ONE HUNDRED TWENTIETH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS

ONE HUNDRED TWENTIETH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS

Edited by Stuart Brown Diane Collinson Robert Wilkinson

London and New York First published 1998 by Routledge II New Fetter Lane , London EC4P 4EE 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 200 I.

© 1998 Routledge

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British Lib rary Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data One hundred twentieth-century philosophers I edited by Stuart Brown, Diane Collinson, Robert Wilkinson. p. em . Includes biographical references. 1. Philosophers-Biography. 2. Philosophy, Modern-20th century. I. Brown , Stuart C. II. Collinson, Diane III. Wilkinson, Robert B804.055 1988 190 '.9 '04-dc21 97-30846 [B] CIP ISBN 0-415-17996-3 (Print Edition) ISBN 0-203-02750-7 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0-203-17468-2 (Glassbook Format) CONTENTS

Notes on Cont ributors vi-vii

List of Abbreviated Sources vii i- ix

Structure of an Entry x

Entries A-Z 1-207

Guide to Schoo ls and Move ments 208-241 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Bredin, Hugh Fulford, K. W. M. Senior Lecturer in Scholast ic Philosophy, Professor of Phil osophy and Mental Hea lth, Queen 's University, Belfast. Unive rsity of Warwick.

Brown, St u ar t Gorner, Paul Professor of Phil osoph y, Op en University. Lecturer in Phil osoph y, Department of Phi losophy, University of Aberdeen. Bunnin,N icholas Fellow, University of Essex, and Director, Jones, Barry Phil osoph y Proj ect, Centre for Modern Chinese Formerly research student, Unive rsity of Studies, University of Oxford. Ma nchester.

Cad wallader, Eva Professor of Phil osoph y, West minste r College, Kuehn, M anfred Penn syl vani a. Associate Professor of Philosoph y, Purdue Unive rsity, Lafaye tte , Indi ana.

C ar r, Indira Mahalingam Senior Lecture r in Law, Un iversity of Exeter, Lace y, A. R. Spec ial Lecturer in Phil osoph y, Unive rsity of Senior Lecturer in Phil osophy (retired), King's Nott ingham, Director of Exe ter Un ive rsity College, Unive rsity of Lond on. Centre for Lega l Int erdiscipli nary Developm ent (EUCLID) Lamb, David Reader in Phil osoph y, Department of C h a nt, C oli n Biomedical Science and Bioethi cs, University of Lecturer in History of Science and Technology, Birmingham. Ope n Unive rs ity.

Lee, Keekok C oli nson, Diane Reader in Phil osophy, University of Sen ior Lec turer in Philosophy, Open Manches ter; Dir ector of the Centre for University. Phil osop hy and the Environment.

Davey, Nicholas Le ggatt, St ua r t Lecturer in History and Theory of Art, Research stude nt, University of Reading. University Co llege Llandalb.

Edwards, Jim Lewis, Peter Senior Lec ture r in Phil osophy, Unive rsity of Lecturer in Phil osoph y, University of Glasgow. Ma nches ter.

Ellis, Ant hony Lyas, C oli n Professor of Phil osoph y, Virginia Sen ior Lec ture r in Philosoph y, University of Commonwealth Unive rsity. Edinburg h.

Ev eritt,Nicholas Ma rtin, R. N. D. Lecturer in Philosoph y, Schoo l of Econom ic Self-employe d; part-time work for the Open and Social Studies, University of East Anglia. University. NOTESON CONTRIBUTORS vii

Mason, Richard Reese, William Fellow of Wolfson, College, Cambridge and Former Professor of Philosoph y, State Tutor in Phil osoph y, Ma dingley Ha ll. University of New York at Albany.

Ri ck amn, H. P. Mills, Stephen Visiting Professor in Phil osoph y, City Lecture r in Phil osophy, Un ive rsity of Ulster at Univers ity, Lo ndo n. Coleraine, No thern Ireland.

Sim, Stuart Outhwaite, William Profe ssor of English Studies, University of Professor of Sociology, University of Sussex, Sunderland. Bri ghton. Singer, Marcus Plant, Kathryn Professor of Phil osoph y Emeritus, Unive rsity of Wisconsin, Madison. Tutor in Phi losop hy, Open Unive rsity.

Walford, David Pollard, Denis Lecturer in Phil osophy, Un ive rsity of Wales, Sen ior Lecture r in Phil osoph y, Unive rsity of Lamp et er. Glamorga n.

Whitford, Marga ret Quinton, Lord An t hony Teacher, Queen Mary and Westfi eld College, Formerly Pre sident of Trinity College, Oxfor d London . and Fellow of the British Aca demy. Wilkinson, Robert Reck, Andrew Staff Tutor and Senior Lecture r in Phil osophy, Open Un ive rsity. Professor of Phil osophy, and Dir ector of Liberal Arts Program , Julane Univers ity, New Orlea ns; Editor; History of Philosophy Williams, James Quarterly. Lecturer in Philoso phy, Unive rsity of Dund ee. LIST OF ABBREVIATED SOURCES

These abbrev iations appea r in the Sources fie ld at the end of an entry, whe re the author gives the sources use d in compi lation of the entry. Periodical abbreviations, including indexes, derive from the initial letters of each significant word in the title, and remain in italic. Books, including annuals, use the author 's or editor 's name(s), or a contraction of the title where this is not possi ble, and appear in roma n.

AJP Au stralasian Journal of Philosophy Becker Encyclopedia ofEthics, ed. Lawrence C. and Charlotte Becke r, New York: Garland, 1992 Burkhardt Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, ed. Hans Burkhardt, Mun ich: Philosophia Verlag, 2 vols, 1991 CA Contemporary Authors: A Bio-bibliographical Guide to Current Authors and their Works, Detroit: Ga le Research Inc., 1962- present CBD Chambe rs Biographical Dictionary, various editio ns; 1994 ed ition ed . Mag nus Magn usson Cors ini The Concise Encyclopedia ofPsy chology , ed. R. Corsi ni, New York: John Wiley, 198 7 DAB Dictionary ofAm eri can Biography, Oxford: Ox ford Un ivers ity Press and New York: Scribner 's, various edit ions Dancy & Sosa A Companion to Epistemology, ed. J.Dancy and E. Sosa, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992 DAS Directory ofAm erican Scholars, New York: R. R. Bowker, 1942-present DFN Dizionario dei Filosofi dei No vecento , Florence : Sansoni, 1976 DNB Di ctionary of National Bio graphy , London: Oxford University Press, vario us editions DSB Dictionary ofScientific Biography, ed. G. C. Gillespie, New York: Scribner 's, 1970­ present EA B En cyclopedia of Am erican Biography, second edition, ed. J. A . Ga rraty, HarperCollins (US) , 1995 Edwards Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, ed. Paul Edwards, New York: Macm illan & Co., 1967 EF Enciclop edia Filosojica , Florence: G. C. Sanson i, 6 vols, 1967 Flew A Dictionary ofPhilosophy, ed. Antony Flew, New York: St Martin's Press, revised seco nd edition, 1984 Goldenson Lon gman Dictionary of Psychology and Psychiatry, ed. R. M. Goldenson, New York an d Londo n: Longman, 1984 Harr e & Lamb The Encyclopedic Dictionary of Psy chology , ed. R. Harr e and R. Lamb, Oxfo rd: Basil Blackwell, 1983 !DPP International Directory of Philosophy and Philosophers, Bowling Green, OH: Philosophy Documentation Center, Bowling Green State University, seventh edition, 1992 Kindler Kindl ers Literatu r Lexikon, Zur ich: Kindl er Verlag , 1965 and 1970 Mitte lstrass Enzyklop ddi e Philosophie und Wissens chaftstheorie , ed . Jurgen Mi tte lstrass, Mannheim: Bibli ographisches Institut AG, 1980- MSS PNB Memoires, Societe des Sciences Physiques et Naturelles de Bou rdeaux NOB Neue Osterreichis che Biographie, Vienna and Mun ich, Amalthea Passm or e 1957 A Hundred Years of Philosophy , John Passmore, Lond on: Duckworth, 1957 Passmore 1985 Recent Philosophers, John Passmore, London: Duckworth, 1985 PBA Proceedings of the British Academy LIST OF ABBREVIATED SOURCES ix

PI Phi losoph er s Index , Bowling Green, OH : Philosophy Documentation Center, Bowling Green State University, various editions RA Reader s Adviser, Bowker (US) , fourteenth edition, 1994 Reck 1968 The New American Philosoph ers, Andrew Reck, Bat on Rou ge : Loui siana State Unive rsity Press, 1968 Reese Dictionary ofPhilosophy and Religion , William L. Reese, New Jersey: Humanities Pre ss, 1980 RPL Revue Philosoph ique de Lou vain Turner Thinkers of the Twentieth Cent ury, ed. Roland Turner, Chicag o: St Jam es Press, second edition , 1987 Urms on & Ree The Concise Encyclop aedia of Western Philosophy , ed. J. O. Urmson and J. Ree, London: Hutchinson , 1960 WD The Writer s Directory, Chicago: St Jam es Press, biennial WW Who :s Who, London: A. & C. Black, 1843-present WW(Am) Who :s Who in Americ a , Chicago: Marquis Who 's Who , 1899-present WWW Who Was Who, London : A. & C. Black, various editions WWW(Am) Who Was Who in America , Chicag o: Marquis Who 's Who , 1899-present STRUCTURE OF AN ENTRY

There are three basic elements to eac h entry. where these are available. For books published The open ing section gives biographical details before 1945, these deta ils may not be so readily and summarizes the phi losophical interests of the ava ilable; for politi cal reasons also so me works ent rant. The first ite m of information after th e may be difficu lt to trace. The Sources fie ld, at name is nationality. Beca use of the diffic ulty of the end of the entry, lists works which were use d establishing entran ts ' preferences, English, Welsh in researching the entry, and not previously given and Scottish have been stan dardized as British. in the Secondary literatur e. Ma ny of these are Cases of dual nationality or changes of citizenship referen ce works or jo urna ls, and are abbreviated. have been noted. Fo llow ing are dates and places A list of the full titles can be found on page vii i­ of bi rth (b :) , and death (d :) if ap propriate, ix . category (Cat:), interests (/nts:) , higher education Text pa ragraphs offer a description of the ( Educ: ), influences on the entran t ( Infls: ), and professi onal appointments ( App ts: ). The last interests, ideas and work of the ph ilosopher, are often posts he ld in higher education expanding on the earlier summary. Influences (both institutio ns, but where appropriate po litical and on and by the entrant), central wo rks, other activit ies are detailed . deve lopments and changes in thought, alignments A bibliographical sect ion gives titles of major to schools or movements , may all be elements works by the entrant (Main publications), and within this section. Names in bold type within the critical or biographical works (S ec on dary text are cross -references, indicating other entries literature) , with dates, locati on and pu bli sh er that will be found in the book . Adorno, Theodor Wiesengrund (1956) Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Stud ien iiber Husserl und die phdnomenologischen Antinomien, Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer (English German. b: 11 September 1903, Frankfurt am translation, Against Epistemology: AMeta critique, Main .d: 6August 1969,Visp, Switzerland. Cat: trans . Willis Domigno, Oxford : Blackwell, 1982). Social philosopher; critical theorist ; (1956) (with Max Horkheimer) Soziologisch e musicologist. Ints: Epistemology. Educ: Exkurse, Europaische Verlagsanta lt (Engli sh University ofFrankfurt,doctorate 1924; studied translation ,A spects ofSociology, trans.John Viertel , music with Alban Berg in Vienna, 1925-8. London: Heinemann, 1973). Infls: Walter Benjamin, Max Horkheimer, (1963) Drei Studien zu Hegel, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. (1963) Eingriffe. Neun Kritische Modelle, Frankfurt: Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche. Appts: Editor, Suhrkamp. Musikbldtter des Anbruchs , Vienna, 1928­ (1964) Jargon der Eigentlichkeit. Zur deuts chen 1930; Privatdozent, University of Frankfurt, Ideologie, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp (English 1931-3; worked in Oxford, 1934-7; member of translation, Jargon of Auth enti city , tran s. Knut the Institute for Social Research, New York, Tarnowski and Frederick Will, London : Routledge from 1938; Beverly Hills from 1941; also & Kegan Paul, 1964). worked with Paul Lazarsfeld on the Princeton (1966) Negative Dial ektik, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Radio Research Project; Professor of (Engli sh translation, Negative Dialectics , trans. E. Philosophy, University of Frankfurt, 1950-69; B. Ashton, New York: Seabury Press , 1973). Assistant Director, 1950-5, Co-Director with (1967) Ohne Leitbild. Pa rva Aesth etika, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Horkheimer, 1955-8, and Director, 1958-69, (1969) Stichworte. Kritische Modelle 2, Frankfurt: Institut fur Sozialforschung, Frankfurt. Suhrkamp. (1969) (Introduction and contributions to) Der Posit ivismusstreit in der deutschen Sozio logie, Neuwied and Berlin : Luchterhand (English Main publi cations: translation, The Positivist Dispute in German Sociolo gy , trans . Glyn Adey and David Frisby, (1933) Kierkegaard: Konstruktion des Asth etis chen, London: Heinemann, 1976). Tiinbingen: J. C. B. Mohr; second edition,Frankfurt: (1969) (ed .) Spdtkapitalismus oder Suhrkamp, 1966 (Engli sh translation, Kierkegaard: Industriegesellschaft? Verhandlungen des 16 Construction ofthe Aesthetic , trans . and ed. Robert deuts chen Soziologentages vom 8- 11 April 1968 in Hullot -Kentor, Minneapolis: University of Frankfurt am Main , Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Minnesota Press, 1989). (1970) Asth etisch e Theorie, ed. Gretel Adorno and (1947) (with Max Horkheimer) Dialektik der Rolf Tiedemann, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp (English Aufkldrung, Amsterdam: Querido (English translation, Aesthetic Theory, trans. C. Lenhardt, translation, Dialectic ofEnlightenm ent , trans. John London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984). Cumming, New York: Herder & Herder, 1972). (1970 -86) Gesammelte Schriften, 20 vo1s, ed. Rolf (1949) Philosophie der neuen Musik, Tiibingen: J. C. Tiedemann, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp (the Theodor W. B. Mohr (English translation, Philosophy ofModern Adorno Archive plans to publish a further twenty Music, tran s. Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley W. volumes ofposth umous papers). Bloom ster, London: Sheed & Ward, 1949). (1973-4) Philosophische Terminologie. Zur (1950) (with Elke Frenkel -Brunswick, Daniel 1. Einleitung, 2 vols, ed. RudolfZur Lippe , Frankfurt : Levinson and R. Nevitt Stanford) The Authoritarian Suhrkamp. Personality , New York: Harper & Brothers. (1951) Minima Moralia. Reflexionen aus dem beschddigten Leben , Frankfurt: Suhrkamp (Engli sh translation, Minima Moralia, trans . E. F.N.Jephcott, Secondary literature: London: New Left Books , 1974). (1955) Prism en.Kulturkritik lind Gesellschaji, Berlin Benjamin, Andrew (ed.) (1989) The Problems of and Frankfurt: Suhrkamp (Engli sh translation, Modernity: Adorno and Benjamin, London: Prism s, trans . Samuel and Shierry Weber, London: Routledge. Neville Spearman, 1967). 2 A dorn o

Bem stein, J. M. (1992) The Fate ofArt: Aesthetic have the impact they deserve outside the Alienationfro m Kant to Adorno, Cambridge: Polity. German-language area. His critique of Husserl --(1994) The Politics of Transfiguration, London : is also a critique ofepistemolo gy as traditionally Routledge. conceived. Brunkhorst, Hauke (1990) Theodor W Adorno: Adorno 's own conception of 'negative' Dialektik der Moderne, Munich: Piper. Buck-Morss, Susan (1977) The Origin of 'Negative dialectic , a dialectic which rejects as utopian the Dialectics ': Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjam in possibility of total reconciliation, is central to and the Frankfurt Institute, Hassocks : Harvester neo-Marxist philosophy (see Jay 1984), as is the Press . line of cultural criticism expressed throughout Friedeburg, Ludwig von and Habermas, Jiirgen (eds) his work, notably in Dialectic ofEnlightenment (1983 ) Adorno-Konferenz 1983, Frankfurt: (1947), one ofthe central books ofthe twentieth Suhrkamp. century, and in his many works in the Jame son, Fredric (1990) Late Capitalism:Adorno,or, philosophy and sociology of music . Adorno 's the Persistence ofthe Dialectic, London : Verso. aesthetic theory has an importanc e far outside Jay, Martin (1973) Adorno , Glasgo w: Collins that field, and has been taken by many Fontan a. --(1973) The Dialectical Imagination: A History contemporary philosophers as a starting-point of the Frankfurt School and the Institute ofSocial for reconceptualizing the role ofphilosophy as a Research, 1923-1950, London: Heinemann whole. As Bernstein (1994) has shown , the (includes substantial bibliograph y). tension between Adorno 's speculative --(1984) Marxism and Totality, Berkele y and Los theorizing and Habermas's more disciplined Angeles: University of Califomi a Press. or, from this point ofview, scientistic approach, Lobig , Michael and Schweppenhauser, Gerhard (eds) remains a fundamental legacy of the Frankfurt (1984) Hamburger Adorno-Symp osium, School. Liinneburg : Dietrich zu Klampen Verlag. In both philosophy and cultural theory Rose, Gillian (1978) The Melancholy Science: An Adorno combined a revolutionary modernism Introdu ction to the Work of Theodor WAdorno , London: Macmi llan (includ es substantial with a deep attachmentto what he saw as the best bibliography). elements ofEuropean thought and high culture , Schweppenhauser, Hermann (ed.) (1971) Theodor W threatened by fascist and Stalinist Ado rno zum Geddchtnis , Frankfurt: Suhrkamp totalitarianism and by commercial philistinism. (includes biblio graph y by Klaus Schultz). Jargon of Auth enticity (1964) is a powerful Thyen, Anke (1989) Negative Dialektik und critiqu e of the abuse ofphilosophical language. Erfah rung: Zur Rat ionalitdt des nichtidentischen Adorno 's own sensitivi ty to issues oflanguage, bei Adorno, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. including a Nietzschean hostility to Wiggershaus, Rolf ( 1986) Die Frankfurter Schule: terminological definition, comes out clearly in Geschichte, theoretische Entwicklung, politische some of his more accessible works , such as his Bedeutung, Munich: Hanser (English translation, The Frankfu rt Schoo l, trans. Martin Robert son, contributions to Aspects of Sociology (1956) Cambridge: Polity). and the Introductory Lectures published as --(1987) Theodor W Adorno, Munich : Beck. Philosophische Terminolo gie (1973--4). Although his thought was sceptical , aphoristically formulated and often despairing, Adorno is without question the most important he was far from the nihilism and frivolity oflater thinker ofthe Frankfurt School, where he acted 'post-structuralist' thought , whose insights he as a crucial mediating force between Marxism may be seen to have anticipated and and the rest of philosophy, and between transcended. philosophy itself and sociolog y and cultural studies . His studies on Hegel, Heidegge r, Husse rl, Kierkegaard and other major philosophers are unequalled in their incisiveness, and are only now beginning to WILLIAM OUTHWAITE Althusser

Althusser, Louis Clarke , Simon (1980) One Dimensional Marx ism: Althusser and the Politics of Culture, London: Allison & Busby. Algerian-French. b: 1918, Birmendreis, Elliott , Gregory (1987) Althusser: The Detour of Algeria , d: 1990, Yvelines, France . Cat: Theory, London: Verso. Marxist; political philosopher; epistemologist; Smith, Steven B. (1984) Reading Althusser, Ithaca , metaphysician; philosopher of science . Educ: NY, and London: Macmillan. Studied at the Ecole Normale Superieure, Paris. Thompson, E. P. (1978) The Poverty ofTheory and Infls: Marx, Lenin, Gramsci, Levi-Strauss , Other Essays, London: Cornell University Press . Gaston Bachelard and Mao Zedong. Appts : Professor of Philosophy, Ecole Normale Althusser is the leading figure in the movement Superieure. known as structural Marxism, which sought to reinterpret Marx in the light of the work of structuralists like Levi-Strauss . A member of Main publications: the French Communist Party, Althusser's development as a philosopher is very much tied up with the fortunes of that organization, in (1959) Mont esquieu: la politique et I 'histoire, Paris: particular with the intense policy debates that Presse s Universitaires de France (Engli sh translation , Politics and History : Montesqui eu, occurred within the party in the aftermath of the Rouss eau, Hegel and Marx, trans. Ben Brewster, denunciation of Stalin at the 1956 Congress of London: NLB, 1972). the Soviet Communist Party, and in the context (1965) Pour Marx , Paris: Maspero (Engli sh ofthe growing rift between Soviet and Chinese translation, For Marx, trans. Ben Brew ster, London: Communism. Most of Althusser's major NLB ,1969). contributions to Marxist theory, such as the (1965) (with Etienne Balibar, Pierre Macherey, et al.), theory ofthe symptomatic reading, the doctrine Lire le Capital e, Paris: Maspero; revised edition, 1968 (English translation, Reading Capital, trans . of the epistemological break, the Ben Brewster, London: NLB , 1970) Overdeterminism Thesis and the insistence on a (1969) Lenine et la philosophie, Paris: Maspero sharp separation between science and ideology, (English tran slation , Lenin and Philosophy and stem from his interventions in these debates , as Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster, London: NLB , does his later interest in the work of Mao 1971). Zedong. Althusser's earliest intellectual (1974) Elements d 'autocritique, Paris : Hachette influence was the philosopher of science Gaston (English translation, Essays in Self-Criticism, trans . Bachelard, from whose work he derived the G.Lock, London: NLB , 1976). (1974) Philosophic et philosophie spontanee des basis for the doctrine of the epistemological savants, Paris: Maspero (Engli sh translation, break. Althusser also drew heavily on the work Philosophy and the Spontan eous Philosophy ofthe of Lenin and Gramsci , whose doctrine of Scientists , trans . Ben Brewster et al., London: NLB, hegemony and theories of the mutually 1990). interactive relationship between the economic base ofa society and its cultural superstructure had a profound impact on Althusser's mature Secondary literature: thought. The general drift ofAlthusser's project is to establish Marxism as a 'theoretical anti­ humanism'; that is, as a social theory whose Assiter, Alison (1990) Althusser and Feminism, London: Pluto Press. concern is with historical process rather than Benton, Ted (1984) The Rise and Fall ofStructural with the actions of individual human beings : Marxism, London and Basingstoke: Macmillan. 'historical process without a subject' as it is Callinicos, Alex (1976) Althusser s Marxism , known . Structuralism, with its commitment to London: Pluto Press. independently operating deep structures of 4 Althusser thought , and downgrading ofthe role of human ideological or theoretical , which are in a agency within history, is an obvious point of dialectical relationship with the economic base . reference here . Althusser's concern in his Taking his cue from Gramsci, Althusser treats theoretical interventions was to press the claims the relationship as one of mutual interaction for Marx's mature writings , Capital for where base and superstructure can affect each example, over those of his youthful, so-called other, whereas in a more traditional Marxist 'humanist' period ofthe early 1840s, such as the thought the base is held to be dominant. Economic and Philosophical Manus cripts of Althusser posits a 'relative autonomy' of the 1844. To counter the fashion of these largely superstructure which is only in 'the last Hegelian works amongst French humanist instance ' (a thesis which remains fairly obscure) Marxists, Althusser posited the existence of a under the dominance ofthe base. Thus events in dramatic change in Marx 's thought in the mid­ the superstructure are as capable oftriggering a 1840s, a rupture or 'epistemological break ', revolutionary situation as those in the base, roughly from The German Ideology and Theses since the former may well constitute the weak, on Feuerbach onwards , which marked his or 'overdetermined', link in a given social coming ofage as a 'scientific' theorist. Before formation : this is Althusser 's 'Over­ 1845 Marx's thought is constrained by the determinism Thesis'. Such a relationship ideological notions of its time; after 1845 he is between base and superstructure actively conducting a scientific critique of his ideology precludes any possibility of meaningful human and pointing out its deficiencies and internal action, and historical process without a subject contradictions.The key to identifying this break is primarily a matter of 'Repressive State lies in Althusser's theory of the symptomatic Apparatuses ' (instruments of state power such reading , where the objective is to isolate the as the police or army) and ' Ideological State underlying structure of thought , or Apparatuses ' (hegemonic institutions such as 'problematic' as Althusser terms it, which the church or universities) working through governs the productionofthe text and moulds its individuals. Those individuals simply act out argument. It is in the nature of a problematic, the roles assigned to them by ideology, which whose family resemblance to Kuhn's notion of provides little scope for human agency. 'paradigm' has been noted by several Althusser was a major theoretical force in the commentators, to set limits on what can be French Communist Party, and his recasting of thought or called into question, and a the fundamental elements of Marxist thought symptomatic reading is concerned precisely to within a structuralist framework generated identify what those limits are. A sharp vigorous debate in Marxist circles , both inside distinction is made in Althusser between and outside France. Arguabl y the most ideology, a closed system of belief featuring influential voice in Western Marxism during the internal contradictions which most of us are 1960s and 1970s, Althusser's structural unaware of in everyday lived experience, and Marxism was much in vogue at the time and had science , a system of enquiry open to change a significant impact across a range of from within . Marxism, through its theory of intellectual disciplines, such as political dialectical materialism, is for Althusser a economy, sociology, anthropology, aesthetics science , and sciences are seen to be beyond the and literary theory. Althussers reputation has reach of ideology. Theory is in fact an declined markedly since the 1970s, partly in the autonomous area ofdiscourse, or 'practice', to wake of the poststructuralist critique of the Althusser, with Marxism being regarded as a metaphysics underpinning structuralist self-validating science . In Althusser's social methodology, as well as the postmodernist theory the superstructure ofa culture consists of challenge to 'grand narrative' theories such as a series of such practices, variousl y political, Marxism; and structural Marxism no longer A ns combe 5 commands much support on the left, where Main publications: notions like the epistemological break are felt to be unhisto rical and far too schematic. A (1939) (with Norman Daniel) The Justice of the common criticism of Althuss er 's work has been Present War Examined, Oxford: published by the that it lacks a human dimension, and his theory authors. of ideology is now consid ered to be overly (1953) (trans.) Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical determinist in character. E. P. Thomps on, for Investigations, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. example, has been particularly scathing of (1956) 'Aristotle and the sea battle ', Mind 65. (1957) Intention, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Althuss er 's denial of the role of human agency ( 1957) Mr Truman :~ Degree, Oxford:published by the in history, and has also been one of a number of author. commentators to accuse Althusser of having (1958) 'Modern moral philosophy' , Philosophy 33. Stalinist tendencies, although others, such as (1959) An Introduction to Wittgenstein s 'Tractatus ', Steven B. Smith, have been just as keen to London: Hutchinson. defend him from this highly emotive charge. (1961) (with Peter Geach) Three Philosophers, Althusser 's most committed disciples have Ithaca: Cornell University Press. been his ex-students Etienne Balibar and Pierre (197 1) Causality and Determination, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. Macherey; the former being the co-author with (1975) ' The first person', in Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), Althuss er of one ofthe central texts of structural Mind and Language, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Marx ism, Reading Cap ital (revised edition); (1976) 'The question of linguistic idealism', in the latter having had notable success in the 'Essays on Wittgenstein in honour of G. H. von application of Althuss erian ideas to literary Wright ' .Acta Philosophica Fennica 28. theory in his widely admired study A Theory of (1979) 'Under a description', Nous 13. Literary Production (1966) . ( 1981) The Collected PhilosophicalPapers ofG E. M. Anscombe (vol. I, From Parmenides to Wittgenstein; vol. 2, Metaphysics and the STUARTSIM Philosophy ofMind; vol. 3, Ethics, Religion and Politics), Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Anscombe, G(ertrude) E(lizabeth) Secondary literature: M(argaret) Diamond, Cora and Teichman, Jenny (eds) (1979) Intention and Intentionality: Essays in Honour ofG British. b: 1919. Cat: Analytic philosopher. E. M.Anscombe, Brighton: Harvester Press. Ints: Philosophy of mind; ethics; metaphysics ; MacDonald, Scott (1991) 'U ltimate ends in practical philosophy of religion; history of philosophy. reasoning: Aquinas 's Aristotelian moral psychology Educ: Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. and Anscombe's fallacy ', The Philosop hical Review Injls: Aristotle, St Thomas Aquinas and vol. 100. Ludwig Wittgenstein. Appts: 1946-64, Research Fellowships,Somerville College, Anscombe converted to Roman Catholicism in Oxford ; 1964- 70, Fellow of Somerville her youth, and a substanti al portion of her work College, Oxford; 1970-86, Professor of on ethics and religion has been devoted to Philosophy, University of Cambridge; 1970­ exploring and defending Catholic doctrines. As 86, Fellow of New Hall, Cambridge, Honora ry a research student in Cambridge she became a Fellow since 1986. 1967, Fellow of the British pupil of Wittgenstein and, although she was Academy; 1979, Foreign Honorary Member, never a disciple of his views, much of her American Academy ofArts and Sciences. thought shows his influence. Like Wittgensteiu 's, much of Anscomb e's work is 6 Anscombe

devoted to the relation between thought and Her highly influential monograph Intention reality. Unlike Wittgenstein, however, she has a (1957) discuss ed at length a major element of serious interest in the history ofphilosophy and this philosophical psychology, the notion of much of her work has been done through the intention , although without overt reference to explicit discussion of such philosophers as ethical issues. Most philosophers had thought of Aristotle, Aquinas and Hume. intentions as mental events which occurred Her first published article was written in the prior to actions and caused them. Anscombe early weeks ofthe Second World War. Itargued, argued that we should not think of intentional contrary to the usual assumption, that it was not action as behaviour brought about by a certain a just war on the grounds that its aims were sort of cause, but behaviour for which it is unlimited and that it would involve the appropriate to give a reason in response to the unjustifiable killing of civilians . In its reliance question why it occurred. She also held that one on the theory of natural law this article knows what one's intentions are without foreshadowed much of her later work. It also observation (in a way in which one cannot embodi ed a conception of human action which always know what, for instance, one's motives she explored and developed in many later are); and this is possibl e only because there is a writings . According to this conception, actions species of knowledge- pra ctical knowled ge­ which has been much underpla yed by have an intrinsic nature , which depends upon philosophers, who have been obsessed with their direct intention, and this intrinsic nature is theoretical knowledge. Practical knowledge, at least as relevant to their moral status as are however, could only be adequately understood their motives and any consequences they may through an understanding of practical have. For instance, it may be held that reasonin g, and this led Anscomb e into an deliberately killing the innocent as a means to influential discussi on ofthis topic and some of one 's ends is murder-whatever one 's motives its ramifications. and whatever the consequences-and is always She also drew attention to the importance of wrong . (According to the Doctrine of Double the fact that one and the same action may fall Effect which Anscomb e espoused, one may under many different descriptions, for instance permissibly perform actions that have the deaths 'ending a war ','killing civilians ' and of innocents as a consequence only so long as 'displacing molecules of air' . Under some of this is not one's 'direct intention ") So, in Mr these descriptions it would be intentional and Truman s Degree (1957) she opposed the under others not; and different intentional University of Oxford granting an honora ry descriptions would evoke different moral degree to President Truman , on the ground that evaluati ons. Is there, then, one correct his ordering the use of atom bombs , with the description? This problem has been extensively intention of causing the deaths of innocent discuss ed ever since. civilians as a means ofwringing total surrender Many of the positions that Anscombe from the Japanes e, was an act of mass murder. propos ed in Intent ion became, for a On this conception, the theory of moral consid erable time, extremely widely accepted. evaluation depends upon the theory of action, This cannot be said of much of her work. Her and Anscomb e argued in 'Modem moral paper 'The first person ' (1975), for instance, philosophy' (1958)-an article that helped lay argues that the word T is not a referring the groundwork for the reemergence in analytic expression. Not understanding this, she held, ethics of Aristot elian virtue theory and natural forces us into postulating a Cartesian ego since, law theory-that moral philosophy should be if T were indeed a referring expression, it abandoned until we have an adequate seems that a Cartesian ego is what it would have to refer to. Like much of Anscornbe's work, this philosophical psycholog y. Arendt 7 difficult paper has been much discussed, but Arendt, Hannah without commanding widespread agreement. To understand the idea ofaction one needs to German-American (emigrated to USAin 1941). understand causality, and some ofAnscombc's b: 14 October 1906, Hannover, Germany. d: 4 most discussed work has been on this topic . In December 1975, New York. Cat: Social critic ; her Inaugural Lecture Causality and political philosopher. E duc: Konigsberg, Determination (1971) (in Collected Papers , Marburg , Freiburgand Heidelberg Universities. vol. 3) she attacked two views which, since the Infls: Husserl and Jaspers . Appts: 1946-8, eighteenth century, have been widely accepted. Chief Editor, Schocken Books, New York; First, she argued against what she called 1949-52, Executive Director, Jewish Cultural 'determinism', the view that every event is Reconstruction, New York; 1953-67, comp letely determined by a prior cause . Professor, Committee on Social Thoug ht, Contrary to the view of Hume, she held that University of Chicago ; 1967-75, Professor, there are many sorts of cause , and some of them Graduate Faculty, New School for Social do not necessitate, or make inevitab le, effects . Research, New York. Second , she attacked the view, deriving from Kant and which had been almost an orthodoxy for fifty years, that determinism would be consistent with freedom ofthe will. Main publi cations: After Wittgensteiri's death Anscombe became one of his literary executors. In this (1951) The Origins of Totalitarianism , New York: capacity she has translate d and edited many of Harcourt, Brace . his works . One ofher own earliest works (1959) (1958) The Human Condition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press . was a difficult , though highly influential, (1961) Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in commentary on Wittgenstein's Tractatus Political Thought, New York: Viking Press . Logico-Philosophicus, in which she combated (1963) Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the the then prevalent interpretation according to Banality ofEvil ,New York: Viking Press . which the work was a manifesto of logical (1963) On Revolution, New York: Viking Press. empiricism. Anscombe is widely thought to be (1970) On Violence, New York: Harcourt, Brace . one of Britain's foremost postwar (1978) The Life of the Mind, 2 vols, ed. Mary philosophers- 'simply the most distinguished, McCarthy, New York: Harcourt Brace . (1982) Lectures on Kant s Political Philosophy,ed. R. intellectually formidable, origina l, and Beiner, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. troublesome philosopher in sight' (J. M. Cameron, The New Republic, 19 May, 1982, p. 34). Her thought is almost always difficult, in large part because it raises questions at the most Secondary literature: fundamental level. Consequently, many of her arguments have been more widely discussed Canovan, Margaret (1992) Hannah Arendt: A than accepted. Her fierce intelligence has often Reinterpretation of Her Politi cal Thought, New found expression in a fierceness ofstyle that not York: Cambridge University Press. everyone has found likeable. Hill, Melvyn A. (ed.) (1979) Hannah Arendt: The Recovery ofthe Public World,New York: StMartin's Press. Sources: Passmore 1957; CA 129; WW 1992. O'Sullivan, Noel (1975) 'Hannah Arendt: Hellenic nostalgia and industrial society', in Anthony de ANTHONY ELLIS Crespigny and Kenneth Minogue (eds), Contemporary Political Philosophers, New York: Dodd, Mead & Co. 8 Aurobindo

Tolle, Gordon J. (1982) Human Nature under Fire: King's College, Cambridge. Infls: Vedanta and The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt, evolutionists such as Henri Bergson and John Washin gton: University Press of America. Dewey. Appts: Founder of Aurobindo Ashram Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth (1982) Hannah Arendt: For at Pondicherry, India. Love of the World , New Haven , Yale University Press (bibliography included).

Main publications: Hannah Arendt was a complex and wide­ ranging thinker whose work cannot easily be (1947) The Life Divine, 2 vols, Calcutta: Arya summarized. She was a critic of modern mass Publishing Hou se. society which, with its tendenc y to atomization, (1950) The Ideal of Human Unity , New York: Sri alienation, anomi e and diffusion of Aurobindo Library. responsibility, was fertile ground for what she (1970-2) Sri Aurobindo Birth Centenary Library , called 'totalitarianism', in which individual Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram (containing human life becomes meaningless and freedoms Essays on the Gita; The Upanishad Texts, are eroded. To counteract this tendency she Translations and Commentaries ; The Secret ofthe advocated the separation of public life from Veda). social and economic life. She looked back to the Greek polis and, to a lesser extent, the early United States of America as models for what Secon dary literature: public life should be. In these societies individual citizens sought to excel in service to Chaudhuri, Harid as and Spiegelberg, Frederic (eds) the community, and authority was vested in (1961) The Interna l Philosophy ofSri Auro bindo: A institutions to which they were committed. Commemorative Symp osium, London :Allen & Arendt's ideas have been extensively discuss ed Unwin. and they have been widely influential. Her Chaudhuri. J,(1954) The Philosophy ofln tegralis m or critics have, however, doubted their the Metaphysical Synthesis Inherent in the Teaching philosophical underpinning. One commentator of Sri Aurobindo, Calcutta: Sri Aurobindo (O'Sullivan 1975, p. 251) questions her Pathamandir. identification ofthe broad notion of ' the public' Pearson , Nathaniel (1952) SriAurobindo andthe Soul Quest ofMan, London: George Allen & Unwin. with the comparatively narrow notion of 'the Price, Joan (1977) An Introduction to Sri Aurobindo s political'. Without that identification it is not so Philosophy , Pondi cherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram . clear that political action is as central a part ofa proper human life as Arendt maintained. Aurobindo , like the other twentieth-century Sources: Derwent, May (1986) Hannah Arendt Indian philosophers such as Radhakrishnan and (biography), New York : Penguin; Turner. Vivekananda, was deeply impressed by the idealism of Shankarite Vedanta. According to STUART BROWN Shankara, the ultimate Reality, Brahman, is beyond space and time, non-dual, qualityless and indescribable.The world as we know it, that is, as consisting of objects in space and time, is maya or illusion.Aurobindo accepted Brahman Aurobindo, Ghose (popularly known as as the ultimate reality: Sri Aurobindo) [Brahman ] cannot be summed up in any quantity or quantities, it cannot be compos ed Indian . b: 15 August 1872,Calcutta. d: 5 of any quality or combination of qualities. It December 1950, Pondicherry. Cat: is not an aggregate of forms or a formal Metaphysician .Educ: StPauls High School and substratum of forms . If all forms, quantiti es Austin 9

or qualities were to disappear, this would lnfls: Aristotle. Appts: Fellow, All Souls remain . Existence without quantity, without College , Oxford , 1933-35; Fellow, Magdal en quality, without form is not only College , Oxford , 1935-52;White's Professorof conceivable, but it is the one thing we can Moral Philosophy, Oxford; 1952-60; Visiting conceive beyond these phenomena. Professor, University of California at Berkeley, The Life Divine (1947 , vol. I, p. 96). 1958-9.

However, he disagreed with Advaita Vedanta, who thought that the phenomenal world was unreal. Aurobindo believed that the truth did not Main publications: lie either in idealismor in materialism since they both gave one-sided views about the nature of (1961) Philosoph ical Papers, Oxford: Clarendon reality. The answer instead lay in integralism, Press; second edition, 1970. according to which matter and consciousness (1962) How to Do Things with Words, Oxford: are connected inseparably. In other words, Clarendon Press; second edition, 1975. matter and spirit are two aspects of a single (1962) Sense and Sensibilia , Oxford: Clarendon whole ; they are both real. Press. According to Aurobindo, Brahman is sat (being), chit (consciousness) and ananda (bliss, delight)-that is to say, Braham is, Brahman Secondary literature: knows and Brahman is bliss. And all that is in space and time is real and is created by Brahman out of delight or ananda . Brahman , for Berlin , Isaiah et al. (1973) Essays on J. L. Austin, Aurobindo, manifests itselfthrough a process of Oxford: Clarendon Press. transformation or involution as matter, and Fann, K. T. (ed.) (1969) Sympo sium on J. L. Austin, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. through a gradual process ofevolution unfolds Warnock , G. J. (1991) , J. L. Austin, London: its many powers-life, mind and Routledge. consciousness. Man is a synthesis of the universe and is comprised of physical matter, vital force, emotive qualities, elementary After a distinguished undergraduate career as a intellect and soul. His goal is one of realizing classical scholar, Austin turned to philosophy. Brahman through knowledge of himsel f. In Hewas a Fellow ofAll Souls Colleg e from 1933 essence , Aurobindos philosophy is largely to 1935, and lectured in philosophy at Oxford influenced by the Advaita Vedanta ofShankara. from 1935 until the outbreak of war in 1939. He is, however, to be regarded as a modern After a notable career in intelligence, he interpreter who has tried to provide some returned to Oxford in 1945, and became justification for the objective existence of the phenomenal world despite accepting a non-dual Professor of Moral Philosophy in 1952. He had Brahman as Reality. by then only edited a volume of H. W. B. INDIRA MAHALINGAM CARR Joseph's Lectures on the Philosophy ofLeibniz , translated Frege 's Grundlagen der Arithm etik and published three papers.His influence rested very largely on his lecturing and seminars in Oxford . A considerable proportion ofhis work Austin, J(ohn) L(angshaw) was reconstructed and publishedposthumously. Austin thought that much philosophical British . b: 1911, Lancaster, England . d: 1960, work was characterized by haste and Oxford . Cat: Analytic philosopher. lnts: carelessness-about languag e, and about well­ Epistemology; philosophy of language ; known facts of our experience-and this philosophy ofmind . Educ: Oxford University. concern is clear in, for instance, 'The meaning 10 Austin of a word' (a lecture delivered in 1940 and promise to...', 'I name this ship ...', 'I hereb y published in Philosophical Papers). It can be bequeath ...'- forms of speech which look seen most famously, however, in the series of initially like ordinary indicative statements , but lectures that he gave in various forms from 1947 which in fact are not. When I say 'I promise to to 1958, which were subsequently published as ...', I do not, according to Austin , thereby state Sense and Sensibilia (1962) . These lectures that Ipromise; I do, by using that form ofwords , consist very largely of a minutely detailed actually promise: my utterance is itselfthe act of examination of A. J. Ayer's exposition of the promising. It seems initially tempting to Argument from Illusion,an argument which had contrast such speech forms, which Austin called widely been taken to show that in perception we 'performatives', with statements: doings as are only ever acquainted with sense data and opposed to sayings . But Austin saw that this never with material 0 bjects.Austin tried to show would be a mistake : after all, stating something that the argument was vitiated from beginning to is itself doing something, and Austin found no end by the failure to give any clear sense to the significant way to distinguish that sort ofdoing central terms . from other sorts ofverbal doings . Some have thought that Austin 's best The way forward , he thought , was to philosophical work is in his papers on the recognize that all speech consists of what he philosophy of action : 'A plea for excuses ' called 'speech acts'; and speech acts have (Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Society 1956­ different levels . When someone utters a 7),' Ifs and cans' (1956), 'Pretending' (1956-7) sentence in a language , Austin called that a and 'Three ways of spilling ink' (1958) . He 'Iocutionary act' . But in performing a thought that there was no way to understand locutionary act one may thereby perform a philosophical puzzles about the nature of action, further act: in saying, for instance, 'there is a bull freedom and responsibility other than to in that field ', I may, depending on the examine in detail particular aspects ofour talk circumstances, either be merely stating that about action, and the articles are characterized there is a bull or be warning you . Such further by an extraordinary sensitivity to the acts Austin called 'illocutionary acts' . I may distinctions that we ordinarily make when we also accomplish some effect by what I say: if I talk about action . Austin thought that 'our warn you that there is a bull in the field, and you common stock of words embodies all the are deterred from going into the field, by my distinctions worth drawing , and the connexions warning I deter you. This Austin referred to as worth marking, in the lifetimes of many the 'perlocutionary effect' of my act. generations: these surely are likely to be more Austin went on to distinguish five different numerous ,more sound , since they have stood up types ofillocutionary act, and he seems to have to the long test of survival ofthe fittest,and more thought that attention to this variety would have subtle , at least in all ordinary and reasonably significant philosophical implications. It practical matters ,than any that you or I are likely would, for instance, wean us away from our to think up' (' A plea for excuses ') . obsession with the true-falsedistinction and the Probably Austin's most famous and fact-value distinction. influential contribution was the notion of There has been much discussion as to what 'speech acts '. The idea first makes its Austin thought was the relevance to philosophy appearance (incipientl y and unnamed) in 'Other ofthe study oflanguage. In part, itwas no doubt minds' (1946), and was given fuller treatment in that he thought that philosophers should use 'Performative utterances' and How to Do more care in the way that they treated an Things with Words. Austin seems initially to essential tool, and that this would lead to have been struck by such forms of speech as 'I progress with old problems. In part, it was no Ay er I I doubt simply the sense that the phenom ena of Main publications: languag e raised problems which were interesting in themselves. Austin also toyed (1936) Language, Truth and Logic, London : with the idea that, just as philosophy had given Gollan cz. birth to such disciplines as psycholog y, it might (1940) Foundations of Empirical Kno wledge, one day give birth to a 'science of'language ',and London: Macmillan . this would no doubt be the home ofmuch that he (1947) Thinking and Meaning, London : H. K. Lewis . (1954) Philosophical Essays, London : Macmillan. was interested in. (1954) The Problem of Knowledge, London: During the 1970s Austin 's influence , which Macmillan. had been enormous in Britain during his lifetime (1963) The Concept ofa Person and Other Essays, and for some years thereafter, largely waned . London: Macmillan . However, detai led work was done on the notion (1968) The Origins of Pragmatism, London: ofspeech acts (by, for instance, J. R. Searle) and Macmillan. that notion itself has passed into common (1969) Metaphys ics and Common Sense, London : Macmillan. philosophical parlanc e. According to Geoffrey (1971) Russell and Moo re: the Analytical Heritage, Warnock, Austin's contributions to philosophy London: Macmillan . 'were not predictable. They opened questions (1972) Probability and Evidence, London : that had seemed closed, and brought in new Macmillan. questions. They followed no tramlines, (1972) Russell, London: Fontana . deepened no dialectical ruts. They brought (1973) The Central Questions ofPhilosophy ,London: balloons down to earth-sometimes very Weidenfeld . visibly much the worse for wear when they got (1980) Hum e, Oxford : Oxford University Press. (1980) Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, London : there' (1991, p. 153). Austin was a superb , and Weidenfeld . hilarious ly amusing, writer. Sense and (1981) Philosophy and Morality and Other Essays , Sensibilia is one of the funniest books ofserious Oxford: Clarendon Press. philosophy ever written.

Sources: Flew ; Passmore 1957; Isaiah Berlin et al. (1973) Essays on 1. L. Austin, Oxford : Clarendon Secondary lit erature: Press ;DNB; The Times, 10Feb 1960,p.13. Foster, John (1985) A. J. Ayer, London : Routledge . ANTHONY ELLIS Hahn, L. E. (ed.) (1972) The Philosophy ofA. J. Ayer, La Salle, Ill.: Open Court. Joad, C. E. M. (1950) Critique ofLogical Positivism , London: Gollan cz. Macdonald, G.F.(ed.) (1979) Perception and Identity , Ayer, Alfre d J ules London: Macmillan . Phillips Griffiths , A. (ed.) (1991) A. J. Ayer: Memoral Essays, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. British . b: 29 October 1910, London . d: 27 June 1989, London . Cat: Logical positivist. In ts: Epistemology; philosophical logic; ethics . Ayer impressed himself emphatically on the Educ: Christ Church, Oxford. Injls: Russell, philosophical consciousness ofhis age with the Carnap and Ryle. Appts: Lecturer, Christ publication of Language, Truth and Logic in Church, Oxford 1933-40;Professor,University 1936. For the rest of his long career he was Colleg e, London 1946-59; Professor of Logic, largely engaged in developing the ideas it Oxford 1959- 78. containe d, often by attenuating them . Its striking effect was due to a number of factors : 12 Ay er

the provocative nature and expression of its The most disconcerting consequence of the contents , its notable literary merits (clarity, verificationprinciplewas the insignificance and force, elegance, firmness ofoutline and solidity emptiness, not of metaphysics, but of moral of construction), perhaps, even, its refreshing utterances (indeed , ofjudgements ofvalue ofall brevity. The ideas it put forward were not kinds) and ofthedoctrines ofreligion . Religious without British exponents-Russell, Moore creeds are transcendentall y metaphysical. The and the marginall y British Wittgenstein-and, basic terms of morality and evaluation before them, W. K. Clifford and Karl Pearson . generally-good, right, ought-are neither But they had been passed through the Vienna natural , that is to say empirical (here Ayer Circle , which had endowed them with a invokes Moore's argument that ethical particularly uncompromising character. naturalism is fallacious , improving its The first, and crucial, thesis was that a formulation in the process) nor can there be non­ sentence is significant only if it is verifiable by empirical properties for them to apply to. The experience. From this it follows that function of value-judgements is to express the metaph ysics, to the extent that it claims to emotions, favourabl e or unfavourable, of the supply information about what lies beyond or speaker and to arouse, in a way that is neither behind experience, is impossible. Metaphysical explained nor evidentl y explainable, similar sentences are without meaning and so neither emotions in the hearer. true nor false. From this elimination of Attempts at the constructive task ofanalysis metaph ysics it follows, in tum , that the only are made on material objects, the past, the self proper business of philosophy is analysis , the and the minds of others . What is empirically definition, in some sense, of intellectually given in perception is sensedata, momentary essential words and types of sentence . The and private to the perceiver (an ancient empiricist dogma Ayer could never bring definitions in question will not be explicit himself seriously to question), so, Ayer definitions ofthe sort to be found in a dictionary. concluded, material objects must be logical They will be definitions in use, or 'contextual' constructions out ofactual and possible sense­ definitions, giving rules for translating data, Mill's phenomenalism stated in more sentences in which a problematic term occurs linguistic terms . The self, equally, is not an into sentences in which only less problematic, underlying substratum of experience, but the epistemologically more elementary,terms are to series, in each case, ofthe experiences each of be found . which contains as an element an experience ofa There is, however, one kind of non­ particular, identifiable human body. Since empirical, a priori , sentence which has an experiences can enter into the construction of acceptable method of verification. This is the both bodies and minds they are neither mental kind of sentence of which logic, mathematics nor physical, but neutral , in the style of neutral and, it turns out, philosophy proper are monism , as in Russell. Past events are composed. These sentences are analytic: true (if startlingl y analysed in terms of the future true or, if false, false) in virtue ofthe meaning of experiences which will verify their occurrence. the terms they contain .Inelementary cases they Other people 's minds are analysed in terms of cannot be understood unless their truth (or their empirical manifestations in bodily falsity) , is acknowledged.Others , whose truth is behaviour. not intuitively obvious , can be derived from Ayer's next book, Foundations a/Empirical them by proofs which rely on rules which Knowledge (1940), develops in quite persuasive themselves correspond to evidentl y analytic detail the phenomenalist account of material truths . (This account of the matter somewhat objects briefly sketched in its predecessor. A idealizes Ayer's too headlong exposition.) wholly original idea-that theories of Ayer 13

perception are 'alternative languages', familiar ground in epistemology and ethics, proposals, to be justified by their convenience, going fully for the first time into the problem of for discussing the facts of perception-was free will, opposing it, not to causation, but to soon abandoned without traces . There is further constraint. consideration of the problem of other minds, In The Problem ofKnowledge (1954) three reinstating the argument from analogy by the major issues with which he had been occupied supposition that it is only a contingent fact that throughout his career-perception, knowledge another's experience is his and not mine. Ayer ofthe past and knowledge ofother minds-are also gives up his earlier thesis that no empirical shown to have a common structure . Ineach case proposition can be known for certain to be true. the only evidence that seems to be available­ He dilutes his phenomenalism by the admission sense-impressions, current recollections, that statements about material objects cannot observed behaviour- falls short of the strictly be translated into statements about conclusions drawn about material things, past sense-data; the two can be correlated only in an events and the minds of others . The possible indefinite and schematic way. reactions are appraised: scepticism, an a priori Furtherconcessions appear in the substantial principle to bridge the gap, its closure by introduction to the second edition ofLanguage, reducing the inferred items to the evidence for Truth and Logic, ten years after its first them, non-empirical direct access to the publication. The chief of these concern the problematic items. Ayer offers a fifth option­ verification principle. It had originally been roughly that ofexplaining the gap in detail and stated in a 'weak' form, as requiring, not then doing nothing about it. The account of conclusive verification, but only that memory is excellent, dispelling an inheritance observation be relevant to the determination of of confusion from Russell . In the opening a statement's truth or falsehood . That, he saw, is chapter knowledge is distinguished from true weak in another way. The notion ofrelevance is belief by the 'right to be sure', an evaluative too indefinite . Ayer proposed various , more notion whose credentials to objectivity are not precise versions ofthe principle, but admitted, discussed. in the face of criticism, that the aim of exact Ayer's later writings do not contain many elucidation had eluded him. His earlier, weird, new ideas. There are two forceful and lucid reductive accounts of statements about future historical studies : on Peirce and James and on events and the minds of others were rejected . Russell and Moore . Three more essay But reductive enthusiasm is evident in his collections contain good things but no great London inaugural lecture of the same year, surprises . There are small books on Hume, Thinking and Meaning .Here the selfthat thinks, Russell and Wittgenstein and a history of the process ofsupposed mental acts in which it twentieth-century philosophy written very does so and the substantive meanings on to definitely from his point of view. The best and which it is alleged to be directed are all analysed most substantial of his later books is The Central into the expression of thought in significant Questions ofPhilosophy (1973) in which a very sentences . broad range oftopics is treated with admirable In Philosophical Essays (1954) topics in liveliness and concision, but in which no new philosophical logic receive serious attention. ideas are advanced. Discussing individuals, he defends the Nearly all Ayer's doctrines were derived implication of Russell's theory of descriptions very recognizably from others, except for those that a thing is no more than the sum of its he soon abandoned.The fact was not recognized qualities, something he was to reaffirm more at first because in 1936 they were exotic and forcefully later. Negation is ingeniously unfamiliar. Most of his early thinking was fairly investigated. The rest of the collection covers direct transcriptionofCarnap,modified, where 14 Ba ch elard

particularly para doxical , by infusions of Dijon; Professor ofthe History and Philosophy Schlick. He was, nevertheless, an exemplary ofScience , the Sorbonne, retiring 1954; Legion philosophical writer : presenting definite theses d'Honneur,1951. for discussion, backing them up with explicit and often ingenious argument and expressing his thoughts in superbly lucid, slightly chilly, Main publications: prose . He deserved his fame. Ayer became immediately well-known on the publication of his first book and strongly influenced his young On the philosophy of science: contemporaries, perhaps giving them the (1928) Essai sur la connaissance approchee. courage of their own developing convictions. (1934) Le Nouvel Esprit scientifique. (I 940) La Philosophie du non. After 1946, at University College, London, both (1949) Le Rationalisme appliqu e, Paris: PUF. staffand students philosophy ofthe department (1953) Le Materialisme rationn el , Paris: PUF. revealed the strong impress of his personality. Theory of criticism: But his self-regard did not take the form of (1938) La Psychanalyse dufeu. requiring submissive disciples ; philosophy to (1940) Lautreamont. him was more a competitive game than a (1942) L 'Eau et les reves. religious rite focussed on himself. His pupils (1943) L 'Air et les songes. have his intellectual style, but not usually his (1948) La Terre et les Reveries de la volonte, Paris: opinions. His department, in the early postwar Corti. years, was the main effective opposition to the (1948) La Terre et les Reveries du repos, Paris: Corti. uneasy coalition between Cambridge (1957) La Poetique de l 'espace, Paris: PUF. Wittgensteinianism and the Oxford philosophy (1961) La Flamme d 'une chandelle , Paris: PUF. of Ryle and Austin. He came back to Oxford just when the latter, on Austin's death, was disintegrating philosophically. In these years he was a dedicated and effective teacher and Secondary literature: animator of philosophical discussion. In the view of the interested public he was gradually Ginestier, P. (1968) Pour connaitre la pens ee de transformed from being the prophet of moral Bachelard, Paris: Bordas. nihilism into the paradigm ofa philosopher. Lafrance, G.(ed.) (1987) Gaston Bachelard, Ottawa : Sources: Passmore 1957; Edwards; Hill. University of Ottawa Press. ANTHONY QUINTON Quillet, P.(1964) Bachelard, Paris: Seghers.

The features ofthe world which most concerned Bachelard were change and discontinuity, Bachelard, Gaston especially in the working ofthemind.Trained as a scientist and deeply impressed by relativity, he began his intellectual career with a sustained French . b: June 1884, Bar-sur-Aube, France . d: attack on the positivistic idea of scientific October 1962, Paris. Cat: Scientist; critic. Ints: progress as a neat process of the accretion of Philosophy of science and of criticism. Educ: truths. Discoveries, he argued , are more Studied for a Mathematics degree, 1912; degree accurately regarded as discontinuities. Later in in Philosophy, 1920; agregation, 1922. Injls: life, turning his attention to artistic creativity, he Nietzsche, Einstein and Jung. Appts: Began argued forcibly against the deterministic adult life as a clerk; served with gallantry during criticism of the school of Sainte-Beuve, in the First World War; Professor of Philosophy, Bachelard's view false to the real workings of Benjamin 15

the imagination. Scientific discoveries and in abeyance, time consciousness is modified works ofart are important discontinuities in the and the mind follows its own impulsions. Since world . the imagination is in principle unpredictable, The growth of scientific knowledg e, criticism of the kind practised by Sainte-Beuve, Bachelard argues, is not a neat, sequential piling further vitiated by its reliance on deterministic up of new truths , as the positivists have principles rejected by science , is a waste of presented it. Discoveries are made not by those effort. Nothing in the humdrum life ofthe artist who accept current science but by those who say allows us to predict the occurrence and nature of no to it, those who correct errors (cf. 1940), and creative acts. It is more appropriate, in discoveries frequentl y involve revisions of Bachelard's view, to classify artistic concepts at all levels, down to the most imaginations into types. His way of doing this fundamental. The assumption, for example, that was to associate them with one ofthe elements : the notion ofreason as enshrined in traditional hence the referenc e, in the titles ofmany ofhis rationalism is fixed for all time is untenable: literary works, to fire, earth, air and water. 'Reason must obey science ... which is ROB ERT WILKINSON evolving' (1940, p. 144; there is much in Bachelard which is Kuhnian avant la lettre) . The outmoded assumptions ofsuch rationalism Bachelard replaces by his preferred method , surrationalism: mutable , polymorphic and in Benjamin, Walter principle revisable at all levels of conceptual generality. This method furthers rather than German. b: 1892, Berlin . d: 1940, Port Bou, stifles the mental process at the heart of Franco-Spanish border. Cat: Marxist; cultural discovery, the sudden intuition which goes theorist ; literary theorist. Ints: Art and society. beyond currentl y received belief sets. Educ: Universities ofBerlin, Freiburg, Munich Everything which presents itself as a final and Bern. Infls: Goethe , Baudelaire, Marx, discov ery or immutable principle is to be Lukacs and Brecht. Appts: Benjamin held no regarded with suspicion: stasis was not a formal academic position, working mainly as a property Bachelard saw around him either in the freelance critic and translator, although he was world or in our knowledge of it; what we call associated with the Institute of Social Research being at rest is merely 'a happy vibration' (La at the University ofFrankfurt (later relocated in Dialectique de la duree , 1936, p. 6). New York). Partly for emotional reasons and partly as a result of his interest in the psychology of creativity, Bachelard was not content to remain solely a philosopher of science . From 1938 Main publications: onwards he published a series of works which are centrallyconcerned with the processes ofthe (1928) Der Ursprung des deuts chen Trauerspiels, artistic imagination, and his views have (Engli sh translation , The Origin ofGerman Tragic important consequences for the nature of Drama, trans. John Osborne, London: NLB , 1977). criticism. The imagination is as valuabl e and as (1966) Versuche iiber Brecht, Frank furt-am -Main : basic a mental faculty as reason . Its product is Suhrkamp Verlag (English translation, the image, irreducible to concepts , imprecise Understanding Brecht, trans. Anna Bostock, and suggestive. The process ofthe imagination London: NLB , 1973). cannot be predicted, and can be studied only a (1968) Illum inations, ed. Hannah Arendt , trans. Harry posteriori. The imagination works best in the Zohn , New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. state Bachelard calls reverie, by which he means (1969) Charles Baudelaire: Ein Lyr iker in Zeitalt er neither a dream nor a dreamy condition but a des Hochkapitalismus, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, contemplative state in which the surface ego is Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag (Engli sh translation, 16 Benjamin

Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era ofHigh championship of experiment - new cultural Capitalism, trans. Harry Zohn, London: NLB, conditions required new forms of art, in his 1973). opinion - has affinities with the work of the (1970) Berliner Chronik , Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Frankfurt School, with which he was loosely Verlag. associated in the Inos and 30s; although the (1979) One-Way Street and Other Writings, trans . School's leading figures (Theodor Adorno and Edmund Jephcott and Kingsley Shorter, London: NLB. Max Horkheimer) often criticized Benjamin's cultural analyses as not being dialectical enough . Somewhat ironically, it is that very lack ofdialectical orthodoxy and rigidity which has Secondary literature: led to Benjamin's renewed popularity amongst the generally anti-Marxist post-modernist Benjamin, Andrew (ed.) (1989) The Problems of movement. Modernity: Adorno and Benjamin, London: Benjamin's writings on epic theatre (the two Routledge. versions of the essay ' What is Epic Theatre?', Bullock, Marcus Paul (1987) Romanticism and for example) help to theorise Brecht's artistic Marxism: The Philosophical Developm ent of practicemore fully.For Benjamin, epic theatre's Literary Theory and Literary History in Walter role was to reveal the underlying socio-political Benjamin and Friedri ch Schlegel , New York: Peter Lang. conditions in such a way that the audience could Eagleton, Terry (1981) Walter Benjamin , London: not ignore them ; if necessary to shock the Verso. audience into awareness ofthoseconditions.By Jennings, Michael W. (1987) Dialectical Images : encouraging identification with the plight ofthe Walter Benjamin s Theory of Literary Criticism, dramatic characters, traditional theatre Ithaca , NY, and London: Cornell University Press . ('culinary', as Brecht had dismissively referred Nagele, Rainer (1988) Benjamin's Ground: New to it) had helped to distract audiences from those Readings ofWalter Benjamin, Detroit: Wayne State socio-political realities . Epic theatre, therefore , University Press. for both Benjamin and Brecht, fulfilled a Smith, Gray (ed.) (1988) On Walter Benjamin : specifically Marxist function, although it would Critical Essays and Recollections, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. not be until after the Second World War, and Brecht's return to communist East Germany, that it would find acceptance in official Marxist Although relatively little known during his political circles . During Benjamin's lifetime , lifetime, when only two of his books were however, epic theatre, and its attendant published, Benjamin is now considered to be commitment to experimentation with form and one of the leading Marxist aestheticians and rejection of the principles of realism, came cultural commentators ofthe twentieth century ; under bitter attack from more orthodox Marxist in particular, he is credited with being one ofthe critics such as Georg Lukacs (although it is also first to recognise the significance ofart as a form worth noting that Benjamin was highly of social production. A close associate of the influenced by earlier theoretical works of playwright Bertolt Brecht, Benjamin was an Lukacs, such as History and Class enthusiastic proponent of'epic theatre' and one Consciousness). ofthe few Marxist critics ofhis time to defend Benjamin spent several years working on his modernism as an aesthetic . Generally speaking, so-called Arcades Project, a wide-ranging the Marxist critical establishment favoured account ofnineteenth-century Parisian city life realism and frowned on experiment in an era going right down to the level of its incidental when the 'socialist realism' of Stalin's cultural details , in an 'attempt to capture the portrait of commisar, A.A.Zhdanov, came to dominate the history in the most insignificant representations Marxist cultural agenda . Benjamin's Bergson 17

of reality, its scraps, as it were' . He was situation .This aspect ofBenjamin's thought has fascinated by the notion (found in Baudelaire) of been particularly influential on the development the flaneur, the figure strolling around the city of cultural studies and postmodemist aesthetics, taking in its sights and sounds, and in this which have equally enthusiastically celebrated fashion gaining an insight into the hidden the breakdown in the distinction between high meanings of both the city and its historical art and popular culture, and the assumed period.The Project was never completed, but its authority ofthe artistic producer. rather impressionistic approach could only Benjamin's call in 'The Author as Producer' appear undialectical and insufficiently for artists to make themselves aware of their analytical to Marxists ofthe Adorno stamp . position in the production process, is part of a One of Benjamin's most important general insistence in his writings that art should contributions to aesthetic theory can be found in be treated as a form of social production. For the essay 'The Work of Art in the Age of him, the important issue is not where art stands Mechanical Reproduction', which introduces with regard to the relations ofproduction of its the concept of 'aura'. The latter refers to the particular historical time, but where it stands sense oforiginality or authenticity of a work of within those relations . In this respect he lays the art, derived from 'itspresence in time and space, groundwork for much later theorizing in its unique existence at the place where it Marxist aesthetics, such as the work of the happens to be'. Benjamin argues that the advent structuralist Marxist movement (Pierre of mechanically-reproducible art forms (film Macherey and Terry Eagleton, for example), and photography being cases in point) led to a whose concern with the ideology of artistic withering away of that aura, and thus of art's production owes much to Benjamin's ideas. authority and cult status .This process ,which for Indeed, the structuralist Marxist technique of Benjamin shatters tradition , can have both reading texts 'against the grain' to make them negative and positive connotations, politically reveal their ideological assumptions, is adapted speaking . It can become implicated in mass from Benjamin's demand in his enigmatic, and movements such as fascism, which for somewhat mystically-inclined late work, Benjamin constitutes the politicization of 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', that in aesthetics, or it can lead to the emancipation of order to bring out the latent 'barbarism' in all artworks from 'dependence on ritual' . Either documents of'civilization' it is the critic's duty way, art is now unmistakably in the political 'to brush history against the grain' . domain as far as Benjamin is concerned. STUARTSIM Benjamin's commitment to artistic experimentation can be seen to particular effect in the essay 'The Author as Producer', where it is argued that the time has come radically to rethink our traditional notions of literary forms Bergson, Henri-Louis and genres . 'Novels did not always exist in the past', it is pointed out, 'nor must they always French . b: 18 October 1859, Paris, d: 3 or 4 exist in the future' . What Benjamin saw January 1941, Paris. Cat: Metaphysician; happening in the modern world was a 'melting process philosopher. Ints: Evolution. Educ: down' ofliterary forms, a process which called Studied at Ecole Normale, Paris, graduating in into question our traditional perceptions of 1881, and taking his doctorate in 1889. Infls: literary value, and of the relationship between Zeno ofElea, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Oriental 'high' and 'low' art, author and reader. Once and Christian mystics , Descartes, Spinoza, again, Brecht was taken as some kind ofmodel Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Claude ofhow we should proceed in this new cultural Bernard, Lachelier, Ravaisson, Spencer, 18 Bergson

Darwin and Einstein. (See also R. Berthelot, Secondary literature: 1913.). Appts: Taught at Anger, 1881-3, Clermont-Ferrand, 1883- 7, and Paris; Barlow, M. (1966) Henri Bergson , Paris: Editions Professor, College de France, in 1900; main universitaires (brief biography linking life and works placed on Vatican 's Index, 1914; Nobel works). Prize for Literature, 1927. Berthelot, R. (1938) Un Romantisme utilitaire, troisieme partie, Paris: Alcan (thorough but hostile ). Capek, M. (1971) Bergson and Modern Physics, Dordr echt: Reidel (full, scholarly and largel y Main publications: sympathetic account, seeing Bergson against the intellectual background). (1889) Essai sur les donnees immediates de la Gunter, P.A. Y. (ed. and trans.) (1969) Bergson and the perception, Paris: A lcan (English translation, Time Evolution ofPhysics, Knoxville , Tenn. : Tennessee and Free Will, trans. F. L. Po gson, London: Allen & University Press (reactions to Bergson by modern Unw in, 19 10). physicists and other s; often technic al). (1896) Matiere et memoire, Paris: Alcan (English --(1986) HenriBergson: A Bibliography , Bowlin g translation, Matter and Memory , trans. N. M. Paul Green, Ohio: Philo soph y Documentation Centre and W.S. Palmer, London: Allen & Unwin, 1911). (revised edition of 1984 original). ( 1900) Le Rire, Paris: Alcan (English translation, Hanna, T. (ed.)(1962) The Bergson ian Heritage,New Laughter, trans. C. Brereton and F. Rothwell , York: Columbia Univeristy Press. London: Ma cmillan, 1911). Husson , L. (1947) L 'Intellectualisme de Bergson, (1903) 'Introduction a la metaphysiquc', Revue de Paris: PUF(claims Bergson is not anti­ Metaphysique et de Morale, 29 Janua ry (see 1912, intellectualist). 1934 for translations) . Jankelevit ch, V. (1959) Henri Bergson, Paris: PUF ( 1907) L 'Evolution creatrice, Paris: Alcan (English (much revised version of 1931 original). translati on, Creative Evolution, A. Mitchell, Kolakowski, L. (1985) Bergson , Oxford : Oxford London: Ma cmillan, 1911). University Press (brie f introduction). (1912 ) Introduction to Metaphysics , New York: Lacey, A. R. ( 1989) Bergson, Lond on: Routle dge Putnam's Sons (trans. by T. E. Hulme of 1903). (attempts down-to-earth assessment of Bergson 's (1919) L 'Energie spirituelle: Essais et confe rences, actual arguments, although it has been accused ofnot Paris: Alcan (English translation, Mind-Energy , bringing out his importanc e). trans. H. W. Carr, Lond on: Macmillan, 1920). Les Etudes bergsoniennes (1948- 76) (periodical in (1922) Duree et simultaneite : A propos de la theorie eleven volum es). d 'Einstein, Paris : Alcan (English translation , Mosse-B astide, R.-M. (1955) Bergson educateur, Duration and Simu ltaneity, tran s. with an Paris: PUF. introdu ction by H. Dingle, Indianapolis: Bobb s­ Papani col aou, A. C. and Gunter, P. A. Y. (eds) (1987) Merrill, 1965). Bergson and Modern Thought, Chur, Swit.: ( 1932) Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religio n, Harwood Academic Publi shers (essays tending to Paris: Alcan (English translation, The Two Sources stress anticipations of mod ern physics and ofMorality and Religion, tran s. R.A. Audra and C. pysch ology, and also parapsychol ogy). Brer eton with the assistan ce of W. H.Carter, Russell , B. (1914) The Philosophy of Bergson, London: Ma cmillan, 1935). Cambridge: Bowes & Bowes (includes H. W. Carr 's ( 1934) La Pensee et le mouvant: Essais et reply and Russell's furth er reply). confe rences, Paris: Alcan (English translation, The Creati ve Min d, trans. M. L. Andison, New York: One of the most striking things about Bergson is Philosoph y Libr ary, 1946). perhaps the extraordinary width of his cultural attainments. At 17 he won an open prize for an Collected editi ons: (1959) Oeuvres, Paris: PUF. original solution to a mathematical problem, (1972 )Melanges, Paris: PUF(includes 1922 , wh ich is and in the same year solved a problem Pascal not in 1959). claimed to have solved but left unpublished Bergson 19

(1972, pp. 247-55). His graduation thesis (in Bergson is often regarded as a rather Latin) was on Aristotle's theory ofplace and he unrigorous, if not hopelessl y high-flown, wrote a short commentary on Lucretius (both thinker. His sympath y with mysticism, reprinted in Melanges, 1972);and he lectured on especially in his later writings (see 1932), such Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus , among other rather cloudy notions as the elan vital (1907) , things . He made a thorough study of the and his often rather lyrical and picturesque styIe, technical literature on the role of the brain in do give some countenance to this. The success connection with aphasia (1972, p. 1209), quoted of style meant that his prewar lectures became detailed scientific evidence when discussing so crowded (a photograph shows people evolution, and in later years took on Einstein in straining to listen through the open windows) public debate on certain paradoxical thatthey were nearly moved to the Opera.But all implications of relativity theory-adebate he is this is only one feature ofa complex whole , and generally regarded as having lost, but several of is far removed from his actual intentions. the leading physicists of the century have Twenty years before his book on morality devoted articles to his work (see Gunter 1969); (1932) he explained his silence on that topic by Papainicolaou and Gunter 1987). saying he could not there reach results 'as Bergson is among the regrettably few great demonstrable or as "presentable" [montrables]' stylists in philosophy. His ideas are often as in his other works , adding that philosophy intricate and difficult , but his exposition ofthem could 'claiman objectivity as great as that ofthe ranks with those ofRussell, Berkeley, the early positive sciences , although of another nature ' Plato and his cordial admirer William James, (1972,p.964).Notonly did he appeal to detailed and this feature survives in the English scientific evidence when relevant, but he translations (all the non-posthumous ones reached his main philosophical positions by having his imprimatur, as he was bilingual starting not, as was commonly thought , from the because of his English mother) . 'There is intuitive data of lived experience but by nothing inphilosophywhich could not be said in reflecting on the treatment of time by science everyday language', he told an interviewer and mathematics. Like William James , with (1972, p. 939). Like Russell he tried to combine whose 'stream of consciousness' his own philosophy with action : 'one should act like a philosophy had so much in common, he insisted man ofthought and think like a man of action', on the importance ofintrospective psychology; as he told a Danish congress in 1937 (1972, p. but whereas for James itwas a starting-point, for 1579). In 1917 he helped to bring America into himself it was a point of arrival : for all the the war, visiting for that purpose , and later similarities oftheir philosophies, he said, he and helped to set up the educational side of the James had reached them quite independently League ofNations, believing that education and (1972,pp. 656-61 ; 1959,pp. 1541-3): Bergson mutual understanding would prevent war. For was rather suspicious of claims to see his last seventeen years he endured crippling philosophical influences' (1972, p. 1480). His arthritis .Fiercely patriotic, he died atthe darkest 1889 work , with its title and its opening chapter moment of French history, of bronchitis on the nature ofexperience, might seem to belie possibl y caused by several hours ' standing in this; but the latter, at least, although it does of freezing condi tions to register as a Jew,refusing , course represent his own view, was added for it is said, to desert his fellow Jews by accepting strategical reasons connected with getting a a presumably face-saving exemption offered by doctorate (1959,p. 1542). the authorities (he refused for the same reason to In the same important autobiographical join the Catholic Church , to which he had by fragment (ibid., pp. 1541-3), written in 1922, then became spiritually converted). 20 Bradley

Bergson tells how in his youth he was the world itself. He solves Zeno 's Achilles confronted by two opposing currents of opinion , paradox by similarly distinguishing Achilles ' Kantian orthodoxy and Spencerian indivisible motion from the divisible trajectory evolutionism. He preferred Spencer because of it covers , a solution which , along with his the 'concrete character of his mind' and his asymmetrical treatment of time and space, has desire to keep always to the domain offacts. He been much criticized.Not only have these views has often been regarded as anti-intellectualist on time been generally (though not because of his emphasis on intuition , a faculty undisputedly) taken to have influenced Proust which evolved from instinct (and is first treated and many other literary figures (see, for in 1903). (On the anti-intellectualism charge see exampl e, Delattre inLes Etudes bergsoniennes, Husson 1947.) Although he later abandoned 1948- 76, vol. 1), but here and in his 'process Spencer (because his science was inadequate), philosophy' approach to substance (1896) and and does indeed give pride ofplace to intuition his views on determinism (1889) and on the as the highest human faculty, it is not at the influence of consciousness (1896) he is expense of intellect in its own sphere , that of sometimes claimed to have anticipated features science and mathematics, which he never of relativity theory, microindeterrninacy and abandoned. The 'intuition ofduration' is indeed modem scientific theories of the mind (see, for the linchpin of Bergson 's philosophy (1972, p. example , Papanicolaou and Gunter 1987). 1148), but intuition in general is 'instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, Sources: Passmore 1957. capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely' (1907 , translation, p. A.R. LACEY 187).Itis certainl y not a substitute for hard work (1934, translation, p. 103. But Bergsons ' treatment of intuition does seem to involve some confusions. Sometimes it seems to mean Bradley, Francis Herbert the getting of bright ideas, which both presupposes and involves intellectual hard British . b: 1846, London . d: 1924, Oxford . Cat: work. But it is also a faculty which diverges Absolute idealist. Ints: Ethics ; logic; from intellect, partl y by apprehending duration metaphysics. Educ: MA, University College , as something essentially unified and continuous Oxford .Infls: T. H. Green, E. Caird, Bosanquet (and the qualitative aspects ofour experiences in and Hegel. Appts: Fellow of Merton College , general) and partly as apprehending ineffable Oxford , 1870-1924. metaphysical reality, culminating in mysticism: here intuition is the method of philosophy as intellect is of science and mathematics-but Main publications: does he distinguish philosophyas an intellectual study about intuition? Bergson's most lasting influence has certainly lain in his distinction (1876) Ethical Studies, London; second edition, Oxford, 1927 (1962 edition cited here). between time as indivisible, qualitatively (1883) Principles ofLogic, Oxford; second edition, heterogeneous and known to experience Oxford, 1922. (duration) and time as divisible, qualitatively (1893) Appearance and Reality, London: Allen & homogeneous, and studied by science , which Unwin; second edition, 1897 (1969 edition cited treats it as analogous to space; though from here). Matiere et memoire (1896) on, both belong in (1914) Essays on Truth and Reality , Oxford. (1935) Collected Essays , Oxford . Bradley 2 1

Secondary literature: morality, in particular, the ideal self is the good will, the identification ofmy will with the ideal Eliot, T. S. (1964) Knowl edge and Experience in the as a universal will' (p. 230) . However, none of Philosophy ofF H. Bradley ,London :Faber&Faber. the necessary superstructure for this was given Mander, W. J. (1994) An Introdu ction to Bradley s in Ethical Studies. That had to wait for Metaphysi cs, Oxford: Clarendon Press . Appearance and Reality . Manser, A. (1983) Bradley s Logic, Oxford: Principles of Logic, like Appearance and Blackwell. Reality,opens withadenialthat it is asystematic --and Stock, G. (eds) (1984) The Philosophy ofF treatise. Bradley also distances himself from H. Bradley, Oxford : Clarendon Press. Hegel, usuall y seen as his main source of Taylor, A. E. (1924-5) Obituary, Proceedings ofthe British Academy II . influence: 'We want no system-making or Wollheim , R. (1959) F H. Bradley , Harmond sworth: systems home-grown or imported' (Preface) . Penguin . Although there are obvious differences Bradley's logic can be appreciated best in contrast with that of Frege, his near Bradle y's central work in idealist metaphysics contemporary (see Manser's paper in Manser was expressed in Appearance and Reality and Stock 1984). Like Frege, he totally rejected (1893) , although he did not regard this as a psychologism in logic, sarcastically referring to systematic exposition of his thinking. His Mill as our 'great modern logician' (1876, p. earlier Ethical Studies (1876) and Principles of 113). But, also like Frege , he was preoccupied Logic (1883) were also important as critiques of with whatever it was about or within a utilitarianism and empiricism. Ethical Studies judgement that held it together, and with the and the chapter on 'goodness' in Appearance connections between judgements that enabled and Reality stress the importance of self logical relations to exist between them . Like realization as an end for morality, but Bradley Frege, but without any supporting symbolism, was equall y anxious to stress that this end could he repudiated subject-predicate logic and only be understood in a wide metaphysical stressed the significance oflogical as opposedto context, rather than as an appeal to mere self­ superficial forms (1883 , pp. 618- 19). (All of interest. The 'self to be realized ' was not 'the this may have influenced the early Russell far selfto be pleased' (1876 ,Essay V, p. 160). The more than he claimed to remember). But 'real moral idea' was the community, which extremely unlike Frege , Bradley drew idealist provided the only intelligible framework for conclusions from his critiques ofpsychologistic realization (p. 210) : Bradley's famous notion of logic: the unity within a statement, and the unity 'My station and its duties' . 'There is nothing between logically related statements,could only better than this ', he wrote, 'nor anything higher be grasped truly as part of a wider metaphysical or more truly beautiful' (ibid .). His scorn for unity : 'All judgment is of Realit y, and that utilitarian ethics was almost unlimited: means that it makes its idea the adjective ofthe happiness could have nothing at all to do with real Universe' (Terminal Essay, 1922, II, p. morality; the idea that any kind of pleasure 628). Again , as with his moral philosoph y, the principle could act as a mora l motivation was underl ying metaphysics ofthis had to wait to be incoherent. The general strategy of Ethical fully explained . Studies was dialectical in a way that can mislead This explanation came in Appearance and the unwary reader searching for clear Reality, where Bradle y expounded his absolute conclusions. Essay VI, on 'Ideal morality', tries idealism as fully as he ever did anywhere. The to explain how self-realization falls into his object of the book was 'to state merely a general widerview : 'The general end is self-realization view about Reality, and to defend this view the making real of the ideal self; and for against more obvious and prominent 22 Bradley

objections' (p. 403) . His metaphysical thinking existence, and all thought and feeling , become was not based on epistemology. Appearance one, we may even say that every feature in the and reality (as with McTaggart) were not universe is thus absolutely good' (p. 365) . aligned with phenomena and noumena (chapter Appearance and Reality ends with what Bradley XII) . Although the ordinary, perceived world invokes as 'the essential message of Hegel': was not Reality for Bradley, he was at pains to 'Outside of spirit there is not, and there cannot stress that it was unreal in comparison with a be, any reality, and the more that anything is higher ideal and, not in comparison with spiritual, so much the more is it veritably real' anything concealed behind the veil of (p. 489) . Bradley, with McTaggart, is normally perception inherited from egocentric taken to be the principal figure in British epistemology: 'The assertion of a reality falling idealism: a movement that now seems peculiar outside knowledge, is quite nonsensical' (p. for the speed of its total downfall. Its 114). Experience, he held, was genuine enough culmination in Bradley's Appearance and in its own terms . Appearance was unreal mainly Reality (1893) was succeeded, soon after 1898, for logical reasons (see p. 334). The idea that by its alleged intellectual defeat by Moore and anything could be only accidentally Russell. But its influence lasted longer than that, ('externally') related to anything else was a starting with the earlier work of Green, profound error. Deeper reflection would show Bosanquet and Bradley himself, going on that all relations were in some way essential or through McTaggart's Nature of Existence intrinsic ('internal'), and could not, in any event, (1921-7) and lasting for the terms of many later be considered themselves, apart from the reality university appointments ofidealists in England within which they existed. 'Reality is one . It and Scotland, half a century after their must be single , because plurality, taken as real, philosophy had been pronounced dead contradicts itself (p. 460) . So a full statement (Collingwood and Joachim were two notable about anything-and hence a fully true examples in Oxford). statement about anything-could not be made Russell tended to take Bradley as a main without reference to everything else. Thus : target ofhis 'revolt into pluralism', although it is ' There will be no truth which is entirely true,just striking that he engaged in direct published as there will be no error which is totally false' debate only with Joachim. Bradley scarcely (pp. 320-1). The repudiation of 'external mentioned his pluralist critics . His only relations' and the doctrine of degrees of truth sustained response was the posthumous and reality were seen by Bradley's pluralist 'Relations' (1923--4, in Collected Essays, critics , Moore and Russell, as well as by him, as 1935). logically fundamental. Bradley was a remarkable writer : powerful, The critical side ofBradley's metaphysics is allusive and scornful, and wholly undeserving often surprisingly trenchant. The positive of the charges of woolly unclarity brought characterization ofthe absolute is more elusive. against him by his later positivist critics . T. S. 'There is but one Reality, and its being consists Eliot noted in his Preface (1964) to the reissue of in experience' (p. 403) . Any further categorical his doctoral dissertation on Bradley how closely statement about it would be bound to be false his own prose style was 'formed on that of since : 'any categorical judgment must be false . Bradley and how little it has changed in all these The subject and the predicate, in the end, cannot years' (pp. 10-11). Bradley's colourful use of either be the other' (p. 319) . Nevertheless, in a metaphor may be valued more highly as sense, it may be said that: 'the Absolute is philosophical rhetoric becomes more actually good, and throughout the world of appreciated. ('The Absolute has no seasons , but goodness it is truly realized in different degrees all at once bears its leaves, fruit, and blossoms. of satisfaction. Since in ultimate Reality all Brentano 23

Like our globe it always, and it never, has Secondary literature: summer and winter' (l893,p.442).) Chisholm, R. M. (ed .) (1960) Realism and the RICHARD MASON Background ofPhenom enology , Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press (contains portions of Psychologi c vom emp irischen Standpunkt). Kastil, A. (1951) Die Philosophi e Franz Brentano : Brentano, Franz Eine Einfiihrung in seine Lehre, Bern : A. Francke. Moore, G.E. (1903) 'Review ofFranz Brentano : The origins of the know ledge of right and wrong' , German-Austrian. b: 1838, Marienburg, International Journa I ofEthics 14: 115- 23. Germany. d: 1917,Florence. Cat: Philosophical Spiegelberg, H. (1960) The Phenom enological psychology. In ts: Intentionality; act Movement: A Historical Introduction, 2 vols, The psychology. Educ: Universtiy of Tiibingen . Hague: Nijhoff. Infls: Aristotle, Kant and the post-Kantians . Appts: Professor of Philosophy, first at the A philosopher and psychologist, Franz Catholic University of Wiirzburg, later at University ofVienna . Brentano has a permanentplace in the history of philosophy as the first to give a clear account of the intentionality, or object-relatedness, of mental phenom ena. Born in the Rhineland, he Main publications: became a Roman Catholic priest and Professor of Philosophy at the Catho lic University of (1874) Psychologic vom empirischen Standpunkt, Wiirzburg . He resigned both priesthood and Leip zig: Duncker & Humb lot, 1874; second edition Chair after the Declaration of Papal Infallibility in 2 volumes, 1911 ; third edition, ed. O. Kraus , Leip zig : F. Meiner, 1925 (English trans lation, in 1871, and was appointed to a Chair of Psychology f rom an Empirical Standpoint, ed. L. L. Philosophy at Vienna University. In a McAlister, London, 1973). voluminous output, his most important work (1889) Ursp rung sittlicher Erkenntnis, Leip zig: was Psychologyfrom the Empirical Standpoint, Duncker & Humblot; third edition, ed. Oskar Kraus , first published in 1874, the same year as 1934 (Engli sh translation, The Origins of Our Wundt's Foundations of Physiological Knowledge Right and Wrong, trans . Cecil Hag ue, Psychology . London: A. Constable, 1902). (1893) The Future ofPhilosophy , Vienna: A. Holder In the Psycholo gy Brentano set out to (1895) Die vier Phasen der Philosophie [The Four provide an account of the structure of mind Phases of Philo soph y], Stuttgart: J. C. Cott'schen which would serve as a foundation for empirical Buchhandlung; ed. Oskar Kraus, Leip zig : F.Meiner, psychology. He calle d this ' descriptive 1926. psychology' (and sometimes 'descriptive (1907) An Investigation of the Psychology of the pheno menology'). He considered himself an Senses, Leipzig : Duncker& Humb lot. ( 1925) Versuch iiber die Erkenntnis [Inqu iry into empiricist: experience, he claimed, was his only the Nature ofKnowledge] ed. Alfred Kastil , Leip zig: teacher. Where Wundt was establishing F. Meiner. psychology as an empirical science through the (1929) VomDasein Gottes [On the Existence ofGod], experimental investigation of the context of ed . Alfred Kastil, Leip zig : F. Meiner. experience, Brentanos primary method was (1930) Wahrheit und Evidenz [Truth and Evidence], carefu l observation of the act of experience ed . Oskar Kraus, Leip zig: F. Meiner. (1952) Grundlegung und Aujbau der Ethik [The Basis itself. Taking for granted a broadly dualistic and Structure of Ethi cs], ed . F. Mayer-Hillebrand, view of the world (as divided into 'psychical' Bern : A. Francke. and 'physical' phenomena), he concentrated on (1954) Religion und Philosoph ie, ed . F. Mayer­ two questions: What are the essential or defining Hill ebrand, Bern : Fran cke. 24 Brentano

character istics of the mental? ; Into what respectively of judgements and feelings that categories can mental phenomenabe classified? much ofthe remainder ofBrentano's extensive It was in attempting to answer the first of philosophy is concerned. Thus representations, these questions that he developed his influential ideas directly present to consciousness, cannot ideas on the intentionality of mind . Mental be eithercorrect or incorrect. They are as it were phenomena, he argued , are distinguished from just there . But when we take up one or other of physical by ' intentional inexistence', that is two opposed stances we open up the possibility ' reference to a content' or 'direction upon an of being right or wrong . In the case of object'. Thus a thought is always a thought judgements, then, one or other of the two about something, a desire is always a desire for opposed stances ofaffirmation or rejection must something, a perception is always a perception be correct in a given case : 'This is a pencil ', or, of something, and so on. This is more than a 'This is not a pencil'. As to which is correct, we merely contingent matter. The'something' may come to understand the difference by be some other mental content (an image, say). It contrasting actual cases of judgements which may be something that does not exist (for are correct with those which are not. And example, a unicorn). Hence the intentionality of judgements are objective in the sense that we mind is not a relation between it and its object cannot affirm correctly what anyone else denies (which would entail that the object existed) it is correctly, or vice versa . This is a non­ 'relational' or 'relation-like'. But there must propositional theory ofjudgement. To affirm! (logically must) always be something towards deny that there is a pencil is not to affirm/deny which a mental act is directed. In the absence of the proposition 'my pencil exists'. It is to affirm! this, mental verbs are literally meaningless. deny the existence ofa pencil. The object of the Subjective experiences can only be understood affirmation/denial is not a proposition, nor even as acts of consciousness directed towards a state of affairs , but, like the object of the objects . corresponding representation, the pencil. As to the second question, Brentano allowed Indeed, terms like 'exist' do not refer: they are only three categories, or 'Grand Classes', of 'systematic', allowing us to express our mental phenomena: representations, acceptance or rejection ofthings . judgements and feelings (including both Much the same, Brentano argued, is true of emotions and volitions) . These reflect three feelings and, hence , since this category includes ways in which mental phenomena may be the ethical stances of good and bad, morals .This directed upon their objects . Thus with a is the basis of his moral philosophy. He representation an idea is simply before the mind considered morality, no less than epistemology, or 'present to consciousness' . But with a to be a branch of descriptive psychology. As judgement we take up a stance towards an idea, with opposed intellectual stances , only one of an intellectual stance , which may be either of two opposed emotional stances can be correct in acceptance or rejection . A feeling also involves a given case. Again, we grasp the difference taking a stance . In this case the stance is betweencorrectand incorrectemotional stances emotional,a feeling being broadly either'for' or only by experience of contrasting cases, much 'against' the idea in question. (Brentano used as we learn what it is for something to be, say, 'love' /'hate' here to mean something along the red. Moreover feelings , like judgements, are lines ofapproach/ avoidance.) objective in the sense that we cannot correctly In this classification, representations are have a pro-emotion towards an object towards basic in the sense that we must have an idea which anyone can correctly have an anti­ before we can take up a stance towards it, emotion, and vice versa . The correctness of intellectual or emotional. However, it is with the feelings, then, including moral feelings , is, like epistemological and ethical implications the correctness of judgements, objective. Camus 25

Brentano developed his ideas on truth and idea by claiming that 'psychical' things are evidence in the posthumously published Truth created ex nihilo every time we call an image to and Evidence (1930) . He distinguished evident mind.He believed that philosophy went through judgements and blindjudgements. The former cycles of flourishing and decline, the latter we should perhaps call self-evident: they being marked by three phases : a shift of interest include judgements ofinner awareness ('1seem from theory to practice, scepticism, and to see a pencil') and judgements of necessary mysticism. As well as being a prolific writer, truth ('two pencils are more than one'). Blind Brentano was a charismatic and inspiring judgements are all those that are not self-evident teacher. His pupils included Alexius Meinong, ('I see a pencil'). Most judgements ofthe outer Karl Stumpf, Christian Ehrenfels and Edmund world and all judgements ofmemory are blind ; Husserl. Through the last, his ideas helped to but, to the extent that they confirm each other, establish the school of phenomenology, from we can have confidence in them. The which (though in a much modified form) judgement, for instance, that there is a three­ modern descriptive psychopathology is dimensional (spatial) world is, Brentano derived . His picture of the mind as intentional believed, so widely confirmed as to be infinitely rather than as a receptacle was an important more likely than any of its alternatives. Truth is formative idea for Freud in the development of then that which 'pertains to the judgement of one who asserts what the person who judges psychoanalysis. Along with others who have with evidence would assert' (p. 139). sought a philosophical foundation for empirical Besides epistemology and moral science , his project failed : the positivist philosophy, Brentano wrote on a wide range of tendencies of scientific psychology owe more to other topics . First, on logic, developing a Wundt. His account of the intentionality of revised syllogism. Second , on the nature of subjective experience remains important in the categories, arguing that there are only concrete philosophy ofmind. (as opposed to abstract) things , and that every Sources: Goldenson; Reese; Corsini; Edwards ; Urmson & Ree. judgement is an acceptance or rejection of a concrete thing (thus any true sentence which K. W. M. FULFORD appears to refer to some abstract entity can be translated into a sentence which refers to a concrete thing- for example, 'he believes that there are horses' becomes 'he affirms horses'). Camus, Albert Third, on God, whose existence, as a Necessary Being, he derived from the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Fourth, on the nature of French . b: 1913, Mondovi , Algeria. d: 1960, chance , rejecting the notion ofabsolute chance near Paris (road accident) . Cat: Philosopher of as self-contradictory, and arguing that the absurd . Ints: Ethics . Infls: Greek thought , determinism is incompatible with the fact of Augustine , Nietzsche and Sartre . Appts: freedom of the will. His ideas, though often Camus's student work on philosophy (on speculative, were always sharp and challenging. Plotinus and Augustine) was interrupted by InReligion andPhilosophy(1954), for instance, illness, and up to the outbreak of the Second he extended his dualistic view of the mind to World War he had a number of theatrical and incorporate a Christian picture of the soul as journalistic jobs in Algiers and Paris ; active in separate from the body and yet capable ofacting the Resistance he became Coeditor (with Sartre) through it. He argued that the soul was createdex of Combat; breaking with Sartre after the war, nihilo at the time ofconception, defending this Camus devoted himselfto writing . Nobel Prize for Literature, 1957. 26 Camu s

Main publications: value system for which these views form the basis. (1942) LeMyth e de Sisyphe, Paris: Gallimard; second, The concept central to the early phase of expanded edition, 1945. Camus's thought is the absurd. Absurdity is a (1942) L 'Etra nger, Paris :Gallimard. feeling which arises from the confrontation of (1945) Lettres Ii un ami allemand, Paris: Gallimard. the world, which is irrational , with the hopeless (1947) La Peste, Paris: Gallimard. but profound human desire to make sense of our (1950-3) Actuelles: I and II, Paris: Gallimard. condition. The appropriate respons e to this (1951 ) L 'Homme revolte, Paris: Gallimard. situation ,Camus argues, is to live in full (1956 ) La Chute, Paris :Gallimard. consciousness of it. He rejects philosophies or courses of action which conjure the problem away, notably religious belief, suicide and Seco ndary literature: existenti alism, which in Camus's view deifies the irrational. From a lucid appreciation of the Ayer, A. 1. (1946) 'Novelist-philosophers', Horizon absurdity of our life three consequenc es flow, 13: 155-68. which Camus calls revolt, freedom and passion . Braun , L. (1974) Witness ofDecline: Albert Camus, By ' revolt' (in the early phase of his thought) Moralist of the Abs urd, Cranbury, NJ: Farleigh Camus means defianc e in the face of the bleak Dickinson University Press. truth about the human condition, hopeless but Cruickshank, J. (1960) Albert Camus and the not resigned, lending to life a certain grandeur. Literature ofRevolt, London and New York: Oxford Again, recognition of absurdity frees us from University Press . habit and conv ention : we see all things anew, Karpushin, V. A. (1967- 9) 'The conc ept of the and are inwardly liberated . By ' passion' Camus individual in the work of Albert Camus' , Soviet means the resolve to live as intensely as Studies in Philosophy, 6, Winter, pp. 52-60. Thody, P. (195 7) Albert Camus: A Study of His Work, possibl e, not so as to escape the sense of New York and London: Macmillan. absurdi ty but so as to face it with absolute Trundle, R. C. and Pulig andla , R. (1986) Beyon d lucidity. The way to do this is to maximize not Absurdity: The Philosophy of Albert Camus, the quality but the quantit y of one's experiences. Lanham: University Press of Ameri ca. Sisyphus is the hero who exemplifies these virtues. He is aware of the hopelessn ess of his As with Unamuno, Camus is not an academic task but rises above his destin y by facing it philosopher but rather a thinker concerned to lucidly: we must imagine Sisyphus to be happy. work out a way of making sense of a life A further consequence difficult to avoid in threatened with meaninglessness. Thanks to his such an outlook is that any course of action is literary skill,Camus's thought was widely permissibl e (tout estp erm is),provided we make diffused and influential and its embodiment in no attempt to escape the consequences of our classics offiction such asL 'Etranger (1942) and actions-witness the behaviour of Mersault in La Peste (1947) continu es to make it one of the the, fictional depiction of this philosophy, most approachable of exampl es of recent L 'Etranger. The experience of war caused French philosophy. His thought has two phases, Camus to change his mind on this point, since it epitomized in the two philosophical essays Le cannot be seriousl y advanced in the face of My the de Sisyph e (1942) and L 'Homme revolte unquantifiable suffering . In L 'Homme revolte (1951) . Common to each phase are the and its fictional counterpart La Peste Camus presuppositions ofatheism, the mortality ofthe seeks to ground values very close to those of soul and the indifference of the universe to liberal humanism on much the same bases as human aspirations. The development lies in the those of his earlier work. The major philosophical change, a marked break with Carnap 27

Sartrean existentialism, is the view that there is (1959) 'T he elimination of metaphysics thro ugh the such a thing as human nature , the conclusion logical analysis of language', in A. J. Ayer (ed .), Camus draws from his analysis ofthe concept of Logical Positivism , Glencoe: Free Press. revolt in life and art. In the concept of human (198 7) 'On protocol sentences', Nous 21. nature he finds a reason and a cause for union between human beings . The detachment ofthe absurdist is replaced by an ethic of sympathy, Seconda ry lit erature: community and service to others . ROB ERT WILKINSON Sarkar, S. (ed.) (1992) 'Carnap: a centenary apprai sal', Synth ese, 93, 1-2. Schilpp, P. A. (ed.) (1963) The Philosophy ofRudolf Carnap , La Salle: Open Court. Carnap, Rudolf Carnap occupies an important position in the evolution ofthe analytic tradition inphilosophy, German. b: 18 May 1891, Ronsdorf not least in his appreciation ofthe significance (Wupperta l), Germany. d: 1970. Cat: Logician. for philosophy of the major developments in Ints: Logic; semantics ; philosophy of science ; logic due to Freg e and Russell. From the latter's epistemology. E duc: University of Freiburg; influence he also conceived his own project of University of lena, PhD 1921; Harvard constructing materia l objects (or their concepts) University, ScD(Hons) 1936. Infls: Kant, from primitive elementary experiences. One Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein. Appts: important point of difference from the atomism Professor of Natural Philosophy, German of Russell, however, is that Carnap takes these University, Prague, 1931- 5; Professor of basic experiences as states ofconsciousness,the Philosophy, University of Chicago , 1936- 52; experiences ofan individual, and not sensations subsequently Professor, University of or simple impressions in the manner of earlier California, Los Ange les from 1954-62;Visiting empiricism. He grew dissatisfied with this Professor, Harvard, 1941-2. project,principally on the ground that scientific , and therefore public , knowledge could not plausibly be constructed on such a subjective Main publications: base. This abandonment of the phenomenalist perspective was heavi ly influenced by his (1928) Der Logische Aufbau der Welt, Berlin: fellow positivist Neurath , whose commitment Weltkreis-Verlag (English translation, The Logical to physicalism he came to share.Along with this Structure of the World and Pseudoproblems in commitment he espoused the thesis, very Philosophy, trans . R. George , Berkeley:University characeristic of the positivists, of the unity of ofCalifornia Press, 1969). method in the sciences . (1934) Logische Syntax der Sprache, Vienna: In the heyday of logical positivism Carnap Springer (Engli sh translation, The Logical Syntax of led the assault on metaphysics. Like many Language, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, empiricists he espoused a form ofthe analytic ­ 1937). (1950) ' Empiricism, semantics and ontology', Revue synthetic distinction, according to which Internationale de Philosophie 4; reprinted in Carnap knowledge can be only of two basic kinds : (1956). 'necessary' truths or tautologies which hold (1950) The Logical Foundations of Probability, independently of partic ular matters of fact and University ofChicago Press. are true in all possible cases ; and factual (1956) Meaning and Necessity, second edition, propositions about the world. Consequently University ofChicago Press. there are just two permissible categories of 28 Carn ap

proposinon which exhaust what can be semantic issues, principally as a result of the meaningfully said. By contrast, the assertions of influence ofthe Polish logician Alfred Tarski. traditional metaph ysicians fail to qualify for The mature statement of his approach, which he either category, being neither tautological not called the method of extension and intension, empirically verifiabl e. Thus, while the was developed through a modification of more sentences of metaphysics might, by virtue of traditional concepts, such as those of class and their seductive syntactical appearance, suggest property. He signalled a departure from a that great profundities were being common assumption, that the role of an communicated, they in fact lacked any literal expression in language is that of naming some sense at all, although they could have some entity, whether abstract or concrete, preferring emotional significanc e for those using them. to talk of expressions as each possessing an Indeed Carnap stigmati zed metaph ysicians as intension and an extension. The intension is the frustrated poets or musicians , seduced by meaning component which is grasped by fundamental confusions about language. The anyone who understands the expression, while princip al source of this confusion is that the extension is what is determin ed by philosophers have typicall y used what Carnap observation or empirical investigation . calls the 'material mode of speech' or 'thing'­ Carnap hoped to provide a basis for the language, and much metaphysics can arise from analysis of modal logic, and while a failure to distinguish what are really sentences acknowledging the existence of the formal about languag e ('s yntactical sentences') from systems already available, he none the less felt sentences about objects (,obj ect-sentences') . that the fundamental notions themselves, for This produc es sentences of a third category, example necessity and possibility, had not been (,ps eudo-obj ect sentences ') which look as if sufficientl y clarified. He also endeavoured to they are about objects but, insofar as they are extend the application of logical rigour to the meaning ful at all, could only be about languag e. topic of induction, seeking to provide a basis for The litmus test for items in this category is that measurin g the degree of inductive support , and there is no empirical test that could be made to produced substantial work on probability. determine their truth . For Carnap, therefore, In a later paper, ' Empiricism, semant ics and metaphysical problems were totally spurious ontolo gy' (1950) ,Carnap delivered his most and did not admit of resolution.The implication consid ered views on ontolo gical questions . of this for philosophy was farreaching­ Maintaining his anti-metaphysical instinct, he philosophy had no business masquerading as a distinguished between what he called 'e xternal' source of knowledge beyond science, and its and 'internal' questions .Acceptance ofa kind of proper role is to be concern ed with the logical entity was ultimately a matter of adopting a syntax of language, especially the language of linguistic framework, not one of belief, still less science. Other disciplines with pretensions to a commitment to some dubious metaphysical scientific status, like psychology, would need to reality. So the question of which linguistic become thoroughly empirical, sheddin g framework to adopt ultimat ely came down to a discredited metaphysical preoccup ations, and choice which was to be made on pragmatic abandoning vacuous speculations about the grounds of expediency, fruitfulness or utility. mind . Only once a framework was adopted, did it On this approach syntax is a matter of make sense to ask 'existential' questions . Thus conventions and the rules which license the decision to adopt the mathematical combinations of linguistic expressions. In his framework of numbers was external, a practical earlier work his concerns were largely of this question of whether to accept certain linguistic formal compl exion, and it was somewhat later forms. An internal question say, about whether that he took more serious account of substantial there exist prime numbers greater than a million Cassi rer 29

was a matter of investigation and j ustification. Infls: Hermann Cohen, Edmund Husserl and This combination of pragmatism and Paul Natorp . Appts: Professor at Marburg and empiricism was very much characteristic of then at Hamburg University (Rector from 1930­ Carnap's whole style of thought. Carnap's 3); Professor at Columbia University in New views attracted criticism from a number of York;also taught at Oxford (1933-5),Goteborg, quarters . Apart from those levelled against Sweden (1935--41) and Yale (1941--4). logical positivism as such, his stance on induction and probability brought him into conflict with Karl Poppe r who notorious ly questioned whether any degree of inductive Main publications: support or 'confirmation' increase d either the probability of a theory being true or one's Major editions of the works ofLeibniz (l904-l5) and rational entitlement to believe in its truth. Kant(l9l2). Carnap was also confronted by Quine with (1899) ' Descartes, Kritik der Mathematischen und scepticism about modalit y and the very idea of Naturwissen schaftlichen Erkenntnis', Marburg: Inaugural Dissertation . analyticity as traditionally conceived. He and (l906-20)Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie Quine additionally parted company on und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit, 3 vols , Berlin: onto logical commitment. Where Carnap saw a Bruno Cassirer (English translation of the third difference ofkind between external and internal volume , The Problem of Knowledge, New Haven : questions, Quine saw a difference ofdegree of Yale University Press, 1950). generality. Others , on different grounds from (l9l0) Der Substan zbegriffand der Funktion sbegriff, Popper, have ju dged his forays into inductive Berlin : Bruno Cassirer (English translation, logic to have been less than successful, albeit a Substance and Function, and Einstein s Theory of substantial stimulus to subsequent work in the Relati vity, New Haven : Yale University Press, field. In other respects , his contributions to the 1923). study ofsyntax and semantics presaged much of (l9l8) Immanuel Kants Leben and Lehre, Berlin : the more recent work on truth-conditional Bruno Cassirer (English translation, Kant sLife and semantics and possib le worlds accounts of Thought ,New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). modality, and even logical pragmatics. Among (1923-9) Philos ophie der symbolischen Formen, 3 those influenced by him in addition to Quine, vols, Berlin: Bruno Cassirer (Engli sh translation, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, New Haven : were Hilary Putna m and the late R. M. Martin , Yale University Press, 1953-7). the latter developing, in idiosyncratic style, a (1925) Sprache und Mythos, Leipzig: B. G. Teubner form ofthe logical pragmatics that Carnap had (Engli sh trans lation, Language and Myth , New envisaged. York: Harper & Brothers, 1946). Sources: WW(Am) 1965. (1927) Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie DENIS POLLARD der Renaissance, Leipzig: B. G. Teubner (English translation, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy , Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963). (1932) Die Platonische Renaissance in England und Cassirer, Ernst die Schul e von Cambridge, Leipzig: B. G.Teubner. (1932) Die Philosophie der Aufkldrung, Tiibingen : J. German. b: 28 July 1874, Breslau. d: 13 April C. B. Mohr (English translation , The Philosophy of 1945, New York. Cat: Neo-Kantian (Marburg the Enlight enment, Princeton: Princeton University Schoo l); historian of philosophy; Press, 1951). epistemologist. In ts: Culture. Educ: Berlin, (1936) Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik, Goteborg : Hogskolas Arskrift. Leipzig, Munich, Heide lberg and Marburg . 30 Cassi rer

(1939) Descartes, Lehre, Personlichkeit, Wirkung, ofculture in general. Thinking ofhuman beings Stockholm: Berman FischerVerlag. as 'symbolic animals', he argued that all culture (1942) Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften, was based on ourconcept-ual ability that allows Goteborg: Hogskolas Arskrift(English translation: us to invent and use artificial signs and symbo ls. The Logic of the Humanities, New Haven: Yale In many ways Cassirer takes up and develops University Press, 1974). also the ideas of the Baden (or Southwestern) (1944) An Essay on Man : Introduction to the Philosophy of Human Culture, New Haven: Yale School of neo-Kantianism as they were University Press. exemplified in the works of Wilhelm (1946) The Myth of the State, New Haven: Yale Windelband and Heinrich Rickert. Just as they University Press. did, he felt that it was necessary to mov e from a (1970) Rousseau, Kant , Goethe, Princeton: Princeton 'critique of reason' to a 'critique of culture' . University Press. However, his many historical studies were not (1971) Idee und Gestalt , Goethe, Schiller, Hol derlin , only in the service of such a critique ofculture . Kleist , Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche They were also meant to be contributions to the Buchgesellschaft. advancement of culture, for he believed that in (1979) Symbol, My th, and Culture: Essays and order ' to possess the world of culture we must Lectures ofErnst Cassirer, 1935- 1945, ed. Donald PhilipVerene.NewHaven:YaleUniversity Press. incessantly reconquer it by historical (1985) Symbol, Techn ik, Sprache, Hamburg: Meiner. recollection'. Like Kant and the neo-Kantians in general, he argued that our concepts determine the way we experience the world. Our experience does Secondary literature: not mirror an objectively existing world or things in themselves . Rather, the world is Braun, H.-J., Holzhey, H.andOrth,E.W.(1988)Ober actively constructed by us in accordance with Ernst Cassirers Philosophie der symbolischen our conceptual framework. In an important Form en, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. sense , we constitute it, using the materials given Cassirer, Toni(1981)Mein Leben mit Ernst Cassirer, to us by the senses . For this reason Cassirer Hildesheim: Gerstenberg. Hamburg, Carl H.(1956)Symb ol and Reality: Studies thought that philosophers should concentrate on in the Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer, The Hague: the conceptual framework that enables us to MartinusNijhoff. experience the world in the way we do Itzkoff, SeymourW. (1971)Ernst Cassirer: Scientific experience it. In more technical terms , we must Knowledge and the Concept of Man , Notre Dame: employ a transcendental method in showing University ofNotreDamePress. how these concepts make our experience Lipton, DavidR.(1978)Ernst Cassirer: The Dilemma possible. However, unlike Kant (but like some of a Liberal Intellectual in Germany , 1914- 1933, of his own neo-Kantian predecessors), he Toronto,University ofToronto Press. Schilpp, Paul (ed.) (1949) The Philosophy ofErnst rejected the idea that the concepts and principles Cassirer, La Salle: OpenCourt; reprinted1973. that make our experience possible are the static and forev er fixed furniture ofthe human mind . He claimed that these concepts and principles Cassirer was Hermann Cohen's most important constantly develop. Altho ugh one may speak of student. His work is often considered to be the a 'natural symbolism' that characterizes all final testament ofthe Marburg school. Yet, there humanconsciousness, itcan take manydifferent are important differences between him and the forms . His philosophy started from the earlier Marburg neo-Kantians. Although he presupposition that, ifthere is a definition ofthe devoted himselfto a critical and historical stud y nature or 'essence' ofhuman beings , it can only ofthe problemofknowledge and the logic ofthe be functional. It cannot be substantial. Cassirer sciences, he was also interested in the prob lem also thought that the original Kantian Chisholm 3 1

conception of critica l philosophy was far too Susanne La nge r. However, his thought was narrow. In partic ular, he argued that the then almost comp letely ignored in German y. In transcen denta l investigation must be extended the late twentieth century, a real interest in to the humanities and even to forms of Cassirer's philosophy has developed in representation that are often called primitive, Germany. Some of his later essays, written in namely mytho logies. They also constitute English, have recently been translated into conceptual systems worthy of analysis. Indeed, German, and there is even talk of'the beginning he argued that every manifestation ofculture is ofa renaissance' of his thinking . an important subject ofphilosophical study in so MAN FRED KUEHN far as our symbolizing nature is present in it. Cassirer felt that 'the artist is just as much a discoverer ofthe forms of nature as the scientist is a discoverer of facts or natural laws'. Chisholm, Roderick Milton This philosophy of culture had, for Cassirer, clear ethica l consequences, for he believed that ' human culture taken as a whole may be American. b: 27 November 1916, North describe d as the progress ofman's progressive Attleborough, Massachusetts. Cat: self-liberation. Language, art, religion , Metaphysician; philosopher of mind . In ts: sciences , are various phases in this process. In Phenomenology. Educ: Studied at Brown all of them man discovers and proves a new Universit y, AB 1938; and Harvard , AM 1940, power-the power to build up a world of his PhD 1942. Infls: Fichte , Reid, Brentano , own, an 'ideal' world ' . Being equally oppose d Meinong , Husserl, Moore ,C.1.Lewis , Cardinal to empiricism, naturalism, positivism and Mercier and Ducasse . Appts: Taught at Lebensphilosophie (which he thought included University ofPennsylvania , 1946-7; thereafter the kind of existential thinking advocated by at Brown University; Andrew W. Mellon Martin Heid egger), he argued for a new kind of Professor of the Humanities, 1972; Visiting idealism and humanism. Indeed , he Professor at many universities, notabl y Graz in characterized his philosophy also as a Austria ; Editor of Philosophy and 'humanistic philosophy ofculture ' .At the same Phenomenological Research, 1980. time he was rather pessimistic about the influence ofphilosophy on politics: 'the role of the individual thinker is a very modest one. As Main publications: an individual the philosopherhas long ago given up all hopes to reform the political world' . And even though he also believedthat 'philosophyas (1957) Perceiving, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (1960) (ed.) Realism and the Backgroun d of a whole' should not give up hope, he thought Phenomenology , Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press. that all that could be done by philosophy was the (1966) Theory of Knowledge, Englewood Cliffs: debunking ofpolitical myths . As he said in one Prentice-Hall (substantiall y revised in second of his last lectures: 'To all ofus it has become (1977) and third (1989) edition s). clear that we have greatly underestimated the (1966) (ed., with others, and trans. Franz Brentano) strength of political myths.Weshould not repeat The True and the Evident, (English edition (with this error'. Cassirer had some followers in the others) translated by Chisholm) . USA during the early years after the Second (1973) (ed. with R. J. Swart z) Empi rical Knowl edge: World War, both among historians of Readings fro m Contempora ry Sources, Englewood Cliffs, N J: Prentice -Hall. philosophy and among philosophical critics . (1976) Person and Object , London: Allen & Unwin; The best known among these was perhaps La Salle : Open Court. 32 Chi sholm

(1976) (ed . with S. Korner) Philosophische well as central philosophy, symbolic logic, Untersuchungen zu Raum , Zeit und Kontinuum, aesthetics, ethics and psycholog y-his war Hamburg: F. Meiner. service was as a clinical psychologist. He has (1978) (ed. with R. Haller) Die Philosophie Franz edited and contributed to the translation of Brentano s, Amsterdam: Rodopi . works by Fichte, Brentano and Meinong. (1981) The First Person, Brighton: Harvester and Chisholm presents his own work in a direct Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press . no-nonsense style, using sets of definitions. (1982) Brentano and Meinong Studies, Amsterdam: Rodopi. These are built up graduall y and form the (1982) The Founda tions of Knowin g, Brighton: skeleton for the main ideas. Despite this rather Harves ter and Minneapolis: Minnesota University formal approach he eschews the technicalities Press . of formal logic in his main works and writes in (198 5) (ed. with others) Philosophie des Geistes, plain English. Apart from comm entaries on Philosphie der Psychologie: Akten des 9. writers like Brentano and Meinong his work International en Wittgenstein Symposiums, Vienna: mainly falls under epistemology, philosophy of Holder-Pichler-Tempsky. mind, metaph ysics and ethics. (1986) Brentano and Intrinsic Value, Cambridge: A key motif throughout Chisholm' s Cambridge University Press. philosophy, and one heavil y influenced by (1989) On Metaphysics, Minn eapolis: Minnesota Brentano and the phenomenologists, is his University Press. emphasis on consciousness and on how things appear to one.Among his central concepts is one he develops from Brentano , that of evidence, Secondary literature: and one of the central problems he sees for epistemology (one which links him with Sextus Bogdan , R. J. (ed.) (1986) Roderick M. Chisholm , Empiricus) is that of the criterion for when we Dordrecht: Reidel (includes intellectual have adequate evidence for something. He autobiography and full bibliography of his writings distinguishes what is directly evident from what to date , partl y annotated by himself). is indirectly evident (Theory of Knowledge, David , M. and Stubenberg, L. (eds) (1986) 1966), and the problem ofthe criterion concerns Philosophische Aufs dtze zur Ehren von Roderick M. the passage from the indirectly evident to the Chisholm, Amsterdam: Rodopi . directly evident. The directl y evident is the Lehrer, K. (ed.) (197 5) Analysis and Metaphysics, 'sel f-presenting' (ibid., p. 28; later he prefers Dordre cht: Reidel. this term: TheFoundations ofKnowing, 1982, p. Philosophia 1978 (special issue). 26), or what we have when: 'Whatjustifies me Sosa, E. (ed.) (1979) Essays in the Philosophy of in counting it as evident that a is F is simply the Roderick M. Chisholm, (includes extended reply by fact that a is F' (Theory ofKnowledge, 1966, p. Chi sholm) . 26). The indirectly evident can then hopefully be reached from this by applying certain Chisholm stands firmly in the main Anglo­ epistemic rules or principles (ibid., p. 38). American tradition ofanalytic philosophy, in a Chapter 3 ofThe Foundation s ofKnowing uses broad sense, but he is unusual in the breadth of an elaboration ofthese ideas to defend a view of the influences that he has brought to bear upon knowledge as justified true belief in the face of it, ranging from the ancient Greeks (his first 'Gettier ' count erexampl es suggesting that such published paper, in Philosophy ofScience for a belief may fail to be knowledge because its 1941, was on Sextus Empiricus) through Fichte, truth and the basis of its justification for the Brentano and Meinong to Cardinal Mercier believer in question are irrelevant to each other and his own teacher C. J. Ducasse, as well as the (cf. chapter 10 of the third edition (1989) of standard sources . His earliest publications Theory ofKnowledge). All this forms partofthe include many reviews, on topics covering , as foundationalism, in the general tradition of Chisholm 33

Descartes, to which Chisholm adheres the view that requirements is the central concept (Foundations, chapter I ; cf. Bogdan (ed.) 1986, of ethics (e.g. 1986, p. 53). Brentano and p. 43) . He is an "intemalist' rather than an Intrinsic Value (1986) develops the ethics of 'extemalist' (cf. Foundations, p. 29), claiming Brentano along lines paralleling his own that justification must be 'epistemic' and epistemology: we have incorrigible knowledge rejecting various otherkinds ofjustification(pp. ofour own valuings, and these are prima facie 27-32). The third edition of Theory of evidence for correct valuings-for emotions, Knowledge repeats or develops many of these like judgements, can be correct or incorrect. points. This is then applied to a detailed development of A further effect of Chisholm's Moore's notion of 'organic unities' . foundationalism is his distinction between Throughout Chisholm assumes, in Moorean 'particularists' and 'methodists' (Foundations. fashion , that 'whatever we are justified in p. 66). Particularists, ofwhom Chisholm is one, assuming, when we are not doing philosophy, start from the question 'Whatdo we know?' and we are also justified in assuming when we are only then go on to the question 'How can we doing philosophy' (Person and Object. 1976, p. decide whether we know?' Methodists do the 16). reverse, while sceptics claim that neither On the nature and existence of the self question can be answered without first Chisholm rejects Hume's 'bundle of answering the other. Empiricism is one type of perceptions' view. Hume says that in seeking methodism, and can take two forms, a genetic himselfhe always stumbles on some perception, doctrine about how we actually come by our but bundles don't stumble on their own knowledge, and a doctrine of justification. contents; experiences need a subject just as Chisholm rejects both of these in Perceiving qualities need a substance. But Kant too goes (1957) , but he shares something with them in wrong in saying we can never know the self, that he accepts incorrigible states ofmind , as a since this is like saying we can never know the foundationalist perhaps must. These, however, substance of an object as something distinct are not sense-datum statements (he rejects from the qualities which give us access to it. We substantial appearances, although he once know the self in knowing states of it, i.e. in accepted them : 1957, p. 117), but statements having experiences (ibid .), although later he that one is in a certain state ofmind, or is being rejected the view that we have an individuating appeared to in a certain way (he does not tell us concept ofourselves, (1981, pp. 16-17,86-90; how he would deal with unconscious beliefs and but cf. Sosa (ed.) 1979, pp. 324-5). This same desires). Later, however, he rejected the view self is the cause of its own actions by that there are first-person propositions, since 'immanent' as against 'transeunt' causation, a this view cannot distinguish 'Xbelieves X is F' medieval distinction he revives between from 'X believes he himself is F'. Instead he causation by agents and causation by events . He develops a theory ofintentional states in terms hopes thus to transcend the deterrninism­ ofdirect and indirect attribution, taking the 'he indeterminism impasse, each limb of which himself' locution as basic (The First Person, seems to make responsibility an illusion. The 1981, chapters 3 and4; see also Boer's summary objection that attributing actions to an agent as in Bogdan (ed.) 1986, p. 87). cause is empty and tells us nothing beyond the Chisholm sees a strong analogy between mere sequence of events he dismisses as epistemology and ethics . The first part of applying equally to transeunt causation: what Perceiving borrows its title from W. K.Clifford: does talk of 'causing' add there either? One 'The ethics of belief' (cf. also Theory of might wonder, however, if this is fair: believers Knowledge, (third edition) 1989, pp. 57--60). in transeunt causation need not be mere Belief, or its withholding, is 'required' ofus in Humeans, and the question arises how agents certain circumstances, and he is sympathetic to manage to decide one way or the other. 34 Chomsky

(Chisholm takes his view further in Bogdan Chomsky, Avram Noam (ed.) 1986: see especially pp . 214-15, 223.) An important contribution to the philosophy American. b: 7 December 1928, Philadelphia. ofmind is Chisholm's revival of'Brentanos idea Cat: Linguist ; cognitive scientist ; libertarian of intentionality as a mark of the mental , socialist; philosopher of language ; philosopher enabling him to maintain 'the primacy of the of mind . Ints: Philosophy of language ; intentional' over the semantic (ibid., pp. 222, philosophy of mind . Educ: University of 231) . Chisholm started a debate on the criteria Pennsylvania. Injls: Zellig Harris , Nelson for intentionality, offering three in the Goodman and W. V. O. Quine . Appts: 1951-5, Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Society, 1955­ Junior Fellow, Harvard University; from 1955, 6. Later (in his entry on intentionality in P. Assistant, Associate, then full Professor at the Edwards (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology;Institute 1967), he added two more, but admitted that Professor in the Department ofLinguistics and together they only provided sufficient Philosophy. conditions and not necessary ones (cf. also Bogdan (ed.) 1987, pp. 36-7, 232. For all his adherence to Moorean common sense Chisholm is ready to distinguish, with Main publications: Joseph Butler, 'strict and philosophical' from 'loose and popular' speech , especially when (1957) Syntactic Structures, The Hague: Mouton. defending mereological essentialism, which he (1965) Aspects ofthe Theory ofSyntax, Cambridge, claims is really congenial to common sense Mass.: MIT. (Person andObject, 1976, pp. 102-3, Appendix (1972) Language and Mind, enlarged edition, New B). The self, however, is a continuant, and is York: Harcourt Brace Jovano vich. immune to Lockean transfers from one (1980) Rules and Representation s, New York: substance to another, but none of this commits Columbia University Press. us to a doctrine of temporal parts (ibid., (1980) 'Rules and repre sentations', with Open Peer Appendix A). Perhaps Chisholm's most lasting Commentary and Author's Response, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 1-61. influence lies in his revival of the ideas of the (1986) Knowl edge ofLanguage: Its Nature, Origin earlier Austrian philosophers, especiall y in the and Use, New York: Praeger. area of intentionality. His foundationalism is (1988) Language and Problems ofKnowledge: The perhaps less in tune with modem views, Mana gua Lectures, Cambridge: Mass. : MIT Press. although they would mostly (but not entirely) (1993) Language and Thought , Wakefield, Rhode agree with his rejection of substantial Island and London: Moyer Bell. appearances and sense data . His apparatus of (1995) 'Language and nature ', Mind 104: 1-61. direct and indirect evidence, and his epistemic principles, have been criticized as inadequate. The extemalism-intemalism debate is still in full swing. His views on agent causality have Secondary literature: had some influence , and mereological essentialism is a currentl y debated topic, as are George, A. (ed .) (1989) Reflections on Chomsky, the ontological questions to which he has Oxford: Blackwell. contributed. Harman, G.(ed.) (1974) On Noam Chomsky : Critical Essays, New York: Anchor. Sources: DAS, 7th edn, 1978; Dancy & Sosa; Kasher, A. (ed.) (1991) The Chomskyan Turn, Oxford: personal communication. Blackwell. Koerner, K. and Tajima, M. (1986) Noam Chomsky: A A. R. LACEY Personal Bibliography , 1951-1986, Amsterdam: 1. Benjamins. Choms ky 35

Salkie, R. (1990) The Chomsky Update: Linguistics Scientific linguistics, then, is conceived as a and Politics, London: Unwin Hyman. part of psychology since its proper object of Sgro i, S. C. (1983) Noam Chomsky : Bib/iografi a study is language understood as a psychological / 949- 8 / , Padua:CLESP. structure. This runs wholly counter to the widespread view that the proper object of study Noam Chomsky is both an eminent linguist and is language understood as a public phenomenon a prominent political activist. His creation and and, in fact, Chomsky denies that a clear concept constant elaboration of generative grammar has of this alleged object is possible. His account been profoundly influential within linguistics entails a rejection of theories which analyse and has contributed significantly to the knowledge of language in terms of use and, development of cognitive science. As a more generally, it requires a sharp theoretical libertarian socialist he has trenchantly and distinction between knowledge ofi anguage and tirelessly criticized US foreign policy and performance. The latter is made prominently in sought to correct deception and narrowness of his distinction between competence and debate within the mainstream media. While performance. Reference must be made to Chomsky's politics has philosophical performance for certain purposes but it is a underpinnin gs and is related very generally to theory of competence, that is to say, of tacit his linguistics, his important philosophical knowled ge of grammar, which is a viable views are located predominantly in the latter. scientific goal. Major questions can be asked Chomsky holds that scientific linguistics,his about performance: for example, how are fundamental concern, should focus its attention people able to consistently produce utterances on questions which can be given clearly appropriate to their changing circumstances? In formulated and empirically testable answers; Chomsky's view, however, these are far beyond further, that there are three basic questions of the reach offoreseeable scientific investigation. this type: What constitutes knowledge of Granted his account of a speaker-listener's language? How is such knowledge acquired? knowledge of his or her language, the second, and How is such knowledgeputto use? Since the and for Chomsk y the most fundamental, introduction ofgenerative grammar inSyntactic question for scientific linguistics can be asked: Structures ( 1957) he has concentrated upon the how is such knowledge acquired?Chomsky is first two questions. adamant that all answers which in effect say that For Chomsky a rigorous scientific knowledge of grammar is learned from description of the knowledge of language experience are mistaken. Crucial to his possessed by a mature speaker-listener is arguments for this and for his alternative answe r possible in the form of a particular generative is a strong claim, for which he holds there is grammar. In this context such a grammar is a detailed support, viz., that children acquir e fully explicit formal theory which purports to principl es of language for which there was no describe precisely the principl es and rules in the evidence in their experience.This phenom enon, mindlbrain of a speaker-listener which often called the poverty of the stimulus , can be characterize the grammatical sentence s of the explain ed in onlyonegeneralway in Chomsky's speaker-listener' s particular language. These view: the principles are innate features of the principles and rules comprise a grammar. child 's mind. Hence, in a second sense, a grammar is a Chomsky offers a more detailed nativist complex mental structure. To possess such a theory. Common to all humans is a genetic structure is to be in a mental state ofunconscious language-programme which encodes linguisti c knowledge of the principl es and rules involved principl es. It is not the mind/brain as a whole and it is this state which constitutes knowledge which is thus programmed, rather a distinct ofianguage. subsystem, the language faculty. Prior to a child 36 Collingwood experiencing language the language faculty is in traditional sense do not exist. Since Chomsky's its initial state, which comprise the genetically views are both influential and controversial they encoded principles and is called by Chomsky have been subject to a large number of Universal Grammar. The language faculty criticisms, many by philosophers. These develops until it reaches its steady state, the include arguments that the theory of an innate mature speaker-listener's state ofknowledge of grammar is biologically implausible (Piaget), his or her particular language . In order for this that the notion of an internal grammar is development to take place it is certainly threatened by indeterminacy of translation necessary for the child to experience its native (Quine), that the idea that general learning language, the experience having such roles as procedures are not involved in language 'triggering' the innate mechanisms and acquisition is implausible (Putnam), that 'shaping' acquisition to the particular language. language is properly conceived as a social Nevertheless the contribution of experience is phenomenon (Dummett) and that innate relatively superficial, being severely knowledge is conceptually impossible. constrained by the genetically determined Chomsky has responded to these and other principles ofUniversal Grammar,and the whole criticisms, often at length-apractice which has process ofdevelopment is characterized as one enabled him to elaborate his position. For of biological growth or maturation rather than Chomsky philosophy is continuous with learning .Thus, for Chomsky, a properanswer to science , a view that he holds to be exemplified the second question involves a precise in the work of such writers as Descartes and specification of the principles of Universal Leibniz in whose rationalist tradition he locates Grammar and a rigorous account ofhow these himself. interact with experience so as to yield knowledge ofa particular language. STEPHEN MILLS A recent revision in his views is pertinent to such an answer. Chomsky has always been concerned to reduce the number of principles and rules postulated by generative grammar. Collingwood, Robin George Transformational rules have this effect and were prominent in his earlier work, but his revised theory suggests that only one highly abstract British . b: 22 February 1889, Cartmel Fell, transformational principle is required . Indeed Lancashire . d: 9 January 1943, Coniston, he now proposes that a very small number of Cumbria. Cat: Neo-idealist; archaeologist; highly abstract simple principles which interact historian . Ints: Metaphysics; epistemology; can explain language acquisition.Crucial to this philosophy of history ; aesthetics; ethics ; is relaxing the notion of a principle ofUniversal political philosophy; philosophy of mind . Grammar so that rather than being a rigid rule it Educ: Rugby Public School and University permits a narrow range of options , called College , Oxford . Injls: Hegel, Vico, Croce, De parameters, with different languages taking Ruggiero, Hobbes and Hume. Personal: J. A. different options . As a child acquires a language Smith, H. H. Joachim, E. F. Carritt and F. J. it effectively fixes a particular parameter on the Haverfield. Appts: Fellow of Pembroke basis ofa small amount ofpositive evidence in College , Oxford, 1912-34; University Lecturer its linguistic experience. Since each principle in Philosophy and Roman History, Oxford, applies to every sentence as a licenser and since 1912-35: Waynflete Professor ofMetaphysical the principles interact, each instance offixing a Philosophy, University of Oxford, 1934--41; parameter can have widespread grammatical Fellow of the British Academy, 1934. effects . It is therefore possible that rules in the Coll ing wood 37

Main publications: Secondary literature:

(1913) (trans .) B. Croce, The Philo sophy of Boucher, David (1989) The Social and Politi cal Giambattista Vico, London: H. Latimer. Thought of R. G Collingwood, Cambridge: (1916) Religion and Philosophy , London :Macmillan; Cambridge University Press . reprinted , Bristol : Thoemmes Press, 1994. --(ed.) (1992) Collingwood Studies (the journal of (1923) Roman Britain , London: Oxford University the Collingwood Society) I. Press ; revised editions , Oxford: Clarendon Press , Donagan, Alan (1962) The Later Philosophy ofR. G 1932, 1934. Collingwood, Oxford : Clarendon Press; second edition , Chicago and London :University of Chicago (1924) Speculum Mentis: or, the Map ofKnowledge, Press, 1985. Oxford : Clarendon Press. Krausz , Michael (1972) Critical Essays on the (1925) Outlines of a Philosophy of Art, London : Philosophy of R. G Collingwood, Oxford : Oxford University Press; reprinted in Essays in the Clarendon Press. Philosophy of Art , 1964; also reprinted, Bristol Mink, Louis O. (1969) Mind, History and Dialectic: Thoemmes Press, 1994. The PhilosophyofR. G Collingwood, Bloomington, (1927) (trans.) B. Croce , An Autiobiography, Oxford: Indiana : Indiana University Press . Clarendon Press . Rubinoff, Lionel (1970) Collingwood and the Reform (1933) An Essay on Philosophical Method, Oxford: ofMetaphysics: A Study in the Philosophy ofMind, Clarendon Press . Toronto : University of Toronto Press. (1936) (with 1. N. L. Myres) Roman Britain and the Taylor, Donald S. (1988) R. G Collingwood: A English Settlements, Oxford : Clarendon Press; Bibliography , New York and London : Garland second edition , 1937. Publishing Co. (1938) The Principles of Art, Oxford: Clarendon Van der Dussen, W. J. (1981) History As Science: The Press . Philosophy of R. G Collingwood, The Hague : Nijhoff. (1939) An Autobiography , London : Oxford University Press. (1940) An Essay on Metaphysics, Oxford : Clarendon Collingwood is distinguished by his Press . outstanding achievements in history as well as (1942) The New Leviathan : or, Man , Society, philosophy. One of the few students of F. 1. Civilization and Barbarism, Oxford : Clarendon Haverfield to survive the First World War, Press; revised edition , ed. David Boucher, Oxford: Collingwood was internationally recognized at Clarendon Press, 1992. his death as the leading authority on Roman (1945) The Idea ofNature, ed. T. M. Knox, Oxford: Britain . In the last decade of his life, despite Clarendon Press . severe illness, he produced a series of (1946) The Idea ofHistory , ed. T. M. Knox, Oxford: philosophical works which in their scope, depth Clarendon Press; revised edition, ed. Jan van der and scholarship are without parallel in Dussen, Oxford : Clarendon, 1993. twentieth -century British philosophy. But his (1964) Essays in the Philosophy ofArt, ed. Alan B. work has failed to influence the mainstream of Donagan, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. modem philosophy. (1965) Essays in the Philosophy of History , ed. In his autiobiography Collingwood explains William Debbin s, Austin, Texas: University of how his involvement in archaeologica l Texas Press. fieldwork became the inspiration for his (1968) Faith and Reason : Essays in the Philosophy of reevau lation of the nature of philosophy. His Religion, ed. Lionel Rubinoff, Chicago: interests in history linked him with philosophers Quadrangle. such as Croce in the Italian idealist tradition (1989) Essays in Politi cal Philosophy , ed. David deriving from Vico and Hegel, but brought him Boucher, Oxford: Clarendon Press. into conflict with Oxford realists such as Joseph and Prichard. Collingwood justly describes his 38 Collingwood life's work as 'in the main an attempt to bring in language-games, Collingwood emphasizes about a rapprochement between philosophyand the place ofa proposition in a complex structure history' (1939, p. 77), although scholars dispute ofquestions and answers . Every proposition is his account ofthe development ofhis ideas. an answer to a question: the significance and the Many of the themes of Collingwood's truth or falsity of a proposition depend on what mature work make their appearance in his first question it is meant to answer. Every question two books: in Religion and Philosophy (1916) involves presuppositions, some of which are he maintains that philosophyand history are 'the themselves answers to yet further questions, same thing' ; in Speculum Mentis (1924) he while those that are not count as absolute articulates a theory of mental life which presuppositions. In An Essay on Metaphysics systematically relates 'forms of experience' (1940) Collingwood maintains that the aim of from pure feeling to rational self-consciousness. metaphysics is to identify the constellations of Inlater works such doctrines are reinterpreted in absolute presuppositions taken for granted by the light of Collingwood's changing conception systematic thinkers in different eras. (The Idea ofhistory, philosophy and the mind . ofNature, 1945, is Collingwood's account ofthe In the later philosophy ofart he continues to presuppositions of European cosmology). think that art, as an imaginative or non-assertive However, since absolute presuppositions form of experience, both makes possible and cannot be either true or false, metaphysics must affects the character of rational thought. But, forgo assessment of them and is thereby whereas in Speculum Mentis imagination is in revealed to be---eontrary to the conclusion ofAn contradiction with expression, in The Principles Essay on Philosophical Method (1933)-a ofArt (1938) art is identified with imaginative historical discipline. expression of feeling . Such expression involves 'The logic ofquestion and answer' emerged bodily gesture, which is language in its from Collingwood's reflection on historical primitive stage, verbal language being a methodology and informs the philosophy of refinement facilitating the expression of historical understanding presented in The Idea intellectual ideas. Through a synthesis of ofHistory (1946). Historians study, not sheer Crocean idealism with Humean events, but past actions, traces ofwhich survive phenomenalism Collingwood maintains that into the present. But actions are performed for artistic activity, by raising feelings to particular reasons in specific circumstances. So consciousness, is at once the beginning ofself­ the historian is obliged to discern the thoughts knowledge and the making ofthe world known which determined the actions in question. Thus in language.Since denial offeeling is corruption all history is the history of thought. of consciousness or bad art, the artist proper Furthermore, the historian can understand past bears the responsibility of speaking on behalfof thoughts only by rethinking them in his own his community. The theory of mind and mind, just as the spectator appreciates a work of language is further elaborated in The New art by reconstructing in his own imagination the Leviathan (1942) as the basis ofCollingwood's emotions expressed by the artist. On this liberal view of freedom as mental maturity account understanding the thoughts of others attainable within a society of people conscious requires understanding one's own thoughts . ofone another's freedom . Thus historical knowledge is a form of self­ At the centre ofCollingwood's philosophy is knowledge . As such it is the science ofhistory, his denial of what he saw as the principle of rather than the pseudoscience of psychology, propositional logic, that the proposition is the which can provide the insight needed for control 'unit of thought' (1939, p. 36). Parallel to of human affairs . Collingwood's opposition to Wittgenstein's concern with the role ofwords the divorce between theory and practice Croce 39 culminates in The New Leviathan , his analysis Secondary literature: ofthe psychological and ethica l foundations of European civilization and of the forces Carr, H. W. (191 7) The Philosophy oj Benedetto threatening to undermine it. Croce, New York: Russell & Russell. Gullace, G. (198 1) Poetry and Literature, Southern Sources: ENP; Turner ; obituary, R. B. McCallum, T. Illinois University Press (translation of La Poesia M. Knox and 1.A. Richmond,PBA 29 (1943):463-80. with a full introduc tion to Croce 's work) . Moss, M. (1987) Benedetto Croce Reconsidered, PETER LEWIS University of New England Press . Niccolini, Fausto (1960) L"editio ne varietur ' delle opere di B. Croce (full bibliography). Orsini, G. (1961) Benedetto Croce, Southern Illinois University Press. Cro ce, Benedetto Piccoli, R. (1922) Benedetto Croce, New York: Harcourt , Brace & Co.

Italian . b: 25 February 1866, Pescasseroli, Italy. d: 20 November 1952,Naples . Cat: Philosopher Croce is one ofthe central figures in the cultura l of spirit. Appts: Croce held no university and political life of Italy in the first halfofthe appointment; he was a man of independent twentieth century. As founder and editor of La means . critica he exercised an extraordinary influence on Italian letters . He was a practising politician, a government Minister, a Senator, during the long years of fascism a focus of sustained Main publications: opposition, and a member of the postwar Provisional Government. His enormousl y The collected works number over 70 volumes; the erudite writings range over the whole of philosophical core, however, are the works which European and world literature, philosophy, and constitute the philosophy of the spirit: political and econo mic theory. He never held a (1902) Estetica. university position, having the means to live an (1909) La logica. independent life amid his magnificent (1909) La Filosojia della practica. collection of books in Naples . Most Italian (1917) Teoria e storia della storiograjia. Also notable are: philosophers addressed his work, Gra rnsci, (1900) Materialismo storico ed economia marxista. indeed, asserting that a close reading of Croce (1910) Problemi di estetica. was a prerequisite for contemporary (1911) Lajilosojia di G B. Vico (English translation), philosop hy.Together with Gentile, with whom, Poetry and Literature, trans . G. Gullace , Southern before an intellectual and political Illinois University Press, 1981). estrangement, he was friend and cothinker, (1913) Saggiosul Hegel. Croce set the agenda (both for his supporters and (1920) Brevario di estetica. opponents) of much Italian philosophizing, and, (1925) Elementi di politica. through R. G. Collingwood's acceptance of (1928) Estetica in nuce (English translation, many of his doctrines his influence extended 'Aesthetics ', in Encyclopaedia Britannica, fourteenth edition). into the English-speaking world , most (1939) La po esia. noticeabl y in aesthetics and the philosophy of English editions of most of these exist; there is also a history. Croce spent much time on Hegel and collection by Cecil Sprigge (1966) Philosophy , was one of the earliest debaters of Marxis m Poetry and History, Oxford : Oxford University (Croce , Labriola, who introduced the study of Press . Marx to Italy, and Sorel were known as the Holy Trinity of Latin Marxist studies , although 40 Cro ce

Labriola was to condemn the revisionism ofthe against fascism has, therefore, a foundation in othertwo). Croce found Marx 's views ,which he the core ofhis philosophy. Having given form to took to be deterministic, at odds with his own our sensations we can now grasp particulars, categorical commitment to freedom . this stone, this man, this water. At the next stage, Following the tragic death ofhis family in an which presupposes and is therefore secondary to earthquake, and after brief periods of study in the aesthetic, comes the stage at which we Rome, Croce returned to Naples and spent the extract the general from the particularand talk in early years ofhis intellectual life exploring the general terms of stones , water, men by forming history and culture of that city. The Scienza concepts . This is the stage of logic, which is Nuova of Vico awoke his mind to philosophy investigated more fully in the second of the and he became interested in the much debated volumes of the philosophy of spirit. The question whether history be an art or a science . aesthetic and the logical stages exhaust the This led him in tum to think about the nature of theoretical activities of the mind . But there is art, a thinking that was to issue in his first major also the practical. This, too, has two stages : the work, and the work by which he is best known in economic, in which we try to get what we have the English-speaking world, Estetica (1902) . In conceptualized (so that the economic depends the course ofwriting this work what had started on the logical, which depends on the aesthetic ; as an interest in the particular questions of art for, Croce asks , how could we seek something if and history widened itself into a systematic we did not have a concept ofwhat we seek?);the philosophy, what he was to call the philosophy final stage is the moral , not merely wanting , but ofspirit. Although that philosophy is elaborated being able to distinguish between what ought in the four works mentioned above , the best and what ought not to be wanted . This is further short introduction to it is Estetica , for that work investigated in the third of the works of the came to be not merely an account ofart but an philosophy of spirit, La jilosojia della pra ctica account that placed art in an overarching (1909) . In these four stages the whole life ofthe account ofall the faculties ofthe human mind . mind is laid before us. The drift of the philosophy of spirit may be Two aspects ofthis philosophy deserve brief grapsed by considering a stone warmed by the further comment: first,the account ofaesthetics. sun. Here the stone passively receives stimuli . Initially Croce had said that art simply is Compare this to the receipt of stimuli by a expression or intuition so that any intuition or human being .Here the recipient ofthe stimuli is expression is art. Later he was to further active in processing them . The first thing the characterize art as a certain kind of intuition , recipient does is to impose a form on the welter first as lyrical intuition and later as cosmic ofexperience. This is the aesthetic stage, which intuition . These notions are continually applied therefore lies at the root of all that we can in the actual study ofworks ofart and literature subsequently do. In that stage we impose order (although it has been argued that examples that on chaos by finding a way of expressing would demonstrate their applicability to the (intuiting, representing-the terms are plastic arts and to music are distinctl y lacking) . interchangeable) the stimuli . That expression Some, including Gentile, found the assertion of issues in language and art and is something that the existence of such distinctions somewhat at every human and not merely every artist does .In odds with the unifying impulse of idealism, to this activity we find expressed our categorical which Croce felt an affinity. Second , Croce freedom : nothing can in advance determine the thought history to be allied with art rather than direction our expression will take, for until science , being concerned with the particular expression has taken place there is nothing rather than the general. That influential view of formed to do the determining. Croce 's history is set out in the fourth volume of the commitment to freedom in the active struggle philosophy of spirit, Teoria e storia della Davidson 41

storiografia (1917) . An implication is that to --and McLaughlin, B. (eds) (1985) Actions and attempt to find in history scientific laws of Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy ofDonald progress is to misconstrue that subject , a Davidson, Oxford : Blackwell. conclusion which has obvious implications for Marxism. Donald Davidson is one of the major COLIN LYAS contributors to contemporary analytic philosophy. Over a period of three decades he has outlined and developed two distinctive and intimatel y related theoretical perspectives in the Davidson, Donald Herbert philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language . Some of his earliest work was American. b: March 1917, Springfield, devoted to uncovering the logical form ofcausal Massachusetts. Cat: Philosopher of mind ; and action statements, already demonstrating philosopher of language . Ints: Casuation; the close relation between semantic and other meaning . Educ: Harvard University, BA 1939, substantive issues. Dissatisfied with standard MA 1941, PhD 1949.Injls: Carl Hempel, Hans analyses of such statements, he argued that Reichenbach, Rudolf Carnap , Willard Van legitimate inferences , for example from 'Caesar Orman Quine and Alfred Tarski. Appts: stabbed Brutus with a knife' to 'Caesar stabbed Instructor, Queen's University (NY) College, Brutus ' were not recoverable unless such 1947-56; Stanford University, California, statements were analysed in terms of relations 1951-67; Professor, Princeton University, between events , where these latter were taken as 1967-70; Professor, Rockefeller University, belonging to an ontological category distinct 1970-6; Professor, University of Chicago , from things and their properties. Espousing a 1976-81 ; Professor, University of California, materialist position, Davidson had to Berkele y, from 1981; John Locke Lecturer, accommodate prima facie conflicting theses: University ofOxford, 1970. that as human beings we were part ofthe natural order, but that our mental life and voluntary action failed to fit the requirements of deterministic law. Davidson disputes that there Main publications: are strict laws connecting the mental and the physical, or connecting mental events with one (1972) (ed. with Gilbert Hannan) Semantics of another, despite being committed to the view Natural Langu age, Dordrecht: Reidel. that each mental event is a physical event. This (1980) Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: controv ersial view, which he calls 'anomalous Clarendon Press. monism', itself supplies an interesting twist to (1984) Inquiries into Meaning and Truth, Oxford. the debates between proponents of soft and hard determinism,the pointbeing that it is only under a physical description that mental events Secondary literature: instantiate deterministic laws. Yet for Davidson causation is essential to understanding the idea of acting with a reason , and we can make Evnine , S. (1991) DonaldDavidson, Polity Press. singular causal claims without reference to any Lepore , E. (ed.) (1986) Truth and Interpretation: laws that they might instantiate. Reasons are not Perspectives on the Philosophy of DonaldDavidson, only causes, but also explanatory ofwhat people Oxford: Blackwell. do. Thus Davidson 's strategy is appropriately described as rationalizing one, in that normative 42 Da vidson

principles embody all that we know about messy, changeable and inconsistent. It is mental life and human action . So while we precisely these features which pose the most might defer to experts about the nature ofcopper acute problems for Davidson himself, or quarks , our everyday or 'folk-psychology' especially indexicality (involving terms like T , requires no such deference. 'this' and 'now'), attributive adjectives like In his treatment of the mental Davidson 'good' and ' large', and indirect speech contexts concentrates on 'propositional attitudes', states as instanced by 'Galilee said that the earth with propositional content as expressed in moves'. Attempts by Davidson and his statements like 'Joan believes that snow is followers to deal with these problems, while white' . He sees beliefs as explanatory, but also exhibiting considerable ingenuity and as showing how other beliefs and actions can be innovation, have met with a mixed reception reasonable, given those initial beliefs . Being a from critics . believer-agent, therefore , amounts to being The two main strands of Davidson's work more or less rational. Not only is this strategy have a wider purport which goes beyond their normative, it is holistic in that we cannot ascribe narrower technical interest. It has to be shown beliefs and other attitudes in isolation, but only how the theory ofmeaning can be put to work in as elements in a web of attitudes . This holistic interpreting the utterances of speakers of an dimension owes much to the influence of alien tongue , using the strategy of 'radical Quine, and this influence is visible elsewhere in interpretation' . Davidson imposes a constraint Davidson's work. on this, called the 'principle of charity', by Undoubtedly Davidson's most significant which we seek to maximize agreement between and influential work has been in the field of what ourselves and the speakers of the other is known as 'truth-conditional semantics', the language. We are to assume that most of what theoretical position according to which the those natives say is true by our lights. Davidson meaning ofa sentence in a language is given by sets himself against scepticism and relativism, stating the conditions under which it is true. arguing that there is no sense to be attached to Furthermore, this type of theory purports to the notion of radically divergent or alternative show how the truth-conditions of sentences are conceptual schemes . Local untranslatability is determined by the semantic properties of the unremarkable; wholesale untranslatability component expressions such as nouns and between languages is unintelligible. Davidson verbs . Such a theory might be expected to yield has influenced many younger philosophers for any sentence S, a sentence of the form'S including John McDowell, Colin McGinn and means p' , in which the meaning of S is given by Mark Platts . He has also attracted spirited whatever sentence replaces p. However, again criticisms from thinkers as diverse as Michael under Quinean influence , Davidson regards any Dummett (on the question ofthe form a theory appeal to 'meanings' as opaque and , drawing on ofmeaning should take) and Jerry Fodor (on the the work ofAlfred Tarski, substitutes locutions status of the mental within the natural order) . ofthe form'S is true if, and only if, p', claiming More generally, his anomalous monism has that a theory based on the notion oftruth is both been condemned as an unstable compromise, more perspicuous and can do all that a theory of and theorists otherwise sympathetic to his meaning is supposed to do. Davidson does, semantical project have none the less suggested however, depart from Tarski in certain respects : that appeal to truth-conditions is at best the latter's work was exclusively with necessary but not sufficient to account for how formalized technical languages, and was and why people behave and speak as they do. combined with a scepticism about the Overall his work has had a conspicuous impact applicability of formal techniques to natural on some major philosophical issues such as languages , everyday languages being too Derrida 43

relativism, objectivity and rationality, and as (1972) La dissemination, Paris : Seuil (Engli sh such has a relevance to debates in discipline translation, Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson, areas outside the traditional boundaries of London: Althone Press, 1981). (1972) Positions, Paris: Minuit (English translation, philosophy. Positions, trans . Alan Bass, London: Althone Press, Sources: WWW(Am) . 1981). (1972) Marges de la philosophie, Paris: Minuit DENIS POLLARD (Engli sh trans lation , Margins of Philosophy , tran s. Alan Bass, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982) . (1974) Glas, Paris : Galilee. (1978) Eperons: Les styles de Nietzsche, Paris : Derrida, Jacques Flamrnarion (English translation, Spurs: Nietzsche s Styles, trans. Barbara Harlow, Chicago: Chicago Algerian-French. b: 1930, Algiers . Cat: Post­ University Press, 1979) . (1978) La Verite en peinture, Paris: Flammarion structuralist; phenomenologist; philosopher of (Engli sh translation, The Truth in Painting, trans. language; metaphysician; aesthetic ian. In ts: Geoffrey Bennington and Ian McLeod, Chicago: Deconstruction. E duc: Ecole Normale Chicago University Press , 1987). Superieure and Harvard University. Infls: (1980) La Carte postalede Scorate aFreud et audela , Sartre, Husserl , Heidegger and others in the Paris: Aubier-Flammarion (Engli sh translation, The phenomenological tradition, as well as Saussure Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, and structuralist theorists .Appts : Philosophy at trans. Alan Bass, Chicago: Chicago University the Sorbonne and Ecole Normale Superieure ; Press, 1987). Visiting Professor, Johns Hopkins , Yale and the (1993) Spectres de Marx, Paris : Galilee (Engli sh translation, Spec tres ofMarx, tran s. Pegg y Kamuf, University ofCalifomia at Irvine ; key figure in London: Routledge, 1994). the development ofthe International College of Philosophy, Paris.

Secondary literature: Main publications: Gasche, Rodolphe (1986) The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection, (1962) (trans. and intro .) L 'Origine de la geom etric, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Paris : Presses Universitaires de France (Engli sh Llewelyn, John (1986) Derrida on the Threshhold of translation, Edmu nd Huss erl s 'Origin of Sense, London, Macmillan Geometry': An Introduction, trans. John P. Leave y, Norri s, Christopher (1987) Derrida ,London:Collin s. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1978). Ryan, Michael ( 1982) Marxism and Deconstruction: (1967) La Voix et la phenom ene: introduction au A Critical Articulation, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins probleme du signe dans la phenomenologie de University Press. Husserl, Paris: Presses Un iversitaires de France Sallis, John (ed .) (1987) Deconstruction and (English trans lation , 'Speech and Phenomena ' and Philosophy: The Texts ofJacques Derrida, Chicago Other Essays on Husserl's Theory ofSigns, trans . and London: University of Chicago Press. David B. All inson, Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Staten, Henry (1984) Wittgenstein and Derrida University Press, 1973). Linco ln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press . (1967) De la grammatol ogie, Paris : Minuit (English Wood, David and Bernas coni, Robert (1988) Derrida translation, Of Grammatology , trans. Gayatri and Differan ce, Evan ston, Ill.: Northwestern Chakravort y Spivak, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. University Press, 1976). (1967) L 'Ecriture et la differance, Paris: Seuil (Eng lish translation, Writing and Difference, trans . Derrida is the founder and prime exponent of Alan Bass, London : RKP, 1978). deconstruction, a method of textual analysis 44 Derrida

applicable to all writing, philosophy no less than Husserl is still caught up in the metaphysics of creative literature, which by means ofa series of presence and that it is not until the work of highly controversial strategies seeks to reveal Heidegger, a critical influence on Derrida's the inherent instability and indeterminacy of thinking and the source of the idea of meaning . One of his primary objectives is to deconstruction, that presence is subjected to draw attention to the inescapably textual close scrutiny. A major target of Derrida's character ofall philosophical writing, which he critique of Western philosophical method has feels that most philosophers try to deny, been structuralism, which he feels largely regarding it as pure argument instead . ignores the implications of the arbitrariness of Deconstruction is best approached as a form of the sign, and he has delivered some devastating radical scepticism and antifoundationalism attacks on the notion ofthere being underlying (Derrida's philosophical project has been structures to discourse. Derrida is particularly variously compared to those of Hume, critical of Levi-Strauss's belief that myths can Nietzsche and Wittgenstein), and Derrida be reduced to a common structure , since it adopts an oppositional stance towards Western requires the existence ofan originary myth-an philosophy from Plato onwards for its indefensibly essentialist line of argument in unacknowledged commitment to a Derrida's view. Derrida is notorious for 'metaphysics of presence', the belief that deploying a range of concepts in his writing­ meaning is essentially stable and determinate differance, supplement, force, for example­ and can be grasped in its entirety. Western while denying that they have the status of philosophy is in this sense logocentrist, concepts . The practice oferasure, derived in the committed to the idea that words are capable of first instance from Heidegger, is taken to communicating unambiguously meanings that sanction the use of a word minus its are present in the individual's mind . It is further metaphysical commitments. Differance is to be regarded, Derridaargues, as phonocentrist, probab ly Derrida'sbest-known'concept',and it believing that speech more authentically is designed to illustrate the shifting and communicates meaning than writing , being indeterminate nature ofmeaning since it can be closerto the original thoughtthan writing is.For heard as either difference (difference) or Derrida, on the other hand , meaning is marked differance (deferral) , with both meanings being by the continual play of difference, and his kept in play at anyone time. Such cases bear out entire oeuvre is designed to show how this calls Derrida's point about the indeterminacy of into question the logocentrist and phonocentrist meaning and the arbitrariness ofthe sign, as well assumptions underlying philosophical as enabling him to call into question the law of discourse . Derrida's is essentially a linguistic identity and thus strike a blow at the very enquiry-he takes his lead from Saussure's foundations of philosophy. Derrida is also identification ofthe sign as arbitrary-although notorious for the obscurity and eccentricity of it has involved excursions into metaphysics, his style, in which punning and word-play, aesthetics, ethics, literary criticism and art applied examples of Saussures associative criticism over the course of what has been a relation , are important parts of a strategy to highly prolific writing career. His roots lie in locate gaps (aporias) in our discourse . The end­ phenomenology, with his earliest important result is a form ofphilosophy which looks closer publications being commentaries on Husser) , to game-playing than to traditional whose concepts of bracketing, epoche and philosophical argument; but since it is part of phenomenological reduction all playa crucial Derrida's concern to problematize the division part in Derrida's development. He argues that, between philosophy and literature , as well as to for all the radicalism of the concepts above, insist that philosophy is above all a form of Dew ey 45

wntmg as dependent as any other on the philosophically marginal details as the status of operation of figures of speech , such practices signatures being cited as evidence. The literary have become an integral part of the project to theorist Christopher Norris has proved to be deconstruct Western metaphysics. The general Derrida's most able apologist from within thrust of'Derrida's work is anti-foundationalist, British academic life, with the philosophers and he is in fact one of the most John Llewelyn and David Wood providing uncornprormsmg antifoundationalists in sympathetic defences of Derrida's modern philosophy, part of a general trend in philosophical credibility. On the whole , this respect which encompasses figures such as however, Derrida has exerted far greater fellow French poststructuralists Michel influence among culture theorists and literary Foucault and Jean-Francois Lyotard and the critics than amongst the philosophical American pragmatist philosopher Richard community. Rorty. Derrida has had an enormous impact on STUARTSIM modern thought , with deconstruction proving itselfto be one of the most controversial as well as most stimulating developments in late twentieth-century intellectual life. There is now what amounts to a Derrida industry­ Dewey,John Christopher Norris has spoken of a 'reconstructive tum ' to academic discourse in American. b: 20 October 1859, Burlington, recent years-andfew works in the general field Vermont. d: 1 June 1952, New York City. Cat : ofcultural studies fail to acknowledge Derrida's Philosopher of education; pragmatist. Ints: influence or engage with his ideas. Response to Social philosophy. Educ: University of Derrida 's theories tends to be highly polarized Vermont, BA 1879; Johns Hopkins University, and he arouses extreme hostility and passionate PhD 1884. Infls: Hegel and James . Appts: advocacy in almost equal measure. Perhaps his 1884-8, 1889-94, Professor, University of greatest area of success has been in American Michigan, Ann Arbor ; 1888-9, Professor, academic life, where he has inspired the work of University ofMinnesota; 1894-1904, Professor the Yale School of literary critics, Harold and Head, Department of Philosophy, Bloom, Paul de Man, J. Hillis Miller and Psychology and Pedagogy, University of Geoffrey Hartman , and through their writings a Chicago; 1904-30, Professor, Columbia whole generation ofliteraryacademics.Derrida University. himselfhas expressed misgivings about the use made ofhis ideas in ' American deconstruction', 'disagreeably surprised' being his comment,but Main publications: there is no denying the extent of his impact. In Britain Derrida 's ideas have met with a greater (1969-90) The Works ojJohn Dewey, general editor, degree of resistance, both from the left, which 1. A. Boydston, Carbondale and Edwardsville: has persistently criticized the deconstructive Southern Illinoi s University Press (divided into enterprise as essentially apolitical in character, three parts: (196 7-72) John Dewey : The Early and from the British philosophical Works, 1882-1898, 5 vols, referred to below as EW; establishment, which, with a few notable (1976-83) John Dewey : The Middle Works, 1899­ exceptions, hardly considers what Derrida does 1924, 15 vols, referred to below as MW; (1981-90) The Later Works, 1925-53, 17 vols, referred to to count as philosophy at all. Charges of below as LW). intellectual charlatanism are not uncommon, (1887) Psychology , New York: Harper & Brothers; with Derrida's obsession with such reprinted in EW2. 46 Dewey

(1899) The School and Society, Chicago: University Secondary literature: ofChicago Press; reprinted in MW I . (1902) The Child and the Curri culu m, Chicago: Boydston , 1. A. and Poulo s, K. (eds) (1978) Checklist University ofChicago Press; reprinted in MW 2. ofWritings abou t John Dewey , 1877-19 77, second (1903 ) Studies in Logical Theory , Chicago: edition, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University University ofChicago Press; reprint ed in MW 2. Press. (1910) The Influ ence ofDarwin on Philosophy and Coughlan, N. (197 5) Young John Dewey : An Essay in Other Essays in Conte mporary Thought, New York: American Intellectual History , Chi cago: University Henry Holt & Company; reprinted in MW4. ofChicago Press . (1916) Democracy andEd ucation:An Introduction to Dykhui zen, G. (1973) The Life and Mind ofJo hn the PhilosophyofEdu cation, New York:Macmillan; Dewey , ed. J. A. Boydston, Carbondale: Southern reprinted in MW9. Illinoi s University Press. (1916 ) Essays in Experimental Logic, Chicago: Rockefeller, Steven C. (1991) John Dewey, Religious University ofChicago Press; reprint ed in MW 10. Faith and Democratic Humanism, New York: (1920) Reconstru ction in Philosophy , New York: Columbia University Press. Henry Holt & Co.; reprinted in an enlarged editi on Schilpp , P. A. (ed .) (193 9) The Philosophy ofJohn with new introduction by John Dewey, Boston: Dewey , Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Beacon Press, 1924; reprinted inMW 12. Press, The Libra ry of Living Philosophers; second (1922) Hum an Nature and Conduct. A n Introduction edition, New York: Tudor Publi shing Company, to Social Psychology , New York: Henry Holt: 1951. reprinted inMW 14. Thoma s, M. H. (1962) John Dewey : A Centennial (192 5) Experience and Nature, Chicago: Open Court; Bibliography , Chicago: University of Chicago reprinted in a revised edition, New York: W. W. Press. Norton, 1929; reprinted in LW I. W'estbrook, R. B. (1991 ) John Dewey andAmerican (192 7) The Pub lic andits Problems, New York:Henry Democracy , Ithaca and London: Cornell University Holt ; reprinted in LW2. Press. (192 9) The Quest f or Certainty , New York: Minton, Balch; reprinted in LW4. (1932) Individu alism , Old and New, New York: Dewey began his career as a Hegelian idealist. Mint on, Balch ; reprinted in L W5 . His 1887 textbook on psycholog y sought to (1932) (with James Hayden Tufts) Ethics , revised synthesize a Hegeliani zed faculty psychology edition, New York: Henry Holt ; reprinted in LW 7. with the newly emerging experimental (1934) ACommon Faith, New Haven: Yale psychology. University Press; reprinted in LW9. (1934) Ar t as Experience, New York: Minton, Balch ; At the University of Chicago Dewey had reprinted in LW 10. assembled an imposing group of thinkers (1935) Liberalism and Socia l A ction , New York: G.P. includin g G. H. Mead, Tufts, Ames and A. W. Putnam; reprinted in LW II . Moore . He founded the famous laborato ry (1938) Exp erience and Education, New York: school for education. Further, he participated in Macmillan; reprint ed in LW 13. numerous social reform organizations , most (1938) Logic: The Theory of Inqu iry , New York: notably Jane Addams' Hull House. Appearing Henry Holt & Company; reprinted inLW 12. as a decentennial publication of the university, (1939) Freedom and Culture, New York: G. P. Putnam, reprinted inLW 13. Studies in Logical Theory (1903) contained (1939) Theo ry of Valua tion. International essays by Dewey and his colleagues William En cyclopedia of Unified Science , vol. 2, ed. Otto James at Harvard hailed it as a sign of the birth Neurath, Rudolf Carnap and Charles Morris , of a new school of philosophy, the Chicago Chicago: University of Chicago Press; reprinted in School. Dewey's philosophy had evolved from LWI3. Hegelian absolut e idealism to experimental (194 9) (with Arthur F. Bentley) Knowing and the pragmatism, James 's Principles of Psychology Known , Boston : Beacon Press; reprinted in LW 16. (New York: Henry Holt, 1890) having exerted Dewey 47

the decisive influence on his thinking . meanings that serve to stabilize the uncertain Evolutionary biology also profoundly shaped flux ofevents . Their political economies, their Dewey's philosophy. Experimental art, their religion, their science , their philosophy pragmatism, which Dewey preferred to call are the human enterprises on behalf of 'instrumentalism', grounded cognition in action meaningful stability. Dewey distinguished and noncognitive experiences. Although philosophy from metaphysics. Philosophy is Dewey abandoned the Hegelian ideal of an wisdom ; its task is the criticism of cultural absolute whole of experience, and stressed the values . Metaphysics, by contrast, is a general biological basis of experience and the need to empirical science ; its task is to present the experiment, he retained the Hegelian strategy of generic traits ofexistence to serve as the ground­ overcoming dualism by the dialectical map for philosophy as cultural criticism. discovery oforganic unities . Dewey's penchant for reform extended to Because ofconflict with the administra tion philosophy itself. He held that traditional over the laboratory school Dewey left the philosophers, while reacting to the problems in University ofChicago and joined the faculty of the civilizations in which they arose, flew from Columbia University. Affiliated with Columbia practical solutions into imagined domains of Teachers College , Dewey continued his work in certainty. Hence Dewey called for the education, rising to the forefront of the reconstruction of philosophy to confront what educational reform movement. He rejected both he deemed to be the major crisis ofhis time-the the formalistic approach and the romantic discrepancy between inherited values and ideals approach to the education ofchildren since these and the new forces of control over nature approaches reflected false psychological unleashed by science and technology-and to theories .He proposed overhauling the system of resolve this crisis by applying the method of education. The interests of children, portrayed enquiry that had succeeded in natural science to as naturally curious and active, had to be social and moral problems . captivated and cultivated by means of Committed to democracy and its values , educational experiences which would foster Dewey participated in significant public events : creativity and independence. he headed the commission that exonerated Leon Dewey's conception ofhuman nature, basic Trotsky of the Stalinist charges in 1937, and he to his educational theories, stressed the joined in the defence of Bertrand Russell malleability of human nature . He esteemed against the denial of his teaching post in New growth to be the aim of education and of life, York in 1941. Dewey called for the reform of growth that should never end. Dewey's zeal for traditional liberalism. Centred on the self­ educational reform was at one with his zeal for reliant individual and his rights to laissezfaire, social reform . liberalism had to be reconstructed, since the Dewey's conception ofexperience is crucial industrialization and urbanization ofsociety by to the understanding of his philosophy. It is means of new technologies produced a new active as well as passive , social as well as social environment which called for a type of individual, objective as well as subjective, individual different from the old type ofpioneer dynamic and continuous. Dewey's metaphysics in the wilderness. is focused on the description ofthe generic traits Dewey condemned fascism and communism ofexistence.Inprimary experience he found the because they abandoned democracy and polarity of stability and uncertainty and the resorted to violence . He advocated the method polarity of the actual and the ideal; he also ofenquiry and democratic processes. detected qualities, events , histories. These traits Dewey's philosophical labours extended to discovered in experience are traits ofexistence all the fields of human experience. His and so of nature . Human beings create the philosophy of art reinstates the ideal oforganic 48 Dilthey unity which he had derived from Hegelian Dilthey, Wilhelm thought. It also stresses the primacy of immediately felt quality. Such quality may German. b: 19 November 1833, Biebrich , occur in my experience; it is consummatory. Germany.d: 1October 1911, Siez (Bozen). Cat: Aesthetic values are consummatory qualities, Philosopher of culture (close to the neo­ experienced not merely in the presence of art Kantians of the Baden school) ; epistemologist. objects stored in a museum, but encountered Educ: Theology, Philosophy and History in every day in ordinary life. In philosoph y of Heidelberg and Berlin . Infls: Kuno Fischer, religion Dewey's position is that of humanistic Edmund Husserl and Friedrich Adolf naturalism. He interpreted religion, not as a Trendelenburg.Appts: Professor at Basel, Kiel, personal experience in the manner of William Breslau and Berlin . James, but as a non-sectarian social effort on the march to realize the ideal. In his closin g years Dewey associated with Main publications: logical empiricism, although he maintained his intellectual autonomy. He never yielded in his Dilth ey's works are available in his Gesammelte naturalistic theory ofvalues and his cognitivist Schriften, 20 vols. Stuttgart : B. G. Teubner; theory of value jud gements . Gottingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 19 14- 90). For the professional philosopher and Many of the essays and reviews found in this edition were scattered in various places, and were difficultto scientist, Dewey's method ofenquiry is his most obtain before. Apart from the works publi shed by important work. This instrumentalist or Dilthe y himself, this edition also includes a numb er pragmatist methodology has won him his ofmanuscripts that were not ava ilable before. distinctive niche in the history of philosophy. ( 1870) Das Leben Schleiermachers vol. I, vol. II 1922 , Enquiry is defined as the process of moving Gesammelte Schriften XIII and Xl V. from an indeterminate situation that blocks ( 1883) Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschafte n,vol. I, Leipzig, Gesammelte Schriften I (English action towards a determinate situation in which translation, Introduction to the Human Sciences , action may proceed. Four stages are described: trans. R. J. Bretanzos, Detroit: Wayne State (i) defining the problem by observation and University Press, 1989). analysis; (ii) imaginative construction of (1894) Ideen iiber eine beschreibende und hypotheses to explain and resolve the problem; zergliedernde Psychologie, Gesammelte Schriften V, 139- 237 (English transl ation in Descriptive (iii) explication of the meanings of the concepts Psychology andHistorical Understanding, trans. R. in the hypotheses, in regard to mathematical H. Zane r and K. L. Heiges, The Hague: Nijhoff, formulations, experimental design and further 1977). deduct ions; and (iv) actual testing. The method (1905) Erlebnis und Dichtung , Stuttgart : B. G. is instrumentalist, not simply because ideas are Teubn er. construed metaphorically astools foraction, but (1907) Das Wesen der Philosophie, Gesammelte Schriften V, pp. 339-428 (English translation, The also because, as any experimental laboratory Essence oj Phiiosophy, trans. S. A. and W. T. Emery, illustrates, instrum entation is employed in New York: AMS Press, 1969). nearly every phase of the process. (1910) Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Dewey's belief that the method of enquiry, Geisteswissenschaften, Gesammelte Schriften VII, the scientific method, should be applied to 79- 190. ( 1961) Pattern and Meaning in History. Thoughts on prac tical problems lent philosophical support to History and Society , tran s. H. P. Rickman, Londo n: the rise and the vogue of the social sciences. Allen & Unwin (represen ts a collection oftranslated Sources: Edwa rds; DAB, supplt 5, 195 1-5; EAB. passages from volum e VII of the Gesammelte ANDREW RECK Schriften). Dilthey 49

(1989-) Dilthey s Selected Works, ed. Rudolf A. stance was thoroughl y antimetaphysical, and he Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi, Princeton : Princeton was more interested in analysing particular University Press .This edition is projected to have six problems than in providing a theory of the volum es. Two ofthese have appeared, including vol. nature of reality. Starting from what he thought I , Introduction to the Human Sciences (1989) which was 'the standpoint of experience and include s a translation of Einleitu ng in die Geisteswissenschaften, vol. 1 and the drafts for vol. unprejudic ed empirical inquiry ', his works II and vol. V, Poetry and Exp erience 1985 ). constituted a series of attempts at establishing the foundation ofth e experiential sciences ofthe mind, called by Dilthey Geisteswissenschaften . While the term 'Geisteswissenschafteri' is Secondary literature: usually translated as 'human sciences ' or 'human studies ', itwas originall y c1oserto what Biemel , Walter (ed .) (1968) ' Der Briefwechsel John Stuart Mill designated the 'moral Dilthe y-Husserl ', Man and World I: 428--46. sciences '. Bollno w, O. F. (1955) Dilthey : Eine Einfiihrung in Today Dilthey is mainly known for his seine Philosophie, second edition, Stuttgart: epistemological analysis of historiography as Kohlhammer; originally Leipzig and Berlin 1936. involving a special kind of mental operation Hodge s, H. A. (1944) Wilhelm Dilthey : An called 'Verstehen' (understanding). Yet, while Introdu ction , Lond on: Kegan Paul, Trubne r & Co. history and the problems concerned with the -- (1952) The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey , London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. writing of history were extremely important to Makkreel, RudolfA. (1969) 'Wilhelm Dilthe y and the him, his philosophy was much more broadl y Neo-Kantians: the distin ction of the conceived than this view suggests . His Geisteswissenschaften and the projected 'Critique ofhistorical reason' was to Kultu rwiss enschaften', Journal of the History of cover all of the human sciences. Arguing that Philosophy 4: 423--40. historical reality was ' truncated' and --(1992) Dilthey: Philosopher ofHuman Studies, 'mutilated ' by those who were trying to force second edition, Princeton: Princeton University the human sciences into the same mould as the Press . natural sciences , he attempted to establish a new Misch, Clara (ed.) (1960) Der junge Dilthey : Ein methodology and foundation for these sciences. Lebensbild in Briefen und Tagebiichern, 1852­ 1870, Gottingen: Vandenho ek & Ruprecht (first He rejected positivism not because he felt that published in 1933). the kind of certainty they were seeking could not Misch, Georg (196 7) Lebensphilosophie und be had, but because he thought that they were Phdnomenologie. Eine Auseinanderse tzung der sacrificing the'legitimate independence ofthe Diltheyschen Richtung mit Heidegger und Husserl, particular sciences '. Dilthey's new foundation Darm stadt : Wissenschaftli che Buchgesellschaft, of the human sciences involved a critique of originally Berlin 1930). consciousness in a Kantian sense. Yet, unlike -- (1985) Orth, E. W. (198 5) Dilthey und die Kant, who believed that his critiqu e could Gegenwart der Philosophie, FreiburglMunich: K. uncover universal conditions of the possibility Alber. of experience, i. e. categories, principles, and Ofinter est for Dilthey's life are : Briefe Wilhelm Dilthey s an Rudolf Haym , 1861­ ideas of the human mind that would hold 1873, ed. Erich Weiniger, Berlin , 1936. anywh ere and at any time, Dilthey thought of these conditions as being embedded in a consciousness of a particulartime and place . He Dilthey's thinking starts from the philosophy of found that no 'real blood flows in the veins ofthe Kant and Schleiermacher. Although he is often knowing subject constructed by Locke, Hume, described as an idealist and romantic , this and Kant, but rather the diluted extract of reason characterization ofhim is rather misleading. In as a mere activi ty of thought'. He wished to many ways he might be better described as an explain even knowledge and its concepts in empiricist. Yet he rejected that label as well. His terms of the manifold powers of a being that 50 Duh em

wills, feels, and thinks, and thus rejected , as only after his death. Thus he has had some ' fixed and dead ' the rigid a priori epistemology influence on the contemporary discussi on ofthe ofKant in favourofa developm ental history that philosophy of history. Although his concept of started 'from the totality ofour being' . Verstehen is often misunderstood , it has This does not mean that Dilthey believed generated a great deal of controversy. Dilthey historians can look merely at the motives and the also had an indirect influence on early actions of individuals. For him the individual is sociological theories through the works of Max always part of a certain culture, and to Weber and Talcott Parsons. Most importantly, understand the individual is also to understand perhaps,early existentialist though t, such as that that culture. Dilthey's 'philosophy of life' of Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger, is (Philosophie des Lebens) is an expression of his unthinkable without Dilthey. Thus Heidegger beliefthatwe must see and understandourselves claimed that his own analysis oftemporali ty and as part of the larger whole that has been created historici ty in Being and Time was ' solely by human beings and that forms our social and concerned with preparin g the way for the historical reality. Furthermore 'e very assimilation of the investigations of W. expression of life has meaning insofar as it is a Dilthey' . And Bollnow's introduction to sign which expresses something that is part of Dilthey was perhaps more an introduction to life. Life does not mean anything other than existential thinking than to Dilthey's theory. itself. There is nothing in it which points to a meaning beyond it.' The expressions of life MANFRED KUEHN form the subject matterofthe human sciences.It is the realm of the method of understanding in the sense of Verstehen. Although different times and different individuals may belong to cultures quite foreign Duhem, Pierre Maurice Marie to ours, we can, according to Dilthey, understand the historical and social processes in French. b: 9 June 1861, Paris . d: 14 September them because we are living individuals who 1916, Cabrespine Ande. Cat: Physicist. Ints: know 'the process by which life tends to Philosophy and history of science; intellectual objectify itself in expressions' . Understanding history;science and religion.Educ: Paris, Ecole is a process sui generis. We cannot explain it by Normale Superieure, 1882- 7, PhD 1888. Injls: reducing it to other, more basic processes. Nor B. Pascal, 1. W. Gibbs, H von. Helmholtz, H. St should it be confused with 'understanding' in Clair Deville, 1. Moutier, J. Tannery and L. the ordinary sense, which signifies any kind of Blondel.Appts: Lille 1887-93, Rennes 1893--4, comprehension. Dilthey describes it as the Bordeaux 1894-1916; Member of Acadernie ' rediscovery ofthe I in the Thou ', or as a form of des Sciences (non-resident). knowing that is concerned with intellectual processes.Itis the comprehension of intentions, motives, feelings or thoughts as they are expressed in gestures, words, works of Main publications: literature, legal codes, etc. Dilthey is also famous for his analysis of (1886) Le Potentiel thermodynamique , Paris: Weltanschauungen or world views. Herma nn. Differentiating between three different types: (1892) 'Quelques reflexion s au sujet des theori es materialism or positivism, objective idealism, physique s' , Revue des Questions Scientijiques 3 1: and idealism of freedom, he himself could not 139- 77. (1892) 'Notation atomique et hypothese identify with any one of them. All three of them atomistique s' , Revue des Questions Scientijiques appeared to him as honest but one-sided views 3 1: 39 1--454. of reality. Dilthey's greatest influence began Duhem 5 1

(1893) ' Physique et metaphysique ", Revue des (1987) Premices philosoph iques, ed. S. L. Jaki, Question, Scientifiques 34: 55- 83. Leiden: Brill. (1893) L'Ecole anglaise et les theories physiques, Revue des Questions Scientifiques 34: 345- 78. (1894) 'Quelques reflexions au sujet de la physique experimentale', Revue des Questions Scie ntifiques Secondary literature: 36 : 179-229. (1900) Les Theories electriques de J. Clerk Max well, Ariew, A. and Barker, P. (eds) (1990) ' Pierre Duhem , Paris : Hermann. historian and philo sopher of science', Syn these 83: (1902) Le Mixte et la combinaison chimique, Paris: C. 177-453. Naud. Brenner, A. (1990) Duh em, scie nce, realite et (1902) Thermodynamique et chimie, Paris : Gauthier­ apparence, Paris: Vrin. Villars (English translation, Thermodynamics and Harding, S. G. (1976) Can Theories be Refilled ? Chemistry, New York: Wiley, 1903). Essays on the Duhem-Quine Thesis, Dordre cht: (1903) 'Analyse de I'ouvrage de Ernst Mach ', Bull. Reidel. Sci. Math. 2/27: 261-83. Jaki, S. L. (1984) Uneasy Genius: The Life and Work (1903) 'E tude sur l'oeuvre de George Green ', Bull. of Pierre Duh em, The Hague, Martinus Nijho ff Sci. Math . 2/27: 237-56. (fullest bibliography in print to date of Duhem's (1903) L 'Evo lution de la mecaniq ue, Paris: A. Joanin writings). (German translation , Die Wandlunger der Lowinger, A. (1941) The Methodology of Pierre Me chanik, Leip zig: 1. A. Barth , 1921). Duhem , New York:Columbia. (190 5-6) Les Origines de la statique, Paris : Hermann Maiocchi , R. (1985) Chimica e jilosojia, scienza, (English tran slation, The Origin of Statics, trans . epistemologia, storia e religione nell 'Opera di Leneaux et al., Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991). Pierre Duhem, Florence: La Nuova !talia (a good (1906) La Theorie phy sique, son objet et sa structure, critical account with a full bibliography). Paris : Chevalier et Riviere; second edition , 1913 Martin , R. N. D. (1982) 'Darwin and Duhem',History (English tran slation , The Aim and Structure of ofScie nce 20: 64- 74. Physical Theory, trans . Wiener, Princeton: --(198 7) ' Saving Duhem and Galileo', History of Princeton University Press , 1954; German Science 25: 302-19. tran slation, Ziel and Struktur physikalischer --(1991) Pierre Duhem: Philosophy and History Theorien, trans. Adler, Leipzig: J.A. Barth , 1908, in the Work ofa Believing Physicist, La Salle. Ill.: reprinted with introduction and bibliography of Open Court. secondary literature by L. Schafer, 1978). --(1991) 'The trouble with authori ty: the Galileo (1906-1 3) Etudes sur Leonard de Vinci, Paris: affair and one of its historians', Modern Theology 7: Hermann. 269-80. (1908) LOZEIN TA 'PAINOMENA Essai sur la Paul, H. W. (1979) The Edge of Contingency: French notion de theorie physique de Platon a Galilee, Catholic Reaction to Scientific Changefrom Darwin Paris : Hermann (English tran slation , To Save the to Duh em, Gainesville: University Presses of Phenomena, trans . Dolland and Maschler, Chicago: Florida. University ofChicago Press, 1969). Popper, K. R. (1959) The Logic of Scientific (1913-58) Le Systeme du monde, histoire des Discovery , London: Hutchinson. doctrines cosmologiques de Platon a Copernic, 10 -- (1963) Conjectures and Refuta tions, London: vols , Paris: Hermann. Routledge. (191 5) La Science allemande, Paris : Herm ann Schafer, L. (19 74) Erfahrun g und Kovention, (English translation, German Science, La Salle: Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: F. Fromman. Open Court, 1991). (1916) La Chimie est-elle une science fran coi s e", Paris: Hermann. Pierre Duhem was a major physicist at the turn (1917) 'Notice sur les travau x scientifiques de of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries , a Duhem ', Memo ires de la Societe des Sciences prolific contributor to the development of the Physiques et Naturelles de Bordeaux 7/1:71-1 69. theories of heat, physical chemistry, (198 5) Medieval Cosmolo gy , trans. Arie w, Chicago: hydrodynamics and electrodynamics , but University of Chicago Press (partial translation of opposed to the atomism that ultimately later volumes ofLe Systeme du Mon de, 1913- 58) . 52 Duhem

triumphed. He was also a seminal writer on the that the very notion of experimental refutation philosophy of science and on the history of became logically ambiguous; so that, necessary science-particularly the medieval period . The as logic was to physical theory, it was not all­ general character and themes of his work as it sufficient and not the ultimate arbiter. evolved have to be understood against the broad Experimental refutation and the response of background of late nineteenth-century physics physicists to it were matters of intuitive and philosophy, as well as his avowed judgement. Physicists had to judge whether an Catholicism. Interpretation of his work is experimental result refuted the theory or complicated by his habit ofreusing earlier work whether it was merely the effect of some other in a new context in ways liable to blind the theory involved in the experimental situation . unwary reader to his changes ofpointof view.At They also had to judge how to amend their the outset his views were obvious variations on theories in the light of accepted experimental late nineteenth-century positivist themes . refutations . Duhem also claimed that the goal of Physical theory was to offer a purely symbolic physics was the intuitively judged improving representation of the facts and to assist the classification which increasingly reflected the memory by providing a classification ofthem. It ontological order. This doctrine of a fallible was quite distinct from metaphysics and from natural classification plays in Duherri's mature common-sense knowledge. How this could system of the Theorie physiqu e a role like have been achieved can perhaps be seen from Popper's notion of fallible truth in his. As the much more detailed discussion offered by Duhem matured , he came increasingly to cite Moritz Schlick in his Allgemeine Pascal's Pensees at crucial points in his Erkenntnislehre, where the relationships argument. Prone as he was to suggest in the first established between different concepts are part ofhis career that the natural classification thought ofas a kind of net giving each concept, looked for by physicists would have a scholastic and therefore the reality it represents, its place in form, these suggestions do not reflect his deeply the scheme of things . Duhem supported his Pascalian temper, made very explicit at the end approach with an instrumentalist account of of his life in his Science allemande. His later atomistic symbolism in chemistry, and by some historical work lends itselfto a like conclusion. rationally reconstructed history of a kind After a decade ofwork that denied the existence already familiar in the work ofEugen Diihring or relevance of medieval science he was and Ernst Mach .At this point he showed no sign genuinel y surprised to discover evidence of it of any interest in or knowledge of medieval while working on the Origines de la statiqu e in science . The first criticisms were Catholic in the early winter of 1903. Thereafter his origin . Duhem was attacked for allegedly historical work changed its character. He did disdaining metaphysics, and for conceding too not, though, align himself with the Catholic much to scepticism, an important point for neoscholasticism of the period, but emphasizes Catholics because oftheir official commitment those aspects ofthe Middle Ages with which it to a semi-rationalist apologetic. Duhem's initial was least compatible, claiming indeed that response, a quasi-Thomist account of the Thomism was incoherent. mutual independence of physics and Sources: Edwards; Mittel strass; E. Jordan (191 7) metaphysics, was never afterwards repeated or 'Duhem, Pierre ', MSSP NB 7/1: 3--40; H. Pierre ­ referred to. His long-term response was Duhem (1936) Un Savant francais, Paris : Pion; DSB twofold : to draw out ofhis initial doctrine that 4: 225a-233b (bibliography); P. Brouzeng (1987) physical theories were symbolic systems a fully Duhem 1861-1916: Science et Providence, Paris : Belin ; S. L. Jaki (1988) The Physicist as Artist, fledged doctrine ofthe theoreticity offacts, and Edinburgh: Scotti sh Academic Press; S. L. Jaki to flesh out what he meant by classification into (1992) Reluctant Heroine: the Life and Work of his still controversial doctrine of natural Helene Duhem, Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press . classification. Experimental laws depended on other theoretical commitments to state them, so R. N. D. MARTIN Dummett 53

Dummett, M(ichael) A(nthony) is for it to be correctl y assertible, and that no E(ardley) statement can be correctl y assertible if it is such as to transcend all possibility ofour verifying or falsifying it. If this is correct then the correct British . b: 1925, London . Cat: Analytic analysis ofsome types of statementmight reveal philosopher.Educ: University ofOxford .Injls: that they do not have what Dummett called a Frege and Wittgenstein. Appts: Assistant 'realist' meaning ; that is to say, they will not be Lecturer, University of Birmingham, 1950-1 ; true or false in virtue ofa reality independent of Commonwealth Func Fellow, University of our cognitive powers . Indeed, some perfectly California at Berkeley, 1955-6; Reader in the clear and precise statements of the given class Philosophy of Mathematics, University of may turn out to be neither true nor false, and a Oxford , 1962-74; Fellow ofAll Souls College, central thrust of Dummett's philosophy has Oxford , 1950-79; from 1979, Wykeham been to question the Principle of Bivalence. Professor ofLogic, and Fellow ofNew College, The issue ofanti-realism, as Dummett called Oxford ; other visiting positions in Europe, the it, has been the main focus ofDummett's work. USA and Africa . It concerns, in his view, a cluster of problems which, though having different subject matters , none the less have a structural similarity. Are Main publications: statements about the external world, for instance , statements about a reality that exists (1973) Frege: Philosophy of Language, London: independently of our knowledge of it? Or are Duckworth. they merely statements about our actual and (1977) (with the assistance of Roberto Minio) possible sense experiences? Are statements Elements ofIntuitionism , Oxford: Clarendon Press. about the mind statements about a reality for (1978) Truth and Other Enigmas, London : which observable behaviour is merel y Duckworth. evidence? Or are they, for instance , really just (1991) Frege and Other Philosophers, Oxford : statements about that observable behaviour? Clarendon Press . Again, to take an example that has been central (1991) Frege: Philosophy ofMath emati cs, London: in Dummett's discussion, are mathematical Duckworth. (1991) The Logical Basis ofMetaphysics, London: statements to be understood as being about a Duckworth. mathematical realm that exists independently of (1993) Origins ofAnalytic Philosophy . us? Or are they simply statements about a (1993) The Seas of Language, Oxford: Clarendon mental realm constructed by what we regard as Press . mathematical proofs? Although highly sympathetic to intuitionism in mathematics, a form of anti-realism, and Secondary literature: although he holds that the argument for anti­ realism in many other areas presents a major challenge, Dummett has never been committed McGuinness, Brian and Oliveri , Gianluigi (eds) to anti-realism generally; in large part , this has (1993) The Philosophy of Michael Dumm ett, been a response to the difficulty in articulating Dordrecht: Reidel. Wright ,Crispin (1986) Realism , Meaning and Truth, an acceptable anti-realist view ofthepast. Much Oxford : Basil Blackwell. of Dummett's work has been pursued through the study ofother major philosophers, and one of his significant achievements has been to In his 1959 article 'Truth' (Proceedings ofthe make the work ofFrege central to contemporary Aristotelian Society 59, 1958-9) Dummett philosophy. proposedthe idea that for a propositionto be true 54 Feng Youl an

Dummett has been particularly influential in Main publications: Great Britain, especially at Oxford . Some, however,have thought that his anti-realism is, in (1924) A Comparative Study ofLife :sIdeals: the Way substance, no more than a reversion to the ofDecrease and Increase with Interpretations and verificationism of the 1930s. It has also been Illustrations f rom the Philosophies ofthe East and objected that it is an overhasty extrapolation West, Shanghai. from a view that is plausibl e (though (1924 )APhilosop hy ofLife, Shanghai. controversial) when applied to the realm of (1924 )AView ofLife, Shanghai. mathematics. (1930-6)A History of Chinese Phil osophy, 2 vols, Shanghai: Commercial Press (English translation, Dummett resigned his Fellowship with the Derk Bodde , Princeton:Princeton University Press). British Academy in protest at its failure, as he (1931) Zhuangzi: ANew Selected Translation with an saw it, to protest sufficiently effectively against Exposition of the Philosophy of Guo Xiang, the cuts in universi ty funding instituted by the Shanghai. Thatch er government of the 1980s . (1934) ABrief History of Chinese Philosophy , Shanghai. Sources: WW 1992. (1936) A Supplement to the History of Chinese Philosop hy, Shanghai. ANTHONY ELLIS (1938) A New Treatise on Nco-Confucia nism, Changsha: Commercial Press. (1939) China s Road to Freedom, Kunming: Commercial Press. (1939) A New Treatiseon the Way ofLiving, Kunmin g. Feng Youlan (Fung Yu-Ian) (1940) New Culture and Society , Kunming: Commerc ial Press. (1940) New Self, Kunming: Kaimin g. Chinese. b: 1895, Tangho, Honan Province, (1942 )New Morality, Chongqing: Commercial Press. China. d: 1990, Beijing . Cat: Neo-Confucian. (1943) A New Treatise on the Nature of Man, Ints: History of Chinese philosophy; neo­ Shanghai: Commercial Press. Confucian rationalism . Educ: University of (1944 ) The Spirit ofChinese Philosophy, Chongqing Beijing and Columbia University, USA. Injls: (English translati on, E. R. Hughes , London: Kegan John Dewey and Frederick 1. E. Woodbridge, Paul). Neo-Confucianism, daoism, Buddhism, and (1944) New Philosophy , Chongqing, Commercial Western logic and metaphysics .Appts: 1923-5, Press. Professor of'Philosopy, Zhongzhou University, (1946) New Scholarship , Shanghai: Commercial Kaifeng; 1926-8, Professor of Philosophy, Press. Yenching University, Beijing; 1933-52, (1946 ) A New Treatise on the Methodology of Professor of Philosophy, Qinghua University, Metaphysics, Shanghai. (1948) Collected Essays in Wartime. Beijing : 1933-52, Dean, College of Arts, and (1948) Short History of Chinese Philosophy , in Head of Philosophy Department, Qinghua English, ed. Derk Bodde, Macmill an: New York. University; 1939--46, Dean, College of Arts, (1958) Essays on the History ofChinese Phil osophy , Southw est Associated University, Kunming ; Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Publishing House. 1952- 90, Professor, Peking University; 1954­ (1983- 90) A New History ofChinese Philosophy , 7 66,Chief, Division of Chinese Philosophy, vols, Beijing: Renmin Publishing House. Research Institute of Philosophy, Academia (1984)MyMemoirs. Sinica ; 1946-7, Visiting Professor,University (1985-) The Collected Works ofFeng Youlan, 14vols. of Pennsylvania , USA; 1947-8, Visiting (1991) Selec ted Philosoph ical Writings ofFung Yt,- Professor, University of Hawaii. Lan, in English , Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. Feng Youl an 55

Secondary literature: controversies. Some critics complained that his perspective altered from one major historical Boorman , H. (ed.) (1970) Biographical Dictionary of study to another, while others thought that Rep ublican China, New York and London: tradition should be a matter of passive discovery Columbia University Press. rather than active construction. Many contested Briere, O. (1956) Fifty Years ofChinese Philosophy his assessment ofparticular figures or schools or 1898-1950, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. rejected his division between the Period of Chan, W. T. (1963) A Source Book in Chinese Philosophers (up to about 100 BC and the Period Philosophy , Princeton: Princet on University Press. of Classical Learning (after 100 BC). China 's Complete Chinese Encyclopedia (1987) Philosophy most serious philosophers, especially those Volumes, Beijing: Chinese Encyclopedia Publications. associated with the periodical Philosophical Louie , K. Inheriting Tradition: Interpretations ofthe Review, admired Feng's deep ingenuity in using Classical Philosophers in Communist China 1949­ sophisticated Western techniques to adapt 1966, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. traditional philosophy to the needs of Masson, M. C. (1985) Philosophy and Tradition: The contemporary China. These philosophers also Interpretation ofChina s Philosophical Past Fung admired his attempt to resolve crucial Yu-Lan 1929-1949 , Taipei: Institut Ricci. controversies over the relative value ofWestern and Chinese thought which preoccupied Feng was a creative philosopher ofoutstanding Chinese intellectual life in the early part of the ability as well as the century's most important century. historian of Chinese philosophy. His concern The focus ofthe philosophical system Feng for metaph ysics, logical analysis, tradition , developed in the 1930s and 1940s was ANew culture and morali ty and his masterl y Treatise on Nco-Confuc ianism (1938), more appreciation of Western and Chinese literally rendered 'A new study of principle' . philosophy produced a philosophical system For this work, Feng drew on the Cheng-Zhu marked by intellectual depth and elegance. Feng school of rationalist neo-Confucianism, was a materialist throughout his career, but after especially the work of Zhu Xi (1130-1200), 1949 political pressure and his own desire to daoism,Chan Buddhism, and Western logical place his work in a Marxist context led to analysis from Plato and Aristotle to the modern repeated self-criticism and to fierce attack by day. He identified four fundamental notions in others, not exclusively in the Cultural his metaph ysics : li (principle), qi (matter) ; dao Revolution. Even during this latter phase his di (the evolution ofthe dao or way); and da quan work often displayed subtlety and balance. (the Great Whole). All are Chinese Feng's doctoral training at Columbia philosophical concepts , but they are related to University under the pragmatist John Dewey the Western concepts of being , non-being , and the neo-realist Frederick Woodbridg e led becoming and the absolute. They differ from him to demand clear argument and analytical their Chinese predecessors and Western rigour in the statement and defence of counterparts, according to Feng , because of his philosophical positions. Feng reinterpreted methodological insistence that his analysis allusive and aphoristic Chinese texts to meet his provide 'empty' or formal concepts and that own high standards of cogency. He sought to associated principles yield no knowledge of determine a great tradition of Chinese actuality. Philosophy was also useless in philosophy, saving what could contribute to a modern flowerin g of Chinese thought and shaping practice, yet 'sageness within and rejecting the rest. His rejection ofHan and Qing kingliness without' from a standpoint of learning and his method of determining what transcendence remained the highest pursuit of belonged to tradition were the focus ofexciting man as man. 56 Fey erabend

Much ofFeng's thought can be related to his Chinese philosophy, although displaying great realist understanding ofthe status ofuniversals intellectual power,also showed the effects of his and his view that metaphysics derived maltreatment. ultimately from logic. All things or events are NICHOLAS BUNNIN what they are in virtue of being things or events ofcertain kinds . Each thing is actual, but its li or principle, which makes it be of its kind, is real and exists abstractly outsid e space and time. Feyerabend, Paul Karl Without the distinction between real and actual Feng thought that formality would be lost and that the criticisms of traditional metaphysics Austrian . b: 13 January 1924, Vienna . d: 11 would overwhelm his formal system . In Feng 's February 1994. Cat: Anti-empiricist; anti­ view the Great Whole, as everything there is, rationalist. Ints: Philosophy of science. Educ: cannot be thought or said.If it could the thinking Institute for the Methodological Renewal of the or saying would stand outside it, and it would German Theatre, Weimar; PhD, University of lack at least one constituent ofeverything there Vienna. Injls: Lakatos, Felix Ehrenhaft, David is.Itis thereforeunsayable, like Laozi's dao and Bohm, Wittgenstein and (though sometimes like that which can be shown but not said in denied) Popper. Appts: Professor, Yale Wittgenstein 's Tractatus. The metaphysics of University; Free University, Berlin; University the unsayable, for Feng, made room for College, London ; University of Auckland; philosophical appreciation of the sublime. University of California at Berkeley; Federal Feng used his metaphysics as a framework Institute of Technolo gy, Zurich; many visiting appointments. for discussions ofmorali ty, culture and art. He consid ered the moral to be that which is in accord with the li ofsociety and the immoral to be that which conflicts with the li. By Main publications : introducing the amoral he placed large areas of life outside the scope of traditional Confucian (1975)Against Met hod, London: NLB. ethical assessment. He argued that cultures (1978) Science in a Free Society , London : NLB should be understood in terms of types rather (contains short intellectual autobio graphy, section than in terms of particular historical 2.11). instantiations and that types of culture could be (1981) Philosophical Papers, 2 vols, Cambridge. explained by underlying material causes. He (1987) Farewell to Reason , London: Verso. applied this view to Chinese intellectual history (1991) Three Dialogues on Knowledge, Oxford: and the problem of inheriting the Chinese past. Blackwell. (1995) Killing Time, Chicago: University of Chicago After the establishment ofthe People's Republic Press (posthum ous autobiography). in 1949 Feng set out a doctrine of abstract inheritanc e, according to which concepts like the Confucian virtue ren (humanity or benevolence) could be abstracted from their Secondary literat ure: concrete class circumstances and used without the taint of past oppression in contemporary Munevar, Gonzalo (ed.) (1991) Beyond Reason: society. Some of the most important and bitter Essays in the Philosophy of Paul Feyerabend , philosophical debates of the 1950s and 1960s Dordretch: Kluwer. surrounded this claim . Like most eminent intellectuals Feng was badly treated in the Feyerabend 's work in the 1950s and 1960s, Cultural Revolution. His final major history of much of it collected in his Philosophical Papers Fou cault 57

(1981), containe d detailed studies in the philosopher. His arguments against rationality, deve lopment ofthe sciences .Along with Kuhn, expressed in a violently polemica l style (but Lakatos and Hesse. he was associated with the with a lively sense of humour) , provoked the view that a historica l perspective on scientific most extreme reactions . The fact that many of change can be at least as fruitful as any logical his detractors believe that his later writings analysis ofscientific methods .Independently of cannot be taken seriously did not strike him as Kuhn, he was an originator of a historical thesis altogether negative . that there are frameworks ofthought which are RICHARD MASON incommensurable (in the sense that logical relations cannot hold between the contents of different frameworks). He believed that so­ called scientific observation terms 'are not Foucault, Michel merely theory-laden ... but fully theoretical (observation statements have no "observational core" ... Or, to express it differently: there are French .b: 1926, Poitiers ,France .d: 1984,Paris . only theoretical terms ' (1981, Introduction, p. Cat: Post-structuralist;historian ofideas.Educ: x). This provided one basis for his critiqu e of Ecole Norma le Superieure , Paris. Infls: Marx, empiricism, both in the philosophy of science Nietzsche, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Jean and more widely. Hyppolite and Georges Canguilhem. Appts: Feyerabends later work, from Against Professor of Philosophy, University of Method (1975), argued that changes in science Clermont-Ferrand; Professor of History and cannot proceed according to any specific Systems of Thought, College de France . method (and hence any 'rational' method : this step is indistinct) . That led him to increasingly strong attacks on what he saw as rationality and Main publications: rationalism. He shares with MacInty re a belief in 'traditions' which can be defended or (1954) Maladie mentale etpsychologie, Paris : Presses criticized appropriately only in their own terms . Universitaires de Frances (Engli sh translation, He wrote in Science in a Free Society (1978): Mental Illness and Psychology, trans. Alan 'There is ... hardly any difference between the Sheridan, New York: Harper Colophon, 1976). members ofa "primitive" tribe who defend their (1961) Folie et deraison: histoire de la f olie Ii r age laws because they are the laws ofthe gods ... and classiqu e, Paris: Plon (English tran slation, Madness a rationalist who appeals to "objective" and Civilization: A History ofInsanity in the Age of standards , except that the former know what Reason , trans . Richard Howard, New York: Mentor they are doing and the latter does not' (p. 82).He Books, 1965). has argued for the democratic contro l of science (1963) Naissance de la clinique: une archeologie du against its control by scientists , and took this regard medical Paris: Presses Universitaires de case as far as its practical consequences in his France (English translation, The Birth ofthe Clinic: interest in non-conventional medica l treatment. An Archaeology of Medical Perception , trans . Alan Sheridan , New York: Vintage Books , 1973). In his last work he acknowledged that he had (1966) Les Mots et les choses: une archeologie des relied on concepts such as 'democracy' , sciences humain es, Paris : Gallimard (English 'tradition' and 'relative truth' which he had translation, The Order ofThings: An Archaeology of come to see to be as rigid as 'truth', 'reality' and the Human Sciences, trans . Alan Sheridan,New 'objectivity', 'whichnarrow people's vision and York: Random House , 1970). ways ofbeing in the world ' (Killing Time, 1995, (1969) L 'Archeologie du savoir, Paris: Gallimard p. 179). Feyerabend had no wish to be accepte d (English trans lation , The Archaeology of as a respectable, academic, professional Knowledge,trans.Alan Sheridan,New York: Harper & Row, 1972). 58 Fou cault

(1977) Surveiller et punir: naissance de la prison, when it is realized as a social practice) that have Paris : Gallimard (English translation,Discipline and led to the present rationality-biased discourse Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans . Alan of Western culture . Foucault sets himsel f the Sheridan, New York: Pantheon, 1977). objective of constructing 'a history of the (1976-84) Histoire de la sex ualite, I-III, Paris: present' by means of these archaeologies, Gallimard (Engli sh translation, The History of which have encompassed such diverse topics Sexuality , I-III, tran s. Robert Hurle y, New York: Pantheon, 1978-85). as changing attitudes to insanity in post­ (1980) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Renaissance European society, the Other Writings 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon, Leo development of the prison system within the Marshall, John Mepham and Kate Soper. same society, and the codes governing sexual practice in classical times . In each case Foucault's concern is to trace the mechanisms involved in the development of the various Secondary literature: discourses of social control in modern culture . There is a consciously anti- Enlightenment Arac, Jonathan (ed.) (1988) After Foucault: strain in Foucault's enquiries, and somewhat Humanistic Knowl edge, Postmodern Challenges, notorious ly he proclaims 'the death ofman ' in New Brunswick , N J: Rutgers University Press. Cou sins, Mark and Hussain, Athar (1984) Michel The Order ofThings (1966), arguing, as do so Foucault , London and Basing stoke : Macmillan. many structuralist and poststructuralist Diamond, Irene and Quinby, Lee (1988) Feminism thinkers, that the concept of'man', in particu lar and Foucault: Reflections on Resistance, Boston: 'rational' man, is a very recent , and in many Northeastern University Press. ways very regrettable, cultural invention. Dreyfus , Hubert L. and Rabinow, Paul (1982) Michel Foucault's archaeologies tend to identify Foucault: BeyondStructuralism and Hermeneutics, discontinuities in history, and he insists that his New York and London: Harvester. cultural analyses are specifically directed During, Simon (1992) Foucault and Literature: against all notions of teleology or assumptions Towards a Genealogy of Writing, London: of transcendental vantage points . Thus in Routledge . Sheridan, Alan (1986) Michel Foucault: The Will to Madness and Civilization (1961) he traces a Truth, London and New York: Tavisto ck radical change in social attitud es towards the Publi cation s. phenomenon ofmadness over a relatively short historical period , whereby behaviour tolerated at one point within civil society was very soon Originally trained as a philosopher, Foucault designated as a social 'problem' requiring an subsequently worked in the fields of institutional respons e. Foucault describ es this psychology and psychopathology, the subject cultural phenomenon of the seventeenth and ofhis first book, Mental Illness and Psychology early eighteenth centuri es as 'The Great (1954), before returning to philosophy and, Confin ement' , and emphasizes the more specificall y, to the history of ideas. He discontinuity involved in such a significant drew inspiration from Marxist, structuralist and shift in perception. The underl ying ideological Freudian theory at various points in his career, reason for this change, Foucault claims , is to be although he tended to disclaim any lasting located in the growin g cult of reason, which led influence on his thought from these traditions . to insanity, or 'unreason', taking on negative The main thrust ofFoucault's work is to merge connotations that were unthinkable before . A philosophy with history such that large-scale whole new structure ofpower evolved , as it did analyses, or 'archaeologies' as he has termed also in the rise of the modern prison system them, can be undertak en of those historical with its systemati zed methods of repression 'discourses' (Foucault's name for thought and punishment, and Foucault is a particularly Foucault 59

acute analyst of power in its institutionalized debate in recent cultural theory, largely derives forms. The analysis of power is a continuing from the work of Foucault, and his project to concern throughout his career, surfacing in all map out a 'history of the present' through his major works . Foucault's approach to archaeological analyses of past discourses has cultural history is fairly broad-brush in style been enthusiastically followed up by a host of and can involve some questionable scholars across the humanities and social generalizations. He adopts a rather cavalier sciences . Foucault has attracted criticism from attitude to historical research, much influenced various quarters . The left, for example, has by Nietzsche's iconoclasm about such matters, denounced his anarchistic tendencies and denying the possibility of historical objectivity quasi-Nietzschean outlook as inimical to and dismissing academic history as being socialist ideas (Foucault's political and merely 'the history ofthe historians' . The latter intellectual position might best be summed up requires a vantage-point outside history in as post-Marxist). A more general criticism has order to make it work, Foucault argues, and he been, that his archaeologies, with their is harshly critical of all such examples of sweeping historical generalizations and often 'transcendental narcissism'. Foucault pursues highly selective use of sources, have been his archaeological enquiries throughout his wildly over-schematic. Rather in the manner of oeuvre, culminating in his monumental three­ the structuralist and Marxist thinkers he affects volume history of sexuality in classical times, to disdain , Foucault has been accused of where the concern is to establish the process imposing a model on the past which cannot whereby the relatively guilt-free view of male always be substantiated by the available sexuality in Greek times, including what is by evidence: 'tall orders largely unsupported by modern standards a very relaxed attitude the facts' being one not untypical verdict on his towards homosexual practices such as archaeological enquiries (J. G. Merquior). pederasty, evolved into the more repressive, as Foucault's self-consciously anti­ well as recognizably more modern, codes of Enlightenment stance has also been the subject behaviour of later Roman society. What of much unfavourable comment, with Jurgen Foucault identifies yet again is the Haberrnas, for example, arguing that the development and institutionalization of abandonment of any commitment to universal methods ofsocial control that are unacceptable reason on the part of poststructuralist thinkers to his quasi-anarchistic outlook. Like so many like Foucault ultimately leads to the end of other French intellectuals in the post-1968 philosophy, and to any possibility ofbeing able evenements period , Foucault comes to display a to discriminate between the claims of deep distrust of all institutional power and its competing theories or discourses. In common tendency towards overt control of individual with most poststructuralist theories Foucault behaviour. Foucault has been a highly espouses antifoundationalism- he claims that controversial figure and his broadly based the theories in The Archaeology ofKnowledge interdisciplinary-minded analyses of culture are'groundless', for example-and this aspect and the nature ofinstitutional power have made of his thought has come under considerable him a difficult thinker to categorize. Purists are attack as well, on the fairly predictable grounds only too apt to see his projected merger of that it undermines the validity of his own philosophy and history as lacking the theories and cultural analyses . intellectual rigour required ofeither discipline. There is no doubt, however, that he qualifies as one of the most influential contributors to the field of history of ideas in the modern era. STUARTSIM Discourse theory, one of the liveliest areas of 60 Freg e

Frege, Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob (1903) Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, BegrijJsschriftlich abgeleitet Bd. II, Jena (English transla tion of extracts in Translations fro m the German. b: 1848, Weimar, Germany. d: 1925, Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, ed. and Bad Kleinen, Germany. Cat: Logicist ; Platonist trans. P. Geach and M. Black, Oxford : Oxford philosopher of mathem atics; analytic University Press, 1980). philosopher. Ints: The epistemological (1918 ) ' Der Gedanke: eine logische Untersuchung' , foundations and ontology of number theory. Beitrdge zur Philosoph ie des deutschen Idealismus I(Engligh translation in P. F. Strawson (ed.), Educ: Universities of l ena (1869- 70) and Philosophical Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Gottingen (1871-3); doctorate in Mathematics. Press, 1967). Appts: 1874-1918, Lecturer, Assistant (1979) Posthumous Writings, ed. H. Hermes , F. Professor, then Honorary Ordinary Professor of Kambartel and E Kaulbach, trans. P. Lon g and R. Mathematics at the University of lena. White , Oxford: Blackwell 1979).

Main publications: Secondary literature:

(1879) Begriffsschrift, cine der arithmetischen Baker, G. P. and Hacker, P. M. S. (1984) Frege: nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Logical Investigations, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Halle (English translation in J. van Heijenoort (ed.), Bell, D. (1979) Frege s Theory ofJudgement, Oxford : Source Book in Mathematical Logic, Harvard Clarendon Press. University Press, 1967; and in Gottlob Frege: Benacerr af, P. ( 198 1) 'Frege: the last logici st ', in P. Conceptual Notation and Related Articles, Terrell French et al. (eds), Midwest Studies in Philosop hy Ward Bynum , Oxford : Oxford University Press, VI, Minne apolis: Minneapolis Un iversity Press. 1972) . Currie, G. (1982) Frege:An Introduction to his (1884) Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, ein logisch­ Philosophy , Brighton: Harvester. mathematische Untersuchung iiber den BegrijJ der Dummett, M. A. E. (1981) Frege : The Philosophy of Zahl, Breslau (reprinted with English translation in Language, London: Duckworth. The Foundations of Arithmetic: A Logico­ --(1982) The Interpretation ofFrege s Philosophy, mathematical Enquiry into the Concept ofNumb er, London: Duckworth. J. L. Austin, Oxford: Oxford University Press, -- (1991) Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics, 1953). London: Duckworth. (1891) ' Funktion und Begriff ', an Address given to Mind (1992) 101,404, October (issue to honour the the Jenaische Gesellschaft fur Med icin und publication in 1892 of Gottlob Frege's 'Ober Sinn Naturwissenschaft, 9 January 1891 (English und Bedeutung '). translation in Translations fro m the Philosophical Resnik, M. (1980) Frege and the Philosophy of Writings ofGottlob Frege, ed. and tran s. P. Geach Mathematics, Ithaca, NY: McGraw-Hill. and M. Black, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Schirn , Mathia s (ed.) (1976) Studien zu Frege, 3 vols, 1980). Stuttgart-Bad Cans tat!. (1892) ' Ober Sinn und Bedeutung', Zeitschrift fii r Sluga , H. (1980) Gottlob Frege, London: Routle dge Philosophie und philosop hische Kritik 100 (English & Kegan Paul. translation in Translations fro m the Philosoph ical Wright, C. J. G. (1983) Frege s Conception of Writings ofGottlob Frege, ed. and tran s. P.Geach Numbers as Obj ects, Aberdeen: Aberdeen and M. Black, Oxford: Oxford University Press, University Press. 1980). Wright, Crispin (ed.) (1984) Frege: Tradition and (1893) Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Influence, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet Bd I, Jena (English translation ofPreface, Introduction and Part I in The Frege was influenced by the technic al Basic Laws ofArithmetic, trans , and ed. with an development of number theory in the nineteenth introduction by Mont gomery Furth, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, 1964). century combined with, as it seemed to him, the 'scandalous' state of its foundations . He set Frege 61

himself the task of giving epistemologically relations, and made possible the explosive secure foundations for number theory and a development of logic in this century. The proper delineation of its subject matter. Frege development of the theory of proofs , in rejected, in particular, attempts to ground particular the work of Alfred Tarski and Kurt mathematics in human psychology. He also Gtidel , stems directly from Frege's pioneering rejected attempts, like that ofJohn Stuart Mill, to work. The logic which Frege invented is now so construe number theory as an empirical science . widely accepted that it is taught as a standard Further, he rejected attempts to portray toolkit without attribution to its inventor, like mathematics as a subject without a subject elementary mathematics itself. However some , matter : that is, as the formal manipulation of notably Brouwer, Heyting and perhaps empty signs with no intrinsic meaning . He took Dummett, accept Frege's fonnallanguage but number theory to be the study ofthe necessary not all ofthe logic he used it to express . relations between numbers, and he took Second, Frege used his formal language to numbers to be mind-independent abstract present, in his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik objects . This view is known as Platonism after Band 1, the first system of axioms and Plato's own similar view. Frege conceived his definitions ofwhat we would now call logic and task as one of setting out precise and self­ set theory, and he commenced the rigorous evident truths of pure logic in terms of which deduction of the accepted truths of number numerical concepts could be defined, and from theory from those axioms and definitions. This which the accepted theorems ofnumber theory was a programme he intended to continue in could be rigorously deduced. This programme volume II.But itwas a spectacular failure, since , is known as logicism, the grounding ofnumber while the second volume was in press, Bertrand theory in pure logic. In the course of this Russell showed that Frege's axioms allowed the enterprise Frege made three momentous rigorous deduction of a contradiction, known to contributions to philosophy. subsequent generations as Russell's Paradox. First, he developed a radically new way of Frege did not find a way ofrecasting his axioms treating quantifiers in logic. Quantifiers are which satisfied him, and his privatepapers show expressions like 'something', 'all' and he eventually abandoned logicism, coming 'everything ' which can fill the gap in predicates round to the view that number theory cannot like '- is red' to form sentences which are true after all be deduced from the necessary truths of or false-for example , 'Something is red' , pure logic. The trouble lay not in Frege's logical 'Everything is red' . Frege's technique enables axioms but in his axioms of set theory. Those us to see a complex expression like '-is red axioms combine the view that every predicate and-is round' as a unitary predicate, from a can be used to define a set, viz. the set ofobjects logical point ofview if not from a grammatical ofwhich that predicate is true, and the view that pointofview.There is no limit to the complexity every predicate must be true or false of every of predicates which quantifiers can tum into object there is. So Russell took the predicate '­ sentences , for example, 'if- is red then all bulls is not a member ofitself' and defined the set of hate - ' is a predicate in Frege's logic, and one things which are not members of themselves, which itself embeds the quantifier 'all' . Frege and he then asked whether the predicate is true deployed his quantifiers in a novel formal or false ofthat very set. It's easy to see that if it is language of his own, the first semantically then it isn't, and if it isn't then it is, which is precise language in which logic and set theory paradoxical. could be rigorously formulated . Frege had formulated what we would now Frege.'s discovery was the most important call Naive Set Theory. However, it is 'naive' breakthrough in logic since Aristotle had only in the sense that to hold such a set theory is founded the subject some two millennia before . naive given Frege's rigorous formulation of it It provided the first successful treatment of and Russell's exploitation of that rigorous 62 Gadamer

formulation to develop his paradox. Prior to follows that all categories of expression have these developments Naive Set Theory had been referents-predicates, logical constants, whole the intuitively appealing set theory. Frege's clauses , as well as noun phrases. But (ii) Frege contribution here was to produce a rigorous also thinks of reference as analogous to the formulation of Naive Set Theory whose rigour relation between a name and its bearer. So the Russell could exploit to develop his paradox, world contains , he thinks , entities thus, between them, ending an age ofinnocence corresponding to predicates, logical constants and prompting the modern development of set and whole clauses, as it contains objects theories . corresponding to noun phrases. These Frege's Platonism has fared better. His basic additional entities are concepts, truth-functions idea is generally accepted-viz. that once a and truth-values, respectively. theory is adequately formulated in Frege 's This theory of Frege's has been immensely formal language , and supposing the theory is influential. Wittgenstein radically reworked it true, then its ontological commitment, whether in his Tractatus, and rejected it root and branch Platonic or not, can be read offfrom its syntax . in his Philosophical Investigations. Davidson This approach is common to, for example, claims a Fregean pedigree for his influential Crispin Wright who has defended Platonism, blueprint for a theory ofmeaning, and Dummett and to W. V. O. Quine and Nelson Goodman, criticizes Davidson from a Fregean point of who oppose Platonism by seeking to view. Frege's entire careerwas passed quietly at reformulate number theory in a way which the University of lena, where he was well eliminates or minimizes its commitment to thought of. But, to his disappointment, his work abstract objects .It is shared also by Hartry Field, did not attract much interest in his own lifetime . but leads him to conclude that number theory is However, there were illustrious exceptions: not true but a useful fiction . Peano, Husserl, R ussell , Wittgenstein and Frege's third great contribution was his Carnap all studied Frege. His posthumous theory of meaning. Frege needed a theory of recognition and his influence upon analytic meaning to show that his novel formal language, philosophy have been enormous. unlike our natural languages , is ontologically Sources: M. A. E. Dummett (1982) The perspicuous. The key notions he used were Interpretation of Frege s Philosophy, London : sense and reference (Sinn and Bedeutung). Duckworth (with bibliography); Terrell Ward Bynum Roughly, the sense of an expression is what a (1993) Gottlob Frege: Conceptual Notat ion and mind grasps , and sense mediates the connection Related Articles, Oxford : OUP (with bibliography). between mind and the worldly entity (the JIM EDWARDS referent) which the expression is about. More precisely, the sense of an expression (i) is grasped by a mind, but (ii) is not a psychological entity, since two minds may grasp the very same sense. Further, (iii) sense connects an Gadamer, Hans-Georg expression with its referent in the world-Frege calls sense 'the mode of presentation of the German. b: II February 1900, Marburg , referent' .Finally, (iv) the sense of an expression Germany. Cat: Hermeneutic philosopher. Ints: contributes to the truth-conditions of sentences Hermeneutic theory ; classical thought ; in which that expression occurs . To grasp the technology (especially medicine). Educ: sense ofa sentence involves knowing its truth­ University of Marburg . Infls: Heidegger. conditions. Appts: Professor of Philosophy, University of On the other hand, the referent of an Marburg , 1937-9; Professor of Philosophy, expression is (i) its semantic role: that is, what 1939--47, and Rector, 1946-7, University of that expression contributes to determining the Leipzig ; Professor ofPhilosophy, University of truth-values of sentences in which it occurs . It Gadamer 63

Frankfurt, 1947-9; Professor of Philosophy, (1986) The Idea ofthe Good. University of Heidelberg, 1949-68. (1986) The Relevance ofthe Beautiful. (1986-) Gesamme lte Werke, 7 vol s, Tiibingen:J. C. B. Mohr. (1989) Das Erbe Europas. Beitrdge, Frankfur t: Main publications: Suhrkamp . (1990) Gedicht und Gesprdch, Frankfurt: Insel­ Verlag. (1942 ) Volk und Geschichte im Denken Herders, (1993) Ober die Verborgenheit del'. Gesundheit. Frankfurt: Klo stermann, Aufsdtze und Vortrdge, Frankfurt : Suhrk arnp (1960) Wahrheit und Methode Grundziige einer (Engli sh translation, The Enigma of Health , philosophischen Hermeneutik; fourth edition, Cambridge : Polity, 1995). Tiibingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1975 (English transl ation, Truth and Method, trans. Willi am Glyn-Doepel, New York : Seabu ry Press). (1964) (ed.) Hegel- Tage, Royaumont, Bonn: Bouvier. Secondary literature: (1967) Kleine Schriften, 3 vols, Tiibin gen : J. C. B. Mohr. (1968) Platos Dialektische Ethik; second edition, Bern stein, Rich ard J. (19 83) Beyond Obj ectivism and Hamburg:Mein er, 1983 (English translation,Plato s Relativism, Philadelphi a: University of Dialectical Ethic, trans. Robert M. Wallac e, 1983). Pennsylvani a Press; Oxford: Blackwell. (1968) Um die Begriffswelt del'. Vorsokratiker. Blei cher, Josef (ed. ) (1980) Contemporary (1976) Hegel s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Hermeneutics, London: Routled ge & Kegan Paul. Studies, trans. P.Christopher Smith , New Haven : --(1982 ) The Hermeneutic Imagin ation , London: Yale University Press. Routledg e & Kegan Paul. (1976) Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. David Bohler, Dietrich (1977) 'Philosophische Ling e, Berkel ey: University of California Press Henneneutik und henneneutische Methode', in (contains essays from Kleine Schriften ). Fuhrmann et al., Text und Applikation: Theologie, (1976) Vernunft im Zeitalter del'. Wissenschafi, Jurisprudenz und Literaturwissenschaft im herm en Frank furt : Suhrkamp (English translation,Reaso n in eutischen Gesprdc h, Poetik und Henneneutik 9, the Age of Science , tran s. Frederick Lawrence, Munich: Fink . Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981). Buber, R. et al. (eds) (1970) Hermeneutik und (1977) Kleine Schriften, vol 4, Tiibingen: J. C. B. Dialektik 1. Festschrift fii r Hans-Georg Gadamer, Mohr. Tiibingen: J. C. B. Mohr. (1977) Philosophische Lehrjahre, Frankfurt: Dallm ayr, Fred (1987) Critical Encounters, Notre Klo stermann (English translation, Philosoph ical Dame :Notre Dame University Press. Apprenticeships, trans. Robert R. Sullivan, --and McCarthy, Thomas (eds) (1977) Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1985). Understanding and Social Inqu iry, Notre Dame: (1979) Das Erbe Hegels: 2 Reden aus Anlass del'. Notre Dame University Press. Verleihung des Hegel-Preises del'. Stadt Stuttgart an Grondin, Jean (1982) Hermeneutische Wahrheit? Hans-Georg Gadamer am 13 Jun i 19 79, Frankfurt: Zum Wahrheitsbegriff Hans-Georg Gadame rs, Suhrkamp. Konigstein: Forum Aca demicurn. (1979) (ed. with G.Boehm) Seminar. Philosophisc he Habennas, Jiirgen (1967) On the Logic ofthe Social Herm eneutik, second edition, Frank furt: Suhrkamp. Sciences; trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen and Jerry (1980 ) Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical A. Stark , London : Heinemann, 1989. Studies on Plato, tran s. P.Christopher Smith , New -- (1979) ' Urbanisierung der heide ggerschen Haven: Yale Univers ity Press. Provinz ' (English translation, 'Urbanizing the (1982 ) Heidegger Memorial Lectures, ed. Werner Heideggerian provinc e in Habermas' , Marx, trans . Steven W. Davis, Pittsburgh, PA: Philosophical-Political Profiles, trans. Frederick G. Duqu esne University Press. Lawrence, London: Hein emann, 1983, pp. 189- 97). (198 3) Heideggers Wege. Studien zum Spdtwer k, Henrich, Dieter (ed.) (1960) Die Gegenwart del'. Tiibingen: J. C. B. Mohr. Griechen im neueren Denken. Fests chrift fiir Hans­ (1984 ) 'Text und Interpretation', in Philippe Forget Georg Gadamer zum 60 Geburtstag . (ed. ), Tex t und Interpretation: Deutsch- Hermeneutik und Dialektik 1. Festschrift fill'. Hans­ Franzosische Debatte, Munich: Fink. Georg Gadamer, (1970) Tiibingen: J. C. B. Mohr. 64 Gadamer

Hermeneutik und Ideologiekrit ik (1971) (various Weinsheimer, Joel (1985 ) Gadamer sHermeneutics: authors) Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. A Reading ofTruth and Method , New Haven : Yale Howard , Roy (1981) Three Faces ofHermeneutics: University Press. An Introduction to Current Theories of -- (1991) Philosophi cal Hermeneutics and Understanding, Berkele y: University of California Literary Theory ,New Haven:Yale University Press. Press . Wright , Kathleen (ed.) Festivals of Interpretation: Hoy, David (1978) The Critical Circle , Berkele y: Essays on Huns-Georg Gadamer s Work, Albany: University of California Press. SUNY Press. Jauss , Hans Rober t (1982 ) Toward an Aesthetic of Reception, trans. Timothy Bahti , Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics is Lang, Peter Christian ( 1982) Hermeneutik, conceived in opposition to the methodological Ideologiekritik , X Hhetik, Konigstein: Forum emphasis of traditional hermeneutic theories Academicum . and their concern with the accurac y of Linge , D. (ed .) (1976) Philosoph ical Hermeneutics, interpretation. Gadam er 's aim is to describe the Berkeley: University of California Press . underlying process, an existential encounter Macintyre, Alasdair (19 76) ' Contexts of between two perspectives or horizons of interpretation: reflections on Hans-Georg expectation, which makes interpretation Gadamer 's Truth and Method ', Boston Univers ity possibl e in the first place. Understanding is not Journ al 27, I . Michaelfelder, Diane P. and Palmer, Richard E. (eds) just a matter of immersing oneself Dialogue and Deconstr uction: The Gadamer­ imaginatively in the world ofthe historical actor Derrida Encounter, Alban y: SUNY Press. or text, but a more reflective and practical Misgeld, Dieter (1977) 'Discourse and conversation: process which operates with an awareness ofthe the theory of communicative competence and temporal and conceptual distance between text hermeneutic s in light of the debate between and interpreter and ofthe ways in which the text Habermas and Gadamer ' , Cultural Hermeneutics 4. has been and continues to be reinterpreted and to Outh waite , William (198 5) ' Hans-Georg Gadamer ', exercis e an influence over us. This effective in Quenti n Skinner (ed.), The Return of Grand history (Wirkungsgeschichte), which traditional Theory in the Human Sciences, Cambridge: historicist hermeneutics tends to see as an Cambridge University Press. -- (198 7) New Philosophi es of Social Science: obstacl e, is for Gadamer an essential element Realism, Hermeneutics and Critical Theory , which links us to the text. Our prejudgements or London: Macmillan. prejudices are what make understanding Ricoeur, Paul (1973) 'Ethics and culture: Habermas possibl e. and Gadamer in dialogue' , Philosophy Today , 17. Although Gadamer has often stressed the Schmidt, Lawrence Kennedy (1985) The distinction between his philosophical Epistemology of Hans-Georg Gadamer.An Analysis hermeneutics, with its origin in Heidegger's ofthe Legitimation ofthe Vorurteile,Frankfurt: Peter hermeneutic ontology, and hermeneutics as a Lang . technique of interpretation, his approach clearly Silverman, Hugh J. (ed.) (1991) Gadamer and poses a challenge to more traditional Hermeneutics, New York: Routledge,Chapman & Hall. interpretations. These differences are brought Sullivan, Robert R. Political Hermeneutics: The out in particular in Gadamer's exchan ges in the Earlier Thinking of Hans-Georg Gadamer, 1960s with Emilio Betti, whose General Theory Pennsylvania State University Press . ofInterpretation was published in 1955. The Thompson, John (1981) Critical Hermeneutics: A alternative conception of the human sciences or Study in the Thought ofPaul Ricoeur and Jiirgen Geisteswissenschafien put forward in Habermas, Cambridge: Cambridge University Gadamer's work also made it central to Jurgen Press. Habermas's reformulation of the Logic ofthe Wachterhauser, Brice (ed.) (1986 ) Hermeneutics and Social Sciences. Habermas welcomed Modern Philosophy , Alban y: SUNY Press . Warnke , Georgia (198 7) Gadamer. Hermeneutics, Gadam er 's critiqu e of hermeneutic objectivism, Tradition and Reason , Cambridge: Polity. which he saw as the equivalent ofpositivism in Gea ch 65

the philosophy of the natura l sciences , and also Visiting Professor,University ofWarsaw ; 1965, his stress on the totalizing character of Fellow of the British Academy. understanding. For Habermas, however, Gadamers stress on the fundamental nature of language, expresse d in his claim that'Being that Main publications: can be understood is languag e' , amounted to a form of linguistic idealism. Together with Gadamers stress on the importance of tradition (1956) 'Good and evil',Analysis, 17. and his rehabilitation of the category of (1956) Mental Acts, London : Routledge & Kegan prejudice , this suggested an ultimately Paul. (1960) (trans. with Max Black) Translations f rom the conservative approach which was unable to deal Philosophi cal Writings of Gottlob Frege, Oxford : with the systematic distortion of Blackwell. communicative processes by relations ofpower (1962) Reference and Generality , Ithaca: Cornell and domination. Habermas and Gadamer University Press; amended edition, 1968. debated these issues in the late 1960s and early (1969) God and the Soul , London : Routledge & 1970s; more recent theorists have tended to Kegan Paul. stress the compatibility of hermeneutics and (1972) Logic Matters, Berkeley: University of critica l theory (notab ly the Frankfurt School) in California Press . a conception of critica l hermeneutics (cf. (1973) (with Elizabeth Anscombe) Three Thompson 1981, Outhwaite 1983). More Philosophers, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (1977) Providence and Evil, Cambridge: Cambridge recently, Gadamer also engaged briefly with the University Press. French deconstructionist philosopher Jacques (1977) The Virtues, Cambridge: Cambridge Derrida (see Gadam er 1984), whose University Press. conception ofinterpretation is more sceptical. (1977) (trans. with R. H. Stoothoff) Gottlob Frege, Gadamer has also published an enormous Logical Investigations, Oxford : Basil Blackwell. amount of work on the histor y of philosophy, (1979) Truth, Love, and Immortality: An Introdu ction notably on Greek thought, scientific rationality to Mc'Iaggart s Philosophy , Berkele y: University of and other topics, including, most recently, California Press . essays on the history and philosophy of medicine . WILLIAM OUTHWAITE Secondary literature:

Evans, Gareth, (1977) ' Pronouns, quantifiers, and relative clauses', CanadianJournalof Philosophy 7. Geach, P(eter) T(homas) Griffin , Nicholas ( 1977) Relative Identity , Oxford : Clarendon Press.

British . b: 1916, London . Cat: Analytic Geach has written influentially in many of the philosopher, In ts: Logic; metaphysics; philosophy of mind ; philosophy of religion ; central areas of philosophy, but his most ethics . Educ: Balliol College, Oxford and St important contribution has been the application Deiniol's Library, Hawarden. Infls: Aristotle , of logical techniques to prob lems of language Aquinas , Gottlob Frege,1.M.E.McTaggart and and metaphysics. His first book gives a logical Ludwig Wittgenstein. Appts: 1951-61 , analysis of the notion ofmental acts. Its greatest Assistant Lecturer, Lecturer, Senior Lecturer, influence, however, came from its opposition to University of Birmingham; 1961--6, Reader in the empiricist doctrine of abstractionism, the Logic, University of Birmingham; 1966-81, view that concepts are formed by abstracti ng Professor ofLogic , University ofLeeds; 1985, them from recurrent features of experience. In 66 Gentile

general, Geach 's view ofthemind owes much to Educ: Pisa 1893-97, PhD 1897. Infls: Hegel, both Wittgenstein and Aristotle . D. Jaja and B. Spaventa . Appts: Campobasso, Geach was never sympathetic to the 1897-1902; Naples, 1902-6; Palermo , 1906­ 'linguistic philosophy' ofthe 1950s and 1960s, 13; Pisa, 1914-16; Rome, from 1917; Minister and Reference and Generality (1962) used the of Education, 1922--4; associated with the techniques of formal logic to understand how Fascist regime until its fall and his death at the referring expressions, and expressions of hands ofItalian partisans in 1944. generality, are used in everyday language and thought. Its most influential view was perhaps the claim that identity claims are meaningless except as relative to some general term: 'x = y' Main publications : can only ever mean 'x is the same something or other as s: (1898) Rosmini e Gioberti , Pisa: Fratelli Nistri (PhD Geach's work in ethics has promoted the thesis) . 'doctrine of the virtues', and part of the (1899) La Filosojia di Marx Studi Critici, Pisa : groundwork for this was laid in his influential Spoerri. article 'Good and evil' (1956). Here Geach (1903)Dal Genov esi al Galuppi , Milan: Treve s. attacked the prescriptivism that was fashionable (1908) Scuola e Filosojia, Palermo: Sandron. (1913) 1 Probl emi della Scolastica e if Pensiero at the time, arguing that the primary sense of Italiano, Bari : Laterza. 'good' is in fact descriptive. Goodness is not, (1913) La Riforma della Dialettica Hegeliana , however, a sui g en eris property, as the Messina : Principato. intuitionists had thought: rather, to be good is to (1916) Teoria generale dello Spirito come Atto Puro , be a good something, and the nature of the Pisa: Vallecchi (English translation, London, something supplies the standards ofgoodness. Macmillan, 1922). His work in the philosophy of religion has (1917) Sistema di Logica come Teoria del Conoscere, used the techniques and results ofmodern logic 2 vols, Pisa: Spoerri . to defend traditional Roman Catholic doctrines. (1920) Discorsi di Religion e, Florence: Vallecchi. Geach's work continues to be discussed , (1920) Giordano Bruno e il Pensiero del although the notion of relative identity, highly Renascimento ; Florence: Vallecchi. influential during the 1960s and 1970s, has now (1920) La Riforma dell 'Educazione Bari : Later za (English translation, London: Benn , 1923). largely been rejected . In ethics, however, the (1920) La Riforma dell 'Educazione, Bari: Laterza. theory of the virtues remains central. (1923) Dante e Manzone, Florence: Vallecchi . Sources: WW 1992; ' A philosophical (1929) Origin e e dottrina del Fascismo , Rome : autobiography' , in Harry A. Lewis (ed.) (1991) Peter Libreria del Littorio. Geach: Philosophical Encounters, Dordrecht: (1931) Filosojia dell 'Arte, Milan: Treves (Engli sh Kluwer. translation, Ithaca : Cornell University Press , 1972). ANTHONY ELLIS (1933) Introduzione alla Filosojia, Milan : Treves. (1936) Memorie, Italiane e Problemi , Florence: Sansoni . (1945) Genesi e Struttura della Societa , Florence: Sansoni (Engli sh translation, Urbana: University of Gentile, Giovanni Illinoi s Press, 1960). (1964) Storia della Filosojia, dalle Origine a Platon e, Italian . b: 30 May 1875, Castelvetrano , Sicily. ed. V. Bellezza, Florence: Sansoni. d: 14 April 1944, Florence. Cat: Idealist (1969) Storia della Filosojia Italiana, 2 vols, ed. E. Garin , Florence : Sansoni. metaphysician. Ints: History of philosophy; (1973) Italian Fascism from Pareto to Gentile, ed. moral philosophy; philosophy of education. Lyttleton, London: Cape . Gi lson 67

Secondary literature: organize our experience in thought , a so-called concrete logic. Sensation was the spontaneous Agosti, V. (1977) Filosojia e Religione activity ofself-affirmation and because thought nell 'Attualismo Geniliano, Bres cia: Paideia. had to be embodi ed in language , our individual Baraldi, G. (1976) ' Divenire e Trascendenza' (PhD self-consciousness or moral personality was thesis), Fribourg. united into the collective consciousness of what Calendra, G. (198 7) Gentile e il Fascismo, Rome: he called the transcendental ego or state, Laterza. although perhaps it could be interpreted as Crespi, A. (1926) Contemporary Thought in Italy , culture . In the interpretation of Harris the state London: Williams & Norgate. here was not-though some of his wrritings Croce, B. (1981) Lettere a Giovanni Gentile, Milan: might imply otherwise-necessarily the Mondadori. Harris , H. S. (1960) The Social Philosophy of concrete state to bejoyfully obeyed but more the Giovanni Gentile, Urbana: University of Illinoi s future world of the individual's unreali zed Press . ideals but it was at this point that Gentile Holme s, R. W. (193 7) The Idealism of Giovanni became, with many of his followers (but in Gentile, New York: Macmillan. contrast to Croce,his one-time collaborator on Jano wski , F. (1889) 'Gentile, Giovanni ', Metzler the Giornale Critica della Filosofia Italiana) , a Philosophenlexikon, Stuttgart: Metzlers che supporter ofItalian fascism and able to serve it Verlagsbuchhandlung, pp. 284- 7. as a Minister of Education while carrying Lion, A. (1932) The Idealistic Conception of through educational reforms in line with his Religion: Vico, Hegel, Gentil e, Oxford : Clarendon. ideals. Gentile was a dominating influence on Minio -Paluello, L. (1946) Education in Fascist Italy , London and New York: Oxford University Press. Italian intellectual life even after the fall of Natoli, S. (1989) Giovanni Gentile Filosofo Europea, fascism in the postwar era. He founded and Turin : Bollati Boringheri. edited the journal Saggi Critici and was a Negri, A. (1975) Giovanni Gentile, 2 vols, Florence: principal editor of the Enciclopedia Italiana La Nuova Italia. (1925ff, 37 vols) . Pardo , E (1972) La Filosojia di Giovanni Gentile, Florence: Sansoni. Sources : Edwards; V. A. Bellezza (1950) Romanell, P. (1938) The Philosophy of Giovanni Bibliograjia degli Scr itti di Giovanni Gentile, Gentile, New York: S. F. Vianni . Florence: Sansoni; Hdllh uber, I. (1969) Geschichte -- (1947) Croce versus Gentil e, New York: S. F. der Italienischen Philosophie, Munich and Basel : Vianni . Reinhardt; Mittelstrass; G.M. Pozzo (1986) 'G entile, Romano, S. (1984) Giovanni Gentile la Filosojia al Giovanni', in Dizionario Critica della Letteratura Potere Sergio Roman o, Milan: Bompiani. Italian a, Turin : Unione Tipografica-editri ce. Signore, M. (1972) Impegno Etico e formzione R. N. D. MARTIN del 'uomo nel Pensiero Gentiliano, Galatina: Editrice Salentina. Spirito ,U. (1969) Giovanni Gentil e, Florence: Sansoni . -- (1976) Dal Attualismo al Problematicismo, Florence: Sansoni . Gilson, Etienne Henri

Gentile propounded a system known as actual French . b: 13 June 1884, Paris .d: 19 September idealism, in which thought was held to be pure 1978, Auxerre , France . Cat: Neoscholastic. Ints: History of philosophy; metaph ysics ; activity and united with action .For Gentile there epistemology; aesthetics. Educ: University of was no sense in seeking the cause ofexperience Paris. Injls: Lucien Levy-Bruhl, Descartes, within the content ofexperience, and beliefin an Aquinas and Bonaventure. Appts: 1921-32, external world was the product of our attempt to University of Sorbonne ; 1932-51 ,College de 68 Gilson

France ; 1929-78, Institute of Medieval Studies, disturbed ,or at least irritated ,many advocates of Universi ty ofToronto. orthodox Thomism. His studies ofthe medieval period began by a kind of accident, when it was suggested to him that he should examine the medieval Main publications: provenance of Descartes's thought. He quickl y came to the conclusion not only that Descartes (1919) Le Thomisme, Strasbourg: Vix, sixth edition, had deep roots in medieval philosophy, but also Paris :Vrin, 1986 (English tran slation offifth edition, that Cartesian philosophy was in some ways The Christian Philosophy ofSt. Thomas Aquin as, inferior to it. Thenc eforward he immersed London: Gollancz, 1957). himself in medieval philosophy, and argued (1937) The Unity of Philosoph ical Experience, New constantly that the great medieval thinkers York:Charles Scribner's Sons. (1948) L 'Etre et I'essence, Paris: Vrin, second edition, attained a level of sophistication and insight 1962 (English translation, Being and Some superior to any philosophy before or after. Philosophers, Toronto : Pontifi cal Institute of One of the first shocks that Gilson Medieval Studie s, 1949; second edition, 1952). administered to conventional Thomists was to (1960) Le philosophe et la theologie, Paris: Fayard show that medieval philosophy was not a simple (English tran slation The Philosopher and Theology , homogeneous body ofthought , still less a mere Ne w York: Random House , 1962). reworkin g ofAristotl e. Ina number ofbrilliant (1963) Introduction aux arts de beau , Paris : Vrin studies ofAquinas (1919), Bonaventure (1924), (English version, The Arts of the Beautiful , New Augustin e (1929), St Bernard (1934) and Duns York:Charles Scribner's Sons, 1965). Scotus (1952) , as well as shorter pieces on Abelard and Albertus Magnus, and other works on medieval philosophy as a whole, he Secondary literature: demonstrated that there were radical differences amongst its greatest figures . He thus McCool , Gerald A. (1989 ) From Unity to Pluralism, permanently changed the map of medieval New York: Fordham University Press, pp. 161-99. philosophy, and also indirectl y challenged the McGrath, Margaret (1982) Etienne Gilson: A very conception of a homogeneous 'Scholastic Bibliography. Une Bibliographie, Toronto: Philosophy' , whether conceived of as a Pontifical Institute of Medie val Studies (complete medieval phenomenon or as a single tradition bibliography ofGilson 's works). survivin g intact to the present day. Quinn, John M. (1971) The Thomism of Etienne The only incontestable constant in medieval Gilson, Villan ova, Pa.: Villanova University Press. philosophy, according to Gilson , was that it was Shook , Laurence K. (1984 ) Etienne Gilson, Toronto: practised within the context of a belief in God Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies. Van Riet, Georges (196 5) Thomistic Epis temology , 2 and an acceptance of Christian revelation . (In vols , St Louis & London:Herder, vol. II, pp. 153- 74. the same way, contemporary philosophy is Van Steenberghen, Fernand (1979) 'E tienne Gilson: practis ed in a context of quantum mechanics , historien de la pensee medievale' , Revue evolutionism, biogenetic theory, and the like.) Philosophique de Louvain 77: 487- 508 . This is why he described it as 'Christian' philosophy. By this he meant, not that Gilson was the most influential historian of philosophy and theolog y, or reason and faith, were confused with one another, but that faith medieval philosophy in the twentieth century. His historical studies led him to adopt the provided insights and data for philosophy to examine and exploit. Christian revelation was, philosophy of Thomas Aquinas as his own, and to expound a metaphysics and a theory of as he put it, 'an indispensable auxilia ry to knowledge which, despite his claim that they reason '. Gilson 's view that medieval were simply the views of Aquinas himself, philosophy was Christian philosophy was vigorousl y contested by several of his scholastic Gilson 69

contemporaries, most notably by Fernand Van things, but their existence is not Steenberghen. conceptualizable. Neither is their existence a One ofthe most decisive insights borrowed sensible quality. How, then, can really existing byphilosophy from Christian faith, according to objects be known? Gilson's answer is that they Gilson , was found in Exodus 3:14, in the can be known in a judgement ofexistence . This Vulgate ego sum qui sum , 'I am who am' .In neo­ kind ofjudgementdiffers from the judgement of Platonic thought , the creative source of the attribution, which is the judgement studied in universe was regarded as something beyond logic.In thejudgementof existence, the verb ' to being, therefore something unknowable and be' is not a copula : it is used, not to affirm a unnameable except as non-being. Augustine predicate of a subject , but rather to affirm its was inspired by Exodus, Gilson argued, to reality. transform this creative source from non-being In his later years Gilson turned his hand to into being, and to identify it with the Christian aesthetics; or rather, to the philosophy of art. God . Thus, from Augustine onwards the The roots ofart, he argued, lie in the fecundit y concept of being came to occup y a central role in and dynamism of being, in being-as-act. In metaph ysics . For Augustine, however, heavil y humankind, this dynamism generates the order influenced as he still was by Platonic thought , offactivity, ofmaking as opposed to knowing . God's being was an immutable essence , from There is an infinite variety in human making , which created being flowed and in which it much ofit for utilitarian ends or else for the sake participated. Knowledge, for instance, was an ofknowledge or desire . The fine arts, however, illumination by the divine intellect , since there have as their end the production of beautiful could be no other source of its being than the objects , that is, objects of which the sensuous divine being himself. Aquinas, whose classical mentor was apprehension is pleasing. Objects of this kind Aristotle , transformed the concept of being possess the properties ofwholeness , proportion again, according to Gilson , this time into the and clarity. idea ofan activity :being as analogous to kicking The production of beautiful objects is the or throwing. Being in this sense, Gilson argues, only purpose of art. Art is not knowledge, nor refers primarily to existence, not to essence . For intuition, nor expression; nor is it symbolical. Augustine, God had been an immutable Works of art may, of course, contain other essence; for Aquinas , God was the pure act of elements : dramatic, expressive, cognitive , existence, He whose entire nature it is to exist. conativ e; but in so far as they are works of art, His essence is existence . Furthermore, God is they are simply objects ofbeauty. Similarly, our not so much the source as the cause of finite experiences of art may have a cognitive existents . He communicates existence to them ; element, and in the case ofa poet such as Dante and in them, too, existence is an act-of-being, this may be powerful and significant. But in so although one which is limited and determined far as we experience Dante's poetry as a work of by the essence whose existence it is. art, we sensuousl y perceive it just as a beautiful Gilson's theory ofknowledge flows from his object made out of language. For Gilson, the metaph ysics of existence, although, as Georges order ofknowing and the order ofmaking might Van Riet has shown , it underwent various be mingled in artistic realities , but they were changes and perhaps was never wholly conceptually distinct, and were the product and satisfactory. The problem of knowledge, for the object ofdifferent mental activities. Gilson , was the problem of explaining our knowledge of an external reality, which is in Sources: DFN; EF; WWW. large part a world of objects . Finite objects possess both essence and existence. The intellect enables us to know the essence of HUGHBREDIN 70 GOdel

Godel, Kurt (1939) 'C onsistency-proof for the generalized continuum-hypothe sis' . (1940) 'The consistency of the continuum­ Austrian-American (American citi zen fro m hypoth eisism ' (third edition, corrected, 1953). 1948). b: 28 April 1906, Brunn, Austria (now (1944) ' Russell's mathematical logic', in P. A. Brno, Czech Republic). d: 14 January 1978, Schilpp, ed., The Philosop hy of Bertrand Russell Princeton, N ew Jersey. Cat: Mathematical (Libra ry of Living Philosophers series). logician and philosopher o f mathematics. Ints: (1947) 'What is Cantor's continuum problem?' Platonism in mathematics. Educ: 1924, (1949) 'A remark about the relationship between Unive rsity of Vienna, PhD 1930; associated relativity theory and idealistic philosophy' in P. A. with Vienna C ircle . Injls: Plato, Leibniz , and Schilpp (ed.) A. Einstein: A Philosopher Scientist. David Hilbert. Appts: 1933--40, U nive rsity of (1958) 'Uber eines bisher noch nicht benutzte Vienna; 1933-8, Privatdocent; 1953- 76, Erweiterung des finitem Standpunktes' [On a Professor, Institute for Advanced Studies, hitherto unused amplification of the finite point of Princeton; 1951, Einste in Award; 1975, view]. National Medal for Science. Honorary doctorates fro m U nive rsitie s of Yale, Harvard, Rockefell er, and from Amherst College, Mass. Secondary literature: M ember ofthe N ational Academy ofSciences , the American Academy of Arts and Sciences , and the Ro yal Society of London, Dawson, 1. W. (1969) The Foundations of corresponding member of the Academie de Mathematics: Symposi um Papers Commemorating Science Morale et Politique, Paris, and the the Sixtieth Birthday of Kurt Giidel, Berlin! British Academy. HeidelberglNY: Springer Vedag. --(1984) The Papers ofKurt Godel: An Inventory , Princeton, NJ: The Institute for Advanced Studies. Kurt Godel Colloquium (1989) Proceedings ofthe Main publications: First Kurt Giidel Colloquium Sept 1989, Vienna: Kurt-Godel-Gesellscha ft, (1986-) Collected Works, ed. S. Fefennan, Oxford: Lolli, Gabrielle (1992) Incompletezza:saggio su Kurt Clarendon Press . Include s: Giidel, Bologna : II Mulino. (1930) (thesis) 'Uber die Vollstandigkeit des Nagel, E. and Newman, J. R. (1958) Giidel:s Proof, Logikalkul as' [On the completeness of the logical New York: New York University Press. calculus]. Shanker, S. G.(ed.) (1988) Giidel s Theorem in Focus, (1930) ' Die Vollstandigkeit der Axiome des logischen Croom Helm. Funkti onenkalkuls' [The completeness of the axioms of the logical calculus offunctions]. Between 1930 and 1940 Godel was responsible (1930) ' Einige metamathematische Resultate iiber for three significant developments in Entscheidungsdefinitheit und Widersprufsfreiheit' [Some metamathemati cal results concerning mathematical logic. Thes e were, first, the completeness and consistency]. completeness proof relating to the first-order (1931) 'Uber formal unentscheidbare Satze der functional calculus; second, th e theorem known Principia Math ematica und verwandter systeme' as Godel' s Theorem, (the first incompleteness [On formally undecidable propositions of Principia theorem); and third, a demonstration that the Mathematica and related systems] (publish ed in systemofRussell's and Whitehead's Principia English, New York: Dover Books, 1992). Mathematica, which the incompleten ess (1936) 'Uber die Lange von Beweisen' [On the length theorem showed to be apparently inconsistent, of proofs]. could be rendered consistent. (1938) 'The consistency of the axioms of choice and of the generalized continuum hypothesis with the Godel 's Theorem constituted a major axioms of set theory' (reprinted Princeton, N J: challenge not only to th e ge nera lly -he ld Princeton University Press, 1970). assumption that basic systems in mathematics are complete in that they contain no statements Goodma n 7 1

that can be either proved or dispro ved, but also Carnap and C. 1. Lewis . Appts: Instructor and to Hilbert's view that proofs of the consist ency Professor, University of Pennsylvania , 1946­ of such a system can be formulat ed within the 64; Professor, Brandeis University, 1964-7; system itself. Briefly, the theorem states that in Professor, Harvard, 1967-77. a formal system S ofarithmetic, there will be a sentence P ofthe language ofS such that ifS is consistent neither P nor its negation can be proved within S. The impact ofthis on Principa Main publications: Math ematica was to undermine the latter 's project of providing a set oflogical axioms from (1951) The Structure of Appearance, Cambridge, which the whole of pure mathematics , as well as Mass.: Harvard University Press. the non-axiom atic residue of logic, were (1954) Fact, Fiction and Forecast, London: Athlone deducibl e, since the theorem showed that Press. mathematics contains propositions that are (1968) The Languages of Art, Lond on: Oxford neither provable nor dispro vable from the University Press. axioms. Godel's ingenious argument revealed (1972) Problems and Projects, Indianapolis: Bobbs­ that in proving the consistency ofthe system one Meui!. would also secure a proof that a particular (1978) Ways ofWorld-Making, 1nianapolis: Haehett. (1984) Of Mind and other Matters, Cambridge: statement, T, could not be proved, and also a Mass.: Harvard University Press. proo f of statement T. This shows that a (1988) Reconceptions in Philosop hy (with Catherine consistency proof of ordina ry arithmetic is not Z. Elgin), London: Routledge. possible using finite procedures. In connection with this it has been claimed that Godel's theorem demonstrates that human beings are superior to machines since they can know to be Secondary literature: true propositions that no machine programm ed with axioms and rules can prove. Ayer, A. 1.Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, e. ix, After 1940 Godel extended his interests in 4. the philosophy of mathematics, working in greater detail on the relationship of the cont inuum hypothesis and the axiom of choice Goodm an, after undergraduat e study of to set theory. His 1949 paper includes a curious philosophy, worked for some years as an art argument for the unreality oftime. But it is the dealer and then returned to the subject. After famous first incompleteness proo f that has writing a distinguished thesis , which was the generated, and continues to generate, lively core ofhis first major publication, The Structure debate among philosoph ers. ofAppearance (1951), he entered the academic Sources: Turner. philosophical profession. Even more than Quine, his early collaborator and for many DIANECOLLIN SON years his colleague at Harvard, Goodman is remarkabl e for his combination of extreme conceptual austerity with speculative intrepidity. He also has a stylistic likeness to Quine: both comb ine exquisite concision with a Goodman, Nelson measure of playfulness.Inanearly article which he wrote with Quine they declared their American . b: 7 August 1906, Somerville, predilection fornominalism.But it emerged that Massachusetts. Cat: Analytic philosopher.Ints: they understood it in different ways. Quine Philosophy of science; philosophy oflanguage; wanted to countenance only concrete aesthetics. Educ: Harvard University. Injls: individuals: Goodm an had no objection to the 72 Goodman

abstract, but reserved his hostility for classes, been invoked by philosophers to explain the which Quine thought had to be admitted to make difference between laws of nature and merely sense ofmathematics. Inthat first book he took accidental generalities and also to interpret as his starting-point Carnap's The Logical counterfactual conditionals. Laws of nature, it Construction ofthe World. There Camap had has been suggested, are those from which we are sought to display the entirety of the linguistic prepared to infer counterfactuals. A most apparatus with which matters of fact are effectively argued paper on this (now the first described as reducible by definitions and the chapter of Fact, Fiction and Forecast (1955)) instruments of formal logic to the smallest concludes that counterfactuals, such as 'if this possible undefined basis: the single empirical had been put in water it would have dissolved' concept of recollection ofsimilarity. Goodman (also expressible with the use of 'dispositional endorsed Carnap's procedure, contrasting his predicate this is soluble') amount to ascribing book as a unique example ofserious philosophy some property, presumably microstructural, with everything else, described as 'amorphous which is possessed by all those things that do philosophical discourses'. But he was highly dissolve in water, to the thing of which the critical of its detail, replacing its account of disposition is being predicated. He went on, in definition, providing it with a formal theory of Fact, Fiction and Forecast, to propoundwhat he simplicity and rejecting one of its main called a 'new riddle of induction'. Why do we purposes, that ofbasing the whole construction take'all emeralds up to now have been green' to on what is epistemologically primary or confirm 'all emeralds whatever are green' and fundamental. Inconstructing a phenomenalistic not 'all emeralds are grue', where 'grue' means system, he said, he was not claiming that it was 'green up to now and blue from now'? Neatly in any way 'closer to the facts' than a parrying objections, obvious and subtle , physicalistic one. The elements he selects are Goodman concludes that we project those individuals, but they are abstract ones, sense­ predicates into unrestricted generalizations and qualia such colours and, more disputably, places singular predictions ('the next emerald I come and times. A concrete phenomenal item is the on will be blue') that are entrenched, that we sum of a colour, a place and a time. Another have got into the habit of projecting. An early object of Goodman's distaste, along with paper with the economical title 'About' classes, is similarity. In an early article on foreshadowed the elaborate account of the likeness of meaning he argued against the notion nature ofrepresentation in art in his Languages of synonymy in a way that to some extent ofArt (1968) .Init the view that art represents the prefigured Quine's 'Two dogmas of world mimetically by resembling it is empiricism' and the protracted campaign emphaticallyrejected .Works ofart are symbols , against meaning, intensions, properties and so like sentences, and, like sentences, they have forth that he developed from that article . Later cognitive value and enlarge our knowledge or Goodman generalized his critique ofsimilarity, understanding of the world . In Ways ofWorld­ denying its explanatory power in any Making (1978) a multitude of world-versions, application. For him denotation or extension is over and above those of art and science, are intelligible and that is all there is to general countenanced, such as the world (or world­ terms applying to a multiplicity of things . version) of common sense, which is not too Nothing is added by saying that things to which disturbing, but also those ofparticular artists or such a word applies are connected by similarity even musical composers. Analogies of to each other. Congruous with Goodman's denotation or representation are here stretched, preference for individuals is his actualism, his many would feel, to breaking point, while the unwillingness to countenance possibilities over incompatibility, as contrasted with the different and above what there actually is. These have selectivenesses, of the apparently competing Gramsci 73

versions is overdramatized. Much of Buci-Glucksmann, Christine (1980) Gramsci and the Goodman's work has been very widely and State, London : Lawrence & Wishart . actively discussed. His early Carnapian idea of Cammett, John M. (1967) Antonio Gramsci and the formally systematic philosophy has not been Origins of Italian Communism, Stanford , CA: carried on by him or others but his philosophical Stanford University Press . Dombroski, Rober t S. (1989) Anton io Gramsci, conscience (' I do not want there to be more Boston: Twayne . things in my philosophy than there are in heaven Joll, James (1977) Gramsci, London : Collins. and earth') has been a valuable example . Pozzolini, A. (1970) Antonio Gramsci: An Introduction to his Thought , London : Pluto Press. Sources: Edwards; Passmore 1985. William s, Gwyn A. (19 75) Proletarian Order: ANTHONY QUINTON Anton io Gramsci, Factory Councils and the Origins ofCommunism in Italy , London : Pluto Press.

Generally regarded as one ofthe most creative and origina l thinkers within the Marxist Gramsci, Antonio philosophical tradition , Gramsci spent most of his career in journalism and politics. He was Italian . b: 1891, Ales, Sardinia . d: 1937, Rome . active in the Turin Factory Council movement Cat: Marxist; political philosopher; culture (a soviet-style workers' organization) in 1919­ theorist. Educ: 1911, University of Turin, but 20, and after its suppression he edited L 'Ordine did not comp lete his degree .Injls:Marx, Hegel, Nuovo , later to become a Communist Party Lenin,Croce and Sorel. App ts: Gramsci held no journal, and sat as a Deputy in the Italian formal academic appointments, working as a Parliament. Gramsci was one ofthe founders of journalist and politician. the Italian Communist Party, and although he was a political prisoner for the last ten years of his life, he went on to become one ofthe Party's major theorists through his prison writings . The Main publi cations: earliest intellectual influence on Gramsci was the Italian idealist philosopher and aesthetician (1948-5 1) Quaderni del carcere, Turin: Einaudi Benedetto Croce,whose work formed a lifelong (Prison Notebooks, trans . Quintin Hoare and source of inspiration despite the fact that its Geoffrey Nowell Smith, London: Lawren ce & author ultimate ly turned fascist sympathizer. Wishart , 1971). (1957) The Modern Prince (selection from papers From Croce, Gramsci derives his deep ly held given at Institutio Gramsci , Rome) , trans. Louis belief in the importance of history as an Marks, New York:International Publishers. intellectual activit y. Another important source (1965) Lettere del carcere, Turin: Einaudi (Letters of influence for Gramsci 's intellectual from Prison , trans. Lynne Lawner, New York: development was the French syndicalisttheorist Harper & Row, 1973). Georges Sorel, whose faith in the working class and admiration for the organizational powers of the Catholic Church througho ut history, Secondary literature: Gramsci shared. Despite the strong pull ofMarx and Lenin, Gramsci also retained a distinctly Hegelian bias to his thought , conceiving of the Adamson, Walter L. (1977) Hegemony and dialectic inprimarily Hegelian terms.Gramsc i' s Revolution: A Study ofAntonio Gramsci s Political and Cultural Theory, Berkeley, Los Angeles and early concern as a Marxist theorist was to find London: University of California Press. ways of countering the fairly crude and mechanical forms of dialectical materialism 74 Gramsci

being propounded by such Bolshevik theorists internalized the values of its rulers . The as Nikolai Bukharin. Marxism was for Gramsci continuing strength of capitalism could be not so much a sociological as a historical theory, attributed to the prevailing influence of and he differed considerably from Soviet hegemonic factors, hence the need for Marxist orthodoxy on this issue, with his interest theorists to tum their attention to the cultural invariably being concentrated on cultural and realm, where the ruling class's values were historical factors rather than on purely constructed. Intellectuals were allotted a key economic considerations. role in this process , and Gramsci set great store Gramsci can be credited with expounding a by education as a political weapon . The more human version of Marxist doctrine than emphasis on ideas as a means ofbringing about most ofhis contemporaries, one less driven by effective change is typical of Gramsci, who did the dictates of economic determinism and more not believe that change would be lasting unless committed to keeping the political leadership of individuals truly desired it and political a Marxist revolutionary movement in touch leadership was based on cultural and moral with the rank and file of its working-class ascendancy rather than just economic power. In members . Throughout his life Gramsci The Modern Prince Gramsci reformulated remained a firm believer in the use ofpersuasion Machiavelli's ideas about leadership so that the to achieve political aims, as opposed to the more Communist Party was seen to be just such an widespread Marxist-Lenin method of the instrument of cultural and moral ascendancy. imposition ofparty discipline and policy from Throughout the prison writings Gramsci above . The vision of the Communist Party put evinces a greater interest in analysing the past forward by Gramsci was a markedly less and identifying historical laws than in laying authoritarian one than usual , closer perhaps to down specific rules for future political action . the model of organization presented by the He represents a humanist strain of thought Catholic Church . Gramsci's major within Marxism which owes much to a long­ contributions to Marxist theory, including the running tradition of humanism in Italian culture enormously influential doctrine of hegemon y, stretching back to the Renaissance period, and come mainly from his prison writings , not he remains one of the least 'economist', as well published until after the Second World War. as least dogmatic , of Marxist theorists . 'Civil hegemony', to give it its full title, Gramsci's humanistic interpretation ofMarxist represents Gramsci 's attempt to provide an theory has exerted a considerable appeal explanation for history's periodic failure to amongst those Marxists unhappy with the conformto the determinist model ofMarxism: if excesses of Stalinism or the cruder forms of the conditions were ripe for the total collapse of dialectical materialism favoured in Russian the capitalist system , why did it not occur? A Communist circles . His reputation has grown ruling class, Gramsci maintained, could keep steadily since his death and he is generall y control over the masses by means other than considered to be the most approachable of brute force or economic power. If it could Marxist theorists to non-believers, given his encourage the masses to share its social, cultural lack ofdogmatism. Within Italian political and and moral values then its dominant position, or cultural life since the collapse of fascism 'hegemony' , was assured . Thus the working Gramsci has been a major force. The Italian class could often prove to be a reactionary rather Communist Party of the post-war period took than a revolutionary force, even though it could much of its lead from Gramsci's example as never be in its long-term interests to be so and both theorist and political activist, and showed despite the presence of the correct economic itself more disposed to compromise than most conditions for revolution, because it had such organizations. In Marxist circles outside Habermas 75

Italy, Gramsci 's influence is most clearly seen in Main publications: the work of the French structural Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser, a great admirer of (1962) Strukturw andel der Offentlichkeit, Berlin : the Italian's ideas, particularly his analyses of Leuchterhand. the relationship between economic base and (1970)Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften, Frankfurt cultural superstructure (Althuss ers notion of am Main: Suhrkamp. the relative autonomy of the super-structure (1971) (with Niklaus Luhm ann) Theorie der echoes Gramsci's insistence on the latter 's Gesellschaji oder Sozia ltechnologie: Wasleistet die Systemforschung ", Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. importance vis-a-vis the base) and his doctrin e (1973) Kultur und Kritik, Frankfurt am Main : ofhegemony. The latter doctrine has won wide Suhrkamp. acceptance among theorists and has been used to (1975) Legitimation Crisis, trans. T. McCarthy, consid erable effect in fields such as political Boston: Beacon Press 1975. science, sociology and aesthetics. Theoris ts of (1977) ' The analytical theory of science and popular culture, as a case in point, rely heavily dialectics' and 'A positivistically bisected on the notion of hegemony in their analyses, and rationalism', in The Positivist Dispu te in German most Western Marxist aesthetic theorists have Sociology, ed. Adey and Frisby, London: Hein emann. adopted the doctrine in order to draw attention to (1984) The Theory ofCommunicative Action and the the crucial ideological role played by the arts Rationalisation of Science, 2 vols, trans. T. within culture. McCarth y, London: Heinemann. (1987) The Philosop hical Discourse of Modernity , STUARTSIM trans. F. Lawren ce, London: Blackwell.

Secondary literature: Habermas, Jiirgen Adey and Frisby(eds) (1977) ThePositivistDispute in German Sociology , London: Heineman n. German. b: 18 June 1929, Dusseldorf. Cat: Bernstein, R. (1985) Habermas and Modernity , Post-Marxist critical theorist. Ints: Social Oxford: Polity Press. philosophy; hermeneutics; modernist Held, D. (1980) Introduction to Critical Theory , (emancipatory) thought; communication London: Hutchinson. (speech-act) theory; historical and socio­ White (1990) Recent Works of Jiirgen Habermas, political criticism. Educ: 1954, doctorate, London: Cambridge University Press. University of Bonn ; 1961, second doctorate (Habilitation), University of Mainz. Infls: Jurgen Habermas is the most notable and Hegel, Kant, Marxist philosophy, Schelling, independent-minded successor to the Frankfurt Fichte, Dilthey, Weber, Adorno, Horkheimer, School of Philosophy, which attempted to Lukacs, Searle and Anglo-Am erican linguistic retrieve Marxism from Stalinist orthodoxy and philosophy. Appts: 1954, Adorno 's assistant, remould it into an incisive form of ideological University of Frankfurt's Institute for Social and cultural criticism . Habermas has extended Research; 1961, professorship, University of that concern into a broad preoccupation with Heidelberg; 1964, taught philosophy and those cultural and political factors which distort sociology at Frankfurt; 1971-84, Director ofthe and disrupt the assumed openness of human Max Planc k Institute, Starnburg; 1984, communication. His distinctive contribution to Professor of History of Philosophy, University contemporary European thought is his thesis ofFrankfurt. that perfectible structures of reasoning and 76 Hab ermas

cumulatively liberating insights into truth are individual creative potential depends upon the tangibly accessible as they are embedded within extent of social emancipation, cultural critique our ordinary communicative practices: they are cannot be dissociated from political critique . In neithergrounded in nor reflections ofan alleged its critical and emancipatory capacities, external reality, but are to be found within the Habermas's ideal of undistorted socially constructed discourses which communication is a true child of this Marxist constitute our 'life-world'. motif. Habermas's thought ranges through an In his antipositivist critique of Popper's and incisive attack upon positivism and Popperian Albert's 'critical rationalism' (see Adley and notions of rationality, an attempt to revitalize Frisby, 1977), Habermas refuses to allow the Marxismas a culturallycritical tool,a critique of motif of an emancipatory truth to be the conservative foundations of Gadamerian marginalized by a methodology that refuses hermeneutics and a stalwart defence of the sense to all except that which can be explicated enlightening capacities of modernist thought through scientific analysis . Decisions and against the critical onslaught of French values relevant to moral and political life cannot deconstruction. His thinking is not so much be replaced or rationalized by scientific marked by distinct transitions as by a calculation (Zweckrationalitiit). Curiously, continuous bringing forward of one or other ofa Gadamer, Habermass next chosen opponent, cluster ofthemes that bind his overall position would concur; but just as Habermas resists the together. These include an intense resistance to ideologically acquired authority of scientific scientific , political and philosophical attempts reasoning to legislate upon questions of social to monopolize knowledge and truth, a and political value , so he disputes the authority passionate commitment to open and undistorted ofhistorical and cultural tradition to be the sole communication as a means to truth and the opponentoftechnological thinking .To resist the conviction that vigilant criticism of untruth one-sidedness of scientific reasoning with the offers the only route to an intellectually open evident partisanship of inherited tradition is and politically unrepressive society. merely to replace one distorted truth with Habermas acquired the basis of his another. Habermas supports his claim by conception of emancipatory truth from his arguing for an analogy between the problems initial deep involvement with the Frankfurt posed by tradition and those confronted by School. Marx's teleological framework psychoanalysis. Just as neurotic behaviour commences with an abstract notion of mankind entails the suppression ofits causes, so tradition as a potentia containing the as yet unrealized can be unknowingly blind to values not its own creative potential. Although the Frankfurt and to the ideological presuppositions which School abandoned the conviction that only the underwrite is own truth claims . alienating process of historical labour could In his debate with Gadamer, Habermas's actualize this truth, Habermas retained through commitment to emancipatory truth was not the its influence the Marxist notion oftruth as a yet sole basis of his opposition. He responded to be realized historical situation in which that profoundly to Gadamer's dialogical model of which was potentially true could be realized as understanding, fusing it with aspects ofSearle's actually true . The importance of this notion for speech-act theory. His famous essay 'The Habermas is that it offers an ideal facilitating a hermeneutic claim to universality' (1980) critique of events as a deviation from the argues that 'truth ... measures itself as an envisaged norm, as well as the basis of an idealised consensus achieved in unlimited (and ideological critique the task of which is to unforced) communications' . That which unmask the social and political factors which validates the pro cedures of a discourse as hide the anticipated truth. As the realization of truthful is not metaphysically or ontologically Habermas 77 distinct from the discourse but emerges of happenstance but springs from actual historically from within it. Thus once questions everyday lingustic practice-is something that concerning the truth claims of tradition are we actually talk ourselves into-s-is Habermas's raised , the participants of that tradition need not profoundest contribution to European remain passively subject to their received philosophy. authority but are rationally invited to critically Habermas's defence of such ideality has reappropriate them and by means of critical drawn the fire of post-structuralist and involvement extend their claims . A variation of deconstructivist criticism on the grounds that the argument appears in Knowledge and Human both his ideal speech act and his espousal ofan Interests (1968), where Habermas argues that as yet to be arrived at historical truth are merely all knowledge has a sociological origin , fictive vehicles for the peddling ofhis particular suggesting the possibility ofa rational discourse political commitments. Not only, it is said, do permitting the participants the opportunity to his arguments perpetrate the fiction of an end revise or make more adequate the norms truth ofdiscourse-therealization ofa truly free underwriting its operating consensus. If communicative society-but they exhibit an discourse about the assumptions underwriting authoritarian attempt to straightjacket the knowledge is possible, it is also possible to direction of history. In The Philosophi cal anticipate more comprehensive (i.e. Discourse of Modernity (1987), Habermas emancipatory) assumptions for that discourse. responds by arguing that any empirically rooted Habermas's central contention is that built into ideal as that ofthe undistorted speech situation the very notion of rational discourse is the cannot be falsified by genealogical reductivism. anticipation of acheiving for it more adequate The claim to truth,just as the claim to meaning , and more open foundations . This intrinsic always reaches beyond the empirical discursive logic impels all rational discourses circumstances which initially generate it. towards an ever more open and enlightened Exploding the universality of a political truth stance . claim by exposing the particularist interests In The Theory of Communicative Action which might hypocritically nurture it, does (1984), Habermas explores the pretheoretical nothing , he maintains , to undermine the critical understandings legitimating speech acts . He potential that truth might have . Furthermore, if argues that in the understanding of something there is difference over an issue there is at least said, understanding occurs not because the agreement over what the issue is; and if there is interlocutors share the same experiences but that, the logical possibility exists of rationally because one can grasp the pointofwhat the other arriving at a consensus as to how such is saying despite any expressive idiosyncrasy. differences might be resolved. In this respect the This effectively reformulates Habermas's ideal notion ofemancipatory critique is pehaps one of speech situation, for if it is in the nature of the last defences against the murderous threat discourse to generate intersubjective meanings ever present within religious and political which can transcend a particular interlocutor, it bigotry. ispossible by means ofsound argument to arrive Habermas's defence of modernity carries at the emancipatory potential within such with it a political import of some weight. Post­ meanings and expand them beyond the structuralist criticism may expose the particular originating discourse . Whosoever speaks a wills to power sustaining progressivist notions language both belongs to and aspires to the of philosophical and cultural modernism, but widening of a universal community grounded what are the consequences of allowing the upon the openness and free consensus of idealistic aspirations of modernism to fall communication. The argument that such a completely to such cynicism? Post-structuralist consensus is neither forced on us nor the result criticism may delight in exposing the alleged 78 Hare

elitist authoritarianism of modernism, but is not (1971) Essays on Philosophical Method, London : the dream ofevery political tyranny to convince Macmill an. those under its subjection that there is no other (1972) Essays on the Moral Concepts , London: actuality than the immediate? If any claim to Macmill an. meaning or truth which seeks to transcend the (1972) Applications ofMoral Philosophy, London: Macmill an. horizons of its socio-political origin is (1981)Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method and Point, disallowed, the claim of the ideal, so necessary Oxford: Clarendon Press. for any aspiration to reformulate positions in a (1982) Plato, Oxford: Oxford University Press. more embracing manner, will wither. With that (1989) Essays in Ethical Theory , Oxford: Clarendon witherin g comes what Habermas is afraid of. Press. Without an awareness ofa responsiveness to the (1989) Essays on Politica l Morality , Oxford: wider claims of rational criticism, capable of Clarendon Press. reminding us of how a situation or argument (1992) Essays on Religion and Education, Oxford : might be structured differently from previous or Clarendon Press. present exemplars, humani ty's consciousness (1993)Essays on Bioethics,Oxford:Clarendon Press. will be imprisoned within the horizon of the immediate and its freedom to imagine and act beyond that horizon irredeemably impaired. Secondary literature:

NICHOLAS DAVEY Hudson , W. D. (1983) Modern Moral Philosophy , London : Macmillan. Seanor, Douglas and Fotion, N. (eds) (1988) Hare and Critics, with comments by R. M. Hare, Oxford : Clarendon Press. Hare, R(ichard) M(ervyn)

Hare's first publish ed work, The Language of British . b: 1919, Backwell, near Bristol. Cat: Morals (1952), has been one of the most Analytic philosopher, Ints: Ethics; political influential works of moral philosophy in the philosophy; philosophy of language. Educ: English-speaking world since the Second World University of Oxford , 1945- 7. Injls: G. E. War. He argued that moral judgements , though Moore, 1. L. Austin and Ludwig Wittgenstein. fundamentally imperative in form, could none Appts: Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford, the less be rational. His later works elaborated 1947-66; White's Professor of Moral these themes and, especially in Moral Thinking Philosophy, Oxford, and Fellow of Corpus (1981), developed the claim that a certain sort of Christi College, 1966-83; Graduate Research utilitarianism must be the correct ethical theory. Professor, University ofFlorida at Gainesville, He has also publish ed a consid erable amount of from 1983; Fellow of the British Academy, work in practical ethics, increasingly so in the 1964. latter half ofhis career. When Hare started working on ethics, the emotivism of philosophers such as A. J. Ayer Main publications: and C. L. Stevenson was in the ascendant. Hare's view was that emotivism was right to (1952) The Language ofMorals, Oxford: Clarendon deny that moral jud gements were factual, or Press. descriptive, statements ofany kind,but wrong to (1963) Freedom and Reason, Oxford: Clarendon hold that they were merely expressions of Press. emotion or attempts to influence the emotions of (1971 ) Practical Inf erences, London: Macmill an. others. In particular, it went wrong in not Har e 79

distinguishing clearly the claim that moral tum generates the thesis of the utterances are attempts to influence the actions Universalizability of Moral Judgements. To ofothers (a claim Hare held to be false) from the accept a particular moral judgement, as a moral view that moral utterances are an attempt to tell judgement, involves accepting it also as a people what to do (which he held to be true) . universal principle. IfI really think that it would And this rendered emotivism unable to give a be morally wrong for me to have an abortion satisfactory account of how ethics could be a then I mustthinkthat it would be morally wrong rational endeavour. So Hare wished to for anyone relevantly like me, in relevantly propound a theory which would be 'a rationalist similar circumstances, to have an abortion. kind of non-descriptivism" (Seanor and Fotion Hare's theory thus came to be known as 1988: 210). Universal Prescriptivism. According to Hare, moral judgements were The practical force of the marriage of fundamentally imperative in their logical form, prescriptivism and universalizability became which is why any form of naturalism must be clearer in Freedom and Reason (1963) and, in incorrect: it would involve the attempt to derive particular, Moral Thinking (1981). In these imperative conclusions from factual, and works, Hare developed a form ofutilitarianism. therefore non-imperative, premises. And this Like most modem utilitarians, he thought of the was the fault which G. E. Moore , although not individual good as consisting in one's desires properly diagnosing it, had labelled the being fulfilled, rather than in happiness , a Naturalistic Fallacy. Moral judgements are not conception known as preference utilitarianism. usually, of course , imperative in their Desires, which he claimed were the subject grammatical form. The nub of Hare's claim that matter of morality, could be ordered according they were logically imperative was this: it is a to their strength, and independently of whose conceptual truth that sincerely accepting a desires they were or what they were desires for. moral judgement commits the speaker to acting He then argued that a sympathetic identification upon it on appropriate occasions if it is within with the desires ofothers would make us come his power. Thus, if someone does not act upon a to identify with those desires as we identify with moral judgement on the appropriate occasions, our own. We should thus come to want the then we may logically conclude that either that satisfaction of desires generally, ranked he could not do so or that he did not accept the according to their strength, and with no concern moral judgement. This view of ethical for whose desires they were nor what they were judgements came to be known as desires for;and, Hare argued, this would lead us prescriptivism. to desire the maximum satisfaction of desires Hare was at pains, however, to show that generally. imperatives are subject to logical constraints, In Moral Thinking Hare worked more just as factual assertions are, and this is part of concentratedly towards a theory that combined what brings morality within the domain of the advantages ofboth act utilitarianism and rule reason . utilitarianism. Although, at the level ofwhat he Hare's second major claim is that a genuine called critical thinking-the level ofthe utterly moral judgement, such as that I ought not, for impartial, rational and knowledgeable agent­ instance, to have my pregnancyaborted,must be an individual act is right if and only if it based upon someprinciples.Hare's claim is that maximizes the satisfaction ofdesire, he argued it is a conceptual truth that moral principles are that in making moral decisions we should not universal in form. This does not mean that they usually consider the consequences of each need be wide generalizations; indeed they may individual act. Doing so would not in fact be very specific . But they must not contain produce the desired result, since our judgements references to particular individuals. And this in would often go wrong . Rather, we should 80 Hartmann

generally follow those rules that have been tried Max Scheler. Appts: 1920-5, Professor of and tested-for example, rules against lying, Philosophy,University of Marburg; 1925-31, cheating, stealing and so forth. We should rest ProfessorofPhilosophy,UniversityofCologne; content with what Hare calls our intuitive 1931--45, Professor of Philosophy, University judgements. Indeed we should try to mould our of Berlin ; 1945-50, Professor of Philosophy, sentiments, and those ofour children, to make it University of'Gottingen. psychologically difficult for us to act against them save in exceptional circumstances. So Hare does not suggest that utilitarian thinking Main publications: should replace an adherence to many of our ordinary, intuitive moral principles. Indeed the fact that a general adherence to these principles (1909) Platos Logik des Seins [Plato's Logic of maximizes utility explains, in his view, why Being], Geissen : A. Thopelmann. they have grown up . Hare's work has been the (1921) Grundziige einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis [Outlines ofa Metaphysics of Knowledge], Berlin : subject of continuous discussion, and virtually W. de Gruyter. every aspect ofit has been criticized.It has been (1923-9) Die Philosophi e des deutschen Idealismu s argued, for instance, that the diversity ofmoral [The Philo sophy ofGerman Idealism], 2 vols: vol. I, utterances cannot be reduced satisfactorily to Fichte, Schelling und die Romantik vol. II , Hegel, the imperative model. Many have argued that Berlin: W. de Gru yter. Ethik, Berlin : W. de Gruyter there is no fact-value distinction ofthe sort that (English is central to his work. Others, again, have held (1926) translation, Ethics, trans. Stanton Coit, 3 vol s, that moral judgements are not essentially London: Macmillan, 1932). universalizable. And many philosophers have (1933) Das Problem des geistigen Seins [The Problem thought that his recent work commits Hare to a ofideal Being] , Berlin: W. de Gruyter. sort of naturalism which his theory was (1935) Zur Grundl egung der Ontologie [Foundations supposed to reject. Allan Gibbard remarks : ofOntology], Berlin: W. de Gruyter. 'Perhaps no philosopher since Kant has (1938) Mogli chkeit und Wirklichkeit [Possibility and developed a theory of moral judgement and Reality], Berlin : W. de Gruyter. (1940) Der Aujbau der realen Welt [The Structure of moral reasoning so ingenious and so carefully the Real World], Berlin : G.A. Hain. worked through as R. M. Hare' (in Seanor and (1940) 'Neue Wege der Ontologie', in Systematische Fotion 1988,p. 57). Philosophie, Stuttgart: N. W. Kohlhammer. (English Sources: Flew; Becker; WW 1992; personal translation, New Ways ofOntology, trans . Reinhard communication. C. Kuhn , Chicago: Henr y Regnery, 1953). ANTHONY ELLIS (1953) Asthetik [Aesthetics], Berlin : W. de Gruyter. (1955-8) Kleinere Schriften [Shorter Writings], 3 vols, Berlin: W. de Gruyter (includes reprints of journal articles).

Hartmann, Nicolai Secondary literature: German. b: 20 February 1882, Riga, Lativa . d: 9 October 1950, Gottingen, Germany. Cat: Cadwallader, Eva H. (1984) 'The continuing Metaphysician; ethicist. Ints: Ontology; ethics . relevance of Nicolai Hartmann's theory of value ', Educ: St Petersburg (gymnasium; Philology), Journal ofValue Inquiry 18: 113-21. Dorpat, Estonia (Medicine) and University of -- (1984) Searchlight on Values: Nicolai Marburg (Philosophy PhD). Infls: Plato, Kant, Hartmann s Twentieth Century Value Platonism , Hegel, Aristotle , Hermann Cohen, Husserl and Lanham, Md. : University Press ofAmerica. Hartmann 81

Hook, Sidney (1930) 'A critiqueof ethicalrealism', comprises both a general theory of value (the International Journal ofEthi cs 40 (Jan.): 179-210. Platonism of which is universally rejected Kuhn,Helmut (1951) 'Nicolai Hartmann'sontology', today) and a revival of the long-neglected Philosophical Quarterly I (July): 289-318. aretaic method of doing ethics , originated by Mohanty, Jitendra N. (1957) Nicolai Hartmann and Aristotle .Aretaic ethics is virtue-centred ethics , Alfred North Whitehead: A Study in Recent an alternative to utilitarianism and formalism. Platonism, Calcutta . Werkmeister, W. H. (1990) Nicolai Hartmann s New Hartmann's phenomenology of virtues is in Ontology, Tallahassee: University of Florida Press, volume II, written in lucid, sometimes austerely 1990. poetic prose, illuminating and inspiring. It is governed, Hartmann says, by a 'logic of the heart', and the influence of Nietzsche is as Nicolai Hartmann, a major German philosopher powerful as that of Aristotle. Volume I is an of the first half of the twentieth century, was aporetic phenomenology of morality and a primarily a metaphysician, but is best known in history of normative ethics and ethical theory. the English-speaking world for his monumental Fortunately, volume Ill's unconvincing attempt Ethics. The most characteristic features of his to solve the problem 0 f freedom does not impair work are his 'aporetic method ', and his the majesty ofthe second volume . insistence on the priority of ontology over epistemology. He saw his aporetic method as Certain aspects of Hartmann's philosophy continuous with the best in Plato and Aristotle, have been compared with Anglo-American as consistent with the scientific spirit and as work. His value Platonism has been compared central to productive philosophizing. The with A. N. Whitehead's (Mohanty 1957) and aporetic method consists oftwo phases : first, a contrasted with G. E. Moore's (Cadwallader careful phenomenology of relevant facts 1984). Several factors in Hartmann's (whether ontological, epistemological, ethical epistemology are reminiscent of C. S. Peirce, or aesthetic); second, a dialectical clarification 'Father of American Pragmatism' , namely of the problems they present. Wherever Peirce 's subtle balancing of anti-dogmatic possible, Hartmann formulated problems as objectivism with non-nihilistic fallibilism. On antinomies (paradoxes), assessing each side the other hand, Hartmann's value intuitionism, carefully. Hartmann thus eschewed the German seemingly incorrigible although radicall y tradition of system-building in favour of his pluralistic, stands in a paradoxical relation to unique aporetic approach. fallibilism (the view that one can always be Hartmann fully ontologized the relation mistaken) . Hartmann claims to resolve this (regarding both being and value) between antinomy with a searchlight metaphor knower and known . Setting the two 'modes of according to which values themselves do not Being' (particulars and universals) on an equal change but rather our perceptions of them . footing in so far as they are both objective and Although this Kantianized value Platonism independent of the knower, he proceeded to runs against the current ofthe times, Hartmann articulate them by a method partly shares the existentialist conviction that human phenomenological, partly logical and partly beings must heroically endow reality with metaphysical. This resulted in 'ontological meaning . For, despite the partial intelligibility stratifications', Hartmann's unique and orderliness of reality and ideality, neither metaphysical approach. New Ways ofOntology God nor cosmic purpose exists . Despite his and Ethics contain its most important examples . objectivism, Hartmann's interests are not Hartmann's most enduring contribution to religious . Nevertheless, his 'emotional philosophy will undoubtedly be his Ethics , the apriorism' ('logic of the heart') imparts a aretaic aspect of which has probably already spiritual tone to the Ethics which will always exerted invisible influences. The Ethics appeal to some. In a century starved of sober 82 Hartshorne

inspirational thoughts on the virtues , Ethics II (1953) Reality as Social Process: Studies in towers alone . Metaphysics and Relig ion, Glencoe and Boston : Free Press ; reprinted,New York: Hafner, 1971. (1953) (with W. L. Reese) Philosoph ers Speak ofGod, Sources: Abdulla K. Badsha 'Nicolai Hartmann', in Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Great Lives fro m History: Twentieth Century Serie s, (1962) The Logic ofPerfection and Other Essays in vol. 2, ed. F. Magill, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Salem Neoclassical Metaphysics, La Salle, Ill.: Open Press ;Edwards. Court. EVA CADWALLADER (1965)A nselm s Discovery ,La Salle, Ill.:Open Court. (1967) A Natural Theology of Our Time, La Salle: Open Court. (1970) Creative Synth esis and Philosophic Method, London: SCM Press Ltd and La Salle, Ill.: Open Hartshorne, Charles Court . (1972) Whitehead s Philosophy: Selec ted Essays , 1935-1970, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. American . b: 5 June 1897, Kittaning , (1976) Aqu inas to Whitehead: Seven Centuries of Pennsylvania . Cat: Process metaph ysician ; Metaphysics of Religi on. The Aqu inas Lecture, panentheist ; panps ychist. Ints: Philosophy of 1976, Milwaukee : Marquette University Publications. religion . E duc: Haverford College, Harvard (1983) Insights and Oversights of Great Thinkers: A n Universi ty, SA 1921, MA 1922, PhD 1923; the Evaluation of Western Philosophy , Albany: SUNY Universiti es of Freiburg and Marburg, 1923-5. Press. Injls: Emerson, Peirce and Whitehead. Appts: (1984 ) Omnipotence and Other Theological 1925-8, Instructor and Research Fellow, Mistakes, Albany: SUNY Press. Harvard University; 1928-55, Instructor to (1984 )Creativity in American Philosophy, Albany: Professor,University of Chicago; 1955-62, SUNY Press. Professor, Emory University; from 1962, (1987) Wisdom as Moderation: A Philosophy ofthe Middleway , Alban y: SUNY Press. Ashbel Smith Professor of Philosophy (1962­ (1990) The Darkness and the Light : A Philosop her 76) and Emeritus Professor (from 1976), Reflects upon his For tunate Career and Those who University of Texas at Austin . Made it Possible, Albany: SUNY Press.

Main publications: Secondary literature:

(1931- 5) (ed. with P. Weiss) Collected Papers of Cobb, Jr, J. B. and Gramwell, F. I. (eds) (1985) Charles Sanders Peirce, 6 vols, Cambridge, Mass.: Existence and Actuality: Conversations with Harvard University Press. Charles Hartshorn e, Chicago: Chicago University (1934) The Philosophy and Psychology ofSensation, Press. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hahn, L. E. (ed.) (1991) The Philosophy ofCharles (1937) Beyond Human ism: Essays in the New Hartshorne, La Salle: Open Court, The Library of Philosophy of Nature, Chicago: Willet,Clark Living Philosophers. &Company; reprinted with new Prefac e, Lincoln: Peters, E. H. (1970) Hartshorne and Neoclassical University of Nebraska Press, 1968. Metaphysics:A n Interpretation, Lincoln :University (1941) Man s Vision ofGod and the Logic ofTheis m, of Nebraska Press. Chicago: Willet, Clark & Company; reprinted, New Reese, W. L. and Freeman , E. (eds) (1964) Process York: Harper & Brothers, 1948, and Hamden, CT: and Divinity: The Hartshorne Fes tschrift, La Salle: Archon Books , 1964. Open Court. (1947) The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of Viney, D. W. (1984) Charles Hartshorne and the God, New Have ,CT: Yale University Press. Existence of God, Albany: SUNY Press. Heidegger 83

Wood, Jr, F. and De Armey, M. (eds) (1986) in his international reputation as an Hartshorne s Neo-Classical Theology, New ornithologist. He published a prizewinning Orleans: Tulane Studies in Philosophy. work, Born to Sing: An Interpretation and World Survey of Bird Song (Bloomington: Second only to Whitehead in the leadership of Indiana University Press, 1973). process philosophy, Hartshorne has redirected Sources: Reck 1968; RA, 4; WW(Am). its course from science to religion and theology. ANDREW RECK He professedly reached his basic philosophical position before becoming Whitehead's assistant at Harvard and working on the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (1931-5). In The Philosophy and Psychology ofSensation (1934) Heidegger, Martin he drew upon scientific psychology and philosophy to demonstrate that sensation is an German. b: 26 September 1889, Messkirch, evaluative feeling exhibiting continuity, a thesis Germany. d: 26 May 1976. Cat: he subsequently elaborated into a panpsychistor Phenomenologist; ontologist. Ints: The psychalist philosophy according to which life or question of being. Educ: Theology and feeling permeates the cosmos , concentrated in Philosophy, University of Freiburg . Injls: The individualized centres , identical to Whitehead's pre-Socratics, Plato, Aristotle , St Paul, 'actual entities' or 'occasions of experience'. Augustine , Aquinas, Duns Scotus , Meister Hartshorne held, like Whitehead before him, Eckhart, Angelus Silesius , Luther, Leibniz, that recent developments in natural science Kant,Hegel,Holderlin, Schelling, Kierkegaard, require a radical reconception of nature . Since Nietzsche, Brentano, Carl Braig, Dilthey, nature is reconceived as an affective continuum Husserl and Max Scheler. Appts: 1919-23, of valuational feelings , furthermore , a new Privatdozent and Assistant of Husserl , theology replaces the classical conception of University of Freiburg ; 1923-8, Professor, God .Hartshorne's speculations came to fruition University of Marburg; 1928-46, Professor, in his 1946 Terry Lectures at Yale Universit y, University of Freiburg; 1946-51, forbidden to published in The Divine Relativity (1947) . teach; 1952- 76, Emeritus Professor, University Hartshorne's process deity has a dipolar ofFreiburg. nature-an abstract, eternal nature and a concrete, temporal nature . It mirrors Whitehead's distinction between the primordial and consequent natures of God. The unity of Main publications: these two aspects of God embraces the World, God being supreme as the eternal-temporal (1927) Sein und Zeit, Tubingen (English translation, consciousness, knowing and including the Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. world . Hence Hartshorne has advocated Robinson, Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1962). panentheism, the doctrine that God includes the (1975) Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, world yet transcends it. Hartshorne has sought Frankfurt (English translation, Basic Problems of Phenomenology ,trans. A. Hofstadter, Bloomington: to employ the instruments of modal logic to Indiana University Press, 1982). prove the existence of God. Thus he has (1978) Metaphy sische Anfangsgriinde der Logik , contributed to the revival of interest in the Frankfurt (English translation, Metaphysical ontological argument in recent decades . His Foundations of Logic, trans . M. Hein, Bloomington: endeavours to rehabilitate the reputation of Indiana University Press, 1984). Anselm and to resuscitate the ontological (1929) Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, Bonn argument illustrate the 'neo-classical' tum of (English translation, Kant and the Problem of his thought. Hartshorne 's hobby in bird­ Metaphysics, trans. R. Taft, Bloomington: Indiana watching and listening to birdsong has resulted University Press, 1990). 84 Heidegger

(1929) Grundb egriffe derMetaphysik, Frank furt. Caputo , John D. (1978 ) The Mystical Element in (1929) Was ist Metaph ysik", Bonn (English Heidegger 50 Thought, Athe ns, Ohio: Ohio tran slation, 'What is metaphysics?' , D. F Krell , in University Press. Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. D. F Krell, Dreyfus, H. (1991) Being-in-the- World: A London: Routledge, 1993). Comm entary on Heidegger s 'Being and Time', (1929) Vom Wesen des Grundes, Halle (English Division I, Cambridge, Mass .: MIT Press. tran slation, The Essence of Reasons, trans . T. Dreyfus , H. and Hall, H. (eds) (1992 ) Heidegger: A Malick, Evan ston: Northwestern Univ ersity Press , Critical Reader, Oxford : Blackwell. 1969). Franzen , Winfried ( 1976) Martin Heidegger; (1940) Ober den Humanismus, Frankfurt (English Stuttgart. tran slation, ' Letter on humani sm' , trans . F Capuzzi, Gadamer, H.-G. (1983) Heid eggers Wege, Tiibingen . in Basic Writings, ed. D. F Krell , London: Guignon , Charles (1993) (ed.) The Cambridge Routledge, 1993). Companion to Heidegger; Cambridge: Cambridge (1943) Vom Wesen del' Wahrhreit, Frankfurt (English University Press. tran slation, 'On the essence of truth ', trans . John Macann, Christopher (ed .) (1992) Martin Heidegger: Salli s, in Basic Writings, ed. D. F Krell , London: Critical Assessm ents, 4 vols, London: Routledge. Routledge, 1993). Olafson , F A. (1987) Heidegger s Philo sophy of (1950) ' Der Urpsprung des Kuntswerks' , in Mind, New Haven : Yale University Press . Holz wege, Frankfurt, (Engli sh translation,'The Ott, Hugo (1988) Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu origin of the work of art', trans . A. Hofstadter, in einer Biograph ie, Frankfurt and New York. Basic Writings, ed. D. F Krell , London: Routledge, Poggeler, O. (1990) Del' Denkw eg Martin 1993). Heideggers, Pfullingen (English translation, Martin (1953) Einfiihrung in die Me taphysik, Tiibingen Heidegger 50 Path ofThinking, trans. D. Magurshak (English translation , An Introduction to and S. Barber, Atlanti c Highlands, N J: Humanities Metaphysics, trans. R. Manheim, Garden City, NY: Press International, 1987). Doubleday-Anchor Books, 1961). Safran ski, Riidiger (1994) Ein Meister aus (1954) Was heisst Denken Z, Tiibingen (English Deutschland: Heidegger und seine Zeit, Muni ch. tran slation, What is Called Thinking", trans. F D. Stern, P. (trans.) (1986), Self-consciousness and Self­ Wieck and J. Glenn Gray, New York:Harper & Row, determination, Cambridge, Mass .: MIT Press 1968). (originally publi shed as Selbstbewusstsein und (1957) Del' Satz vom Grund, Pfullingen (Engli sh Selbstbestimmung). tran slation, The Principle ofReason, trans. R. Lilly, Tugendhat, E. (1970) Del' WahrheitsbegrijJ bei Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991). Husserl und Heidegger, Berlin, 1979. (1957) Identit dt und Differenz, Pfullingen (English Herrmann, F -W. von (1985) Subj ekt und Dasein , tran slation, Identity and Difference, trans. J. Frankfurt. Stambangh, New York: Harper & Row, 1969). -- (198 7) Herm eneutische Phdnomenologie des (195 9) Unterwegs zur Sprache, Pfullingen (English Daseins, Frankfurt. tran slation, On the Way to Language, trans . P. D. Hertz and J. Stambaugh, New York: Harper & Row, 1971). For Heidegger there was only one question , die (1961) Nietzsche, 2 vols, Pfullingen (Engl ish Seinsfrage (the question ofbeing) .While still at tran slation, Nietzsche 4 vols, trans . D. F Krell ,New school he read Brentano's On the Manifold York: Harper & Row, 1979-87). Meaning ofBeing according to Aristotle and as (1986) Beitrdge zur Philosophie: vom Ereignis, Frank furt. a theolog y student he studied On Being: An Outline ofOntology by Carl Braig. At the same time he became acquainted with something called 'phenomenology' through the study of Secondary literature: Husser)'s Logical Investigations,a work which exercised a fascination on him which was to Biemel , Walter (1973) Martin Heidegger; Hamburg remain for the rest ofhis life. He never accepted (English translation , Martin Heidegger: An Husserl's phenomenology in its transcendental Illustrated Study, London: Routledge , 1977). and idealistic form but in Husserl 's early Heidegger 85

phenomenology he saw a way ofseeing which 1933 Jaspers had been enthusiastic about the could provide the method for ontology. content of Heidegger's rectoral speech) . The Husserl's devastating critique ofpsychologistic rest ofhis life was like that ofKant: uneventful. accounts of logic was put to effective use in Heidegger's major work, (Being and Time) Heidegger's doctoral thesis on the theory of explicitly raises the question which had begun to judgement. The influence ofthe early Husserl is exercise him even as a student: the question of still strong in Heidegger's habiltation thesis on the meaning or sense (Sinn) of being . The Duns Scotus. In 1919 Heidegger became method of such ontology he calls Husserl's assistant. Under the influence of phenomenology. In the formal sense this is Husserl, but also drawing on such figures as simply adherence to the maxim made famous by Kierkegaard and Dilthey, Heidegger began to Husserl and his followers : 'To the things develop his own brand of phenomenology themselves!' It is the letting be seen of that which focuses on the facticity oflived existence which shows itself. But as philosophy rather than transcendental consciousness and its phenomenology is the letting be seen of what pure ego. This culminated in Sein und Zeit (in primarily and for the most part does not show English, Being and Time), which appeared in itself,but which is the ground ofwhat does show 1927 and confirmed a reputation which itself. The phenomenon of philosophical Heidegger had already established through his phenomenology is not this or that being or entity teaching . but the being ofbeings or entities (das Sein des In the early 1930s, having previously been Seienden). Being is that which determines unpolitical, Heidegger began to be attracted by entities as entities , that on the basis of which the National Socialist movement and its entities are always already understood. charismatic leader, Adolf Hitler. Like many Understanding ofbeing makes all comportment German intellectuals of the time he saw in the to entities-both those which I am not and that movement a force for renewal and regeneration. which I myself am-possible. Being (Sein) is This led him to accept the rectorship of his not something laid up in some realm to which university, Freiburg, in April 1933 and shortly the phenomenologist has some mysterious afterwards to join the Nazi Party. He was active access . It is what is understood in the always in the Nazi cause for ten months , resigning the understanding of being which already belongs rectorship in February 1934 after it had become to the being ofDasein (Heidegger's term for the clear that he did not have the support needed to being which we ourselves are). implement his romanticized and rather Consider the kind ofbeing of the things with idiosyncratic version of Nazism . Although which we have-to-do, things which Heidegger Heidegger certainly did some shameful things calls Zeug (equipment).One gets clear about the in the early days ofthe Third Reich it must also mode ofbeing ofZeug by making explicit, and be acknowledged that he was deeply critical of conceptualizing, the understanding of being what passed in Nazi circles for 'philosophy' which is already implicit in our circumspective (racism and biologism). In 1942 he resigned having-to-do-with things . We do not have to put from the committee charged with editing the ourselves into this mode of comportment; we works of Nietzsche after the committee had are always already in it. Phenomenology, as the been ordered to remove those passages in which letting be seen ofbeing, is the laying bare ofthe Nietzsche speaks contemptuously of conditions ofthe possibility ofentities showing antisemitism. After the war Heidegger paid for themselves or ofour comportment to entities . what he called his Dummheit (stupidity or Phenomenology, as understood by silliness) by being forbidden to teach . His fate Heidegger, is phenomenology of Dasein. The was sealed by a damning report written on him absolute prerequisite for doing philosophy, in by his former friend Karl Jaspers (although in Heidegger's view, is recognition ofwhat he calls 86 Heidegger

the ontological difference (being is not a being). makes possible both theoretical and practical But Dasein is a being, so how can modes ofcomportment to what is. According to phenomenology which makes being thematic the second interpretation Heidegger is an be phenomenology of Dasein'l Dasein is a existentialist. It is true that Being and Time being, but not just a being, occurring among contains some brilliant analyses of such other beings . The being of Dasein, what typically existentialist themes as Angst, guilt Heidegger calls existence, is such that Dasein and death . But these are not examined for their understands its own being, but in understanding own sake but rather for their specially disclosive its own being it at the same time understands the function in relation to the being ofDasein.Their being of entities other than itself. Heidegger treatment is subservient to the question of the calls the understanding of being disclosedness meaning ofbeing as such . (Erschlossenheit). The Da in Da-sein is But even when such misinterpretations have disclosedness.Dasein is the clearing (Lichtung) been put aside it can still be difficult to see the which makes possible the openness ofwhat is. continuity between early and late Heidegger. It is because Dasein is the ontological being The late Heidegger is still talking about being that the posing and answering ofthe question of but in ways which make it more tempting for the the meaning of being as such iiiberhaupti English-speaker to write 'Being'. 'There is requires an analysis of the fundamental being only so long as Dasein is' ('Nur solange structures of the being of Dasein. And this is Dasein ist, gibt es Sein') he says in Being and largely what Being and Time provides. Time. Being only 'is' uiDasein's understanding Although Being and Time is a very large of being . But understanding, it would seem, is book it is only part of a much larger projected something we do, so being is the product of work. Being and Time, one might say, answers human beings . In his later thought it is made the question: how is comportment to entities clear that we stand in the truth ofbeing .The truth possible? What makes comportment to entities (or unconcealedness) of being as the clearing possible is the understanding of being . But how (Lichtung) in which what is shows itselfas what is the understanding of being possible? The is is not in any sense something which we make complete work was to have shown how time is or which is at our disposal. But although the the 'horizon' by reference to which being is truth of being is not at our disposal it is not an understood. Heidegger's lectures of1927.Basic eternal truth . Heidegger speaks of Problems ofPhenomenology, go some way to Seinsgeschichte, the history ofbeing . There is a carrying out this task. necessity about the elements ofthis history but, There are two ways ofinterpreting Beingand unlike Hegel, Heidegger does not think in terms Time which make it seem thatthere is a complete ofan inevitable progression towards the truth of break between the phenomenological being . He does, however, talk as though there Heidegger and the later Heidegger who had been a falling away from a primordial describes his philosophy as Denken (thought or experience of being had by the pre-Socratics. thinking). According to the first interpretation The truth of being which animates our own Heidegger's phenomenology of Dasein isjust a technology-dominated age is such that entities modification of Husserl's phenomenology of are experienced as material for use . Underlying consciousness. Heideggers Dasein is Husserl's such experience is the metaphysics of consciousness or subject but with a practical subjectivity according to which the being of twist (practical engagement with things is given what is is being an object (Gegenstand) . greater emphasis than mere perception). But as Presenting Heidegger in such abbreviated Heidegger sees it the move from consciousness form inevitably makes him seem more abstract to Dasein is much more radical than this.Dasein than he is. Although he thinks the question of as the understanding, or disclosedness, of being being is the philosophical question this does not Hempel 87

mean he talks about nothing else and that those and Vienna, originall y Physics and who have difficulty with such talk will find Mathematics, then Philosophy (PhD, Berlin , nothing valuable in him. His essay on the work 1934, with dissertation on 'Beitrage zur ofart, for example , in which he overcomes the logischen Analyse des Wahrheitsbegriff" , subjectivistview thatthe work ofart isthe object published in part at Jena, 1934); member of of 'aesthetic experience', but also the Hegelian Berlin Gesellschaft fur empirische (later: view that it merely points to a truth which only wissenschaftliche) Philosophie (allied to philosophy can adequately express , has an Vienna Circle) ; research with P. Oppenheim in immediacy and concreteness and wealth of Brussels and Camap in Chicago , 1934-9. Infls: insight which should impress anyone who H. Behmann, Hilbert , P. Oppenheim, Shlick , approaches it in an unprejudiced way. And Camap, Reichenbach, R. A. Fisher, O. Helmer, similar claims can be made for his essay on Nicod, Goodman, Tarski, Grelling and Dray. technology and some of his writings on Appts: Taught at City College, New York, language. 1939--40; Queen 's College, Flushing, New The same people who dismiss Heidegger as York, 1940-8; Yale, 1948-55; Stuart Professor of Philosophy, Princeton, 1955-73; University unintelligible sometimes, in contradictory Professor of Philosophy, Pittsburgh, 1977; fashion, deplore the extent ofhis influence. That Visiting Professor at Columbia, 1950, at he has been influential is undeniable. In Harvard, 1953--4, at Hebrew Universit y in philosophy Sartre would be unimaginable Jerusalem, 1974, at Berkeley, 1975 and 1977, without Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty clearly and at Pittsburgh, 1976; President of APA owes much to him (although perhaps more to (Eastern Division), 1961;Member of American Husserl) . Philosophical hemeneutics Academ y of Arts and Sciences ; sometime (Gadamer) would not have been possible Editor ofErkenntnis. without Heidegger. But his influence has not been confined to philosophy. For example, a distinctive form of psychotherapy was developed under the influence of Heidegger's Main publications: analysis ofDasein (Ludwig Binswanger). And in theology, both Protestant and Catholic, (1936) (with E Oppenheim) Der Typusbegriff im Heidegger's influence is unmistakable (e.g. Lichte der neuen Logik, Leiden : A. W. Sijthoff. Rudolf Bultmann, Paul Tillich, Karl Rahner) . (1945) 'Studies in the logic of confirmation', Mind But these are just examples ofdirect influence . (reprinted with some changes and postscript in In more subtle ways his thought has had a (1965). (1952) Fundam entals of Concept Formation in profound impact in fields as diverse as literary Empiri cal Science, Internat. Encyc. of Unified theory, envionmental studies , social science and Science, II, 7, Chicago: Chicago University Press aesthetics. (expanded in German translation, Grundz iige der Begriffsbildu ng in der empirischen Wissenschaft, PAUL GORN ER Dusseldorf, 1934). (1958) 'The theoretician's dilemma ', in H. Feigl, M. Scriven and G.Maxwell (eds), Minn esota Studies in the Philosophy of Science II, Minneapolis: Minne sota University Press. Hempel, Carl Gustav (1962) ' Deductive-nomological vs. statistical explanation', in H. Feigl and G. Maxwell (eds), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy ofScience III, German-American. b: 8 January 1905, Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press. Oranienburg, Germany. Cat: Philosopher of (1963) (ed. with R. G.Colodn y) Frontiers ofScience science . Educ: Gottingen, Heidelberg , Berlin and Philosophy, Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press. 88 Hempel

(1965) Aspects of Scientific Explan ation and Other 'classificatory' concept and postponing Essays in the Philosophy of Science, New York: The questions of degrees or numerical values. Free Press and London:Collier-Macmillan Assuming a universal hypothesis is confirmed (incl udes new title essay and eleven reprinted items , by positive instances of it, he insists that many revised and three with Postscript s; expanded whatever confirms a hypothesis must confirm and revised in German translation, Aspekte der all its logically equival ent formulations . A wissenschaftliche Erkldrung; Berlin and New York, 1972). white shoe therefore (or, better (1965, p. 22), a (1966) Philosophy of Natural Science, Englewood sentence reporting an observation of one) Cliffs, NJ : Prentice-Hall. confirms 'All ravens are black ' because (being (1983) (ed. with H. Putnam and W. K. Essler) a non-black non-raven) it confirms 'All non­ Methodology , Epistemology, and Philosophy of black things are non-ravens ' . Hempel simply Science: Essays in Honour ofWolfgan g Stegm iiller accepts this, adding that it sounds odd because on the Occasion ofhis Sixtieth Birthday , Dordrecht: we normall y come to know things about the Reidel (reprinted from Erkenntnis 19, 1-3, 1983) . evidence in one order and not another. Not everyone is so sanguin e, and this 'paradox of confirmation' has been extensively discussed Secondary literature: (see, for exampl e, Scheffler 1963). After adding some further requirements Hempel claims that, Camap, R. (1950) Logical Foun dations of roughl y, an observation statement confirms a Probability , §87-8, Chicago: Chicago University hypothesis if it entails what the hypothesis Press . would say if only the objects mentioned in the Dray, W. H. (1957)Laws and Explanation in History, observation statement existed (1965, pp. 36-7); London: Oxford University Press. it shows that part ofwhat the hypothesis says is Essler, W. K., Putnam, H. and Stegmuller, W. (eds) indeed true (1966 , p. 64). Confirmation so (1985 )Epistemology, Methodolo gy, and Philosophy defined is purel y syntactical, holding between of Science: Essays in Honour ofCarl G Hempel on sentences ; but later, answering Goodman's the Occasion ofHis Eightieth Birthday , Dord recht: 'grue' paradox, he admits that confirmation Reidel (includes bibliography; reprinted from must be partly pragmatic, involving restrictions Erkenntnis 22, 1-3, 1985). Gunnell, 1. G. (1975) Philosophy, Science, and on the kinds of predicates allowed (1965, pp . PoliticalInqui ry ,Morristown ,NJ:General Learning 50-I). Press . Hempel also discuss es meaning, rejecting Kyburg , H. E. and Nagel, E. (eds) (1963) Induction: both verifiability and falsifiabili ty as adequate Some Current Issues, Middl etown, CT: Wesleyan criteria (and also Poppe r's use of falsifiability University Press (discussions ofHempel and Cam ap to demarcate empirical science), and claims that with replies). cognitive significance is a matter ofdegree and Mandelbaum, M. (1984) Philosophy, History, and the no simple criterion can be given (ibid., p. 117). Sciences, Baltimore, MD:John s Hopkins University He also agreed with Quine in rejecting the Press (especiall y chapter 7). analytic/synthetic distinction (1985, p. I). Rescher, N. (ed.) (1969) Essays in Honour ofCarl G Hempel: ATribute on the Occasion ofhis Sixty -Fifth But Hempel's other main contribution that Birthday , Dordrecht: Reidel (includes biographical has proved controversial is his account of note , and bibliography). scienti fic explanation. He develops a 'covering­ Scheffl er, I. (1963) The Anatomy of Inquiry , New law model', where to explain something is York: Knopf; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, basicall y to infer it from a law plus initial 1964. conditions. The law may be universal in form or merely statistical , the inference being deductive Hempel 's early work primarily aims at in the former case and usually (but not always) analysing confirmation, considered purely as a inductive in the latter.The laws must not be mere Husserl 89

accidental generali zations, and explanation is Consciousness, trans. 1. Churchill, Bloomington: not mere reduction to a familiar, though the Indiana University Press, 1964). inductive kind, unlike the deductiv e, is relative (1929) Formale und transzendentale Logik,Tiibingen to the background ofknowledge (1965,pp. 397­ (English translation, Formal and Transcendental 403) . As with Braithwaite, the emphasis is on Logic, trans. O.Cairns, The Hague : Nijhoff, 1969). (1950) Cartesianische Medita tionen, The Hague subsumption into a system. Hempel is (English translation, Cartesian Mediations,trans. O. concerned with an idealized sort of explanation Cairns, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960). (ibid., pp. 425-8), but controversy has mainly (1954) Die Krisis der europdischer Wissenschaften arisen over his claims to extend it over subjects und die transzendentale Phdnomenologie, The like history and psychology (pp. 231--43, 463­ Hague (English translation, The Crisis of the 87). European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, tran s. D. Carr, Evanston: Sources: PI; Edwards; Mittelstrass; IOPP. Northwe stern University Press, 1970). A. R. LACEY

Secondary literature:

Husserl, Edmund Dreyfus, H. (ed.) (1982) Huss erl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science , Cambridge: Mass.: MIT Press. Elliston, F. and McCormack, P. (1977) Husserl: German. b: 8 April 1859, Prossnitz, Moravia.d: Expositions and Appraisals, Notre Dame University 27 April 1938,Freiburg, Germany. Cat: Press. Phenomenologist. Ints: Epistemology; Hammond, M.,Howarth, 1. and Keat, R. (1991) ontology.Educ: Universities of Leipzig, Berlin, Understanding Phenomenology, Oxford: Vienna and Halle. Infls: Literary influences Blackwell , chapters 1- 3. include Descart es, the British empricists and Heidegger, M. ( 1985) History ofthe Concept ofTime, Kant; personal influences include Franz trans. T. Kisiel, Bloomin gton: Indiana University Brentano and Thomas Masaryk. Appts: 1891­ Press, pp. 27-126. Kern,I. ( I964) Husserl undKant,The Hague:Nijhoff. 1901, Privatdozent, University of Halle; 1906­ Lauer, Q. (1958) The Triumph ofSubjectivity, New 16, Ordinarius, University of Gottingen; 1916­ York: Fordham University Press. 28, Professor,University ofFreiburg. Mohanty, J. N. (1990) Transcendental Phenomenology, Oxford: Blackwell. Smith, D. W. and McIntyre, R. (1982) Husserl and Intentionality, Dordrecht: Reidel. Main publications:

(1900-1) Logische Untersuchungen, Halle (English Edmund Husserl, the founder of translation, Logica l Investigations, trans. 1. N. phenomenology, first came to prominence Findlay, London: Routledge, 1970). through the publication of his Logical (1913) Ideen zu einer reinen Phdnomenologie und Investigations (1900-1). It was on the basis of ph dnomenologischen Philosop hie, Tiibingen this book that the phenom enological movement (Eng lish translation, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure was formed. The early phenomenologists were Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological most impressed by the call to a return to the Philosophy ,FirstBook,trans. F.Kersten , Oordrecht: things themselves (' Zu den Sachen selbst! ') in Kluwer, 1982). the sense of giving precedence to how things ( 1928) Phdnomenologie des inneren (material objects but also numbers, institutions, Zeitbewussts eins, Tiibingen (English translation, works ofart, persons, etc.)present themselves in The Phenomenology of Internal Time- actual experience over the dictates of some 90 Husserl theory or system as to how they must be. Such In attempting to convey the essential philosophers were strongly influenced by charact er of Husser!'s phenomenolo gy it is Husser!'s arguments against psychologism, perhaps best to begin with the notion of the were profoundly rea list in outlook and intentionali ty of consciousness. Consciousness generally exhibited a marked anti-Kantian in its various modes has the property of being tendency. It therefore came as something of a 'o f' something or being directed towards shock when Husser! published his next main something . For example, in thinking something work, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure is thought about, in perception something is Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological perceived, in imagining something is imagined, Philosophy (1913). For this seemed to represent in fear something is feared. Husser! calls these a reversal ofall that phenomenology had come various modes of consciousness intentional to stand for.Itwas notthe idea ofarriving at pure experiences or acts . Unlike his teacher consciousness by a process ofreduction which Brentano he does not regard the object of was found objectionabl e. Nor was it the idea of consciousness as being in all cases an inner intuiting and describing the essential structures mental entity. When I think about a mental of such consciousness (for according to the image my consciousness is directed towards a phenomenologists everything has its essence). mental entity. But when, for example, I see this Rather what was found objectionable was the book on my desk this intentional experience, the idea that everything else is constittited in pure seeing, is directed towards a material object. consciousness. This seemed like a capitulation What I am concious of is not an inner mental to the neo-Kantians. Thereafter it was no longer picture of a book but, precisely, a book. Even possibl e to speak of a Husserlian school. when I merely imagine a book it is not the case Husser! himself would continue to insist that the reluctanc e to follow him in the transcendental that my consciousness is directed towards a direction laid down in his Ideas was based on a mental image. Each intentional experience, and failure proper!y to understand the nature ofhis not just those which essentially involve the use trancendentalism. In 1916 he moved to oflangua ge, contains something Husser! calls a Freiburg, where three years later Martin sense or meaning (Sinn), and it is this which is Heidegger became his assistan t. Husser! had responsible for the experience's directedness great hopes for Heidegger, seeing in him towards its object. someone of matchl ess ability who would Intentionality is not a property which continue to develop phenom enolo gy along the consciousness just happens to have. Without it lines he, Husser!, had laid down . Although not consciousness would not be consciousness. It mistaken about Heidegger 's ability, he was belongs to the essence of consciousness. The mistaken about his identification which his various modes of consciousness, as well as conception of phenomenology. The publication having the fundamental essential feature of in 1927 of Being and Time, and Heidegger's intentionali ty, also have more specific essential succession to Husser!'s Chaira year later, served features: for example, perception essentially only to accelerate a process which had been involves sensation. The sense or meaning of the underway for some years: the emergence of experience 'animates' sensation in such a way Heideggerian phenom enolog y as the dominant that it becomes an appearance of an object. In force in German philosophy. As Husser! was perception the 0 bject perspectivally adumbrates Jewish the advent of Nation al Socialism itself (schattet sich ab). The perceptuall y resulted in even greater isolation . But then presented front-side of the object refers beyond Husser! always thought of genuine philosophy itself to the unseen rear-side. as an essentially lonely task. He continued to be Normall y consciousness is directed to wards creative, producing in the last years ofhis life his some item in the wor!d and normally this item is monum ental Crisis of the European Sciences regarded as really existing and as really (1954) . Husserl 91

possessing such and such properties. But universal horizon of all that shows itself. The whether or not the object of consciousness in world is not just the totality of objects of fact exists, and whether or not it possesses the consciousness, not just one great big object, but properties it is intended as having, this mode of that from within which entities show consciousness, with this object, exists and can themselves. be described by the subject whose What is the purpose ofsuch description? Itis consciousness it is. It is possible to describe supposed by Husserl to yield ultimate intentional experiences independently of the understanding of things . To describe the question of the real existence and real being­ structures of transcendental consciousness in thus of their object. Moreover it is possible to which something becomes an object of describe the essence of such experiences, the consciousness is todescribe the'constitution' of features and structures without which they that thing . The world and everything in it, would not be the experiences they are. including human beings, is constituted in However, even if we disregard the question transcendental subjectivity. As Husserl uses the ofthe reality ofthe object ofan experience we term, 'constitution' suggests a kind ofmaking, a still regard the experience itself as an event in bringing into being . It was in this 'creationist' the world, as belonging to a psycho-physical sense that Husserl's transcendental idealism reality, the human being, which is one item was generally understood-and generally among others in the world . And even when we rejected . However, it has recently been argued disregard the question of the reality of a that such an interpretation is mistaken. What is particular object we still take for granted the constituted in consciousness is not things but existence ofthe world as a whole. This taking­ senses, not the things that consciousness intends for-granted , which Husserl calls the general but the senses 'through' which it intends them . thesis ofthe natural attitude , can be suspended In the final phase of his phenomenology or ' put out ofaction' in an operation which he Husserl introduces the notion of the life-world calls the transcendental reduction. (Lebenswelt), the world of lived experience. Consciousness on which this operation has been What he calls objectivism seeks to eliminate carried out is not itselfan item in the world but everything subjective from our representation rather that for which there is a world . of the world by allowing as real only those Phenomenology as the mature Husserl aspects of experience which can be represented understands it is the description ofthe essential by means of the concepts of the mathematical structures ofthis transcendental consciousness natural sciences . Such objectivism dismisses or subjectivity. These structures are not inferred the lifeworld as mere appearance. But this is to by any kind ofKant ian transcendental argument call in question the lifeworld from ths but are 'seen' by the phenomenological standpoint of what is itself a construction 'observer' in the phenomenological, as opposed formed on the basis of the lifeworld . The to the natural , attitude . properties and structures attributed by the Anything, ofwhatever ontological type, can objectifying sciences to the 'objective' world be an objectofconsciousness. Inthe case ofeach are themselves the product of a process of type of entity phenomenology describes the idealization and mathematization of structures of consciousness of such an entity. 'Iifeworldly' structures. The task of philosophy This includes a description oftheentity itselfbut is not to downgrade the lifeworld but to remove as object ofconsciousness, i.e. as phenomenon. from it the 'garment ofideas' which science has In abstraction from questions of real existence thrown over it. However, Husserl's emphasis on and real nature one considers the entity simply the lifeworld in his later philosophy does not as it shows itself to consciousness. represent a fundamental change in his Phenomenology also describes the world, as the conception of phenomenology as 92 Ingard en

transcendental phenomenology. The lifewor!d the problem of essence], Halle an der Saale: Max does not represent the ultimate foundation , for it Niemeyer. is itself constituted in transcendental (1925) Ober die Stellung der Erkenntnistheorie im subjectivity. System der Philosophie [On the Position of Theory of Knowledge in the System of Philosophy], PAUL GORNER Jahrbuch fi ir Philosoph ie und Phdnomelogische Forschung 7. (1929) ' Bemerkungen zum Problem "Ideali smus­ Realismus'" [Remarks on the problem ' idealismrealism'] , Jahrbuch fUr Philosophie und Ingarden, Roman Phdno melogische Forsc hung 10. (1931) Das literarische Kunstwerk (original in German), Halle an der Saale: Max Niemeyer Polish . b: 5 February 1893,Cracow, Poland . d: (English translation, The Literary Work ofArt, trans. 14 June 1970, Poronin , near Cracow. Cat: George G. Grabowicz, Evanston Ill.: Northwest Phenomenological philosopher; realist. Ints: University Press, 1973). Ontology, epistemology and philosophy of (1937) The Cogn ition of the Literary Work of Art aesthetics ; major contributor to the realism! (original in Polish; German translation 1968, English translation, Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern idealism debate. Educ: 1912- 17, studied in University Press, 1973). German y under Edmund Husserl, first at the (1946) 0 budowie obrazu [On the Structure of University of'Gottingen (from 1912) and then at Painting], Cracow: Polish Academy of Sciences the University of Freiburg im Brcisgau (from (1947) Szkize z fi lozofii literatury [Essays on the 1916).Injls: Bergson and Huss erl.Appts: 1924, Philosophical Literature], Lodz. Privatdo zent (unsalaried lecturer), John (1947- 8) Spar 0 istnienia swiata 2 vols [The Casimir University of Lvov (Lemberg) in Controve rsy about the Existence of the World] (German translation, 1964/65/74) , Cracow: Polish Poland ; 1933, Associat e Professor; 1935, Full Academy of Sciences. Professor; 1945-63, Professor, Jagiellonian (1958) Studia z estetyki [Studies on Aesthetics] 2 vols, University, Cracow (from 1949-56, during the vol. 3, Warsaw: PWN, 1970; reviewed in Journal of Stalinist period , he was forbidden to teach and Aesthetics and Art Criticism (1959) 17 by A.- T. instead was attached to the Academy of Tymieniecka. Sciences and Letters where his duties left him (1962) Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Kunst, consid erable free time for his own researches); Musikwerk, Bild, Architektur, Film [Investigations from 1963,Emeritus Professor atthe University on the Ontology of Art, Musi c Work, Pictures, Architecture and Film],Tubingen: Niemeyer. of Cracow, and Honorary Professor of the (1963) On the Motives which Led Husserl to University ofLvov. Transcendental Idealism (English translation, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1973- 5). (1966) Przezycie-dzielo-wartosc [Experience of Artwork and Value], Cracow: Polish Aca demy of Main publications: Science s. (German translation, 1969). (1971) Upodstaw teorii poznania [At the Foundation (1921) 'O ber die Gefahr einer Petitio Principii in der of the Theory of Knowledge], Cracow: Poli sh Erkenntnistheorie' [On the danger of a petitio Academy of Sciences. principii in the theory of knowledge ], Jahrbuch fu r (1974) Wstep do fe nomenologii Husserla Philosophie und Phdnomelogische Forschung 4: [Introduction to the Phenomenology of Husserl] , 545- 658. Warsaw: PWN. (1922)' Intuition und Intellekt bei Henri Bergson' (1984) Man and Value, Washington: Catholic [Intuition and intelle ct by Henri Bergson],Jahrbuch University Press. fur Philosophie und Phdnomelogische Forschung 5: (1985) Roman Ingarden: Selected Papers in 286-461. Aesthetics, ed. P. J. McCor kick, Munich: (1925) 'Essentiale Frage n. Ein Beitrag zum Problem Philosophia, and Washington: Catholic University des Wesens' [Essential questions. A contribution to Press. Ingarden 93

(1986) The Work ofMusic and the Problem of its to solve the old problem of how an infima Identity, trans . A. Czerniawski, ed. Jean G.Harrell, species (individual essence) can realise itself in Berkele y: University of California Press . concrete individuals. (1986) Ontology of the Work ofArt, Ohio University The alien, neo-Kantian climate of Freiburg Press . brought Ingarden and Husserl very close together and, although Ingarden returned to Poland at the end of the First Wor!d War and did Seconda ry literature: not see Husser! again until 1927, the two philosophers remained lifelong friends and correspondents . Ingarden perhaps kept in closer ' Bibliografia Praz Filosoficznych Romana Ingarden , touch with Husserl's developing thought than 1915-1965, Odbitka z Ksiazki R.Ingarden', Studi z any other ofthe latter 's Gottingen students , but estetyki T. II, 495- 527. it was always the objects of consciousness Dzmiemidok, B. and McCorm ick, P.(eds) (1989) The which preoccupied him and not, as it came to be Aesthetics ofRoman Ingarden: Interp retations and Assessments, Dordre cht: Kluwer. with Husserl, the intentional anal ysis of Mays, W. et at. (eds) Journal ofthe British Societyfor consciousness itself. In his 'B ernerkun gen zum Phenomenology 6,2, May (Ingarden issue). Problem "Idealismus-Realisrnus'" (1929) Tymieniecka, A .-T. (1955) ' Le Dessein de la Ingard eri's argument is that it is necessary first to philosophie de Roman Ingarden', in Revue de investigate the mode ofbeing ofobjects before Met aphysique et de Mo rale: 32-57. drawing conclusions about their relationship to, --(1957) Essence et existence. Etude apropos de and possible dependency upon, consciousness . la philosop hie de Roman Ingarden et Nicolai Perhaps Ingarderi's most original Hartmann, Paris. phenom enological work has been in the analysis --(ed.) (1976) Analecta Husserliana, vol. 4; of various works of art, beginning with his book 'Ingardeniana', Dordrecht: D. Reidel. The Literary Work ofArt (1931) where, utilizing Van Breda, H. L. (1970) ' Professor Roman Ingarden', a theory developed by Alexander Pfanderon the Obitua ry, The Journ al of the British Society for basis of suggestions by Husserl, he first Phenomenology 1,3 , October: 100. discloses the various strata of intentional constituents which interact to form the Although Ingarden is perhaps best known to 'harmonious polyphon y' of each art work. English speakers for his philosophy of However, Ingarderi's interest in the philosophy aesthetics, this needs to be seen within the of art arose out of his concern with the perspective of his lifelong concern with the ontological problem of idealism- realism, and problems ofepistemology and ontology. In his The Literary Work ofArt is actually subtitledAn dissertation on Ber gson , for example, he Inv estigation on the Borderlin es of Ontolo gy, interprets such Bergsonian themes as the flux of Logic and Theory of Literature. Ingard eri's consciousness and its immediate givens in the ontolo gical position in this work is that, since light of the phenomenologicall y based works ofart are created by human subjects , they epistemological framework of consciousness, are-and may be perceived to be-c-ontically content of consciousness and object of heteronomous (or dependent) objects . In consciousness. His 'Essential e Frageri' (1925) contradistinction, real objects and the objects of is likewise a work in which he is concerned to mathematics do not depend upon delimit the field of phenomenology by a consciousness . They are self-suffici ent or systematic demonstration of the existence of ontically autonomous . such objective essences as are implied by Ingarderi's chef-d 'oeuvre is almost cer tainl y 'e ssential questions' of the type ' What is x? '. his massive, three-volume Spar 0 istnienia Gilbert Ryle reviewed this work swiata [The Controversy About the Existence of sympathetically in Mind 36 (1927) , although he the Wor!d]. Volume I, 'E xistential ontology', pointed out that Ingard en admits to being unable concerns the modal analysis of real, ideal and 94 Irigaray

possible being . Volume II, 'Formal ontology', (1981) Le Corps-a-corps avec la mere, Editions de la has two parts . Part IIII is called 'Form and pleine lune. Essence' and Part II/2 'World and (1982) Elemental Passions, Athlone. Consciousness'. These first two volumes are (1983) L 'Oubli de I 'air. Chez Martin Heidegger, reviewed by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka in Mind Minuit. 56 (1957). He did not live to complete the (1984) An Ethics of Sexual Difference; Ithaca, NY: culminating Volume III, 'Material ontology', Cornell University Press, 1993. (1985) Parler n 'estj amais neutre, Minuit. but in 1974 a contribution to it was published (1987) Sexes and Genealogies; Columbia University posthumously in German called 'On the causal Press, 1993. structure of the real world'. The full import of (1989) Thinming the Difference: For a Peaceful these remarkable volumes has yet to be Revolu tion;Athlone, 1994. assessed, but it is clear that Ingarden has done (l990)Je, Tu, Nous: Towards a Culture ofDifference; much work towards an ontology based on what Routledge , 1993. is given to consciousness which avoids any (1991) The Irigaray Reader, ed. Margaret Whitford, recourse to transcendental idealism. Oxford : Blackwell (provides a selection ofextracts). (I 992)J'aime iI toi, Grassel. BARRY JONES (1994) Essere due, Editore Bollati Boringhieri. (1994) La Democrazia comincia a due, Editore Bollati Boringhieri.

Irigaray, Luce Secondary literature: Belgian with French nationality, b: Either 1930 or 1932, Blaton, Belgium. Cat: Feminist Burke, Carolyn, Schor, Naomi and Whitford, philosopher; psychoanalyst. Educ: University Margaret (eds) (1994) Engagin g with Irigaray , ofLouvain, the University of Paris and the Paris Columbia University Press (includes a wide range of Institute of Psychology; trained as a critical account s). psychoanalyst with the Ecole Freudienne de Grosz, Elizabeth (1989) Sexual Subversions, Sydney: Paris . Infls: Freud, Lacan, Derrida , Hegel, Allen & Unwin, chapters 4 and 5. Whitford,Margaret (1991) Luce Irigaray :Philosophy Nietzsche and Heidegger. Appts: Taught sixth­ in the Feminin e, Routledge (includes an ample formers in Belgium, 1956-9; attached to the bibliography of primary and secondary texts). Centre National de Recherches Scientifiques in Paris since 1964; Lecturer, University of Paris VIII (Vincennes) 1969- 74; Lecturer, Ecole des Irigaray was initially attracted to literature , Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales , since 1985; writing her master's thesis on the poet Paul attached to the International College of Valery, whose work privileges consciousness Philosophy in Paris since 1987. and reflexivity. It was not until she left Belgium for Paris, where she undertook a diploma in psychopathology and began training as a Main publications: psychoanalyst, that she turned her attention to the unconscious, and in particular to the notion of a cultural unconscious (or cultural (1973) Le Langage des dements, Paris: Mouton . (1974) Speculum of the Other Woman; Ithaca, NY: 'imaginary' as it has come to be called) .She was Cornell University Press , 1985. analysed by Serge Leclaire , one ofthe original (1977) This Sex Which Is Not One; Ithaca, NY: Cornell members of Lacan's Ecole Freudienne, and University Press, 1985. until the publication ofSpeculum in 1974 seems (1980) Marin e Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche; to have been uncontroversially Lacanian. Columbia University Press, 1991. James 95

Speculum fused a psychoanalytic attention 1872-80, Instructor, 1880-5, Assistant to what is repressed by culture with a Derridean­ Professor, 1885-1907, Professor ofPsychology inspired account ofthe repressions required by and Philosophy, Harvard University. metaphysics. In both cases, Irigaray argues, the feminine is excluded. She concludes that 'woman' does not yet exist in the cultural Main publications : imaginary of the West; that Western culture is founded on an originary matricide more ancient than the parricide ofFre ud's Totem and Taboo. (1975-90) The Works of William Jam es, ed. F. H. The feminist critique contained in Speculum led Burkhardt, F. Bowers and I. K. Skrupselis , 21 vols, Cambridge, Mass .: Harvard University Press (cited to Irigaray's expulsion from the Lacanian below as WWJ). School of Psychoanalysis at Vincennes and (1890) The Principles of Psychology , 2 vols, Ne w launched her on her public career as feminist York: Henry Holt ; reprinted in 3 vols in WWJ, 198 I. and philosopher ofsexual difference. (1892) Psychology, Briefer Course,New York:Henry Her subsequent work has explored the Holt; reprinted in WWJ, 1984. question of sexual difference in three areas in (1897) The Will to Believe and Other Essays, New particular. First, she has looked for the forgotten York: Longmans, Green & Co. ; reprinted in WWJ, woman in the history ofphilosophy; second, she 1979. has examined the sexual bias in language ; third, (1898) Human Immortality: Two Suppos ed she has considered the issues ofwomen's civil Objections; second edition, Boston : Houghton Miffiin, 1899; reprinted in WWJ, 1986. status and rights .Along with Helene Cixous and (1899) Talks to Teachers on Psychology: and to Julia Kristeva, Irigaray is probably one of the Students on Some ofLife :~ Ideals, New York: Henry best-known representatives of French feminism Holt & Company; reprinted in WWJ, 1983. in Europe, the USA and Australasia. Her (1903) The Varieties ofReligious Experience: A Study international reputation,however, is often based ofHuman Behaviour, New York: Longmans, Green on a misapprehension of her thought. She has & Co.; reprinted in WWJ, 1985. been well understood and influential in (1907) Pragmati sm, New York: Longmans, Green & countries like Holland and Italy which have a Co.; reprinted in WWJ, 1975. strong tradition in continental philosophy, but (1909) The Meaning of Truth: ASequel to has so far had no significant effect on 'Pragmatism ', New York: Longmans, Green & Co. ; reprinted in WWJ, 1975. philosophy in Britain , where her work has been (I 909)A Pluralistic Universe,New York: Longmans, appreciated predominantly by literary critics . Green & Co.; reprinted in WWJ, 1975. Sources: CV supplied by Luce Irigaray. (191 I) Some Problems ofPhilosophy : A Beginning of MARGARET WHITFORD an Introduction to Philosophy , prepared for press by H. M. Kallen and edited by H. James , Jr, New York: Longmans, Green & Co.; reprinted in WWJ, 1979. (1912) Essays in RadicalEmpiricism , ed. R. B. Perry, New York: Longmans, Green & Co.; reprinted in James, William WWJ ,1979.

American. b: 1January 1842,New YorkCity. d: 26 August 1910, Chocorua, New Hampshire. Secon dary literature: Cat: Psychologist;pragmatist, Ints: Philosophy ofreligion . Educ: University ofGeneva, 1859­ Allen , G. W. (196 7) William Jam es: A Biography, 60; Harvard Universit y, 1861-7; University of New York: Viking. Berlin, 1867-8; Harvard University, 1868-9, Myers, G. E. (198 7) William Jam es: His Life and MD 1869. Infls: Renouvier and Peirce. Appts: Thought, New Haven : Yale University Press. 96 Jam es

Perry, R. B. (1935) The Thought and Character of student. In psychology James 's influence was William Jam es, 2 vols, Boston: Little, Brown. profound; it promoted the establishment of Reck, A. J. (1967) Introdu ction to William Jam es, experimental methods . In philosophy it Bloomington:Indiana University Press. influenced Dewey's shift from Hegelianism to Seigfried,C. H. (1990) William Jam es s Radical instrumentalism and contributed to Husse rl Reconstruction of Philosophy, Albany: SUNY some of the terminology and insights for Press . phenomenolog y. James 's interest in philosophy preceded and paralleled his interest in William James was the son of Henry, an eminent psychology. His earliest papers discussed the transcendentalist writer and lecturer, and the sentiment of rationali ty, the dilemma of younger brother ofHenry, the famous novelist. determinism, the moral philosopher and the Educated informally in Europe as a child, and moral life. In 'The will to believe' (in 1897) after a brief period in Newport, Rhode Island, James argued for the right to hold religious and preparing to become a portrait artist, James moral beliefs even when logical or factual enrolled in Harvard. He interrupted his formal evidence is unavail able. Ifthe option for belief education to participate in the scientific in an hypothesis is live, forced and expedition to the Amazon led by Louis Agassiz momentous-that is, if believing it will make a and also to study in Europe. Hobbled by poor major difference in life-then, assuming it is health and psychological depression in his compatible with logic and the facts, our youth, James credited the writings of the French passional, volitional nature should seize belief philosopher Charles Renouvi er for releasing despite the absence of evidence. Religious him from depression by providing the formula belief, James contended , contains two of choosing or willing to be free. In 1876 he propositions: (i) that God guarantees the established one of the first psychology everlastin gness of ideals and values cherished laboratories in the United States at Harvard. His by humans ; and (ii) that the belief in (i) comprehensive work The Principles of encourages humans to make a better world, Psychology (1890) won him international fame. enhancing the survival and triumph of these In the Preface James announced the intention of ideals and values. James's interest in religion establishing psycholog y as a natural science. was long-standing. In filial devotion to his Incorporating the findings and theories of the father 's memory James had edited, with a long experimental psychologists, primarily German , introductory essay, The Literary Remains ofthe the Principles also drew upon the entire history Late Henry James (Boston :James R. Osgood & of introspective psychology, primarily British . Company, 1885). But where the father Thus James 's psychology contains two strands . philosophized, drawing upon One is based in biology, revolutionized by transcendentalism and Swedenborg's mystical Darwinian evolution; it is amenable to theology, the son psychologized, relying on experimental investigations of physiology and empirical reports and case studies . On the one behaviour. Consciousness is conceived to be a hand James lent his name to psychical research function of the biological organism dependent and the investigation of occult phenomena, on the brain, instrumental to the organism's falling into the embrace ofthe spiritualists while coping with its environment and struggling to reaping the scorn of the professional realize its purpos es. The other strand , based on psychologists. On the other hand he produced the introspective method, renovated one of the greatest works on the psychology of associationist psychology by describing religion, The Varieties of Religious Experience consciousness as a stream of feelings and ideas. (1903) . Based on his Gifford Lectures at The ' stream ofconsciousness' concept spread to Edinburgh, James 's Varieties examines religion literature, manifest in the writings , for example, as it occurs in individual cases of experience . of Gertrude Stein, who had been James's Jaspers 97

Religion is treated as distinctively individual, radical empmcism. In contrast to traditional not social or institutional. James's typology of empiricism, radical empiricism found that religious experience-for example,' the relations are as immediatelygiven in experience healthy-minded', 'the sick soul'-has as qualities; this James considered to be a matter persisted, but his theory of the common of fact. In addition, it postulates structure of all religious experience remains methodologically that nothing be admitted as a sketchy. The structural dynamics characteristic fact except what some experient can experience of religious experience involves initially a at some time . Further, it is the generalized psychological state in which a need is felt; conclusion that the parts of experience hang second , a step into a deeper level of together by means of experienced relations consciousness, itself connected to a cosmic without resort to any trans-empirical principle. consciousness; and, finally, reparation of the Just as James's pragmatism has had a profound initial state by re-energizing the individual. impact on American philosophy, especially in In 1898, in his address, 'Philosophical the instrumentalism ofJohn Dewey, his radical conceptions and practical results', delivered empiricism contributed to the rise of new beforethe Philosophical Union at the University realism and subsequently to logical empiricism. ofCalifornia in Berkeley, James used the term James's endeavourto articulate the metaphysics 'pragmatism', which he attributed to Charles suggested by the generalization of radical Peirce, to designate his philosophy. It stressed empiricism finds expression in the last book he action as the goal of thought and clarified published during this lifetime, A Pluralistic concepts in terms oftheir practical effects . Thus Universe (1909) . Based on his Hibbert Lectures James unleashed pragmatism to the world . at Oxford, this work offers a sustained criticism Affiliated with a host ofthinkers in America and of absolute idealism and intellectualism, and Europe-Ostwald in Berlin , Papini in Rome, F. finds in the works of Bergson and Peirce the C. S. Schiller at Oxford, Bergson in Paris and hope of a temporalist metaphysics of change, Dewey in Chicago- James's pragmatism, to chance and pluralism. James had intended to Peirce's consternation,was also allied with such formulate this metaphysics in a comprehensive currents ofthought as positivism, utilitarianism, work comparable to his Principles of nominalism and anti-intellectualism. James Psychology. Although James discernibly dedicated his book Pragmatism to J. S. Mill, anticipated the rise ofprocess philosophy, death claiming that it applied to the concept of truth cut his efforts short. His unfinished manuscript the principle ofutility that Mill had used in the was published posthumously under the title analysis ofthe good . Pragmatism for James was Some Problems ofPhilosophy (1911). both a method for settlingmetaphysical disputes Sources: EAB: Edwards; H. James (ed.) (1920) and a theory oftruth . As a method pragmatism Letters of William James , 2 vols, Boston: Atlantic prescribed that rival metaphysical theories be Monthly Press; DAB. evaluated by reference to the differences they ANDREW RECK make in the lives of those who hold them . If there are no differences then the controversies over the theories are fruitless . The pragmatist conception oftruth is dynamic: it maintains that the truth of a proposition consists in the Jaspers, Karl successful consequences ofholding it. James's theory oftruth immediately aroused criticisms, German. b: 23 February 1883, Oldenburg, and his replies to his critics , along with other Germany. d: 26 February 1969, Basle , essays on the topic, were collected in The Switzerland. Cat: Existentialist; psychologist; Meaning ofTruth (1909) . James also espoused philosopher; historian of philosophy. Ints: 98 Jaspers

Historyofphilosophy.Educ: Studied medicine, Secondary literature: Universities of Berlin , Gottingen and Heidelberg (1902-8). Injls: Literary Ehrlich, L. H. (1975) Karl Jasp ers: Philosophy as influences : Kant, Hegel , Kierkegaard, Faith, Amherst, Mass .: University ofMassachusetts Nietzsche, Plotinus , Bruno, Spinoza and Press. Schelling. Personal influences : Max Weber and --and Wisser, R. (eds) (1988) Karl Jasp ers Today: Heidegger. Appts: Independent Assistant, Philosophy at the Threshold of the Future, Heidelberg Psychiatric Clinic, 1908-15; Washington : University Press ofAmerica. Geiken, G.and Kunert , K. (1978) Karl Jaspers. Eine (1909-20); University of Heidelberg, Bibliographie, Oldenburg. Psychology (1915-19), then in Philosophy, Olson , A. M. (1979) Transcendence and initially as Extraordinarius (1919-21) and then Hermeneutics: An Interpretation of the Philosophy as Ordinar ius (1921-37 and 1945-8). of Karl Jaspers, Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic. Piper, K. (ed.) (1967) Karl Jaspers. Werk und Wirkung, Munich: R. Piper. Samay, S. (1971) Reason Revisited: The Philosophy Main publication s: of Karl Jaspers, Notre Dame , Ind .: Gill & Macmillan. (1913) Allgemeine Psychopathologie , Berlin : J. Saner, H. (1970) Karl Jasp ers in Selbstzeugnissen und Springer (English translation, General Bilddokumenten, Hamburg: Rowohlt . Psychopathology , trans. J. Hoenig and M. W. Schilpp , P. A. (ed.) (1957) The Philosophy ofKarl Hamilton, Man chester : Man chester University Jaspers, New York: Tudor Publishing; second Press , 1962) . edition, 1981. (1914) Psychologie der Weltanschauu ngen, Berlin : J. Schragg, O. O. (1971) Existence, Existenz, and Springer. Transcendence: An Introduction to the Philosophy (1932) Philosophie, 3 vols, Berlin : 1. Springer of Karl Jaspers, Pittsburg, PA: Duquesne Univers ity (English tran slation , Philosophy , trans . E. B. Press and Louvain : Editions E. Nauwelaerts. Ashton , 3 vols , Chicago: Chicago University Press , Wallraff, C. F.(1970) KarlJaspers.An Introduction to 1969-71). his Philosophy , Princeton, NJ : Princeton University (1935) Vernunft und Existenz; Groningen: J. W. Press. Wolters (English translation, Reason and Existenz; trans. W. Earle, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, The prewaryears were for Jaspers dominated by 1956) . his friendship with Heidegger during 1920-33 (1947) Von der Wahrheit, Muni ch: R. Piper. and the publication of his chie f philosophical (1949) Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte, work, Philosophie (1932) . The war years were Zurich: Artemis and Muni ch: R. Piper (English tran slation, The Origin and Goal ofHistory, trans . spent, stripped of his Chair and silenced by the M. Bullock, New Haven: Yale Unive rsity Press, authorities, in Heidelberg with his Jewish wife, 1953). working on his second most important (1957) Philosophical Autobiography , in Schilpp philosophical work, Von der Wahrheit (1947) . (revi sed and enlarged , 1981); also in Piper (ed.) At the end of the war Japsers was restored to his 1967. Chair but he declined the Rectorship of the (1962) Der philosop hische Glaube angesichts der University,although hewas activ ely involved in OfJenbarung, Munich: R. Piper (English translation, its reform. In 1948 he left Germany to take up Philosophical Faith and Revelation, trans . E. B. the Chair of Philosophy at the University of Ashton, New York: Harper & Row, 1967). (1967) Karl Jaspers: Schicksal und Wille. Basle, where he spent the rest of his life, Autobiograph ische Schriften , ed. H. Saner, Munich: continuing to publish prolifically, both on R. Piper. philosophy and, controversially, on sensitive issues of postwar German politics . Jaspers 99

Jaspers's earliest major work,his Allgeme ine (ii) the Encompassing which we ourselves are Psychopathologie (1913), while containing a (das Umgreifende, das wir selbst sind), this classification of psychological abnormalities latter splintering into a diversity of the ways in and diagnostic techniques, foreshadows his which we are (as existence (Dasein), existenz later philosophical preoccupations in its (Existenz), understanding, reason, concern to formulate a methodology for consciousness). psychiatric medicine suitable for its 'object', a The Encompassing as such transcends the suffering human being . Fundamental to subject-object fissure, and is thus not a possible Jaspers's approach is the adoption of a object of knowledge. Being in itself is phenomenological method and the deployment absolutely inaccessible to thought ; ontology is, ofa distinction, deriving from Dilthey and Max accordingly, impossible. Only the modes of Weber, between causal-explanatory methods Being (die Weisen des Seins), which mark the (erkliiren) and a method involving an intuitive­ limits and the horizon ofour experience, can be sympathetic understanding ofthe 'patient' as a illuminated (erhellt) and clarified (gekliirt) but living whole (verstehen). Hence Jaspers's not explained ierkldrt), Such 'illumination' emphasis on biography or 'pathography'. His (Erhellung) is contrasted with ontology-a classic study established the methodology ofa project doomed to failure (scheitern) and called phenomenological and existential psychiatric 'periechontology' (Periechontologie). medicine . Although Being as such is inaccessible to His two chief philosophical works are thought ,we,as conscious beings, enjoy a kind of Philosophie (1931) and Von der Wahrheit immediate access to our own lived and (1947) .The central theme ofhis thought may be experienced Being, the Being of possibilities. described as the finitude ofhuman existenceand Although not capable ofconceptual (categorial) the limits of human experience. Jaspers articulation or expression, our Being (Existenz) contrasts the truths ofphilosophy with those of can be illuminated by means oftokens (signa). science and religion . The truths of philosophy Jaspers , in his 'illumination' of our Being or are forms oifa ith; the truths ofnatural science Existenz (Existenzerhellung) distinguishes are alone objectively true, and are characterized three such signa: (i) Freedom, the Being of by their 'compelling certainty' and their possibilities of Being, is neither conceptually 'universal validity'; the truths of religion are determinable nor knowable as an object ; it can symbolic, forms of chiffre . Philosophy has only be lived and experienced in choice and many possible starting-points; the starting­ action; (ii) Communication (Kommunikation) point of Jaspers's own philosophy is the with others springs from the existential ground ultimate experienceofknowing (erkennen), and of our Being, involves recognition of the the fundamental question arising therefrom: freedom ofthe other, manifests itself in loving How does Being manifest itself? conflict (/iebender Kampf), and may save us All knowing is referential and intentional. As from the isolation and loneliness, to which our such it involves the fissuring of subject and singularity and individuality may seem to object (die Subjekt-Objekt-Spaltung). This condemn us; (iii) Fundamental situations fissure is the locus ofall beings, all objects , all (Grundsituationen) mark the limits of our knowing . It both marks the limits ofobjectivity finitude, include origin, mortality, guilt, and points beyond itself to the transcendent, to conflict, accident and historicality, and become , the Unfissured (das Ungespaltene), the when recognized and accepted (lived and Encompassing (das Umgreifende) . Jaspers experienced), limiting situations distinguishes two senses ofthis last term: (i) the (Grenzsituationen); they then mark the Encompassing as such (das Umgreifende transition from mere existence (Dasein) to schlechthin) or Being in itself(das Sein an sich) ; authentic existenz (Existenz) . FARIS Kripke 101

worlds, it provided a systematic framework for Kripke supplied the desired overall framework clarifying problems arising in relation to the for accommodating the different logics-the plethora of already existing systems of modal same fundamental ideas were in play, the logic. These systems, while formally well devel individual systems embodying specific oped, had yet to be provided with a satisfactory restrictions or conditions imposed on the semantics . Among the other applications in relations between worlds . Subsequently Kripke which Kripke has played a leading part are those has gone on to make pioneering contributions to to do with intuitionistic logic, which is of the theory oftruth and the analysis ofthe more particular interest and concern for philosophers recalcitrant of the logical and semantic of mathematics. Such was the potential of this paradoxes, as well as further developments in framework, that it took in studies ofall manner the field ofquantification theory. ofnotions over and above the basic modalities He made his greatest impact in a series of ofnecessity and possibility. lectures (1970) which appeared in revised form This very diversity of modal logics posed in 1980. At the centre of his analysis was an problems, for the question immediately arose of assault on the long-cherished distinction whether there was any overall unifying between necessary and a posteriori truths . It was perspective under which modal inferences here that Kripke introduced his famous idea of could be systematically treated . Unfortunately the 'rigid designator' in his discussion ofproper some of the best known ofthese logical systems names, a topic which had already received delivered different accounts ofwhat qualified as extensive treatment since Russell's analysis of correct inferences. It was all very well to have 1905. Kripke's thesis was that proper names elegantly presented axiomatic systems, but pick out their bearers or referents quite without proper interpretation it was impossible independently of any descriptions that might be to supply any definition of validity, and hence associated with them.Additionally, he espoused any satisfactory proofs of completeness for such what is known as the causal theory ofmeaning , systems . At best, logicians managed to give i.e. that speakers' use of names is grounded rather informal readings of their logical ultimately in an original 'dubbing' of the object operators of necessity or possibility. The with the name, and subsequent use is sustained distinctiveness of'Kripkes approach was in his by a causal chain reaching back to that original definition of what he described as a 'model­ episode in which the name was first assigned to structure', comprising a set ofpossible worlds the object. This had the immediate implication with relations of accessibility or 'relative that names were not to be construed as in any possibility' between those worlds . So, with way equivalent in meaning to any associated respect to any given modal logic, the model description or set ofdescriptions, and this in turn assigns a truth-value to each atomic formula or entailed dispensing with any Fregean-type proposition. So any given formula is either true distinction between the sense and reference of or false in, or at, a world in the set. Kripke then terms. Kripke's view also had the consequence defined the notion ofvalidity for the given logic, that identity statements featuring only proper a formula being valid in this sense if it came out names were, if true, necessarily true.There were true in all models . He went on to develop immediate implications here for the philosophy quantified modal logic, i.e. that which deals of mind : some of the proponents of the view with modalized formulae involving the known as 'central state' materialism had apparatus of quantification (informally stressed the contingency of the identity of expressed by 'all' and 'some'). In this logic an thoughts and brain processes; now the idea of interpretation is provided for predicate contingent identity was in question. expressions, specifying the sets ofobjects to be Another interesting outcome of Kripke's assigned to those expressions. In this way work was a renewed interest in the issue of 102 Kr istev a essentialism, i.e. in whether a distinction Main publications: between an entity 's essential and its merely contingent properties was sustainable. At an (1969) Semeiotike: Recherches pour une semanalys e, intuitive level it seems quite natural to say that Paris: Seuil. some properties are essential to an object or a (1974) La Revolution du langage poetiqu e, Paris: person , as Kripke would say that having a Seuil (English translation, Revolution in Poetic specific biological parentage was essential to an Language, trans . Margaret Waller, New York: individual, whereas their becoming a famous Columbia University Press, 1984). (1974) Des Chinois es, Paris :Editions des Femmes philosopher was not. The distinction, and (Engli sh translation , About Chinese Women, trans. Kripke's account, continues to be hotly debated . Anita Burrows, New York and London: Marion Kripke has not ceased to be controversial. In his Boyars, 1986). 1982 monograph he ventured aprovocative,and (1977) Polylogue, Paris: Seuil. to some minds totally wrong-headed, (1980) Pouvoirs de l 'horreur: essai sur I'abjectio n, interpretation of parts of Wittgenstein's Paris: Seuil (English translation, Powers ofHorror: Philosophical Investigations according to An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez, New which he attributes to Wittgenstein a York: Columbia University Press , 1982). comprehensively sceptical position on meaning (1980) Desire in Language: ASemiotic Approa ch to and rule-following. His influence on both Literature and Art, ed. Leon S. Roudie z, trans. Thomas S. Gora, Alice Jardine and Leon S. Roudiez, seniors and contemporaries has been New York: Columbia Un iversity Press. consid erable, sharpening up the debates with (1981) Le langage, cet inconnu, Paris: Seuil (Engli sh other and more extravagant possible-worlds translation, Language the Unknown: An Initiation theorists like David Lewis, and attracting a into Linguistics, trans . Anna M. Menke, Heme! lengthy chapter of critical appraisal from the Hempstead: Harvester, 1989). proFregean Michael Dummett . Others, like (1983) Histoires d 'amou r, Paris: Deneol (Engli sh Hilary Putna m, have applied the notion ofrigid translation, Tales of Love, trans . Leon S. Roudiez, designation to kind terms as well as individual New York: Columbia Un iversity Press, 1987). terms . Inevitably, the notion of possibl e worlds (1986) Au commencement etait l 'amour: has itself come into question despite its utility, psychanalyse et fi ji, Paris: Hachette (Engli sh translation, In the Beginning was Love: and few have been convinced by Kripke's Psychoanalysis and Faith , trans. Arthur arguments for propositions which can be both Goldhammer, New York: Columbia University necessary and a posteriori. Press, 1987). Sources: See secondary literature. (1988) Etrangers Ii nons-memes , Paris: Fayard DENIS POLLARD (English trans lation , Strangers to Ourselves, trans. Leon S. Roudiez, New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).

Kristeva, Julia Secondary literature: Bulgarian . b: 1941, Bulgaria. Cat: Psychoanalyst; aesthetic ian; linguist ; Allen, Jeffner and Young, Marion (eds) (1989) The semio logist; feminist theorist. Ints: Cultural Thinking Muse: Feminism and Modern French Philosophy , Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University history. Educ: 1966, University ofParis; Ecole Press. Pratique des Hautes Etudes .Infls: Marx, Freud, Benjamin,Andrew (ed.) (1990) Abj ection , Lacan, Barthes, Jakobson, Levi-Strauss, Hegel, Melan cholia and Love: The Work of Julia Kristeva, Bakhtin and Georges Bataille.Appts: Professor London and New York: Routledge. ofLinguistics, University ofParis VII. Lechte , John (1990) Julia Kristeva, London and New York: Routledge. Kuhn 103

Miller, Nancy K. (ed.) (1986) The Politi cs ofGender, studies . The most contentious part of Kristeva's New York: Columbia University Press . work remains her feminist theories , which are almost provocatively reactionary by the Kristeva's original subject was linguistics but standards of recent French feminism and have she has since branched out to become a major aroused considerable controversy in feminist theorist in semiotics , psychoanalysis and circles worldwide . feminism . She first came to prominence in the STUARTSIM late 1960s through her association with the radical Parisianjournal Tel Quel . Barthes was a key influence on her semiotic enquiries , where her early concern was to develop a semiotic theory capable of describing poetic language, Kuhn, Thomas S(amuel) with particular reference to modernism. One of her most important contributions to semiotic American. b: 18 July 1922, Cincinnati, Ohio . theory has been the concept of intertexuality, the Cat: Historian of science; philosopher of idea, derived from her study ofBakhtin, that any science . Educ: 1943, graduated in Physics , text is a 'mosaic of quotations' from other Harvard University. Infls: Alexandre Koyre , textual sources . Another key Kristevian Emile Meyerson, Helene Metzer, Anneliese semiotic concept is chora, a kind ofdisruptive Maier, Jean Piaget, B. L. Whorf, W. v. O. Quine energy operating within the semiotic enterprise. and Ludwig Fleck. Appts: 1948-56, Junior A basically untheorizable entity, chora, is Fellow, then Assistant Professor, General identified as a feminine element, a receptacle or Education and History of Science, Harvard womb in its original Greek sense , which for University; 1961-4, Professor, History of Kristeva corresponds to the poetic in language. Science, University of California, Berkeley; From the 1970s onwards , after qualifying as a 1968-79, M. Taylor Pine Professor of the psychoanalyst (with Lacan as a major HistoryofScience , Princeton University; 1979­ influence) , Kristeva's work becomes 83, Professor, Philosophy and History of increasingly preoccupied with psychoanalysis Science, Massachusetts Institute of and its application to problems of feminism. Technology ; 1983-91, Laurance S. Rockefeller Kristeva is a feminist theorist of less radical Professor of Philosophy, MIT; 1991-, Professor disposition than such 'second-generation' Emeritus , MIT. feminists as Luce Irigaray and Helene Cixous, with their commitment to a 'feminism of difference' and specifically feminine discourse (ecriture f eminine). Reconciling this second­ Main publications: generation feminism with the first-generation feminism oftheorists like de Beauvoir has been (1957) The Copernican Revolution: Planetary a particular project of Kristeva in her feminist Astronomy in the Development ofWestern Thought , writings , and she has claimed , in opposition to Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. the second generation's sectarian impulses, that (1962) The Structure of Scientifi c Revolution s, Chicago :Chicago University Press; second enlarged 'the dichotomy man/woman' belongs to edition , 1970. metaphysics rather than to biology. Kristeva has (1966) (with John L. Heilbron , Paul L. Forman and been a leading voice in French intellectual life Lini Allen) Sourcesfor History ofQuantum Physics: since the 1960s and has had a significant impact An Inventory andReport, Philadelphia: Memoires of in her various chosen fields of enquiry. The the American Philosophical Society. concept of intertextuality, for example, has (1977) The Essential Tension : Selected Studies in passed into general usage in literary and cultural Scientific Tradition and Change, Chicago : University of Chicago Press . 104 Kuhn

(1978) Black-Body Theory and the Quantu m former preoccupation appears to have Discontinuity , 1894-1912, Oxford: Oxford influenced the latter domain but not vice versa. University Press. His reputation as a historian of science is (1983) ' Rationality and theory choice' , in Journal of indisputably solid, but his fame, transcending Philosophy 80, pp. 563-71. subject boundaries, rests primarily on Th e (1992) 'The natural and the hum an sciences ', in D. Hiley et al. (eds) The Interpretive Turn: Philosop hy, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which Science and Culture , Ithaca, NY: Cornell University admirers and critics tend to concentrate on, Press. often excluding much else which might serve to (1994) 'Afterwords', in P. Horwich (ed.) World modify the dominant theme which appears to Changes: Thomas Kuhn and the Nature ofScience. them to emerge from its initial publication in 1962. That thesis is perceived to consist of: (i) a Secondary literature: paradigm establishing itself constitutes the maturi ty of a science; (ii) paradi gms (embod ying exemplars) are scientific Barnes, Barry (1982) T. S. Kuhn and Social Science, achievements universally recognized and New York: Columbia Univers ity Press. Buchd ahl, Gerd (1965) Review of The Structure of accepted by the community of practitioners to Scientific Revolutions,British Journal ofthe History provid e model problems and solutions , ofScience 4: 55- 69. permitting normal science to occur ; (iii) Guttin g, Gary (ed.) (1980) Paradigms and paradigm changes involve revolutionary Revolutions,Notre Dame: University ofNotre Dame science ; (iv) competing paradigms are Press. incommensurable because each selects Horwich, Paul (ed.) (1994) World Changes: Thomas different problems as significant to solve, using Kuhn and the Nature ofScience, Cambridge, Mass.: in tum different standards to count as success of MIT Press. Hoyningen-Hucnc, Paul (1993) Reconstructing solution ; furthermore , no common Scientific Revolut ions: Thomas S. Kuhn 50 observational data exist that could function as a Philosophy of Science, Chicago: University of neutral standard for comparing them, as each Chicago Press (publi shed in an earlier version in involves perceiving different 'facts'; (v) neutral 1989 as Die Wissenschaftsph ilosoph ie Thomas S. rules and facts cannot , therefore, determine Kuhns: Rekonstruktion und Grundlagenprobleme). paradigm change; (vi) paradigm change is Lakato s, Imre and Musgrave, Alan (eds) (1970) accounted for by the decisions ofthe scientific Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, community, namely, justification by authority Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Laudan , Larry (1977) Progress and Its Problems, of persons , not by impersonal criteria like Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press. logical or methodolo gical rules. Putn am, Hilary (1981) 'T he corroboration of Philosophers of science tend to conclud e theori es', in 1.Hacking (ed.), Scientific Revolutions, irrationalism or relativism from the above.If so, Oxford : Oxford University Press. there can be no philosophy but only sociolog y Shapere, Dudle y (1964) Review of The Structure of (and history) of science. On the other hand, Scientific Revolutions, Philosophical Review 73: historians and sociologists of science , while 383- 94. welcoming the treatment of cognitiv e beliefs Siegel, Harve y (1987) Relativism Refuted: A Critique of Contempo rary Epis temological Relativism, and interests by the ordinary methods of Dordre cht: D. Reidel. empirical sociolo gy, nevertheless, think that Kuhn has underplayed the influence of external factors, such as politic al and social ones, on Kuhn 's work falls into two main categories­ scientific research . Kuhn himself, however, his writings as a historian of science and his moans that he has been much misund erstood . more controversial contribution to the But he is satisfied that Hoyningen-Huene philosophy and sociolo gy of science . His (1993) has done justice to the compl exities of Lacan 105

his own position and the controversies (1975) Encore, 1972-3, Paris: Editions du Seuil. surround ing it since the publication of The ( 1978) Le Seminaire, Livre II: Le Moi dans la theorie Structure ofScientific Revolutions. de Freud, Paris: Editions du Seuil (English Kuhn shares with Popper the honour of translation, The Ego in Freud s Theory, ed. J.-A. laying the agenda, in the main, of (Anglo­ Miller, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (1981) Le Seminaire, Livre VII: L'Ethique de la American) philosophy of science in the last psychanalyse, Paris: Editions du Seuil. thirty years. Popper and positivists adhere to (1986) Le Seminaire, Livre VIII: Le Transfert, Paris: Reichenbach's distin ction between the context Editions du Seuil. of justification and the context of disco very, (1991) Le Seminaire, Livre XVII: L 'Envers de la thereby defending the thesis of scientific psychanalyse, Paris: Editions du Seuil. rationality and of progress which is linear and cont inuous . The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is perceived as a thought­ provoking seminal work posing a powerful Secondary literature: chall enge to this 'traditional' view. By decentring the formal logical dimension, the MacCannell, J. (1986) Figuring Lacan: Criticism and Kuhnian account bears some affini ty to the the Cultural Unconscious, London: Croom Helm. writin g of French historians and philosophers of Schneiderman, S. (1983) Jacques Lacan : Death ofan science like Gaston Bachelard,as well asthat of Intellectual Hero, Cambridge, Mass .: Harvard Feyerabend, not to mention Michael Polanyi. University Press. Kuhn himself explicity acknowledges the Sturrock, J. (ed.) (1979) Structuralism and Since, influence of'Koyre, another historian ofscience Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press on his thoughts . (contains a short bibliography).

Sources: CBD; DAS; Turner; WD; PI; personal It is not easy to encapsulate Lacan 's work communication. becaus e of his persistent refusal to state and KEEKOKLEE develop any systematic theories, but one approach to his ideas is, first, to consider his views on language, and then to take in other concepts With which these views are closely interrelated. Lacan, Jacques Accordin g to Lacan , langua ge has two aspects. There is the public, rule-governed and French . b: 1901, Paris . d: 1981, Paris. Cat: syntactical structure, but this is counter­ Psychoanalyst. Ints: Philosophy of mind ; balanc ed by the alternative level of free philosophy of language. Educ: Trained in association in pun, word-play and dreams . Medicine and Psychiatry at the Paris Medical Lacari's views on language owe much to Faculty.Injls: Sigmund Freud and Ferdinand de Saussure, but he stresses to a much greater Saussure. Appts: 1932,Chefde Clinique, Paris extent this second, free-a ssociation aspect. Medical Faulty; 1964, founded the Ecole The unconscious is both created by and Freudienne, Paris, and becam e President ofthe reflects language. The rule-governed aspect of Champ Freudien at the University ofVincennes. the latter constricts and suppresses the unconscious, which in its turn asserts its freedom and psychical energy through its persistent attempt to undermine and destabili ze Main publications: syntax and fixed meaning by the use of free association. ( 1966) Ecrits I and II, Paris: Editions du Seuil. The unconscious is also in tension with the ( 1974) Television , Paris: Editions du Seuil. ideal ego, or persisting and integrated self. It is 106 Langer

at the 'mirror phase' that a child makes the first continuous slippage of language. However, oflifelong attempts to create a self, or to gain a there must be some statements, or a sense of identity. Such attempts always fail, metalanguage used about language, which are because the selfis merely a constantly shifting, not subject to such a factor: the meaning ofthe fluidly organized matrix or nexus which assertion that there is continuous slippage in projects and objectifies itself into a deceptive language must be fixed, so that we can know this and fictitious wholeness. Syntactical language alleged fact about language. is the ground and agent of this deception: the KATHRYN PLANT order found within this level of language both allows and directs such objectification. What we view as reality is also constructed by and reflected in language and changes with linguistic developments. Reality is given its Langer (nee Knauth), Susanne Katerina structure by,and isparasitic on, languag e.There is no metalanguage to describe any ultimate American. b: 20 December 1895, Manhattan, reality 'behind' what is given to us by the New York. d: 17 July 1985, Old Lyme, language we use. Lacan thus reverses the Connecticut. Cat: Neo-Kantian symbolist. Ints: traditional order between the symbolic (in this Aesthetics; philosophy of mind ; philosophy of case , language) and what it symbolizes: the language .Educ: Radcliffe College ,Cambri dge, former creates the latter. Mass., and the Universit y ofVienna (1921-2). Lacan was concerned to break down the Infls: C. S. Peirce, L. Wittgenstein, A. N. barriers between different intellectual Whitehead, Ernst Cassirer and Charles Morris . disciplines, and his work ranges freely over the App ts: Tutor in Philosophy, Radcliffe College, concepts of such traditionally diverse areas as Harvard , 1927--42; Lecturer in Philosophy, psychoanalysis, linguistics, the theories of Columbia University, 1945-50; Professor of knowledge and mind, and literary and critical Philosophy and Professor Emerita , Connecticut theory. His interest in, and application of his College, New London, 1954-85. work to, the latter two areas can be illustrated by his treatment, in Ecrits (1966), of Edgar Allan Poe's story 'The purloined letter'. According to Lacan's analysis, the letter ofthe story's title is a Main publication s: symbol of language : as it passes through the hands of the various characters it takes on a (1930) The Practice ofPhilo sophy , New York: Holt. different meaning by playing a different role in (1937)An Introduction to theStudy ofSymbolic Logic, each life. Boston : Houghton Mifflin and London: Allen & There is a strong feminist interest in Lacan's Unwin. works .According to one feminist interpretation (1942) Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the the public aspect of language is male-oriented Symbolism of Reason, Rite and Art, Cambridge, and paternalistic, whereas conversely the Mass.: Harvard University Press; third edition, subversive strugg le of the free-association 1957. aspect oflanguage is a reflection of the attempts (1953)FeelingandForm :A Theory ofArt, New York: ofthe feminist principle to assert itself. Scribner and London : Routledge. (1957) Problems ofArt: Ten Philosophical Lectures, Lacan's writings are self-critical: his later New York: Scribner and London: Routledge . works examine and destabilize the conceptual (1958) (ed.) Reflections on Art , Baltimore: Johns structure of the earlier, thus leading to Hopkins University Press. difficulties in giving an exposition ofhis views . (1962) Philosophi cal Sketches, Baltimore: Johns He deliberate ly incorporates ambiguity, pun, Hopkins University Press and London: Oxford word-play and multip le meaning into his University Press. publications, to highlight his position on the Langer 10 7

(1967-82) Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling, 3 vols , experience incapable oflinguistic expression. It Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press . is this expanded notion of symbol which has been the target ofcriticism from contemporary philosophers (see, for example, the review of Secondary literature: Philosophy in a New Key by Ernst Nagel , Journal ofPhilosophy 40 (1943) : 323-9). Having originally taken music to exemplify Danto, Arth ur, de Sousa, Ronald B. and Morawski , her view ofart as presentational symbol , Langer Stefan (1984), essays in Journal ofPhilosophy 81: 641-63. proceeds in her next book, Feeling and Form Gosh, Ranjan K. (1979) Aesthetic Theory and Art: A (1953), to provide a detailed account of the Study in Susann e Langer, Delhi: Ajanta. principles ofcreationand expression in the great orders ofart.Art, for Langer, is significant form, and the arts are unified through the notion of Although Susanne Langer is famous as an expression.The forms ofart are abstracted from aesthetic ian, her work in aesthetics is their everyday employment to create , in interwoven with her contributions to the Schiller's terms, a semblance or illusion which philosophy of mind and the philosophy of presents or symbolizes ideas of feeling, the language . Like her mentors, A. N. Whitehea d artist's knowledge of feeling , as opposed to and Ernst Cassirer, she is a systematic thinker. signalling his currentl y felt emotions . Thus the But Langer worked in a period when significance ofart is that it enables the beholder philosophical systems were unfashionable: in to recognize directly the forms of human the 1940s and 1950s she set about constructing feeling, 'growth, movement, emotion, and a theory of art when her contemporaries everything that characterizes vital existence' questioned the very possibility of such a theory. (1953, p. 82). The artistic illusion (not However, Langer's theory of art itself delusion) , which is not a mere arrangement of originated in her semantic theory and was in its given materials in an aesthetically pleasing turn the basis of her theory of mind, the pattern but what results from the arrangement, crowning achievement ofher long career. Langer calls 'living form' ; and "living form" is The major themes of Langer's philosophy the most indubitable product of all good art' are sounded in Philosophy in a New Key (1942), (ibid.). where she identified the 'keynot e' of twentieth­ However,'why must artistic form, to be century philosophy as a concern with the nature expressive of feeling, always be so-called ofsymbolism. Langer's interest in art led her to "living form"?' Moreover, why need art 'only a conception ofthe symbol stemming from the seem, not actually be, life-like'? That is to say: Kantian analysis ofexperience as developed by 'Why is semblance necessary?' These Cassirer rather than to that current in logic and questions, prompted by her theory of art, were positivist epistemology. She argues that the the origins of the final phase of Langer's symbolic ordering of experience occurs at all philosophy, culminating in the three volumes of levels of sensitive life through the making of Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling (1967-82). abstractions, understood as the perception of Here she investigates 'actual living form as form. Consequently, Langer distinguishes two biologists find it ... and the actual phenomena of kinds of symbol. Discursive symbols, the feeling' in order to show that the fundamental paradigm of which is verbal language, are division between human and animal mentality is characterized by fixed units of meaning and 'a vast and special evolution of feeling in the syntactic relations . Non-discursive symbols , hominid stock ' (see the Introduction to Mind , found in sensory experience, ritual, myth and vol. I) . Langer's theory of mind is resolutely art are characterized as articulated wholes naturalistic in its exclusion of assumptions whose function is the presentation of forms of 108 Lenin

about non-ph ysical ingredients in human life. revoliutsii, Petrograd (Eng lish translation, State and But at the same time it aims, as with all Langer 's Revolution: M arxist Teaching on the State and the philosophical writing, to provide a conceptual Task of the Proletar iat in the Revolution, United structure of sufficient generality to be Communist Party ofAmer ica, 1917). applicable, to be workable, both within and (1933)Filosofskie tetradi [PhilosophicalNot ebooks], Moscow (first separate edition). beyond the natural sciences. (1960- 80), Collec ted Works, 47 vols, Moscow and London: Fore ign Languages Publishing House, Sources: New York Times, 19 Ju11985; Turner. Progress Publi shers and Lawrence and Wishart PETER LEWIS (English translation ofthe fourth Russian edition of Lenin 's work).

Lenin, Vladimir Il'ich (pseudonym of Secondary literature: V.l. Ul'ianov) Copleston, F. C. (1986) Philosophy in Russia: From Russian . b: 10April (22 N.S.) 1870 Simbirsk. d: Herzen to Berdyaev, Tunbridge Wells: Search Press 21 January 1924, Gorki, near Moscow. Cat: and Notre Dame : University of Notre Dame Press, ch. II. Marxis t. Educ: Simbirsk gymnasium, 1879­ Hardin g, N. (1977-81)L enin sPolitical Thought,vo l. 87; briefly attended University of Kazan ' in I : Theory and Practice in the Democratic 1887 until his expulsion and exile; graduated in Revolution, vol. 2: Theory and Practice in the Law as an external student of the University of Socia list Revolution, London and Basingstoke: St Petersburg in 1891. Injls: Influenced by Macmill an. Marx, Engels, A. 1. Herzen, N. G. Wetter, G. A. (1958) Dialectical Materialism: A Chernyshevsky, Plekhanov and Bukharin. Historical and Systematic Survey ofPhilosophy in Appts: Professor of Philosophy, University of the Soviet Union, trans. Peter Heath, London Moscow, 1883-1920. Routledge & Kegan Paul, ch. 5.

The son of a school inspector, Lenin was Main publications: introduced to Marxism by his elder brother Aleksandr, who was executed in 1887 for his part in a revolutionary populist plot to ( 1902) Chto deliat '? Nabo levshie voprosy nashego assassinate Tsar Alexander III. From 1893 dvizheniia, Stuttgart (English trans lation, What is to Lenin practised as a lawyer in St Petersburg, be Done?Burning Questions ofour Movement, New where he became leader of the main Marxist York: Intern ational Publi shers, 1929). (1909) Materializm i empiriokrititsizm : kritiches kie circle. In 1895 he was arrested and imprisoned, zametki ob odnoi reaktsionnoi filosofii, Moscow and in 1897 exiled to Siberia. In 1900 he (Eng lish translation , Materialism and Empirio­ emigrated to Western Europe, and led the Criticism: Critical Notes Concerning a Reactionary Bolshevik faction which emerged from the Philosophy, trans. David Kvitko, New York: Second Congress of the Russian Social­ Intern ational Publishers, 1927). Democratic Labour Party in 1903. He returned (1916)lmp erializm,kak vysshaia stadi ia kapitalizma: to Russia during the 1905 Revolution but again populiarnyi ocherk, Petrograd (English translation, emigrated to Western Europe in 1907, where he Imp erialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism: A was active in the international socialist Popu lar Outline, New York: International movement and again embroiled in party strife Publi shers, 1933). and leadership struggles, not least with (1918) Gosudarstvo revoliutsiia : uchenie Bogdanov and Trotsky. He opposed Russia 's marksizma 0 gosudarstve i zadachi proletariata v participation in the First World War, and Lenin 109

returned after the February Revolution, subjective idealism, which inevitably organizing the seizure of power in October 1917 terminates in solipsism. Bogdanov's conflation with his fonneropponent Trotsky.The first head of social consciousness and social being also of state of the Soviet Union , he survived the undermined the Marxist distinction between period of civil war and Allied intervention (he class consciousness and objective social was severely wounded by a Social conditions (a distinction which underlay Revolutionary in 1918), and in 1921 replaced Lenin's emphasis on the role of the the coercive policies ofWar Communism with revolutionary activist). Lenin , by contrast, the more liberal New Economic Policy. He died predicated his metaphysics and epistemology in 1924 from a stroke . on the naive realism accepted by 'every healthy Although his earliest works criticized the person who has not spent some time in a lunatic petit-bourgeois economic romanticism of asylum or studied the science of idealist Russian Populism, affinities arguably remained philosophers' . He equated matter with in the emphases Lenin brought to Marxism as a 'objective reality, which is given to man in his political theory ; notably in his rejection of sensations, and which is copied, photographed 'objectivist', determinist and evolutionary and reflected by our sensations, while existing versions ofMarxism, his belief in the peasants' independently of them' (author's translations; latent revolutionary potential, and the see Collected Works, vol. 14, pp. 69, 130). paramount role accorded in What is to be Done ? Through this definition he reasserted (1902) to a tightly disciplined vanguard of materialism in the face of 'physical idealist' professional activists in leading the masses to interpretations of the contemporary 'crisis in revolutionary consciousness and action. In his physics'. His effective identification of Imperialism , the Highest Stage of Capitalism philosophical materialism with realism and a (1916) ,he saw the growthofmonopolies and the representationalist theory of perception was of scramble for colonies as morbid symptoms, and decisive significance in Soviet philosophy and justified his activist strategy in the Russian intellectual history . Equally influential was his contextby appealing to the unevendevelopment insistence that all philosophical positions are of capitalism in different countries. The ultimately either materialist or idealist (the consequence that socialism would triumph at 'agnosticism' of Hume and Kant being different times in different countries was part of concealed idealism), and that these ' two great his argument for the continuing post­ camps' represent antagonistic social classes . revolutionary role ofthe state as an instrument Hence the 'struggle ofparties' in philosophy, or ofclass domination (this timeoftheproletariat). its 'partisanship' (partiinost '), a quality openly The Leninist theory of the state was expounded exhibited in Lenin's unrestrained invective in State and Revolution (1918) . against his opponents, to the dismay even of Lenin's Materialism and Empirio-Criticism fellow Marxists like Aksel'rod (Ortodoks). (1909),a strikingly polemical work replete with Despite the philosophical crudities of quotations from Russian and Western writers, Lenin's assault on phenomenalism, he was at was conceived in the library of the British pains to distinguish his position from the vulgar Museum and prompted by a leadership struggle or ' mechanical' materialism of Vogt, Buchner among the Bolshevik Emigres. It defended and Moleschott. Thought is not secreted from Engels's dialectical materialism against the the brain like bile from the liver ; the psychical is attempts of Bogdanov, Lunacharsky and other 'the highest product of matter' but is not Bolsheviks to modernize Marxism by marrying reducible to it. The relationship between it to the empiriocriticism of Avenarius and thought and nature is dialectical, and the Mach. Lenin insisted that in denying that human dialectic in general was given greater experience is caused by a reality external to it, prominence in Lenin's Philosophical the Russian Machists were embracing Notebooks ,a collection of notes, summaries and 110 Levinas

drafts largely dating from 1914-16, when he translation, The theory of intuition in Husserl 's was in Switzerland, and unpublished until Phenom enology , trans . Andre Orianne , Evanston: 1929-30, when they were included in a North western University Press, 1973). collection of his works . Most striking is the (1947) De l 'existent a I'existence, Paris: Fontaine (English translation, Existence and Existents, trans. respect paid to Hegel (a full understanding ofhis Alphonso Lingis , The Hague: Nijhoff, 1978). Logic is held to be necessary for a proper (1949) En decouvrant l 'existence avec Husser! et understanding of Marx's Capital) and, Heidegger , Paris: Vrin. memorably, Lenin asserts that intelligent (1961) Totalite et infini, The Hague : Nijhoff(English idealism is closer than stupid materialism to translation, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphon so intelligent materialism. Unlike Engels, he Lingis, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969). placed the law of the unity and struggle of (1963) DijJicile liberte, Paris : Albin Michel. opposites above the law ofthe transformation of (1974) Autrement qu 'eire ou au-dela de I'essence , quality into quant ity: it was the heart of the The Hague: Nijho ff(English transaltion, Otherwise dialectic, which he now considered to be the than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphon so Lingis, The Hague: Nijhoff, 198 1). essence ofMarxism;and he found support in the (1982) Ethiqu e et infini, Paris: Fayard (English dialectic for his typically activist belief that translation, Ethi cs and Infinity , trans. Richard A. 'man's consciousness not only reflects the Cohen, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, objective world, but creates it' (Colle cted 1985). Works, vol. 38,pp. 180, 242, 276).Few Western scholars perceive in Lenin's writings anything of philosophical profun dity or originality, but their influence upon and reverential treatment Secondary literature: by one of the world's largest communities of professionalphilosophers is an indelib le feature Bernasconi, R and Wood, D. (1988) The Provocation ofthe history oftwentieth-century philosophy. ofLevinas: Rethinking the Other , London and New York: Routledge (colle ction of critical essays by T. COLIN CHANT Chanter, S. Gans, J. Llewel yn, et al.). Blanchot, M. et al. (1980) Textes pour Emmanuel Levinas, Paris: J. M. Place. Cohen, R. (ed.) (1986) Face to Face with Levina s, Albany: State University of New York Press Levinas, Emmanuel (collection of essays by T. de Boer, J.-F. Lyotard, R. Bernasconi, et al.). Derrida, J. (1978) 'Violence and metaph ysics', in French . b: 30 December 1905, Kaunas , Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass, London : Lithuania. Cat:Phenomenologist; theologian. Routledge & Kegan Paul and Chicago: Chicago Ints: Ethics; philosophy of religion ; judaism. University Press, pp. 79- 153. Educ: University of Strasbourg Institute of Lingis, A. (1985) Libido: the French Existent ial Philosophy and University of Fribourg. Injls: Theories, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Bergson , Husserl and Heidegger. Appts: Wyschogrod,E. (1974) Emmanuel Levinas : the Professor ofPhilosophy, University ofParrs X; Problem of Ethi cal Metaphysics, The Hague : Nijhoff. University of Paris IV; Director of the Ecole Normale Israelite Orientale. Emmanuel Levinas was first to introduce the phenomenology ofHusserl and the philosophy of Heidegger to a French audience. His Main publications: philosophical method is phenomenological but the centra l themes ofhis philosophy are ethical. (1930) La Theorie de l'intuition dans la Through a phenomenological study of the ph enomenolo gie de Husserl , Paris: Alcan (English relation of the self to other persons , Levinas Lewis III

argues for the primacy ofthe good over the true. Philosophy, UCLA ; 1970-3, Associate Phenomenology, as the way to discover Professor of Philosophy, 1973- , Professor of meaning from within our lived experience, Philosophy, Princeton; 1983, elected to allows himto study face-to-face human American Academy ofArts and Sciences; 1992, relations such as desire and love.From this point elected Corresponding Fellow of the British of departure, he argues that man's ethical Academy; visiting appointments and relation to another person comes before his fellowships in Australia, the USA and Britain ; relation to himself(self-interest) or to the world editorial consultant to Philosophical Papers. ofthings (Being) . For Levinas, the other person is absolutely other : beyond knowledge or thought about the being ofthings. Face-to-face Main publications : with the other person man is obliged to put responsibility for the other before self; for this reason the relation puts man in the position of (1969) Convention: A Philosophical Study , hostage . Thus Levinas puts forward an ethics of Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (1973) Counterfactuals, Oxford, Blackwell. obligation and self-sacrifice dependent on a (1983) Philosophical Papers, vol. I, Oxford : Oxford relation to the other that is beyond totalization, University Press. beyond comprehension and expression: he calls (1986) On the Plurality ofWorlds, Oxford: Blackwell. it infinite . In Totality and Infinity (1961), his (1987) Philosophical Papers, vol. 2, Oxford : Oxford most influential book, this infinity is presented University Press (contains bibliography to 1986). through the perception of the face and through (1991) Parts of Classes, Oxford: Blackwell. the obligation man is put under when in the presence of the face of another. Levinas has influenced philosophers such as Jacques Secon dary literature: Derrida and Jean-Francois Lyotard and the writer Maurice Blanchot. His thought is a major reference-point when philosophers consider the Elgin, C.Z. (1992) Critical Notice of Parts ofClasses, relation oftheir thought to ethics, theology and in Philosophical Books 33: 193-8. Inwagen, P. van (1986) Critical Notice of Judaism . Philosophical Papers I, in Mind 95: 246-57. Loux, M. J. (ed.) (1979) The Possible and the Actual: Sources: Catalogues ofBibliothcque Nationale, Paris Readings in the Metaphysi cs 01 Modality , Ithaca : and National Library of Scotland. Cornell University Press. Stalnaker, Robert (1988) critical notice of On the JAMES WILLIAMS Plurality olWorlds, in Mind 97: 117-28.

David Lewis has written on several areas of philosophy (metaphysics, mind, logic, Lew is, David K( ellogg) language) , but is best known for his work on counterfactuals (conditionals such as 'If American. b: 28 September 1941, Oberlin , kangaroos had no tails, they would topple Ohio . Cat: Analytical philosopher oflanguage; over'). Lewis analyses such conditionals in logician . Ints: Philosophy of mathematics; terms of possible worlds , and in so doing philosophy of mind ; ethics. Educ: St espouses 'extreme modal realism'-see Robert Catherine's Society, Oxford, Swarthmore and Stalnaker's article in Loux 1979. Extreme Harvard . Infls: The analytical tradition , in modal realism-as it emerges from Lewis's particular Rudolf Carnap and F. P. Ramsey. Counterfactuals (1973) On the Plurality of Appts: 1966-70, Assistant Professor of Worlds (1986) and articles in the Philosophical 112 Lon ergan

Papers-is 'the thesis that the world we are part of roles specified in common-sense ofis but one ofaplurality ofworlds , and that we psychology' (p. xi). who inhabit this world are only a few out ofall Lewis's more recent concern has been with the inhabitants of all the worlds' (1986, p. vii). the philosophy of mathematics. In Parts of Moreover, the claim that there is a plurality of Classes (1991) he attempts a mereological worlds is, Lewis maintains , an existential one. reduction of set theory : parts of classes are The notion of similarity between worlds subclasses (the null set not being a genuine functions here as a primitive and raises issues class), and singletons (unit classes) are their concerning, for instance , identity across worlds mereologlcal atoms ; Lewis 's axiomatization of (Lewis's position on which has been criticized set theory makes singletons the primitives ofhis by Saul Kripkein 'Identity and necessity' : see theory. If, as Lewis believes , 'most of Moore 1993 below) , but it offers Lewis a mathematics is into set theory up to its ears' (p. standpoint from which to treat other matters . 58), then his structuralist treatment ofset theory Modality on his analysis becomes results in the nominalization ofmathematics. quantification (what is possible is what is the case at some world , what is necessary is what is Sources: A. W. Moore (ed.) (1993) Meaning and the case at all worlds , and so on for 'the Ref erence, Oxford; AJP 62, 1984; IWW; WW(Am); impossible' and 'the contingent") . Similarly, the DAS; Burkhardt. articles 'Causation' and ' Events' (in 1987) STUART LEGGATT analys e both phenomena in terms of counterfactuals as Lewis conceives them . Lewis's version ofmodal realism has, however, been criticized by, among others, P. Forrest and D. M. Armstrong (Australasian Journal of Lonergan, Bernard Philosophy 62 (1984) : 164-8), and moderate modal realists such as Robert Stalnaker (see his Canadian. b: 17 December 1904, Buckingham, contribution in Loux) have instead attempted to Quebec . d: 26 Novemb er 1984, Pickering, interpret 'possible worlds' in terms of states of Ontario . Cat: Thomist. Ints: Epistemology; affairs or possible histories ofthe world (Lewis methodology; metaphysics; philosophical rejects 'ersatz modal realism', as he calls this theolog y. Educ: Heythrop College and position, in chapter 3 of 1986, and replies to Gregorian University. Injls: Aristotle, Aquinas other criticisms in chapter 2). and Newman. Appts: 1953- 1965, Gregorian In the introduction to volume 2 of University; 1966-70, Regis College , Toronto; Philosophical Papers (1987) Lewis writes that 1973-83, Boston College. much ofhis work seems to advance the thesis of 'Humean supervenience ... the doctrine that all there is to the word is a vast mosaic of local Main publications: matters ofparticular fact' (p. ix): the world is the sum of all space-time points and qualities at them- 'all else supervenes on that' . Lewis's (1957) Insight, London: Longman, Green & Co.; fifth materialism motivates his contributions to the edition, Collected Works ofBernard Lonergan, vol. philosophy of mind (see the articles collected 3, Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1992. (1967) Collection, edited by F. E. Crowe, New York: under that heading in volume 1of Philosophical Herder & Herder; second edition, Collected Works of Papers, 1983), in which he has developed 'a Bernard Lonergan , vol. 4, Toronto: University of broadl y functionalist theory ofmind, according Toronto Press, 1988. to which mental states qua mental are realizers (1968) Verbum : Word and Idea in Aquinas, London: Darton , Longman & Todd. Lon erg an 113

(1974) A Second Collection , edited by William F. J. nerve. If Kant had exploited his own critical Ryan and Bernard J. Tyrell, London: Darton, method to the full, he would have come to Longman & Todd. realize that the very concept of knowledge is itself intelligible and possible only on the prior assumption ofreal objects and properties which Secondary literature: are objects for knowledge, and which are actually known by the knowing subject. For Lonergan, then, philosophy begins with Crowe, Frederick E.(1992) Lonergan, London: the attempt to know what knowing is. The very Geoffrey Chapman. possibili ty of knowin g what knowing is is Lamb , Matthew L. (ed.) (1981) Creativity and inherent in the nature of consciousness. Method, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. Knowing is a conscious activity, and McShane, Philip (ed.) (1971-2) Pape rs fro m the International Lonergan Congress 1970, 2 vols, consciousness is an awareness immanent in Dublin : Gill & Macmillan (vol. 2: Language, Truth cognitional acts. The knowing of which we are and Meaning) . aware has a threefold character: empirical, Meynell , Hugo A. (1976) An Introdu ction to the intellectual and rational. As empirical, knowing Philosophy of Bernard Lonergan , London: is sensing, perceiving and imagining . As Macmillan; second edition, 199 1. intellectual, knowing involves the act of Tracy, David (1970) The Achievement of Bernard understanding and the formation of concepts . Lonergan, New York: Herder & Herder. As rational, knowing culminates in affirmations of what there is. These are not three types or Bernard Lonergan was the main exponent in stages of knowing , but constitute a dynamic English of what is sometimes called unity. All knowing requires a process of 'transcendental Thomism'. This emerged from 'insight' (hence the title of Lonergan's most a confrontation, and a partial synthesis , of some famous work), which is the name he uses for the elements of Kantian method with Thomistic act of understanding a set of data. Insight is realism , initiated earlier in the century by exemplified in Archimedes 's cry ' Eureka' , and Marechal. A fundamental principle in in the slavebo y in Plato 's Meno. The early Lonergan 's philosophy is his definition ofbeing chapters ofInsight provide a detailed analysis of as ' the objective of the pure desire to know '. the activit y of knowin g in mathematics , the Reality, that is, has a structure which is empirical sciences and common sense. isomorphic with the structure ofknowledge. It The dynamic , historicall y evolving, follows that a description and a theory of methodologically diverse character ofknowing knowled ge is a precondition and the foundation makes it plain that reality cannot be conceived of metaph ysics . A knowledge of knowled ge of as a static universe ruled by classical laws of leads to a knowledge ofwhat is known, and what physics . Lonergan describes it rather as is known is what there is. 'emergent probability', a phras e designed to This methodological priority of indicate that the universe functions as much by epistemology over metaph ysics was strongly statistical probabilities as by classical laws. contested by Thomists such as Gilson , for When reality is conceived ofas the knowabl e as whom a philosophy that began with a study of something 'proportionate' to human cognition consciousness could never escape from it and ('proportionate being '), it can be said to have arrive at the extra-mental world . Gilson pointed three components: 'potency' is the component to Descartes and Kant as philosophers who that is experienced or imagined; 'form' is the conspicuously failed in this respect. component that is known by the understanding; Transcendental Thornists , however, would 'act' is the component known by the judgement claim that Kant's view that we cannot know of reason . things in themselves was a kind of failure of These three components can themselves be of different kinds. Our understanding of things 114 Lukacs

is an understanding both oftheir properties and general form: 'If the real is completely relations, and of their con crete individuality: intelligible , God exists . But the real is the former is 'conjugate form' and the latter is completely intelligible. Therefore, God exists .' 'central form', terms which correspond with However, Lonergan does not think that this Aristotle's accidental and substantial form. argument will persuade someone who was Coordinate with these we can also distinguish hitherto an agnostic or an atheist that God exists . central and conjugate potency, and central and Its function rather is, like that of St Anselm's conjugate act. Central act is existence and proof, to demonstrate to those who already conjugate act is occurrence. believe in God that their belief is rationally Lonergan also examines practical reasoning grounded and defensible. Lonergan is regarded and the possibility ofethics . He defines good as by some as having one of the most powerful 'theobject ofdesire ' .However, one ofthethings philosophical minds of the twentieth century, that we desire is knowledge, and this desire but he is not widely known outside Thomistic generates a second sense of good: the good of circles . order, as instantiated in the state, the economyor the family. Good refers here to states ofaffairs Sources: Catholic Encyclopedia; RPL 83, 1985. which are rationally and purposefully designed, HUGHBREDIN willed and constructed to satisfy our desires . Good as the object of rational choice presents itself as value . On the ontological level, good refers to every kind oforder and, at its limit, to the intelligibility intrinsic in being . Moral Lukacs, Gyorgy choices involve four elements: sensible and imaginative representations; practical insight ; Hungarian.b: 13April 1885,Budapest. d: 1971, practical reflection; and decision. Budapest. Cat: Marxist; aesthetician; One ofthe peculiarities ofhuman knowing is metaphysician; political philosopher; literary that, although we have an unrestricted desire to theorist. Ints: Hegel. Educ: Universities of know, we have a limited capacity to know.Thus, Berlin and Heidelberg, and the Marx-Engels 'therange ofpossiblequestions is larger than the Institute in Moscow. Infls: Marx, Hegel, Kant, range ofpossible answers'. This consideration Dilthey, Weber, Rosa Luxemburg, Georges leads Lonergan to the postulation of Sorel and Georg Simmel. Appts: Professor of transcendent being, that is to say, being that is Aesthetics and Cultural Philosophy, University beyond us, which is 'without the domain of ofBudapest. man's outer and inner experience'. Transcendent being, however, must be presumed to be intelligible, and this leads to the logical possibility of an unrestricted act of Main publications: understanding, whose object includes transcendent as well as proportionate being . Its (1911) Die Seele und die Formen, Berlin: Fleischel object would also include self-understanding (English translation, Soul and Form , trans. Anna (since all knowing is, by definition, conscious). Bostock, London: Merlin Press, 1974). (1920) Die Theorie des Romans, Berlin : Paul Cassirer Such an understanding would be one of the (English translation, The Theory ofthe Novel, trans. characteristics ofGod. Anna Bostock, London: Merlin Press, 1971). The affirmation of what God is, and the (1923) Geschichte und Klassenbewussts ein, Berlin: affirmation that God is, are different matters . Malik Verlag (English translation,Historyand Class Lonergan believes that many ofthe arguments Consciousness, trans. Rodney Livingstone, London: for the existence of God are included in the Merlin Press, 1971). Lukacs 115

(1924) Lenin: Studie iiber den Zusammenhang seiner Lukacs is generally regarded as one of the first Gedanken, Vienna: Verlag der theorists of not e in what has come to be call ed Arbeiterbuchhandlung (English translation,Lenin: 'Western ' Marxism, a writer who mad e valuable A Study on the Unity of his Thought, trans. Nicholas contributions to several areas of Marxist theory, Jacobs, London: NLB, 1970). most notably perhaps in aesthetics. He is (1947) A tortenclmi regeny ; Budapest: Hungaria (English translation, The Historical Novel, trans. identified with a Hegelian approach to Marxism Hannah and Stanley Mitchell, Harmondsworth: which was at odds with Communist Party Penguin, 1969). orthodoxy for most of his lifetime. His earliest (1947) Goethe und seine Zeit, Berne: Francke writings on aesthetics were tinged with the neo­ (English translation, Goethe and his Age, trans. Kantianism so fashionable in pre-First World RobertAnchor, London: MerlinPress, 1968). War Central European intellectual circles, and (1947) A po lgar nyomaban: a hetveneves Thomas he described himself as a ' subj ective idealist' at Mann , Budapest: Hungaria (English translation, this point in his career. From The Theory of the Essays on Thomas Mann, trans. Stanley Mitchell, London:Merlin Press, 1964). Novel (1920) onwards, however, the influence (1948) Der Junge Hegel, Zurich and Vienna: Europa of Hegel begins to dominate. Lukacs's mature Verlag (English translation, The Young Hegel, trans. intellectual dev elopment is very much tied up Rodney Livingstone, London:Merlin Press, 1975). with the political fortunes of Marxism, and at (1950) Studies in European Realism , trans. Edith various times he was an activist on behalf of the Bone, London: Hillway. Communist Part y in Hungary and Germany as (1958) Wider den missverstanden Realismus, well as holding Hungarian government posts Hamburg: Claasen (English translation, The during the Soviet Republic of 1919 and the Meaning of Contemporary Realism , trans. John and Necke Mander, London: MerlinPress, 1963). uprising of 1956 . During the 1930s and 1940s (1963) Die Eigenart des Aesthetischen, Neuwied: Lukacs spent much of his tim e in Moscow, Luchterhand. working at the Marx- Engels Institute and the (1976) Zur ontologie des gesellschaft lichen seins, Philosophical Institute of the Moscow Budapest: Magveto Kiado(English translation, The Academy ofSciences, as well as editing various Ontology of Social Being, trans. David Fernbach, literary periodicals. On his return to Hungary London:Merlin Press, 1978). afterthe Second World War he tookup a Chair at the University of Budapest, although he was later expe lled from the Communist Party for his Secondary literature: part in the 1956 uprising and even exiled for a while. Lukacs's most contentious work of Arato, Andrew and Breines, Paul (1978) The Young Marxist theory is History and Class Lukacs and the Origins of Western Marxism, Consciousness (1923), whose Hegelian idealist London: SeaburyPress andNewYork: PlutoPress. bias , lukewarm commitment to materialism and Gluck, Mary (1985) George Lukacs and his generally anti-positivist sentiments scandalized Generation, 1900-1918, Cambridge: Mass.: the Russian Communist Party leadership in the Harvard University Press. 1920s . Lukacs was later to reject the idealist Heller, Agnes (ed.) (1983)Lukacs Reapp raised , New dimension of this work, although Hegel York: Columbia University Press. remained a lifelong source of inspiration. It is Joos,Ernest (ed.) (1987) George Luka cs and his World: AReassessment, New York: PeterLang. Lukacs's aesthetic writings that have probably Lichtheim, George(1970)Lukacs, Collins. done the most to build his reputation, Marcus, Judith and Tarr, Zoltan (eds) (1989) George particularly his works of literary criticism and Lukacs: Theory, Culture, and Politics, New literary theory. Studies in European Realism Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. (1946), The Historical Novel (1937) and The Zitta, Victor (1964) George Lukacs' Marxism: Meaning ofContemporary Realism (1957) have Alienation, Dialectics, Revolution. A Study in all been highl y influential studi es, and represent Utopia and Ideology , The Hague:MartinusNijhoff. some ofthe most succ essful defences ofrealism 116 Lyotard

in the Marxist canon . A supporter ofthe official of Philosophy, Paris. Held posts at various Soviet aesthetic doctrine of socialist realism, universities in the USA. Lukacs nevertheless could be severely critical of its simplistic tendencies and he developed a variant form known as 'critical realism', which Main publications: judged novels less in terms of their political correctness than on their ability to make plain the socio-political forces that shaped human (1954) La Phenomenologie, Paris: Presses character in any given historical period.This led Universitaires de France , 1954 (English translation, Phenomenology, trans. Brian Beakley, Albany, NY: to the controversial rejection on ideological SUNY Press , 1991). grounds of the modernist tradition in literature (1971) Discours.figure, Paris: Klinckseick. (Kafka and Joyce, for example) in favour of (1974) Economie libidinale, Paris: Minuit (English approved 'critical realists' like Thomas Mann . translation, LibidinalEconomy, trans . lain Hamilton In his late career Lukacs explored the history of Grant , London: Athlone Press, 1993). aesthetic theory in The Specificity of the (1977) Instructions paiennes, Paris: Galilee. Aesthetic (1963), a heavily Hegelian work (1977) Rudim ents pai ens : genre dissertatif, Paris: centrally concerned with the issues ofreflection Union genera le d'editions, and representation, and, finally, the ontological (1979) (with Jean-Loup Thebaud) Au Just e, Paris : Christian Bourgeois (English translation, Just theories of Marx and Hegel (published Gamin g, trans . Wlad Godzich, Manchester: posthumously in 1976.Lukacs has beenahighly Manchester University Press, 1985). influential figure in the Western Marxist (1979) La Condition postmoderne, Paris: Minuit tradition, although his dogmatic commitment to (English translation, The Postmodern Condition, realism and dislike of modernist trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Brian Massumi, experimentation have drawn criticism from Manchester: Manchester University Press , 1984). various quarters-most notably perhaps from (1983) Le Differend, Paris : Minuit (English the playwright Bertolt Brecht, who clashedwith translation, The Differend, trans. George Van Den Lukacs over the form a Marxist aesthetic should Abbeele, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988). take. The impact of Lukacs' brand of (1984) Tombeau de I'intellectuel et mitres papiers , Hegelianized Marxism can be seen in the work Paris: Galilee. ofWalter Benjamin, the Frankfurt School, the (1988) Peregrinations, New York: Columbia French-Romanian theorist Lucien Goldmann University Press (written in English by Lyotard). and the American critic Frederic Jameson. (1988) L 'inhumain, Paris: Galilee (English STUARTSIM translation, The Inhuman, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby, Cambridge: Polity, 1991).

Lyotard, .lean-Francois Secondary literature:

French . b: 1924. Cat: Postmodernist; political Bennington, Geoffrey (1988) Lyotard: Writing the philosopher; philosopher of language ; Event, Manchester: Manchester University Press . aesthetician; culture theorist. Educ: University Callinicos, Alex (1989) Against Postmodernism: A of Paris; 1971, doctorate. Injls: Marx, Freud, Marxist Perspective, Cambridge: Polity Press. Lacan, Nietzsche and Kant. Appts: 1972, Dews, Peter (1987) Logics ofDisintegration: Post­ Professor of Philosophy, University of Paris structuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical VIII (Vincennes) , 1949-59, taught at Lycees Theory, London and New York: Verso. and the University of California at Irvine ; Readings, Bill (1991) Art and Politics: Introdu cing founding member of the International College Lyotard, London: Routledge. Ma cIntyre 117

Sarup, Madan (1990) An Introductory Guide to Post- thought. The iconoclastic sentiments of The structuralism and Postmodernism, Hemel Postmodern Condition struck a chord in Hempstead: Harvester. contemporary intellectual circles and have Sim, Stuart (1992)BeyondAesthetics: Confrontations inspired a whole generationofcultural theorists . with Poststru cturalism and Postmodernism, Hemel Reaction amongst more orthodox left-wing Hempstead: Harvester. thinkers to Lyotard's postmodernist scepticism has been predictably hostile . Postmodernism is a sceptically inclined form of philosophy which calls into question the STUARTS1M certainties of other discourses , and Lyotard is one of the movement's leading theorists . Although best known for his writings on postmodernism he has published widely in MacI ntyre, A(lasdair) C(halmers) various areas of philosophy such as philosophy of'language,political philosophy and aesthetics. His early work is in the Marxist tradition ; but in British . b: 1929, Glasgow. Cat: Analytic common with many left-wing French philosopher. Ints: Ethics ; history of ethics ; intellectuals he turned sharply against Marxism Aristotle ; Aquinas ; Confucianism. Educ: in the aftermath of the 1968 "evenements", and Universities of London and Manchester. Injls: in his highly controversial study Economie Franz Steiner, Karl Polanyi and St Thomas libidinale (1974) he staked out a provocatively Aquinas . Appts: Lecturer in Philosophy of post-Marxist position which rejected the basic Religion, University of Manchester, 1951-7; assumptions ofMarxist methodology. This line Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Leeds, ofdevelopment culminated in The Postmodern 1957-61 ; Fellow of University College , Condition (1979), where the notion of universal Oxford , 1963-6; Professor of Sociology, theories was dismissed out of hand, the University of Essex, 1966-70; University argument being that such 'grand narratives' (for Professor of Philosophy and Political Science , example Marxism) had lost all credibility. University ofBoston, 1972-80; W. Alton Jones Against grand narrative, with its authoritarian Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, connotations, Lyotard championed the cause of Vanderbilt University, 1982-8; McMahon/ ' little narrative', essentially the narrative of Hank Professor of Philosophy, University of individual human beings , which needed no Notre Dame, from 1988; various otherpositions foundational justification (Lyotard is a at Oxford, Yale, Princeton, Brandeis University, committed antifoundationalist). Much of his post-1968 political thinking is structured Wellesley College . around the idea of specific campaigns to correct abuses of individual freedoms . Lyotard has become increasingly concerned with the nature Main publications: and rules ofjudgement in his later work, where his line of argument tends to be that judgement (1953) Marxism: An Interpretation, London: SCMP; is essentially pragmatic and specific to a revised and reissued as Marxism and Christianity, discourse. In Lyotard's view discourses are New York: Schocken Books , 1968. incommensurable, and between any two (1955) (ed. with Antony Flew) New Essays in discourses lies an unresolvable area ofdispute, Philosophical Theology, London: SCMP. or 'differend'. Kant is a constant point of (1958) The Unconscious, London: Routledge & reference in these later writings , where Lyotard Kegan Paul. consciously seems to be trying to return to a pre­ (1959) Difficulties in Christian Belief, London: Marxist and Hegelian framework ofdialectical SCMP. 118 MacIntyre

(1966) A Short History of Ethics , New York: timeless, unchanging, determinate set. He held Macmillan. rather that they are embodied in, and partially (1967) Secula rization and Moral Change, London: constitutive of, forms of social life, and so Oxford Univers ity Press. change as social life changes. This does not (1971 ) Against the Self-Images ofthe Age, Lond on: mean merely that different societies have held Duckwort h. (1981)After Virtue, Lond on: Duckworth. different things to be right or good but, much (1987) 'The idea of an educated public', in G.Haydon more radicall y, that what it means to describ e (ed.) Education and Values, London University something as right or good may itself chang e; Institute of Education. indeed, the very idea of morali ty is subject to (1988) Whose Justice? Which Rationali ty, Notre change. So, to take one central case, the Dame: Notre Dame University Press. peculiarly moral, Kantian sense of 'ought' that ( 1990) First Principles, Final Ends and characterizes much modern ethical thought­ Contemporary Philosophical Issues , Milwauke e: an 'ought' that expresses obligations binding on Marqu ette University Press. all rational beings as such, but unable to be (1990) Three Rival Versions ofMoral Enquiry, Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press. derived logically from any factual statements­ is compl etely absent in, for instance, the Homeric period . It arose, according to Maclntyre, in the modem period when the social Secondary literature: roles and ideals that had originall y provid ed a backing for it gradually dropped away. And this Horton, J. and Mendu s, S. (eds) (1993) Aft er development explains the peculiarl y intractable MacIntyre, Oxford: Polity Press. nature of moral disputes in the modem world , MacInt yre, Alasdair, Dahl,Norman 0., Baier,Annette which is not a feature of all possibl e moralities and Schneew ind,J. B. (1991) ' Book symposium' on but of one with a certain history. Whose Justice? Which Rationality ?, in Philosophy MacInt yre developed in detail this diagnosis and Phenomenological Research II : 149-78. of the problems of modem morality in After Virtu e (1981). Its central claim is that modern Macintyre's first book, written when he was 23, morality is in deep disarray. It is, he suggested, tried to rescue both a purified Christianity and a no more than the fragments of a conceptual purified Marxism for the modern world . He scheme which has lost the context which once argued that, properly understood, Marxism, as made it intelligible, and to which have been the historical successor to Christianity, largely added, as a way ofattempting to cope with the shares both its content and its function as an breakdown of the traditional moral philosophy, interpretation ofhuman existence. such moral fictions as natural rights and utilit y. In 1955 New Essays in Philosophical The attempt is a failure since, for one thing,there Theology , which Macintyre edited with Antony are no such things as natural rights or utilit y; Flew, and which gathered together a number of and, for another, this yoking of incompatible essays applying the methods of conceptual moral traditions has largely made of morality analysis to specific religious issues, just what Nietzsche and various forms of reinaugurated the serious study of the emotivism have claim ed that it is: the mere philosophy of religion,a subject which had been expression of subjective preference with no moribund in the analytical tradition for some objective criteria for deciding between them. decades. If moralit y is again to make sense for us, we Since the mid-1960s most of Macintyre's must, according to Maclntyre, recapture work has been concerned with ethical and social something of the Aristotelian tradition ofmoral theory. philosophy. Further, given the nature of our In A Short History of Ethics (1966) he society and its ruling liberal individualist ideas, attacked the notion that moral concepts are a this will not be easy. It would entail recapturing McTaggart 119

a numberofideas that are now lost. The concept (1987), Macintyre argued that the dual aim of of what Macintyre calls a practice-a the liberal university-to prepare students for a cooperative enterprise in pursuit of goods social role and to teach them to think for internal to that enterprise-would be essential; themselves-could no longer be achieved: the this, outside of the area of games, and demise of the 'educated public', a self­ particularly in our participation in political life, conscious body of people with a common we have all but lost. So too we should need to intellectual inheritance and shared standards of recapture the notion of a whole human life, an argument, has made it impossible . In Three idea lost to us now because bureaucratic Rival Versions ofMoral Enquiry he envisages modernity has seen to it that our lives have no the university 'as a place of constrained unity. And, third, we should need to recapture disagreement, of imposed participation in the sense that what we are is largely a matter of conflict, in which a central responsibility of what we have become through our history and higher education would be to initiate students traditions . Without these notions, morality can into conflict' (pp.230-1).Macintyre's work has make little sense for us. The choice , as been widely influential. Some, however, have Macintyre puts it, is between Nietzsche and questioned his historical interpretation; and Aristotle. many have not found modern moral thought to Given this analysis , a central problem is how be in such comparative disarray as he suggests . rationally to recommend one tradition of thought as against another. Macintyre turned to Sources: Flew ; WW 1992; Becker; personal this issue in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? communication. (1988) and in his Gifford Lectures , Three Rival ANTHONY ELLIS Versions ofMoralEnquiry (1990) .The accounts ofjustice that we find in Aristotle and Hume­ to take what are for us two of the most central examples-are, according to Macintyre, embedded in overall systems ofthought which McTaggart, John McTagga rt Ellis respectively impose their own standards of rationality on them . That being so, how may we British .b: 1866, London .d: 1925, London . Cat: adjudicate between them? Macintyre argues Ontological idealist. Ints: Metaphysics. Educ: that there can be no such thing as a rational MA and LittD, Trinity College, Cambridge. enquiry which does not adopt the standpoint of Infls: Spinoza and Hegel. Appts: Fellow of a particular tradition ; this, however, need not Trinity College, Cambridge, 1891-1923; involve any form of relativism, since the College Lecturer, 1897-1923. tradition from which one reasons may itself involve an absolute conception oftruth. So it is with the Thomist tradition that Macintyre recommends in these works . And it can show Main publications : itselfrationall y superiorto both the Nietzschean tradition and the tradition of post­ (1896) Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic, Cambridge. Enlightenment ethics that we have inherited ; it (190 I) Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, Cambridge. can solve problems that these traditions (1906) Some Dogmas 0/ Religion, London: Arnold; themselves must recognize to be problems, and second edition , 1930. explain why they themselves cannotdo so. Ifthe (1910) A Commentary on Hegel s Logic, Cambridge. state of modernity is characterized by lack of (1921-7) The Nature ofS xistence, 2 vols, Cambridge: agreement about even the most fundamental Cambridge University Press . questions, what role does this leave for the (1934) Philosophical Studies, ed. S. V. Keeling, university? In 'The idea ofan educated public' London: Arnold (papers of 1893-1923). 120 McTa gg art

Secondary literature: commented unkindl y that if Hegel was the prophet of the absolute and Bradley its Broad, C. D. (1933-8) Examin ation of Mc'Iaggart s chivalrous knight , McTaggart was its 'devoted Philosophy , Cambridge. and extremely astute family solicitor' Geach , P. T. (1979) Truth , Love and Immortality, (Introduction to second edition of Some London: Hutchin son. Dogmas ofReligion, 1906,p.xxviii) .This is less than fair, not only because McTaggart's McTaggart gave short, clear outlines of his meticulous caution is more likely to appeal to thinking in two papers reprinted in modem readers than Bradle y's hapha zard Philosophical Studies (1934) : early, in 'The rhetoric , but because McTaggart's Universe, 'a further determination of the absolute' (1893) , substance which contains all content, and of and late, in 'An ontological idealism ' (1923) . which every other substance is a part' (1921-7, There was little change in his views during his SSI35), is far less metaphysically charged than lifetime, although he did move from a Bradley's Hegelian Absolut e. Although preference for a dialectical, Hegelian method McTaggart rarely acknowledged the direct towards a more directl y deductive exposition. debit,his nearest philosophical ancestor was not His final position is summed up in the two Hegel but Spinoza: both he and Spinoza aimed volumes of The Nature ofExistence (1921-7), a at the same kind ofcomprehensive, deductively detailed and comprehensive treatment of his explained metaphysical view. He felt a idealist metaph ysics, along with its sympath y with the mystical strain in Part V of ramifications for religion and the place of Spinoza 's Ethics (see 1906, SS247) , but he also values . shared the reluctance of Spinoza to appeal McTaggart called himself as 'ontological directly to mystical experience. idealist' (' all reality is spirit') althou gh he did The exact details ofMcTaggart 's system will not regard this position as being open to 'rigid be followed by very few modem readers . There demonstration' (1921-7, SS432) . He was also, are numerous undefined terms. The reasoning, unusuall y, an epistemological realist in that he from a priori premises, is proudl y deductive, said that knowledge was a true belief: 'and I allowing for only two empirical postulates: that should say that a belief was true when, and only something exists and that what is exists is when, it stands in a relation of correspondence to differentiated (1921-7, chapter 3). There is a a fact' (1934 , p. 273). Although he was plurality of (spiritual) substanc es which impressed by Hegel, and has often been classed together make up the Universe, but no God with Bradley as an English neo-Heg elian , his (SS500) . McTaggart considers issues of idiosyncratic form of idealism differed from divisibility, definition and identity to reach a Hegel and Bradle y in crucial ways (see 1921- 7, conclusion that a sui generis relation of SS48, 52, 136).He accepted the real existence of 'determining correspondence' must hold separate individuals. He thought that individual between wholes and parts of substanc es (see truths could be fully true, and believed that truth SS197, 202). Reality as it is has to be very consisted in a relation of correspond ence different from how it seems. Space, time and between a belief and a fact. The starting-point physical objects are all proved to be 'unreal' for his idealism was not the dependence of an (ibid., chapters 33-5). (And it is the ingenious object on a knowing subject but ' the assertion proofofthe unreality oftime which remains the that nothing exists but spirit' (SS52) . He most widely studied part of the system .) differed from Hegel and Bradley, too, in the Individual minds are substances which must be clarity of his exposition and the modesty of its immortal (liable to metemps ychosis) : a point to tone (see, for example, SS912) . Broad which McTaggart attached great personal Malcolm 121 significance. Love was seen as an 'e motional Malcolm, Norman quality' of souls of particular importance: an ' intense and passionate' 'spec ies ofliking' only American. b: 1911, Selden, Kansas. d: 1990, felt by persons for each other (SS459--60). London . Cat: Analytic philosopher. Ints: McTaggart 's moral philosophy was only Philosophy of language; epistemology; scantily developed. His attribution of values to philosophy of mind; philosophy of religion . states of souls and his views on the Educ: Universities of Nebraska, Harvard and indefinability ofgood owe a clear debt to Moore Cambridge. Infls: G. E. Moore and Ludwig (who would hardly have accepted the Wittgenstein. Appts: 1940-2, Instructor, supporting metaphysics, includin g its Princeton University; 1947-50, Assistant uncompromising determinism). The Nature of Professor, 1950-5, Associat e Professor, 1950­ Existence ends with Spinozistic praise of 'a 64, Professor of Philosophy, 1964- 78, Susan timeless and endless state of love-love so Linn Sage Professor; 1979- 90, Visiting direct, so intimate and so powerful that even the Professor,Cornell University; 1990, Fellow, deepest mystic rapture gives us but the smallest King's College, London . foretaste of its perfection ' (SS9l3). McTaggart 's philosoph y is highly individual in combining views that are often held apart: a Main publications: belief in the immortality of the soul along with atheism; ontological idealism along with (1958) Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, with a epistemological realism and pluralism. biographi cal sketch by G. H. von Wright, Oxford: McTaggart is usually seen as a foil in the early Oxford University Press; second edition, with development ofG. E. Moore and Russell, who Wittgenstein's letters to Malcolm , 1984. (1962) Dreaming, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. both came to differ diametricall y from him after (1963) Knowledge and Certainty: Essays and their revolt against idealism in 1898. Later Lectures, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. readers may find that his arguments were less ( 1971) Problems ofMind: Descartes to Wittgenstein, ridiculous that Moore and Russell portrayed New York: Harper & Row. them to be. His argument on the unreality of ( 1977) Memory and Mind, Ithaca: Cornell University time, in particular, continu es to attract some Press. (1977) Thought and Knowledge, Ithaca : Cornell interest. Few today will accept his opinion that University Press. the 'utility of Metaphysic is to be found ... in the (1984) (with D. M.Armstrong) Consciousness and com fort itcan giveus' (1934, p. 184). He had no Causality: A Debate on the Nature ofMind, Oxford: discipl es and no successors, but he has had Basil Blackwell. occasional admirers, sometimes unexpectedly; ( 1986) Nothing is Hidden: Wittgenstein sCriticism of for example: 'I could not ... imagine a much His Early Thought, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (1993) Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View ?, more exciting and rewarding enterprise than the London: Routledge. rational rigourcombined with the satis faction of (1995) Wittgensteinian Themes, Essays 1978-1989, one's deepest cravings that it seemed ed. G. H. von Wright, Ithaca: Cornell University McTaggart offered ' (M. Tanner, 'Metaphysics Press. and music ', in A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), The Impulse to Philosophise, Cambridge, 1992, p. 191). Secondary literature:

Putnam, Hilary, (1962) Dreaming and depth grammar, in R. Butler (ed.) Ana lytical Philosophy, RICHARD MASON First Series, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 122 Mao Zedong

Malcolm's earliest work-andpossibly some of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-Tung) his best-minutely analysed and rejected the argument, commonly propounded by Chinese . b: 1893, Shaoshan, Xiangtang County, epistemologists from Hume onwards , that no Hunan Province , China . d: 1976, Beijing . Cat: empiricaljudgementcan be known for certain to Marxist; political and military leader; poet. be true since future experience may always give Ints: Social and political philosophy. Educ: us reason to think it false. One of the most First Normal School , Changsha, Hunan discussed of Malcolm's works, however, was Province and briefly audited courses at his book Dreaming (1962), in which he argued University of Beijing . Infls: Kang Youwei, that dreams are not mental experiences that take Liang Qichao, Yan Fu and Western liberal place during sleep. The idea that they are such thinkers , Li Dazhao, Chen Duxiu, Marx, Lenin, mental experiences is an incoherent theory Stalin, and Soviet theoreticians,Ai Siqi, and Qin generated by the desire to explain a Shihuang (China's first Emperor). Appts: phenomenon that has no (philosophical) Chairman, Central Executive Committee, explanation, namely that 'sometimes when Chinese Soviet Republic , 1931--4; Chairman, people wake up they relate stories in the past Council of People's Commissars, Chinese tense under the influence ofan impression' (p. Soviet Republic , 1931--4; Chairman, Politburo, 87). (One reason this book was so widely Chinese Communist Party, 1935- ; Chairman, discussed was that it seemed to encapsulate a Standing Committee, Chinese Communist sort ofbehaviourism that was widely thought to Party Politburo, 1956-76; Chairman, be unavoidable given the basically Revolutionary Military Council, 1945-9; Wittgensteinian foundation to which many were Chairman, People's Revolutionary Military attracted.) Council , 1954-9; Commander in Chief, In an influential article, Malcolm argued that People's Liberation Army, 1945-9; Chairman, one version ofthe ontological argument for the National Defence Council, 1954-9; Chairman, existence ofGod is in fact valid-aview almost Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, universally rejected since Kant. His argument 1943-76; Chairman, People's Government rested upon the idea that the reality of God's Council (Head ofState), 1949-58. existence is to be found in the 'language games' of religious believers, and that one of those 'language games' involves the concept ofa God who has 'necessary existence'. Main publications: The influence of0. E. Moore on Malcolm is clear in his constant attempt to recall (n.d.) Dialectical Materialism (Lecture Notes) , philosophers to ordinary language ; and the Dalian: Dazhong Bookshop. influence of Wittgenstein is clear in his (n.d.) Selected Writings by Chairman Mao, n.p. underlying beliefthat our only access to reality, (1960) Comrade Mao Zedong on Marxist Philo sophy whether the reality of God or of mental (Extracts), Urumqi : Xinjiang Qingnian Publishing phenomena such as dreams , is through human House. linguistic practices. The influence of both is (1960) Mao Zedong s Philosophical Thought , clear in his sympathy with the deliverances of extract s compiled by the Department of Philosophy common sense, and it is on these foundations of of Peking University). his philosophical work that most criticism of (1960-5, 1977) Selected Works ofMao Tse-tung; 5 Malcolm has focused . vols, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. Sources: Passmore 1957; personal communication (1966) Quotations From Chairman Mao , Beijing: with Ruth Malcolm. People 's Publishing Company. ANTHONY ELLIS Mao Ze do ng 123

(1967) Selected Readings, Beijing: Foreign movement. Mao 's study of the peasantry Languages Press. convinc ed him that overthrowing the landlord (1968) Selec ted Readings of Mao Zedong s Writings, class was necessary for China to secure a 2 vols, Beijing : People 's Publishing House. prosperous and independent future. He (1988) Mao Zedong s Collected Annotations on recognized the crucial revolutionary potential Philosophy, Beijing : Zhongyang Wenxian Resear ch of China 's peasant population and the Institute . importanc e ofopening the party bureaucracy to the influence of the masses. When first articulated, these views were rejected by the Secondary literature: Party in favour of orthodox concentration on the urban proletariat as the main focus of Boorman , H. (ed.) (1970) Biographical Dictionmy of revolutionary activity. Republican China, New York and London: During the years of Party instability Columbia University Press. following the Guomindang massacre of Briere, O. (1956) Fifty Years of Chinese Philos ophy Communists in 1927, Mao established a base in 1898-1950, London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd. Jiangxi Province . Together with the militar y Complete Chinese Encyclope dia (1987), Philosoph y strategist Zhu De,he developed theories dealing Volumes, Beijing: Chinese Encyclopedia with party organization and leadership and with Publication s. control of population and territory. Their Louie , K. (1986) Inheriting Tradition: Interpretations guerrilla and mobile warfare and popular ofthe Classica l Philosoph ers in Communist China revolutionary mobilization evaded successi ve 1949-1966, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. campaigns organized by Guomindang leader Schram , S. (1966) Mao Tse-tung, Harmondsworth: Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kia-shek) to crush them. In Penguin Books . Jiangxi, Mao also had his first experience -- (1989) The Thought of Mao Tse-tung, directing a major purge of those rebelling Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. against his authority. Mao's successful application ofhis theoretical position increased After early radical activity organizing peasants his political power, culminating in his elevation and students in Hunan Provinc e, Mao turned to to party leadership in 1935 as Chairman ofthe Marxism under the influence ofLi Dazhao and Politburo . Chen Duxiu,China' s first major Marxist By 1934, however, Guomindang figures. He argued from a Marxist perspective encirclement forced Mao and his followers to for the legitimac y of seizing power by force embark upon the Long March which, after against Bertrand Russell's reformist terrible losses, ended at Yanan, Shanaxi gradualism during Russell's visit to Hunan . Province. Mao's lectures in Yanan reflected Mao represented Hunan at the founding meeting years of revolutionary experience and explored of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921 and many matters, including military strategy, entered a busy life of organizational, government, philosophy, literature and art.In all educational and trade union activities. He cases, he argued for the primacy of politics. His became a member of the Communist Party's integrated military and political ideas bore fruit Central Committee and the Director of its in the Anti-Japan ese War and in renewed civil Organization Departm ent in 1923. Under war against Jiang Jieshe and the Guomindang. Comintern policy of cooperating with the Mao's victory led to the establishment of the Nationalists, Mao also held important posts People 's Republic in 1949. with the Guomindang, dealing with party As a ruler Mao veered between the cautious and flexible pragmatism of his principal organization , propaganda and the peasant 124 Mao Zedong

colleagues and his own utopian , voluntarist Shihuang, China's rationalizing and unifying populism displayed in the establishment ofthe first Emperor. In othermore positive ways, Mao communes, the Great Leap Forward and the aimed to sinify Marxism by placing it within the Cultural Revolution. He broke with the Soviet context of Chinese history, thought and Union , which provided a model ofrevolution so literature , although he was hostile to different from his own . The humiliating failure Confucianism as the central ideology ofChina's of the Great Leap Forward threatened his feudal past. position and led to the Cultural Revolution, in Mao's own philosophicalworktook the form which Mao appealed to the populace against the oflectures on dialectical materialism delivered Party apparatus. In the face of the resulting in 1937 in Yanan. For the most part, these anarchy and violence , Mao turned to the army to lectures were unimpressive summaries of restore order; but with a debilitated Party and Soviet texts, but two essays 'On practice' and dogmatic leadership under the Gang of Four, he 'On contradiction' were extracted and printed in spent his last years publicly revered, though in revised form in 1950 and 1952. 'On practice' growing isolation and confusion. discusses Marxist epistemology and the In the treatment of philosophers and other relations between theory and practice. The intellectuals, Mao also responded to conflicting theme ofseeking the truth from the facts derives demands. Because his regime needed the from ancient Chinese sources and was used to cooperation ofsophisticated, Western-educated combat the Moscow-educated dogmatists who figures to articulate and implement new challenged Mao's authority. More original was policies, Mao included all who were not 'On contradiction', an exploration ofdialectics enemies in a broad front programme of New drawn theoretically from ancient yinyang Democracy. His conception of democracy, doctrines as well as from Hegel and Marx and however, was based on the doctrine ofpopular practically from Mao's understanding of dictatorship, in which the party would exercise Chinese society. The claim that contradictions leadership through constant attention to the would continue to arise in society even after the masses . He was contemptuous of the 'flabby establishment of socialism supported Mao's liberalism' of bourgeois democracy. Mao sought to reshape the thinking of intellectuals to doctrine of permanent revolution. His gain loyalty as well as consent on the model of distinction between antagonistic and non­ his party rectification campaign of1942-3. Mao antagonistic contradictions allowed room for provided gestures of conciliation, but also discussion rather than violence as a response to closed the universities to retrain philosophers some controversies. His voluntarism was and others in Marxistthought. He waged intense supported by the claim that at times campaigns against intellectual opponents, superstructure, theory and relations of initially the pragmatist and liberal philosopher production took priority in determining social Hu Shi. The relative latitude of the Hundred developments. 'On practice' and 'On Flowers Campaign gave way to the harsh Anti­ contradiction' became major elements in Mao Rightist Campaign when Mao was angered by Zedong Thought, studied and emulated the depth of residual bitterness and opposition throughout China . Their dogmatic use amongst intellectuals. A modest return to wider undermined the doctrines of voluntarist debate was swept away by the Cultural flexibility, respect for the facts and the concrete Revolution, during which distinguished figures appropriation of China's complex history were humiliated and physically attacked, with within universal Marxist thought. some hounded to death. Intellectuals were sent to the countryside, in some cases with their work ofa lifetime destroyed. Regarding the brutal side ofhis treatment of NICHOLAS BUNNIN intellectuals, Mao compared himself with Qin Marcel 125

Marcel, Gabriel Marcel, including his reply, 'Regard en arriere', trans, in The Philosophy ofEXistence, London: The HarvillPress, 1948). French. b: 1889, Paris . d: 1973, Paris . Cat: Neo­ Hammond, Julien (1992) 'Marcel's philosophy of Socratic and theistic existentialist; playwright humannature', Dialogue 35, I: 1-5. and musician. Ints: The phenomenology ofthe Schilpp, Paul A. (ed.) (1994) The Philosophy of human existence; metaphysical reality; ethics. Gabriel Marcel , LaSalle:OpenCourt. Educ: The Sorbonne, Paris ; 1908, doctoral Troisfontaines, Roger(1953) De I'Existence aI'Etre, thesis on 'The Metaphysical Ideas ofColeridge 2vols, Paris(concordance andbibliography). and their Relationship to the Philosophy of Schelling'. Infls: Karl Jaspers and Roman Marcel's philosophy is discursive and Catholicism. Appts: 1912--40, taught unsystematic: the expression of a reflective intermittently at various secondary schools in exploration rather than a record ofconclusions Verdome, Paris and Sens; worked for the Red reached. His intention is to reveal a Cross in the Second World War; 1929, metaphysical reality and his starting-point is the converted to Roman Catholicism; undertook human situation, the experience ofbeing-in-the­ numerous European lecture tours, including the world . The mainspring of his thought is the Gifford Lectures in 1949-50. claim that the human person is, ali fond, a participant in, rather than a spectator of, reality and the life ofthe world; a being that ultimately Main publications: cannot be encompassed to become an object of thought. (1927) Journal metaphysique (1913-23), Paris: Marcel described himself as Socratic and Gallimard (English translation, Metaphysical questioning rather than as an existentialist. He Journal, trans. Bernard Wall, Chicago: Regnery, 1952). repudiated idealism because of the 'way in (1935) Etre et avoir, Paris: Aubier (English which [it] overrates the part of construction in translation, Being and Having, trans. Katherine sensual perception', and he was repelled by Farrer,New York: Harper& Brothers,1949). philosophies that deployed special (1945) Homo Viator: Prolegomenes a une terminologies or proceeded by assuming that metaphysique de l 'esperan ce, Paris: Aubier (Englishtranslation, Homo Viator: Introdu ction to a reason, properly exerted, could achieve a total Metaphysic of Hope, trans. Emma Crawford, grasp ofreality. 'Reality', he wrote, 'cannot be Chicago: Regnery, 1951; reprinted, New York: summedup .' Immediate, personal experience is Harper& Row, 1962). the touchstone ofall his enquiries, and in this he (1945) La Metaphysique de Royce, Paris:Aubier. (1949-50) Le Myst ere de L 'etre (The Gifford resembles the avowedly existentialist thinkers Lectures)(Englishtranslationin2vols, The Mystery even though he emphasized personal ofBeing: I. Reflection and Mystery (1949); 2. Faith transcendence and human relationships rather and Reality (1950), trans.G.S.FraserandR.Hague, than the existential freedom and autonomy Chicago: Regnery). traditionally associated with existentialism. He (1955) The Declin e of Wisdom, New York: Philosophical Library. developed a phenomenology of his own that (1963) The Existential Background of Human owed nothing to Husserl. Dignity , Cambridge: Mass.: Harvard University Marcel distinguished two kinds of Press. consciousness, ' first reflection' and 'second reflection' . In first reflection a person might mentally stand back from, say, a direct Secondary literature: relationship of friendship, in order to describe and objectify it. This, according to Marcel, is to Gilson,Etienne(ed.)(1947) Existentialism e chretien: separate oneself from the relationship and to Gabriel Marcel, Paris: Pion (essays in honour of treat it as a 'problem' in need ofexplanation. In 126 Marcuse

'second reflection' the immediacy of the Professor of Philosophy, University of relationship is restored, but additionally there is California at Santa Barbara, 1967. an awareness of participation in Being: the recognition that we inhabit a 'mystery'; that it is not our prime task to separate ourselves and Main publications: objectify this condition and that 'Having', that sense of owning one's body, talents , abilities , (1928) 'Beitrage zu einer Phanomcnologie des must be transformed into 'Being'. historischen Materialismus', Philosophische Hefte: On the basis ofthis analysis Marcel conducts 45-68. an investigation into a range of concepts, (1932) Hegels Ontologie und die Grundlegung einer including incarnation, fidelity, hope, faith, love Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit, Frankfurt: V. and disponibilite (availability). In being Klostermann (English translation, Hegel s Ontology disponible a person is receptive to others , is fully and the Theory of Historicity , Seyla Benhabib, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987). present and responsive to them and,through this (1936) (with Erich Fromm and Max Horkheimer) kind of intersubjectivity, affirms a mutual Studien fiber Autoritdt undFamilie, Paris: F. Alcan. participation in Being. (1941) Reason and Revolution. Hegel and the Rise of A summary of Marcel's ideas conveys little Social Theory , New York: Oxford University Press ; of his thought's philosophical penetration, second edition , Boston: Beacon Press, 1960. which is achieved by detailed and vivid (1955) Eros and Civilization:A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud, Boston: Beacon Press. phenomenological enquiry rather than by the (1964) One Dim ensionalMan :Studies in the Ideology orderly presentation of proofs .His dramatic and of Advanced Industrial Society , Boston: Beacon other writings powerfully complement the Press. major themes ofthe philosophy. (1964) Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis, Boston: Sources: PI. Beacon Press; new edition , Harmondsworth: Penguin , 1971. DIANIE COLLINSON (1965) Kultur und Gesells chaft , 2 vols, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. (1965) (with Robert P. Wolff and Barrington Moore Jr) A Critiqu e ofPure Tolerance, Boston: Beacon Press. (1968) Negations: Essays in Critical Theory , Boston: Marcuse, Herbert Beacon Press. (1968) Psychoanalyse und Politik, Frankfurt: Europaische Verlagsanstalt. German. b: 19 July 1898, Berlin. d: 30 July (1968) (with others) Aggression undAnpassungin der 1979, Munich. Cat: Critical theorist. Ints: Industriegesells chaft, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. History of philosophy; social philosophy; (I 969)An Essayon Liberation,Boston :Beacon Press. psychoanalytic theory. Educ: Philosophy at (1969) Ideen zu einer kritischen Theorie der Berlin and Freiburg (doctorate 1923); further Gesells chaft , Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. study in Freiburg, 1929-32, with Husserl and (1970) Five Lectures: Psychoanalysis, Politics and Heidegger; left after his relations with Utopia, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro and Shierry M. Weber, Boston : Beacon Press. Heidegger deteriorated. Infls: Husserl, (1972) Counterrevolution and Revolt, Boston: Heidegger, Adorno, Horkheimer, Hegel, Marx Beacon Press. and Freud . Appts: Member of Institut fur (1973) Studies in Critical Philosophy, Jois de Bres, Sozialforschung, from 1933; exile in Geneva, Boston: Beacon Press. New York and California; Section Head, Office (1975) Zeit-Messungen. Drei Vortrdge und ein of Strategic Services, 1942-50; Professor of Interview, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. (1977) Die Permanenz der Kunst. Wider eine Philosophy, Brandeis University, 1954-67; bestimmte marxistische Asthetik: Ein Essay, Munich: Hanser. Maritain 127

(1978) The Aesthetic Dimension: Towards a Critique and the most concerned with a directl y ofMarxist Aesthetics, Boston: Beaco n Press. philosophical engag ement with classical (1978 -) Schrifte n, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Marxism and with the phenomenology of his (1980) Das Ende der Utopie. Vortrdge und Diskussionen in Berlin 1967, Frankfurt:Verlag Neue teachers Husse rl and Heidegger. Marcus e's Kritik. early work in particular is strongly marked by the attempt to fuse Marxist and phenomenological insights, a central feature of Seconda ry liter ature: later existentialist Marxism in France and of praxis philosophy in Yugoslavia . Along with Marxism and phenomenology, the third Breuer, Stefan (1977) Die Krise der element- already prominent in the 1930s in Revolutionstheorie. Negative Vergesellschaftung und Arbeitsmetaphysik bei Herbert Marcuse, Marcuse 's many essays in the Institute's Frank furt: Syndikat Autoren- und journal, the Zeitschriftfiir Sozialforschung, and Verlagsgesellschaft . in his contribution to its joint project on Brunkhxorst, Hauke and Koch, Gertrud (1987) authority and the family-was Freudian theory. HerbertMarcuse zur Einfiihrung, Hamburg: Juniu s. His post-war work was dominated by a Claussen, Detlev (198 1) Spuren der Befreiung-« Herbert Marcuse. Eine Einfiihrun g in sein reworking of themes in Marx (especially the politis ches Denken, Darmstadt: Luchterhand. analysis ofalienation in the 1844 manuscripts) Haberm as, Jurgen (ed.) (1968) Antworten auf Herbert and Freud, in an ambitious theory of human Marcuse, Frankfurt : Suhrkamp. emancipation. Together, Eros and Civilization -- (1978) Gesprdche mit Herbert Marcuse, (1955) and One Dimensional Man (1964) made Frank furt : Suhrkamp. Jansohn, Heinz (1971) Herbert Marcuse: Marcuse the paradigmatic thinker of the New Philosophische Grundl agen seiner Left across North America and Western Europe Gese llschaftskritik, Bonn : Bouvier. in the late 1960s and into the 1970s-a role Katz, Barry (1982) Herbert Marcuse and the Art of which surprised but did not disturb him. Liberation: An Intellectual Biography , London: Although the empirical analysis in One New Left Books. Kellner, Douglas (1984) Herbert Marcuse and the Dimensional Man can be questioned , and it now Crisis ofMarxism, London: Macmillan. appears in some ways as a left variant of the Macintyre, Alasdair (1970) Marcuse, Glasgow: theories of industrial society prominent in the Fontana. 1950s and 1960s, it remains a brilliant attemptat Matti ck, Paul (1972) Critique of Marcuse: One­ a philosophical diagnosis of the times. Dimensional Man in Class Society,London:Merlin. Roth , Roland , Rebellische Subj ektivitdt. Herbert Marcuse und die neuen Protestbewegun gen, WILLIAM OUTHWAIT E Frank furt and New York: Campus. Stark, Franz (ed.) (1971) Revolution oder Ref orm.Herbert Marcuse und Karl Popper. Eine Konfr ontation, Muni ch: Kosel (Engli sh translation , Reform or Revolution: A Confrontation Between Maritain, Jacques Herbert Marcuse and Karl Popper, trans . Michael Aylway and A. T. Fergu son, Chicago: New University Press, 1976). French . b: 18November 1882, Paris.d: 28 April Wolff, Kurt H. and Moore Jr, Barrington (eds) The 1973, Toulouse . Cat: Thomist.lnts: All areas of Critical Spirit : Essay s in Honor of Herbert Marcuse, philosophy. E duc: University of Sorbonne, Boston: Beacon Press . College de France and University of Heidelberg. Infls: Bergson, Aquinas ,Charles Of the core members of the Frankfurt School , Peguy and Leon Bloy. Appts: 1914-40, Institut Marcuse was both the most actively political Catholique, Paris; 1948--60, Princeton . 128 Maritain

Main publications: Redp ath, Peter A. (ed.) (1992) From Twilight to Dawn: The Cultural Vision of Jacques Mari tain, (1920) Art et scolastique, Paris: Librairie de L'Art Notre Dame, Ind .:University of Notre Dame Press . Catholique; third edition, 1935 (English translation, Rover, Thomas Domini c (196 5) The Poetics of Art and Scholasticism ,London: Sheed & Ward; New Maritain , Washington, DC: The Thomist Press . York:Charles Scribner 's Sons, 1930) . (1932) Distinguer po ur unit, ou les degres du savoir, Jacques Maritain was one ofthe most significant Paris : Desclee de Brouwer ; eighth edition, 1963 and influential Thomistic philosophers of the (English translation, The Degrees of Knowledge, first half ofthe twentieth century. It is possib le London: G. Bles; Ne w York: Charles Scribner's to regard him as a conservative and orthodox Sons, 1959). Thomist, more like Garrigou-Lagrange than (1934) Sept lecons sur l 'etre et les premiers prin cipes like apparently more radical transcendental de la raison spe culative, Paris: Pierre Tequi (English Thomists such as Marechal and Lonergan. translation, APrefa ce to Metaphysics, London and However, his philosophical subtlety and insight New York: Sheed & Ward, 1939). raised him far above his more pedestrian (1942) Les Droits de I 'homme et la loi naturelle , New contemporaries, and his genius was supported, York:Editions de la Maison Francaise; Paris: Paul rather than suppressed or distorte d, by the Hartmann, 1947 (English translation, The Rights of Thomistic framework within which he worked. Man and Natural Law, New York: Charles Maritain's epistemology and his Scribner's Sons, 1943; London: G.Bles, 1944). metaphysics can conveniently be dealt with (1947) Court Traite de l 'existence et de l 'existant , together.The act ofknow ledge,he states,begins Paris: Paul Hartmann (Engli sh translation,Existence in the encounter between an intellect and and the Existent,New York:Pantheon Books, 1948). sensible realities . These realities , however, are (1947) La Personne et Iebien commun, Paris: Desclee envisage d by the intellect in one oftwo ways. In de Brouwer (English translation, The Person and one way, the intellect concentrates upon The Common Good , New York: Charles Scribner's observable and measurable phenomena; and Son s; London: G.Bles, 1948). being as such, though it is the metaphysical (1953) Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry , New foundation ofphenomena, is ignored .This is the York:Pantheon Books;London:Harvill Press, 1954. perspective adopted by the empirical sciences. Inthe otherway, which Maritain calls the way of common sense, sensib le realities are either Secondary literature: apprehended unreflectively or, if reflectively, by a mental process ofprogressive abstraction and classification, culminating in a concept of (1972) The New Scholasticism 46:118-28 being which has a universal extension but little (bibliography, excluding article s up to 1961). orno intension: 'being' then becomes an empty Allard, Jean -Louis (ed.) (198 5) Jacques Maritain, concept. This perspective, if divested of all Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press. connection with reality, is the starting-point of Hudson, Deal W. and Man cini, Matthew 1. (eds) logic and mathematics. (1987) Understanding Maritain, Macon, Ga.: Common-sense know ledge, however, can Mer cer University Press. also generate an intuition of being qua being , Kna sas, John F.X. (ed.) (I 988)Jacques Marita in:The and this intuition is the beginning of Man and his Metaphysics, Notre Dame , Ind.: metaphysics. The object of such an intuition University ofNotre Dame Press. (which he variously called abstractive intuition, Phelan, Gerald B. (193 7) Jacques Maritain, New eidetic intuition and eidetic visualization) is York: Sheed & Ward. being in all its richness and plenitude, the exploration of which is a lifetime's work. The Maritain 129

intuition is intellectual in character, and thus At the heart of his thinking is a distinction unlike Bergsonian intuition. Also, it is not given between the individual and the person . The to everyone to have it. It is, in fact, 'a sublime concept of the individual is opposed to the and exceedingly rare mental endowment', a concept of the universal. An individual is a 'gift bestowed upon the intellect', a kind of instantiation of humanity in a particular living intuition never experienced, for instance , by body. Since all matter has a kind of'avidity' for Kant. being, an individual seeks an egotistical Maritain believed that, by reflecting both absorption of everything into itself. It also is upon being, the object ofthe intuition, and also disposed to change and dissolution.Personality, upon the concept of being which the intuition in contrast, refers to the spiritual identity of brings forth in our minds , the metaphysician can human beings . It has two characteristics: first, progressively clarif'y and formulate various persons have a wholeness and independence, a properties and principles ofbeing. Thus he will possession of their own existence, such that observe the distinctness of essence and their actions aim to perfect and realize existence. Again, he will find that he is able to themselves; and second, the spiritual nature of apprehend being under different aspects . Inone persons disposes them to be open to others and aspect , he sees that being possesses the attribute otherness, to engage in communication, love ofunity. Inanother aspect, being as an object of and friendship . thought, he sees its truth. Being as an object of Both individuality and personality generate love and will possesses goodness . In this way, the urge to live in society, and have an influence the metaphysician comes to formulate the on social organization and social justice. As transcendental attributes of being : its unity, individuals , we look to society for the truth and goodness. satisfaction of our material needs . As persons , Reflection on being, and our intuitive however, we seek out other people in love and concept ofit, also produce the first principles of friendship . It is on the latter level that Maritain reason . Thus, being as something given to the explains his conception of the common good, mind, and being as something affirmed by the which is one ofhis fundamental socio-political mind, come together as subject and predicate of principles and the foundation, in his view, of the judgement 'being is being', the principle of true democracy. The common good is not the identity (whose logical counterpart is the same as a collection ofindividual goods, in the principle of non-contradiction). This principle utilitarian manner. Neither is it the same as the is not a tautology, but an expression of the public good, if by this is meant the good of a energy ofexistence, ofthe affluence and luxury social collective regarded as something distinct ofbeing . The principle of sufficient reason, that from the good of its members . The common 'everything which is, to the extent to which it is, good is, rather, the good of 'a multitude of possesses a sufficient reason for its being', persons', and that is to say, the good of each follows from reflection on the fact that being person individually which is, simultaneously, and intellect are connatural, or made for one the good of the society of persons taken as a another. It also induces reflection on the whole. distinction between dependent existence and The good in question is the good ofpersons , existence a se, and thus leads us to the idea of a and thus pertains to spiritual and cultural Divine Being . development. A necessary precondition for this Maritairi's social and political philosophy is personal freedom, and this implies the was a response to the cataclysmic events ofthe progressive freeing ofhumanity from economic 1930s and 1940s, and was in essence a defence bondage and totalitarian repression. It also ofliberal democracy againstthe two extremes of justifies the traditional values in social and totalitarianism and individualist utilitarianism. 130 Meinong

political theory : progress , human dignity, full Professor, 1889; founded first laboratory for equality, democracy and morality in public life. experimental pyscho logy in Austria at Graz , Maritain's aesthetics, or rather his philo 1894. sophy of art, exploits the notion of 'creative intuition'. This is a type of intuition which originates in the preconscious or unconscious Main publications: mind : not the Freudian unconscious of instinct and repressed desire, but a preconscious which (1877 , 1882) Hum e-studien: I, Zur Geschichte und underlies and provides the energy for Kritik des modernen Nominalismus, II , Zur intellection. In some people, 'privileged or ill­ Relationstheorie, in Sitzungsberichte der fated ', preconscious energies are productive philo sophisch-s-historischen Klass e der and formative , or in short, creative. Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wisenschaften, vols 78, Creative intuition is cognitive, although it is 101, Vienna (see 1966 for translations). (1885) Ober philosophische Wissenschaft und ihre a non-conceptual or preconceptual form of Propddeutik , Vienna : A. Holder. knowledge. What it revea ls is both the (1894) Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur subjectivity ofthe artist and, simultaneously,the Werth-Th eorie, Graz: Leus chner & Luben sky. reality of things with which his subjectivity is (1896) 'O ber die Bede utung des Weberschen connat ural. Realities are grasped in their Gesetzes. Beitrage zur Psychologic des Verglei chens und Messen s' , in Zeitschrift fir singularity rather than their essence, but their Psychologie und Physiologic der Sinnesorgane I I. very singularity is emblematic ofthe universe of (1899) 'O ber Gegenstande hoherer Ordnung und things to which they belong. A work of art is deren Verhaltniss zur inneren Wahrnehrnung' , in therefore a sign both ofthe universe at large and Zeitschrift fir Psychologic und Physiologic der of the subjective universe of the artist. Sinnesorgane, 21. (1902) Ober Annahmen , Leipzig : J. A. Barth (see Maritains works no longer receive the attention 1910). that they attracted during his lifetime, and his (1904) 'O ber Gegenstandstheorie' , in A. Meinong type ofThomism is not at present fashionab le. It (ed.), Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und remains to be seen whether his influence can Psychologic, Leipzig : 1. A. Barth (Engli sh equa l his stature . translation,'The theory ofobjects', trans . I. Levi, R. B. Terrell and R. M. Chisholm , in R. M. Chisho lm (ed.), Realism and the Background of Sources: DFN ; EF; WWW;RPL 71, 1973. Phenomenology , Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960. HUGHBREDIN (1906) 'O ber die Erfahrungsgrundlagen unseres Wissens ', in Abhandlungen zur Didaktik und Philosoph ie der Naturwissenschafte n Sonderabdruck der Zeitschrjit fu r den physikalischen und chem ischen Unterricht I . Meinong, Alexius (von) (1906) 'O ber die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften, in Zeitschrift fur Philosoph ic und philosophischc Kritik 129. Austrian . b: 17 July 1853, Lemberg (now (1910) Ober Annahmen, second edition, considerably revised, Leipzig:J. A. Barth (Eng lish tran slation , On Lvov) . d: 27 November 1920. Cat: Assump tions, trans. J. Heanue, Berkeley, Cal.: Metaphysician . In ts: Philosophy of mind ; University of California Press, 1983; editor's perception. Educ: Studied at University of introduction includes details of how 19 10 differs Vienna, first History with subsidiary from 1902). Philosophy (graduating 1874),then,via the Law (1915) Ober Mogl ichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit, Schoo l, Philosophy. Infls: Hume, Kant, Leipzig: J. A. Barth . (191 7) 'Ober emotionale Prasentation', in Schopenhauer, Brentano, Carl Menger, Russell Sitzungsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften and several ofhis own students . Appts: Taught in Wien, Philosophisch-hi storischen Klasse 183 at Vienna, 1878-82, and then Graz , becoming (English trans lation , On Emotional Presentation , Meinong 131

trans. M.-L. Schubert Kalsi ,Evanston, Ill.: suggestion, on Hume . He soon turned to pure Northwestern University Press, 1972). philosophy, though in his early years combining (1918) 'Zum Erweise des allgemeinen it, as was almost inevitable then, with Kausalgesetzes ', in Sitzungsbericht der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, Philosophich­ psychology, setting up the first Austrian historischen Klasse 189. experimental laboratory in psychology, in Graz, (1920) ' Selbstdarstellung' , in Gesaumtausgabe where he worked from 1882, being almost (1968 -78), vol. 7 (partial English translation, in R. completely blind for his last fifteen years or so. Gros sman, Meinon g, London: Routledge & Kegan His experimental work was on psychology of Paul,1974. (1923) Zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen perception, but he gradually emancipated Werttheorie (in place of second edition of 1894), himself from 'psychologism', the attempt to Graz: Leuschner & Lubensky. solve philosophical problems by irrelevant (1966) K. F. Barber, Meinon g s Hume Studies, empirical or introspective methods . Here as University Microfilms, Michigan: Ann Arbor elsewhere he worked in parallel with Frege and (tran slation with commentary of 1877 and part s of 1882). Husserl, though apparently without any mutual influence. Nevertheless he insisted that Collected editions: psychology must not be abandoned altogether. (1913-14) Gesammelte Abhandlungen, Leipzig: J. A. Like a good phenomenologist he insisted on Barth. 'inner experiences' as a, if not the, subject (1968-78) Alexius Meinong Gesamtausgabe, 8 vols, matter for philosophy (1968-78, vol. 7, p. 11, Graz : Akad . Druck- und Verlagsan stalt (vol. 7 include s full bibliography). written in 1920), and in 1912 wrote an article entitled 'For psychology and against psychologism in general value theory' (Logos III, 1912, reprinted in vol. 3 of Alexius von Secondary literature: Meinong Gesamtausgabe (1968-78). Meinong was unfortunate in living too early Chisholm, R. M. (1982) Brentano and Meinong to be flung out of Austria by Hitler, so that he Studies, Amsterdam: Rodopi . could not join the many German-speaking Findla y, 1. N. (1933) Meinong s Theory ofObjects, Oxford: Clarendon Press; second expanded edition, philosophers in exile who wrote in English. 1963. Apart from a single page in Mind (1879, Grazer Philosophische Studien 25-6 (1985-6) reprinted in 1968-78, vol. 7) he wrote (contains several articles on Meinong). Grossmann , R. (1974) Meinong, London: Routledge exclusively in German, and, despite the better & Kegan Paul. fate ofMach and Frege , that may be partly why Lambert, K. (1983) Meinong and the Principle of he has never achieved the popularity in Independence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Anglophone philosophy ofMoore and Russell, Press . Radakovic, K., Tarouca, S. and Weinhandl, F. (eds) with whom he has considerable philosophical (1952) Meinong-Gedenkschrift, vol. I, Graz: kinship . Only recently, after the pioneering ' Styria' Steirische Verlagsan stalt . efforts ofJ.N. Findlay and R. M. Chisholm and Russell , B. (1904) 'Meinongs theory of complexes and assumptions' , Mind. others, have translations started appearing. Schubert Kalsi , M. L. (1987) Meinong s Theory of The one thing everybody knows about Knowledge , Dordrecht: Nijhoff (includes Meinong is that he had a jungle, providing rich biographical note and discussions of Brentano's nutrient for all manner of strange beasts , from influence on Meinong and Meinong's on Chisholm). the golden mountain to the round square . Recently, however, the lushness of its After his initial study of history Meinong vegetation has come under more sceptical entered philosophy via its own history, working scrutiny (Grossman 1974; N. Griffin in Grazer on his own on Kant for the subsidiary subject in Philosophie Studien, 1985-6). The issue is his first degree, and then, at Brentano's complex. Meinong does talk in ajungly sort of 132 Meinong

way, and apart from being and subsistence we actual' (or real) that he had sought to oppose by are asked to accept, at various times, quasi­ a third alternative to existence and subsistence being, pseudo-existence and 'outside-of-being­ (1910, translation pp. 159,170). But his main ness' (Aussersein, variously translated, but objection was that being of universal often and perhaps best left untranslated). Ifwe application it would have no significance, and are to talk about something, he thinks, there his later solution was ' the Aussersein ofthepure must in some sense be something there to talk object' (1904, translation pp. 83-6). The point, about. But in what sense? Every thought must in effect, is to abandon the need to specify an have an object (Gegenstand) , which Meinong ontological status for the basic objects of then treats as an entity (Grossman (1974) thought. But alas! Aussersein itself ends up as translates Gegenstand as 'entity', but this seems something 'being-like' (seinsartiges) , which question-begging and breaks the link with does not after all apply universally: the round thought) . Some objects are real (wirklich) : square has it only in a qualified way, and things roughly, those that are perceptible and in space even more defective, like the paradoxical and time. These also subsist (bestehen), but Russell class, not at all (1917, chapter 2; cf. some objects merely subsist and are not real, Heanue's introduction to his translationof1910, though they still have being (Sein) ; they are pp. xxx-xxxi; Griffin, in Grazer higher-order objects and presuppose objects of Philosophische Studien 1985-6, draws some the lowest order, which one can say 'witha grain interesting implications regarding modern of salt--cone of Meinongs favourite 'paraconsistent' logic). expressions-they have as parts ; a stock Meinong regards all this as a new example is the difference between red and philosophical subject , the theory of objects, an a green, although the assignment of objects in priori science of objects in general ; so far, he general to the different orders is a complex thinks, mathematics is the only part of this matter. Some objects ,however, neither exist nor theory which has been developed. It goes subsist, such as the golden mountain and the beyond metaphysics, which is, or should be, an existence ofthe golden mountain, although we empirical science studying everything which can think of them and they have properties or can be known empirically (1904, translation pp . 'being so' (Sosein) : the golden mountain is 109-10 especially). Facts about what exists can golden . only be known empirically, whereas all other Meinong now faces a problem becauseofthe facts are knowable only a priori (1910, principle that higher-order objects presuppose translation p. 61). This claim, however, to see a lower-order ones. But how can the perfectly new rival to metaphysics has not been generally good higher-order object, the non-existence of accepted. the golden mountain, subsist ifits presupposed In escaping from psychologism Meinong lower-order object, the golden mountain, does went beyond Brentano by distinguishing (along not? At first he toyed with a shadowy third kind with Twardowski and Husserl but with greater ofbeing, or 'quasi-being', which would belong insistence) the object and the content of a to every object, i.e. anything at all, however thought or experience (e.g. 1917, chapter 7),and absurd or contradictory. 'There are objects of also by distinguishing 'assumptions' or which it is true that there are no such objects', as 'supposals' (Annahmen) as intermediate he puts it with conscious paradox (1904, between judgements and ideas or translation p. 83), thereby raising questions representations (Vorstellungen)-a topic to about quantification that have similarly which he devoted a whole book, although he has engaged Frege, Russell and Quine . This does been accused (by C.D.Broad reviewing 1910 in indeed suggest the jungle, and he later said that Mind, 1913) of conflating assuming (or just it betrayed the same 'prejudice in favour ofthe pretending) a proposition is true with merely Merleau -P onty 133 entertaining it (does 191O-translationp.254­ Main publications: counter this?). But jud gements etc. are not the propositions or states of affairs they are of. ( 1942) La Structure du comportement, Paris: PUF. Meinon g calls these 'obj ectives' (Objektive), a (1945) Phenomenologie de la perception, Paris: NRF rather wider term (1910 , translati on pp. 75- 6). Gallimard. Objectives form a special class of objects, ( 1947) Humanisme et terreur, Paris: Gallimard. distinguished as essentially being positive or (1948) Sens et non-sens, Paris: Nagel. negative, the (in German) rather harsh term (1953) Eloge de la philosop hie, Paris: NRF Objekt then being introduc ed for other objects. Gallimard. Finally he applies these various notions , or (1955) Les Aventures de la dialectique, Paris: Gallimard. analogues of them, to develop theories of (1960) Signes, Paris: NRF Gallimard. emotional and conativ e, as well as cognitiv e, mental processes and their objects, and develops an objectivist theory of values. Apart from his widespread role as an Aunt Sally of Secondary literature: ontolo gical profligacy, Meinong influenced the 'critical realism ' of Dawes Hicks and others, Dillon, M. C. (1988) Mer leau-Ponty s Ontology , and philosophers currently better known such as Bloomin gton: Indiana University Press. Ryle and Chisholm. Some ofthe ideas touched Edie, J. M. (1987) Merleau-Ponty s Philosophy of on in the last paragraph show a considerable Language, Lanham: University Press of America. kinship with, if less direct and overt influence Madison, G. B. (1973) La Phenomenologie de on, the later theories of speech acts and the Merleau-Ponty, Paris: Klincksieck. currently popular investigations into content. Robinet, A. (1970) Merleau-Ponty , Paris: PUF. Spiegelberg, H. (1969) The Phenomenologi cal (See also Findlay, in Radakovic et at. (eds) Movement, vol. II , second edition, The Hague: 1952.) Martinu s Nijhoff. Sources: PI; Passmore 1957; Edwa rds; personal Tilliette, X. (1970) Merleau-Ponty, Paris: Seghers. communication with Prof. P.Simons.

A. R. LACEY Merleau-Pon ty has been presented both as a phenomenologist and as an existentialist, but a study of his thought reveals the limited utility of general labels of this kind. Whilst he was the first French thinker to use the term Merleau-Ponty, Maurice 'phenomenology' in the title of a major work and to identify philosophy with French . b: 1908, Rochefort-sur-mer, France. d: phenomenology, he does not rely greatly on the 1961. Cat: Phenomenologist. Ints: methods of Husserl; and equally, although he Epistemology; philosophy of language; shares many of the concerns of his friend aesthetics.Educ: After a brilliant student career Sartre, Merleau-Ponty disagrees with the latter at various lycees and the Ecole Normal e on such fundamental issues as the extent of Superieur (1926-30),Merleau-Ponty gained his human freedom. He argues that experience is agregation in 1931. Infls: Descart es, Husserl, shot through with pre-existent meanings, Sartre and empiricalpsycholo gy.Appts: Taught largely derived from language and experienced in a number oflycees before the Second World in perception. War; served in the French army during the war; Merleau-Ponty arrived at these views professorships at Lyon, the Sorbonne and gradually, beginning from a prolong ed and finally the College de France; Coeditor, with extensive study of the psycholo gy of Sartre and de Beauvoir,ofL es Temps Modernes. perception . His first significant work , La 134 Merleau-Ponty

Structure du comportement (1942) is essentially without complete logical justification, to a critique ofthe major psychological theories of believing in its future. perception of the time, notably behaviourism The concluding section of the work draws and Gestalt theory (as put forward by Kohler) . out some important consequences of these Merleau-Ponty denied that there is a causal views, firstly concerning Cartesianism. As with relationship between the physical and the Husserl, Merleau-Ponty's thought to some mental , and he therefore finds the behaviourist extent defines itself by reference to that of account of perception, entirely in terms of Descartes . Merleau-Ponty is logically bound to causation, unacceptable.Gestalt theory he finds deny that Cartesianism is acceptable, and this he not false but not developed sufficiently to do does. The Cartesian presupposition of a justice to the facts of perception. His general distinction between meditating ego and conclusion is that a new approach is needed if transcendent cogitata is incompatible with the perception is to be properly understood. thesis of the primacy of perception, and thus This new approach is his version of Merleau-Ponty classifies the cogito of the phenomenology, and its application to second Meditation as a merely 'verbal cogito' . perception is the subject ofhis second and most He replaces it with a 'true cogito ' of the form important work, Phenomenologie de la 'there is a phenomenon; something shows itself perception (1945). The fundamental premise of '. Put in metaphysical terms, the fundamental this work is that of the primacy ofperception: category revealed by Merleau-Ponty's our perceptual relation to the world is sui philosophy is what he terms 'being-in-the­ generis, and logically prior to the subject-object world' (etre-au-monde). The subjective and the distinction. Theories of perception which deny objective are facets of this prior, embracing this are rejected in the opening chapters of the structure . work: for example, all sense-data theories are This thesis conditions his analysis of time, in dismissed, since they attempt to reconstruct which he argues that the notions of time and experience by using artificial abstractions subjectivity are mutually constitutive. Time is which presuppose the subject-object not a feature of the objective world, but is a dichotomy. By contrast Merleau-Ponty goes on dimension of subjectivity: past and future to explore the phenomenal field by using a much appear in our present and can only occur in a expanded notion of Gestalt. It is argued that the temporal being . Time is more than the form of elements of Gestalts are both inherently the inner life, and more intimately related to meaningful and open or indeterminate. subjectivity than is suggested by regarding it as One of the most original features of this an attribute or property of the self. To analyse phenomenology is his theory ofthe role of the time, Merleau-Ponty contends, is to gain access body in the world as perceived (Iemonde percus, to the complete structure ofsubjectivity. an area ofthought he develops at much greater In the final pages of the Phenomenology of length than does Sartre . Merleau-Ponty Perception Merleau-Ponty discusses the nature contends that a numberofthe most fundamental and limits of human freedom, a theme features ofperception are a result ofour physical developed further in the political works , incarnation: our perception of space is Humanisme et terreur (1947) and Les Aventures conditioned by our bodily mode ofexistence;or de la dialectique (1955). He rejects the Sartrean again, we regard perceived things as constant doctrine that we are condemned to be because our body remains constant. Further, (absolutely) free, replacing it with his own view Merleau-Ponty contends that perception is a that we are condenmed to meaning . Experience committed (engage) or existential act, not one in comes ready furnished with meanings, and so which we are merely passive. We discover although we are free to make choices the field of meanings in the world , and commit ourselves, freedom is accordingly circumscribed. These meanings are conveyed by a number of social Moore 135

institutions, but above all by language . As he (1959) Philosophical Papers, London: George Allen puts it inhis discussion ofthecogito : 'Descartes, & Unwin. and a fortiori his reader, begin their meditation (1962) Commonplace Book, 1919-1953, London: in what is already a universe of discourse' George Allen & Unwin. (Phenomenology of Perception, p. 401) . (1986) G E. Moore: The Early Essays, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Unsurprisingly, it was to a consideration ofthe (1991) The Elements ofEthics, Philadelphia: Temple role of language as a vehicle for University Press. intersubjectivity that Merleau-Ponty turned in his final years, but he did not live to work out a complete theory. Merleau-Ponty also developed an interest in Secondary literature: aesthetics, especially of the visual arts. This follows from his theory of the primacy of Ambrose, Alice and Lazerowitz, Morris (eds) (1970) perception: he found in painting a fuller G E. Moore: Essays in Retrospect, London: George appreciation of our special perceptual relation Allen & Unwin. with the world than in science or in philosophies Klemke, E. D. (ed .) (1969) Studies in the Philo sophy which analyse perception in terms of the ofG E. Moore, Chicago: Quadrangle Book s. primacy ofthe subject-object distinction. Schilpp , P. A. (ed .) (1968) The Philosophy ofG E. Moore , third edition, Open Court: La Salle. ROBERT WILKINSON

When Moore was a student the idealism of such philosophers as Bradley and Bosanquet was dominant in British philosophy.Itis no surprise , Moore, G(eorge) E(dward) then, that Moore's earliest published work shows considerable sympathy with this British . b: 1873, London . d: 1958, Cambridge, movement. However, his famous 1903 paper England . Cat: Analytic philosopher. Ints: 'The refutation of idealism' (Mind 12, 1903) Epistemology; moral philosophy. University of marked a break with it, and his work over the Cambridge University, 1892-6. Infls: J. M. E. next few years, along with that of Bertrand McTaggart and Bertrand Russell. Appts: Russell, was a sustained criticism ofthe idealist movement. This work is often thought to put Lecturer in Philosophy at University of Moore squarely in the empiricist camp, and Cambridge, 1911-25, Professor of Mental much of it is certainly an attempt to clarify an Philosophy and Logic, 1925-39, University of empiricist epistemology. However, the limits of Cambridge;Editor ofMind , 1921--47; Fellow of this empiricism are clearly visible in his ethical the British Academy, 1918; Order of Merit, work, where he held that goodness was a non­ 1951. natural , irreducible property, the object of direct, non-sensory knowledge. Much ofMoore's later work was concerned Main publications: with the scepticism that characterized the empiricist movement from Hume to Russell. In (1903) Principia Ethica , Cambridge: Cambridge opposition to this, he defended the view that University Press. most of the things that we think we know we (1912) Ethics, London: Williams & Norgate. really do know. This gave rise to the popular (1922) Philosophical Studies, London: Routledge & image of Moore as the philosopher of plain KeganPaul. common sense. (1953) Some Main Problems ofPhilosophy , London: There is, however, little to sustain that image George Allen & Unwin. in Moore's first published book, Principia 136 Moore

Ethica (1903). It defended a consequentialist more than half a century following the theory of ethics, holding that the fundamental publication of Moore 's book. Many thought that concept of ethics is the good, and that right Moore's argument had captured the essential actions are those which maximize the good . A autonomy of ethics . Others, however, thought popular version of such a theory is the that it rendered ethics a suspect endeavour, since utilitarianism ofMill and Bentham, the doctrine it seemed to put it largely beyond the pale of that marries consequentialism with hedonism, rational argument. and holds that the right action is always that Moore's subsequent writing on ethics had which maximizes happiness. Moore , however, nothing like the influence of Principia Ethica . ferociously rejected the hedonism that he found His Ethics (1912) was a minute statement of in utilitarianism and held instead that goodness utilitarianism, and an equally minute is to be found in a numberofdifferent things , but examination ofsome objections to it. It defends preeminently in the experience of personal a consequentialist position, though mainly by affection and the contemplation ofbeauty. (This asserting that it is self-evidently correct , a type aspect ofhis philosophy strongly influenced the of argument that has had little force against BloomsburyGroup ,of which he was a member.) generations ofphilosophers who thought that it He held that it is impossible to give any is self-evidently incorrect. argument as to what are the ultimate goods ; it is Once he had broken with the idealist self-evident, and we know directly, without tradition, Moore's dominating concern was to argument, what they are. What actions will understand the nature of sense data and their maximize the good could not be directly known, relation to the material world. Outside ofethics, however; this is a matter ofcalculation, and so it is his work in this general area that was most Moore rejected the type of intuitionism which influential. He began this in a series oflectures held that we could directly know, without given in 1910-11 (Some Main Problems of argument or calculation, what are the right acts Philosophy, 1953), and his very last works still or the correct moral rules. show a concern with the problem. Roughly That ' the fundamental principles of Ethics speaking, sense data might be thought to be must be self-evident' (1903, p. 143) Moore identical with material objects, which would thought followed from a more basic claim : the yield a theory of perception often known as fundamental principles of ethics cannot be direct realism ; or they might be thought to be inferred from any further principles; they are separate , mental entities which represented true, but there is no reason why they are true. material objects (the representative theory of This view was part of what was to become the perception); or it might be that there are no most influential aspect of Principia Ethica : its material objects independent ofour sense data, attack on naturalism in ethics . Moore was never and that to know a proposition about a material completely clear just what he had in mind by object is merely to know that if certain talking ofnaturalism, and he gave a number of conditions were satisfied then certain sense data different explanations. But we may say that it would be experienced (phenomenalism). was, in a general way, any attempt to reduce Moore analysed these types oftheory, over and evaluative notions to non-evaluative ones. The over again, in enormous detail in such articles as attempt to do so Moore baptized ' the 'A defence of common sense' (1925; reprinted Naturalistic Fallacy', and it seemed to Moore, in Philosophical Papers, 1959) and 'Proof of an and to many others, that it followed from his external world' (1939; reprinted in diagnosis that ethical propositions could not be Philosophical Papers) . inferred in any way from non-ethical ones . A These papers, like nearly all of Moore's concern with this issue dominated moral work,are characterized by an obsessive concern philosophy in the English-speaking world for simply to be clear about just what philosophers Murdoch 137

have meant when they have made such typically himself was never clear in his own mind just philosophical claims as that we can never really what was the force ofhis arguments. Whatever know anything about the external world, or that their precise force, however, they had enormous time or space is unreal. The painstaking analysis influence, transforming the face of in such papers gave rise to the popular view that epistemology. analysis was an end in itselffor Moore, but this Moore was not a great prose stylist, once was not so. He saw it merely as the necessary guilelessly writing an 82-word sentence in groundwork for arriving at the truth . which 46 of the words are ' so' or 'and'. His Moore did not arrive speedily at many writing , however, always aspired to, and usually philosophical truths : about the relation of sense achieved, a remarkable simplicity and clarity. data to external objects , for instance, he did not Sources: Passmore 1957; Flew; The Times, 25 Oct 1958, p. 10. form a view until 1953 and even then he did no more than reject direct realism . On the question ANTHONY ELLIS of whether we could have knowledge of the external world, however, Moore formed an opinion very early. In his 1905-6 lecture 'The nature and reality of objects of perception' Murdoch, (Jean) Iris (Philosophical Studies, 1922), Moore submitted to inordinately detailed examination Irish. b: 15 July 1919, Dublin . Cat: 'I might the meaning of the question whether we can describe myself as a Wittgensteinian neo­ have any knowledge of the external world . In Platonist!' . Ints: Moral philosophy; Plato; Some Main Problems ofPhilosophy (1953) he religion ; metaphysics. Educ: MA, Somerville began to work towards an answer, one which, in College , Oxford ; Newnham College , one way or another, he held to for the rest ofhis Cambridge, Injls: Plato, Wittgenstein, Sartre life: surely, the claim that I know some things and Weil. Appts: Fellow of St Anne's College, about the external world ismore certain than any Oxford , from 1948. argument that might be given to show it wrong . His position found its most famous exposition on the occasion when, in a British Academy Main publications: lecture ('Proofof an external world', published in Proceedings ofthe British Academy 25), he (1953) Sartre , Romantic Rationalist, Cambridge: claimed to disprove the proposition that we Bowes & Bowes; second edition, Sartre, Romantic cannot know the existence ofexternal objects by Realist, 1980. pointing out to the audience his two hands . This (1970) The Sovereignty ofGood, London: Routledge typified what came to be thought of as the & Kegan Paul. characteristic Moorean 'appeal to common (1977) The Fire and the Sun, Oxford. sense' . (1986)Acastos, London: Chatto & Windus. (1992) Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, London: There has been much debate as to what Chatto & Windus. force-ifany-thisargumentative strategy had. To some, it has seemed that Moore was doing no more than merely denying what philosophers have given arguments for. Others have thought Secondary literature: that he was trying to show that such philosophical claims violated the rules of Begnal , K. (1987) Iris Murdo ch AReference Guide, Boston : G.K. Hall. ordinary language . It is fair to say that Moore 138 Murdoch

Iris Murdoch's philosophical works have been inwardness and public conduct is morality' few in comparison with her many novels , (' Art and Eros : a dialogue about art', inAcastos, although she herself might see little distinction 1986,p. 31).She writes of'ourconfidencein our between the genres : 'It may be that the best own inner life of thought and judgment and in model for all thought is the creative our real existence as individual persons capable imagination' (1992 , p. 169). The views in oftruth' (1992 , p. 221) : 'no theory can remove almost all her philosophical writings are or explain away our moral and rational mastery recapitulated and elaborated in Metaphysics as of our individual being' (p. 213). This anti­ a Guide to Morals (1992) . Ruminative in pace , existentialist confidence is realized discursive in style and intuitive in the flow of its interestingly in her fiction .One of her characters arguments, this wide-ranging treatise is at the says: 'one is responsible for one's actions, and farthest point from conventional academic one's past does belong to one . You can't blot it exposition. It must be ironic that a work written out by entering a dream world and decreeing in this way might well turn out to be seen as one that life began yesterday. You can't make of the finest and most original examples of yourself into a new person ovemight' (The philosophy produced in twentieth-century Black Prince, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975, Britain . p.359). Murdoch has always stood apart from Against Derrida (whom she classes as a analytical orthodoxy. Plato has been her model 'structuralist') she argues for a clear, strong and prime inspiration. Metaphysics as a Guide view of truth : 'the truth , terrible, delightful, to Morals makes no effort to argue basic funny, whose strong lively presence we Platonic premises which a more cautious author recognise in great writers' (1992, p. 215) . Her would have felt some need to defend. (' A work argument is a transcendental one: 'We must ofart is ofcourse not a material object, though check philosophical theories against what we some works ofart are bodied forth by material know of human nature (and hold on to that objects so as to seem to inhere in them' is phrase too) ... Language is meaningful, ergo asserted without argument on p.2.)The Platonic useful, it performs its essential task, through its themes she has pursued have been largely those ability to be truthful' (p. 216) . of the Phaedrus and of the Republic: the soul; Truth, reality and the good are linked in her the indispensability ofmetaphor; the motivation work as they are in the Republic, except that, for for the search for truth (Eros, to her and Plato) ; her, a vision ofthe real is not the preserve ofthe the reality ofthe good ; the relations between art, mathematically educated elite, as it was Plato : truth, the good and God. 'We find out in the most minute details of our One of her starting-points has been lives thatthe good is the real. Philosophytoo can opposition to a view of the self which she attend to such details' (p. 430) . As with Plato, identifies in both Sartre and Wittgenstein: a visual imagery is central (and also the imagery view that left morality to be located only in the ofattention, from Simone Weil) : 'Looking can rightness of discrete choices, displacing be a kind of intelligent reverence. Moral goodness, character and virtue-'The agent, thinking, serious thinking, is clarification thin as a needle , appears in the quick flash ofthe (visual image) . The good,just, man is lucid' (p. choosing will' ('On "God" and "Good''', in The 463). We see reality ; a truthful view ofit shows Sovereignty of Good, 1970, p. 53). She has us the good, and 'The sovereign Good is ... maintained a confidence in the solidity and something which we all experience as a creative continuity ofthe self(or the soul as she prefers force' (p. 507). it): 'What goes on inwardly in the soul is the Much ofher thinking has been devoted to the essence of each man, it's what makes us value and danger ofart. (Her interpretations of individual people. The relation between that Plato on these themes are in The Fire and the Ni etzsche 139

Sun and in 'Artand Eros', inAcastos.) Good art, our new disturbed understanding of religious she believes, 'shows us how difficult it is to be truth' (p. 511). Her thought must be unique as a objective by showing us how differently the creative reimagining of Plato in the late world looks to an objectivevision' (l970,p.86). twentieth century. Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals includes RICHARD MASON extended reflections on the value in ontological arguments. Murdoch wrote earlier that 'God was (or is) a single perfect transcendent non­ representable and necessarily real object of attention ; and ... moral philosophy should Nietzsche, Friedrich attempt to retain a central concept which has all these characteristics' ('On "God" and "Good''', German. b: 15 October 1844, Rocken . d: 25 in 1970, p. 55). Yet 'to speak of "religious August 1900, Weimar, Germany. Cat: Post­ language" as something specialised, supposed Kantian philosopher. Ints: Ontology: to be expressive rather than referential, is to epistemology; Greek and Christian thought; separate religion from the truth-seeking theory of values; nihilism; aesthetics; cultural struggle of the whole oflife' (1992, p. 418) . theory. Educ: 1858-64, received a primarily Clarity ofvision must be matched by clarity classical education at the renowned Pforta oflanguage. To achieve this remains one ofthe school ; after a brief spell at the University of roles ofphilosophy: Bonn, where he intended to study Philology and Theology, went to the University of Leipzig to We must ... preserve and cherish a strong study Philology under Ritschl. Infls: Ancient truth-bearing everyday language, not marred Greek thought, particularly Heraclitus, Plato or corrupted by technical discourse or and Socrates; Montaigne, Spinoza, scientific codes ; and thereby promote the Lichtenberg, Rochefoucauld, clarified objective knowledge of man and La society ofwhich we are in need as citizens, Schopenhauer, Wagner, F. Lange , Kuno Fischer and as moral agents and Emerson. Appts: 1869-79, taught philosophy, University of Basel (increasing ill­ (p.I64). health and disillusion with academic life prompted his resignation); 1879-, survived on a And : sparse pension, living ascetically and wandering restlessly, mainly between Sils The task of philosophy is not less but more Maria in the Ober-Engadine, Nice and Turin; essential now, in helping to preserve and 1889, collapsed, was taken back to Germany refresh a stream of meticulous, subtle, and died soon after. eloquentordinary language, free fromjargon and able to deal clearly and in detail with matters ofa certain degree of generality and Main publications: abstraction. We cannot see the future, but must fear it intelligently The now authoratative edition ofNietzche's collected (p.211). works is the Nietzsche Werke: Kritische Gesamtansgabe (KGW), 30 vols, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967­ She writes that she has been wanting to put the 78. argument of Plato ' into a modem context as (1872) Die Gebiirt der Tragodie (English translation, background to moral philosophy, as a bridge The Birth of Tragedy, trans. W. Kaufmann, New between morals and religion, and as relevant to York: Viking Press , 1954). 140 Nietzsche

(1873-6) Unzeitgemdsse Betrachtungen; Bd I, David 5) and 'Truth and lies in a nonmoral sense ' (1873) Strauss , der Bekenner und Schriflsteller,1873; Bd 2, appear in trans lation by D. Brezeale in Philosophy VomNutzen und Nacht eil der Historiefur das Leben , and Truth: Selectionsfrom Nietzs che's Notebooks of 1874; Bd 3, Schopenhau er als Erzieher, 1874; Bd4, the Early I870s, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Richard Wagner in Bayreuth, 1876 (Engli sh Humani ties Press, 1979. A subs tantial quantity of trans lations , Untimely Meditations: no. I , David Nietzsche's later, most philosophically provocative Strauss ,the Confessor and Writer; no. 2,On the Uses unpublished notes appear in the post-humous and ill­ and Disadvantages of History for Life; no. 3, named collection Der Wille zur Macht (Samtli che Schopenhauer us Educator; no. 4, Richard Wagner Werke, Bd IX), edited by Baeumler, Stuttgart: in Bayreuth, trans. R. 1. Hollingdale, Cambridge: Kroner, 1965 (English translation, The Will to Cambridge University Press, 1983). Power, trans. W. Kaufmann and R. 1. Holli ngdale, (1878-80) Mens chliches, Allzumenschliches, Bd I, Londo n: Weidenfe ld & Nicolson, 1969). 1878, Bd 2, Vermischte Meinungen und Spriiche, 1879, Der Wanderer and sein Schatten, 1880 (Eng lish translation, Human All Too Human, including 'Assorted maxims and opinions' and 'The Secondary literature: wanderer and his shadow', trans . R. J. Hollingdale, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). Allison, D. (ed .) (1977) The New Nietzsche, (1881) Die Morgenriithe (English translation, Contemporary Styles ofInterpretation , New York: Daybreak, trans . R. 1. Hollingdale, Cambridge: Dell Publishing Co. Cambridge University Press, 1982). Anse ll Pearson, K. (1991) Nietzs che and Modern (1882) Die frohliche Wissenschaft, Abt. V 343-83, German Philosophy, London: Routledge. 1887 (Eng lish translation, The Gay Science, trans . Deleuze, G. ( 1983) Nietzsche and Philosophy, W. Kaufmann, New York: Vintage Press , 1974) . Londo n: Althone Press. (1883-5) Also sprach Zarathustra, Abt. I & 2, 1883, Heidegger, M. ( 1979-82) Nietzs che, ed. and trans . D. Abt. 3, 1884, Abt. 4, 1885 (English trans lation, Thus Krell, 4 vols, New York: Harper Row. Spok e Zarathustra, trans. R. 1. Hollingdale, Janz, Otto (1978) Friederich Nietzsche, 3 vo ls, Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 1969). Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag (probab ly the most (1886)Jenseits von Gut und Bose (English translation, reliab le and scho larly biogra phy). Beyond Good and Evil , trans. W. Kaufmann, New Nehemas, A. (1985) Nietzsche : Life as Literature, York: Vintage Press, 1966). Cambridge, Mass .: Harvard University Press. (1887) Zur Genealogie der Moral (Engli sh Schacht, R. (1983) Nietzsche, London: Routledge. trans lation, On the Genealogy ofMorals , trans. W. Schrift, A. (1990) Nietzsche and the Question of Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale, New York: Vintage Interpretation, London: Routledge. Press , 1968). (1888) Der Fall Wagner (English translation, 'The case of Wagner', trans. W. Kaufmann, in The The enigma of Friedrich Nietzsche, one of Portable Nietzs che, ed. W. Kaufmann, New York: twentieth -century Europe's most influential Viking Press , 1954). philosophers, does not lie in the now well­ (1889) Die Gotzen-Ddmmerung (Engl ish translation , documented politically motivated abuse of his The Twilight ofthe Idols, trans . R. J. Hollingdale, Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 1968). writings by his sister Elizabeth Forster­ (1895) Der Antichrist (English translation, The Anti­ Nietzsche but in the fact that his philosophy is Christ, trans. R. 1. Hollingdale, Harmondsworth: simultaneous ly familiar and remote . The post­ Penguin Classics, 1968). structuralist genealogical stratage ms ofMiche l (1895) Nietzsche contra Wagner (Engli sh translation, Foucault and Derrida 's dissolution of fixed 'Nietzsche against Wagner ', trans . W. Kaufmann, in meaning make Nietzsc he's nihilism and The Portable Nietzsche, ed. W. Kaufmann, New York: Viking Press, 1954). perspectivism strange ly familiar. Yet that (1908) Ecce Homo (English translation, Ecce Homo, familiarity is discon certing, for Nietzsc he's trans, W. Kaufmann, New York: Vintage Press , voice also speaks in the now unfa miliar 1968). philosop hical languages of Schopenhauer, Two of Nietzsche's important early essays, Lange, Spir and Teichmuller. 'Philosophy in the tragic age of the Greeks' (1872- Ni etzsche 141

Nietzsche's notoriety rests upon such alleged inconsistencies ofNietzsche's thinking singular doctrines as the will to power, the virtually vanish . eternal recurrence, nihilism and the Artistenmetaphysik is the name Nietzsche announcement of God's death, iconoclastic gives to his first response to these Leitmotifen as expression, mastery of aphoristic form, and a expressed within The Birth ofTragedy (1872) deployment of contradiction and inconsistency and the Untimely Meditations (1873- 6). which for many compromised his philosophical Combining an assumed universal existential status. Nietzsche's reception is now an predicament with the hermeneutical axiom of autonomous field of study and recent looking at one's own through the eyes of the scholarship has come to question the 'received' foreign, he contends that the relevance ofGreek view of him as an unorganized thinker, aesthetic practice lies in its transformation ofthe suggesting that his written corpus gains its existential predicament without recourse to coherence in its very plurality. His responses to otherworldly metaphysics. The Dionysian arts nihilism and to art's relation to existence clearly of music and drama do so by ecstatically vary but the questions to which his different succumbing to flux, the Apollonian plastic arts responses are an answerare invariably the same. by deliberately denying the actuality of Nietzsche's early university experiences set becoming with the illusion of timeless beauty, his lifelong philosophical preoccupations: first, and tragic drama by reconciling its audience to interpreting AncientGreekculture as a response the horror ofevery open finitude with a closed to the existential problematic of finitude ; and graspable image ofit. second , pursuing the philosophical and cultural The Artistenmetaphysik is an inverted consequences of post-Kantian metaphysical Platonism: metaphysical truth is vacuous whilst scepticism; and third, maintaining intellectual art as living within appearance is understood as integrity whatever the cost. His thought is an the means of suppressing awareness of the instance of a Lebensphilosophie: philosophy futility of existence. Socratic reasoning is without experience is empty and experience attacked for atrophying the aesthetic impulse . without philosophy is blind . A combination of By positing the illusion ofan intelligible world his knowledge ofGreek thought, his discovery ofBeing, the desire to create a reality according ofSchopenhauer and a reading ofthe history of to our needs is negated . Nietzsche was haunted philosophy by Kuno Fischer established his by the question: what creative resources will primary philosophical Leitmotifen. First, reality European thought retain if the Socratic faith is is an endless Becoming (Werden) . Second, as rendered empty and nihilism looms? instrumentalist devices language and reason The 'experimentalist' phase of Nietzsche's reflect the world not as it is but how our needs thinking-Human All Too Human (1878-80), require us to perceive it. Third, within religion, Daybreak (1881) and The Gay Science ethical codes and scientific practice humanity (1882)---exposes the shortcomings of this has institutionalized its values, projected and aesthetic . As all illusions are temporary, mistaken them as aspects of being-in-itself. Apollonian aesthetics can only exacerbate the Fourth, the existential predicament is graspedas existentialist predicament. The loss of its spell the imminent risk of having one's belief in will make the return to Dionysian actuality even reason as a criterion of truth and reality more painful. The Artistenmetaphysik entails a exploded by the unintelligibility of flux and of needlessly pessimistic view of becoming. having, as a consequence, to stare into the Finitude per se is not the problem, but our presence of nihilism . And, fifth, there is the evaluation of it. Accordingly, Nietzsche's question ofhow one can live with a knowledge experimentalische Denken criticizes religious of the latter abyss. When read as a continuous and moral systems which alienate individuals response and reappraisal ofthseLeitmotifen, the from actuality by perpetrating the illusion of 142 Nietzsche

fixed truths . Art is condemned for beautifying critical hermeneutic and as an aesthetic such truths and extending their influence prescription for the new Weltanschauung. If subsequent to the collapse of their supporting there is no absolute truth or ground , the question beliefs . Experimentalism quests for both arises as to what values prompt a belief in their historical and non-European exemplars of'this­ existence. The absence of meaning-in-itself is worldly' lifestyles which promote values no cause for pessimism since it liberates us from affirming rather than denying the existential the canons ofculturally transmitted meaning to predicament. Yet this experimentalism requires the end of creating our own purposes and values . what it criticizes, namely, the imaginative The dynamic is that ofhaving to overcome the capacity to speculate about what is not seen but need for received meaning (Nietzsche's might be the case, an imaginative capacity definition of weakness) in order to take which is condemned in art as capable of responsibility for legislating one's own (his estranging one from actuality. In addressing this definition of strength). The eternal recurrence problem, Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883-5) gains its ethical force in this context for, as well announces Nietzsche's final phase ofthinking , as being a hypothesis about how within infinite which centres around the notions ofthe will to time endless but numerical finite configurations power, radical nihilism, perspectivism and the ofenergy must repeat themselves, it also serves eternal recurrence. Within Thus Spoke as an existential prohibition. Without taking on Zarathustra notions of existential alienation, the creative responsibility for one's perspective willing , becoming and creativity are fused into a one is eternally condemned to a repetition ofthe unified monistic ontology in which artistic same disillusionment, as adopted faith after creativity becomes the transforming vehicle of faith is broken within the vortex ofthe abyss.Art mankind 's being as a mode of becoming. Pain, as the means of projecting meaning and value suffering and contradiction are no longerseen as into existence thereby returns to pride ofplace objections to existence but as an expression of within Nietzsche's analysis of the existential its actual tensions . This does not rid the predicament. Despite the enormous impact of individual of his suffering but transforms his Nietzsche's thought upon European art and evaluation of it. In Nietzsche's thinking the literature, his philosophical reception continues importance ofthe creative individual lies in his to be distorted by the ideological consequences being an embodiment of the life-transforming of his sister's politically inspired editorial process which constitutes all becoming. meddling and its strange legitimization by In subsequent writings, the will to power is Marxist intellectuals desirous of perpetuating developed into a Leibniz-like monadology the myth of Nietzsche as a philosophical without the latter's central organizing principle. precursor of fascism . What is not in question, Within this ontology of flux, inanimate and however, is that the piety of his metaphysical animate beings are presented as different nihilism and his endeavour to contemplate densities of Kraftzentren (power centres) existence without recourse to religious combining and interchanging for the sake ofthe apologetics affects the direction of greater power, i.e. unhindered activity. This Heideggerian thought and, because of that, account of becoming is the ground both of subsequently shapes French post-structuralism Nietzsche's repudiation of unchanging things and deconstruction. In its account ofdisclosive and selves and of his affirmation of meaning, hermeneutics now assumes what perspectivism: the world does not exist apart Nietzsche's aphoristic devices demonstrate. As from the totality of perspectival interactions words can communicate as clearly through the which make it up. This unsaid as through the said, the aphoristic rather Interpretationsphilosophie operates both as than the systematic style is better suited to Nishida 143

invoking the unstated realms ofthought behind Secondary literature: assertions. Nietzsche's major contribution to this sea-change in twentieth-century European Collinson, D. and Wilkinson, R. (1994) Thirty-Five philosophical sensibility is only now beginning Oriental Philosophers, London: Routledge . to receive the acknowledgement it truly merits . Nishitani, Keiji (1991) Nishida Kitaro , trans. J. W. NICHOLAS DAVEY Heisig and Yamamoto Seisaki, Oxford: Yale University Press. Toratoro , Shimonura (1960) Nishida Kitaro and Some Aspects ofhis Philosophical Thought , Tokyo. Yoshinori, Takeuchi (1982) 'The philosophy of Nishida, Kitaro Nishida ', in Frederick Franck (ed.) The Buddha Eye, New York: Cross Road. Waldenfels, Hans (1980) Absolute Nothingness : Japanese. b: 1870. d: 1945. Cat: Zen Foundations for a Buddhist-Christian Dialogue, philosopher. Infls: Profoundly influenced by trans. J. W. Heisig , New York: Paulist Press . the Zen Buddhist canon, the negative theology of Nicholas of Cusa, French positivism, Kitaro Nishida is esteemed as the first modern Bergson, William James, Fichte and Hegel. Japanese 'philosopher' in the European sense App ts: 1901, koji (lay Zen practitioner); and is primarily associated with the founding of Professor of Philosophy and Religion, former the ' Kyoto Schoo l' ofphilosophy. Through his Imperial Kyoto University. role in that school Nishida had a seminal influence upon such contemporary Japanese philosophers as Abe Masao , Yoshinori Main publi cations: Takeuchi, Hajime Tanabe but particularly upon the two greatest twentieth-century (1911) An Inquiry into the Good (English translation, disseminators ofJapanese thought in the West, M. Abe and C. Ives, New Haven , CT and London: D. T. Suzuki and Keiji Nishitani. Yale University Press , 1990). Perhaps the respective courses of European (1915) Thought and Experience; extended in 1937. and Japanese thought are now so propitiously (1917) Intuition and Refle ction in Self-consciousness (English translation, V. H. Viglielmo , Y. Takeuchi aligned that the importance of Nishida's and 1. S. O'Leary, Albany: State University ofNew philosophical achievement can be appreciated York Press, 1987). outside Asia. Since the epoch-making work of (1923) Art and Morality (English translation, D. A. Nietzsche and Heidegger, much continental Dilworth and V.H. Viglielmo , Honolulu : University European philosophy has attempted to resolve of Hawaii Press, 1973). the challenge of nihilism by articulating the (1927) From the Actor to the Seer. nature of existence and existential experience (1930) The Self-consciousness ofthe Universal . without recourse to metaphysical dogma or a (1932) The Self-determination ofNothingness. (1933-4) Fundam ental Problems of Philosophy philosphicallanguage tainted by the traditional (English trans lation, D. A. Dilworth, Tokyo: Sophia categories ofmetaphysics . Such an undertaking University, 1970). is a particularly difficult one as European (1933-45) Philosophical Essays , 3 vols . thought lacks what Buddhist tradition has long (1945) The Logic ofthe Place ofNothingness andthe possessed, namely an experimenta l analytic Religious World-view (English translation, Last capable of theorizing nothingness. On the other Writings: Nothingn ess and the Religious World­ hand, the situation faced by many Japanese view, D. A. Dilworth , Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987). religious thinkers after the Meij i restoration of (1947-53) Complet e Works, 18 vols, Tokyo . 1868 was to capitu late to the increasing influences of European norms of thought, to 144 Nishitani

become outright nationalist reactionaries or to away would be denied . Zettai rnu allegedly utilize the conceptual artillery of European preserves that potentiality, offering to Western philosophy as a means of bringing into thought the possibility of an existentially communicable clarity for Japanese and affirmative nihilism. It fell to Nishitani, one of European readers alike the undogmatic but Nishida's most talented successors , to work out elusive insights of Zen philosophy. Nishida the philosophical implications ofsuch a mode of made the last path his own and offered to thought. European philosophy a profoundly non­ NICHOLAS DAVEY nihilistic Zen view of nihility rendered in Western philosophical terms . The confrontation of Buddhist thought and Western philosophy in Nishida's work involves Nishitani, Keiji a characteristic conceptual and experiential transposition. Whereas Christianity and Western metaphysics might be disadvantaged Japanese . b: 27 February 1900. d: 1991. Cat: by holding the absolute (God) to be above both Zen philosopher;philosopher ofreligion .Educ: immediate expression and experience, they Schooled in Ishikawa Prefecture and Tokyo; in 1924 graduated in Philosophy from Kyoto have the advantage ofa conceptual framework University. Injls: Meister Eckhart, Nietzsche, which can cognize the transcendent. Dostoyevsky, Kierkegaard , Heidegger, Conversely, Zen philosophy is advantaged by Emerson , Carlyle, St Francis , Nishida, Sosseki , regarding the absolute (i.e. reality'as it is') to be Hakuin and Takuan. Appts: 1926, Lecturer in amenable to immediate experience, while it Ethics and German, Kyoto Imperial College; lacks the conceptual artillery to grapple with 1928, Lecturer, Buddhist Otani University; that which lies beyond immediate expression. 1935, Professor of Religion, Kyoto Imperial Nishida attempts a fusion ofthe positive aspects University; 1936-9, studied with Heidegger in of both European and Zen tradition by Freiburg , Germany; 1955-63, Chair ofModern suggesting that the Zen experiential intuition of Philosophy, Kyoto State University. absolute nothingness (zetta i rnu) can be conceptually articulated via Nicholas ofCusa's negative concept ofGod: it is never that which Main publications: can be stated ofit for it is always more than that; it is what it is not stated to be. (1940) The Philo sophy ofFundamental Subjectivity , Nishida's invocation of absolute Tokyo. nothingness or emptiness (sunyata) should not (1946) Nihilism, Tokyo (English translation , The Self­ be understoodwithin the customary polarities of Overcoming of Nihilism, trans. G. Parkes and being and non-being, affirmation and denial. Setsuko Aihara , Albany, NY: State University of Zettai mu encompasses both the immanent New York Press, 1990). simultaneity of all coming into being icreatio ex (1948) Studies in Aristotle, Tokyo. nihilo) and ofall passing away.Itis close to what (1949) God andAbsolute Nothingness, Tokyo. the existential metaphysics of Nietzsche and (1961) What is Religion ?, Tokyo (English translation, Religion and Nothingn ess, trans . Jan Van Bragt, Heidegger would render as the 'being' of all London: California University Press, 1982). becoming. Rather than calling it Being, Nishida (1992) 'The awakening of selfin Buddhism', 'The 1­ names the absolute 'nothingness' on the thou relation in Zen Buddishm ', and 'Science and grounds that were the absolute an absolute Zen', in Frederick Franck (ed.) The Buddha Eye:An Being , all potentialities would be realized and Anthology of the Kyoto School, New York:Cross the infinity of coming into being and passing Road, pp. 22-30, 47-60 and 111 -37 respectively. Nishitani 145

Secondary literature: the problem of nihilism and Zen's capacity to accept and yet positively transform an ontology Parkes, Graham (ed.) (1991) Nietzsc he and Asian ofnothingness. Some brief contextual remarks Thought , Chicago: University ofChicago Press; see will illuminate the circumstances appertaining pp.13, 18, 106-11 , 195-9,213 (useful on Nishitani to Nishitani's fusion ofaspects of European with and excellent on Japan's assimilation of German Zen philosophical tradition . philosophy). Japanese cultural tradition tends not to Van Bragt, Jan (1961) ' Introductory essay' to Religion attribute to individualism the same value as and Nothingness, London: California University Occidental culture . Although unusual for a Press. Japanese, it was not personally inappropriate Waldenfels, Hans (1980) Absolute Nothin gness: that after the death ofhis father and the onset ofa Foundations for a Buddhist-Christian Dialogue, serious tubercular affiiction the young Nishitani trans. J. W. Heisig, New York: Paulist Press (contains substantial bibliography of Nishitani's should turn in his sense of hopelessness and published articles). despair to arch-European analysts of the suffering individual consciousness, namely, Nietzsche , Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky and Nishitani was a leading figure in the Kyoto Heidegger. And yet despite their unJapanese School ofJapanese philosophy, a non-sectarian individualism, key elements in these thinkers Zen Buddhist philosopher profoundly made them curiously accessible to Nishitani . concerned with interconnecting, first, Christian and Buddhist ethics and, second , the Buddhist The aesthetical-existential dimension of ontology of sunyata (emptiness) with European Japanese tradition emphasizes the aesthetic as ontologies ofnothingness (nihilism). A student the meaningfully sensed and emotionally of Martin Heidegger from 1936-9, appropriated and the existential as that which significantly he attended the latter's lectures on affects the very substance of one's personal Nietzsche and nihilism at Freiburg University. being. A terser summary of Nietzsche's and One of the most outstanding non-European Heidegger's aspirations for philosophy could commentators on both the mystical tradition in not be found. Their high regard for aesthetic German theology and the works ofKierkegaard, intuitions of the meaningfully 'disclosed' Nietzsche and Heidegger, Nishitani was also a irrespective ofvolition is clearlyparalleled in the renowned translator into Japanese, one of his Japanese understanding of the aesthetic . principal achievements being the translation of Furthermore , the highly indeterminate character Schelling's Essence ofHuman Freedom . of the Japanese language, which lends itself to The hermeneutic axiom 'questioning one's allegory and allusion , finds a curious resonance own from the perspective of the foreign ' in the styles of Nietzsche and Heidegger, who describes Nishitani's lifelong preoccupation more often than not convey their meaning not by with nineteenth- and twentieth-century the utterance ofpure statements but by allowing European existentialist thought as offering a the unspoken reservoirs ofmeaning behind the means to articulating and philosophically said to be resonated by what is said. Given such reappropriating the central conceptions ofZen hermeneutical 'crossovers', it is perhaps not so thought. Nishitani commenced his surprising that Nietzsche's and Heidegger's philosophical career exclusively preoccupied with thinkers of the continental European examination ofnihility should profoundly strike existential and phenomenological tradition.Not Nishitani's philosophical imagination, nor that until his discovery ofthe philosophy ofNishida he should be able to offer such a lucid and did Nishitani, far from abandoning his former pertinent critique oftheiranalysis as he does, but interests , see them as a means to reengage with from the philosophical perspective of Zen the Zen tradition of religion and philosophy. Buddhism. Like Nishida, Nishitani focuses primarily upon 146 Nishitani

The underlying motifofNishitani's thinking presupposes the fiction of the self as detached is religious in the special Zen sense of refusing cognitive subject but because mechanistic to distinguish between the religious and explanation renders redundant the very subject philosophical quest. When Nishitani writes that which it supposedly serves: 'at the basis of religion is the existential exposure of the technological thought lies the problematic which is contained in the usual "dehumanization" of humanity ... With regard to mode ofself-being, so would he equally accept a human being, the dimension out of which a Tillich's assertion that the proper role of "thou" confronts an "I" is completely erased'. philosophy is to advance existential interests, to Seventh, what Nishitani fears within the process existentialize humanity's mode of being. The of 'dehumanization' is the irrevocable transition from 'theusual mode ofself-being' to appearance of what Nietzsche would call 'fully existentialized human existence' is in 'passive nihilism'. Technology's subversion of Nishitani's terms the journey from the Great the existential 'why?' with thepurposeless 'how' Doubt (taigi) to the Great Affirmation, from the of mechanistic explanation suggests that the traumatic discovery of the emptiness of self­ ultimate ' for-the-sake-of-which' may be for the centred being to the ecstatic insight that such a sake of nothing at all. Western science and loss of (illusory) selfhood is a condition of philosophy thus lead for Nishitani to the crisis of realizing what was in fact always the case: that nihilistic despair. However, eighth, the Japanese one is neither set apart from nor set against the term for crisis none the less also implies an universe but intertwined with all ofits aspects . opportunity and it is at the moment ofthe Great The presuppositions of this transformative Doubt that Nishitani comes into his own. argument are eightfold. First, all things are Nietzsche's solution to passive nihilism is becoming (shojo : perpetually coming to be and active nihilism . If there are no meanings in passing back into extinction) as they are nothing themselves, not only can the world not be (mu) or lack an essence. Second, the world is condemned as meaningless (passive nihilism) therefore an emptiness (sunyata). Third, the but we are free to create our own meanings and things which make up the world must be perspectives (active nihilism) . Nishitani considered not as stable identities but as fields of correctly perceives that Nietzsche's active force or energy, the character of which nihilism requires that one pass through passive perpetually change according to mutual density nihilism . That, however, implies that active and proximity. Fourth, Nishitani equates this nihilism cannot fully overcome its passive Nietzschean ontology with the Buddhist notion forerunner since the act of creating 'new' values of ' networks of causation' (pratitya­ presupposes precisely the gulfbetween subject samutpada), thereby linking the Sanskrit and world which sets the oppositional basis for conception of karma (the interdependence ofall theproblemofpassive nihilism in the firstplace. things) with Nietzsche's amor fati . Fifth, Having exposed the cui de sac in the Western adapting the Heart Sutra's contention that the analysis of nihilism, Nishitani turns back via 'hindrance ofignorance' is the principal cause of Nishida to the Zen tradition but armed with suffering,Nishitani contendspaceNietzsche that European philosophical techniques capable of egoistic self-preoccupation, the fictions of rendering into reasonable and meaningful pyschology and the 'metaphysics of grammar' words the wordless wisdom ofZen.The result of prevent us from seeing that ' selfthat is not a self', that return is that nihilism can be made to namely the 'original self' which has its ecstatic overcome itself. For Nishitani, 'religion is an 'home-ground' in the interconnectedness of all existential exposure to the problematic in the those fields which constitute sunyata. Sixth, usual mode of self-being'. Within Buddhist Nishitani then embarks upon a critique of dialectics, the Great (philosphical) Doubt can Western technology not so much because it transform itself into the Great (religious) Nozick 147

Affirmation. Retnrning to the concept of at Princeton, 1962-5; Fullbright Scholar, essenceless networks of causation, Nishitani University of Oxford, 1963--4; taught at remarks : Harvard, 1965- 7,and at Rockefeller University, 1967-9; Professor of Philosophy, Harvard, On that field of emptiness, each thing comes 1969- 85, from 1985, Arthur Kingsley Porter into its own and reveals itself in a self­ Professor of Philosophy; Woodrow Wilson affirmation, each in its own possibili ty and National Fellowship, 1959-60; Fellow at Van virtus of being. The conversion to and Leer Jerusalem Foundation 1976- 7; Fellow of entrance to that field means, for us men, the Center for Adanced Stndy in Behavioral fundamental affirmation of the being of all Sciences, Palo Alto, 1971-2; Rockefeller things , and at the same time of our own Foundation Fellowship, 1979-80; National existence. The field ofemptiness is nothing Endowment of Humanities Fellowship, 1987­ but the field of the great affirmation . 8; Fellow of American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1984- ;Honora ry AM,Harvard, 1969; One could not be more removed from Honorary DHumLitt, Knox College, 1983. Nietzsche's active nihilism than here, for whereas the latter distances the creative individual from those who cannot overcome the Main publications: rancours of passive nihilism , Nishitani's position offers via ' the waters of nihilism ' an (1968) 'Moral complications and mor al structures', ecstatic reconcilation of the 'empty' or Natural Law Forum. 'purified' self with all other beings that (1969) 'Newcomb's problem and two principles of constitnte the 'field of emptiness' that is the choice' , in N. Rescher (ed.), Essays in Honour of world. Nishitani's philosophical mission is Carl G Hempel, Dordrecht: Reidel (this article undoubtedly rendered all the more difficult introduced the problem to the philosophi cal world). because of his standing both within and without (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Oxford: his tradition, and yet precisely because he Blackwell (received Na tional Book Award 1975). attempts to 'question his own through the eye of (1981) Philosophical Explanations, Oxford: Oxfo rd the foreign' we-the European foreigner­ University Press (received Ralph Waldo Emerson obtain an extraordinary 'eye into our own ' . Award 1982; as well as epistemology this book treats metaphysics, phil osophy of mind and ethics). NICHO LAS DAVEY (1989) The Examined Life, New York: Simon & Schuster. (1990) (ed.) Harvard Dissertations in Philosophy , 1930-198820 vols, New York: Garland Press. (1990) The Normativ e Theory ofIndividual Choice, Nozick, Robert New York: Garland Press (reprint of 1963 PhD dissertation). (1993) The Natu re of Rationality , Princeton, NJ: American. b: 16 November 1938, Brooklyn. Princeton University Press. Cat: Political philosopher;epistemologist. Ints: Political philosophy; epistemology. Educ: Columbia University, BA 1959; Princeton University, AM 1961, PhD 1963, with Secondary literature: dissertation on 'The Normative Theory of Individual Choice'. Infls: Locke, Rawls, Block, W. (1980) ' On Robert Noz ick's "On Austrian Hempel, Vlastos, Morgenbesser.Appts: Taught methodology"' , Inquiry . 148 No zi ck

Campbell, R. and Sowden, L. (eds) Paradoxes of 'state ofnature', and certain rules of transfer by Rationality and Cooperation, Vancouver: UBC contract or gift, 'whatever arises from a just Press (reprints 1969 article with discussions). situation by just steps is itselfjust' (p. 152). A Capaldi, N. (1984) 'Exploring the limits of analytic 'minimal state' is envisaged as hypothetically philosophy: a critique of Nozick's Philosophical developing from the state of nature, limited to Explanations ', Interpretation. Corlett, J. A. (ed.) (1991) Equality and Liberty: 'protecting all its citizens against violence , Analysing Rawls and Nozick, New York: St Martin's theft, and fraud, and to the enforcement of Press, London: Macmillan. contracts, and so on' (p. 26), and Part II claims Dancy, J. (1985) An Introduction to Contemporary that no further development ofthe state can be Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell. justified. However, an important principle of Elster, J. and Moene , K. O. (eds) (1989) Alternatives rectification is implied , and may involve some to Capitalism , New York: Cambridge University redistribution in actual societies , though Press. without 'introduc[ing] socialism as the Journal of Libertarian Studies, 1977 (has several relevant articles). punishment for our sins' (p. 153), and some Machan, T. R. (1989) Individuals and Their Rights, La features are later modified (for example, see The Salle , Ill: Open Court . Examined Life (1989), chapter 3, on Moffatt , R. C. L. (ed.) (1978) '''Minimal government" inheritance). Critics have asked, inter alia, in theory and practice', in Personalist (October whether he succeeds in steering between issue, devoted to Nozick). anarchism and the more extensive state, Narveson, J. (1988) The Libertarian Idea, whether he relies overmuchon moral behaviour, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. whether his doctrine of entitlement is Nielsen, K. (1985) Equality and Liberty: A Defence of Radical Egalitarianism, Totowa , NJ: Rowman & adequately founded, especially the rules of Allanfeld. acquisition, and whether he can avoid Noonan, H. W. (1985) 'The closest continuertheory of supplementingrights with otherconsiderations. identity', Inquiry . InepistemologyNozickanalyses knowledge Paul, J. (ed.) (1981) Reading Nozick: Essays on in terms of 'tracking' the truth (Philosophical Anarchy,State ,and Utopia, Totowa ,N J: Rowman & Explanations, chapter 3): one knows a truth if Littlefield. one believes it, would not believe it were it false, Political Theory , 1977 (contains some relevant but would believe it were it true. He uses this to articles). Sampson, G. (1978) 'Liberalism and Nozick's deal with scepticism, but it has controversial "minimal state' '', Mind (cf. discussion by 1. R. features : for example, that one can know a Danley in Mind, 1979). conjunction while not knowing (but merely Schaefer, D. (1984) 'Libertarianism and political believing) one of its conjuncts (p. 228). philosophy: a critique of Nozick's Anarchy, State, Nozick's latest book, The Nature of and Utopia ',Interpretation. Rationality (1993), starts by exploring the WolffJ, (1991) RobertNozick: Property , Justi ce and rationale of acting on principle and then the Minimal State, Cambridge: Polity Press. introduces the notion ofsymbolic utility, i.e.the value ofsomething as a symbol , a notion he had Nozick has made notable contributions to both used in The Examined Life (pp. 286ft) to political philosophy and epistemology. His moderate some ofthe conclusions ofAnarchy, most famous work, Anarchy, State, and Utopia State, and Utopia. As well as offering further (1974), propounds an extreme libertarian views on Newcomb's problem (compare the position. Starting from the inviolability of 1969 article), he develops a theory of rational certain rights he claims that justice is not a belief (although one might wonder whether he matter of achieving a certain end-state nor a here satisfactorily distinguishes belief from pattern of distribution but rests on entitlement: acceptance), and emphasizes throughout the given certain rules ofacquisition in a Lockean role of evolution in determining why we have Ortega y Gass et 149

the intuitions we have, especially when, as with Guy, A. (1969) Ortega y Gasset, Paris: Seghers. the Euclidean nature of space , these intuitions Marias , 1. (1960) Ortega y Gasset: circumstancia y are not strictly true (p. 105). vocacion, Madrid: Revista de Occidente.

Sources: IWW 1993-4; WW(Am) 1992- 3; PI; Ortega is a figure of the first importance in the personal communication. recent intellectual history ofhis country, both as A. R. LACEY a writer and as editor of the Revista de Occidente, a periodical and a series of books through which modern European ideas were transmitted to Spain. Ortega's own extensive writings range over history, politics, aesthetics Ortega y Gasset, Jo se and art criticism as well as the history of philosophy, metaph ysics, epistemology and Spanish .b: 1883,Madrid .d: 1955, Madrid . Cat: ethics. They are written in lucid Castilian, by a Ratio-vita list. Educ: Educated at the University master of the language , making Ortega a ofMadrid and then in Germany. Appts: Began considerable stylist as well as an important his career as aneo-Kantian;he began to develop thinker. his own ideas from 1910 onwards as Professor After a youthful period as a neo-Kantian, ofMetaphysics at Madrid, a position he retained Ortega began to develop his own ideas in the until forced into exile by the Civil War and the Meditaciones del Quijote (1914), and the lines Second World War; returned to Madrid in 1948, of thought adumbrated there are worked out in founding , with Julian Marias , the Institute of his major philosophica l works thereafter, Humanities. culminating in the incomplete, posthumously published La idea de principio en Leibniz (1958), on which Ortega was working at the Main publications: time of his death. Ortega referred to his own mature philosophy as 'ratio-vitalist', a term he uses regularly from the early 1920s onwards. All in Obras completas, 12 vols , Madrid: Alian zal Ortega's metaphysics begins with a critique Revista de occidente, 1983: ofboth realism and idealism. The former takes (1912) Medita ciones del Quijote. the world or objects to be the ultimate reality, (1921) Espana invertebrada ;revised 1922 and 1934. while the latter gives priority to the self. Neither (1925) La deshumanizacion del arte. view is acceptable, since there is a further (1930) La rebelion de las masas. category logically prior to both that of self and (1932-3) Unas lecciones de metajisica (published that ofthing, and this ultimate category is life: 'I 1966). am not my life.This, which is reality, is made up (1935) Historia como sistema. of me and of things . Things are not me and I am (1940) Ideas y creencias. not things : we are mutuall y transcendent, but (1958) La idea de prin cipio en Leibniz y la evolucion both are immanent in that absolute coexistence de la teoria deductiva (posthumous). which is life' (1932-3, XIII). Further, although the life of an individual is given to them, each person must work unceasingly to preserve it. We Seconda ry liter ature: are in continual danger of catastrophe, and to avoid it is our ceaseless endeavour. As he often Borel , J. (1959) Raison et vie chez Ortega y Gasset, says, 'Life is a task' ('La vida es quehacer') .Our Neu chatel : La Baconniere. chiefasset in this struggle is reason . By 'reason' Garagorri , P. (1970) Introduccion a Ortega, Madrid: he does not mean pure intellection or a capacity Alian za Editorial. for abstract thought, but more broadly, 'any M & L Peirce 15 1

(1868) ' Some consequences of four incapacities', The son of Benjamin Peirce, the most eminent ibid. 2: 140- 57; reprinted in CP 5: 156-89. American mathematician in the nineteenth (186 9) 'G rounds of validity of the laws of logic: century and a Harvard professor,Charles Peirce further consequences of four incapacities ', ibid . 2: began his career as a physicist with the United 193-208; reprinted in CP 5: 190-222. States Coast and Geodetic Survey, of which his (1877) 'The fixation of belief', Popula r Science father was superintendent. As a working Monthly 12: 1- 5; reprinted in CP 5: 223-7. scientist he was a pioneer in the effort to map our (1878) ' How to make our ideas clear ', ibid. 12: 286­ 302 ; reprinted in CP 5: 248- 71. galaxy, publishing in 1878 Photometric (1878) 'The doctrine of chances', ibid. 12: 604-15; Researches. In the 1870s he was one of the reprinted in CP2:389- 4 14. major participants in the Metaphysical Club in (1878) 'The probability of induction' , ibid. 12: 705­ Cambridge, Massachusetts. This informal 18; reprinted in CP 2:415-32. group included William James , Oliver Wendell (1878) 'T he order of nature', ibid. 13: 203-1 7; Holmes and Chauncey Wright, and is the reprinted in CP 6: 283-30 I. alleged birthplac e of American pragmatism . (1878) 'Deduction, induction, and hypothesis', ibid. After his resignation from the Geodetic Survey 13: 470-82; reprinted in CP 2: 372-88. in 1891, Peirce lived in Arisbe near Milford, (1891) 'The architecture of theories', The Monist I: Pennsylvania . Living in poverty, he wrote and 161-76;reprintedin CP6: 11-27. occasionally lectured for the rest of his life. (1892) 'The doctrine of necessity examined' , ibid 2: William James often came to his assistance, 321-37; reprinted in CP 6: 36--45. providing funds and arranging for his lectures. (1892) 'The lawofmind', ibid. 2: 533-59; reprinted in CP6: 86-113. A series of three articles in the Journal of (1892) 'Man' s glassy essence', ibid . 3: 1-22; Speculative Philosophy in 1868-9 launched reprinted in CP 6: 155-75. Peirce as a philosopher who rejected the (1982-) Writings of Charles S. Peirce. A foundationalism, intuitionism, introspectionism Chronological Edition, ed. Max H. Fisch, et al., and egoism prevalent in modern philosophy Bloomington: Indiana University Press. since Descartes . In this series of articles Peirce contended that scepticism could not be Collections: employed wholesale to beliefs in general, as (1931- 5) The Collected Papers ofCharles Sanders Descartes had proposed, nor could it be used to Peirce, vols 1- 6, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University establish beliefs that were absolutely certain, Press. (Cited below as CP followed by volume and since every beliefwas fallible. Further, he denied pag e numbers.) that introspection was a means of internal (1959) The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders observation of private mental states, and Peirce, vols 7-8, ed. Arthur Burks , Cambridge, contended that all knowledge of mind is inferred Mass .: Harvard University Press. (Cited below as from external observation. He therefore denied CP followe d by volume and page numbers.) that the human mind has the capacity of intuition to grasp clear and distinct ideas as certain truths . Inquiry, he maintained, is a social and not a Secondary literature: private enterprise. He also depicted thinking as essentially the interplay of signs, generalizing even that the individual human mind is but a Feibleman, 1. K. (1946) An Introduction to Peirce's sign. From 1877 to 1878 a series of six articles in Philosophy , Interpreted as a System, New York: the Popular Science Monthly established Peirce Harper & Broth ers. as a pioneer in the philosophy of science. The Murph ey, M. G. (196 1) The Developm ent of Peirce :~ Philosophy , Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University series is most famous for Peirce's enunciation of Press. the principle ofpragmatism, stated in the second Thompson, M. (1953) The Pragmatic Philosophy of article without use ofthe word, as the following C. S.Peirce, Chicago: University ofChicago Press . rule for the clarification of ideas: 'Consider what 152 Peirce effects, which might concei vably have practical (Generality) . In a series of five articles that bearings, we conceive the object of our appeared in The Monist in 1891-3, Peirce conception to have. Then, our conception of undertook to erect a system of metaphysics, a these effects isthe whole ofour conceptionofthe 'cosmogenic' philosophy, by drawing upon the object' (CP 5: 258). When in 1898 James used principles and concepts of the sciences. Peirce the term 'pragmatism', inspiring an argued for tychism (the doctrine of objective international philosophical movement, he cited chance), synechism (the doctrine of continuity) Peirce's formula . Displeased by James's and agapism (the doctrine ofevolutionary love). psychologizing of a logical principle, and by his He also identified his categories of firstness, transformation of a methodological rule into a secondness, and thirdness phenomenologically metaphysics wedded to nominalism, Peirce and psychologically as feeling, resistance , and renamed his principle 'pragmaticism'-a word conception. Drawing upon the principles and 'ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers' (CP 5: conceptions ofthe special sciences, he sketched 277). Many of Peirce's most influential ideas a cosmogonic philosophy of evolutionary were presented in the Popular Science articles : idealism. Peirce maintained that philosophy is a his conception ofbelief as a habit ofaction; his science.During his life he made several attempts conception of enquiry as the process of fixing to classify the sciences and place philosophy belief; his emphasis on the scientific method as within the classification. The theme threading the only reliable method of fixing belief; his his various efforts is that the sciences be ranked doctrine offallibilism-namely, that no beliefis according to the generality of their principles absolutely certain ;his conceptions oftruth as the and conceptions, so that the more general be at opinion that the unlimited community of the top ofthe hierarchy, those lying below being scientific enquirers is fated to reach and ofreality less general yet depending upon the higher for as the object of that opinion; his conception of some of their general principles. Hence all natural law as statistical, and hence the doctrine sciences are divided into three classes in of chances ; his discovery of the role of descending order: sciences of discovery, hypothesis in scientific inquiry, which he called sciences of review and practical sciences . abduction to distinguish it from induction and Philosophy is located in the sciences of deduction. Peirce's philosophical investigations discovery, which are ranked in descending anticipated major developments not only in order: mathematics, philosophy (coenoscopy) pragmatism and the philosophy of science, but and the special sciences (ideoscopy). also in symbolic logic and the theory of signs. Philosophy, moreover, is subdivided in His writings on formal logic, many of them descending order as phenomenology posthumously published, presage the (phaneroscopy), normative science (including subsequent rise of symbolic logic, and his work ethics, esthetics, logic) and metaphysics. Peirce on the theory of signs, which he named never completed his lifework , but he left at his 'semiotic', remains in the forefront of current death a welter ofpapers, which his widow sold to research . In his logical investigations Peirce had the Harvard University Department of discovered three fundamental kinds of relations : Philosophy. These papers have proved to be a one-term (monadic), two-term (dyadic) and treasure-trove for philosophical scholars. The three-term (triadic), all other kinds of relations Transactions ofthe Charles S. Peirce Society , being resoluble into these three, but none ofthe founded in 1964 and edited by Peter Hare and three being reducible further.Meaning , the sign­ Richard S. Robin, is a journal that, in quarterly relation, he found to be a triadic relation , its three publication, presents articles and reviews on terms being the sign, the object and the Peirce and Peirce scholarship . interpretant. The three kinds of relations are the key to Peirce's basic set of categories : Firstness Sources: DAB: Edwards; EAB. (Quality), Secondness (Relation) and Thirdness ANDREW RECK Pia get 153

Piaget, Jean Conception ofNumb er, trans. C. Gattegno and F. M. Hodgson, London:Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952). (1941) (with Barbel Inhelder) The Child s Swiss . b: 1896, Neuchatel, Switzerland. d: Construction ojQuantities, London: Routledge & 1980, Geneva. Cat: Developmental Kegan Paul and New York: Basic Books, 1974. psychologist. Ints: Child development, (1974) Experim ents in Contradiction, London: especially cognitive; epistemology. Educ: Routledge & Kegan Paul; New York: Norton. University of'Neuchatel, PhD on biolog y ofland (1974) The Developm ent of Thought , London: molluscs ; University of Zurich, psychology; Routledge & Kegan Paul; New York: Norton. Sorbonne University, psychology, logic, philosophy of science . Infls: Philosophical influences : Kant, Andre Lalande and Leon Secondary literature: Brunschvieg. Psychological influence : Alfred Binet. Appts: 1921, Director ofStudies , Institut Boden, M. A. (1979) Piaget, Brighton: Harvester J.-J. Rousseau (now Institut des Sciences de Press and London: Fontana Paperbacks; New York: r Education), Geneva (1932, Codirector); 1925, Viking Press, 1980. Professor of Philosophy, University of Flavell , J. H. (1963) The Developm ental Psychology Neuchatel; 1929, Professor of the History of of Jean Piaget, Princeton, N J: Van Nostrand Scientific Thought, University of Geneva ; (includes full bibliography up to 1963). Hundert, E. M. (1989) 'The child 's construction of 1940, Professor of Experimental Psychology, reality', ch. 4 of Philosophy, Psychiatry and Director of the Psychological Laboratory, Neurosci ence, Oxford : Clarendon Press . Geneva ; 1955, Professor of Psychology, Sorbonne , and Director, Centre International de l'Episternologie Genetique, Geneva . Piaget's theory of cognitive development in children, genetic epistemology, has become widely influential in psycho logy and education. The key insight of genetic epistemology is that Main publi cations: our cognitive abilities, in particular our grasp of basic physical concepts and logica l operations, (1924) Le Langage et la pensee chez I 'enfant , Paris: are not 'given' but acquired in a series of Delachaux & Niestle (English translation, The developmental stages through interaction with Language and Thought oj the Child, trans . M. the environment. Originally a biologist, Piaget Warden, London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., became interested in developmental 1926; second edition, trans. M. Gabain, 1932). psychology during his time in Paris. Extending (1924) Le Jugement et la raisonn ement chez I 'enfa nt, Binet's work on IQ testing , he was struck by the Paris: Delachaux & Niestle (English translation, difficulty found by many children as old as eight Judg ement and Reasoning in the Child, trans. M. in following apparently straightforward Warden , London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1928). (1930) The Child s Conception ofPhysical Causality, syllogisms . Children , it seemed to him, lacked trans. M. Grabin, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul certain logical capacities which as adults we (originally published 1927). take for granted. Working initially by talking (1936) The Origin oj Intelligence in the Child, with children, including his own, he went on to London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953; New York: develop a series of ingenious experiments by International Universities Press, 1966. which he was able to map out the stages through (1937) The Child s Construction ofReality , London: which these capacities are acquired. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955; New York: Basic Piaget proposed four main stages (each with Books, 1954. a number of substages): sensorimotor, (1941) (with A. Szeminska) La Genese du nombre preoperational, concrete operational and forma l chez l 'enfant, Paris (English translation, The Childs operational. The order, though not the duration, 154 Piaget

ofthese stages is fixed. The sensorimotor stage operations period' . This is the least studied of lasts from birth up to about age 4.The new born­ Piaget's stages. Itinvolves the emergence ofthe infant has no ability to organize its world . It has ability for ' scientific' thinking, the key to which a number of inborn reflexes-grasping, is the ability to isolate relevant causes . This in sucking, following a moving object-through tum, Piaget claimed, required the ability not which it operates on its environment. The only for logical thinking but also for second­ experiences generated by these reflex activities order reflection on one's own thought allow the child to build up rudimentary processes. conceptions of space and time, ofthe distinction Although Piaget's work was largely between the self and the world, and of the observational and experimental, he read widely independent existence of objects . Piaget in philosophy as a young man and throughout observed, for instance, that up to about eight his life remained actively interested in the months , a baby loses interest in a toy if it is philosophical implications of his findings . He hidden . The toy, he claimed, simply ceases to considered himself to be concerned with the exist. The baby has to learn through repeated traditional problems ofthe theory of knowledge experiences that objects continue to exist even while at the same time regarding these as when we are not directly aware ofthem. At the biological problems . The 'reality' with which sensorimotor stage, the child's world is a world epistemology is concerned is the environment in of 'pictures emerging from nothingness at the which organisms live. Hence the 'problem of moment ofaction ,to return to nothingness at the the relation between thought and things ... moment when the action is finished' (Piaget becomes the problem of the relation of an 1937: 43). organism to its environment' (Piaget 1930, p. The sensorimotor stage is followed by the 129). Ifwe study this relationship not as it is but preoperational stage (when language is as it comes to be, we have indeed a genetic acquired) and the'concrete operations period', epistemology. which together last up to young adolescence. To the extent that he was concerned with the During this period the child gradually ceases to constructive aspects of mind, Piaget was a depend on immediate perception and develops Kantian . He considered himself 'very close to the capacity for logical thinking . Piaget found, the spirit of Kantianism' and wrote of 'The for example, that a young child shown pairs of child's construction of reality'. However, where sticks ofunequal length is unable to infer from Kant posited a priori cognitive structures the separate perceptions 'A longer than B' and necessary for the organization of experience, 'B longer than C' that A is longer than C. Again, Piaget posited inherited modes of functioning in a series of famous 'conservation by means of which, through interaction with the experiments', he showed that children had to environment, cognitive structures were learn the principle of invariance. In one developed.These modes offunctioning were no experiment the child is first shown two identical more than the simple reflex activities of the glasses with equal amounts ofwater in them, A sensorimotor stage, which, by 'generalization' and B; the water from B is then poured into a and 'differentiation', led ultimately to the third glass, C, which is thinner, the level ofthe emergence ofthe power of abstraction and other water thus ending up higher. The child's high-level cognitive functions . There was also, response to this, up to about eight years, is as Hundert (1989) has pointed out, a (largely typically to claim that the amounts ofwaterin A unacknowledged) Hegelian component to and B are equal,but that there is more water in C Piaget's thinking.Inaddition to 'assimilation', a thanA. Kantian construction of reality by the mind, The last developmental stage, corresponding cognitive development depended on broadly with adolescence, is the 'formal 'accommodation', a Hegelian adaptation ofthe Popper 155

mind to reality. With the possible exception of Kraft, 1. Kraft, Carnap, Feigl and von Mises. psychoanalysis, Piaget's genetic epistemology, Appts: Taught at Canterbury University though still controv ersial, has been the single College, New Zealand , 1937--46, and London most important influence on modern School of Economics, 1947-69, holding Chair developmental psychology. The dependence of in Logic and Scientific Method from 1949;FBA cognitive developm ent on active exploration of 1958;knighted for services to philosophy, 1964; the environment is a corner-stone ofeducational FRS 1976; CH 1982. theory and practice. His philosophy has been much criticized. He has been accused of the 'genetic fallacy' of confusing the Main publications: (psychological) origins of logical structures with their (formal) properties. It has been said that his developmental stages are, merely, A numb er of Popper 's books were conceived or logically necessary: second-order reflection written many years before they were publi shed, and they were often revised and expanded in later presuppos es first-order reflection, for instance. editions . Yet the empiricalpsychology he helped to found (1934) Logik der Forschung, Vienna: Springer. is philosophically significant: it gives substance (1945) The Open Society and Its Enemies, London: to philosophic al speculation (there is no tabula Routledge. rasa, for instance; the concepts of 'self' and (1950) 'Indeterminism in quantum physics and in 'other' really are, as Kant supposed, mutually classical physics', British Journalfo r Philosop hy of dependent); and it is anti-foundational, the a Science. priori itselfbeing shown to be rooted not just in (1957) The Poverty of Historicism, London: experience, but, ultimately, in primitive Routledge & Kegan Paul; Boston, Mass.: Beacon sensorimotor reflexes. Press (revised version of three articles originally publish ed separately in 1944- 5). Sources: Harre & Lamb . (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery , London: K. W. M. FULF ORD Hutchinson; New York: Basic Books (translation of revised and expanded version of Logik der Forschung 1934). (1959) 'T he propensity interpretation ofprobability' , British Journa lfor Philosophy ofScience. Popper, Karl Raimund (1972) Objective Know ledge: An Evolutionary Approa ch, Oxford: Clarendon. (1974) ' Replies to my critics' , in P. A. Sch ilpp (ed .), Austrian-British. b: 28 July 1902, Himmelho f, The Philosophy ofKarl Popper, La Salle, Ill.: Open Vienna. d: 17 September 1994. Cat: Court . Philosopher of science; poli tical philosopher. (1977) (with Sir J. C. Eccles) The Selfand Its Brain: Ints: Epistemology. Educ: Studied at An Argu ment for Int e ractionism, Berlin: Springer University of Vienna and (after its foundation in International. 1925) the Pedagogic Institute, 1919-28 (1979) Die beiden Grundprobleme der (Maturas 1922 and 1924); PhD,'Zur Erkenntnistheorie, ed. T. R. Han sen, Tubingen: J. C. Method enfrage der Denkpsychologie', 1928); B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). (1982) The Open Universe: An Argument for also training as cabinet-maker and teacher in Indeterminism , ed. W. W. Bartley III, London: Mathematics and Science (with qualifying Hutchinson; Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield. thesis on 'Axiome, Definitionen und Postulate (1982) Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics, der Geometric ', 1929) and working as social ed. W. W. Bartley III, London: Hutchinson ; Totowa , worker and then schoolteacher. Infls: Hume, N J: Roman & Littlefield. Kant, Fries, Laplace, K. Buchler, H. Gornperz, (1983) Realism and the Aim of Science, ed. W. W. Bolzano, Einstein, Bohr, R. Larnmer, Tarski , V. Bartle y III, Lond on: Hutchinson; Totowa, NJ: 156 Popper

Rowman & Littlefield (this and the previous two Schilpp, P. A. (ed.) (197 4) The Philosophy ofKarl titles form (with additions) volumes I, II , and III Popper, La Salle , Ill.: Open Court. respecti vely of Posts cript: After Twenty Years in Wilkins, B. T. (1978) Has History Any Meaning? A proo f since 1957 but never pub lished) . Critiqu e of Popper s Philosophy of History , (1986) Unended Quest: An Intellectual Hassocks: Harvester. Autobiography , London: Fontana (extracted from P. Williams, D. E. (1978) Truth, Hop e, and Power: The A. Schilpp (ed.) , The Philosophy of Karl Popper, La Thought of Karl Popp er, Toronto, Buffa lo and Salle: Open Court , 1974). Londo n: Toronto University Press . (1990) A World ofPropensities: Two New Views on Causali ty and Towards an Evolutionary Theory of Knowledge, Bristol : Thoemmes. Popper did not become a professional philosopher until his mid-thirties, after Collected editions: publishing the first version ofthe book by which (1963) Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of he is most well known , Logik der Forschung Scientific Knowledge, London: Routledge & Kegan (1934), and did not seem to think much of Paul; New York: Basic Book s (essays and lectures). professional philosophers in general , at least to (1983) D. Mi ller (ed.) A Pocket Popp er, London: judge by his thoughts round his ninetieth Fontana; reprinted as Popper Selections, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. birthday (Sunday Times, 12 July 1992). But he (1984)Auf der Suche nach eine besseren Welt,Munich had been concerned with philosophical and Zurich: Piper (English trans lation ,In Search ofa proble ms at least since the age of 17, when he Better World: Lectures and Essays f rom Thirty first raised and solved the proble m of Years, London and New York: Routledge , 1992). demarcating science from non-science , and this and the problem of induction occupied much of his attention over the next few years (see Secondary literature: Conjectures and Refutations, 1963).His officia l studies,however (when he was not training to be Bambrough, R. (ed.) (1967) Plato, Popper and a cabinet-maker) , were in science and Politi cs: Some Contributions to a Modern mathematics and in psychology, especially Controversy , Camb ridge : Heffer. child psychology, which brought him to his Bunge, M. (ed.) (1964) The Critical Approach to teacher Karl Buchler, and Alfred Adler and Science and Philosophy , Glencoe, Ill,: Free Press; Heinrich Gornperz , among others . As a Jew, London : Collier-Macmillan. however, an academic, or indeed any, career in Burke , T. E. (1983) The Philosophy of Popper, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Austria was not going to be possible for him,and Currie , G.and Musgrave, A. (eds) (1985) Popper and after being invited to lecture in England on the the Human Sciences, Dordrecht: Nijhoff. strength ofhis book he passed via New Zealand De Vries, G.J. (I 952)Antisthenes Redivivus:Popp er s (at a time when academic research was strangely Attack on Plato , Amsterdam: NorthHolland. frowned upon there: see 1986, p. 119)to his final Levinson, P. (ed.) (1982) In Pursuit ofTruth: Essays academic home in London. An incidental on the Philosophy ofKarl Popp er on the Occasion of interest lay in music, where he had interesti ng his Eightieth Birthday , New York: Humanities Press . ideas on the genesis of polyphony (ibid., SS12), Levinson, R. B. (1953) In Defence of Plato , and has had music of his own performed Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press . recently (Sunday Times, 12 July 1992). Magee, B. (1973) Popper, London: Fontana . Popper's philosophy is summed up in the -- (1985) Philosophy and the Real World: An title of one of his books : Conjectures and Introduction to Popp er, La Salle, III.: Open Court. Refutations (1963) . His contact with the Vienna O'Heart, A. (1980) Karl Popp er, London: Routledge Circle (although he was never invited to forma l & Kegan Paul. membership) and with psychology as studied in Popper 157

Vienna, as well as a reading of Hume and Kant, (like 'All swans are white') will not itself be convinced him that two basic, and connected, falsifiable but is hardly meaningless. Also sins are psychologism and inductivism. The metaphysical statements, on this criterion, can quest for justification of our theories seems to provide a useful stimulus for science , as with lead to either an infinite regress or a basis in pure atomism and the corpuscular theory of light experience , whether this is regarded as (1963, pp. 257-8). underlying all statements (as Fries held a The properprocedure for science is to set up century earlier) or as represented by hypotheses designed to be as falsifiable as epistemologically privileged statements , as possible , and then test them by reference to with the Vienna Circle . But no such basis exists 'basic statements ', i.e. those whose form makes (The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 1959, them potential falsifiers of the hypothesis , as SSSS25-6)-as indeed is now widely accepted. 'There is a black swan here now' would, if His teacher Buchler had divided language into accepted, falsify 'All swans are white' . The three functions , expressive, communicative and basic statements themselves must be falsifiable descriptive, but Popper added a fourth: (hence the importance ofadding 'here now' in argumentative, claiming that this showed ' the the above example), and the regress that priority of the study of logic over the study of threatens is stopped when we reach ones we all subjective thought processes' (1986, p. 77)­ decide to accept-we should not regard them as which incidentally convinced him that there certain or established, as verificationists regard were no such things as conditioned reflexes their basic statements . The need for decision on (ibid.). Inductivisrn, the view that statements or when to stop testing opens the way to abuse by theories can be given positive support 'conventionalist strategerns' , or inductivel y, raises ' Hume' s problem' (see 1972, 'immunization' as he later called it (1972,p.30), p. 85), which Popper claimed to solve, by but conventionalism can be avoided (The Logic showing that scientific theories are indeed ofScientifi c Discovery, pp. 108- 9). One ofthe immune to verification, or to positive most controversial features ofPopper's system confirmation, but are open to falsification. is his replacement of confirmation (in the sense Induction itself in fact he generally regarded as ofpositive support) by 'corroboration', which a not only invalid but never actually used hypothesis acquires by surviving severe tests (although TheLogic ofScientificDiscovery (pp. (see ibid., p. 251, n.l): can he really avoid 52-3) seems to relax this latter claim) . inductivism? Popper insisted at one point that an Falsifiability brings us to the hub ofPopper 's appraisal must be synthetic ,not tautological,but philosophy.Many readers at first thought that he he also insisted that we can never make any was simply substituting falsifiability for the hypothesis more probable, in the sense of'more verifiability ofthe Vienna Circle as the criterion likely to be true' . How then can saying that a for meaningfulness. He since emphasized time hypothesis is corroborated go beyond saying and again that this was not so, and the point was simply that it has passed certain tests? Any taken . Falsifiability provides , by what he attempt to appraise it in the light ofthis seems admitted is 'a proposal for an agreement or ruled out, and 'if corroborated then appraised' convention' (ibid., p. 37), a way of becomes tautological (see especially ibid., p. distinguishng empirical scientific statements 251, n. 1, SSSS81-2, pp. 418-19, and 1972, p. from pseudoscience like astrology, or else, as he 19, SSSS23--4 (answering Salmon on this-but later decided, from metaphysics (1986, p. 41), what are we to make of'goodreason(s)' atp. 81, which is not necessarily meaningless, for the line 7 up, p. 91, line 1?).) Elsewhere, though in a negation of a falsifiable universal statement different context, he agreed that a fresh 158 Putnam requirement he introduced may indeed involve Putnam, Hilary 'awhiffofverification ism' (1963,p.248, n.31). Although for Popper we cannot show our American. b: 31 July 1926, Chicago, Illinois . theories to be 'likely to be true' , we can show Cat: Philosopher of mathematics. In ts: them to have ' likeness to the truth' Philosophy of mind; philosophy of science ; 'verisimilitude', a notion he introduced in philosophy of language. E duc: University of Conjectures and Refutations (1963) or shortly Pennsylvania, BA 1948; University of before, encouraged by Tars ki's rehabilitation, California at Los Angeles, PhD (supervisor as Popper saw it, of the notion of truth (The Hans Reichenbach), 1952. Infls: William Logic ofScientific Discovery,p.274, n. 1; 1963, James, C.S.Peirce, John Dewey, RudolfCarnap pp. 223-37). A falsified theory can, however, and Ludwig Wittgens tein.App ts: Northwestern still be useful , as is Newton's. University, Princeton University; Professor of Epistemology, Popper thought, should study the Philosophy of Science , MIT, 1961-5; not subjective acts of knowing but objective Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University, things known (1972,chapter 3),which belong to 1965-76; Walter Beverley Pearson Professor of the third of the three 'worlds' he postu lates, Mathematical Logic, 1976- ; President, physical objects and subjective states inhabiting American Philosophica l Association, 1976; the other two (1986 , SS38; 'Replies to my President, Association of Symbolic Logic, critics', 1974, SS21 ; The Open Universe, 1982, 1980. Addendum I). Somewhat analogous to falsifiability is the 'negative utilitarianism' Popper developed in Main publi cations: his other main work, The Open Society and its Enemies (1945), stressing the need to minimize (1960) 'Minds and machines', in Sidney Hook (ed .), evil rather than maximize good, which can lead Dimensions ofMind, Albany, NY: SUNY Press. to counterproductive utopianism. In this (196 7) 'Mathematics without foundations', Journal connection he strongly criticized Plato, Hegel ojPhilosophy 64 . and Marx, and with them the appeal to (1972) Philosophy ofI.ogic, London: Allen & Unwin. essentialism and definitions , provoking strong (1975) 'The meaning of meaning', in Keith defences of Plato (1952, 1953), to which an Gunderson (ed.) Language, Mind and Knowledge, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy ofScience , vol. Addendum to the 1962 edition of The Open VII, Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press. Society and its Enemies replies . In similar vein (1975) Mathemati cs, Matter and Method, The Poverty of Historicism (1957) attacks Philosophical Papers , vol. I, Cambridge: historicism, the view that there are laws or Cambridge University Press . patterns in history that the social sciences should (1975) Mind , Language and Reality, Philosophical aim to predict, and which combines the Papers , vol. 2, Cambridge:Cambridge University ' naturalistic' approach of physical science with Press. (1978) Meaning and the Moral Sciences, London: the 'anti-naturalistic' Verstehen approach. Routledge. Topics omitted here include : mind and body (1980) 'Models and realit y', Journal oj Symboli c (1977), indeterminism (1950, revised in The Logic 45. Open Universe, 1982; 1972, chapter 6); (1981) Reason , Truth and History , Cambridge: propensities (the 1959 article, included in Cambridge University Press . Philosophy and Physics, 1974, and in 1990). (1982) Renewing Philosophy, Cambridge, Mass. : Sources: Interview by Lesley White , Sunday Times, Harvard University Press . (1983) Realism and Reason, Philosophical Papers, News Review , 12JuI 1992,p. 8; Edwards. vol. 3, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. A. R.LACEY Pu tna m 159

(1987) The Many Faces of Realism, La Salle: Open syntactically and phoneticall y from English. Court. Neither of these individuals can be (1988) Representation and Reality , Cambridge, MA: distinguished in terms of their utterances about MIT Press. the local fluid they experience: they produce identical utterances featuring the word 'water'. Putnam 's point is that the word cannot mean on Secondary literature: the lips of the first individual what it does when uttered by the second individual , because in each case there is a different fluid being referred Clark, P. and Hale, B. (eds) (1994) Reading Putnam , Oxford : Basil Blackwell. to. So the locus of meaning cannot be ' in the mind ', or if it is, it cannot determine what is being referred to in the world beyond the skull. Hilary Putnam is a philosopher who manifests a But even granted at this point, a truth­ unique blend of technical skill and breadth of conditional account would not be sufficient to interest. Early in his career he made significant pin down reference either. For this reason contributions to the philosophy ofmathematics Putnam urged a shift down from the level of the and the application of logic to quantum theory. sentenc e to the level of terms or referring Elsewhere, his best-known writings have expressions.So how does one fix the meaning of covered topics in the philosophy of mind, such terms ? One familiar solution, rejected by meaning and the contemporary debates about Putnam , is the one according to which both realism . proper names and kind terms are to be construed It is no surprise , therefore , that Putnam's as abbreviated descriptions or clusters of such. discussions of the problems of meaning are Instead, Putnam exploits the idea,due to Saul intimately related to the positions he has taken, Kripke, of the ' rigid designator ', an expression and frequentl y abandoned, on some of the which retains the same reference in 'all possible central philosophical questions . He formerly worlds '. So a term like 'Kripke' would refer espoused a form of realist position, which he essentially to that individual, whereas the later described disparagingly as ' metaphysical expression 'The author of Naming and realism' which he characterized in terms of two Necess ity' would not. Pursuing this approach basic theses : (i) that there is a determinate and with regard to kind terms , for example 'gold', mind-indep endent world; and (ii) that there is 'copper ', etc., Putnam would maintain that ultimately one ' true ' theory of this world which these ' rigidly' design ate the particular metals is the goal ofscientific investigation. whose fundamental constitution is the object of Where meaning is concerned, the focus of scientific investigation . He does, however, much debate has been the thesis that meaning point out that reference can be secured by determines reference . Putnam has contend ed descriptions, amounting in effect to stereotypes, that theories which endeavour to reduce based on the more overt characteristics of the meaning to mental states or inner processes are substances described, and this is the common manifestly unsatis factory. Deploying what has currenc y ofordina ry communication. Meaning, become one of the more shop-worn of after all, has a social dimension and cannot be philosophical fictions, he asks us to imagine two exclusively a matter of what goes on inside planets which differ only in the fact that one has individual heads . As he abandoned realism , so water and the other a superficially Putnam shifted his ground on the relation indistinguishable fluid with fundamentally between reference and meaning: the ability to different chemical constituents. On the first understand langua ge does not require what planet there is an individual who speaks realism demands , namely that there is some English;on the second planet another individual secure 'match' between language and 'the who speaks a language indistinguishable 160 Quine

world ' . Thus has he moved to a more Oxford . Infls: Rudolf Camap,C. I. Lewis, verificationist stance on meaning . Bertrand Russell, H. M. Sheffer and Alfred Ofall the positions that Putnam has rejected, Tarski. Appts: 1936-78, first Instructor, then one of the most significant in late twentieth­ Associate Professor, Professor and eventually century philosophy is functionalism. Formerl y Peirce Professor of Philosophy at Harvard its leading exponent, he later considered it to be University; 1978- , Professor Emeritus , fatally flawed . Briefly, functionalism in the Harvard. philosophy of mind is the thesis that psychologica l states, for example 'believing that snow is white' , 'hoping that functionalism Main publications: is true ', are essentially computational states of the brain. Human psycho logy, therefore , is (1934) A System ofLogic, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard merely the software of the brain-computer. University Press. Putnam originall y endeavoured to characterize (1940) Math emati cal Logic, New York: Norton. functionalism in terms ofTuring machine states, (1941) Elementary Logic, Bosto n: Ginn. but one consequence ofmeaning not being in the (1950) Methods of Logic, New York: Holt. head is that it is not possible to individuate (1953) From a Logical Point of View: 9 Logico­ concepts or beliefs without reference to the Philosophi cal Essays, Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press. environment (including the social environment) (1960) Word and Object, Cambridge, Mass : MIT ofthe cognitive agent. Putnam views the whole Press. strategy of looking for some non-intentional (1963) Set Theory and Its Logic, Cambridge, Mass. : characterization ofthe menta l as misconceived, Harvard University Press . and the attempt to assign one kind of (1966) The Ways ofParadox and Other Essays, New computational state to each kind of York: Random House. 'propositional attitude ' as naive . Together with (1966) Selected Logic Papers, New York: Random Hou se. this goes his general rejection of a scientism (1969) Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New which he saw as infecting philosophy, and his York:Columbia University Press . increasing preoccupation with normative (1970) Philosophy ofLogic, Eng lewood Cliffs, NJ : issues. Putnam 's influence may be measured in Prenti ce-Hall; second edition, Cambridge, Mass.: the lively debates he has conducted both against Harvard University Press , 1986. representatives of the realism he rejected on the (1974) The Roots of Reference, La Salle , Ill.: Open one hand, and positions like that of Richard Court . Rort y, which he regards as self-defeatingly (1978) (with J. S. Ullian) The Web ofBelief, New York: Random Hou se. relativistic. (1981) Theories and Things, Cambridge, Mass. : Sources: See secondary literature. Harvard University Press . DEN IS POLLARD (1987) Quidditi es: An Intermittently Philosophical Dictiona ry , Cambridge, Mass .: Harvard Univers ity Press. (1990) Pursuit ofTruth , Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Quine, W (illa rd) V(an) (Orman )

American. b: 25 June 1908, Akron , Ohio. Cat: Seconda ry lit erature: Logician . In ts: Philosophy of language ; mathematical logic; epistemology; philosophy of science . Educ: Oberlin College, Ohio ; Barrett, R. B. and Gibson, Roger F. (eds) (1990) Harvard University, PhD 1932; University of Perspectives on Quine, Oxford: Blackwell. Quine l61

Davidson, D. and Hintikka, J. (eds) (1969) Words and virtue of meaning' . At issue was the positivist Obj ections: Essays on the Philosophy of WV 0. verification principle, according to which Quine, Dordre cht: Reidel. analytic statements were charact erized as those Dilham, Ilham (1984) Quine on Ontology , Necessity which were ' verified' by all experiences or and Experience: APhilosophical Critique, London: observations. He further argued that attempts to Macmillan . Gibson, Roger F. (1982) The Philosophy of WV define analyticity were circular, involving Quine, Tampa: University Presses of Florid a. equally problematic notions like that of ( 1988) Enlightened Empiricism: An synonymy or sameness of meaning, and that Examination ofW V Quine s Theory ofKnowledge, verification could not be applied to individual Tampa: University ofS. Florida Press. statements in isolation. Quine thus embraced a Gochet , Paul (1986) Asce nt to Truth: A Critical holistic view in which our beliefs confronted Examina tion of Quine s Philosophy , Munich: experience, not individually, but as an entire Muni ch Verlag. body. Predictions which turned out to be false Hahn, L. E. and Schilpp , P. A. (eds) (1986) The Philosophy ofW V Quine, Peru, Ill.: Open Court. would entail a revision ofthe overall system,but Hookway, Christopher (1988) Quine, Cambridge: this would not dictate exactly how the Polity Press. adjustments were to be made. Kirk, R. (1986) Translation Determined, Oxford Quine, therefore, had a strong aversion to University Press. intensional notions such as those of 'meaning', Shahan, R. W. and Swoyer, C. (eds) (1979) Essays on 'property' or 'proposition', seeing them as the Philosophy of WVQuine, Norman, Ok.: having no legitim ate role in a proper semantic or University of Oklahoma Press, and Hassocks , psychological theory. One up-shot of his attack Sussex: Harvester (includes biblio graph y). on analyticity and meanin g was that there were no 'objective' relations of synonymy or Quine's influence on analytic philosophy has sameness of meaning, and hence all translation been profound and wide-ranging. His early was indeterminate. This thesis of the contribution to logic amounted to a substantial "indeterminancy of translation' entails that the modification of the R ussell-Whitehead linguistic behaviour of language speakers is system of Principia Mathematica, but like consist ent with incompatible but equally Russell he remained loyal to the idea of coherent schemes or 'manuals' of translation extensional two-valued logic, evincing a that might be constructed.There isno'fact ofthe consid erable scepticismabout the very notion of matter ' as to the meaning of a speaker 's alternativ e logics, especially those constructed utterances. Given that, on Quine's view, there to accommodate modal concepts like those of are no meanings or analytic truths, then there is necessit y and possibility. an immediate and radical implication for Quine was himself influenced by logical philosophy itself: there is no role for philosophy positivism, but even while reacting to it, he as an activity exclusively or predominantly preserved a strong empiricist orientation. He concerned with a priori theori zing about shared with the positivists the view that science 'concepts' or ' meanings' . is the only source of knowledge. There is no Quine sought to extend his programme by ' first philosophy' of the type envisaged by naturalizing epistemology, providing a heavily traditional philosophers. Espousing a broad behaviouristic account of the relation of beliefs naturalism, Quine saw philosophy as part of and theories to sensory input. Quine appeals to science, in effect as natural science 's reflection the fact that we do, after all, learn language not on itself. He was particularly concerned with the only from the non-human world, but from other application of this naturalistic perspective to human beings, and that acquirin g such languag e language. In a famous paper ('Two dogmas of understanding is a matter of bringing one's own empiri cism', in 1953) he mounted an assault on speech behaviour into line with that of others in analyticity and the whole notion of ' truth by one's particular language community. 162 Ram s ey

Quine is also justly renowed for his utterances, then what a speaker if onto logically discussion of ontological commitment, committed to becomes relativized to the commenced in the seminal paper ('On what particular manual or scheme oftranslation used there is' , in Quine 1953). Without exaggeration to interpret their utterances. it can be said that this paper generated a vast For all the relativistic overtones of his secondary literature devoted to questions of approach, Quine has commitments ofhis own , ontology and reference. The question for Quine not least ofwhich is his physicalism, his view of is how one determines the ontological physics as the basic science to which all other commitments ofa theory (or a person's body of 'lesser' sciences should be in principle beliefs about what exists) . Natural language is reducible. Despite a pronounced leaning unhelpful in this regard, since it has many towards nornalism, he reluctantly feels he has to different ways of expressing such countenance one category of abstract entity­ commitments, i.e. there is no one readily sets. Science needs mathematics, and while one identifiable syntactic device serving the might dispense with many of the apparent purpose. Furthermore, speakers of natural 'entities' of mathematics such as numbers, no language talk prima facie about all manner of mathematics adequate for physical science can things : their sentences contain names of be sustained without sets. As always, Quine's nonentities, there are definite descriptive ultimate justification for his stances is phrases which do not always have the function essentially pragmatic, and his own outlook ofrefer ring to objects.Quine's recommendation represents yet another twist to the story of was that ontological disputes could be clarified American pragmatism in philosophy. by resort to logic, and more specifically the Quine's views have been the focus of many device ofquantification. This would mean that, debates: with RudolfCarnap and Jerrold Katz in the technical thought logical idiom, on the notion of analyticity, and with Ruth ontological commitment would be expressed by Marcus Barcan and others on the question of means of what is standardly known as the modality and the possibility ofmodal logics. He 'existential' quantifier (informally expressed had a significant influence on Donald by 'There is ...' or 'There exists'). Thus Davidson, his holism has been questioned, someone could express their ontological perhaps most forcefully by Jerry Fodor, and commitmentby saying things ofthe form 'There despite his own logical stance, he has inspired are Xs ', where 'X' indicates the kinds ofentity much work on the development of logics to which the person is committed. This is the tolerating reference to nonentities, at least some basis for Quine's famous slogan that 'To be is to ofwhich have put in question his coupling ofthe be the value of a bound variable' (that is, a notions ofexistence and quantification. variable bound by the existential quantifier). Sources: Edwards; Turner; Quine, W. V. O. The Time Critics pointed out that there are at least some ofMy Life: An Autobiography, Cambridge, Mass.: uses of 'There is' and related expressions in MIT Press, 1985. natural language which do not plausibly carry DENIS POLLARD ontological commitment, e.g. 'there are several ways ofdealing with this problem', but which , if subjected to the technical regimentation Quine recommends, would involve such commitment. Quine's indeterminancy thesis Ramsey, Frank Plumpton has implications for his account ofontological commitment: if there is no ultimate fact of the British. b: 22 February 1903, Cambridge, matter about what exactly someone is saying or England. d: 19 January 1930, Cambridge. Cat: what entities they are referring to in their Philosopher of mathematics; logician . Educ: Rawls 163

1923, graduated in Mathematics, Trinity paradoxes which Russell had tried to resolve College , Cambridge; 1924-6, Fellow ship at with the theory of types . Thus Ramsey King's College, Cambridge. Injls: introduced a notion of'predicative functions'­ Wittgenstein, Russell and Keynes . Appts: that is, truth functions which allow many 1926-30, University Lectureship in arguments-which was derived from Mathematics, University ofCambridge. Wittgenstein. Later papers revealed a development of Ramsey's thought towards pragmatism and intuitionism with regard to the problem oftruth, Main publications: although he maintained that a pragmatic theory of truth was actually a supplement to the (1931) The Foundations ofMath emati cs and Other correspondence theory, rather than a rival. Thus Logical Essays, ed. Richard B. Braithwaite, London: in 'General propositions and causality' (written Routledge . in 1929) he argued that general propositions­ (1978) Foundations: Essays in Philosophy, Logic, for example 'All men are mortal'- are not Math ematics and Economi cs, ed. D. H. Mellor, strictly speaking propositions with truth London: Routledge . functions which can be determined as eithertrue (1991) Frank Plumpton Rams ey on Truth, ed. N. or false. Instead , he argued, they represent the Rescherand U. Majer, Dordrecht: Kluwer. kind of proposition which it is reasonable or unreasonable to maintain .Thus to hold that ' All men are mortal' is to reasonably expect that all Secondary literature: men we meet in the future will be mortal. General propositions do not make definite statements about objects , he maintained. Most Mellor, D. H. (1980) Prospects for Pragmatism, of Ramsey 's essays were published Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. posthumously. In the Introduction to his Ryle, G.(1950) 'If','so ', and 'because ', in M. Black collection of essays in 1931 Braithwaite said (ed.) , Philosophical Analysis, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. that Ramsey 's premature death 'deprives Sahlin, Nils-Eric (1990) The Philosophy of FP Cambridge ofone ofits intellectual glories and Ramsey , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. contemporary philosophy of one of its profoundest thinkers' . Son ofan eminent mathematician and President of Magdalene College, and brother of Arthur Michael who became Archbishop of DAVID LAMB Canterbury, Ramsey had a short but nevertheless outstanding career at Cambridge where he made important contributions to logic and philosophy.He wrote highly original papers on the foundations ofmathematics, probability, Rawls, John theory of knowledge, philosophy ofscience and economics. His early essays, 'The foundation of American. b: 21 February 1921, Baltimore. mathematics' (written in 1925) and Cat: Social contract theorist. Ints: Moral and 'Mathematical logic' (written in 1926) revealed political philosophy; philosophical analysis . the influence of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Educ: Princeton University. Injls: Social Logico-Philosophicus and Russell and contracttheorists such as RousseauandHobbes. Whitehead's Principia Mathematica . Ramsey Appts: Assistant Professor, Cornell University; accepted Russell and Whitehead's logicist John Cowles Professor ofPhilosophy, Harvard, objective of deriving mathematics from logic, from 1976. but sought to do so without collapsing into the 164 Ri co eur

Main publications: actors. The actors in the original position, however, understand political affairs, princip les (1958) 'Justice as fairness ', Philosophical Review, of economic theory, the basis of social 67: 164. organization and the laws of human psychology (1971) A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Mass.: (pp. 137-8). They are also assumed to act with a Belknap Press and Oxford University Press. (1993) Political Liberalism , New York: Columbia sense ofrational self-interest and to be capable University Press. of a sense of justice (i.e. acting on the agreed principles) (pp. 140-5). According to Rawls the parties in the original position will arrive at the following two Secondary literature: princip les: First Principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total Barry, Brian (1973) The Liberal Theory ofJustice: A system of equal liberties compatible with a Critical Examination of the Principal Doctrines in 'A Theory of Justice ' by John Rawls, Oxford: similar system of liberty for all. Second Clarendon Press . Principle: Social and economic inequalities are Blecker, H. Gene and Smith,Elizabeth H. (I 980)John to be arranged so that they are both: (i) to the Rawls ' Theory ofSocial Justice: An Introdu ction, greatest benefit of the least advantaged, Athens : Ohio University Press. consistent with the just savings principle; and Chandran, Kukathas and Pettit , Philip (1990) Ra wls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics, Cambridge: (ii) attached to offices and positions open to all Polity. under conditions offair equalit y ofopportunity Daniel s, Norman (ed.) (1975) Reading Rawls: (p.302). Critical Studies in Rawls ' 'A Theory of Justice " According to Rawls liberty, the first Oxf ord: Blackwell. principle, is to have 'lexical' priority in that the Hart (1972-3) ' Rawls on liberty and its priority', University ofChicago Law Review. first principle must be satisfied before the Martin, Rex (1985) Rawls and Rights, Lawrence, second principle is considered (see Hart 1972­ Kans as: University Press of Kansas. 3,p . 534 for a critica l account, and Barry 1973). Pogge, Thomas (1989) Realizing Rawls, Ithaca, NY: Although Rawls is correct in stressing the Cornell Un iversity Press . Wolff, Robert Paul ( 1977) Understanding Rawls: A importance of liberty one cannot but raise Reconstruction and Critique of 'A Theory of others, the following questions. Will the Justice " Princeton University Press. origina l position always yield the two Rawlsian principles? Could it not, for instance , yield In his book A Theory ofJustice (1971) Rawls is education as a basic principle? Do the actors , concerned with discovering the principles ignorant of their society's economic and which any society must have if it is to be just. In political development, have sufficient order to arrive at these princip les he uses the information to arrive at the two principles? Or, hypothetical device ofplacing actors behind a do the actors agree on these principles because veil ofignorance . Each actor in this hypothetical they happen to be just in themselves? situation has no knowledge of his place in Sources: DAS. society, his class or social status, his INDIRA MAHALINGAM CARR psycho logical inclinations, his intelligence and strengths , the particulars of his rationa l plan of life, the economic and political situation ofhis society, the level of cultural attainment of his Ricoeur, Paul society and the generation to which he belongs (p. 137). Denia l of such information to the actors, according to Rawls, will allow them to French . b: 27 February 1913, Valence, Drorne, arrive at principles that are not evaluated purely France . Cat: Hermeneutics. In ts: on the basis of circumstances specific to the Phenomenology; existentialism; literary the Rico e ur 165 ory; Biblical studies. Educ: Philosophy, Secondary literature: Universities ofRennes and Paris.Infls: Jaspers, Marcel, Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer and Bourgeois , P. ( 1990) Traces of Understanding: A Freud. Appts: Professor of Metaphysics, Profile ofHeidegger s and Ricoe ur s Hermeneutics, Universities of Paris IV and Paris X; Dean of Amste rdam : Rodopi Wurzburg. Faculty, University of Paris X; John Nuveen Klemm, D. (1983) The Hemeneutical Theory ofPaul Professor Emeritus, University of Chicago. Ricoeur: A Constructive Analysis, London and Toron to: Associated Universities Presses. Reagan, C. (ed.) (1979) Studies in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. Main publications: Stevens, B. (1991) On Paul Ricoeur, London: Routledge. --(1991) L 'Apprentissage des signes: Lecture de (1950 ) Philosophie de la volonte. I. Le volontaire et Paul Ricoeur, Dordre cht: Kluwer. l 'involontaire, Paris: Aubier (English translation, Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary, trans. E. V. Kohak, Evanston: The first stage in Paul Ricoeur 's thought, Northwestern University Press). reinforced by his study ofthe works of Jaspers (1955) Histoire et verite, Paris: Seuil (English in a prisoner ofwar camp in Germany during the translation, History and Truth, trans. C. A. Kelbley, Second Wor!d War, is existentialist. This Evanston: Northwes tern University Press, 1965). existentialist basis then shifts towards ( 1960) Philosophie de la volonte. Finitude et phenomenolog y and the philosophies of culpabilite. I. L 'homme fa illible, Paris: Aubier Husserl and Heidegger-Ricoeur translated (Eng lish translation , Fallible Man, trans. C.A. the first volume of Husserl's Ideen into French . Kebley, Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1965). After phenomenology, or more precisely from (1960 ) Philosophie de la volonte . Finitude et within phenomenology, his thought proceeds to culpabilite. II. La symbolique du mal, Paris: Aubier a philosophical hermeneutics, the proper term (Eng lish translation , The Symbolism ofEvil, New York: Harper & Row, 1967). for Ricoeur 's mature philosoph y. Philosophical (1965) De l 'interpretation . Essai sur Freud, Paris: hermeneutics studies the diverse structures Seuil (English translation, Freud and Philosophy: through which meaning can be brought to the An Essay on Interpretation, trans. D. Savage, New subject, structures such as culture, religion, Haven: Yale Univers ity Press). society and language: it owes much to ( 1969) Le Conflit des interpretations. Essais de phenomenological study of experience but at l 'hermeneutique , Paris: Seuil (English translation, the same time offers a powerful critique of the The Conflict of Interpretations: Essay s in foundations of traditional phenomenology. Hermeneutics, Evanston: Northwes tern University Philosophical hemeneutics brings together two Press, 1974). strands ofhermeneutics correspondingto two of ( 1975) La Metaphore vive, Paris: Seuil (English Ricoeur's main interests: Biblical interpretation translation , The Rule of Metaphor. Multi­ and the philosophical question of textual Disciplinary Studies ofthe Creation ofMeaning in interpretation as found in Schleiermacher, Language, trans. R. Cze rny et al., Toronto: Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer. Here, the University ofToronto Press, 1978). (1983) Temps et recit, Tome I, Paris: Seuil (English self-transparent autonomous sujectivi ty at the translation , Time and Narrative, Vol. I, trans. K. foundation ofphenomenology is replaced by the McLaughlin and D. Pellauer, Chicago: Univers ity of need to interpret meaning as carried by various Chicago Press, 1984). structures. For Ricoeur the meaning carried by (1984) Temps et recit . Tome II. La Configuration dans structures such as texts cannot be known Ie recit de fiction, Paris: Seuil (English translation, absolutely and thus the subject cannot claim to Time and Narra tive, Vol. II, trans. K.McLaughlin absolute knowl edge or self-knowledge. If the and D. Pellauer, Chicago : University of Chicago central question for philosophical hermeneutics Press, 1988). is that of meaning then its guiding principle is 166 Rorty

that the many sources of meaning cannot be (1991) Objectivity, Relativism , and Truth , reconci led into a single account or discourse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (papers of Ricoeur's work is the attentive study of these 1983-9). various discourses and of how they impinge on the subject and undo any attempt to bring them together into one. Ricoeur 's work is important Secondary literature: in debates on phenomenology, existentialism, hermeneutics, critical theory, deconstruction and poststructuralism.It offers aphilosophy that Hall, David L. (1993) Richard Rorty: Prophet and mediates between the traditional position put Poet ofthe New Pragmat ism, Ithaca: SUNY Press . Malachowski , A. R. (ed.) (1990) Reading Rorty , forward by philosophers such as Gadamer in Oxford : Blackwel l. hermeneutics and Husser! in phenomenology Saatkamp, H. J. (ed.) (1995) Rorty and Pragmatism: and the poststructuralist critiques of those The Philosoph er Responds to His Critics, positions as encountered in the work ofDerrida Vanderbilt. or Lyotard (both of whom studied with West,C. (1989) The American Evasion ofPhilosophy, Ricoeur) . London: Macmillan (contains a critical version of Sources : Catalogues ofBibliothcque Nationale, Paris Rorty 's development, chapter 5, pp. 194-210). and National Library of Scotland. JAMES WILLIAMS Rorty's first book, The Linguistic Turn (1967) , contained a long introduction on the 'Metaphilosophical difficu lties of linguistic philosophy' which signalled many of his Rorty, Richard McK ay reservations about the analytical-linguistic tradition (from which he originated), as well as American. b: 4 October 1931, New York. Cat: revealing his interest in the nature and place of Post-analytical, hermeneutical, pragmatist. philosophy. Ints: Nature and history of philosophy; His large international reputation was metaph ysics . Educ: BA, Chicago, 1949; MA, founded by Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature Chicago , 1952; PhD, Yale, 1956. Infls: Dewey, (1979), which (like the work ofWittge nstein) Heidegger, Sellars, Wilfred S.and Wittgenstein. offered a comprehensive aetiology for the App ts: Yale, 1954-6; Wellseley, 1958-61 ; problems in current philosophy. (But, unlike Princeton, 1961-82; Virginia, 1982- ; many Wittgenstein, Rorty provides a good deal of visiting appointments. historica l analysis in support ofhis views .) According to Rorty, the mind, as a subjective mirror of objective, external nature , has been a persuasive and dominating presence in Western Main publi cations: thought ,at least from the time ofits most famous 'invention' by Descartes . A polarity between (1967) The Linguistic Turn, Chicago: University of mind and nature , he believed, lay behind the Chicago Press. very statement of the standard problems of (1979) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, epistemology. And that polarity was only Princeton: Princeton University Press . restated in a variant form when the mind (1982) Consequences of Pragmat ism , Minnesota: (regarded as a theatre for representations) was University ofMinnesota Press (papers of 1972-80). replaced , in the twentieth century, by language, (1989) Contingency , Irony, and Solidarity , and when the problems of epistemology were Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. recast as problems of(linguistic) reference. (1991) Essays on Heidegger and Others, Cambridge : Rorty has always been acute ly self­ Cambridge University Press (papers of 1983- 9). conscious about the nature of philosophical Rorty 167

activity, and Philosophy and the Mirror of elaborated dialogue with critics and Nature included theorizing about the role and commentators. status ofboth past (often erroneous) and future (1) If philosophers' truth cannot be pure and (redirected) philosophizing as an element in its timeless it can at least have some pragmatic wider diagnosis. Philosophy's prestigious role value . Rorty is a frank pragmatist about truth, as elitist cultural criticism, Rorty thought, was a identifying himselfas clearly in the tradition of consequence of the privileged terrain of the James and Dewey. This was much debated in mind (later, language) as a courtroom where the the 1980s, with not much progress beyond the philosopher could arbitrate on the acceptability positions staked out by James and Russell ofclaims to knowledge (later, meaningfulness), before 1910. often on the basis of 'foundationalist' (2) Rorty portrayed the representational theorizing, and sometimes with pretensions of mind as a source of problems underlying being outside history. The historical apparently opposed philosophical positions. dismantling ofthe mind removed the privileged That procedure could stand as a clear model of status of philosophy. Philosophical problems deconstructionist unmasking . He saw his own had to be seen as intrinsically non-timeless, approach as post-analytical, closer to the given that no one could expect to produce a approaches adopted in current continental finally correct, purely philosophical question European philosophy. He traced out a history of and answer. What was left, Rorty thought in Part influences leading towards his thinking, from III of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Nietzsche through Heidegger. This history has couldbe seen byuseof'Oakeshott's notion ofthe been the subject ofmuch debate, like his history conversation ofmankind: of earlier philosophy in Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature . His work on Derrida has To see keeping a conversation going as a created an obvious comparison with his own sufficient aim ofphilosophy, to see wisdom view of'philosophy as a kind ofwriting'. as consisting in the ability to sustain a (3) As an anti-foundationalist, anti­ conversation, is to see human beings as essentialist work, Philosophy and the Mirror of generators of new descriptions rather than Nature (like the PhilosophicalInvestigations of beings one hopes to be able to describe Wittgenstein) presented a remarkably accurately. essentialist story about the origin of (p.378) philosophical problems and the place of philosophy. (Rorty, though, has not yet tested He pointed towards what he thought to be the his thinking against what is apparently the most less dogmatic, less problem-solving tenor ofthe extremely non-historical territory: the hermeneutical tradition as a way forward . traditional problems in the philosophy of Philosophy, in any case, could be seen as a mathematics.) The thought that this story might 'literary genre' (Introduction to Consequences be a narrowly North American and European of Pragmatism, 1982, p . xiv)-a thought one was put to Rorty with some force at the personified by his transition at that time from a Inter-American Congress of Philosophy at Chair in Philosophy to one in Literature (then, Guadalajara in 1985. There, his notion of later, in Humanities). His view ofphilosophy as philosophy as play (a provocative extrapolation literature receives some incidental support from ofconversation) was subject to sharp criticism his own admirable style ofwriting: plain, lucid by Latin American philosophers who had been and often witty . in touch with a different European tradition of His work since 1979 has pursued themes philosophy as radical political critique (see initiated in Philosophy and the Mirror of Proceedings and Addresses of the American Nature, branching into an increasingly 168 Royce

Philosophical Association, vol. 59, no. 5, June Visiting Professor to Professor of Philosophy, 1986,pp.747-59). Harvard University. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989) pursues the themes developed and discussed in the decade after Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, but with a wider political Main publications: understanding. ('We Western liberal (1885) The Religious Aspe ct ofPhilosophy, Boston: intellectuals should accept the fact that we have Houghton Mifflin ; reprinted , New York: Dover, to start from where we are' ('Solidarity or 1955. objectivity?' (1985), in Objectivity, Relativism, (1892) The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, Boston : and Truth, 1991).Rorty's views were prominent Houghton Mifflin ; reprinted, New York: Dover, in debates over the social and cultura l position 1983. of philosophy which raged in American (1897) The Conception of God, New York: academe through the 1980s. He created for Macmillan. (1899-1900) The World and the Individual 2 vo ls, himse lf a problem ofcombining an estimation New York: Macmillan; reprinted, Magno lia, Mass. : ofany reasoned attitude as a contingent choice Peter Smith, 1983. of language with his own professed liberal (1908) The Philosophy of Loyalty , New York: preferences. His solution was a form of Macmillan. conscious ('ironic') self-consciousness: 'the (1908) Race Questions , Provincialism, and Other citizens of my liberal utopia would be people American Problems , New York: Macmillan. (1912) The Sources ofReligious Insight, New York: who had a sense of the contingency of their Charles Scribner's Sons. language ofmoral deliberation, and thus oftheir (1913) The Problem of Christianity, New York: community' (p. 61). Away of life could not be Macmillan; reprinted, Chicago : University of founded on a story based on truths about the Chicago Press, 1968. human condition (as discovered by (1914) Warand Insurance, New York: Macmillan. philosophers). It might be grounded in stories , (1916) The Hope ofthe Great Community , New York: but they would be ones told in drama, in fiction Macmillan. (1919) Lectures on Modern Idealism, New Haven, or in philosophy, without pretensions to being CT: Yale University Press . timeless discoveries. RICHARD MASON Secondary literature:

Clendenning, J. (1985) The Life and Thought ofJosiah Royce, Josiah Royce, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Marcel , G. (1945) La Metaphysique de Royce, Paris : Gallimard (English translation, Royce s American. b: 10 November 1855, Grass Valley, Metaphysics, trans. V. and G. Ringer, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956). California. d: 14 September 1916, Cambridge, Oppenheim, F. M. (1980) Roy ce s Voyage Down Massachusetts. Cat: Absolute idealist. In ts: Under: A Journ ey of the Mind , Lexington, Metaphysics. Educ: University of California, Kentuck y: University ofKentucky Press. Berkeley, AB 1875; Universities ofLeipzig and Smith, J. E. (1950) Royce sSocial Infinite, New York: Gottingen, 1875-6; Johns Hopkins University, Library of Liberal Arts Press . PhD 1878. Injls: Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Bradley, James and Peirce . The son of pioneer parents, Josiah Royce Appts : 1878-82, Instructor in English, brought to his philosophical career as the University ofCalifornia, Berkeley; 1882- 1916, leading American exponent of absolute idealism the flair of a Westerner. Already a Royce 169

Harvard University professor of philosophy, (1899-1900). Based on Royce's Gifford Royce published a history focused on the first Lectures delivered at the University of decade of the Americanization of California, Aberdeen, it identifies as the 'world knot' the California from the Conquest in 1846 to the double-barrelled question: What is an idea and Second Vigilance Committee in San Francisco how is an idea related to reality? Royce (Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 1886). He exposed distinguished the internal meaning of an idea the chicanery ofGeneral John Charles Fremont, from its external meaning .The internal meaning the principal figure in the American seizure of is the purpose in the mind having the idea; the the Mexican province. Pursuing his analysis of external meaning is the object to which the idea American character as susceptible to false refers. Inthe first volume of The World and the ideals, Royce also published a realistic Western Individual Royce distinguished four answers to novel, The Feud of Oakfield Creek (Boston : the question, each generating a conception of Houghton Mifflin, 1887). The novel depicts a being: realism, mysticism, critical rationalism feud between a San Francisco millionaire and constructive idealism. As a result of against a populist settler over the possession of Royce's dialectical examination, only the land. Royce's philosophical idealism dawned fourth-constructive idealism-is left standing early in his career. Kant and Hegel were his as the sole conception that bridges the gap philosophical idols, and the problems of between idea and reality. The idealist knowledge his earliest philosophical concerns. conception regards the purpose in the individual InGermany he attended the lectures ofH.Lotze, mind as an expression of the same Will that and at Johns Hopkins he studied under G. S. expresses itself in the world . Idealism, Morris . The first major fruition ofhis idealism according to Royce's argument, further was The ReligiousAspectofPhilosophy (1885), guarantees the reality of finite individuals a work which contains aunique argument for the embraced in the Absolute Individual. To make existence ofGod as the Absolute Knower. The his case Royce utilized conceptions derived argument proceeds from the existence oferror. from modern mathematics and mathematical Since truth consists in the correspondence ofa logic, and in particular sought to respond to the judgementto its object, and since alljudgements absolutism ofF. H.Bradley , who had denied the refer to the objects they intend, no judgement possibility of knowledge ofthe absolute. Thus could be deemed false, so that error would not the first volume contains, in addition to the exist. But error, the discrepancy ofa judgement lectures, a supplementary essay, 'The one, the with its real object, does exist. The possibility of many, and the Infinite' . Hence Royce was a error requires the supposition of further pioneer in the use ofmathematical logic in the judgements transcending the error. Such further formulation of philosophical argumentation. judgements culminate in an all-inclusive system Bradley's positive influence on Royce is evident of thought, or the Absolute Knower. Royce's in Royce's use ofthe term 'experience' instead argument for the absolute from the possibility of of the term 'thought' in his later philosophy. error persuaded few thinkers, although William Meanwhile, Royce's colleague William James, James at the time fell under its spell. Major with whom he had team-taught courses, was challenges, most notably in the debate arranged developing his own philosophy of radical by George Holmes Howison at the University of empiricism, pragmatism and pluralism, and the California in the summer of 1895, later debates continued on home ground . Inaddition, published in The Conception of God (1997), younger philosophers, such as Ralph Barton confronted Royce with the objection that his Perry, took issue with Royce's treatment of absolutism swallowed up personality and moral realism , and the movement ofnew realism was responsibility. Royce's next approach to the launched . Royce entered the fray. He insisted absolute was The World and the Individual that his own conception ofideas as purposes was 170 Russell

a form of pragmatism, which was tenable only if Pauline Christianity as the exemplar of the it was absolute . James's reduction of absolute principle ofthe community ofinterpretation.As idealism pragmatically to signifying merely individuals have the capacity to extend that, since the world is conceived to be perfect, themselves to embrace common events in the we may take ' moral holidays' had irritated the past and common deeds in the future as their morally conscientious Royce . After all, one of own, they are capable of forming communities Royce's arguments for personal immortality ofmemory and ofhope . Add to this capacity the had pivoted on his acceptance of the Kantian principle ofoyalty, or love, shaped by the Will to idea that the finite individual self needs all Interpret, and humankind is destined to form the eternity to fulfil his moral obligation.But Royce invisible Church, the Community of retorted in kind to James's strictures . He Interpretation, the Beloved Community. In a construed James's conception of truth to mean basic sense, Royce's last major work 'truth' is equivalent to the 'expedient', and he transformed the absolute into a community. translated the oath ofthe witness in the jury box Royce was intellectually and emotionally in court as follows : 'I swear to tell the expedient, shaken by the outbreak ofthe First World War. the whole expedient, and nothing but the He responded, hastily, to propose a visionary expedient, so help me future experience.' And scheme of international insurance to safeguard he persisted in his dismissal of realism as an nations against war. When insurance experts epistemology, charging that it placed an criticized the proposal as impractical, he offered unbridgeable gulfbetween ideas and reality.But a revision that did not allay the criticisms. Royce's indulgence in polemics did not deter Sources: DAB; Edwards; J. Clendenning (ed.) (1970) him from constructive philosophical work. In The Letters oj Josiah Royce, Chicago: Univ. of the wake of pragmatism, his thought turned Chicago Press; EAB. practical. In The Philosophy ofLoyalty (1908), ANDREW RECK he grounded morality, first, in the principle of loyalty as the commitment ofthe individual to a cause, and, ultimately, on the principle of loyalty to loyalty. The relation of the finite individual to the absolute persisted as Royce's Russell, Bertrand Arthur William most crucial philosophical problem. The Problem ofChristianity (1913), esteemed to be British . b: 18 May 1872, Trelleck, Wales. d: 2 Royce's greatest work, was his last major February 1970, Penrhyndeudraeth. Cat: attempt to solve the problem. Borrowing from Logical empiricist (with reservations). Ints: Charles Peirce the theory ofinterpretation as a Mathematical logic; metaphysics; philosophy triadic relation , he construed interpretation to be ofmind ; politics ; philosophy ofscience ;history a cognitive social process distinct from of philosophy; (opposition to) religion . Educ: perception and conception, and designated its Trinity College, Cambridge, 1890-4. Injls: three terms as (i) the consciousness being Hume, Peano, Moore and Wittgenstein. Appts: interpreted, (ii) the interpreting consciousness, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, 1895­ and (iii) the consciousness to whom the 1901 and 1944-70; College Lecturer, 1910-16; interpretation is addressed. Individuals University of Chicago, 1938-9; University of participating in interpretation are bound together to form a community, thereby California at Los Angeles, 1939--40; many exemplifying how many finite individuals can visiting appointments. become one community. Royce pointed to Ru ss ell 17 1

Main publications: Griffin , N. (1991) Russell 's Idealist Apprenticeship, Oxford : Clarendon Press. Hylton, P. (1990) Russell, Idealism and the The McMaster University Edition of Russell 's Emergence oj Analy tical Philosophy , Oxford : Collected Papers (London : Allen & Unwin, 1983- ) Clarendon Press. will be the definitive edition. Jager, R. (1972) The Developm ent of Bertrand See also Werner, M. (1981) Bertrand Russell: A Russell s Philosophy , London: Allen & Unwin. Bibliography ofhis Writings 1895-1976, Munich: Kilmi ster, C. (1984) Russell, Brighton: Harve ster. Saur, and Blackwell , K. and Juja, H. (eds) (1995) A Monk , R. (1995) Phantoms of the Dusk , London: Bibliography of Bertrand Russell, London: Cape (biography, vol. I). Routledge. In particular: Pears, D. F. (196 7) Bertrand Russell and the British (1900) A Critical Exposi tion of the Philosophy of Tradit ion in Philosophy , London: Fontana/Collins. Leibniz, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ryan, A. (1988) Bertran d Russell: A Polit ical Life, (1903) The Principles ofMathematics, Cambridge: Harmondsworth: Allen Lane. Cambridge University Press; second edition, 1937. Savage , C. Wade and Anderson, C. A. (eds) (198 9) (1905) 'On denoting ', in Mind (reprinted in many Rereading Russell: Essays in Bertrand Russell s collections). Metaphysics,Minneapolis:University of Minne sota (1910) Philosophical Essays, London : Longmans, Press. Green. Schilpp, P.A. (ed.) (1944) The Philosophy of Bertrand (1910-1 3) (with A. N. Whitehead) Principia Russell , Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern Mathematica, Cambridge: Cambridge University University Press. Press; second edition , 1925- 7. (1912) The Problems of Philosop hy London: William s & Norgate. Russell summed up his work, not always (1913) The Theory of Knowl edge; in Collected without some reconstructive hindsight, in My Papers, vol. VII, ed. E. R. Eames and K. Blackwell, Philosoph ical Development (1959) and in his London: Allen & Unwin, 1984 (pub lished posthumously). Autobiography (1967-9). In 1895 he formed a (1914) Our Knowledge ofthe External World as a plan to 'write one series of books on the Field f or Scientific Method in Philosophy , London: philosophy of the sciences from pure Open Court. mathematics to physiology, and another series (1918) The Philosophy ofLogicalAtomism (lectures), of books on social questions. I hoped that the in Monist, 19 18- 19. (1919) Introduction to Math ematical Philosophy, two series might ultimate ly meet in a synthesis London: Allen & Unw in. at once scienti fic and practical' (1967-9, vol. I, (1921) TheAnalysis of Mind London:Allen & Unwin. p. 125). The first part of this project was (1927) The Analysis ofMatt er, London: Kegan Paul. achieved, but not the final synthesis : most (1940) An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth , London: commentators agree that there is an Allen & Unw in. (1945) A History oj Western Philosophy , London: unbridgeable gap between his writings on Allen & Unwin. metaphysical or mathematical philosoph y on (1948) Human Knowledge: Its Scop e and Limits, one side and his works on morality, education, London: Allen & Unwin. politics and his polemics against religion on the (1959) My Philosophical Development, London: Allen & Unw in. other. This latter part of his output (see Ryan (1967- 9) Autobiography, London:Allen & Unwin. 1988 for a full discussion) has been far less highly valued by later academic critics , although the proportion ofhis writing remaining Secondary literature: in print must be testimon y to its continui ng popularity. His long philosophical career fell into Ayer, A. J. (1972) Russell, London: Fontana/Collins. Blackwell , K. (1985) The Spinozistic Ethics of several phases . Bertrand Russell, Lond on: Allen & Unwin. 172 Rus sell

(1) Until 1898, he was a Hegelian idealist point for philosophical questioning, and was (see Griffin 1991), a period he repudiated therefore unable to shake off the set of entirely. traditional problems associated with the (2) Then, he wrote : 'Itwas towards theendof reliability of ' our ' knowledge of 'the external 1898 that Moore and I rebelled against both world' . Here, he ended in a familiar cui de sac: Kant and Hegel. Moore led the way, but I 'the whole of what we perceive without followed closely in his footsteps' (1959, p. 54). inference belongs to our private world . In this Until around 1911 he was deeply engaged in the respect , I agree with Berkeley. The starry philosophy and foundations of mathematics, heaven that we know in visual sensation is espousing varying forms of strongly realist inside us. The external starry heaven that we metaphysics and epistemology. believe in is inferred' (ibid., p. 27). (3) In 1911 he met Wittgenstein, first as his (2) He always maintained a reasoned teacherand soon as a colleague.He had a period confidence in what he was happy to collect of atomism allied to forms of neutral monist under the title ofscience ,accepting its results as ontology, with an increasing interest in data for philosophy, and preferring to clothe his language . philosophical writing in scientistic terminology (4) From about 1927 to 1938 he spent much ('analysis', 'atomism', 'incomplete symbols'). time away from narrowly defined philosophy, This preference may have been a reaction lecturing and writing on a huge range ofpopular against the view ofmetaphysics as a consolatory subjects . branch of belles lettres which he castigated in (5) Between 1938 and about 1950 he his idealist predecessors. returned to academic philosophical work, (3) More important, he always maintained making contributions to the philosophy of that philosophy, in analogy with 'science', science . could and should deliver substantive results : (6) From 1950 to his death at the age of 98 in theories about what exists, what can be known , 1970, most of his energies went on extremely how we come to know it. This assumption in his active political campaigning. work caused some ofits most serious problems, Russell said that his original interest in and also set it apart in the most obvious way philosophy had two sources : from both the early and the late thinking of Wittgenstein. Although he shared the early On the one hand, I was anxious to discover Wittgenstein's use of a language ofanalysis, a whether philosophy would provide any work such as The Philosophy of Logical defence for anything that could be called Atomism (1918; very unlike Wittgenstein's religious belief, however vague ;on the other Tractatus) was deeply ambiguous about the hand, I wished to persuade myself that nature of the analytical enterprise, its objectives something could be known , in pure and the nature of its end-points.The status of his mathematics ifnot elsewhere. 'logical atoms' was entirely unclear. The whole (1959,p.ll) project was presented as a 'scientific' investigation into what sort ofthings exist, and It is impossible to summarize common or how the mechanism ofperceptual knowledge is continuous views in his work ;but them are some meant to work . Yet he understood that he was in assumptions that do underlie it from 1898 what he himselfbelieved to be the territories of onwards . physics and empirical psychology. Russell (1) He never moved away from an retained a desire for an edifice ofphilosophical egocentric, Cartesian stance as the starting- theory which would somehow explain how the Russell 173

mechanism ofperception related to what can be Both physics and psychology were builtupon'a known (or, sometimes, said). Here, his roots in neutral stuff' (p. 287). The mind itself was the traditions ofBritish empiricism are evident construed along Humeian lines , with 'a (see Pears, 1967), overlaid with an apparatus of collection of events connected with each other modern logic and dressed in quasi-scientific by memory-chains' (p. 27) as a modernized language. version of'Humc's congeries ofideas . Russell's important contributions to Russell's paper of 1905, 'On denoting', was philosophy began negatively, with his rejection the foundation of much twentieth-century ofthe idealism he had read in Bradley and heard philosophizing about language (F. P. Ramsey from McTaggart (see Hylton 1990). His study called it 'a paradigm ofphilosophy'). The overt of Leibniz (1900) gave an example for later question was the 'meaning' ofexpressions such analytical-historical studies in identifying a as 'the common factor of 6 and 9' (or, more handful of crucial tenets in Leibniz, and then problematically, 'the integer between 2 and 3') diagnosing the conflicts inherent in them. The or 'the King ofFrance'.The questionwas forced same procedure was applied by Russell (and on Russell by his assumption that the meaning Moore) against idealism. There, the crucial of terms was what they stood for (following a tenet was claimed to be the 'dogma of internal model ofnaming). Such 'definite descriptions' relations' : all individuals are necessarily related plainly had meanings where , in some cases, they to each other, forming a single Whole. Russell stood for nothing. The essential point of his argued for the existence of genuinely theory, Russell wrote, independent individuals and the entire truth of particular statements (see his Philosophical was that although 'thegolden mountain' may Essays, 1910).His leap from idealism to a world of separate facts raised problems about the be grammatically the subject ofa significant ontological status of those facts, and the proposition, such a proposition when rightly relations between a judging subject, a analysed no longer has such a susbject. The judgement and an object ofjudgement (see F. P. proposition 'the golden mountain does not Ramsey, 'Facts and propositions', Aristotelian exist' becomes ' the propositional function "x SocietySupplementary Volume, 1927, for a clear is golden and a mountain" is false for all discussion). Regardless of his difficulties, to values ofx' . him, pluralism was a necessary presupposition (1959, p. 84) of ' analysis' (see The Philosophy ofLogical Atomism, 1918, I). Existence was understood in terms of truth: Russell's ontological speculations were "TheauthorofWaverleyexists" means "there is never resolved. By the time of The Analysis of a value ofc for which the propositional function Mind (1921) he had reached this view: 'x wrote Waverley' is always equivalent to 'x is The stuff of which the world of our c' is true'" (p. 85). experience is composed is, in my belief, 'On denoting' showed how a logical form neithermind nor matter, but something more could differ from obvious forms of common primitive than either. Both mind and matter language. But it was not until 1918, Russell seem to be composite, and the stuffofwhich claimed later, that he first become interested in they are compounded lies in a sense between the definition of,meaning' and in the relation of the two, in a sense above them both, like a language to fact. 'Until then I had regarded common ancestor. language as "transparent" and had never (p. 11) examined what makes its relation to the non­ linguistic world' (1959,p.145).Althoughinhis 174 Rus s ell

final period , after 1950, he tended to play down an end to his 'logical honeymoon', as he said his earlierwork on language (perhaps as a result (1959, p. 75). His interpretation ofnumbers as of his scorn for what he considered as trivial , classes ofclasses was underrninded by paradox: ' linguistic' philosophy), some ofthat work had consider a class that is not a member ofitself­ been well ahead of its time. From 1921, for is it a member ofitself?-ifyes, then no-ifno, example, there isa passage that could have come then yes. The theorizing required to avert this from Wittgenstein twenty years later: paradox cost Russell years of thought, and led to the development of important parts of the Understanding words does not consist in technical apparatus in Principia Mathematica. knowing their dictionary definitions, or in Later, after 1911, discussions with Wittgenstein being able to specify the objects to which convinced Russell that the logicist project was they are appropriate. Understanding flawed in principle. He came to accept the view language is more like understanding cricket: of the Tractatus that mathematical statements it is a matter of habits, acquired in oneselfand are vacuous tautologies, not truths about a realm rightly presumed in others .To say that a word oflogico-mathematical entities . has a meaning is not to say that those who use In 1938, aged 66 and temporarily tired by the word correctl y have ever thought out two decades of political polemics, Russell what the meaning is: the use of the word returned to the academic teaching of comes first, and the meaning is to be distilled philosophy. The results-An Enquiry into out of it by observation and analysis . Meaning and Truth (1940) and Human Moreover, the meaning of a word is not Knowledge ( 1948)---eontained valuable work absolutely definite : there is always a greater on scientific method . He came to the view that or less degree ofvagueness . inductive inference cannot be enough for (The Analysis ofMind , 192I ,pp.197-8) 'science ', and moved towards a surprisingly Kantian position that some 'principles of inference' must be presuppos ed: 'Andwhatever ... and more strongly still: 'Formy part, I believe these principles of inference may be, they that, partly by means ofthe study ofsyntax, we certainly cannot be logically deduced from facts can arrive at considerable knowledge of experience. Either, therefore , we know concerning the structure of the world' (last something independently of experience, or words ofAn Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, science is moonshine' (1948, p. 524). He ended 1940). by expressing his deeply ingrained empiricism Russell's reputation is most unshakeable in in the broadest, most general terms : logic and the philosophy of mathematics. His early search for a solid base of certainty for such inadequacies as we have seemed to find mathematical truth led him to the view that it in empiricism have been discovered by strict was grounded in logic. His logicism was adherence to a doctrine by which empiricist develop ed independently from the earlier work philosophy has been inspired : that all human ofFrege, and was expressed in notation he had knowledge is uncertain, inexact, and partial. learned from Giusepp e Peano in 1900. The Principles ofMathematics (1903) and the three To this doctrine we have not found any volumes of Principia Mathematica (1910-13, limitation whatever. written with A. N. Whitehead) remain as (ibid., closing words) treasure-stores ofpainstaking logical argument: the foundation for modem, systematic logic (see Nothing has been said here about Russell's Kilmister 1984). But the cracks in Russell's works on moralit y, politics and religion . These project began to show as early as 1901, putting were copious , forceful, elegant and full ofwit, Ryle 175

but he himself rarely saw them as original. He century, and this is not negligible. He himself never shook off the radical, aristocratic, came to judge his political campaigning against Victorian liberalism inherited from his parents. nuclear weapons as more valuable than His attitude to religion was essentially that ofan theoretical philosophizing. Whatever one eighteenth-century rationalist. thinks of that, the example he set for the role of An interesting angle on the tensions between an intellectual in practical affairs has been Russell's many concerns is seen in his affection hugely influential. (Here he resembles Noam for Spinoza (see Blackwell 1985) and a Chomsky, who delivered the memorial lectures Spinozistic strain that appears many times in his on Russell in Cambridge in 1970.) writing (most strikingly, at the end of The The Principles ofMathematics (finished on Problems ofPhilosophy, 1912). Passages such the last day ofthe nineteenth century), written at as this, on Spinoza, must have contained some great speed, with a passion of intellectual element of would-be self-portraiture:'The love discovery, must remain a monument to ofhumanity is a background to all his thoughts , Russell's great logical gifts. His place, with and prevents the coldness which his Frege, as a founder and builder ofmodern logic, intellectualism might otherwise engender. It must be untouchable. was through the union ofthe love oftruth and the His influence as a philosopher is less clear. love of humanity, combined with an entire Versions of logical empiricism similar to absence of self-seeking, that he achieved a Russell's varied positions remained popular in nobility, both in life and in speculation, which academic philosophy in the USA for some time has not been equalled by his predecessors or after the influence of Wittgenstein had successors in the realm of philosophy' (review obliterated them in Britain . Russell's analytical, of Hale White and Stirling's translation of quasi-scientific approach remained the Spinoza's Ethics , The Nation , 12 November dominant style in philosophy (but regrettably 1910, in Collected Papers, vol. VI, p. 254). without his elegance and wit). Russell's repeated attempts at systematic His relationship with Wittgenstein has been philosophical theorizing maintain their interest much debated. From 1911 to 1913 Russell's more from the brilliance ofhis writing and the problems became Wittgensteiri's problems .The virtuosity of his logical talents than from the extent of his intellectual generosity towards creation ofany single positive set ofviews that Wittgenstein was poorly acknowledged and has could be encapsulated as Russell s Philosophy. not been adequately recognized. (Indeed, it seems to have been fairly early in his RICHARD MASON careerthat he realized he was fated to change his mind so often that a lasting synthesis was unlikely.) Russell is still the most widely read philosopher in the analytical tradition , as he Ryle, Gilbert might have wished : 'Philosophy proper deals with matters ofinterest to the general educated British . b: 19 August 1900, Brighton , England . public , and loses much of its value if only a few d: 15 October 1976, Yorkshire (died while on professionals can understand what is said' holiday) . Cat: Analytical philosopher. Ints: (1948, p. 5). His popularity has had one Epistemology; philosophy of mind; theory of important consequence: his writings may have meaning ; Plato. Educ: Queen's College , brought more peopleto an interest in philosophy Oxford . Appts: Taught at Oxford ; served with than those of anyone else in the twentieth the Welsh Guards ; Waynflete Professor of 176 Ryle

Metaphysical Philosophy, 1945; Editor of him initially to a study of the work of recent and Mind, 1947. contemporary German philosophers, such as Meinong, Brentano, Bolzano, Husserl and Heidegger, and it is with these authors that his Main publications: first publications were concerned. But a distincti vely Rylean answer to these problems

(1931- 2) 'Systematically misleading express ions' , began to emerge with the 1932 paper Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Society 32. 'Systematically misleading expressions' . This (1933) John Locke on the Human Understanding, argues that philosophical puzzles arise from a Oxford: Oxford University Press (lecture). failure to notice that some expressions, often of (1945) Philosophical Arguments, Oxford: Clarendon ordinary language, are 'of such a syntactical Press (inaugural lecture). form that [they] are improper to the fact (1949) The Concept ofMind, Lond on and New York: recorded ', and hence that the philosopher 's job Hutchinson. (1954) Dilemmas, Cam bridge: Cambridge University is 'the detection of the sources in linguistic Press. idioms of recurrent misconc eptions and absurd (1962) A Rational Animal, London: Athlone Press theories ' (emphasis added).For example,justas (lecture). 'Mr Baldwin is a statesman ' picks out a subject (1966) Plato s Progress, Cambridge: Cambridge and says that the subject has an attribute, so University Press. grammar would suggest that ' Mr Pickwick is a (1971 ) Collected Papers, 2 vols (vol. I: Critical fiction ' in a similar way picks out a subject and Esssays; vol. 2: Collected Essays, 1929- 68), London: Hutchinson; New York: Barnes & No ble. says that the subject has an attribute. But this (1979) On Thinking, ed. K. Kolend a, Oxford: suggestion, Ryle argues, is false. It is clear from Blackwell; New Jersey: Rowm an & Littlefield. the article that Ryle thinks that those who are (1993) Aspects ofMind, ed. Rene Meyer, Oxford: misled by systematically misleadin g Blackwell. expressions are not the ordinary, unreflective users of them, but rather those (like philosophers) who theorize about them, and are Secondary literature: hence led to postul ate strange existents (like Mr Pickwick, or, more philosophically, Platonic Addis, Laird and Lewis, Dougl as (1968) Moore and forms, propositions, universals, etc.). What is Ryle: Two Onto logists, University ofIowa Press. less clear from the article is what makes an Kolend a, K.(ed) (1972) Studies in Philosophy: A expression non-misl eading, or 'proper' to the Symposium on Gilbert Ryle, Hou ston: Rice facts it records . University. This conception of philosophy is extended, Lyons, William (1980) Gilbert Ryle: An Introduction to His Philosophy, Brighton: Harvester Press. and given lengthy application, in Ryle's best­ Wood, Osca r P.and Pitcher, George (eds) (1960) Ryle: known work, The Concep t of Mind (I949). The A Collection of Critical Essays , New York, book is a prolon ged attack on Cartesian dualism, Doubleday (good bibliograph y and which Ryle mockingly labels 'the official autobiographic al sketch). doctrine', or the dogma of the ghost in the machine. He argues that the Cartesian is guilty Ryle's earliest philosophical interests focused of a series of 'category mistakes '-in other on problems about philosophical method: what words, that he has been misled by systematicall y is characteristic of the sorts of questions that misleading expressions. Exactly what a philosophers ask, and how are such questions to category is, is never made clear, but roughly it is be satisfactorily answered? These concerns led a range ofitems ofwhich the same sorts ofthings Ryle 177

can be meaningfully asserted. Thus, in a cricket ofhis conduct are managed'. He argues instead team, the bowler and the batsman belong to the that one can make mistakes about one 's feelings same category, in that they are members ofthe and sensations because the description ofthem team .But team spirit would belong to a different often embodies a hypothesis about what caused category, since it is not a further and ethereal them (for example, a chill ofdisquiet, a tug of member of the team but rather is a set of commiseration) and this hypothesis can be relations between the members , and relations mistaken . This may be true, but it does not between entities are not themselves a further establish the official behaviourist programme. entity ofthe same kind .Again, two citizens who Problems about the nature of the mind, and the pay taxes belong to the same category, but the recurrent temptation to think of our mental life average tax-payer belongs to a different one. as a set of operations performed in a private Ryle argues that the Cartesian has failed to 'inner' theatre, continued to preoccupy Ryle in notice that our mental and physical concepts his later writings, and some of his subsequent belong to different categories. Realizing that reflections can be found in the second volume of talk about the mind is not talk about a physical his Collected Papers (1971) and in the two entity, the Cartesian concludes that it must be posthumous collections of material On talk about a non-physical entity, failing to Thinking (1979) and Aspects ofMind (1993). realize that it is not talk about an entity ofany It was not just in the field of mind that Ryle kind . In addition to, and perhaps as a deployed his conception of philosophical consequence of, making this overarching methodology. InDilemmas (1954), he sought to category mistake , the dualist is then led into show that other philosophical puzzles (about subsidiary errors ofa similar kind, for example fatalism, about infinity, about the contrast in confusing occurrences or episodes on the one between common sense and science , etc.) arise hand, with dispositions, tendencies and out of a misunderstanding of how language capacities on the other. operates, and can be solved by getting clear Ryle's positive thesis , which assigns about the proper logic of everyday concepts . mentalistic talk to what he regards as the correct Part ofhis interest in Plato (revealed in a number category, treats talk about the mind as talk about ofarticles in volume 1 of the Collected Papers , the way in which we behave . 'In describing the and in Plato 50 Progress, 1966) derived from his workings ofaperson's mind',he tells us, 'we are ability to interpret Plato as engaging in the sort not describing a set ofshadowy operations. We oflogico-linguistic analysis which Ryle himself are describing the ways in which parts of his favoured .Without in any way founding a school conduct are managed' . So to say that someone of'Ryleans', Ryle was an immensely influential was painting thoughtfully would be to say how philosopher. With Wittgenstein and Austin, he was painting, not to say his painting was although in a very different way from each of accompanied by a second invisible process of them, he was responsible for the linguistic thinking . It is statements like this, and others method of philosophizing which dominated the with a similar content, which support the middle decades of the century and which was interpretation of Ryle as a logical behaviourist. known as linguistic philosophy. Although few But Ryle's account ofspecific mental concepts philosophers would now endorse the often falls short of his programmatic behaviourism of The Concept of Mind, its declarations. When talking about emotions and insistence on a priori connections between mind sensations, for example , he does not attempt to and behaviour would still be widely accepted­ show that in describing someone as feeling a for example, by functionalists among others . pang , weare 'describing the ways in which parts Even philosophers such as D.M.Armstrong and 178 Santayana

D. C. Dennett, who would count themselves Secondary literature: among Ryle's critics , would acknowledge the influence on them of Ryles thinking. IfRyle's Ames, Van Meter (1965) Proust and Santayana: The writings now seem the products of an earlierera, Aesthetic WayofLife,New York: Russell & Russell. it is because their consid erable lessons have Arnett, W. E. (1957) Santayana and the Sense of been so thoroughly absorbed into contemporary Beauty, Bloomin gton: Indiana University Press. thinking. Butler, R. (1956) The Mind ofSantayana , Chicago: Henry Regnery. Cory, D. M. (1963) Santanaya: The Later Years, New Sources: Edwa rds; DNB ; Turner; WW. York: Braziller. NICHOLA S EVE RITT Duron, J. (1949) La Pensee de George Santayana, Paris: Nizet. Farre, L. (1953) Vida y Pensam iento de Jorge Santayana , Madrid: Verdad y Vida. Lachs, J. (1988) George Santayana, Twayne Santayana, George (Jorge Augustin Publishers. Levin son, H. S. (1992) Santayana: Pragma tism and Nicolas Ruiz de S.) the Spiritual Life, University of North Carolina Press. Spanish . b: 16 December 1863, Madrid. d: 29 Mun son, T. N. (1962) The Essential Wisdom of September 1952, Rome. Cat: Systematic George Santayana,New York: Columbia University Press. philosopher. Ints: Metaphysics ; epistemology; Schilpp , P.A. (ed.) (1940) The Philosophy ofGeorge ethics; aesthetics; politics. Educ: Taken to Santayana , Evanston and Chicago : No rthwestern America 1872; educated at Harvard. Infls: University Press. Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza .Appts: Member of Sprigge, T. L. S. (1974) Santaya na, London: Philosophy Department, Harvard, 1889- 1912; Routledge. an inheritance allow ed him to relinquish his post in 1912, after which Santayana lived in Europe, Santayana is usually thought of as the author of based chiefly in Rome, and devoted himself to The Sense ofBeauty (1896) and of its central writing (he retained Spanish nationali ty all his thesis, that beauty is pleasure taken to be a life but wrote in English). property of an object. It is a quirk ofhistory that the creator of the system ofthe Realms ofBeing (1927-40), and of its predecessor The Life of Main publications: Reason (1905-6), should be best known for a doctrine he does not refer to after his first book. All publi shed by Scribn ers (New York) and Constable One of the reasons for the compa rative neglect (London). A collected edition of works up to 1940, of Santayana 's works since his death has the Triton Edition, was publi shed by Scribners (14 undoubtedly been his prose style: a poet, volumes) . A new complete works is curr ently being issued by the MIT Press. essayist and novelist as well as a philosopher, (1896) The Sense ofBeauty. Santayana preferred to write in a prose which is (1905-6) The Life ofReason, 5 vols. mellifluous, metaphorical and often beautiful. ( 1910) Three Philosophical Poets. His reputation as a prose stylist is unassailabl e, (1913) Winds ofDoctrine. ( 1916) Egotism in German Philosophy. but his work did not find favour with those who (1923) Scepticism and Animal Faith. believed that philosophy should be written as it (1927/30/38/40 )The Realms ofBeing. was by William James or Russell. (1933)Some TurnsofThoug ht in Modern Philosophy. The major work of the early part of ( 1946) The Idea ofChrist in the Gospels . Santayana' s career is The Life of Reason (5 (1951) Domin ations and Powe rs. Santayana 179

volumes) , an evaluative survey of human therefore our worldview contains non­ institutions from the standpoint of ethical indubitable elements. Further, Santayana eudaemonism: happiness is the good for distinguishes between existence and being: to humankind, and is best secured by the exist is to stand in external relations such that harmonizationofour various interests by the use these relations are not deducible from the nature of reason . Santayana surveys society, religion , of the existent. Being is the ontological status art and science , estimating which, if any, ofthe attributable to, for example, definite qualities forms of these institutions exhibited in history which do not happen to be part of the existing have promoted the rational life, and sketching univers e, for exampl e a definite shade ofcolour. alternative, ideal forms. These surveys are Santayana next proceeds to divide what there is prefaced in the first volume , Reason in Common into four irreducibly different categories, the Sense, by an account ofthe birth ofreason, the four realms ofbeing: essence, matter, truth and process whereby the immediate flux of spirit. experience is ordered by the mind . What An essence is a character or quality which emerges is the 'common-sense' world picture of has the ontological status ofbeing, and the being a universe ofphysical objects and minds, with a ofevery essence is exhausted by its definition, concomitant development of self­ not in words, 'but the character which consciousness, and a shift from instinctive distinguishes it from every otheressence . Every action to the deliberate pursuit ofideals. Hence, essence is perfectly individual' (Triton Edition, Santayana says that his subject is progress . He vol. XIV, p. 19). All essences are universal and sets out to answer the question: 'In which of its eternal, being individual, outside space and adventures would the human race, reviewing its time, and standing in no external relations . The whole experience, acknowledge a progress and totality of all essences is the realm of essence a gain? ' (Triton Edition, vol. III, p. 13). and is infinite . Santayana insists that all The stress on progress and the dynamic essences are equally primary, although whether reform of institutions gave this work this can be true oftheessence ofpure being itself considerable appeal in the USA, where is a moot point. Some essences are manifested in elements of aestheticism and detachment in existence; one mode of manifestation is to be Santayana's earlier works had attracted adverse imagined by a consciousness; another is criticism. Interestingly, when free of the embodiment in matter. Harvard ambience (which he never liked), Matter is the only active principle among the Santayana developed in the Realms ofBeing a realms of being . It is external to consciousness, system in which a refined aestheticism becomes spatial ,temporal and mutable : all change and all prominent. The compatibility of this system existence (as distinct from being) is grounded in with that ofthe Life ofReason is a central issue matter. It is the flux of matter which determines in Santayana studies . which essences are embodied, and accordingly Santayana prefaces the later system with determines the content of the realm of truth . Scepticism and Animal Faith (1923), in which Spirit (i.e. consciousness) is an epiphenomenon its epistemological basis is set out. Ifknowledge ofmatter.A central concept in this philosophy of nature is that ofatrope, defined as the essence or is that which is beyond all doubt, then the only form of an event. This notion is used by acceptable epistemology is a solipsism of the Santayana to define what he calls the psyche . present moment. However, it is psychologically Denying all causal efficacy to spirit, Santayana impossible to live by such a belief; we have an has to find a material agent to determine the irresisitible urge ('animal faith') to believe in course oflife and both body and spirit, and this the independence of the external world, and is the psyche, 'a system of tropes, inherited or 180 Sartre

acquired, displayed by living bodies in their Reason , whereas it is prominent in The Realms growth and behaviour' (Triton Edition, vol. ofBeing. XIV,p .324). ROBERT WILKINSON Santayana held a correspondence theory of truth : propositions are true if what they assert to be the case is the case, and the sum of all true propositions is the realm of truth . Further, Santayana contends that any fact has a complete Sartre, Jean-Paul description which constitutes the truth about it. Since such a description, however, would French . b: 1905, Paris. d: 1980, Paris. Cat: include a specification of all the relations ofthe Existentialist. Ints: Phenomenology; ontology; fact, any complete description ofany fact would psychology. Educ: Ecole Normale Superieure, be infinite . The realm oftruth is that segment of 1924-8;research student at the Institut Francais the realm of essence which happens to be in Berlin and at Freiburg University, 1933-5. illustrated in existence. Infls: Literary influences : Descartes, Hegel, The fourth realm of being is that of spirit or Husserl, Heidegger and Marx. Personal consciousness. Spirit and body are not two facts influence: Simone de Beauvoir. Appts: Taught incongruously juxtaposed and mysteriously philosophy at lycees in Paris and elsewhere. related : they are realizations ofthe same fact in incomparable realms of being . Spirit is a moral integration and dignity accruing to a body when the latter develops a certain degree of Main publications: organization and responsiveness to distant things . It is incarnate by nature, not accident, (1936) 'La Transcendence de l'ego', in Recherches and cannot exist disembodied. Santayana Philosophiques 6 (English translation, 'The sometimes defines spirit as the inner light of transcendence ofthe ego ', trans. F. Williams and R. attention, and attention is by definition Kirkpatrick, New York: Noonday Press, 1957). transitive . An instance of awareness Santayana (1936) L 'Imagination, Paris: Alcan (English calls an intuition, and the object given in translation, The Imagination , trans. F. Williams, intuition is an essence .When an essence is taken University ofMichigan Press , 1962). to be a sign ofsomething in the external world, (1939) Esquisse d 'une theorie des emotions, Paris: Hermann (English translation,Sketchfora Theory of our knowledge ofthe object is symbolic . When the Emotion s, trans. Philip Mairet, Methuen, 1962). the essence is intuited for itself, our knowledge (1940) L'Imaginaire: psychologie is said to be literal. Pure intuition Santayana phenomenologique de l'imagination, Paris: considers to be the natural function of spirit, to Gallimard (English translation, The Psy chology of which it tends whenever it can (which is, Imagination, New York: BemardFrechtman, 1948). generally, very rarely) . To experience essences (1943) L 'Etre et Ie neant, Paris: Gallimard (English in pure intuition is also to experience them translation, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel aesthetically, and so the spiritual and aesthetic Barnes , London: Methuen, 1957). modes oflife turn out to be identical. (1960) Critique de la raison diale ctique, part I, Paris: In many respects, Santayana's claim for the Gallimard (English translation, Critiqu e of unity of his earlier and later thought is Dialectical Reason , trans Hazel Barnes , New York, defensible: many major positions remain 1964). (1983) Cahiers pour une morale, Paris: Gallimard unchanged, notably materialism and (English translation, Notebooksfor an Ethics , trans. epiphenomenalism. There is room for a David Pellaner, Chicago: University of Chciago contemplative ethic in both systems, though it is Press, 1992). true that it is hardly mentioned in The Life of Sartre 18 1

(1983) Les Carnets de la drole de guerre, Paris: political comment. His first novel, Nausea Gallimard (Engli sh translation, War Diari es, trans . (1938), succeeds both as philosophy and novel. Q. Hoare, London: Verso Books). His trilogy of novels Roads to Freedom is (1985) Critique de la raison dialetique, vol. 2 regarded as a classic of twentieth-century (incomplete), Paris: Gallimard. literature. (1989) Verite et existence, Paris: Gallimard (English Sartres early work is influenced by and is translation, Truth and Existence, trans. Ronald Aronson, Chicago: Chicago University Press , also critical of Husserl and Heidegger . In The 1992). Transcendence of the Ego (1936) he uses a phenomenological method , derived from Husserl , to describ e the structure of consciousness. At the same time he argues Secondary literature: against Husserl's identification of the self with transcendental consciousness. In The Blackham , H. J. (1961) Six Existentialis t Thinkers, Imagination, The Psychology of the London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Imagination and Sketch for a Theory of the Catalano, J. S. (1987) Commentary on Jean-Paul Emotions (1936, 1940, 1939) he works at the Sar tre s Critique of Dialectical Reason, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. borderline betweenphilosophy and psychology. Cranston, M. (1962) Sartre, Edinburgh: Oliver & In the last of these he criticizes the theories of Boyd. James ,Janet and Dernbo , rejects Freud 's theory Danto, A. C. (1975) Sartre,New York: Viking Press . ofthe unconscious and develops his own view Howells, Christina (ed.) (1992) The Cambridge of emotion as a means of transforming the Companion to Sartre, Cambridge: Cambridge world. University Press. Sartres Being and Nothingness (1943) is a Manser, A. (1967) Sartre, New York: Oxford major document of existentialism. He describ es University Press. Murdoch, 1. (1953) Sartre, Romantic Rationalist, it as 'an essay on phenomenological ontolog y'. Cambridge: Bowes & Bowes . Its primary question is: 'What is it like to be a Warnock, M. (1972) The Philosophy of Sartre, human being?' Sartre's answer is that human London: Hutchinson. reality consists of two modes of existence: of being and of nothingness . The human being Sartre was a leading exponent of atheistic exists both as an in-itself (ensoi), an object or existentialism, a novelist, playwright and critic thing, and as a for-itself (pour-sol s, a as well as a philosopher. He was at one time a consciousness. The existence of an in-itself is Communist, then a Marxist. In later life he 'op aque to itself ... because it is filled with developed his own style of Marxist sociolog y. itself '. In contrast, the for-itself, or During the Second World War he was a soldier consciousness, has no such fullness of and for nine months was a prisoner of war in existence, because it is no-thing . Germany. After his release he worked in the Sartre sometimes describes consciousness of Resistance Movement and when the war ended things as a kind of nausea produced by a became editor of Les Temps Moderne. In 1964 recognition ofthe conting ency oftheir existence he was awarded, but refused ,the Nobel Prize for and the realization that this constitutes Literature. He became politically active after Absurdit y. The realization generates a desire of the 1968 May Revolt. His last major the for-itsel fto exist with the fullness of being of philosophical work, the Critique ofDialectical an existing thing but without contingency or Reason (1960) was written , he maintained, to loss of consciousness. The desired embod ying reconcile existentialism and Marxism. ofconsciousness is never possible : it can never Concomitantly with his philosophical work he become a thing and remain consciousness. The was producing novels, plays, criticism and two regions ofbeing are entirely distinct and the 182 Saussure

ideal offusing them is 'an unrealizable totality transformation of the Hegelian dialectic by which haunts the for-itself and constitutes its showing that rational human activity, or praxis , very being as a nothingness of being'. He says: is necessarily dialectical. He saw Marxism as 'It is this ideal which can be called God ... man the dominant philosophy of the twentieth fundamentally is the desire to be God .' century and existentialism as one element in its According to Sartre, consciousness, because structure . At the same time he criticizes it is nothingness, makes us aware of the Marxism's way ofobserving society as a whole possibility ofchoosing what we will be. This is within a dialectical framework and its neglect of the condition ofhuman freedom . To perform an the individual point of view. He therefore action a person must be able to stand back from advocates the use of the dialectic from the participation in the world ofexisting things and agent's standpoint and argues that praxis , so contemplate what does not exist. The choice examined, shows itself to embody the ofaction is also a choice ofoneself. In choosing dialectical procedures as a necessary condition oneselfone does not choose to exist: existence is of its activities: we unavoidably use it, he given and one has to exist in order to choose. maintains, whenever we attempt to examine From this analysis Sartre derives a famous ourselves or society at large. This is the basis of slogan of existentialism: 'existence precedes the proposed interaction of Marxism and and commands essence'. He maintains that existentialism that will enable Marxism to take there is no reason for choosing as one does. The on 'a human dimension' . choice is unjustified, groundless. This is the Sartre has been criticized for the conception perpetual human reality. oftotal human freedom he expounded in Being 'Bad faith' is an important concept in and Noth ingness, and especially for the Sartrean existentialism. To act in bad faith is to implications ofhis account ofthe human being turn away from the authentic choosing of as a solitary individual who is detachable from oneself and to act in conformity with a historical and social contexts (see, for example, stereotype or role . Sartre's most famous Murdoch 1953, chapter 7). In the Critique he example is that ofa waiter : repudiates much of that early position and admits limits to freedom . Let us consider this waiter in the cafe. His Some of Sartre's philosophical writings movement is quick and forward, a little too have, in accordance with his wishes, been precise, a little too rapid . He comes towards published posthumously; most significantly, the patrons with a step a little too quick ... his Notebooksfor an Ethics (1983), a work that goes voice, his eyes express an interest a little too some way to fulfilling the promise Sartre made solicitous for the order ofthe customer ... he at the end of Being and Nothingness to devote a gives himself the quickness and pitiless subsequent work to ethical questions. rapidity of things ... the waiter in the cafe DIANIl": COLLINSON plays with his condition in orderto realize it. (l943,p.59)

After the Second World War Sartre began a Saussure, Ferdinand de radical reconstruction ofhis ideas. He planned the Critique ofDialecticalReason (1960) in two volumes, the first to be a theoretical and abstract Swiss. b: 1857, Geneva. d: 1913, Geneva. Cat: study, the second a treatment ofhistory, but he Language theorist ; semiotic ian. Educ: completed only one volume . His aim was to Universities of Geneva, Berlin and Leipzig. establish an a priori foundation for dialectical Infls: The neogrammarian school oflinguistics. thought which would justify Marx's Appts:Teacheroflanguages, Ecole Pratiquedes Saussure 183

Hautes Etudes, Paris ; Professor of Linguis tics, University of Leipzig during his studies there, University ofGeneva. although he was ultimately to react against what was essentially a philologically oriented style of linguistics. The only book published by Main publications: Saussure during his life was the early neogrammarian-influenced Me moire (1878), a work of comp arative phil ology which ( 1878) Memoire sur le sys teme primitifdes voyelles investigated the vowel system of early Indo­ dans les langues indo-europeennes, Leipzig: publi sher unknown . European languages, but his fame rests on the (19 16) Cours de linguistique generale , ed. Charles Course, published posthumously from student Bally,Albert Sechehaye and Albert Reidlinger, notes of his University of Geneva lecture series, Paris: Payot (Course in General Linguistics, trans. 1907-11. Saussure's primary concern in the Wade Bask in, London: Peter Owen, 1960). Course is to outline a methodology for linguistics, thus establishing the nature of the linguist's object of study and placing the subject Secondary literature: on a scientific footing. What he is searching for in his enquiry is the underlying structures of language. It is this methodolo gical bias which Aarsleff, Hans (1982) From Locke to Saussu re: Essays on the Study ofLanguage and Intellectual marks him out from previous schools of History, London: Athlone Press. linguistics, which in the main had treated the Culler, Jonathan (1975) Structuralist Poetics: subject historically. The linguis tic model Struct uralism, Linguisti cs and the Study of developed by Saussure has been adopted and Literature, Lond on: Routledge; Ithac a, NY: Cornell refined by structuralist theoris ts such as Levi­ University Press. Strauss and Barthes, and through their work and -- (1976) Saussure , London: Collins. Holdc roft, that of their followers has attained a powerful David (1991) Saussure: Signs, System, and Arbitrariness, Cambridge : Cambridge University cultural significanc e. Saussure's most Press. important insight is probably his recognition Koerner, E. F. K. ( 1973) Ferdinand de Saussure: The that language is a system: a self-contain ed and Originand Development ofhis Linguistic Thought in self-regulatin g totality with its own set of rules Western Studies of Language, Brauns chweig: and procedures, or grammar. Language as a Vieweg . system (langue), the primary object of Starobin ski, Jean (1979) Words Upon Words: The Saussures enquiry, is differentiated from Anagrams ofFerdinand de Saussure, New Haven: langua ge as a set of utteranc es (parole), with Yale University Press. chess, another self-contain ed, self-regulating totality, being put forward as an analogy for how Saussure is acknowledged to be the founder of langue operates. The heart of Saussure' s modern linguistics, the thinker most responsible linguistics is the theory of the sign, an entity for reorgani zing the discipline alon g scientific consisting of a signifier (a word, whether lines . Through his Course in General spoken or written) and a signified (the mental Linguistics (1916) he, had a major impact not image or conc ept lying behind a word) . When just on linguistics but on cultural studies in signifier and signified combine in an act of general, the book providing the basis for the understanding, the word ' dog' and the concept development of structuralism and semiology, of 'dog' for example, they form the sign . the theory ofsigns. Saussure's earliest source of Language for Saussure is a system of signs influence was the neogrammarian school of bound together by grammatical conv entions , historical linguistics that he encountered at the and it constitutes the model for all other sign- 184 Saussure

systems within the general science of landmarks of twentieth-century intellectual semiology. When we respond to a sign within a history, particularly in the way that it establishes system , as to the colour showing on a traffic the credentials oflanguage as the crucial site for light, we do so according to our understanding debates about culture . In this respect Saussure is ofthe grammar ofthe parti cular system . To say one ofthe major sources ofwhat has been called that the sign is conventional is to say that it is the 'linguistic tum' in modem intellectual arbitrary-c-one word being as good as another to enquiry. Within linguistics itself Saussure's describe an object, as long as there is general influence lives on in the development of agreement as to its use amongst the relevant structural linguistics-c-one of the dominant language-users-and this has been one of the trends in the discipline-from the work of most contentious notions in Saussure, since it Jakobson and the Prague School (who raises the spectre of radical instability of influenced Levi-Strauss in their turn) down to meaning . Saussure himself was unhappy with Chomsky and his transformational-generative the implications of the notion and eventually grammar. In wider cultural context Saussure's settled for the rather unsatisfactory solution of linguistic theories have provided the basis for ' relative' arbitrariness instead . The structuralism, with the terminology and various arbitrariness ofthe sign allows it to change over binary oppositions of the Course being taken time, and Saussure distinguishes between over wholesale by structuralists and language in its synchronic and dischronic semiologists. Until the advent of forms. The former refers to language as a static poststructuralism the linguistic model totality complete with its constant element (its developed by Saussure constituted one of the grammar), the latter to language in its most powerful and influential analytical tools evolutionary phases in time where change can available to culture theorists , and Saussure's occur, say in the meaning of a word. Saussure ideas have been enthusiastically propagated in further distinguishes between syntagmatic and fields as diverse as anthropology (Levi­ paradigmatic relations as regards words . When Strauss), fashion and advertising (Barthes) and words are strung together in phrases or even psychoanalysis (the post-Freudian French sentences , these grammatically organized psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan has argued that sequences are called syntagms ; when words are the unconscious is structured like a language). more loosely connected (as in the 'association of The standard approach adopted by the ideas' mode of thinking), then they are structuralist in the analysis of any cultural described as being in associative (or phenomenon is derived straight from paradigmatic) relation . Value is seen to be Saussurean methodology: it is to demarcate the system-bound and function-oriented for boundaries of the system in question, then to set Saussure: the value ofa word is a matter of its about classifying the operations ofthe system's functional relationship to other words in its grammar within synchronic and diachronic sequence. perspective. Even post-structuralism, which Saussure also pursueda rather curious theory consciously seeks to undermine the in later life that Latin poets had deliberately assumptions ofstructuralist methodology, such concealed anagrams of proper names in their as the commitment to deep structures and to work, although he never managed to produce metaphysical essences in general , owes a any very hard evidence for his belief and considerable debt to Saussure since it is his published nothing on the topic. Saussure.'s work notion of the arbitrariness of the signifier that has proved to be a major source of inspiration provides one ofthe starting points for the post­ both inside and outside the field of linguistics, structuralist project. Derridean deconstruction, and the Course can be considered one of the as a case in point , relentlessly emphasizes the Sch el er 185 signifier's arbitrariness in order to back up its Secondary literature: claim that meaning is basicall y unstab le, thus licensing some of the wilder flights of post­ Frings, M. S. (1965) Max Scheler, Pittsburgh: structuralist fantasy. Derrida's deployment of Duquesne University Press . Saussure in the cause ofpoststructuralism has --(ed.) (1974) Max Scheler (1874-1928): ensured that the latter figure remains a Centennial Essays , The Hague : Marti nus Nijhoff. significant cultura l force right through to the Good , P. (ed .) (19 75) Max Schel er im close ofthe twentieth century. Gegenwa rtsgeschehen der Philosophie, Bern . Perrin, R. (1991) Max Scheler 's Concept of the STUARTSIM Person, London: Macmillan.

The early years of Scheler's philosophical career were spent in lena, which at that time was Scheler,Max dominated by idealism of the neo- Kantian variety. Howeverthe study ofHusserl's Logical Investigations converted him to German. b: 22 August 1874, Munich.d: 19 May phenomenology, which he interpreted as 1928, Frankfurt. Cat: Phenomenologist. Ints: essentially realist in character. In 1906 he Value theory ; epistemology; metaphysics; moved to Munich and joined an already philosophy of religion ; sociology of flourishing circle ofphenomenologists . But in knowledge; philosophical anthropology. Educ: 1910 he became a private scholar, having had to University of lena. Infls: Husserl , Augustine, resign his position in Munich for persona l Pascal , Nietzsche and Bergson . Appts: 1899­ reasons . This situation lasted until his 1906, Lecturer, University of lena; 1906-10, appointment to a Chair in Cologne in 1919. At Lecturer, University of Munich; 1919-28, the beginning ofthe First World War he wrote Professor of Philosophy and Sociology, his The Genius ofWar and the German War, in University of Cologne; 1928, Professor of which, like many other intellectuals including Philosophy, University of Frankfurt. Husserl, he saw something positive in war, a kind of spiritua l regeneration. After the war, however, he adopted a pacifist position. For a time he was a committed Catholic .However, he Main publications: never had any time for official Church philosophy, drawing inspiration from (1913) Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Augustine rather than Aquinas . He later materiale Wertethik(Engli sh translation ,Formalism distanced himself from Catholicism and even in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethi cs ofValue, tran s. M. from theism . He died at the height ofhis powers S. Frings and R. L. Funk, Evanston : Northwestern in 1928, shortly after his move to Frankfurt. His University Press, 1973). (1913) Zur Phdnomenologie und Theorie der friend and admirer, Martin Heidegger, Sympathiegefiihl e und von Liebne und Hass announcing his death to his own students in (English translation, The Nature ofSympathy , trans . Marburg , described Scheler as the most P.Heath, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954). powerful force in contemporary philosophy. (1921) Vom Ewigen im Menschen (Engli sh Scheler was not a typical academic translation, On the Eternal in Man , trans. B. Wall, philosopher. He was an elemental force, a kind London: SCM Press). ofphilosophical volcano . The sheer profusion (1926) Die Wissensform en und die Gesellschaft. ofhis ideas and the lack ofany clearly defined (1928) Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosm os. unity makes summary difficult. For a large part All included in: of his career he described himself as a (1954) Gesamm elte Werke, Berne :A. Francke Verlag. 186 Scheler

phenomenologist. What attracted him about Such phenomenological description embraces Husserl's Logical Investigations was the attack both the 'object' of such consciousness, as on psychologism and the defence of the intended, and the various forms of religious possibility of the intuition ofessences . He was 'act' which make up such consciousness. There deeply hostile to the idealistic form which can be no proof(Beweis) ofGod's existence but Husserl's phenomenology subsequently there can be an Aufweis, in the sense of a assumed. Scheler's phenomenological realism bringing to see. In his later, less is distinctive in the epistemological priority it phenomenological and more metaphysical, gives to feeling and emotion over 'theoretical' work in this area God is depicted not as a modes of consciousness. Perhaps the best preexisting entity but as something emergent in example ofScheler's phenomenology at work is man in the course ofa cosmic struggle between his Formalism in Ethics (1913), the work for spirit (Geist) and urge (Drang) ,the two essential which he will probably be best remembered. In attributes of the primordial ground of being this work he defends what would nowadays be (Urgrund des Seins) . called a form of moral realism. It is partly a Other features of Scheler's thought which negative work, designed to demonstrate the deserve mention are: inadequacies ofthe most influential attempt to (1) His concept ofpersonhood. A person is combat subjectivism and relativism, viz. not a thing or substance, not even a non-physical Kantian ethics, that 'colossus of steel and thing or substance . Rather a person is the bronze' as Scheler calls it. The formalism and 'executor', 'doer' (Vollzieher) of 'acts'. It does consequent emptiness of Kant ian ethics rests on not exist as something behind its acts but in and a failure to distinguish between goods as things through its acts. As such persons in their that are desired and aimed for and values. Kant personhood can never be objectified. is absolutely right in thinking that ethics with its (2) His treatment of the 'problem of other unconditional requirements on conduct cannot minds' .Rejecting both analogical inference and be based on goods. But it does not follow that it empathy as the basis of such knowledge, he cannot be based on values . It is a mistake to claims that attention to the 'phenomenological suppose that what is a priori concerns form only. facts' shows that we directly perceive the other Values are a priori and moreover exhibit a person's joy in their laughter, their sorrow in hierarchical order which is itselfa priori . There their tears, and so on. We can only deny this on is clearly some affinity here with the the basis of the presupposition that perception is intuitionism of Moore and Ross (Scheler was simply a 'complex ofphysical sensations'. familiar with the former) . But whereas the (3) His conception of the sociology of apprehension ofvalue is something essentially knowledge, which investigates the connections intellectual for these British intuitionists, for between different kinds of knowledge and the Scheler values are disclosed in feelings . The value systems of different social groups . denial of cognitive significance to feelings, he However, he insists that this does not amount to thinks , rest on the mistaken view that feelings sociologism, which would have the same are simply internal occurrences, lacking sceptical and relativistic consequences as the intentional structure . It would be interesting to psychologism so effectively refuted by Husser!. investigate, from a Schelerian perspective, how (4) His notion of philosophical far Hume's subjectivism rests on an inadequate anthropology. In his Die Stellung des Mensch en understanding ofthe nature offeeling . im Kosmos (1928) he deals first with those Scheler also applied phenomenology to elements which human beings share with notable effect in the field ofreligion . In his On animals : feeling-urge (Gefiihlsdrang) , in stinct, the Eternal in Man (1921), written when he was associative memory and organically bound still a professing Catholic, he describes the practical intelligence. As regards these features essential structures of religious consciousness. human beings differ from animals only in Schlick 187

degree. The essential difference is that human (1935) Sur le fondement de la connaissance, Paris: beings have spirit (Geist), animals do not. It is Herma nn. spirit which makes human beings open to the (1937) L'Ecole de Vienne et la ph ilosoph ie traditio nelle, Travaux du IXe Congres International world (weltoffen) in the sense that they are able de Philosophie, Paris: Hermann. to objectify things and view them as they are (1938) Gesamm elte Augsdtze, Vienna: Gerold & Co. rather than being wholly absorbed in an (1948) Gesetz, Kausa litdt und Wahrscheinlichkeit, 'e nvironment' (Umwelt) structured by their life Vienna : Gero ld & Co. needs. (1948) Grundziige der Naturphilosophie, Vienna: PAUL GORNE R Gerold & Co (English translation, Philosophy of Nature, trans, von Zeppelin, New York : Philosophic al Library, 1968). (I 952)Naturund Kultur, ed.1.Rauscher, Vienna: Stgt Humboldt Verlag. (1979) Philosop hical Papers, 2 vols, ed.Mulder and Schlick, Friedrich Albert Moritz van de Velde Schli ck, Vienna Circle Collection no. II , Dordrecht: Reidel. (1986) Die Proble me der Philosophie in ihrem German. b: 14 April 1882, Berlin . d: 22 June Zusam menhang, ed.Mulder et al., Hamburg: 1936,Vienna. Cat: Physicist; philosopher Suhrkamp (English translation, The Problems of physics. Ints: Epistemology. Educ: Berlin Philosophy in their Interconnection, tran s. Heath, 1900--4, Heidelberg 1901, Lausanne 1902; PhD Vienna Circle Collecti on, no. 18, Dordrecht: Reidel, in Physics, Berlin, 1904; Habilitation, Rostock , 1987). 1911 (concept of truth) . Infls: Helmholtz, Kirchhoff, Hilbert, Mach, Planck, Poincare and Wittgenstein. Appts: Rostock 1911-21 , Kiel Secondary literature: 1921; Chair of the History and Theory of the Inducti ve Sciences, University of Vienna, Ayer, A. 1. ( 1970) Logical Positivism, Lond on: Allen 1921-36. & Unwin. Gadol, E. T. (1982) Rationality and Science, Vienn a, Springer. Haller, R.(ed.) (1982) Schlick und Neurath ein Main publications: Symposion, Amsterdam : Rodopi . John ston, W. M. (1972) The Austrian Mind, Berkeley: (1917) Raum und Zeit in der moderne Phys ik, Berlin: University ofCalifornia Press. Spr inger (English translation, Spa ce and Time in Juhos, B. (1967) ' Schlick, Moritz', in Paul Edwards Contemporary Physics, Oxford : Clarendon, 1920). (ed.) Encyclopedia of Philosophy, N ew York : ( 1918) Allgemeine Erkennt nislehre, Berl in: Springer; Macmillan, VII: 319a-324b. second edition, 1925 (English translation , Genera l Kraft, V. (1950) Der Wiener Kreis, Vienna: Springer Theory ofKnowledge , Blumberg, Vienna and New (English translation , The Vienna Circle , trans. A. York: Springer, 1974). Pap, New York: Philosophical Library, 1953). (192 1) (ed. with P.Hertz) H. von Helmholtz, Schriften Neurath, O. (1935) Le Developpement du Cercle de zur Erkenntnist h eorie , Berlin : Sprin ger. Vienne et I 'avenir de I 'empiris me logique, Pari s: (1922 ) (with M. Rubn er and E. Warburg) Helmholtz Herma nn. als Physiker, Physiologe und Philosop h, Karl sruh e: Passmore , J. A. (1957) A Hundred Years of C. F. Muller. Philosophy; second edit ion, Lond on: Duckworth , (1925) 'Naturphilosophie' , in M.Dessoir (ed.) 1966. Lehrbuch der Philosophie, Berlin, II, 397-492. Reichenba ch, H. (1951) The Rise of the Scientific ( 1927) VomSinn des Lebens, Erlangen: Palm & Enke . Philosophy , Berkeley and Los Angeles: University (1930) Fragen der Ethik, Vienna: Springer (English ofCalifornia Press. translation, Problems ofEthics, trans. Rynin, New Ryckman , T. A. (199 1) ' Conditio sine qua non. York: Prenti ce-Hall , 1939). Zuordnung in the early epistemo logies of Cass irer (1934) Les Enonces scientifiques et la realite du and Schli ck' , Syn these 88: 57-95. monde exte rieure, Paris: Herm ann. 188 Sea rl e

Waismann , F. and McGu inness, B. (eds) (1967) among his predecessors, in French and English Wittgenstein lind der Wiener Kreis, Oxford: as well as in German, including the nineteenth­ Blackwell (Engli sh translation , Wittgenstein andthe century positivists and neo-Kantians. His Vienna Circle, trans. Schulte and McGuiness , system, however, has much in common with Oxford: Blackwell, 1979). that of Duhem of the early 1890s, no doubt because of their mutual dependence on Moritz Schlick was the key figure in the later nineteenth-century physicists like Kirchhoff development of the neo-positivist Vienna and acquaintance with highly formaliz ed Circle. An early exponent of Einstein's mathematical systems . It has also, with its relativity theory he was brought , at the strongly fallibilist tendenc y, much that would suggestion of Hans Hahn, from Kiel to the have been more acceptable to Popper than the Vienna Chair orginally created for Ernst Mach . later verificationist and probabilistic theories At least initially, though , his work shows no associated with neo-positivism. Its one feature trace of the verificationist doctrines usually in common with later neo-positivism is its associated with the Vienna Circle . Schlick's insistence that analytic a priori and synthetic a approach also differed from that of his posteriori are mutually exclusive, and on the associates in that there was little oftheir obvious principle of contradiction. The verifiability left-wing and anti-clerical politics. Schlick's theory of meaning was very much a later anti-m etaphysical programme sought a more development, possibl y under the influence of scientific and rigorous philosophy, depending the Wittgenstein ofthe Tra ctatus. It is difficult to on a logical analytic approach. Inthis, no doubt, see how Schlick could have acquiesced in he was one source ofthe anti-historical attitude anything like the doctrine , possibl y that so marked off the neo-positivists from even misrepresented by Ayer , that meaningful their hero Mach among their predecessors. In sentences were logical constructions out of his early work the general theory ofknowledge sense data. For if sense data are genuine was to be modelled on the abstract sciences , sensations , signs could never be logical particularly physics and mathematics. It was to constructions ofwhat they signify, and if not, it be purely discursive, consisting of the remains unclear how concepts and propositions knowledge of the relations between things, not do in fact represent the actual sensations . the acquaintance with things in themselves , Sources: Metzler; H. Feigl (1937) in Erkenntnis 7: which he regarded as metaphysical. Such purel y 393-419; P. Frank (1949) Modem Science and its propositional knowledge was to be attained by Philosophy, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP; conjectural systems ofconcepts set up as signs Ziegenfuss & lung; NoB , 19: 120-8; DSB 1975: to represent things, to symbolize them and their 177a-1 79b (bibliography). mutual relations , and be verified after the fact. Truth, not rejected by Schlick but regarded as R. N. D. MARTIN easily obtainable compared with the more valuable generality of relations , is defined by the existence ofunambiguous reference to the facts. In this discursive propositional system Searle, J(ohn) R(ogers) concepts were defined implicitl y by their place in the system , and theory was thought of as a kind ofnet giving each concept and thus object American. b: 1932, Denver. Cat: Analytic its place. It thus functioned as a classification of philosopher. Ints: Philosophy of language ; reality. philosophy of mind. Educ: Universiti es of It is hard to assign the detailed influences Wisconsin and Oxford . Injls: Gottlob Frege, behind Schlick's work. He shows acquaintance Ludwig Wittgenst ein and 1. L. Austin . Appts: with most of the empiricists and rationalists 1959, Assistant Professor. 1964, Associate Strawson 189

Professor, 1967, Professor, University of one may be, for instance , commanding, California, Berkeley ; visiting positions in apologizing, or whatever. Such further acts Britain, Italy, Germany, Canada , Brazil, Searle called 'illocutionary acts'. Much of Norwa y and the USA ; 1977, Member of the Searle 's early work was devoted to clarif'ying American Academy ofArts and Sciences. the notions of propositional and illocutionary acts, and classifying the various sorts of illocutionary act. A speech act is an action, and much of Main publications: Searle's more recent work has been an attempt to forge an account ofthe mental- in particular (1958) ' Proper names ', Mind 68. to give an account of intentionality. His account (1964) ' How to derive "ought" from "is'" , places intentionality within the area of the Philosophical Review 73. biological: according to Searle , the mind is (1969) Speech Acts, Cambridge: Cambridge caused by and realized in the physical structure University Press. (1978) 'Prima facie obligations', in Joseph Raz (ed.), ofthe brain. Although he favours a naturalistic Practical Reasoning , Oxford: Oxford University account he has resisted popular reductionist Press. theories . Most famously, he has argued against (1979) Expression and Meaning, Cambridge: the fashionable attempt to understand the mind Cambridge University Press. as a computer program: in his famous 'Chinese (1980) 'Minds, brain s, and programs', The room' argument, he argued that computer Behavioraland Brain Sciences 3. programs are specified in purely syntactical (1983) Intentionality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. terms, and thus cannot capture the semantic (1984) Minds, Brains and Science: The 1984 Reith dimension that is essential to many mental Lectures, London: British Broadcasting phenomena. Corporation. One of Searle's earliest, and most famous, (1985) (with Daniel Vanderveken) Foundations of articles ('How to derive "ought" from "is'") Illocut ionary Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge already used some ofthe techniques ofspeech­ University Press. act theory, arguing that such linguistic practices (1992) The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, as promising enabled one to derive , by normal Mass.: MIT Press. logical means, evaluative conclusions form factual premises. Searle's work has, from the beginning, engendered considerable Secondary literature: controversy-in the case of his rejection of computer models of the mind, from outside of Lepore, Ernest and van Gulick, Robert (eds) (1991) the philosophical community. The conception John Searle and His Critics, Oxford: Basil of speech acts, however, has become part of Blackwell. common philosophical thought. Parret, Herman and Vershueren, Jef (eds) (1992) Sources: Personal communication. Searle on Conversation, Amsterdam Press and John ANTHONY ELLIS Benjamins.

Searle has tried to develop a comprehensive theory of language and the mind . Following Strawson, Peter Frederick Austin, he held that all speech consists of 'speech acts' and speech acts have different levels. Uttering a sentence-referring and British . b: 23 November 1919, London . Cat: predicating-Searle called a 'propositional Analytical philosopher of logic and language . act'. But in performing a propositional act one Ints: Epistemology; metaphysics. Educ: St may thereby perform a further act: in uttering it John's College, Oxford . Infls: Analytical and 190 Strawson

Oxford philosophy, in particular H. P. Grice . The influence of analytica l and ordinary Appts: 1946, Assistant Lecturer in Philosophy, language philosophy account for Strawson's University College ofNorth Wales; John Locke interest in language, thought and their 'objects' . Scho lar, University of Oxford; 1947-68, This interest appears already in 'Truth' Lecturer in Philosophy (1947) , Praelector (Analysis, 1949), which attacks the semantic (1948), Fellow (1948-68), Honorary Fellow theory oftruth: 'true' does not describe semantic (1979) of University College, Oxford; 1960, or other properties; rather, 'true' and 'false' are Fellow of the British Academy ; 1966-87, performative orexpressive-to say a sentence is Reader (1966-8), then Waynflete Professor of 'true' is to express agreement with it. This Metaphysical Philosophy (1968-87), article prompted his controversy with 1. L. University of Oxford; 1968-87, Fellow, then Austin, a defender of the correspondence Honorary Fellow (1989), Magdalen College, theory of truth : explaining truth as Oxford; 1971, Honorary Member, American correspondence between statements and facts Academy ofArts and Sciences; 1977,Knighted; fails, argues 1990, Member, Acade mia Europaea; several Strawson, since facts are not something visiting appointments in the USA and Europe . statements name or refer to-s-Tacts are what statements (when true) state' (1971 , p. 196). Strawsori's 1950 article 'On referring' Main publications: (collected in 1971) attacks Russell's 'theory of definite descriptions ' . For Russell , a sentence (1952) Introdu ction to Logical Theory , London: such as 'The King of France is wise' is false, Methuen. since, when analysed, it contains an assertion of (1959) Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive existence (namely,'There is a King of France ') . Metaphysics, London: Methuen; new edition, Russell 's analysis, Strawson argues , London: Rout ledge, 1990. (1966) The Boun ds of Sense: An Essay on Kant s compounds the notions of referring to 'Critique of Pure Reason '; new edition, London: something and asserting its existence-'to refer Routledge, 1990. is not to assert' (p. 15)-though in referring to (1971) Logico-Linguistic Papers, London: Methuen. something one may 'imply' (in the specia l sense (1974) Freedom and Resentment, and Other Essays, Strawson reserves for this word) that it exists . London: Methuen. Strawson argues that Russell fails to distinguish (1974) Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar, London: Methuen. sentences (or expressions), their use and their (1985) Scepticism and Naturalism: Som e Varieties. utterance. Whereas for Russell a sentence is The Woodbridge Lectures 1983, London: Methuen. true, false or meaningless, Strawson maintains (1992) Analysis and Metaphysics: An Introduction to that a sentence is significant in virtue of Philo sophy , Oxford : Oxford University Press. conventions governing its use, irrespective of whether the sentence, when uttered, is about something. A sentence such as that concerning Secondary literature: the King ofFrance is meaningful but, ifnot used to refer to something, the question of its truth or Corvi, Roberta (1979) La filosofia di P F Strawson , falsity does not arise. Scien ze Filosofiche 24, Milan: Vita e Penserio. Interest in the relation between forma l logic Van Straaten , Z. (ed.) (1980) Philosoph ical Subj ects: and ordinary language continues inlntroduction Essays Presented to P F Strawson, Oxford: to Logical Theory (1952) , which partly aims 'to Clarendon Press (includes select bibliography of bring out some points ofcontrast and of contact Strawsori's work to 1980). between the behaviour of words in ordinary speech and the behaviourofsymbols in a logical system' (p. iv). Formal logicians cannot, Tarski 191

Strawson argues , give the exact , systematic arguing that a subject expression presupposes logic of expressions of everyday speech, 'for some empirical fact identifying a particular, these expressions have no exact and systematic Strawson comes to regard particulars as logic' (p. 57). Formal logic is an ' idealized 'complete' and universals as 'incomplete', thus abstraction' revealing certain structural traits of giving added depth to Frege's notion of ordinary language but omitting others . The 'saturated' and 'unsaturated' sentence notion of a gap between formal logic and constituents. ordinary language has drawn criticism (for The conclusions reached in Individuals form example, Quinein Mind , 1953), but it motivates the basis for later works, notably The Bounds of Strawson's criticisms of the formal semantics Sense (1966) and Subject and Predicate (1974), popularized by Donald Davidson (see 'On but also underpin Strawsori's examination of understanding the structure ofone's language', scepticism and naturalism in 1985, where he in Freedom and Resentment, 1974). rejects philosophical scepticism and reductive Strawson's concerns also appear in naturalism by appeal to certain traits in ordinary Individuals (1959), the subtitle of which , ways ofthinkingand speaking.Certain essays in however, marks a new interest in 'descriptive Freedom and Resentment, however, show metaphysics' . This enterprise differs from Strawson's work in other areas of philosophy 'revisionary metaphysics', in that while (notably ethics and aesthetics); and in his most 'descriptive metaphysics is content to describe recent publication (1992, published in France in the actual structure of our thought about the 1985), based on introductory courses taught at world, revisionary metaphysics is concerned to Oxford, he examines the nature ofphilosophical produce a better structure' (p. 9), and from practice (which turns out to be largely his own) . conceptual analysis in its scope and generality, In this work, he distances himselffrom ordinary since its aims 'to lay bare the most general language philosophy and reductive analytical features of our conceptual structure' . The philosophy, regarding philosophy as the attempt book's first part maintains that material bodies to understand the relations between concepts, an are the basic particulars to which we refer and of attempt that, while broadly 'analytical', does which we predicate qualities, kinds, etc. not aim to reduce such concepts to others more Chapter 3, 'Persons', argues for the simple . primitiveness of the concept of a person, 'a type Sources: P. F. Strawson (1988) 'Ma philosophie: son of entity such that both predicates ascribing devcloppcmcnt, son theme central et sa nature states of consciousness and predicates ascribing generale ',RTP 120: 437-52; WW; IWW; Burkhardt; corporeal characteristics are equally Edwards. applicable to a single individual of that single STUART LEG GATT type' (p. 102). Making states ofconsciousness secondary in relation to the concept ofa person enables Strawson to avoid traditional difficulties concerning the mind-bodyproblem. The book's second part examines the distinction Tarski, Alfred between logico-grammatical subjects and their predicates. Reflection on two traditional criteria Polish-American. b: 14 January 1902, Warsaw. for this distinction allows Strawson to view d: 26 October 1983, Berkeley, California. Cat: particulars as paradigm logical subjects and thus Mathematician; logician; philosopher. Ints: to explain ' the traditional, persistent link in our The theory of truth ; philosophy of language; philosophy between the particular-universal logic; semantics; foundations of mathematics. distinction and the subject-predicate Educ: University of Warsaw, PhD 1926 (reference-predication) distinction' (p. 188). In (supervised by Stanislaw Lesniewski). Infls: 192 Tarski

Lvov-Warsaw School, Stanislaw Lesniewski, Carnap, Rudolf (1934) Logical Syntax ofLanguage, Jan Lukasiewicz. Appts: 1922-5, Instructor in Vienna, Lond on: Kegan Paul and New York: Logic, Polish Pedagological Institute, Fical, Harcourt Brace, 1937. Church, Alonzo (1979) 'A comparison of Russe ll's Warsaw; 1925-39, Docent, and Adjunct resolution of the semantical antino mies with that of ProfessorofMathematics and Logic,University Tarski ', Journal ofSym bolic Logic 41: 747-60. of Warsaw ; 1939--41, Research Associate in Field, Hartry (1972) 'Tarski's theory oftruth ' ,Journal Mathematics , Harvard University; 1941-2, ofPhilosophy 69(13): 347-75. Member, Institute for Advanced Study, Jordan, Zbigniew (1967) 'The development of Princeton; 1939-68, Lecturer, Associat e mathematical logic in Poland between the two wars', Professor, then Professor (1946) at the in Storrs MacCall (ed.), Polish Logic 1920- 39, Oxford: Clarendon Press. University of California, Berkeley; 1968- 83, Luschei, Eugene C. (1962) The Logical Systems of Professor Emeritus, University of California, Lesniewski, Ams terdam: North-Holland. Berkeley. Popper, Karl R. (1972) ' Philosophical comments on Tarski 's theory of truth ' , in Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approa ch, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Main publications: Quine, W. V. (1966 ) 'On an application of Tarski's theory of truth ', in Selected Logic Papers, New (1933) Projeci p rwady w Jezyk ach nauk York: Random House. dedukcyjny ch [The Concept of Truth in the Wolenski, Jan ( 1993) "Tarski as a philosopher ' , in Languages ofDeductive Science s], Warsaw. Coniglione, F. (ed.) Polish Scientific Philosophy , (1935) 0 logice matematycanaj i metodsie Amsterdam : Rodopi . dedukcjnaj, Lvov (translated and expanded as Introduction to Logic and the Methodology of Alfred Tarski made major contributions to logic Deductive Sciences, New York: Oxford University Press, 1941). and mathematic al theory. Whle his own (1935-6) ' Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten interests were predominantly mathematical, his Sprachen', Studia Philosophica I: 261-405. work on metalogic and semanti cs has had the (1944) 'T he semantic conception of truth and the most direct impact on the developm ent of foundations of sema ntics', Jo urnal of Philosop hy analytical philosophy, although his earlier and Phenom enological Research 4: 34 1-75. contributions on set theory are of interest to (1953) (with Andrzej Mostowski and Rapha el M. Robinson) Undecidable Theories , Amsterdam: more logically orientated philosophers, as is his No rth-Holland. work on the concept of logical consequences (1956) (ed. and trans . J. H. Woodger) Logic, which anticipated by more than a decade Semantics, Metamathematics: Papersfro m 1923 to similar, but less well-known work by Karl 1938, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Popper on deductive inference. (1973) (with R. M. Mo ntague and D. S. Scott) An Axio matic Approach to Set Theory , Amsterdam: His most thorough exploration of the No rth-Holland. semantic issues was in his monograph-l ength (1981) (ed. S. R. Grant and R. N. Mackenzie) The paper (The Concept of Truth in Formalized Collected Works ofAlfred Tarski, 4 vo ls, University Languages, first publish ed in German, 1935-6). ofCalifom ia Press. As the title implies, Tarski saw his task as one of providing a satisfactory account of truth for the specialized idioms of science and mathematics . Secondary literature: The elements of Tarski's strategy were a) to charact erize what he called adequacy Barw ise, J. and Etchemendy, J. (1987) The Liar: An conditions-the minimal conditi ons that should Essay on Truth and Circularity, Oxford: Oxford be met by any adequate theory oftruth, and b) to University Press. provide a definition of truth which meets those Black, Max (1948) 'T he semantic definition of truth" conditi ons.The aim was to supply a definition of Analysis 8: 49-63. the term ' true sentence' which was both Tarski 193

materially adequate and formally correct. He Tarski's reason for thinking that instances of noted that although the notion ofa true sentence the T-schema give only 'partial' definitions of in colloquial language seemed quite clear and truth is this: that only the totality of such T­ intelligible, he considered that all previous sentences for a language could provide a attempts to characterize exactly what this really complete definition, and given that the number meant had been fruitless and vague . While ofsentences in a language ispotentially infinite, owning himself to be puzzled by traditional no such totality of T-sentences could be disputes, he none the less thought that he was delivered. Tarski also required that no semantic determining the core sense ofthe 'classical' or terms (e.g. 'true') should be taken as primitive. 'correspondence' notion , as opposed to other In this he was influenced by his commitment to well-established notions, including the physicalism which could no more tolerate pragmatist notion oftruth as utility. irreducible semantic concepts than it could For Tarski, any acceptable definition oftruth tolerate irreducible mentalistic ones. should have as a consequenceall instances ofhis Tarski's theories have had a mixed reception T-schema: ' S is true if, and only if, p' , for which among philosophers. From a technical point of one concrete example might be 'Snow is white' view, Tarski's strategy only works for sentences is true if, and only if, snow is white' . It is whose logical forms can be represented in first­ important to emphasize that Tarski's schema is order logic, i.e. for sentences whose truth­ not itself intended as a definition-that is the values are determined by the truth-values of point of calling it a material adequacy atomic sentences . But there are many condition-it serves to fix the extension ofthe meaningful sentences which do not readily lend predicate ' ... is true', the things to which it themselves to such formalization, such as applies, namely the sentences of the given counterfactual conditionals and sentences language . As regards formal correctness, this involving modal notions like those ofnecessity condition is intended to avoid the notorious and possibility. paradoxes and antinomies, of which the Liar Karl Popper enthusiastically embraced paradox is among the best known . These Tarski's work on truth as rehabilitating the anomalies arises when i) a language contains its traditional correspondence theory. Others have own semantics, i.e. the means of referring to its regarded his adequacy condition as a best own expressions, and ii) when the standard neutral and at worse irrelevant to the debate logical laws apply. Tarski regarded i) as a concerning the merits of the correspondence conspicuous feature ofnatural languages, and in notion as against those of the coherentists and large measure it explains his pessimism about the pragmatists. One complaint has been that the possibility of applying formal methods to Tarski's theory supplies no criterion of truth, informal , as contrasted with formal , languages. although it was never part of his intention to Given that abandoning logical law was provide such a criterion. Despite Tarski's own unthinkable, Tarski introduced his distinction scepticism about the possibility ofapplying his between object-language and meta-language. formal methods to natural languages , there have By this means, he hoped to neutralize the been comprehensive attempts to exploit his antinomies. Thus, for a given language L, the ideas in providing theories of meaning for prima facie paradoxical sentence 'This sentence natural languages, of which two of the more is false in L' could not itselfbe a sentence ofthe notable examples are provided by the work of object-language L, but only ofits metalanguage Donald Davidson and Richard Montague. L*. Moreover, for adequate discussion of Additionally, Hartry Field contributed semantics , the meta-language needed to be amendments to the theory with a view to richer in expressive resources than the language fulfilling Tarski's own physicalist aims . The it was used to discuss . debate between proponents oftruth-conditional 194 Tillich

semantics and more informal approaches to the (1959) Theology of Culture, New York: Oxford issue of meaning in natura l languages owes a University Press. considerable debt to Tarski's pioneering work. (1962) Morality and Beyond, New York: Harper & Row. Sources: Edwards ; Steven Givant (1986) (1963) Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions, New York: Columbia University Press . ' Bibliography of Alfred Tarski ', JSL 5: 913--41; (1965) Ultimate Concern, ed. D. M. Brown, New Turner; Jan Wolenski (1989) Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School, Norwell: Kluwer, York: Harper & Row. DENIS POLLARD

Secondary literature:

Tillich, Paul Alston , William P. (1961) 'Tillich's conception ofa religio us symbol' , in Sidney Hook (ed.), Religious Experience and Truth, New York: SUNY Press. German. b: 20 August 1886, Starzeddel, Kegley, C. W. and Breta ll, R. W. (eds) (1956) The Prussia . d: 22 October 1965, Chicago , Illinois . Theology of Paul Tillich, New York: Macmillan Cat: Existentialist; theologian. In ts: (includes biblio graphy). Philosophy of religion . Educ: Universities of McKelway, A. J. (1964) The Systematic Theology of Berlin, Tiibingen , Bres lau and Halle­ Paul Tillich, Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press. Wittenberg . Infls: Schelling and Martin Scharlemann, Robert P. (1969) Refl ection and Doubt in the Thought ofPaul Tillich, New Haven : Yale Heidegger. Appts: University of Berlin , University Press. Privatdozent 1919-24; Universities of Marburg, Dresden and Leipzig, 1925-9; Professor of Philosophy, Frankfurt, 1929-33; Tillich burst onto the American scene in a time Union Theological Seminary, 1933-55; of contradictions, as a dialectical thinker Harvard, 1955- 62; University of Chicago , wishing to do justice to basic but opposing 1962- 5; ordained into the Evangelical Lutheran points ofview valid within a certain context but Church ofthe province ofBrandenburg, 1912. not assimi lable to each other. His genius lay in bringing the opposed positions into juxtaposition so that they might enrich each other while remaining themse lves. His witness Main publications: was such that his European publications in article form were quick ly translated and made (1932) The Religious Situation ,New York: Holt. into books which exercised wide influence in (19 36) The Interpretation of History, New York: the American theologica l scene, and beyond . Scribners. He worked with four oppositions: (i) that (1948) The Protestant Era, Chicago: Chicago between neo-Orthodoxy and Christian University Press. liberalism, where his religious existentialism (1948) The Shaking of the Foundations, New York: Scribners. added social relevance to the former and depth (1951 -63) Systematic Theology , 3 vols, Chicago : to the latter; (ii) Protestantism and Catholicism, University ofChicago Press. where he endors ed the Protestant principle (1952) The Courage To Be, New Haven : Yale (forbidding identification ofthe divine with any University Press. human creation), while producing a system (1954) Love, Power, and Just ice, New York: Oxford intelligible to Thomistically inclined scholars ; University Press . (iii) philosophy and theology, where the former (1957) Dynam ics ofFaith , New York: Harper. posed questions whose most fruitful answers were to be found in a theological 'method of Unamuno y Jugo 195 correlation', bringing finite and infinite Main publi cations: perspectives together; (iv) bourgeois capitalism and the Marxistchallenge,where he said 'yes' to All in Obras completas, 16 vols , Madrid: Aguado, the 'prophetic, humanistic and realistic 1950-9: elements' in Marx and 'no' to the negative (1895) En torno al casticismo. elements in the Soviet system (1936 , section 11, (1905) Vidade Don Quijot e y Sancho. (1910) Mi religiony otros ensayos breves. part 1). (1912) Contra estay aquello. Exploring the 's ymbolic' character of (1913)Del sentimiento tragico de la vida. religious expression, Tillich argued that (1931) La agonia del Christianismo. symbols point to the ultimate and 'participate' in the reality they signify. They also have life histories, coming into being, developing, Secondary literature: becoming enfeeb led, dying and being replaced by other symbo ls. 'Being itself' he believed to be a literal expression, apparently because it Ferrater Mora, Jose (1957) Unamuno, bosquejo de was, in his view, a self-validating concept. una filosofia, second edition , Bueno s Aires : Editorial Sudameri cana . Tillich defined religion as the object of Huertas -Jourda , Jose (1963) The Existentialism ofM. ultimate concern. Movement from anxiety to de Unamuno, Gainsville: University of Florida courage is one ofthe routes to the ultimate. On Press. this theme (1952) he discussed four stages of Lacey, A. (1967) Miguel de Unamuno: The Rhetoric courage, which recapitu lated stages ofculture. ofExistence, The Hague: Mouton. The 'courage to be as a part ' gives way to Marias, Julian (1943) Miguel de Unamuno, Madrid : Espasa-Calpe. individuality, the 'courage to be as oneself'. Meyer, Francois (1955) L 'ontologi e de M de This stage oflife, and ofthe world, gives way to Unamuno, Paris: PUF. meaninglessness and the'courage of despair'. Oromi, Miguel (1943) El pensami ento filo sofico de Despair gives way to the 'courage to accept Miguel de Unamuno, Madrid: Espasa-Calpe . acceptance' and ordinary theism to 'the God Rudd, Margare t Thoma s (1963) The Lone Heretic, above the God oftheism'. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Sources : Reese. Unamuno was perhaps not a philosopher in the WILLIAM REESE sense in which Russell or Wittgenstein. were, and was not concerned with either the construction of systems or the analysis of technica l problems . Yet his thought, though unsystematic, has a reach and penetrationwhich Unamuno y Jugo, Miguel de make it impossible not to classi fy it as philosophical. It centres around a number of Spanish . b: 1864, Bilbao, Spain . d: 1935, profound themes : immortality, religion , the role Salamanca. Cat: Analyst of the human of reason , human nature and the human condition. Ints: Epistemology; ethics . Injls: predicament,and how to live in a world in which Pascal and Kirkegaard.Appts: Spent almost all reason does not appear to cohere with or satisfy of his adult life, from 1891 onwards, at the the deepest of human needs . Unamuno was also University of Salamanca, first as Professor of concerned with some specifically Spanish Greek and then as Rector ; this way of life was themes : the nature of the Spanish character, the punctuated by six years ofpolitical exile (1924­ place of Spain in Europe and the right form of 30), enforced by the government of Primo de government for his country. These concerns are Rivera as a result ofUnamuno's republicanism. expressed not only in Unamuno's primarily 196 Unamuno y Jugo

religious or philosophical works, but also in understand is another... there is between them poetry and novels . such an opposition that we can say that The basis ofUnamuno's thought is his view everything vital is anti-rational and everything of human nature and the human predicament. rational anti-vital. And this is the basis of the He objects strongly to the conception of human tragic sense of life' (1913, ch. 2). Our deepest nature espoused by academic philosophers, a wish is to live forever, whilst our reason tells us conception which overemphasizes our we are faced with annihilation. This painful rationality and the value ofreason while at the contradiction is the tragic sense of life, and same time ignoring the most important aspects never leaves us: human consciousness, ofour situation .For Unarnuno , a human being is Unamuno concludes, is therefore best not an entity whose primary and distinctively characterized as a lifelong illness . valuable attribute is the capacity for rational Granted that we have no belief in personal thought but rather an individual of flesh and immortality, how is it appropriate for us to blood (de came y hueso, literally of flesh and behave in this condition? Unamuno argues that bone), faced with the fact of mortality and an authentic life is possible, a life informed by agonizing internal conflicts-this stress on adherence to an ideal based on a passage in individuality, concreteness and angst is one ofa Senancour's novel Obermann (1804) : if number of elements in Unamuno's outlook annihilation is what is reserved for us, let us which make it more akin to existentialism than make it an injustice . We must strive to become any other. Consonant with this basic premise is fully ourselves, to make ourselves his repeated attack on rationalism, especially in irreplaceable. We must fight destiny, even if we its scientific form. For reasons which will know we have no hope ofvictory, in a Quixotic become clear, he regards reason as the faculty manner. Our only 'practical solace' (consuelo which leads us to despair, and rationalism practicoi for having been born is work­ falsifies the human condition by failing to deal Unamuno notes that Adam and Eve were set to adequately with our deepest needs .His attackon work before the Fall-and so in practical terms what he termed 'wretched logic' (la coch ina we must seek full personal realization and logica) begins in his Vida de Don Quijote y irreplaceability via our work. We must so work Sancho (1905) and is a major theme ofhis most as to leave our mark on others, to dominate important philosophical work, Del sentimiento them: 'The true religious morality is at bottom tragico de la vida (1912) . aggressive, invasive' (1913, ch. 11) This Reason leads us to despair, Unamuno argues, 'domination', however, is not to be thought ofas principally because its conclusions contradict a crude political ascendancy or attaining of the deepest ofall human desires, the hunger for worldly power, but rather a making ofourselves personal immortality (el hambre de la unforgettable, and this can often be done as well inmortalidad personal). Above all things, passively as actively. human beings wish to continue to be themselves In the course of elaborating this outlook indefinitely, though without the experience of Unamuno develops a number of other ideas of pain . Moreover, our wish is not for an philosophical interest. As might be expected, immortality of angelic contemplation or granted his view of human nature and the place merging with an absolute but for the of reason in it, Unamuno has an appropriate resurrection of the body, and for a life of philosophy ofbelief. Our fundamental attitudes perpetual action. The whole tendency of to life are not the consequence of rationally rational investigation is to indicate that this worked out beliefs, but spring instead from deepest ofwishes is in fact frustrated, and there features of the personality which are not is therefore a profound tension at the heart ofthe rational : 'It is not our ideas which make us human condition: 'to live is one thing and to optimists or pessimists, but our optimism or Wei! 197

pessimism, derived as much from physiological (1950) L 'Attente de Dieu, Paris: Gallimard (English or perhaps pathological origins , which makes translation, Waiting on God, London: Routledge & our ideas ' (1913, ch. 1). The tragic sense Kegan Paul, 1951). (sentim iento) of life is no exception: it is (1950) L 'Enracinement; Paris: Gallimard (English universa l and prerational, though it can be translation, The Need f or Roots, London: Ark Paperbacks, 1987). corroborated by rational beliefs . Further, (1951) La Condition ouvriere, Paris: Gallimard. Unamunos outlook leads him to a particular (1951) Lettre aun religieux , Paris: Gallimard. conception of the activity of philosophizing (1955) Oppression et liberte, Paris: Gallimard itself. Philosophy is not a detached, rational (Engli sh translation , Oppression and Liberty , pastime nor an academic or scholastic London: Ark Paperbacks, 1988). discipline, but a way of coping with the human (1988) Oeuvres Completes, 4 vols, Paris: Gallimard . predicament: we live first, then philosophize (primum vivere, deinde philosophari). We philosophize eitherto resign ourselves to life, or Secondary literature: to find some finality in it, or to amuse ourse lves and distract ourselves from our griefs . Kempfner, G. (1960) La Philosophi e mystique de ROBERT WILKINSON Simone Weil, Paris: La Colombe. McClellan , D. (1989) Simone Weil: Utopian Pessimist, London: Macmillan. Winch, P. (1989) Simone Weil: The Just Balance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Weil, Simone

Simone Weil's work was wide-ranging and French . b: 1909, Paris. d: 1943, near Ashford , diffuse, but concentrated on two central areas : Kent, England . Cat: Moral and social moral and social issues, and the religious life. In philosopher; philosopher of religion . E duc: the former she embarked on a quest for a College Henri IV and Ecole Normale programme of social justice and enquired into Superieure . Infls: Plato, Pythagoras and the the nature and possibility ofhuman freedom . In Stoics, and Eastern philosophy; personal the latter she was concerned with the spiritual , influences include Emile Chartier (' Alain') and religious and mystica l elements which, she the Dominican priest Father J. M. Perrin .Appts: believed , were interwoven with this earth ly life. After having received her agregation, taught at The two facets of Weil's philosophy were different lycees ; 1934-5, worked in a Renault linked by her conception of humanity. She factory in Paris, and for a short time in 1936 was considered that our situation in the universe is in an anarchist brigade in the Spanish Civil War; twofold : we have an inner sense of freedom and came to London to join the Free French in 1942; the belief that humanity is basically good, but contracted tuberculosis and, refusing to Cat these are constantly threatened with more than her compatriots under the Nazi encroachment and annihilation from outside by occupation, died in a nursing home . the forces ofnecessity found in the natural laws which govern the universe . The freedom and goodness ofhumanity are Main publi cations: also under threat from immersion in a collectivist society. Human beings may believe that they will gain a sense ofsecurity from being (1947) La Pesanteur et la Grace, Paris: PIon (English apart ofsuch a society, butthe reality is thattheir translation, Gravity and Grace, London: Ark individualit y will be distorted or destroyed. Paperbacks, 1987). Weil detected a strong collectivist and 198 Whit ehead

universalist tendenc y in contemporary society, Cross and prefigured or reflected in certain non­ but it is not a modern phenomenon: collectivism Christian philosophies, such as that ofPlato and can also be found in various historical periods, many varieties ofEastem thought. including that ofthe Roman Empire, which Weil KATHRYN PLANT referred to as the 'great beast'. In La Condition ouvri ere (1951) she stated that modern industrial organizations in particular have an exploitative capitalist social structure which puts profit and production Whitehead, A(lfred) N(orth) before human beings , and thus depersonalizes and dehumanizes them . Although she British . b: 15 February 1861, Ramsgate , recogni zed that there can be no abolition of England . d: 30 December 1947, Cambridge, industrial organizations, she recommended that Massachusetts. Cat: Mathematician; work must be reorganized, not as a bureaucratic philosopher ofscience ; process metaph ysician . ' hierarchy of functions' with its inevitable Ints: Philosophy of science . Educ: Trinity division of labour, but as an industrial Colleg e, Cambridge, BA 1884, DSc 1905. democracy with workers having full Infls: Maxwell , Boole and Russell. Appts: consultation about their own working lives and 1884-1910, Fellow, Assistant Lecturer to conditions. Crucially Weil thought that such Senior Lecturer, University of Cambridge; restructuring, in order to be complete, would 1911-18, Lecturer in Applied Mathematics and have to be shot through with spiritual values and Mechanics, University College, London ; 1918­ the workers ' awareness oftheir own dignity and 24, Chief Professor of Mathematics, Imperial sense of responsibility towards each other. College of Science and Technolog y, London , The theme of responsibility and duty and Dean ofthe Faculty of Science , University towards others is also taken up in of London (1918-22); 1924-37, Professor of L 'Enracinement (1950) . Weil considered that Philosophy, Harvard ; 1931, elected Fellow of people cannot claim rights , but have rights the British Academ y; 1945, awarded the Order conferred on them. They are, purely because of of Merit by the British Crown . their status as human beings, the objects ofthe eternal and unconditional duties binding on all human agents . In this work, she developed the theme that people need to feel rooted in a Main publications: community, for which the state is no substitute . If there is no cohesive social group to which (1910-13) (with Bertrand Russell) Principia people belong , as is the case with many Mathematica, 3 vols, Cambridge: Cambri dge industrial workers , there is a sense ofdislocation University Press. and loss. Nevertheless, to have a sense of (1919) An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of community does not fully satisfy human needs : Natural Knowledge; second edition,Cambridge: people also have to be rooted in the spiritual Cambridge University Press , 1925. realm . (1920) The Concept of Nature, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press . Spiritual growth reaches its completion in (1922) The Principle ofRelativity, with Applications what Weil regarded as the only true loss of self, to Physical Science, Cambridge: Cambridge that of the one-pointedness of mystical University Press. experience in which the self is emptied and (1925) Science and the Modern World, New York: becomes transparent to God. This state is Macmillan Co. ; reprinted, New York: The Free attainable through rigorous spiritual self­ Press, 1967. discipline, like that outlined by St John of the (1926) Religion in the Makin g, New York: Macmillan Co. Whit eh ead 199

(1927) Symbolism:Its Meaning and Effect,New York: Universit y Press) . In 1903 he was elected a Macmillan Co.; reprinted,New York: Fordham Fellow ofthe Royal Society in London. He next University Press, 1985. publish ed (1903) The Ax ioms of Projective (1928) TheAim s ofEducation and Other Essays,New Geometry (Cambridge University Press) and York: Macmillan Co. ; reprinted, New York: The (1907) The Axioms of Descripti ve Geometry Free Press, 1967. (Cambridge University Press). (1929) The Function of Reason, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press ; reprinted, Boston: Meanwhile, Whitehead had come to accept Beacon Press, 1958. the logicist thesis that the foundations of (1929) Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, mathematics rested in logic,a thesis favoured by New York: Macmillan Co.; reprinted corrected Bertrand Russell, his former student at edition, ed. D. R. Griffin and D. W. Sherburne, New Cambridge who had switched to philosophy. In York:The Free Press , 1967. 1901Whiteheadand Russell began their famous (1933) Adventures ofIdeas, New York: Macmillan collaboration, the former serving as the Co. ; reprinted, New York: The Free Press , 1967. mathematician, the latter as the philosopher, to (1934) Nature and Life, Chi cago: University of produc e Principia Math ematica. Whitehead Chicago Press. was to prepare a fourth volume on geometry, but (1938) Modes of Thought, New York: Macmillan Co. never did so. The new matter in the second edition (1925) is solely Russell 's. After resigning his lectureship at Cambridge and Secondary literature: moving to London, Whitehead produc ed a popular, introductory text for the Home Lowe, V. (1962) Understanding Whitehead, University Library of Modern Knowledge , An Baltimore: John s Hopkins University Press . Introdu ction to Math ematics (London : -- (1985) Alfred North Whitehead: The Man and Williams & Norgate , 1911). He also delivered His Work, Vol. I: 1861-1910, Baltimore: Johns several address es and wrote numerous papers Hopkin s University Press. on education, published in The Organi sation of -- (1990) Alfred North Whitehead: The Man and Thought, Educational and Scientific (London : His Work, Vol. II: 1910- 1947, ed. J. B. Schneewind, Williams & Norgate , 1917) and The Rhythm of Baltimore: John s Hopkins University Press. Schilpp , P. A. (ed.) (1941) The Philosophy of Alfred Education (London : Christophers, 1922). This North Whitehead, Evan ston: Northwestern phase of his work culminated in The Aims of University Press; second edition, New York: Tudor Education and Other Essays (1928) . In London Publishing Co., 1951. Whitehead's focus shifted to the philosophy of Sherburne, D. W. (1966) AKey to Whiteh ead :~ science . This shift, which allied him with the 'Process and Reality ', New York: Macmillan; neo-realists G. E. Moore, C. D. Broad, T. P. reprinted , Chi cago: University of Chicago Press, Nunn and Bertrand Russell, also led to his 1981. philosophical break with Russell. Whitehead's contributions to the philosophy Whitehead first achieved eminence in the field of science, or of nature, are contained in several ofmathematics . His fellowship dissertation was remarkabl e books . An Enquiry Concerning the devoted to Maxwell 's Treatise on Electricity Principles of Natural Kno wledge (1919) and Magn etism. Becoming engrossed in the unleash ed Whitehead 's realism. The Concept of investigation ofthe various systems of symbolic Nature (1920) decried the bifurcation ofnature reasoning allied to ordinary algebra , such as into mind and nature, and, having adopted a Hamilton's quaternions,Grassman's calculus of realistic stance, portrayed nature as consisting extension and Boole's symbolic logic, he of the passage of events, to be understood in authored (1898) A Treatise on Universal terms of objects , includin g what Whitehead Algebra , with Applications, vol. 1 (Cambridge called 'eternal objects', recurrent universals 200 Whitehead

akin to Plato's fOnTIS or Santayana's essences .In efficacy. Ready to present a new system of this work Whitehead also unveiled his method philosophy, Whitehead seized the opportunity of extensive abstraction, a method to explain to do so in the Gifford Lectures he delivered at how mathematical entities such as points and Edinburgh in 1928. The result was the most lines are abstracted from concrete experience. famous system ofspeculative philosophy in the The Principle ofRelativity, with Applications to English language in the twentieth century­ Physical Science (1922) was Whitehead's Process and Reality (1929) . Defining endeavour to offer a theory alternative to speculative philosophy as the endeavour to Einstein 's. At Harvard Whitehead's philosophy frame a consistent and coherent system of took a speculative turn. In Science and the categories which would be comprehensive Modern World (1925) he showed how the enough to interpret every item of experience, categorial presuppositions formulated by the Whitehead proposed such a system , subject to philosopher-scientists of the seventeenth subsequent revision . Among its nine categories century exhibited a cosmology which the of existence are the categories ofactual entities , romantic poets of the nineteenth century had eternal objects , prehensions and nexus . An rebelled against because of its devaluation of actual entity is an occasion of experience, nature , and which the scientific discoveries of identical with the simplest quantum event; it the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries feels-i.e,prehends-all its past negativel y and were overthrowing. Whitehead suggested positively. It is lured, concresces or completes nothing less than a revolution in philosophical itself, then perishes , to be prehended by its cosmology, an overhaul ofthe basic categories successors. Ingredient in its constitution are ofthought. Science and the Modern World was eternal objects which ingress or are prehended a popular success . It elucidated then arcane by it. Actual entities fOnTI societies , or nexus ; scientific theories such as relativity and the human person , for example, is a society. quantum mechanics,associating these scientific Distinct from the categories of existence is the notions with a whole range of human values , in category of the ultimate: it is creativity, the one, history, literature, religion and civilization. It and the many. Creativity is, however, not God :it also introduced philosophical phrases that is neither an actual entity nor a society of caught on in process philosophy, such as the actualities, but rather the surge of activity or fallacy of misplaced concreteness, the fallacy of novelty, of flux ongoing in all actual entities . simple location and the conception ofGod as the The idea ofGod is a notion derivative from the principle ofconcretion. Religion in the Mak ing categories ,categorial obligations and categorial (1926) defined religion as that which the explanations advanced by Whitehead. As the individual does in his own solitude to appreciate first accident of creativity, God , in his the novelt y and to assuage the loss that incessant primordial and in his consequent natures , is the change or process entails . It further advanced actual entity that guarantees the order of process theology when it underscored the cosmos . Process and Reality has been grandly dynamic quality ofreligion as itselfcaught up in appreciated by some American philosophers, change . Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect such as, F. S. C. Northrop, Paul Weiss and (1927) presented Whitehead's theory of Charles Hartshorne,although others, like W. V. conceptual meaning and of perceptual O. Quine, are more disposed to continue in the knowledge. This epistemology repudiated the vein ofthe earlier works . Still it has endured as theories of the contemporary heirs of David the mainspring of process theolog y.Noteworthy Hume . It recognized two sorts of perception, among Whitehead's last books is Adventures of perception in the mode of presentational Ideas (1933). It presents his philosophy of immediacy and perception in the mode ofcausal civilization, stressing the primary, creativ e role Witt gen stein 20 I

of general ideas. It also offers easy access to (1933 -5) The Blue and Brown Books; Oxford: Whitehead's mature philosophy. Blackwell,1958. (1931--48) 'Bemerkungen tiber Frazers Golden Bough '; ed. R. Rhees , in Synth ese 17, 1967 (in Sources : DNB 1941-50; Edwards. Klagge and Nordmann 1993. ANDREW RECK (1937--44) Bermerkungen iiber die Grundlagen der Math ematik (Engli sh translation , Remarks on the Foundations ofMath ematics, ed. G.H. von Wrigh t, R. Rhees and G. E. M. Anscombe, trans . G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell, 1956). Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann (1938 and 1942-6) Lectures and Conversations on Aes thetics , Psy cholo gy and Relig ious Belief; ed. C. Barrett , Oxford: Blackwell, 1966. Austrian (naturalized British in 1939). b: 26 (to 1949) Philasophische Untersuchunge n (Engli sh April 1889, Vienna. d: 29 April 1951, translation, Philosophical Investigations, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, trans. G. E. M. Cambridge, England . Cat: Logica l atomist Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell, 1953). (developed form); later, sui generis. Ints: (1949-51) Ober Gewissheit (Eng lish translation , On Language; philosophy of mind ; logic; Certainity, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von philosophy of mathematics; nature of Wright , trans. G. E. M. Anscombe and D. Paul , philosophy. Educ: Technische Hochschule, Oxford: Blackwell, 1969). Charlottenburg, 1906-8; University of (1914 -51) Vermischte Bermerkungen (Engli sh translation, Culture and Value, ed. G.H. von Wright , Manchester, 1908-11 ; Trinity College, trans . P.Winch , Oxford: Blackwell , 1980). Cambridge 1911-13. Infls: In Culture and Other publi cations consist ofcorre sponde nce, lecture Va lue he listed Boltzmann, Hertz, notes by students and manuscript s by Wittgenstein Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos, varying in length from short note s to fully finished Weininger, Spengler and Sraffa;Brouwermight typescript s. Several important short writings are be added . Appts: Fellow of Trinity College, collected in1.Klagge and A. Nordmann (eds) (1993) Cambridge, 1930-6; Professor of Philosophy Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951, Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett. and Fellow of Trinity College , Cambridge, 1939--47.

Secondary literature: Main publications: Principal biographies in English: MeGuinness, B. F.(1988) Wittgenstein: A Life, vol. I, (1921) Logisch-Philo sophische Abhandlung (the London: Duckworth (to 1922). only major work published in his lifetime), in Malcolm, N. (1958) Ludwig Wittgenstein: AMemo ir Annalen der Naturphilosop hie vol. 14 (English with a Biograph ical Sketch by George Henrik von tran slation, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus , trans . Wright, Oxford. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, London: Monk , R. (1990) Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961). Genius , London: Cape.

Wittgenstein's principa l works (with dates of Bibliographies: compo sition) , include: Frongia, G. and McGuinness, B. F. (eds) (1990) (1914 -16) Not ebooks 1914-16; ed. E. M. G. Wittgenstein: A Bibliographical Guide, Oxford: Anscombe and G. H. von Wright , trans. G. E. M. Blackwell. An scombe , Oxford : Blackwell, 1961. Shanker, V. A. and Shanker, S. G. (1986) Ludwig (1929) 'A lecture on ethic s'; in Philo sophical Review Wittgenstein: Critical Ass essm ents, vol. 5, A 74, 1965 (in Klagge and Nordmann 1993) . Wittgenstein Bibliography , London: Croom Helm (before 1933) ' Philosophy ' , sections 86-93 of the so­ (lists 5,868 items) . called Big Typ escript (in Klagge and Nordmann 1993). Selected monographs and commentaries: 202 Witt g en st ein

Anscombe, G. E.M. (1959) An Introduction to phases of his work-represented by his two Wittgenstein 51 Tractatus, London: Hutchinson. masterpieces, the Tractatus Logico- Black, M. (1964) ACompanio n to Wittgenstein s Philosophicus and the Philosophical Tractatus, Cambridge. Investigations-and of the relationship Hacker, P. M. S. (1972) Insight and Illusion, Oxford ; revised 1986 . between them. Opinions differ on the continuity --and Baker, G. P. (1980, 1986; 1990, 1995) or discontinuity of his development, from Wittgenstein: An Analytical Commentary on the commentators who see a compl ete volte-face to Philosophical Investigations: vol. I, Meaning and those who detect enduring interests and Understanding; vol. 2, Rules, Grammar and attitud es. Necessity; vol. 3, Meaning and Mind; vol. 4, Mind In his youth Wittgenstein studied for six and Will, Oxford: Blackwell. Hallett , G. (1977) ACompan ion to Wittgenstein s years as an engineer. He worked briefly, in the Philosophical Investigations, Ithaca , NY: Cornell late 1920s, as an architect. Perhaps as a result, a University Press. practical, almost mechanical, approach to Kenny, A. (1973) Wittgenstein, Harmondsw orth: philosophy can sometimes be seen in his work, Penguin. even in writing as abstract as his Remarks on the Kerr, F. (1986) Theology after Wittgenstein, Oxford: Foundations of Math ematics (see I , SS 119, Blackwell. III, Kripke , S. A. (1982) Wittgenstein on Rules and 122; SS 21, 49, 51; V, S 51). Private Language, Oxford: Blackwell. In 1911 he went to Trinity College, McGinn, C. ( 1984) Wittgenstein on Meaning, Oxford: Cambridge, to study with Russell , on the advice Blackwell. of Frege. The themes which took life in his Malcolm, N. (1986) Nothing is Hidden, Oxford: notebooks soon afterwards included some Blackwell. which had preoccupied Russell for many years: Pears , D. F. (1987-8) The False Prison, 2 vols, the nature and ingredients of a proposition; its Oxford. Wright, C. (1980) Wittgenstein on the Philosophy of relation to objects ; logical truth. There was also Mathematics, London: Duckworth. a concern with the will, the self and the place of There are many collections ofpapers, including: value which Wittgenstein may have brought Block, I. (ed.) (1981 ) Perspectives on the Philosophy from his early reading ofSchopenhau er. ofWittgenstein, Oxford: Blackwell. The Tractatus Logico-Ph ilosophicus was Pitcher, G. (ed.) (1968) Wittgenstein: The compos ed during the Great War while Philosophical Investigations, London: Macmillan (cont ains many initial reviews and important early Wittgenstein was serving in the Austrian army. papers on Wittgen stein). (Few classics of philosophy could have been Phillip s Griffiths, A. (ed.) (1991) Wittgenstein: written in worse conditions.) He wrote ofit in a Centenary Essays, Royal Institute of Philosoph y letter to Ludwig von Ficker (1919) : 'My work Lectures vol. 28 (1989-90), Cambridge. consists of two parts: ofthe one presented here, Shanker, V. A. and S. G. (eds) (1986) Ludwig plus all that Ihave not written . And it is precisely Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments, 5 vols, London: Croom Helm . this second part that is the important one. My Vesey, G. (ed.) (1974) Understanding Wittgenstein, book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures vol. 7 (1972­ from the inside as it were' (P. Engelmann, 3), London : Macmillan. Letters fr om Ludwig Wittgenstein with a Memoir, Oxford : Blackwell, 1967, p. 143). Wittgenstein has been the most influential Despite the Russellian logical skeleton of the twentieth-century philosopher in the English­ work-s-ofgreat technical interest to later Anglo­ speaking world . Interpretations ofhis work vary American commentators-Wittgenstein's radicall y on almost every point ,to the extent that emphasis on the ethical aims of the Tractatus it would be misleading to suggest that any must be taken seriously. He believed (and neutral account can be given . Some knowledge continu ed to believe at leastup to his'Lecture on of his life is needed to form a view of the two ethics' in 1929) that value stood outsid e what he Wittgenstein 203

thought ofas 'the world' : 'Ifthere is any value These views embodied radical implications that does have value, it must lie outside the for philosophy. It could not be a 'body of whole sphere of what happens and is the case' doctrine' or aim at 'philosophical propositions' . (6.41) . It could be an activity of elucidation-'the He needed to fit together 'what happens and logical clarification of thoughts' (4.112). And is the case' with what can be said about it, and to what was written in the Tractatus might well be set that apart from what cannot be said-about elucidatory, but would have to be recognized as 'the sense of the world' (6.41) and about 'the nonsensical itself: purporting to say what could will in so far as it is the subject of ethical only be shown . 'Whatwe cannot speak about we attributes' (6.423) .Saying is possible. Saying­ must pass over in silence' (7). language-consists of 'the totality of After the Tractatus Wittgenstein underwent propositions' (4.001). And 'only propositions a decade of mental turmoil when he worked in have sense' (3.31). But: 'If the world had no rural Austria as an elementary teacher and as a substance, then whethera proposition had sense gardener. He returned to philosophy in the late would depend on whether another proposition 1920s during the time when he was helping to was true.In that case we could not sketch out any design a house for his sister in Vienna. In 1928 picture oftheworld (true or false)' (2.0211-12). he attended a lecture by Brouwer (on But 'we' can do this... so the world does have a Mathematics, Science and Language). He substance ... The argument is a Kantian, joined discussions of the Vienna Circle . In 1929 transcendental one, leading to a world of he went back to Cambridge, where he was objects, pictured in language. 'A proposition is awarded a PhD for the Tractatus and where he a picture of reality' (4.0114.021) and 'The began the teaching which was to have an totality of true propositions is the whole of enormous influence on philosophy during and natural science ...' (4.11). after the rest ofhis life. Wittgenstein relied on strong dichotomy: on Wittgenstein was never a logical positivist. one side was language consisting ofarticulated But the frequent misidentification of the (3.141) propositions, in which everything 'objects' in the Tractatus with items of sayable depended on (without necessarily being elementary experience may have led his reducible to) the fact that elementary thoughts towards the connections between propositions can picture states ofaffairs ; on the linguistic sense and the empiricist notion of other side were the realms ofthe will, ethics and 'inner' mental experiences. This theme was the mystical. Here, nothing could be said, central to much of his subsequent work. A less though something might be shown . Logic and evident but equally significant breaking-point mathematics, which could not be seen as came in his early view of necessity as presenting facts about the world, were tautological. The crux appeared very early as a diagnosed as tautologies -the limiting case of concern: 'A point cannot be red and green at the the combination of signs (4.466) . They were same time : at first sight there seems no need for not-likeattempts to saysomething about value this to be a logical impossibility' (Notebooks or ethics- nonsensical (unsinnig). But they 1914-16,16 August 1916; see also Tractatus were empty ofsense (sinnlos) because they said 6.3751).Further thought on this in the 1930s led nothing . The contrast was between what was to a new understanding ofmodality. said and what was shown : 'Logical so-called A view of meaning was needed in propositions show [the] logical properties of Wittgenstein's early thinking to sustain his view language and therefore of [the] Universe, but ofwhat was unsayable. In his middle and later say nothing' (Notebooks 1914-16, p. 107). years meaning moved to the centre of his Logic was 'not a body ofdoctrine but a mirror­ interests in its own right. The Blue Book(1933­ image of the world' (6.13). 4) opened with the question 'What is the 204 Wittgenstein

meaning ofa word?' In the Tractatus (3.203) he the word could have no 'function' (S260) . Its had written: 'A name means an object. The use could have no 'criterion of correctness': object is its meaning ...' . This single, direct, 'whatever is going to seem right to me is right. essentialist link between language and reality That only means that here we can't talk about was denied later, or diminished to a special case. "right'" (S 258) . ' The meaning ofa word is not Wittgensteiri's attention moved towards the the experience (Die Bedeutung ist nicht das meaningfulness of gestures, questions, orders, Erlebnis) one has in hearing or saying it, and the proposals, guesses, greetings, wishes and so on. sense (Sinn) of a sentence is not a complex of He catalogued cases where precision and such experiences' (ibid., II, p. vi). determinacy were irrelevant to meaningfulness, This thinking was fatal to an empiricist and where the senses of common terms (for account of meaning, where words acquired their example, 'game') could be conveyed meanings by standing for mental contents successfully when they could not be found to (ideas, sense data, impressions). The whole stand for anything in common. His interest in view of language as a 'vehicle of thought' (I, meaning in social contexts has often been seen S329) changed radically. So did central as a form of holism-sense would be elements in any philosophical psychology, such determined by an indefinitely wide range of as the self and the will . The latter half of the linguistic, social and cultural conditions ('use in Philosophical Investigations, Part I, and language', PhilosophicalInvestigationsI, S43) . subsequent lectures in the 1940s worked But more probably, having held an extremely through the consequences and ramifications. clear-cut theory of meaning, he now wanted to Wittgensteiri's Remarks on the Foundations deny that any theory could cover the sufficient ofMathematics is an incomplete and unrevised or necessary conditions for meaning or text which must be read with reservations. In it meaningfulness. (See Anscombe, 'A theory of he stresses the need for practical use as a language?', in Block 1981.) touchstone for mathematical theorizing: 'What The most important area where this was can the concept "non-denumerable" be used applied was where words had been thought to for?', for instance (on Cantor, I, Appendix II , stand for mental objects: 'red' somehow stands for my inner impression ofredness; 'toothache' S2). He may have been influenced by Brouwer, gets its sense for me because I have used it to and some have read him as a mathematical stand for an ache in my tooth . Part I of the intuitionist, although the psychological basis of Philosophical Investigationsis preoccupied intuitionism cannot have appealed to him . with this theme . It comes to a focus in the His work has had much influence in social passages known as the 'private language anthropology, social theory and the philosophy arguments' (SS242-309;or wider-seeKripke of religion (Leach, Winch D. Z. Phillips) . The on this point). One strand in these arguments is denial of clear foundations for meaning in the a suggestion that an understanding ofthe sense form ofdeterminate links between language and of any term cannot depend on personal reality could be widened from language to social acquaintance with its reference (what it stands or religious practice. A search for justifications for). Someone who has never had toothache in terms of objective, factual truth might be (seasickness, a hangover) uses 'seasickness' replaced by legitimation in terms of social or just as intelligibly as someone who has . Its cultural use. meaning'for' the user of the word, which seems Wittgenstein himself was extremely averse essential, 'drops out of consideration as to any form of theorizing-linguistic, social , irrelevant' (I, S293) . What matters is that the mathematical and so: 'We can only describe and word is used in accordance with the rules of say, human life is like that' ('Remarks on language, which have to be social, 'public', not Frazer', inKlagge and Nordmann 1993,p. 121). 'private' inside the language-user. Otherwise This applied equally in philosophy, although it Zhang Binglin 205

is undeniable that he did present his own dialogue, arguments with himself. aetiology, diagnosis and prescription for Wittgenstein's writings, in terms ofthe volume philosophical problems. It should be enough to ofcommentary on them, have had an immense describe the actual use of language. influence. His work was at the centre of ' Philosophical problems arise when language philosophical attention in the English-speaking goes on holiday' (Philosophical Investigations world through at least the 1950s and 1960s, with I, S38) . Like Kant, he believed that people have its main school ofstudy at Oxford. (It was also tendencies to think (speak) in ways which lead the subject of lurid debate, as, for example, to erroneous, illusory or misleading questions. engendered by Gellner's Words and Things The answer, he believed, was to see the normal (1959) .) uses of language perspicuously, to get a clear Wittgenstein advised his own students to oversight (Ubersichiv. The aim was 'complete give up philosophy and take up something clarity. But this means that the philosophical useful instead, such as medicine or carpentry.To problems completely disappear' (I, S133). the extent that few did this (though some did) his Wittgensteiri's final period, in Part II ofthe successful influence may have been slight. He Philosophical Investigations, in On Certainty was equally unsuccessful in convincing his and in his lectures of the 1940s, showed a new successors against the value of explanatory balance among his interests. His dislike of theory. Attempts to discover theories of philosophical theory and his views on the meaning (or even reference) have continued philosophy of mind focused into a dislike of unabated, in the face ofthe plain implication of 'scientific' psychology. He had said earlier that the Philosophical Investigations that there can 'What we are supplying are really remarks on be no sufficent conditions for making sense.The the natural history ofhuman beings' (I, S415) . growth of cognitive psychology and social On Certainty applied this in the theory of theory also show how his thinking may have knowledge. Epistemological certainty could been disregarded. have its origins neither in theoretical There could be no single verdict on foundations (as in classical empiricism) nor in Wittgenstein. The Tractatus-as he probably unsupported, intuitive common sense (as intended it-stands at one pole of a certain type asserted by G. E. Moore). Instead, doubt, of metaphysics, presenting a clear, dogmatic certainty, justification, evidence, knowledge account of what can be said and why. Some and so on were associated with actual social strands in his later thought appealed to writers practice, and that appeared to provide some kind associated with postmodemism: metaphysical of legitimation: 'Our knowledge forms an explanation and justification were abolished, to enormous system. And only within this system be replaced only by a clear view ofhow things has a particular bit the value we give it' (S410) ; are, how language is used, how culture and 'I would like to reserve the expression "I know" society operate. for the cases in which it is used in normal RICHARD MASON linguistic exchange' (S260) . On Certainty is an unrevised text, dating from the last months of Wittgensteiri's life. He might well have repudiated the appearance of unsophisticated holism and relativism that can be read into some Zhang Binglin (Chang Ping-lin) ofits less cautious passages. Wittgenstein regarded his later philosophy Chinese. b: 1868, Yuhang, Zhejiang Province, as intrinsically unsystematic. His philosophical style was highly individual: aphoristic, full of China . d: 1936, Suzhou. Cat: Historian of questions, suggestions, jokes, snatches of ancient Chinese philosophy; anti-Qing dynasty political leader. Ints: Textual criticism and 206 Zhang Bin glin

philological studies , Zhuang zi, Buddhism and Briere, O. (1956) Fifty Years of Chinese Philo sophy old text Confucianism. Educ: Studied the 1898-1950, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd . Chinese classics in Yuhang and the classics , Complete Chinese Encyclopedia (1987) , Philo soph y philology and history with YuYue in Hangzhou. Volumes, Beijing: Chinese Encyclopedia Infls: Zhuangzi , anti-Manchu scholars , Yu Yue Publications. Weber, 1. (1986) Polit ics im Leben des Gelehrten and ancient philologists . Appts: 1896-8, staff Cheng Ping-lin 1869-1936, Hamburg: MOAG. member, Current Affairs Journal; 1898, staff member ofZhang Zhidong (Governor General of Hubei and Hunan Provinces); 1902-3, Zhang Binglin , who was also known as Zhang teacher of sinological studies , Patriotic Society Taiyan, was a major political figure acting to school, Shanghai; 1906-8, Editor, the overthrow the Qing dynasty and an outstanding Tongmenghui journal Minbao (Tokyo); 1906­ commentator on the Confucian classics and 8, Leader, Restoration Society revolutionary other ancient Chinese philosophy. He also party and otherpolitical groups ; posts underSun developed his own philosophical system . His Zhong shan and Yuan Shikai ; Editor, the journal early political collaboration with Liang Qichao Huaguo ; Head, Zhangshi guoxue jiang yansuo and Kang Youwei in the late 1890s ended over private school, Suzhou ; Editor, magazine his rejection ofKang's devotion to maintaini ng Zhiyan . the monarch y. In 1900 Zhang cut offhis queue to display his unwillingness to cooperate with monarchists seeking reform within the Main publications: framework of the Qing dynasty. Severa l times he was forced to seek safety in Taiwan and Japan, where he instigated the formation ofanti­ (n.d.) Answers to Questions on Philology. Manchu patriotic organizations imbued with a (n.d.) Discussions oj Chinese Classics, Zhonghua Book Company. sense ofChinese history and a devotion to anti­ (n.d.) Interpretation oj 'Jiwulun. Qing revolution. Upon his return to Shanghai in (n.d.) Interpretation oJZhuangzi. 1902 Zhang joined Cai Yuanbei and others in (n.d.) Literature and History. radical educational projects, which also (n.d.) Liu Zizheng s Views on the Zuozhuan . provided a focus for secret revolutionary work. (n.d.) New Dialects. In this period he taught sinological studies at the (n.d.) Notes on the Spr ing andAutumn Annals and on Patriotic Society school. His anti-Qing articles Zuo :~ Commentary. in the newspaper Subao led to imprisonment in (n.d.) A Study oJthe Radi cals in the Shuow en. (1906-11) articles in Classical Studies Academic Shanghai , after which he returned to Japan to Journal. edit the journal Minbao for Sun Zhongshari's (1914) Revised Views . revolutionary party Tongmenghui. Zhang's (1914) Selected Works oJZha ng Taiyan. growing discontent with Sun led to an (1917 -19)Zhang :~ Works, 24 vols . unsuccessful attempt to remove Sun as head of (1933) Second Series of Zhang s Works. the Tongmenghui. In 1910 Zhang was elected (1939) Catalogue ofthe Writings ofTaiyan. head of a rival revolutionary party, the (1939) Third Series ofZhang s Works, 3 vols. Guangfuhui, or Restoration Society. After the 1911 revolution Zhang resigned from the Tongmengh ui and formed parties and groupings Secondary literature: challenging the Tongmenghui and its successor, the Guomindang, in the unstab le politics of Boorman, H. (ed.) (1970) Biographical Dictiona ry oj early Republican China. Zhang served China's Republican China New York and London:Columbia first Presidents, Sun Zhongshan and Yuan University Press. Shikai , but conflict with Yuan led to his house Zhang Binglin 207

arrest from 1913 until Yuan's death in 1916. require no objective world to explain them. His Zhang lectured abroad to overseas Chinese . analysis of perception, influenced by Kant, Upon his return unsuccessful missions for Sun's combined categories derived from rational Guangzhou government led to Zhang's thought and empirical representations. retirement from political life in 1918. Although Zhang wrote several superb works in Zhang's great strength as a scholar grew out philology and linguistics, the most important for of his training with Yu Yue in philology and philosophical study is his Discussions of textual criticism. Zhuangzi's views and daoist Chinese Classics, showing how linguistic suspicionofcivilization and the state led to early knowledge is crucial to understanding classical opposition to Confucianism, but he later texts. He used Indian, Western and ancient became a leading commentator on the Chinese logic to develop a sophisticated theory Confucian classics, supporting the traditional of names . He was also interested in ancient old text school of interpretation against Kang Chinese legal and ethical codes as central to Youwei's advocacy of new text interpretation. Chinese culture, with a special concern for rites He was especially devoted to Zuo 50 ofmourning. Zhang wrote traditional prose and Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals. poetry of great distinction. He strenuously His interest in Buddhist writings led to opposed the vernacular movement begun by Hu influential studies comparing the daoist Shi, but by the end of his life this movement had writings of Laozi and Zhuangzi with the displaced Zhang's own style from the centre of Buddhist text Jushe Weilun. Buddhist, daoist literary life. and Western idealism influenced his mature systematic philosophy. He held that a single underchanging hidden principle underlies all perception and that subjective perceptions NICHOLAS BUNNIN GUIDE TO SCHOOLS AND MOVEMENTS

This contains short descriptions and bibliographies concerning the major schools of philosophy mentioned in the entries . Names in bold indicate that there are individual entries for these philosophers, schools or movements.

Absolute Idealism Randall Jr, John Herm an (l 967) 'F. H. Bradley and the working-out of absolute idealism ', Journal ofthe History ofPhilosophy 5: 245-67. Robinson, Dan iel S. (19 51) ' Philosophy toda y: absolute ideali sm ' , Personalist 32 : 125- 36. A form of idealism that stems from Schelling Sprig ge, T. L. S. (1983) The Vindication ofAbsolute and Hegel and which includes Hegelianism, Idealism, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. though it was developed outsid e Germany as much with reference to native philosophical STUART BROWN controversy as to Hegel. Forms of absolute idealism were developed in England by Bradley, Joachim and Bosanquet and, in America, by Royce,Calkins and Blanshard. Absolute idealism regards the world of sense as Analytical Philosophy only partiall y real. Human knowledge, or what passes as such, is highly fragmentary and partial. True knowled ge is ofpropositions that perfectly cohere with one another. Whatever is Analytical philosophers are those who believe real is an aspect of the eternal consciousness or that the main, or the only, task for philosophy is Absolute Spirit. Absolute idealism had some the 'analysis' of concepts and that philosophy tendenc y to pantheism and collectivismand was should not attempt, or can attempt only with oppos ed by those wishing to emphasize qualifications, to be ' synthetic', i.e. to make individual persons in metaphysics statements about the nature of reality. Though (personalists) and in politics . the modern analytical movement has tended to be opposed to traditional metaphysics, analysis has been conceived as a part of philosophy at least since Socrates. The modem movement Bibliography began with Frege's analytical work on the nature of mathematics and is characterized Cunningham, G. Watts (1993) The Idealistic initially by an emphasis on logical analysis. Argument in Recent Brit ish and American Russell's theory of descriptions, which sought Philosophy , Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries to show how a referring expression like 'the Press. present King of France' could have meaning Joachim, H. H . (l906) The Nature ofTruth, Oxford. even though no such person exists, was taken to Metz, Rudolf (1938) A Hun dred Years of British be a paradigm of logical analysis. Among the Philosophy , tran s. J. W. Harvey, T. E. Jessop and H. Sturt , ed. 1. H. Muirhead, London: Allen & Unwin. other leading early figures were Moore and the (Originally publi shed in German, Heid elberg, early Wittgenstein. The Vienna Circle, 1934.) especially Carnap, was influenced by this Quinton, A. M. (l 97 l- 2) 'Absolute Idealism', phase of analytical philosophy and in turn Proceedings ofthe British Academy 57. influenced it, for instance, through A. J. Ayer . Though Cambridge and Vienna are commonly Analytical Philosophy 209

regarded as the birthplaces, Justus Hartnack has Philosophy in the English-speaking world, claimed that analytical philosophy originated, as well as in Scandinavia, has remained broadl y largely independently, in Uppsa la . Poland also within this tradition , and its influence has developed its own tradition of analytical continued to increase elsewhere. It has been philosophy, associated with Twardowski and introduced in Spanish , for instance, by Ferrater the Lvov-Wa rsa w Circle. Mora, in German by Tugendhat and, in Analytical philosophy has developed in a Portuguese by Hegenberg. In France number ofways .One development was through commentary on Wittgenstein has been given by the influence of the later Wittgenstein , who, Jacques Bouveresse and on Davidso n and after his return to philosophy in the late 1920s, Dennett by Pasca l Engel. became increasingly doubtful about the practice of reductive analysis . Strictly speaking , he rejected analysis, but his later linguisti c Select Biblio graphy philosoph y is commonly regarded as a deve lopment within the same tradition rather than a repudiation of it. Analytical philosophy Ammerman, Robert (ed.) (1965) Classics of Analytic took root in the highly pluralistic culture of Philosophy , New York: McGraw-Hill. Antiseri , Dario (1975) Filisofia Analitica: /'a nalisi America and, in so doing, was itselfaffected by del linguaggio nella Cambridge-Oxford othermovements such as p ra gm atism and, as a Philosophy , Rome : Citta Nuova. result, became more diverse. Because of these Corrado, Michael (1975) The Analytic Tradition in and other developments, many of the tenets Philosophy. Backgroun d and Issues, Chicago: characteristic of early analytic philosophy have American Library Association . (Contains been questioned from within the tradition. bibliography.) Some, like Quine, have attacked the analytic­ Ferrater Mora, Jose (1974) Cambio de marcha in synthetic distinction. Stra wson, though he fi losofi a [Shifting Gear in Philosophy], Madrid : Alianza Editorial. sought to defend it, was willing to engage in Hartnack, Justus (1967) ' Scandinavian philosophy' in what he termed 'descriptive metaph ysics ' . The Paul Edwards (ed.) Encyclopedia of Philos ophy , place oflogic in philosophy is no longer agreed . New York: Macmillan & Co. Many analytical philosophers since the 1970s Hylton, Peter Russell (1990) Idealism and the have had broader sympathies with traditions , Emergence of Analytic Philosophy , Oxford: both present and past , to which their Clarendon Press. predecessors had been hostile. Pap, Arthur (1949) Elements ofAnalytic Philos ophy , New York: Macmillan. A further broadening influence on analytical Passmore, John (1988 )Recent Philosophers,London: philosophy has been a burgeoning of interest in Duckworth. areas of philosophy which had previous ly been Skolimowski, Henryk (1967) Polish Analytical neglected. Whereas logic, language, Philosophy. A Survey and Compari son with British epistemology and philosophy of science had AnalyticalPhilosophy , London: Routledge & Kegan seemed to be centra l areas , since the 1950s Paul. analytical philosophers have been working , for Urmson. J. O. (1956) Philo sophicalAnalysis ,Oxford : Oxford University Press . instance, in such areas as the following : Weitz, Morris (ed.) (1966) Twentieth Century aesthetics (Sibley, Wollheim and others) , ethics Philosophy: TheAnalytic Tradition,New York: Free (Stevenson, Hare, Foot and others) ,philosophy Press. of education (Hirst and Peters), philosophy of William s, Bernard and Montefiore, Alan (1965) history (Dray), philosophy oflaw(Dworkin and British Analytical Philosophy, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Hart) , philosophy ofreligion (Alston, Mitchell and Swinburne, amongst others), philosophy of the social sciences (Winch) and political philosophy (0. A. Cohen) . STUART BROWN 210 Com te an Positivism

Comtean Positivism in the nineteenth century but, when its application failed to deliver political or economic improvements , there were reactions against it in the early twentieth century, which A movement that pursued the ideals and were an important starting-point for much practic es ofthe positivism inspired by Auguste original philosophical thought, notably with Comte (1798-1875). According to Cornte, the Caso and Vasconcelas in Mexico . history of the sciences must pass through theological and metaphysical stages before arriving at the 'positive' stage, when scientists Bibliography abandon claims to absolute truth in favour ofthe empirical study of the 'relations of succession Benrubi , Isaac (1926) Contemporary Thought of and resemblanc e' between phenom ena. The France, trans. Ernest B. Dicker, London: Williams French Revolution, according to Comte, had & Norgate. taken French society from a theological to a Bridges, J. H. (ed.) (1915) Illustrations ofPosi tivism: A Selection of'Articlesfrom the 'Positivist Review'in metaphysical stage. What was needed was a Science, Philosophy, Religion andPolitics, London: positive sociology which, because properly Watts. scientific, would command consent and lead to Charlton, D. G. (1963) Secular Religions in France a better society. Later on, Comte made 1815-1870, London: Oxford University Press. positivism into a kind of secular religion, with Kent, W. (1932) Londonf or Heretics, London: Watts. holy days,a calendar of 'saints ' and a catechism. (Originally publish ed in German, Heidelberg, Positivist Societies assembled in quasi­ 1934.) Metz, Rudolf (1938) A Hundred YearsofPhil osophy , church es and engaged in a secular analogue of trans. J. W. Harvey, T. E Jessop and H. Sturt, ed.1. H. worship , a cult of reason. Muirhead, London: Allen & Unwin. (Originally Cornte' s positivism was very influential in published in German, Heidelb erg, 1934.) France and in the twentieth century Levy-Bruhl wrote an enthusiastic book about Comte. By the STUART BROWN AND 1920s, however, according to Benrubi , French ROBERT WILKI NSON philosophy was more marked by reactions againstan ' empiric positivism ' (Benrub i,p .13). Comte had a number of admirers in England, inciudin gJ . S.Mill.A London Positivist Society Critical Realism was founded in 1877 though, from 1898­ 1916-most of the life of the movement in England- there were two independent Positivist groups in England. According to This label was adopted by an influential group Metz, they ' displayed their greatest strength and of American realists in 1920 to distinguish vigour of growth' in the eighties and nineties. themselves from the new realists of a decade ' At the tum of the century a rapid process of before. The group included D. Drake, A. O. decay set in which nothing could arrest, and Lovejoy, J.B.Pratt, A. K.Rogers, G.Santayana, under which the whole movement languished R. W. Sellars and C. A. Strong. They opposed and slowly died away', (Metz p. 181).One ofth e what they took to be the 'naive' realism of the groups , led by Frederic Harrison, remained new realists , who believed that physical objects more active and itsjournal ThePositivist Review were perceived directl y. According to the was published until 1925. critical realists the mind directly perceives only A number of Italian philosoph ers were ideas or sensedata . They thus returned to the influenced by Comtean positivism, including epistemological dualism of Descartes. Some, Ardigo, Marchesini , Martinetti, Rignano and but not all, also accepted an ontolo gical dualism Varisco . It was also influential in Latin America of mind and body. Evolutionary Philosophers 21 1

Outside America , Dawes Hicks adopted the Ayer, A. J. (1940) Foundations of Empirical term 'critical realism ' to characterize his own Knowledge, London: Macmillan. position. (See also R ealism .) Feyerabend, Paul K. (1965) 'Problems of empiricism' , in R. G.Colodny (ed.) Beyondthe Edge ofCertain ty, Englewood Cliffs, NJ : Prentice-Hall. Biblio graphy Jorgenson, Jorgen (195 1) The Development ofLogical Empiri cism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pr im ary: Morick, Harold (ed.) (1972) Challenges of Drake , D. and other s (1920) Essay s in Critical Empiri cism, Belmon t, CA: Wadsworth, and Realism , New York: Garden Press. London: Methuen, 1980. Kurtz, Paul (196 7) American Philosophy in the Quine , W. Van O. (1936) 'Two dogmas of Twentieth Century: A Sourcebook, New York: empiricism' , in From a Logical Point of View, Macmillan. London: Gollancz; second edition 1946. Sellars, R. W. (1932) A Philosophy of Phy sical Realism, New York: Macmillan. Secondary: STUART BROWN Harlow, V. E. (193 1) A Bibliography and Genetic Study of American Realism, Oklahoma City: Harlow. Montague, William. P.(1937) 'The story ofAmerican realism', Philosophy 12: 140-50,155-61. Passmore, John (1957) A Hundred Years of Evolutionary Philo sophers Philosophy , London: Duckworth, ch. 12. STUART BROWN Not so much a school as a variety ofphilosophers who have given evolution, particularly Darwin's theory, a central place in their system. These have sometimes been naturali stic, as was Haeckel's, and Empiricism sometimes agnostic, as was Spencer's. But othe rs have sought to accommodate Darwin's scientific work within a metaphysical or evaluative Broadly, the doctrine that all knowledge ofthe framework that was more sympathetic to religion. Some , like C. Lloyd Morgan, interpreted the idea of world is based upon sense-experience. evolution in a non-m echanistic and non-reductionist Empiricism has been partic ularly favoured in way, leaving room for theism. Others , like Teilhard the twentieth century by both Pragmatists and de Chardin, have accommodated evolution within a Logical Po sitivists. William J ames referred to pantheistic system. his theory ofknowledge as 'radical empiricism' and both A. J. Ayer and Herbert Feigl styled their view 'logical empiricism'. Although empiricism was very influential in the first half Bibliography ofthe century, especially amongst philosophers of science and those who were sceptica l about Primary: the possibility of metaphysics, it later became Boodin, John Elof(l923) Cosmic Evolution . subject to radical criticism from philosophers Bergson , Henri (1907) L 'Evolution creatrice, Paris . such as Quine, Wittgenstein and Feyera be nd. Goudge, Thomas A. (196 1) The Ascent of Life: A Philosophical Study ofEvolution , London: Allen & Biblio graphy Unwin. Hobhouse, L. T. (190I) Mind in Evolution, London. Morgan, C. Lloyd (1923) Emergent Evolution, Anderson, John (1962) Studies in Empi rical London. Philosophy, Sydney: Angus & Robertson . Nob le,E. (1926) Purposive Evolution , London. 212 Existe ntialism

Sellars, Roy Wood (1922) Evolutionary Naturalism, are what we decide to be. Human consciousness Chica go: Open Court . has a different mode of being from that of Secondary: physical objects. A human being exists not only Dotterer, Ray H. (1950) ' Early philo sophies of as a thing (a body) but also as 'no-thing'; that is, evolution', in V. T. A. Ferm (ed.) A History of Philosophical Systems, Freeport, NY: Books for as a consciousness, or emptiness, that is the Libraries Press, pp. 365-73. condition for choosing what one will do and be. MacDougall, W. (1923) Modern Ma terialism and Wecannot choose whether or not to choose;even Emergent Evolution, London , 1923. ifwe think we can refuse to make a choice,that in Stow, Persons (ed.) (1950) Evolutionary Thought in itself is a choice. America, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. The issues of freedom and choic e are of STUART BROWN crucial importanc e in existentialism. Sartre thinks that authentic choices are completely undetermined. If we act to fulfil the requirements of a social role-if, for example, a Existentialism waiter carries out what he thinks are the preset duties of his job, or unrequited lovers behave as they think they ought to do-e-then we are guilty of choosing in bad faith. If we make our The term 'existentialism' is usually taken to decisions merely by reference to an external refer to a broad movement, ofwhich Heidegger moral code or set of procedures, then we are, and Sartre are often regarded as the two main similarly, not arriving at authentic choices. exponents. Other thinkers frequently labelled Buber disagrees with Sartre over what it is to 'existentialist' are Kierkegaard, Jaspers , choose: he maintains that values which have Marcel, Buber and, in her earlier writings , been discovered, not invented, can be adopted Simone de Beauvoir. It has also been claimed for one's life (Cooper 1990: 173). that such temporall y remote figures as St Many existentialists consider that there are Augustine and Pascal are amongst the two approaches to the world . For Sartre, we can intellectual ancestors of existentialism. The erroneously consid er ourselves to be movement reached its zenith in the immediate determined objects, no different in the way we post-war period in France, but began to declin e exist from the fixed, familiar, solid physical by the 1960s. objects that surround us. When we become A general concern of existentialism is to give aware that our existence is not like that of an account of what it is like to exist as a human physical objects , we are thereby dislocated from being in the world. There is no complete the material world and slide into an authentic unanimity on what this account must contain: perspective which is fluid and angst-ridden.For both the atheism of Sartre and the religious Buber, there is no feeling ofangst or dislocation. thought of Marcel and Buber are incorporated Any of our experiences are capabl e of within existentialist thought. Nevertheless, transporting us from the humdrum, everyday, certain more explicit features of this bald causally-governed I-It world-p erspective in statement can be formulated. Epistemologically, which only part ofour being is engaged, to the it is denied that there can be an absolutely atemporal and acausal I-Thou world of objective description of the world as it is without freedom, dialogue and the reclamation of the the intervention of human interests and actions. wholeness of our human existence. The world is a 'given' and there is no It is often claimed that existentialism is epistemological scepticism about its existence; it concerned with key or crisis experiences. has to be described in relation to ourselves.There Existentialist themes are thus suitable for is no fixed essence to which beings have to inclusion in literary works, as has happened conform in order to qualify as human beings; we Frankf ur t School 21 3

with Sartre's philosophical nc vei I.a Nausee and Frankfurt School with many of his plays, includin g Les Mains Sales. According to David Cooper (1990: viii), This term was initially used to refer to the existentialism has had an influence on later 'C ritical Theorists ' associated with the Institut philosophers such as Richard Rorty. It is in the fur Sozialforschung [Institute for Social mainstream of twentieth-century philosophical Research] , after it was re-established in thought and contributes significantly to the Frankfurt am Main after the Second World War; replacement of the Cartesian inheritance which it has now come to be used to cover 'critical has dominated philosophy for the last three theory' as a whole , from its beginnin gs in the centuries. 1920s to its present state as a dispersed but still active philosophical tradition. The Institut fur Sozialforschung was Bibliography established as a private foundation in 1923 to develop interdisciplinary Marxist research , and Primary: when Max Horkheimer succeeded the historian The prim ary sources for existentialism are to be found Carl Grunberg as Director in 1930 he under the individu al, headings of the various inaugurated the conception of a distincti ve existentialist thinkers . Publication details ofS artre's 'critical theory'.The Institute provided a base or novel and play are as follows : looser forms of support for many of the most Sartre, J.-P. (1938) La Nausee, Paris: Gallimard (Eng lish translation, Nausea , London: Penguin, brilliant neo-Marxist thinkers of the twentieth 1976). century.Although the rise of Nazism meant that -- (1948) Les Mains Sales, Paris: Gallimard it had to move, first to Geneva and Paris, and (Eng lish translation, Crime Passionnel, Lond on: then, in 1934, to New York, its work survived all Methuen, 1961). these vicissitudes and itsjournal, the Zeitschrift Secondary: fUr Sozialforschung, publish ed from 1932 to Cooper, David E. (1990) Existentialism, Oxford: 1941 (the last three parts in English), remains Blackwell. Kaufmann , W.(ed.) (1975) Existentialism fro m one of the richest intellectual documents of the Dostoievsky to Sartre, New York: New American period. Library. As well as Max Horkheimer, Theodor Macquarrie, 1. (1973) Existentialism: An Adorno and Herbert Marcuse, those associated Introduction, Guide and Assessment, Lond on: with the Institute included Walter Benjamin, Penguin. the historian Franz Borkenau, Horkheimer 's Olafson, F. A. (1967) Principles and Persons: An Ethical Interpretation ofExis tentialism, Baltimore: close associate the economist Friedrich Pollock Johns Hopkins University Press. and two other economists, Henryk Grossman Solomon , R. C. (1972) From Rationalism to and Arkady Gurland, the psychologists Bruno Existentialis m, New York:University Press of Bettelheim and Erich Fromm, the political and America. legal theorists Otto Kirchheimer and Franz -- (1987) From Hegel to Existentialism, Oxford: Neumann, the Sinologist Karl Wittfogel and the Oxford University Press. J. Sprigge , T. L. S. (1984) Theories of Existence, literary theorist Leo Lowenthal. Felix Weil, London: Penguin. the founder of the Institute, also published two Warno ck, M. (1970) Existentialism , Oxford: Oxford literature surveys in the journal, whose articles University Press. and book reviews spanned an enormousrange of material. The distinctive Frankfurt School perspec tive is, however, essentially that of Adorno, KATHRYN PLANT Horkheimer and Marcuse. It is a flexible neo- 214 Heg eli anism

Marxism oriented around an increasingly translation, Science and Politics. Studies in the negative philosophy of history epitomized by Developm ent ofCritical Theory, Cambridge, Mass.: Adorno and Horkheimer 's Dialectic of MIT Press, 1985). Enlightenment, which they wrote at the height Held, David (1980) Introduction to Critical Theory: of the Second World War, arguing that the Horkheimer to Habermas, London: Hutchinson. Honneth, Axel and Wellmer, Albrecht (eds) (1986) Enlightenment critique of myth and domin ation Die Frankfurter Schule und die Folge n, Berlin: De itself contributes to new forms of domination. Gruyter. Helmut Dubiel has aptly characterized their Jay, Martin (1973) The Dialectical Imagination. A perspective as a respons e to three critical History ofthe Frankfurt School and the Institute of challenges: those of fascism, Stalinism and Social Research, 1923-1950, London: Heinemann. managerial capitalism, whose perceived (Includes substantial bibliography.) similarities and apparent invincibili ty pushed Wiggershaus, Rolf (1987) Die Frankfur ter Schule, the Frankfurt thinkers into a position of Munich: Hanser (English translation, The Frankfurt permanent and increasingl y desperate School, trans. Michel Robertson, Cambridge: Polity, opposition. 1993). A second generation of postwar critical WILLI AM OUTHWAITE theorists, notably Jurgen Habermas, Karl-Otto Apel, Albrecht Wellmer and, for a time, Alfred Schmidt, pursued the perspectives of the Frankfurt School in a more orthodox academic Hegelianism context, aiming to integrate the individual social sciences with philosophy in a constructive synthesis closer to the original intentions of Critical Theory than to its postwar A form of absolute idealism , associated with development. More recently, a number of the influence ofthe German philosopher, G.W. philosophers and sociologists who worked with F. Hegel (1770-1831). Hegelianism was Habermas in the 1970s such as Claus Offe, Axel important throughout the Western World in the Honneth, and Klaus Eder are continuing the nineteenth century and its influence was carried project of critical theory into the nineties. into the twentieth century- for instance, by Edward Caird in Britain and W. T. Harris in America . Hegelians elsewhere included Bibliography Bolland in the Netherlands. Native forms of absolute idealism, more tenuously linked to Primary: Hegel, were developed in England by Bradley The Institute 's collective public ations includ e the and Bosanquet, in Italy by Croce and Gentile following (as well as various histories listed in Jay and, in America, by Royce and Blanshard. 1973). Though Hegel was a bete no ire to analytical (1936) Studien iiber Autoritdt und Familie, Paris: philosophers and his influence in the English­ Felix Alcan. speaking world was very low in the middle (1956) Sozio logische Exkurse, Frankfurt: decades of the century, study of his work has Europaische Verlagsanstalt (English translation, burgeoned since the 1970s. Aspects ofSociology, trans. John Viertel, London: Heinemann, 1973). Secondary: Bibliography Bottom ore, Tom (1984) The Frankfurt School, London: Tavistock. De Guibert, Bernard (1949) ' Hegelianism in France', Dubiel, Helmut (1978) Wissenschaftsorganisation Modern Schoolman 26: 173- 7. und po litische Erfahrung, Studien zur friih en Findlay, J. N. (1956) 'Some merits of Hegelianism ', Kritischen Theorie, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp (English Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Society 56: 1- 24. Herm en eutics 215

Haldar, H. (1927) Neo-Hegelianism, London. The range ofhermeneutics has been further Levy, Heinrich (1927) Die Hegel-Renaissance in der extended-first in Dilthey's Philosophy oflife, deutschen Philosophie, Chariottenburg. and more recently in contemporary, continental McTaggart, John Ellis (190 I) Studies in Hegelian philosophy-bystressing that interpretation is a Cosmolo gy, Cambridge. pervasive and characteristic feature of human Metz, Rudol f (1938) A Hundred Years of British life which finds its systematic consummation as Philosophy , trans. J. W. Harvey, T. E. Jessop and H. a Hermeneutic Philosophy. Sturt, ed. 1. H. Muirhead, London: Allen & Unwin. The traditional , but continually refined (Originally published in German, Heidelberg, methodology of interpretation starts by 1934.) recognizing as its aim the grasping of the meaning of individual entities . The relation STUART BROWN between parts and whole , both the internal structure of a text (or something text-like) and its wider context become focal, resulting in the Hermeneutic Circle in which the meaning ofthe Hermeneutics parts determine that of the whole, while the latter, in tum, determines the former (a sentence and its words, a poet's whole output and one of his poems, are examples). As a consequence Hermeneutics , the art and methodology of there is here no fixed starting point for cognition interpretation originated in Ancient Greece , and this has been treated as a challenge to the became an adjunct to theology under search for certain foundations associated with Christianity and achievedprominence in the last traditional epistemology. century as a methodology ofthe human studies This does not, however, dispense with which challenged the predominance of epistemological issues . Even ifcertainty eludes positivism. Recently it became fashionable us, as it does in other cognitive enterprises, and among Western intellectuals, particularly there are, notoriously, subjective elements in because it figured in the philosophies of much interpreting, truth, or at least a distinction Heidegger and Gadamer. between better and worse, remains the goal. To Interpreting the law, religious texts and ground such judgements requires spelling out literature is as old as the investigation of nature . the presuppositions of a hermeneutic approach. Because life and liberty can depend on getting One is that there are common, basic features the law right, salvation on correctly reading the of humanit y. There would be no basis for divine message , and cultural coherence on interpretation if we could not assume-in spite reasonable agreem ent about literature , of variety and historical change-that others hermeneutics arose to meet the need for purposively are capable of reasoning and methodical and veridical interpretation. The emotionally respond much like us. primary subject matter ofhermeneutics are texts The second presupposition is Vico's but by the nineteenth century-mainly through principle that man can understand what man has the work of Schleiennacher and Dilthey ­ made. The two presuppositions are, obviously, meaningful phenomena such as speech , interdependent. A common nature makes the physical expressions, actions , rituals or human world familiar and our capacity to conventions, were included as text-like because decode its manifestations confirms and defines in them human experience is interpreted and the range of that communality. communicated. So their study-unlike that of Hermeneutics as the methodical exploration mute nature- requires a hermeneutic approach. of meaning is distinct from other forms of Understanding a person's worries or the cognition and uses presuppositions and institutions ofa society is more like interpreting processes all of its own ; this does not exclude, a poem or legal text than like explaining however, sharing some presuppositions and chemical changes . procedures with other cognitive approaches. 216 Id ealism

Bibliography by Bradley and Bosanquet and, in America, by Royce. Absolute idealism was , how ev er, being Dilthey, W. (1976) 'The development of opposed from the beginning of the century and hermeneutics', in H. P. Rickman (ed.) Dilthey: indeed before by pragmatism,personalism (or Selected Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge personal idealism) and realism. The influence University Press. (The original German version of idealism waned considerably during the first appeared in vol. 5 of his Collected Works.) Gadamer, H. G. (197 5) Truth and Method, trans. hal f of the century, though there were Terren Broden and John Cumming, London: Sheed indications of a revival in the 1980s and 1990s. & Ward. Habennas, Jiirgen (1968) Knowledge and Human Interest, trans. J. Shapiro Heinmann, Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press. Bibliography Palmer, R. E. (1969) Hermeneutics, Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press. Ricoeur, Paul (1981) Hermeneutics and the Human Primary: Sciences, ed. and trans. John B. Thompson, Foster, John (1982) The Case for Idealism, London: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Routledge & Kegan Paul. Rescher, Nicholas (1982) Conceptual Idealism, H. P. RICKMAN Washington, DC: University Press of America. Sprigge, T. L. S. (1983) The Vindica tion ofAbso lute Idealism, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Walker, R. C. S. (1989) The Coherence Theory of Truth: Realism , Anti-Rea lism, Idealism, London: Idealism Routledge. Secondary: Coates, P.and Hutto, D. (eds) (forthcoming) Current Issues in Idealism, Bristol: Thoemmes Press. In the late seventeenth century the term Cunningham, G. Watts (1933) The Idealistic ' idealist' was used by Leibniz to refer to a Argument in Recent British and American Philosop hy, Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries philosopher who gave priority to the human Press. mind, who attached a lesser importance to the Dasgupta, Surendranath (1962) Indian Idealism , senses and who opposed materialism. He Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. referred to Plato as 'the greatest ofthe idealists', Ewing, A. C. ( 1945) Idealism: ACritical Survey , London: Methuen. associating the Greek philosopher with doubts Howie, John and Burford, Thomas (eds) (1975) about the existence ofa material world. This last Contemporary Studies in Philosop hical Idealism , aspect impressed Kant, and as a result of his Boston, Mass.: Stark & Co. influence, idealism came to be most commonly Metz, Rudolf (1938) A Hundred Years of British Philosophy , trans. J. W Harvey, T. E. Jessop and H. contrasted with realism.Kant sought to mediate Sturt, ed. 1. H. Muirhead, London: Allen & Unwin. and, in his way, overcome the dispute between (Originally published in German, Heidelberg, realists and idealists. But he acknowledge d his 1934.) was a form of idealism (as well as a form of Milne, Alan (1962) The Social Philosophy ofEnglish Idealism, London: Allen & Unwin. realism) and he greatly influenced the German Muirhead, 1. H. (1931) The Platonic Tradition in idealist tradition which, especially through Anglo-Saxon Philosophy. Studies in the History of Hegel, held a dominant position in Western Idealism in England and America, London:Allen & philosophy at the beginning of the twenti eth Unwin. Quinton, A. M. (1971-2) 'Absolute idealism', century. Proceedings ofthe British Academy 57. Hegelianism was repres ented in the early Vesey, Godfrey (ed.) (1982) Idealism. Past and twentieth century by Edward Caird in Britain Present, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. and W. T. Harris in America. Native forms of absolute idealism were developed in England STUART BROWN Linguistic Philosophy 21 7

Intuitionism 'positive' laws of particular countries. Legal positivism goes back at least to the eighteenth century and is associated, for instance, with Jeremy Bentham. It is represented in the In mathematics intuitionism names a system twentieth century by, amongst others, Hans propounded by L. E. J. Brouwer (1881-1966) Kelsen . Although legal positivists are not that identifies truth with being known to be true. necessari ly positivists in a broader sense, legal Its claim is that in mathematics a statement is positivism is a consequence of Logical true only if there is proof of it and that a Positivism insofar as statements about 'natural mathematical entity exists only if a constructive rights' can be regarded as metaphysical and existence proofcan be given for it. According to therefore , on that doctrine , meaningless. Some Brouwer, mathematics is not reducible to logic ofthoseassociated with logical positivism, such in the way propounded by Frege and Russell. as the founder of the Uppsala School, Axel Mathematical intuitionism rejects the law of Hagerstrorn, are known also for being legal double negation , the law ofthe excluded middle positivists. and classical reductio . In ethics intuitionism is the view that moral Bibliography truths are known by intuition , that is, known directly rather than inferred . G. E. Moore Detmold,M .1. (1984) The Unity ofLaw and Morality: (1873-1958) was a major proponent of this A Refutation of Legal Positivism, London: view, holding that goodness was a non-natural Routledge & Kegan Paul. and non-analysable property that could be MacCormick, Neil (1986) An Institutional Theory of apprehended by a faculty of'intuition' . Law: New Approa ches to Legal Positivism , Dordrecht: Reidel. Biblio graphy Shuman , Samuel !. (1963)Legal Positivism: Its Scop e and Limitations, Detroit: Wayne State University Press. Dummett, Michael (1977) Elements ofIntuitionism, STUART BROWN Oxford : Oxford University Press . Heyting, A. (1966) Intuitionism, second edition, Amsterdam: North-Holland. Hudson, W. D. (1967) Ethical Intuitionism, London : Macmillan. Parkinson, G. H. R. (1988) An Encyclopaedia of Linguistic Philo sophy Philosophy, London : Routledge.

Influenced in varying degree by the later DIAN IE COLLINSON Wittgenstein, a number of mostly Oxford or Cambridge philosophers, including Ryle, Austin and Wisdom began to practice philosophy as though its problems could be Legal Positivism solved,or dissolved ,through carefu lattention to details of language . Ryle's influential Concept ofMind sought to show, by looking at mental verbs, adverbs and adjectives, how the The term 'positivism' is used in a specia l sense Cartesian 'ghost in the machine' was a myth . in connection with the law, for instance to deny Austin drew attention to some of the other uses that there are any rights (such as supposed oflanguage than to state facts. Wisdom sought 'natural rights') except those granted by the 218 Logical Positivism

to develop an idea of Wittgenstein's that other attempted assertions about what is the philosophy was in some respects like case-it is, rather, to engage in analysis . psychotherapy. Linguistic philosophy has been Although logical positivism belongs within influential throughout the English-speaking the broad movement known as positivism and world, for instance , in the work ofBouwsmaand can be thought of as having precursors in the Searle in America, and Scandinavia, through eighteenth century Enlightenment and in the the work ofvon Wright and Hartnackandothers. nineteenth century movement associated with Linguistic philosophy may be regarded as a Comte , it is a distinctively twentieth century development within analytical philosophy, development, reflecting a new emphasis on which also focuses on language . But those who logic and language. It is presaged in are usually called 'linguistic philosophers' Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico­ reject the idea of a logical language and stress Philosophicus (1921) but properly derives from the study ofordinary language . the Vienna Circle and associated groups in Berlin (to which Hempel and von Mises were Bibliography attached), Lvov and Uppsala . It became one of the most influential movements inphilosophy in Chappell , V. C. (ed.) (1964) Ordinary Language, the middle decades ofthe century. After the rise Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice -Hall, 1964. of Nazism, many of the leading figures of the Rorty, Richard (ed.) (1967) The Linguistic Turn: movement, including Carnap and Hempel , Recent Essays in Philosophical Method, Chicago: Chicago University Press. (Contain s good emigrated to the United States. Logical bibliography.) positivism was also influential in Scandinavia, Waismann , Friedrich (ed. Rom Harre) (1965) The in Sweden as the legacy of the Uppsala School , Princip les of Linguistic Philosophy , London: in Finland through the advocacy ofKaila and in Macmillan. Denmark because ofJorgensen. InEngland the STUART BROWN movement had one of its most eloquent representatives in A. J. Ayer, whose critique of ethical and religious propositions continued to influence philosophical debate long after the Logical Positivism Second World War, as in the writings by R. M. Hare on ethics and in the critique by A. G.N. Flew oftheological assertions. The term 'Logical Positivism' was used Although logical positivism was very originally to refer to the standpoint of a group of influential it had never been free ofdifficulti es. philosophers, scientists and philosophers who It had never been possible to state the all­ became known as the Vienna Circle . The chief important principle of verifiability accurately tenets of logical positivism were that: (l) the enough so that it drew the line between the only genuine propositions (that are strictly true propositions of science , on the one hand, and or false about the world) are those that are those of metaphysics etc. on the other, in the verifiable by the methods of science ; (2) the 'right' place .The credibility ofthe principlewas supposed propositions of ethics, metaphysics undermined by repeated failure to draw this line and theology are not verifiable and so are not satisfactorily or to explain the status of the strictly 'meaningful'; (3) the propositions of logic and mathematics are meaningful but their principle itself. Leading philosophers who had truth is discovered by analysis and not by at one time been sympathetic to logical experiment or observation; (4) the business of positivism moved to new positions . W. Van O. philosophy is not to engage in metaphysics or Quine , for instance , argued that the distinction Lvov- Warsaw School 21 9 between analytic and synthetic proposi tions Lvov-Warsaw School assumed in much empiricist writing was not tenable. In the 1960s there was a broad reaction against scientism in the West. The scientistic Also known as 'the Warsaw Circle', this school orientation of the logical positivists had been of logical analysis had affinities with the repugnant to some philosophers such as Vienna Circle. Though they developed Wittgenstein all along. By the late 1960s logical independently there were many contacts positivism was no longer directly influential in between the two groups. But, according to Z. Western intellectual culture, though it had Jordan , other philosophers such as Russell, influenced the development of analytical Frege, Hume, Leibniz, Mill, Spencer, Bolzano, philosophy. Brentano , James, Poincare, Duhem, Mach, Hilbert, Einstein, Husserl, Bridgman, Whitehead and Weyl were 'equally influential ' (Jordan 1945, p. 32). The School 's central Bibliography preoccup ation was with logic and language. They sought in a logical language 'a more Primary: perfect medium than ordinary speech ' . Ayer, A. 1. (1936) Language, Truth and Logic, Negatively they distrusted 'abstract speculation London: Gollancz; second edition 1946. of an illusive and deceptive clarity' . Some, like --(ed.) (1959) Logica l Positivism , Glencoe, Ill.: Ajdukiewicz, were closer to Logical Free Press, and London: Allen & Unw in. (This work Positivism, but others, like Kotarbiski, has an extensive biblio graphy.) Lukasiewicz and Tarski, though favouring Feigl, H. and Blumberg, A. (1931) 'L ogical logic without metaphysics, held less extreme positivism, a new movement in European views than the Vienna Circle. In general the philosophy', Journal ofPhilosophy. Polish philosophers avoided the ambitious Reichenbach, Hans (1951) The Rise of Scientifi c programm atic ventures ofthe Austrians. Philosophy , Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Secondary: Coffa, 1. Alberto (1991) The Sematic Tradition from Bibliography Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Coniglione, Francesco (ed.) (1993) Philosophy and Friedman, Michael (1991) 'The re-eva luation of Determinism in Polish Scientific Philosophy , logical positivism' ,JournalofPhilosophy 10. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Gower, Barry (ed.) (1987) Logical Positivis m in Jordan, Z. (1945) On the Development of Perspective, Totowa: Barnes & Noble. Mathematical Logic and ofLogical Positivism in Hanfling, Oswald (198 1) Logical Positivis m, Oxford: Poland between the Two Wars, London: Oxford Blackwell. University Press. Jorgenson,Jorgen (1951) The Developm ent ofLogical Skolimo wski, Henryk (1967) Polish Analytical Philosop hy: ASurvey and Compariso n with British Empiricism , Chicago: University of Chicago Press Analytical Philosophy, New York: Humanities (Encyclopedia of Unified Scienc e Series). Press. Quine, W. Van O. (1936) 'Two dogmas of Woleenski, Jan (1984) Logic and Philosophy in the empiricism', in From a Logical Point of View, Lvov-Warsaw School, Dordrecht: Kluwer London: Gollancz; second edition 1946. Academic. Rescher, Nicholas (ed.) (1985) The Heritage of Logical Positivism, New York: Lanham.

STUART BROWN STUART BROWN 220 Marxism

Marxism agenda-to change the world, rather than merely to interpret it. In the twentieth century Marxism has been an extremely influential theory, not just Although probably best known as a socio­ politically (as in the establishment of several political theory (the source ofCommunism, for Marxist political systems such as the USSR and example), Marxism is at base a philosophical the Chines e People's Republic) , but also theory whose roots lie in Hegelian idealism and philosophically and aesthetically. There have its notion of the dialectic. Whereas Hegel been various schools within Marxism, among postulated a 'World Spirit' graduall y attaining the most important of which have been the self-reali zation through a process ofdialectical Soviet and the Western; the former (Lenin, progression, the Marxist dialectic is firmly Stalin et al.) primarily concerned with the located at the material level-thus the concept practical political issue of constructing a new ofdialectical materialism on which Marxism is socialist state, and the latter (Lukacs, the structured. When applied to history by Marx Frankfurt School et al.) generall y (see The Communist Manifesto) the thoory of characterized as more interested in aesthetic and dialectical materialism yields a picture ofclass academic philosophical matters . (Maoism struggle being waged over time, with each form represents yet another variant , an adaptation of of society (or 'thesis') generating its own Marxist thought to the very different social contradiction (or 'antithesis'), until a new conditions of a peasant-dominated Eastern synthesis is achieved, setting off the dialectical society.) Marxism's impact on aesthetic debate process on yet another cycle . From such a has been considerable, with the controversy perspective medieval society is superseded by between supporters of realism and modernism bourgeois society, which in its turn is to be mirroring a longer-running historical debate superseded by a new, classless, socialist about the proper social role ofart and the artist. society-the 'dictatorship of the proletariat', In the late twentieth century the decline of where the working class takes over control of Marxism as an international political force has society's means of production, thereb y severely eroded its philosophical and aesthetic extending the cycle ofclass struggle . authority. For postmodernists, for example , Marx saw society as consisting of an Marxism has become a paradigm case of an economic base and cultural superstructure, with outmoded'grand narrative' ,or universal theory. the base as dominant. The nature of a society's cultural superstructure (its various institutions, Bibliography legal, political, educational, and so forth) was held to be largely determined by the nature of its economic base and the means ofproduction this Anderson, Perry (1976) Considerations on Western entailed. Marx explores the nature of the Marxism, London: NLB. McLellan, David (1973) Karl Marx: His Life and economic base of a capitalist society, and the Thought , Basingstoke: Macmillan. type ofsocial being that proceeds from it, in his Marx , Karl (186 7) Das Kapital, Hamburg: Meis sner major work, Capital . The main impact of & Behre (English translation, Capital vol. I, tran s. capitalist economics, it is contended, is to Eden and Cedar Paul, London: Dent , 1960). alienat e workers from their labour, a --and Engels, Friedrich (1848) Manifest der phenomenon later referred to by Marxist Kommunistischen Partei, London: Communist theorists as reification-the transformation of League (English translation, The Communist labour and worker into commodities to be Manifesto, ed. Frederic L. Bender, New York and bought and sold on the open market. Marx thus London: Norton, 1988). bequeaths to his followers a philosophical STUARTSIM theory which has a definite socio-political Munich Circ le 22 1

Materialism O'Connor, John (ed.) (1969) Modern Materialism: Readings on Mind-Body Identity , New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. Robinson, Howard (1982) Matt er and Sense: A In metaphysics, the view that the world is Critique ofContemporary Materialism,Cambridge: fundamentally material and that mental Cambridge University Press . Sellars, R. W. (1950) 'The new materialism ' , in V. T. phenomena are a function ofor are reducible to A. Ferm (ed.) A History ofPhilo sophical Systems, ph ysical phenomena. Mat erialism and idealism Freeport,NY: Books for Libraries Press,pp. 418-28. are diametrically opposed in metaphysics and Smart, J. J. C. (1963) Philosophy and Scientific there is a long history to this opposition in Realism , New York: Humanities Press. Chinese and Indian phi losophy, as well as in STUART BROWN European. Marxism involves what is known as 'dialectical materialism', which has been influential not on ly in the former Soviet Union and in China, but also , though to a much lesser degree, in Japan and Latin America. Munich Circle Materialists in the western world characteristically adopt what they term 'scientific realism'. Philosophical materialism The Munich Circle (based at the University of has had influential advocates in both the United Munich) marks a significant moment in the States (R. W. Sellars) and Australia (J. J. C. deve lopment ofphenomenology in the first half Smart and D. M . Armstrong and is now ofthe twentieth century. The origin of the circle vigorously debated in books and journals owed much to Theodor Lipps (1851 -1914), for throughout the English-speaking world. the earl y members ofthecircle were his students who had been holding regular meetings (since 190 I) for the purposes of discussing his Biblio graphy (Lipps's) descriptive psychology-see his Grundtatsachen des Seelebens (1883). The Armstrong, D. M. (1968) A Materialist Theory of group called itself Akademisch­ Mind, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; second Psychologischer Verein, and it was at one of its edition, 1993. meetings that Lipps chose to defend his Bunge, Mario (1981) Scientific Materialism, psychologism against Husserl's recent Dordrecht: Reidel. onslaught on it in Logische Untersuchungen Church land, Paul M. (198 1) 'E liminative materi alism (1901). Husserl had argued that, contrary to and propositional attitudes', Journal ofPhilos ophy 78: 67-90. Lipps 's claim, psychologism could not act as a Feyerabend, Paul K. (1963) ' Materialism and the foundation for logic; for to suggest that the mind-body problem', Review of Metaphysics 17: psychology of knowledge can furnish such a 49-66. foundation is to leave open the avenue to Lund , David H. (1994) Perception , Mind and scepticism and , with it, the destruction of Personal Identity: A Critique of Materialism , knowledge, and of any sense of truth and Lanh am, MD: University Press of Ame rica. falsehood. Despite his vigorous defence of his McGill, V. J., Farber and Sellars (1949) Philosophy for the Future: The Quest of Modern Materialism, position, Lipps was horri fied to witness the New York. speed with which his students progressively McGinn,Colin (1980) 'Philosophical materialism', embraced the new discipline of Synthese 44 : 173-206. phenomenology, especially in its Husserlian Madell,Geoffrey (1988) Mind and Materialism, formulation in the Logische Untersuchungen, in Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. addition to their interest in Husserlian aesthetics 222 Naturalism and the general issue ofvalue .What was clear to Naturalism these students , but opaque to Lipps, was that here was a radical approach to the question of the foundation ofscience which did not depend This term has many meanings and there are not on psychologism, positivism or naturalism. only different kinds of naturalism-ethical Intoxicated by Husserls new discipline of epistemological and aesthetic , for instance ----': phenomenology, the members of the circle but varieties within these . None the less, when began to travel between Munich and Gottingen, the term is used out of context and without where Husser! was teaching at the time. This qualification, it most commonly refers to a meant that some members ofthe Munich Circle perspective according to which it is not were also members of the Gottingen Circle . necessary to invoke any supernatural causes in The members of the Munich Circle whose order to explain phenomena. Materialism is energy and scholarship solidified the one form ofnaturalism, but a naturalist need not phenomenological approach to philosophy in be a materialist. Santayana was a major the following years were : Adolf Reinach influence on American naturalism in the ear!y (before his departure for Gottingen, where he twentieth century, for instance on Morris Cohen founded another phenomenological circle), and Woodbridge ; Dewey, R. W. Sellars , Ernest Theodor Conrad, Moritz Geiger, Aloys Fischer, Nagel and Sidney Hook were also leading August Gallinger, Ernst von Aster, Hans naturalists . Cornelius, Dietrich von Hilde-brand and, from Ethical naturalism is another common form 1906, Max Scheler . Those who belonged to the of naturalism, according to which actions that Munich and the Gottingen Circles were : are right or wrong are so in virtue ofpossessing Wilhelm Schapp , Kurt Stavenhagen, Hedwig some (natural) property. Utilitarianism is one Conrad-Martius, Dietrich von Hilde-brand kind ofnaturalistic ethics. Jean Hering, Edith Stein, Fritz Kaufmann : Alexander Koyre and Roman Ingarden.

Bibliography Select Bibliography Fenner, D. E. W. (1993) 'Varieties of aesthetic naturalism', Am erican Philosophical Quarterly 30: Boring, E. G. (1950) A History of Experimental 353-62. Psychology , second edition, New York: Appleton­ Ferm , Vergilius (1950) 'Varieties ofnaturalism, in V Century-Croft s. T. A. Ferm (ed.) A History of Philo sophical Sy.:tems: Geiger, Morit z (1913) 'Beitrage zur Phanomenologic Freeport,NY: Books for Libraries Press,pp. 429-41. des asthetischen Genusses', Jahrbu ch fiir Franklin, R. L. (1973) 'Recent work on ethical Philosophie und Phiinom enologische Forschung I , naturalism', American Philosophical Quarterly 7: 55-95. Halle : Niemeyer, pp. 567-684. Krikorian, Y. H. (ed.) (1944) Naturalism and the Ingarden, Roman (1957) 'O ber die gegenwartigen Human Spirit, New York: Columbia University Au fgaben der Phanomenologic' Archivio di Press. Filosofia, pp. 229-42. Kurtz, Paul (1990) Philosophi cal Essays in Spiegelberg, A. (1971) The Phenomenological Pragmatic Naturalism , Buffalo , NY: Prometheus. Mo vement: A Historical Introdu ction , The Hague: Munro , James (1960) " 'Naturalism" in philosophy Martinus Nijhoff. and aesthetics ', Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 19: 133-8. Pettit , Philip (1992) 'The nature of naturalism-II' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume 66: 245-66. SEBASTIEN ODIARI Pratt, J. B. (1939) Naturalism, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Neo-Ka ntians 223

Scott , Jr, Robert B. (1980) ' Five types of ethical views of Liebmann, Alois Riehl (1844-1924), naturalism ' , American Philosophical Quarterly 17: Enrich Adickes (1866-1928), Friedrich Paulsen 261-70 (1864-1908), and Max Wundt (1879-1963), for Sellars, R. W. (1970) ' Realism, naturalism and humanism' , in G. P. Adams and W. P. Montague instance.A late representative ofthispersuasion (eds) , Contemporary American Philosophy, vol. 2, is Heinz Heimsoeth (1886-1975).The two most 1930 . important philosophical traditions identifiable Stroud , Barry (1977) 'T ranscendental arguments and within Neo-Kantianism are the so-called epi stemological naturalism', Philosophi cal Studies 'Marburg School ' and the 'Southwest German', 31 : 105-1 5. Wagner, S. J. and Warner, R. (eds) (1993) Naturalism: 'Baden' or ' Heidelberg School '.Also important A Critical Appraisal, Notre Dame : Notre Dame was the so-called 'Gottingen' or 'Neo-Friesian' University Press. school. STUART BROWN The most important philosophers of the Marburg school were Hermann Cohen (1842­ 1918), Paul Natorp (1854-1924), and Ernst Cass ire r (1874-1945). Also significant were Rudolf Stammler (1856-1938), Karl Vorlander Neo-Kantians (1860-1928), and Arthur Buchenau (1879­ 1946). Cohen's and Natorp's thought was close to the metaphysical school, but Cohen placed a The so-called 'Neo-Kantians' did not so much greater emphasis on ' the fact of science ' and form one unified movement as they represented epistemological consid erations . Indeed, many, often quite different, reactions to the philosophy for him was nothing but a 'theory of philosophical positions prevalent in German y the principles of science and therewith of all around the middle ofthenineteenth century,and culture '.Opposed to any form ofPsychologism, especially to Hegelian Idealism and the many Cohen opted for a very Platonic interpretation of different forms of Naturalism, Monism and Kant. Cassirer, who was Natorp 's most Materialism found in Buchner, Haeckel, Vogt important student, placed more emphasis on and others . During this period, characterized by culture than his teachers . In doing so, he came an 'anarchy ofconviction' (Dilthey), the ' return close to the views of the Baden school. The to Kant' seemed to be a promising strategy to philosophers of this form of Neo-Kantianism many. Yet, there appears to be no clearly had placed greater emphasis on the identifiable philosophical tendency common to investigation of values and their role in the all. The term Neukantianismus has been in use humanities from the very beginning. The most since about 1875. Though it was at that time not important members ofthis school were Wilhelm unusual to talk of Jungkantian er (young Windelband (1848-1915) and Heinrich Rickert Kantians) or of a 'new criticism', the (1863-1936). Others were Jonas Cohn (1869­ characterization of the new approach to 1947), Emil Lask (1875-1915) and Bruno philosophy as 'neo-Kantianisrn' took hold . Bauch (1877-1942). The Gottingen school was Otto Liebmann, who formulated the motto charact erized by the thought of Leonard Nelson 'Back to Kant' in 1865, is usually regarded as (1882-1927) who, to a large extent, followed the first representative ofthis movement. Others Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843). Reacting who were important for the beginnings ofNeo­ especiall y to the Marburg school ,Nelson placed Kantianism were Eduard Zeller (1814-1908), greater emphasis on psychology, while at the Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-94), and same time denying that he was advocating Friedrich Albert Lange (1828-75), who are Psychologism . Nelson was not as influential as sometimes taken to characterize the 'early' or his colleagues in Marburg and Baden , though 'physiological' Neo-Kantianism. Their view is Rudolf Otto (1869-1937) was to some extent contrasted with the ' metaphysical' or 'realistic' indebted to him. 224 Neoscho lasticism

Bibliography scholastic philosophy in general. Scholasticism, as it came to be called during the Adair-Toteff, Christopher (1994) 'The neo-Kanti an Renaissance, originated in the Aristotelian Raum controversy' , British Journalofthe History of revival ofthe twelfth century, and flourish ed in Philosophy2: 131-48. Beck, Lewis White (19 67) 'Neo-Kantianism', in Paul the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. After a Edwa rds (ed .) The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, period in the doldrums it was revived in the New York : Macmillan. sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by Cajetan, Dussort, Henri (1963) L 'eco le de Ma rbourg, Paris: Presses universitair es de France. John of St Thomas, and Francisco Suarez, in Finnis, 1. M. ( 1987) ' Lega l enforcement of "Duties of what is known as the ' second scholasticism' . It oneself' : Kant vs. Neo -Kantians', Colum bia Law then declined once more, and was virtuall y Review 87: 433ff. Kohnke, Klaus-Christi an (19 92) The Rise of Neo­ moribund until a revival of interest in Thomas Kantianism : Germa n Academic Philosophy Aquinas took place within the Catholic Church between Idealism and Positivism, New York: in the early and mid-nin eteenth century. Despite Cambridge University Press. (Origin ally pub lished in German as Entste hung und Aufstieg des initial hostility within that Church, important Neukantianismus, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, centres of a revived scholasticism had been 1986.) established in Rome and Louvain by the end of Lehmann, Ger hard (1963) 'Kant im Spatidealismus und die Anfa nge der neukantischen Bewegun g', the century, and a number of influential journals Zei tschriftfiir ph il o sophische Fors chung 23: 438­ consolidated the revival. Initially, in Louvain at 56. any rate, neoscholastics were committed to a Ollig, Hans-Ludwig (ed.) (1982) Neukantianismus. Texte der Marburger und der Siidwestdeutschen beliefin aphilosophia perennis, and to the view Schule , ihre Vorldufer und Kritiker, Stuttgart: that, in the entire history of European thought , Reclam Verlag. Aquinas had come closest to expounding such a --(ed.) (1987) Materialien zur Neukantian ismuslr iskussion, Darm stadt: philosophy. However, study of the sometimes Wissenschaftl iche Buchgesellschaft. radical differences amon g the great medieval Pich e, Claude (1991) ' Kants dritte Kritik und die philosophers showed that the quest for a Genese des badische n Neukantianismus', Akten des siebenten internationalen Kant-Kongresses, philosophia p erennis was not part of the kurfiirstliches Schloss zu Ma inz; 1990, II(2 ), ed. scholastic tradition, and throughout the present Ge rhard Funke, Bonn and Berlin: Bouvier Verlag, century neoscholasticism itself has manifested pp. 615-28. Willey, Th. E. (1978) Back to Kant. The Revival of substantial internal divisions . What all Kantianism in German Social and Historic Thought , neoscholastics share is, firstly, a commitment to 1860-1914, Detroit. some form ofrealism , both epistemological and, MANFR ED KUEHN in particular, the objective reality of values; secondly, a commitment to metaphysics as the foundational philosophical science; and thirdl y, a belief that earlier scholastic philosophers Neoscholasticism approached philos ophical issues in broadly the right kind of way. The dominant trend in neoscholasticism at present is 'transcendental The name given to a philosophical movement Thomism', which derives from a confrontation which began in the middle of the nineteenth and partial synthesis of some elements of century and which, though it has tended to focus Thomism with Kant (Bernard Lonergan, narrowl y on the thought of Thomas Aquinas , Emerich Coreth, Joseph Marechal) and can be regarded as a revival and continuation of Heidegger (Johann es Lotz). Perso na lism 22 5

Bibliography Boman , L. (1955) Criticism and Construction in the Philosop hy of the American New Realism , Stockholm: Alquist & Wiltsel!. John, Helen James (1966) The Thomist Spectrum, Metz, Rudol f (1938) A Hundred Years of British New York: Fordham University Press. Philosop hy, trans. J. W. Harvey, T. E. Jessop and H. McCool, Gerald A. (1989) Nineteenth-Century Sturt, ed. J. H. Muirhead, London: Allen & Unwin, Scholasticism, New York: Fordham University pp. 530-704. (Originally published in German, Press. Heidelberg, 1934.) -- (1989) From Unity to Pluralism, New York: Passmore, John (1957) A Hundred Years of Fordh am University Press. Philosophy , London: Duckworth, ch. II . Van Riet, Georges (1965) Thomistic Epistemology, 2 vols, St Louis and London: Herder. STUART BROW N

HUGHBREDIN

Personalism

New Realism The term has its origins inthe nineteenth century in the view of Schleiermacher and others that God is a person and not as conceived in systems The 'New Realists ' were a group of six of pantheism and Absolute Idealism. Its use in American philosophers (E. B. Holt, W. T. the earlier part ofthe twentieth century, when a Marvin, W. P. Monta gue, R. B. Perry, W. T. number of philosophers claimed the title, is Pitkin and E. G. Spaulding) who produc ed a more focused on individu al human persons as series of programm atic articles in 1910 and fundamental and irreducibl e realities. shortly thereafter. In these articles they oppos ed Maritain, Mounier and Stefanini defended a the idealist doctrin e of internal relations . They Christian or Catholic 'personalism' against asserted the independence of the known from naturalistic and materialistic philosophies. For the knower in the case of at least some objects­ similar reasons some absolute idealists , physical things , minds or mathematical entities. including Caird, Calkins and Green are To avoid either an idealistic or a materialist associated with personalism. But, to a large theory of the mind, some-particularly Holt­ extent, those who called themselves adopted a neutral monism. 'personalists' were reacting against the then In England, Moore and Russell have a good prevalent tradition of absolute idealism. Many deal in common with these New Realists , as had were themselves inclined to idealism, such as Alexander, and are sometimes group ed with Brightman, Carr, Howison , Rashdall and Webb, them.(See also CriticalRealism and Realism.) and rejected the tendency of Hegelian idealism to monism and pantheism, which they took to deny ultimate reality to individual persons . But Bibliography some personalists were realists, as were Pringle-Pattison and Pratt. The pragmatist Schiller adopted the word for himself. Primary: Macmurray's personalism was partly a reaction Holt, Edwin B. et al. (1910) ' The program and first to broader cultural influences which tended to platform of six realists', Jo urnal of Philosop hy, depersonali ze people as well as to mechanistic Psychology and Scientific Methods 7: 393-40 I. --(1912) The New Realism: CooperativeStudies in and reductionist trends in philosophy. The same Philosophy , New York: Macmillan. is true to a large extent of the Mexican Secondary: personalist, Antonio Caso. 226 Phenomenology

Personalism under Howison and Bowne , family resemblance than doctrines held in became an established school at the Uni versity common . The following kinds of of Boston, as it did also at the University of phenom enology may be distinguished. Southern California. The journal The Personalist was founded in 1919 but was Realist ph enom enology renamed The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly in 1980. This owed its inspiration to Husserl's Logical Investigation s. It is characterized by a rich ontology which rejects the empiricist restriction ofwhat there is to the physical and Bibliography the mental. There are physical entities and mental entities but there are also numbers , Primary: states of affairs , logical laws, institutions, Bowne , Borden Parker (1908) Personalism, works of art and so on . Following the slogan Norw ood, Mass.: Plimpton Press. 'To the things themselves! ' entities of all Knudson, A. C. (1949) The Philosophy of ontological types are to be taken as they present Personalism , Boston, Mass.: Boston University themselves to consciousness and not as some Press. theory or system says they must be. Everything Macmurray, J. (1961) Persons in Relation, Lond on: Faber. has its ' what', its essence. Phenom enolo gy is Sturt, H. (ed.) (1902) Personal Idealism , London: the study of essences and relations between Macmillan. essences by means of a kind of non-s enso ry Secondary: seeing or intuition (Wesensschau). The truths Brightm an, E. S. (1950) ' Personalism (including which such phenomenology lays bare are a personal idealis m)' , in V. T. A. Ferm (ed.) A History priori . The a priori is not merely formal hut can ofPhilosophical Systems, Freeport, NY: Book s for pertain to literall y anything, e.g. there are a Libraries Press. Deats, Paul and Robb , Carol (1986) The Boston priori truths about sensation. Moreover the Personalist Tradition in Philosophy , Social Ethics, necessity which characterizes a priori truths and Theology , Macon, GA:Mercer University has nothing to do with how we think or even Press. how we must think but is purely obj ective . Lavely, John H. (1967) ' Personalism ', in Paul Although considerable emphasis is given to the Edwa rds (ed. ) Ency clopedia of Philosop hy, New intentionality ofconsciousness-its being 'of' York: Macmill an & Co. Metz, Rudol f (1938) A Hun dred Years of British or 'about' somethin g, its directedness-toward Philosophy , trans. J. W. Harvey, T. E. Jessop and H. something-and intentional experiences Sturt, ed. J. H. Muirhead, London:Allen & Unwin, constitute much of the subjectm atter of pp. 380-98. (Originally publi shed in German, phenomenology, this is not because it is Heidelberg, 1934.) thought that somehow things other than Passmore, John (195 7) A Hundred Years of consciousness depend for their existence and Philosophy , London: Duckworth, ch. 4. character on consciousness. Rather the failure to recognize intentionality is blamed for STUART BROWN attempts to reduc e material objects to sensations, logic to psycholo gy, values to feelings.

Phenomenology Transcendental phenomenology Despite having been the inspiration for realist phenomenology Husserl 's phenom enolog y What unites the various things that have been developed into a form of idealism. For call ed phenom enolo gy is more a matter of transcendental phenomenology consciousness or subjectivity is the exclusive theme.Objects of Phenomenology 227

consciousness figure in phenomenological unfolding (Auslegung) of Dasein's description but as purely intentional objects, i.e. understanding of Being . The being with the objects qua objects of consciousness. From understanding of Being is not a transcendental motives which are partly Cartesian and partly ego outside the world but a being whose Being Kantian a procedure is adopted for arriving at is Being-in-the-world. However this is not a pure consciousness. This is not an item in the crude reverting to pre-Kantian naivete . Dasein world but that for which there is a world . The is not in the world in the sense ofone thing being operation which enables the phenomenologist located in a much bigger thing . Itis not a subject to enter the transcendental dimension of pure which unlike the transcendental subject is not consciousness is the phenomenological or outside the world . Rather the conception of transcendental reduction. This is a way of Dasein as Being-in-the-world represents an reflecting on consciousness, as opposed to being attempt to overcome the subject-object absorbed by the world and items in the world, dichotomy. What Heidegger means by 'world' which involves the suspending or putting out of is a structure of significance. This is not action ofall beliefs regarding the real existence something over and against Dasein but part and and real nature of all objects of consciousness parcel of what Dasein is. Reversing the (including the world as a whole) . Intentionality customary order, theoretical modes of is no longer conceived as the way in which a intentionality, comportment to beings, are seen conscious subject relates itselfto a pre-existing as grounded in practical modes . Being-in-the­ reality but as the medium in which what counts world is not itself an instance of intentionality, as real is constituted. Transcendental but a condition of the possibility of phenomenology is the description of the intentionality. essential structures of the constitution (constituting) of the world in transcendental Existentialphenomenology subjectivity. This is best exemplified by Merleau-Ponty. Towards the end of his philosophical career Hermeneutic phenomenology Husserl introduced the idea of the Lebenswelt This is how Heidegger describes his own form (life-world), the world oflived experience. The of phenomenology. Phenomenology is the properties and structures attributed by the method of ontology, the study of the Being natural sciences to the 'objective' world are (Sein) ofbeings (what is,Seiendes) .A necessary themselves the product of a process of preliminary to the question of the meaning of idealization and mathematization of ' life­ Being as such is the ontology ofthe being which wordly' structures .The task ofphilosophy isnot asks the question about Being .To say that Being to down-grade the life-world as 'mere is the proper subject-matter ofphenomenology appearance' but to remove from it the "garment suggests that Heidegger is engaged in of ideas' which science has thrown over it. something totally different from transcendental Largely through the influence ofMerleau-Ponty phenomenology, for which the subject-matter is many phenomenologists came to see the transcendental consciousness. However the description ofthe life-world and the exposure of difference is not as great as it first seems. Being the 'prejudice' ofthe idea ofan objective world is not some great abstraction but that which of wholly determinate entities as makes it possible for beings to show themselves phenomenology's principal task. What makes or be encountered. Dasein (Heidegger's term such phenomenology existential as opposed to for human being) is unique inasmuch as its transcendental is that the consciousness of the Being involves an understanding ofBeing, that life-world it seeks to describe is that of the of itself and that of what is not itself. concrete, situated, historical, engaged body­ Phenomenology is hermeneutic in the sense that subject in the world rather than that of a it consists in the interpretation , the conceptual transcendental ego. It involves a 'reduction' in 228 Philosophical Anthropology

the sense of the suspension or putting out of Pivcevic, E. (1970) Husserl and Phenomenology , action of the objective sciences but not a London: Hutchinson University Library . genuinely transcendental reduction . Unlike Spiegelberg, H. (1960) The Phenom enologi cal Husserl, Merleau-Ponty does not see the laying Movement, The Hague . bare of the life-world as merely a stage on the PAUL GORN ER way to world-constituting transcendental subjectivity.

Philosophical Anthropology Biblio graphy

Primary: This movement can be traced back to the Husserl , E. (1990) Logische Untersuchungen, Halle ; second edition, 1913 (Engli sh translation, Logical eighteenth century-particularly to Kant-and Investigations, trans . 1. N. Findlay, London: it has precursors in the early part ofthe twentieth Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970). century, including Dilthey and Husserl. It -- (1913) Ideen zu einer reinen Phdnom enologie flourished in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s, und phdnomenologischen Philosophie, Halle when Max Schele r and Helmut Plessner were (English translation, Ideas: General Introdu ction to Pure Phenomenology, trans . W. R. Boyce Gibson, key figures . It has since spread elsewhere and London: Allen & Unwin, 1958). has attracted attention in the English-speaking -- (1949) Cartesianis che Meditationen, The world. The movement can be characterized as a Hague (English translation, Cartesian Meditations, reaction against the overly scientistic, trans. Dorion Cairns , The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, mechanistic or reductionist studies of human 1969). (1962) Die Krisis der europdis chen nature characteristic of Darwinian, Freudian Wissenschaft en und die transzendentale and other approaches. Modern science is often Phdnomenologie, The Hague (English translation, seen by those who associate themselves with The Crisis of European Scien ces and philosophical anthropology as in a state ofcrisis Transcendental Phenomenology, trans . David Carr, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970). (sometimes as reflecting a crisis in Modern Heidegger, M. (1927) Sein und Zeit, Halle (Engli sh European society) . With its emphasis on not translation, Being and Time, trans . John Macquarrie treating humans as mere scientific objects but as and Edward Robinson, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, free beings , it has affinities with certain other 1962). movements, such as Existentialism and -- (1976) Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, Frankfurt (English translation, The Basic Problems Phenomenology . Amongst those most of Phenom enology , trans. Albert Hofstadter , commonly associated with philosophical Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982). anthropology are Ludwig Binswanger, Martin -- (1979) Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Buber, Ernst Cassirer, Arnold Gehlen, R. D. Zeitb egriffs, Frankfurt (English translation, History Lang, Michael Polanyi and Werner Sombart . of the Concept of Time Prolegom ena, trans . Theodore Kisiel , Bloomington: Indiana University But the breath of the movement makes a Press, 1985). consensus about its history unlikely . It has been Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945) Phenomenologie de la developed in a number of discipline areas , Perception, Paris (English translation, including biology, psychology and theology, in Phenomenology ofPerception, trans. Colin Smith , different ways . Those who describe themselves London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962). Secondary: as engaging in 'philosophical anthropology' Howard. M., Howarth, J. and Keat , R. (1991) define themselves in various ways and they Understanding Phenomenology, Oxford: Basil construct and associate themselves with Blackwell. different histories . Post-Marxism 229

Bibliography Circle, some of whose members rejected the term 'positivism' because of its associations Primary: with the older movement and preferred the Agassi , Joseph (1977) Towards a Rational phrase 'logical empiricism'. Against this, Philosophical Anthropology, The Hague : Martinus however, one member, Victor Kraft, argued in Nijhoff. favour of accepting the label 'positivist': 'The Cassirer, Ernst (1963) An Essay on Man , New Haven , CT: Yale University Press. Vienna Circle shares with traditional Haeffner , G. (trans. E. Watkins) (1990) The Human positivism, after all, the restriction of all Situation: A Philosophical Anthropology, Notre positive knowledge.' Dame: Notre Dame University Press . Holbrook, David (1988) Further Studies in Philosophical Anthropology, Aldershot: Avebury. Landmann, Michael (1955) Philosophische Bibliography Anthropologie, Berlin (English translation, Philosophical Anthropology , trans. D. 1. Parent, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974). Frankel, Charles (1950) 'Positivism', in V. T. A. Ferm Rescher, Nicholas (1990) Human Interests: (ed.) A History ofPhilosophical Systems , Freeport, Reflections on Philosophical An thropology, NY: Books for Libraries Press, pp. 329-39. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Kolakowski, Leszek (1968) Positivist Philosophy Secondary: from Hume to the Vienna Circle, trans. N. Guterman, Lenfers, Dietmar (1989) The Marv el ofHuman Being: New York: Doubleday, and Harmondsworth: A Student Manual ofPhilosophical Anthropology, Penguin Books , 1972. Dublin : Dominican. Kraft, Victor (1953) The Vienna Circle: The Origin of Pappe, H. O. (1961) 'Onphilosophical anthropology', Neo-Positivism , trans. A. Pap, New York: Australasian Journal ofPhilosophy 39: 47-64. Philosophical Library. -- (1967) ' Philosophical anthropology', in Paul Edwards (ed.) Encyclopedia of Philosophy, New STUART BROWN York: Macmillan & Co. Wein, H. (1957) 'Trends in philosophical anthropology in post-war Germany', Philosophy of Scien ce: 46-56. STUART BROWN Post-Marxism

Post-Marxism can be defined in two main ways: Positivism first, as an attempt to reformulate Marxist thought in the light of recent theoretical and social developments that challenge many of the assumptions and categories of classical Broadly, any view that accords to science a Marxism ; secondly, as a rejection of Marxist monopoly of knowledge about the universe. doctrine in favour ofone or other ofthese recent Positivism is characteristically anti­ theoretical developments.One way of signalling metaphysical and commonlyanti-religious.The the difference is Emesto Lac1au and Chantal term was introduced by Claude-Henri Saint­ Mouffe's distinction between being 'post­ Simon (1760-1825) and popularized by his Marxist' or 'post-Marxist' . To be the former is, follower, Auguste Comte (1789-1857). with Lac1au and Mouffe, to be committed to Comtean Positivism was not only a philosophy finding space within Marxism for a whole new but a substitute religion-a religion of range of social protest movements-feminism, humanity, with its equivalents of churches and anti-institutional ecology, ethnic, national, and worship . It was less professionally academic sexual minorities, for example-as well as for than the Logical Positivism of the Vienna the techniques of post-structuralism and 230 Postmodernism

postmodernism. It is also to challenge the Deleuze and Felix Guattari . It is found in validity ofmany classical Marxist assumptions philosophy, culture and the arts, and claims such as the central position ofthe working class Nietzsche amongst its philosophical ancestors. in bringing about social change, and the notions Whilst no clear definition ofpostmodernism ofhegemon y and historical necessity. The new can be given, it includes an examination ofthe Marxism aims at a pluralistic approach to social and cultural tendencies which have politics . dominated advanced capitalist societies since Post-Marxism, on the other hand, implies a the late 1950s and is characterized by definite break with, and move beyond , the dislocation and fragmentation; a concern with Marxist cause and its concerns . A case in point images, the superficial and the ephemeral; and a would be the many French intellectuals whose rejection of the traditional philosophical search faith in Marxist theory was shaken by the for an underlying unity, reality, order and actions ofthe French Communist Party during coherence to all phenomena.The movement is a the 1968 Paris evenements, when the Party was successor to and a critique of modernism, a widely felt to have colluded with the state in term which Lyotard (1979 , 1984, p. xxiii) uses defusing a revolutionary situation . Thinkers 'to designate any science that ... maker s] an such as Jean-Francois Lyotard and Jean explicit appeal to some grand narrative'. Such Baudrillard subsequently rejected Marxism, narratives are alleged to be comprehensive turning instead to postmodernism in its various accounts of a teleological process which will guises .Post-Marxism is more ofan attitude-of ultimately realize some hitherto idealized state disillusionment in the main-towards Marxism ofaffairs . The two accounts for which Lyotard than a specific system of thought in its own reserves his main attack are that of emancipation, which stems from the right. Enlightenment and the French Revolution, and that of speculation, which stems from the Bibliography Hegelian tradition and its ideal ofthe complete synthesis of knowledge. All grand narratives Laclau ,Ernesto and Mouffe, Chantal (1985) and the consensual collusion or acquiescence Hegemony and Socialist Strategy : Towards a upon which they were founded have collapsed, Radi cal Democratic Politics, London: Verso. and the question of justification or --and-- (1987) ' Post-Marxism without 'legitimization' of any enterprise which was apologies', New Left Review, 166. permitted by their assumption has once more Lyotard , Jean-Francois (1974) Economie libidinale, become acute. Paris: Minuit (English translation, Libidinal Lyotard maintains that due to the Economy , trans. lain Hamilton Grant , London: computerization of the past three decades , the Athlone Press, 1993). nature of knowledge itself has changed. Any Smart, Barry (1992) Modern Conditions, Postmodern information which cannot be rendered into a Controversies, London: Routledge. form suitable for being stored in a databank is STUARTSIM marginali zed. Knowledge is legitimized not by an appeal to its truth, or its ability to represent accurately what is objectively the case. Instead, there is an appeal to its efficiency: minimi zation of input or maximi zation of output or both are Postmodernism the goals to be achieved. To replace grand narratives there are language-games, which are relative , restricted and incommensurable. Each language-game is Postmodernism is a movement which began in governed by its own set ofrules and is played by the 1970s. Its chief exponents include Jean­ those who contract in, whether implicitl y or Francois Lyotard, Jean Baudrillard, Gilles explicitl y. There is no self-legitimation of Po st -st ru cturalism 23 1

language-games, which are arbitra ry and thus audience, viewer or critic to think about and replaceable . They are always placed against an possibly to revise the expectations or princip les oppon ent, whether other peopl e or language as on which their approach to art is based, but not it is traditionally used . all consensually founded beliefs are arbitrary Postmodernism also advocates the view that and replaceable, and emancipationand the relief time is dislocated. On the 'grand narrative' of suffering are worthy goals even if they can approach, time is regarded as a constant, never be fully realized . uniform, objective, one-directional flow which is split into past, present and future. The present is considered as the link between past and future, and the tempora l process is reflected in the Select Biblio graphy tenses of verbs . According to postmodernism, there is no objective reality governing the Primary: structure of language: what is traditionally Lyotard, J.-F. (1979) La Condition Postmodern e, thought ofas being in the past or the future can Paris: Editions de Minuit (English translation, The Postmodern Condition, trans. G. Bennington and B. be recalled or inscribed into what is traditionally Massumi , Manchester: Manchester University regarded as the present. With the rejection of Press, 1984). 'grand narrative' time, there is a temporal Secondary: fragmentation into a series of perpetual and Fekete, J. (ed.) (1987) Life after Postmodernism: dislocated presents which are not to be Essays on Value and Culture, Manchester : contrasted with the past or the future. Manchester University Press. Jameson, F. (1990) Postmodernism , or the Cultural Novels which 'p lay' with the tempora l Logic of Late Capitalism, Durham, NC : Duke process, such as James Joyce's Finnegans University Press. Wake, are in this respect to be regarded as Norri s, C. (1990) What s Wrong with Postmodernism? postmodern, as are all avant-garde works ofart Critical Theory and the Ends of Postmo dernism , which are presentations of dislocated or Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. fragmente d time, space or meaning, whether or Sarup , M. (1988) An Introductory Guide to Post- structuralism and Postmodernism , Hemel not they are from the postwar period. A play Hemp stead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. such as Samuel Beckett 's Waiting for Godot is Silverman, H. J. (ed.) (1990) Postmodernism­ held to be a repudiation of the modernist Philosophy and the Arts, London: Routledge. expectation that there is any overall , --and Welton , D. (eds) (1988) Postmodernism and comprehensive meaning to be found within the Continental Philosophy ,Alban y: State University of text itself, or to be legitimately provided by any New York Press . unregenerately modernist member of the KATHRYN PLANT audience. The avant-garde is on the margins of art, and is kept there by those who collude in or create the arbitrary rules of art criticism. The view that there is no objective reality behind the series ofephemeral images which are presented Post-structuralism to us reaches its most extreme in statements such as Baudrillard's, that the Gulf War did not take place; instead, the West was confronted with Post-structuralism is a movement within fragmenta ry television images which presented, philosophical and literary criticism. It emerged but did not represent, American 'smart bombs ' from and was hostile to structuralism, which taking out Iraqi emplacements. laid claim to scientific objectivity, detachment Some aspects of the postmodernist and comprehensiveness. Its main exponents are programme are of more interest or use than Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, Julia others . The avant -garde in art can lead the Kristeva, Jean-Francois Lyotard and, in his 232 Pr agmatism

later writings , Roland Barthes . It has trends in Saussure in his work on linguistics . Such common with postmodernism and includes association escapes from the allegedly public deconstruction within its scope. It began in nature and rule-gov ernedness oflanguage , and France in the late 1960s, quickly spreading to is held up as a prime example of liberation and otherparts ofEurope and North America . creativity. Derrida's article 'Shibboleth' As a movement, it is characterized by being (Hartman and Budick (eds) 1986) contains the anti-traditional, anti-metaphysical and anti­ word-associations 'shibboleth', 'circumcision', ideological. At its most philosophically 'anniversaries', 'rings' 'constellations', and is respectable, it claims that many or all interspersed with words in German; no doubt to philosophical writings in the Western tradition take advantage ofthe Saussurean assertion that inadvertently undermine themselves by not the division between natural languages is not being able to sustain the assumptions on which clear-cut but arbitrary. they are based . One example ofthis is found in What is most useful in the post-structuralist Derrida 's critique of Levi-Strauss, where programme are the secondary commentaries on Derrida claims that there is an underl ying the works of previous thinkers and the new contradiction between the assertions that the perspectives on literary texts . If these aspects taboo on incest is natural, but nevertheless has to alone were retained from post-structuralism, it be enforced by social sanctions . Another would become a less radical and more illustration comes from Rousseau's Emile: it is respectable philosophical and literary asserted that the psychological nature of women movement. is different from that of men, but that women should not (not cannot) follow the same interests Select Bibliography and occupations as men. According to post-structuralist thought , there is no stability of meaning or, in Derrida 's Derrida, J. (1986) ' Shibboleth', in G.Hartman and S. terminology, no 'metaphysics of presence' in Budick (eds) Midra sh and Literature, New Haven: Yale University Press. language . This position goes against the view of Dews, P. (1987) Logics of Disintegration: Post­ Saussure that the meanings of words can be Structuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical anchored down by those ofother words which Theory, London: Verso. occur in the same sentence or phrase . The post­ Easthope, A. (1988) British Post-Structuralism , structuralist argument is that a word cannot be London: Routledge. thus fixed in meaning , because that of other Merquior, J. (1986) From Prague to Paris: A Critique words is equally unstable. of Structuralist and Post-Structuralist Thought , Allied to this position is the broad view that London: Verso. the meaning of a literary text is also Sarup , M. (1988) An Introdu ctory Guide to Post- structuralism and Postmodernism , Hemel indeterminate.This assertion can be understood Hemp stead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. in one oftwo ways : that instead of there being Weedon , C. (198 7) Feminist Practice and Post­ just one definitive and authoritative Structuralist Theory, Oxford: Blackwell. interpretation of a literary work, there can be KATHRYN PLANT multiple meanings ; or that a text can take any interpretation whatsoever. The more moderate claim can be useful because it allows new approaches in literary criticism. Post-structuralism casts doubt upon the Pragmatism status ofthe subject as a persisting entity, as such an entity would be a fixed and permanent structure . Advantage is taken by some of the North Pragmatism originated in the 1860s out of American post-structuralists, and by Derrida discussions among a number of thinkers in himself, ofthe inclusion ofword-association by science , mathematics, law, psycholog y, and Pragmatism 233

philosophy, all influenced by Darwin's theory that opinion upon which inquiry converges if of evolution, aiming at attaining a scientific carried on long enough, so that the truth is the philosophy in which questions could be settled opinion fated to be accepted as the ultimate as decisively as in the sciences . The term outcome of inquiry. Thus, instead of defining 'pragmatic' was adopted from Kant's Critique inquiry as a process aiming at truth, Peirce ofPure Reason, where it is used to designate a defined truth as the outcome ofinquiry, inquiry type ofjudgement about which there can be no carried on in a certain way and with certain objective certainty but about which one is safeguards, such as those that characterize practically certain, as shown by one's scientific procedures. Reality, he claimed, is willingness to bet on it. Peirce credited the what it is independently ofwhat anyone thinks British psychologist and philosopherAlexander about it, so reality is the object ofa true belief. Bain with the key definition ofbeliefas 'that on Peirce's conception was adopted and which one is prepared to act' . Although modified by William James. Applying the pragmatism is not a philosophy ofopportunism pragmatic theory of meaning to the concept of and is not incompatible with adhering to certain truth, James was led to the view that the truth of principles, it is centrally concerned with what an idea is to be found in its working ; it is true if ' works' for the purposes at hand, and the idea of it satisfies, is verifiable and verified in the practical is central to the pragmatic experience. Peirce was bothered by this philosophy, even though pragmatism's modification of his original idea, and renamed conception of the practical is itself a disputed his doctrine 'pragmaticism', a term 'ugly matter. enough to be safe from kidnappers'. What One thinker, otherwise little known , who troubled Peirce was that James appeared to played an important role in the development of allow subjective elements into the equation: if pragmatism was Chauncey Wright, a scientist believing that a certain idea is true would lead and mathematician who constantly emphasized one to act in a way different from the way one the importance of the Darwinian theory and would behave if one believed it false, then on attempted in his brief life to work out an James's view the idea would be said to have evolutionary account of consciousness. The meaning, for it makes a difference in conduct actual founder of pragmatism was Charles and concrete life. For Peirce this importation of Sanders Peirce .Peirce conceived ofpragmatism belief into the criterion of meaning was not as a method for the clarification of ideas, and applicable in the requisite way to scientific used it to clarify the ideas ofmeaning, truth, and inquiry. On James's view, since reality is reality. Peirce thought of inquiry as originating malleable and subject to change in accordance in doubt, uncertainty, an unsatisfactory feeling with human desires , so therefore is truth. This from which we struggle to free ourselves, which Peirce could not accept. However, while in turn stimulates inquiry or thought , aimed at Peirce's writings were generally ignored , eliminating the irritation ofdoubt by producing James's treatment of it made pragmatism in its place belief, which Peirce characterized as famous as well as controversial. a satisfactory feeling marked in our natures as a James made pragmatism famous . John habit of action .To have a beliefis to have a habit Dewey applied it to all areas of life, especially of acting in a certain way under certain though not solely to education. Dewey held that conditions. The idea is that the meaning of an an idea is true if it satisfies the conditions ofthe abstract conception is to be found in our problem it was developed to solve. Dewey conception of its practical or sensible effects conceived of all ideas as hypotheses, tentative under various hypothetical conditions. Peirce solutions to problems , true to the extent that they arrived at his conception oftruth by applying the satisfy the conditions of the problem. Dewey's pragmatic criterion; thus he held that the truth is model ofinquiry is the biological one ofwhat an 234 Pragmatism

organism does when it is hungry: hunger is a engage in this interaction.This led to an original dissatisfied state from which the organism and very difficult metaphysics and a theory of struggles to free itself by engaging in food social psycholo gy remarkable for its originalit y seeking activiti es; the activity of finding and and fruitfulness. eating food satisfies the conditions of the C. 1. Lewis developed a 'conceptualistic problem, and thinking, on Dewey's view, arises pragmatism ', a pragmatic theory ofthe a priori . only out of problematic or indeterminat e Whereas Dewey regarded the distinction situations .Although the indeterminate situation between analytic and empirical truths as an becomes determinate through inquiry, 'untenable dualism' merely marking the determinac y is not a permanent condition; the different roles each play in inquiry, Lewis solution ofone problem leads to new problems, advanc ed the idea that a priori ideas can be and the meaning of life, knowing , and inquiry justi fied and modified on pragmatic grounds . It are to be found in action .Dewey generalized this is the a priori element in knowledge, Lewis held, model to cover social and moral problems as which is pragmatic, not the empirical. F. C. S. well as scientific inquiry. On Dewey's view, Schiller had quite a different perspective, not called 'instrumentalism', all social thinking is a that of a logician . Though not one of the form of social inquiry involvin g originators of pragmatism, he was a British ally experimentation, which requires active very sympathetic to some ideas of William modification of the environment. The situation James, especially James's idea of the will to consisting in the organism in constant believe. He called his philosophy humanism, interaction with the environment changes as the and it has come to be called pragmatic relation between the organism and the humanism. He played an important role in environm ent changes, and the aim is to exercise British philosophy as a critic of the absolute intelligent control over the indeterminate idealism of Bradley and Bosanquet, a role situation to bring it to a satisfactory termination. enhanc ed by his special rhetorical gifts . Thus ideas, thinking, mind are instrumental to All told, the most important pragmatists reconstruction of the indeterminate situation, were Peirce, James, and Dewey. Inrecent years and inquiry and knowing occur for the sake of some of their key ideas have been accepted, adaptation to and modification of the modified, and applied in different ways by such environment. Dewey came to hold that the contemporary philosophers as W. V. O. Quine, traditional problems of epistemology and large Donald Davidson, and Richard Rorty . So, after numbers of other traditional philosophical a period of desuetude in the middle part of the questions arise out of confusions generated by twentieth century, pragmatism, in a somewhat tradition , failure to question unexamin ed different guise, is very much alive and again at presuppositions, and failure to take adequate the centre of philos ophical discussion. account of the biological basis of human life. Both James and Dewey held that mind developed in theprocess of evolution as a means Bibliography of enabling creatures who developed minds to adaptto and modify their environments.George Herbert Mead held views very like Dewey's. Abel, Reuben ( 1966) Humanistic Pragmatism: The However, he carried this evolutionist and Philosop hy ofF C. S.Schiller, New York: The Free Press. pragmatic view of mind further than the other Dewey, John (1920) Reconstruction in Phil osophy , pragmatists, and developed an original theory of Boston, Mass.: The Beacon Press, revised edition, the origin of language and intelligence and the 1948. self out of the interactions among different Fisch, Max H. (1986) Peirce, Semeiotic, and organisms and the gestures in which they Pragmatism, Bloomin gton: Indiana University Press. Realism 23 5

James, William (1907) Pragmatism , New York: Lucas, George (1989) The Rehabilitation of Longmans, Green and Co. Whitehead: An Analytic and Historical Assessment -- (1909) The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to ofthe Process ofPhilosophy , Albany, NY: SUNY 'Pragmatism ', New York: Longmans, Green and Press. Co. Moreland, J. P.( 1988)'An enduring self: the Achilles ' Madd en, Edward H. (1963) Chauncey Wright and the heel of process philosophy', Process Studies 17: Foundations ofPragmatism, Seattle: University of 193- 9. Washington Press. Neville, Robert C. (1974) The Cosmology of Mead, George Herbert (1934) Mind, Selfand Society, Freedom , New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. --(1987) 'C ontributions and limitations of process -- (1964) Selected Writings, ed. Andrew 1. Reck, philosophy', Process Studies 16: 283-98. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Reck,Andrew J. (1975) ' Process philosophy, a Murph y, Arthur E. (1993) ' Pragmatism and the context of rationalit y', Transactions of the C. S. categorical analysis ', Tulane Studies in Philosophy Peirce Socie ty 29(2, 3 and 4): 123-78, 331-68, 687­ 24: 58- 91 722. Sibley, Jack R. and Gunter, Pete A. Y. (eds) (1978) Peirce, C. S. (1934) Collected Papers, vol. V, Process Philosophy: Basic Writings, Washington, Pragmatism and Pragmaticism, Cambridge, Mass.: DC: University Press of America. Harvard University Press. STUART BROWN Sleeper, Ralph W. (1986) The Necessity of Pragmatism , New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Thayer, H. S. (1981) Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism, Indianapolis : Hackett Publishin g Compan y, second edition. Realis m --(ed.) (1982) Pragmat ism: The Classic Writings, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishin g Comp any. Wiener, Philip P. (1949) Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Controversies connected with 'realism ' are University Press. deeply embedded in philosophy and, in the MAR CUS SINGER West, date back at least to Plato and Aristotl e, each of whom was a prototype for one kind of realist. Plato opposed the view that moral values are dependent on social convention and his theory of forms represents one kind of moral Process Philosophy realism . Plato 's 'realism ' has tended to be associated with belief in the existence of abstract entities generally and especially about mathematical objects. Realism in mathematics A metaphysical philosophy that postulates has been a common, though controversial process rather than substance as fundamental. position, and was espoused by Frege , amongst This movement has been dominated by others. Whitehead, though Harts horne has also been Although a realist about abstract objects , influential in the latter part of the century. The Plato tended to deny the reality of the objects of journal Process Studies was founded in 1971. the senses and, forthis reason, is associated with idealism . Inthis respect Aristotle differed from Bibliography him and Aristotle 's realism about the objects of the senses remains hugely influential, for Brown, Delwin, et al. (eds) (1971) Process instance, in the Scholastic tradition . Even when Philosophy and Christian Thought, Indianapolis: absolute idealis m dominated in British and Bobbs-M errill. American universities, early in the twentieth century, Aristotle always provided an 236 Semiology

alternative. Twentieth-century realism has not Putnam, Hilary (1982) 'T hree kinds of scientific only these connections with the distant past but realism ', Philosophical Quarterly 32: 195-200. also with other realisms, such as that of the Wild, John (1948) Introduction to Realistic Philosop hy, New York: Harper & Bros. Scottish Common Sense School. It is thus a Wright, Crispin (1992) Truth and Objectivity , word of great historical complexity and no Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. general statement can do justice to the choice of Secondary: the term 'realist' by twentieth-century Bowman, Lars ( 1955) Criticism and Construction in the Philosophy of American New Realism, philosophers as a whole. Realism has been Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell. oppos ed not only to idealism , but to -- (1967) 'British and American realism, 1900­ subjectivism, relativism, constructivism and 1930' Monist 5 1: 159- 304. phenomenalism. The opposition to idealism, Dummett, Michael (1982) ' Realism' , Synthese 52: however, was ofparticular importance earlier in 55- 112. Feyerab end, Paul (1964) ' Realism and the century. instrum entalism ', in Mario Bunge (ed.) The Critical The realist revolt against absolute idealism Approa ch to Scienc e and Philosophy, New York: dates back at least to Russell and Moore in the Free Press. 1890s. It was characterized by an espousal of Harlow, Victor (1931) A Bibliography and Genetic pluralism, external relations , a correspond ence Study ofAmerican Realism, Oklahoma City: Harlow Publishing Co. theory of truth and a belief in realities Passmore, John (1985)Recent Philosop hers, London: independent of a mind . In America there were Duckworth, ch. 5. different schools of realism such as New Perry, Ralph Barton (1926) Philosophy ofthe Recent Realism and Critical Realism and these terms Past, part V, New York: Scribner 's. are also extended to thinkers with similar views Schneider, Herbert (1946) A History of American Philosop hy, New York: Columbia University Press, elsewhere. pp. 571-2. Among the persistent problems about -- ( 1964) Sources of Contemporary Realism in realism has been, how to accommodate it within America, Indiana: Bobb s-Merrill. an empiricist epistemology. Those who have STUART BROW N favoured an empiricist epistemology of science have been inclined to deny the reality of theoretical entities. Against this there have been those who have called themselves 'scientific realists', such as W. Sellars , who have wished to Semiology assert the reality of all the entities spoken ofin science, includin g those that are not observable. Many philosophers in the 1980s and 1990s, Semiology, or 'the science of signs ', is largely reacting against a previously comm on derived from the work of the linguist Ferdinand subjectivism in ethics or various forms of de Saussure, one of the major sources of pervasive relativism, have sought to defend inspiration behind structuralism, a movement ethical realism. that can fairly claim to be the home of semiolo gical analysis. For Saussure, language Bibliography was a system and, cruciall y, a system of conventionall y-agreed signs that elicited a Primary: predictabl e response from the individual. The Bhaskar, Roy (1975) A Realist Theory ofScience, study of language was essentially the study of Leeds: Leeds Books. the relations between its various signs, that is, of Devitt, Michael (1984) Realism and Truth, Oxford: the internal grammar of the linguistic system. Blackwell. Language became the model for how all sign Moore, G. E. (1903) ' The refutation of idealism', Mind New Series 7. systems worked, with Saussure predictin g the development ofa more general discipline called Stru cturalism 23 7

'semiology' (after the Greek word for sign, Structuralism semeion) that would study such systems . Semio logical analysis is a matter of analysing the grammatical relations between signs within a given system . Claude Levi­ Structuralism is a methodology originally used Strauss thus treats a group of South American in the social sciences and later adapted to the Indian myths as a self-contained system , where treatment ofliterary texts and, more broadly, all the signs in question are manipulated around in artworks . Its first major exponent was each individual myth in the mannerof variations Ferdinand de Sa ussure, whose theoretical work on a theme . The group in effect constitutes a in linguistics is the common ancestor of all later genre with its own common underlying structuralistanalyses. Saussure himselfgave the grammar. impetus to later structuralist work by his Roland Barthes' work contains some ofthe statement that all aspects ofsocial life could be most sustained examples of semiological treated by the methodology that he had adopted analysis in the structuralist literature , with its for linguistics. detailed researches into such phenomena as The structuralist approach is what Saussure advertising and fashion . In each case Barthes 's calls 'static' or 'synchronic': that is, it is concern is to identify the semiological codes ahistorical. Ittakes a cross-section ofits subject­ involved in the system and how the audience matter and provides an analysis of the way in responds to these. Literature and film equally go which all parts of a self-regulating system to make up sign systems for structuralist function together to form a consistent and analysis , with the analyst setting out to identify coherent whole . Such elements have meaning or and describe the grammar applying within an significance or function only by comparison individual text, or across literary or cinematic with otherelements, and from their place within genres (detective thrillers , westerns, etc.). the total system . For Saussure, the meaning ofa word, or what he calls a 'sign', is partly determined by contrast with the other words in the context of which it occurs . Structuralist Bibliography methodology is also intended to be purely descriptive: it takes as its raw data only actually­ Barthe s, Roland (195 7) Mythologies, Paris : Seuil occurring social phenomena, which it does not (English translation, Mythologies, trans . Annette evaluate or judge. Lavers, London: Jonathan Cape, 1972). One important distinction made by Saussure Culler, Jonathan (1983) Structuralist Poetics: was that between the deeper level of langue, or Structuralism, Linguisti cs and the Study of Literature, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. the rules and procedures operative within a Levi-Strauss, Claude (1964) Mythologiqu es I: Le cru natural language, and the surface level of et le cuit, Paris : PIon (English translation , The Raw parole , or the strings ofwords generated within and the Cooked: Introduction to a Science of and limited by those rules and procedures. A Mythology , I, trans. John and Doreen Weightman, two-tier division was similarly adopted by later New York: Harper & Row, 1969). comparative structuralists: Levi-Strauss, for Saussure, Ferdinand de (1916) Cours de linguistiqu e example , thought that particular myths were generate, ed. Charles Bally, Albert Sechehaye and exemplifications of a deeper underlying Albert Reidlinger, Paris: Payot (English translation, structure or pattern common to all myths, and Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin, claimed that his discoveries in this area could be London: Peter Owen, 1960). used for a further structuralist study ofhow all human minds operate. Structuralism links all individual examples of social phenomena to their underlying structure , and this means that STUARTSIM 238 Upps ala School

their authors or ongms are not taken into academic school in philosophy' in Sweden. consid eration in any way. Academic philosophy there had previousl y Ifused properly, structuralist analyses can be been strongly idealistic . The new positivistic useful , although limited . One criticism levelled movement was founded by Axel Hagerstrorn against the methodology is that it simply and Adolf Phalen and flourish ed in the period assumes that the phenomena studies are 1910--40. Justus Hartnack has claimed that coherent wholes : neither in Levi-Strauss 's analytical philosophy can be said to have treatment ofmyth,nor in Edmund Leach 's study originated, largely independently, in three places: Cambridge, Uppsala and Vienna . The ofGenesis, is there any attempt to disprov e the Uppsala School shared with the Vienna Circle competing hypothesis that the subject-matter is a strong bias against metaphysics, as well as the a loose collection of narrative from different view that moral utterances have no truth value. sources . Another objection is that, by the It shared with the Cambridge analysts such as improper use of the method ology, what is Moore and Russell both their emphasis on alleged to be the underlying structure of conceptual analysis and a strong commitment to particular exemplifications is simply imposed realism in reaction to the previously dominant and not discov ered. idealism . Structuralism has had a powerful influence The Uppsala School was in some respects on many disciplines throughout most of the continu ed in the period after the Second World twentieth century, but in the last three decades it War by Konrad Marc-Wogan, Ingemar has been displac ed by post-structuralism, its Hedenius and others. These, however, were hostile descendant. more influenced by the Vienna Circle and by Anglo-American analytical philosophy than by Hagerstrom and Phalen.

Bibliography Bibliography Works on structuralism by individual authors include : Barthes, R. (1990) S/Z, trans. R. Miller, Oxford: Blackwell. Hartnack, Justus (1967) 'Scandinavian philosophy', Leach, E. (1969) Genesis as Myth , London : Jonath an in Paul Edwards (ed.) Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy , Cape. New York: Macmillan & Co. Levi-Strauss, C. (1969) The Raw and the Cooked, Sandin, Robert T. (1962) 'T he founding of the London: Jonathan Cape. Uppsala School', Journ al ofthe History ofIdeas 23: Saussure, F.de (1974) Course in General Linguistics, 496- 512. London: Fontana . Wedberg, Anders (1980) 'Sweden', in John R. Burr (ed.) Handbook of World Philosophy : General works on structuralism include : Contemporary Developm ents Since 1945, London: Piaget, J. ( In I) Structura lism, London: Routledge. Aldwyc h Press, pp. 173- 90. Sturrock , J. (ed.) (1979) Structuralism and Since, Oxford: Oxford University Press. STUART BROWN KATHRYN PLANT

Vtilitarianism Uppsala School

Utilitarianism is a normative ethical doctrin e The Uppsala School was, according to springing from largely nineteenth-c entury Wedberg, 'the first unequi vocally naturalistic foundations and deriving from the view that Utali tiarianism 239

happiness is the greatest good. It judges the fallacy, that is, of deducing moral judgements morality ofacts by their consequences.The best from statements offact. His own view was that known version ofthe Principle ofUtility is that good is a non-natural property that is known formulated by John Stuart Mill (1806-73): 'The intuitively and that an action is right if its creed which accepts as the foundation ofmora Is, consequences would be better than any other Utility, or the greatest Happiness Principle alternative and possible action . holds that actions are right in proportion as they In the latter half of the twentieth century tend to promote happiness , wrong in their much discussion has focused on the relative proportion as they tend to produce the reverse of merits of rule-utilitarianism, which holds that happiness' (Utilitarianism, ch. 1). right actions are those that conform to rules Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) is widely general observance of which would maximize regarded as the founder of modern happiness , and act-utilitarianism, which holds Utilitarianism although its general principle that the right action is the particular one that was enunciated earlier by Helvetius, Hutcheson maximizes happiness in a situation . Both forms and Hume. Bentham maintained that only ofutilitarianism are vulnerable to the criticism pleasure is intrinsically good and pain that they do not adequately satisfy intuited intrinsically bad, and that the amount of principles concerning justice and equity. pleasure or pain produced is the determining Another influential view is that developed by J. factor in judging the morality of an action . 1.C. Smart who has argued that there is no proof J. S. Mill refined Bentham's morally ofthe truth or falsity ofutilitarianism but that it vulnerable claim that it is the quantity of embodies a certain attitude that is apt to appeal pleasure or pain that counts by distinguishing to the generality of people and that offers between 'higher' and 'lower' pleasures, but in guidance for the conduct of the moral life. A allowing that some pleasures are better than comparable approach has been elaborated by R. others this doctrine invited the criticism that in M. Hare, resulting in a doctrine of 'preference cases of two actions producing equal amounts of utilitarianism' that avoids many of the pleasure something other than pleasure difficulties connected with the estimation of determines their moral values . Mill also placed pleasures and pains and in which the morally emphasis on personal liberty and the individual right act is the one that provides people with conscience rather than on the mechanical what they would prefer to have and prevents calculation of pleasures and the social and them from having what they prefer not to have . legislative sanctions favoured by Bentham. A Utilitarianism has been stringently criticized significant flaw in Mill's defence of happiness by Bernard Williams who has maintained that it as the supreme good is his failure effectively to disregards the kind ofsignificance life actually meet the criticism that there is a general has for mature persons who, he points out, shape conviction that on many occasions the bringing their lives meaningfully by means of projects about ofajust state of affairs over-rides the aim the importance of which is not recognized by a ofcreating the maximum ofhappiness . doctrine that seeks simply to satisfy as many Utilitarian doctrine was criticized and preferences as possible , taking no account of developed by Henry Sidgwick (1833-1900) their differing values . who in The Methods ofEthics (1874) rejected psychological hedonism and argued that moral principles may be known intuitively. G. E. Bibliography Moore , in chapter 3 of his Principia Ethica (1903), likewise rejected psychological hedonism and also argued that Utilitarianism Primary: was guilty of committing the naturalistic Bentham, Jeremy (1789) Introdu ction to the Principles ofMorals andLegislation, London. 240 Vienna Circle

Mill, J. S. (1861) Utilitarianism, London . others in the 1930s at Konigsberg,Copenhagen, Moore , G. E. (1903) Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Prague, Paris and Cambridge. By these means Cambridge University Press. allianc es were formed with similar groups in Sidgwick. H. (1874) The Methods of Ethics, London : Berlin, Uppsala and Warsaw (see Lvov­ Macmillan . Wa rsaw School). The Vienna Circle had Warnock, M. (ed.) (1962) Utilitarianism, London : fellow-trav ellers throughout the world, Fontan a/Collin s. (Contains Mill's Utilitarianism, his On Liberty, and the first five chapters of particularly in the USA (Ernest Nagel , Charles Bentham's Introduction to the Principles ofMorals Morris and W. V. O. Quine) and in Britain and Legislation.) (Susan Stebbing and Richard Braithwaite). Its Secondary: international influence was consolidated Hare, R. M. (1981) Moral Thinking, Oxford: through editorial control of the journal Clarendon Press . Erkenntnis, which Carnap and Hans Lyons, D. (1965) The Forms and Limi ts of Reichenbach made the principal publication of Utilitarianism, Oxford : Oxford University Press. the Logical Positivism movement. Quinton, A. (1973) Utilitarian Ethics, London: The Circle was broken up by the rise of Macmillan . Nazism in the German-speaking world . Its Sen, A. K. and William s, B. A. O. (eds) (1982) Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge influence remained none the less considerable University Press. in other countri es. In the USA, where Carnap Smart, J. J. C. and William s, B. A. O. (1973) had emigrated, an ambitious series of brochures Utilitarianism: For and Against, Cambridge: entitled the International Encyclopedia of Cambridge University Press. Unified Science was planned. This series was DIANE COLLINSON eventually completed, though some of the numbers in it (Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions, for instance) were remote in spirit from logical positivism. In the English­ speaking world generally the influence of the Vienna Circle Vienna Circle was consid erable, though diluted, because of the way logical positivism affected Analytical Philosophy. In Scandinavia the The name adopted by a group of Logical influence has also continu ed, particularly Pos itivists in Vienna who were led by Moritz through the Uppsala School. Schlick. The leading philosophers in the group were Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, Herbert Feigl, Friedrich Waismann , Edgar Zilsel and Bibliography Victor Kraft. Amongst the prominent scientists and mathematicians were Phillip Frank, Karl Ayer, A. J. (1956) 'The Vienna Circle', in Gilbert Menger, Kurt Gtidel and Hans Hahn. Both Ryle, et al. The Revolution in Philosophy , London: Ludwig Wittgenstein and Karl Popper knew Macmill an. members of the Circle, though they distanc ed -- (1959) 'History of the Logical Positivism themselves from its ideas. A. J. Ayer was movemen t', in A. J. Ayer (ed.) Logical Positivism , associated with the Circle as a young man and Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, and London: Allen & became one of the most able advocates of its Unwin, pp. 3-10. point of view in the English-speaking world . Kraft, Victor (1950) Der Wiener Kreis, Der Ursprung The group published a manifesto in 1929 stating des Neopositivismus, Vienna (English translation , The Vienna Circle: The Origin of Nco-Positivism, its 'scientific outlook' (wissenschaflliche trans. A. Pap, New York: Philosophical Library, Weltauffassung). It also organized an 1953). international congress in Prague, followed by Vitalism 241

Neurath, Otto (1935) Le developpment du Cercle de Bertalanffy, who preferred to think of Vie/me et I'avenir de l 'empiricisme logique, Paris: themselves as ' organicists', maintaining that Hermann. many organic processes can be reduced to Carnap, R. and Hahn, H. (1929) inorganic ones , but den ying that the inorganic Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis, Vienna:Wolf. can be identi fied with the mechanical. Smith, Barry (1987) 'Austrian origins of logical The second importantusage of this term is in positivism' ,inBarry Gower(ed.)Logical Positivism the compound 'ratio-vitalism', adopted by in Perspective,Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble. Ortega y Gasset to describe his own Ubel, Thomas E. (ed.) (1991) Rediscovering the philosophy,and consequently very influ ential in Forgotten Vienna Circle, Dordrecht: Kluwer the Hispanic language communities. Ortega Academic Publishers. differentiates his view from the usage in the STUARTBROWN philosophy of biolo gy described above; from epist emologies which regard knowledge as a biological process (e.g. Avenarius); and from epist emologies claiming the possibility of a non-rational grasp of ultimate reality (e.g. Vitalism Bergson). Ratio-vitalism is the view that (a) reason is the onl y means to knowledge, but (b) insists that reason must be regarded as a This term and som e close variants have been prop erty ofa living subject, thinking the system used to describe some quite different types of in question. philosophy in the twentieth century. One of the major types of usage is in the Bibliography philosophy ofbiology, where vitalism is used to denote the view that life is a property of Edwards, Paul (ed.) (1967) Encyclopedia of organisms which is irreducible to Philosophy , New York: Macmillan & Co. physiochemical processes, a view held, for FerraterMora, Jose (1984) Diccionario de Filosofia , example, by Driesch and von Uexkiill. These Madrid:Alianza Editorial, fifthedition. thinkers maintain that , whilst there are close Nagel, E. (1961) The Structure of Science, London: links betw een the organic and inorganic Routledge& Kegan Paul. Ortega y Gasset, Jose (1924) Ni vitalismo ni properties of organisms, no reduction of the racionalisrno, alsoin Obras Completas III. former to the latter is possible. Organisms Schlick, M. (1949) Philosophy ofNature, New York: exhibit principles or modes of being entirely Philosophical Library. distinct in kind from the non-organic. Vitalism Toulmin, S.and Goodfield,J. (1962) The Architecture in this sense is to be differentiated from the ofMatt er, London: Hutchinson. views of biologists like J. S. Haldane and von ROBERTWILKINSON