Measuring Army Deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan

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Measuring Army Deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan CHILDREN AND FAMILIES The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and EDUCATION AND THE ARTS decisionmaking through research and analysis. ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE This electronic document was made available from www.rand.org as a public service INFRASTRUCTURE AND of the RAND Corporation. TRANSPORTATION INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAW AND BUSINESS Skip all front matter: Jump to Page 16 NATIONAL SECURITY POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY Support RAND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Purchase this document TERRORISM AND Browse Reports & Bookstore HOMELAND SECURITY Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND Corporation View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non- commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This report is part of the RAND Corporation research report series. RAND reports present research findings and objective analysis that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. C O R P O R A T I O N Measuring Army Deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan Dave Baiocchi SUMMarY ■ How many soldiers have served in Key findings Iraq and Afghanistan? What has the troop mix looked • The Army has provided the bulk of U.S. troops to Iraq like since the start of operations in September 2001? and Afghanistan—over 1.5 million troop-years between What effect, if any, has cumulative time in theater had September 2001 and December 2011, more than all on the Army’s capacity to deploy? the other services combined. In October 2008, the Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army asked RAND to assess the demands placed upon the • Since 2008, the cumulative amount of time that a sol- dier has spent deployed has increased by an average Army by deployments to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) of 28 percent. and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. Army leadership was interested in understanding how many • As of December 2011, roughly 73 percent of active soldiers had served in theater over the course of OIF and component soldiers had deployed to Iraq and/or OEF. Afghanistan, up from 67 percent in December 2008. RAND conducted an initial analysis of these issues • Most of the remaining 27 percent who have not yet using December 2008 data; this document summarizes deployed are recent recruits, are forward-stationed in an update to that analysis using December 2011 data.1 other overseas locations, or have contributed to opera- For the analysis, researchers used data from the Defense tions in Iraq and/or Afghanistan by directly supporting the mission from the continental United States. Manpower Data Center (DMDC), which uses the Contingency Tracking System (CTS) to track personnel • The Army retains very little unutilized capacity to deploy involved in contingency operations. The analyses focused additional active component soldiers without lengthening on the active components (ACs) of the services, but with deployments or shortening the time between deploy- particular attention to the Army’s AC.2 ments, both of which increase the burden on those who have already deployed. Though telling, the findings were not necessarily surprising. The Army has provided the bulk of U.S. troops to Iraq and Afghanistan—over 1.5 million troop-years as of December 2011, more than all the other services combined. Moreover, the cumulative amount of time that a soldier has spent deployed has increased by an average of 28 percent since 2008. In contrast, the percentage “not yet deployed” and the Army’s unutilized capacity to deploy have both decreased. 2 As of December 2011, roughly 73 percent of AC soldiers had deployed to Iraq and/or Afghanistan, up from 67 percent in December 2008. Most of these soldiers were working on their second, third, or fourth year of cumulative deployed duty. Most of the remaining 27 percent who have not yet deployed are recent recruits, are forward-stationed in other overseas locations, or have contrib- uted to operations in Iraq and/or Afghanistan by directly supporting the mission from the continental United States (e.g., intelligence analysts or recruiters). Th e Army, therefore, retains very little unutilized capacity to deploy additional AC soldiers without lengthening deployments or shortening the time between deployments, both of which increase the burden on those who have already deployed—a challenge Army leaders and policy- makers will be engaged with for the foreseeable future. The Army Has Provided Almost 4 in 7 of the Total Deployments to Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 54% 17% 15% 14% Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps 1.08 million 333,000 309,000 280,000 troop-years troop-years troop-years troop-years Sources: DMDC Contingency Tracking System Deployment File (September 2001 through December 2011). NOTES: The percentages indicate the total number of deployed troop-years provided to OIF/OND and OEF from ACs only and do not refl ect services’ support to other missions and activities. Percentages have been rounded to the nearest integer. 3 The Army has provided over 1.5 million troop-years to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. higher than those of the other services. While these results are MEasURING THE TOtaL NUMBER not surprising (OIF/OND and OEF have been predominantly OF trOOP DEPLOYMENts THE arMY ground operations), the results do highlight the demands placed Has PROVIDED on the Army. One way to measure the Army’s contributions to OIF (it has been referred to as Operation New Dawn [OND] since September 2010) in Iraq and OEF in Afghanistan is by the total number of troop-years deployed. A troop-year is a metric MEasURING HOW LONG INDIVIDUAL used to measure cumulative deployment length. For example, SOLDIErs HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED one troop-year is equivalent to any of the following cases: one A second way in which to consider the services’ contributions soldier spending 12 months deployed, two soldiers deployed to operations in Iraq and/or Afghanistan is the cumulative time for six months (each), one soldier deployed for eight months that individual soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines have spent and another soldier deployed for four months, and 12 soldiers deployed. deployed for one month each. Examples of interesting data include that 38,800 AC As of December 2011, the Army had provided over soldiers have spent 12 months of their time in the Army 1.5 million troop-years to OIF/OND and OEF—a 50 percent deployed. (Because these data are cumulative, the 12 months increase since December 2008. This includes both Army AC of deployment time could have been accumulated over more and mobilized reserve-component soldiers who have served in than one deployment.) Similarly, 40,500 AC soldiers have spent OIF/OND and/or OEF at any time since the beginning of the 13 months deployed, and 9,800 AC soldiers have accumulated conflicts. Together, the Army AC alone has contributed nearly 14 months of deployed time. For the purpose of comparison, 1.1 million troop-years to these two operations. the complete deployment numbers, grouped by years of deploy- ment, are provided in the table on page 5. They reveal that the Army, both its active and reserve components, has more The Army Has Provided More Troops Than of its service members with relatively high cumulative months All the Other Services Combined deployed than the other services. Since 2008, the cumulative The Army has provided, by far, the largest portion of troop- amount of time that a soldier has spent deployed has increased years in support of OIF/OND and OEF, relative to the other by an average of 28 percent (not shown in the table). services. Specifically, Army AC soldiers have provided 54 Of particular note are the 136,000 AC soldiers working on percent of the cumulative troop-years deployed to Iraq and/or their second year of cumulative deployment time and an addi- Afghanistan, even though the Army represents only 40 percent tional 136,000 AC soldiers working on their third year or longer of the total U.S. AC force. This represents a slight increase from of cumulative deployment time. December 2008, when 52 percent of all AC deployments were Army soldiers. The Army’s reserve deployments are also much 4 Soldiers’ Cumulative Time Deployed Exceeds That for Other Services Cumulative Time That Individuals Have Deployed to OIF/OND and OEF Between September 2001 and December 2011, by Month Number of personnel Cumulative 30 1 2 months deployed 29 40,000 3 28 4 This radar chart plots the cumulative months that 27 30,000 5 individuals have spent deployed to OIF/OND and OEF against the number of personnel that have been 26 25+ 20,000 6 deployed for that time. We chose a radar plot for these 25 months 1–12 7 months data because it is useful for highlighting how long the 10,000 bulk of the troops in each service have spent deployed. 24 8 0 The numbers around the outside circle (proceeding in 23 9 a clockwise direction from the top of the circle) depict cumulative months deployed, and the rings (moving 22 10 radially outward from the center of the chart) depict 21 13–24 11 the number of service members who have been 20 months 12 deployed for that period of time.
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