Tangled web: The Syrian civil war and its implications. Mediterranean Quarterly, 24(1), 1-11.

Çitlioğlu, E. (2020). A Turkish Perspective on Syria. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 1-35. Cohen-Almagor, R. (2018). US-Saudi Arabia Relations: Business As Usual?. The Diplomatist, 6(10), 6-7.

Commins, D. (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris.

59 Connable, B., Campbell, J. H., & Madden, D. (2016). Stretching and exploiting thresholds for high-order war: how Russia, China, and Iran are eroding American influence using time tested measures short of war. Rand Corporation.

Connable, B., Dobbins, J., Shatz, H. J., Cohen, R. S., & Wasser, B. (2020). Weighing US Troop Withdrawal from Iraq: Strategic Risks and Recommendations. Rand National Defense Research Institute Santa Monica, Santa Monica United States.

Constitution of the Republic of Iraq. (2005). [15 October 2005], Available at: https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/iq/iq004en.pdf

Danckwardt, P. (2016). Conceptualizing Isis in inter- national legal terms –Implications, crises and failure of Westphalian notions of authority (dissertation). Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden .

Daniel Corstange, & Erin A. York. (2018). Sectarian Framing in the Syrian Civil War. American Journal of Political Science, 62(2), 441–455. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12348

De Azevedo, C. V. (2020). ISIS Resurgence in Al Hawl Camp and Human Smuggling Enterprises in Syria. Perspectives on terrorism, 14(4), 43-63.

Denning, D. 2010. Terror’s web: how the internet is transforming terror- ism. In M. Yar, & Y. Jewekes (Eds.), Handbook of Internet Crime (pp. 194–212). Willan Publishers. Dergisi, 10(2), 95–128. https://doi.org/10.12658/M0424

Dodge, T. (2016). The Danger of Analogical Myths: Explaining the Power and Consequences of the Sykes-Picot Delusion. AJIL Unbound, 110, 132-136.

Eaton, J. (2016, August 25). U.S. military now Says Isis leader was held in Notorious Abu Ghraib prison. Retrieved March 13, 2021, from https://theintercept.com/2016/08/25/u-s- military-now-says-isis-leader-was-held-in-notorious-abu-ghraib-prison/

El Azhary, M. (2012). The Iran-Iraq war historical, economic, and political analysis.

Fox, J., & Sandler, S. (2005). Separation of religion and state in the twenty-first century: comparing the Middle East and Western Democracies. Comparative Politics, 317-335.

60 Frantzman, S. J. (2016). Mosul: The Origins and Future of Competing Agendas Over Retaking the City From ISIS. Middle East Review of International Affairs (Online), 20(2), 10.

Freedom House. (2021). Global Freedom Ranking. Retrieved February, 2020, from https://freedomhouse.org/country/iraq/freedom-world/2021

Freedom House. (2021). Global Freedom Ranking. Retrieved February, 2020, from https://freedomhouse.org/country/Syria/freedom-world/2021

Friedman, A. (1993). Spider's web: The secret history of how the White House illegally armed Iraq. New York, New York: Bantam Books.

Gambill, G. C. (2003). The American-Syrian Crisis and the End of Constructive Engagement. Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, 5(4).

Halliday, F. (1991). The Gulf War and its aftermath: first reflections. International Affairs, 67(2), 223-234.

Hanauer, L., & Miller, L. E. (2012). Resolving Kirkuk: Lessons learned from settlements of earlier ethno-territorial conflicts. Rand National Defense Research Inst Santa Monica Ca.

Hashim, A. (2018). The Caliphate at War: The Ideological, Organisational and Military Innovations of Islamic State. Oxford University Press.

Hassan, O. (2015). Undermining the transatlantic democracy agenda? The Arab Spring and Saudi Arabia’s counteracting democracy strategy. Democratization, 22(3), 479–495. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2014.981161

Heisbourg, F. (2015). The strategic implications of the Syrian refugee crisis. Survival, 57(6), 7 20.

61 Hinnebusch, R. (2008). What Does Syria Want? A Presentation by Raymond Hinnebusch for the Center for Naval Analyses and the Forum du Futur (France). Center for Naval Analyses Alexandria Va.

Hobbes, T. (1968). Leviathan. Baltimore: Penguin Books

Homeland Security Committee. (2016). Cash to Chaos: Dismantling ISIS' Financial Infrastructure . Homeland Security , 2–34.

Human Rights Watch. (2020). Europe’s Refugee Crisis | An Agenda for Action. [online] Available at: [Accessed 5 April 2020].

Human Rights Watch. (2021, March 23). Thousands of Foreigners Unlawfully Held in NE Syria. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/23/thousands-foreigners- unlawfully-held-ne-syria.

International Crisis Group. (2019). Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria. [online] International Crisis Group. Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/207-averting-isis-resurgence-iraq-and-syria [Accessed 22 March 2021].

International Displacement Monitoring Centre. (2020). Syria Country information. Retrieved from Internal Displacement : https://www.internal- displacement.org/countries/syriaInternational Organization for Migration. (2021). Iraq Master List Report 120, January - February 2021. International Organization for Migration.

Irshaid, F. 2014. How Isis is spreading its message online. In BBC news Accessed 22 Dec 2020.Available at: http://www.bbc.co. uk/news/world-middle-east-27912569

Jubenkanda, R. R., Marume, S. B. M., Namusi, C. W., & Madziyire, N. C. (2016). An analysis of essential elements of the State.

Ker-Lindsay, J. (2013). Preventing the Emergence of Self-Determination as a Norm of Secession: An Assessment of the Kosovo ‘Unique Case’Argument. Europe-Asia Studies, 65(5), 837-856.

62 Kirmanc, Ş. (2013). Identity and nation in Iraq. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Klausen, J. 2015. Tweeting the Jihad: social media networks of western foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 38, 1–22.

Lafta, R., Al-Nuaimi, M., Burnham, G. (2018) Injury and death during the ISIS occupation of Mosul and its liberation: Results from a 40-cluster household survey. PLOS Medicine 15(5).

Lefevre, R. (2013). Ashes of Hama: the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. New York, New York: Oxford University Press.

Lewis, B. (2010). Faith and power: Religion and politics in the Middle East. Oxford University Press.

Lichtenheld, A. G., & Schon, J. (2021). The consequences of internal displacement on civil war violence: Evidence from Syria. Political Geography, 86.

Lucas, S. 2014. Syria Interview: Islamic’s State of Iraq’s Abu Summayah al Britani on Conflict and Caliphate. Accessed 22 Dec 2020.Available at: http://eaworldview.com/2014/06/syria-interview-islamic-state-of- iraq-abu-sumayyah-al britani-conflict-Caliphate/

Macario, G. (2019). The Death of Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi: what future for IS? Opinio Juris, 1–6.

Makovsky, A. (2001, January 17). Syria under bashar al-asad: The domestic scene and the 'CHINESE model' of reform. Retrieved March 13, 2021, from https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/syria-under-bashar-al-asad-domestic- scene-and-chinese-model-reform

Maoz, M., & Yaniv, A. (2013). Syria Under Assad (RLE Syria): Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks. Routledge.

63 Mark Dohrmann & Robert Hatem. (2014). The Impact of Hydro-Politics on the Relations of Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. The Middle East Journal, 68(4), 567–583. https://doi.org/10.3751/68.4.14

Marr, P. (2012). The modern history of Iraq (3rd ed.). Boulder, Colo: Westview Press.

Mason, R. C. (2009, July). US-Iraq Withdrawal/Status of Forces Agreement: Issues for Congressional Oversight. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE.

Mazzetti, M., Goldman, A., & Schmidt, M. (2017, August 02). Behind the sudden death of a $1 Billion Secret C.I.A. war in Syria. Retrieved March 12, 2021, from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/world/middleeast/cia-syria-rebel-arm-train- trump.html

Modigs, R. (2003). United States Foreign Policy In The Middle East After The Cold War. Army Command And General Staff Coll Fort Leavenworth Ks.

Mohamedou, M. (2018). A Theory of ISIS: Political Violence and the Transformation of the Global Order. London: Pluto Press.

Mohseni, P., & Kalout, H. (2017). Iran’s axis of resistance rises. Foreign Affairs, 24.

Morgenthau, H. J. (1948). Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace. New York: A.A. Knopf.

Mufti, M. (1996). Sovereign creations: Pan-Arabism and political order in Syria and Iraq. Cornell University Press.

Nacev, A., & Bogatinov, D. (2018). Understanding Terrorist Motivation with an Emphasis on ISIS Recruitment Methods. Understanding Terrorist Motivation With An Emphasis On Isis Recruitment Methods, 81-94.

64 Oehlerich, E., Mulroy, M., & McHugh, L. (2020). Jannah or Jahannam: Options for Dealing with ISIS Detainees. Middle East Institute.

Peter, M. (2015). Between Doctrine and Practice: The UN Peacekeeping Dilemma. Global Governance, 21(3), 351–370. https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02103002

Polk, W. (2013, December 10). Understanding Syria: FROM pre-civil war TO POST-ASSAD. Retrieved March 13, 2021, from https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/12/understanding-syria-from-pre- civil-war-to-post-assad/281989/

Rafizadeh, M. (2013, April 17). How Bashar al-Assad became so hated. Retrieved March 13, 2021, from https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/how-bashar-al- assad-became-so-hated/275058/

Rayburn, J. (2014). Iraq after America: Strongmen, sectarians, resistance. Hoover Institution Press.

Ruist, J. (2015). The Fiscal Cost of Refugee Immigration: The Example of Sweden. Population and Development Review, 41(4), 567-581.

Sassoon, J. (2012). Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime. Cambridge University press.

Shanks, K. (2019). The politics of IDP education provision: Negotiating identity and schooling in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. International Migration, 57(2), 32-47.

Sinkaya, B.(2020). Implications of the Syrian Civil War on the Alawites. Insan & Toplum

Soguk, N. (2015). With/Out a State, Kurds Rising: The Un/Stated Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq. Globalizations, 12(6), 957–968. https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2015.1100857

Solis, A. (2015). Only Can Judge: Analyzing Which Courts Have Jurisdiction over ISIS. S. Ill. ULJ, 40, 69.

65 Sowell, K. (2019, April 4). The stalled effort to expel U.s. troops from iraq. Retrieved March 13, 2021, from https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/78782

Suliman, F., & Khwanda, H. (2020). External Sector: Between Congestion and Sanctions’ Syrian Economy Case, 1987–2018’. Foreign Trade Review, 55(3), 382-401.

Swedish Ministry of Justice. (2019, June 3). Sweden to host expert meeting on ISIS tribunal. Regeringskansliet. https://www.government.se/press-releases/2019/06/sweden-to-host- expert-meeting-on-isis-tribunal/.

Takeyh, R. (2010). The Iran-Iraq War: A Reassessment. The Middle East Journal, 64(3), 365- 383.

Taylor, T. (2003). Model Bioweapons Inspector in Russia and Iraq: David Kelly, 1944–2003.

Teller, N. (2019). Al-Hol – the aftermath of ISIS. The Jerusalem Post.

Tesón, F. R. (2016). The Case for Armed Intervention against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. The Independent Review, 21(2), 181-197.The World Factbook. (2021). Iraq: People and Society. Retrieved on March, 2021 https://www.cia.gov/the-world factbook/countries/iraq/#people-and-society

The World Factbook. (2021). Syria: People and Society. Retrieved on March, 2021 https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/syria/#people-and-society

Tomuschat, C. (2015). The Status of the'Islamic State'under International Law. Die Friedens Warte, 223-244.

Transparency International. (2021). Corruption Perceptions Index. Retrieved February, 2020, from https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/Iraq

Transparency International. (2021). Corruption Perceptions Index. Retrieved February, 2020, from https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/Syria

66 UN Security Council. (2015). Security Council resolution 2249 (2015) [on terrorist attacks perpetrated by ISIL also known as Da'esh], 20 November 2015, S/RES/2249 (2015), available at: https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/RES/2249(2015)

UNHCR. (2015). The sea route to Europe: The Mediterranean passage in the age of refugees. UNHCR UN Refugee Agency, 2–20.

United Nations. (2020, September). Europe and the Refugee Crisis: A Challenge to Our Civilization. United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/academic-impact/europe-and-refugee- crisis-challenge-our-civilization.

Vahid, M. (2015, January 15). Official Languages in Iraq. Retrieved from Ethnologue: https://www.ethnologue.com/contribution/55036

Venkatraman, A. (2007). Religious basis for Islamic terrorism: The Quran and its interpretations. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30(3), 229-248.

Von Der Stein, I. (2013). Changing Portrayal of Asma Al-assad in the Western Media. GRIN Verlag.

Warius, A., & Fishman, B. (2009). A Jihadist’s Course in the Art of Recruitment. Combating Terrorism Center, 2(2). Retrieved 22 March 2021.

Wilson Center. (2019, October 28). Wilson Center. Retrieved from Wilson Center: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state

Yousif, B., Morrar, R., & El-Joumayle, O. (2020). Conflict, Institutions and The Iraqi Economy.

67