1 . Bataille talks of an ‘abyss’ ( 1986 , p. 80); Ryle ( 1971b , p. 182) and Dummett ( 1993 , p. xi) talks of a ‘gulf’. 2 . See Reynolds & Chase, 2011 , pp. 254–255. 3 . A recent of the field is given in Floyd, 2009 ; see also Beaney, 1998 ; Preston, 2005 . 4 . See esp. Sluga, 1998 ; Stroll, 2000 ; Glock, 2008 ; Monk, 1996a . See also Hylton, 1990 ; Hacker, 2007 ; Glendinning, 2006 ; Preston, 2007 ; Floyd, 2009 , p. 173. 5 . See e.g. Stroll, 2000 ; Glock, 2008 . See also Reynolds and Chase, 2010 ; Reynolds et al., 2010 . 6 . An early variant of this view is proposed by Urmson (1992 ), who divides the of into four types: (i) ‘classical’ analysis (Russell), (ii) ideal- analysis (early Wittgenstein, , Quine, Goodman), (iii) ‘therapeutic positivist’ (p. 299) analysis (later Wittgenstein, Ryle, Wisdom, Waismann), and (iv) ‘ordinary language’ analysis (Austin). Weitz ( 1966 ) similarly comments that ‘it has become established practice in anthologies and of twentieth century to divide its analytic parts into (a) Realism, (b) Logical Analysis or , (c) Logical , and (d) Linguistic, Ordinary Language, or Conceptual Analysis’ (p. 1). Russell (1959 , p. 216) talked of three waves in 1914–1959, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus , , and the later Wittgenstein. More recently, Hacker (1996 , pp. 4–5; 2007 ) proposed a similar understanding of as a series of phases in the history of philosophy, rather than defining it as either a of necessary and sufficient conditions or as a family resem- blance . Whereas Urmson emphasises the ‘decisive break’ (1960 , p. 187) between modes of analysis, Hacker emphasises the causal links which connect one phase to another; see also Sluga, 1998 , pp. 107–108. Simons (2000 ), drawing from Brentano’s (1998 ) view of the history of philosophy, also proposes a four-phase history of analytic philosophy, beginning with Russell and Moore, followed by Dewey and James, going through Wittgenstein and Quine and culminating with Rorty. In tracing the American aspect of this development, Simons gives an alternative view to Hacker’s, who finds in Quine and his followers ‘the decline of analytic philosophy in all but name’ (1996, p. xi). Simons traces a parallel line of development in , starting with Brentano and Husserl, moving on to Heidegger, then to Sartre and finally to Derrida. For a criticism of Simons’ view, see Dummett, 2010 , pp. 148–149.

184 Notes 185

7 . One may emphasise the British (e.g. Hacker, 1996 ) or the American perspective (Simons, 2000 ; Soames, 2003 ) of this phase. 8 . As points out, ‘even Japanese philosophy departments are split between analytic philosophers, Heideggerians, Hegelians and so on’ (2010, p. 149). 9 . See Hacker, 1996 , p. 274. 10 . Ayer et al., 1967 . 11 . It is notable, however, that the first use of the term ‘analytic philosophy’ is to be found in a critique against it, launched in 1933 by one of its earliest opponents, R. G. Collingwood. See Beaney, 2001 . Another early use of the term is made by Nagel ( 1936 ), who had seen ‘analytic philosophy’ as a European phenomenon, ‘professed at Cambridge, Vienna, Prague, Warsaw, and Lw ó w’ (p. 6). 12 . Nonetheless, ‘continental philosophy’ is currently taught as a branch of philosophy in the continent; see Gosvig ( 2012). 13 . Despite this, there have been attempts at defining continental philosophy in what Reynolds and Chase ( 2010 ) call ‘essentialist’ terms. For example, Cooper ( 1994 , pp. 4–7) points to what he sees as three definitively ‘conti- nental’ themes: ‘cultural critique, concern with the background condi- tions of enquiry, and ... “the fall of the self”’ (p. 4). But these themes do not seem to sufficiently characterise a distinctively continental approach to philosophy (e.g. they have been of philosophical concern since antiq- uity); they are not even necessarily proper to (academic) philosophy. For all these, Cooper notes that they are features which are not admitted by analytic philosophers into their conception of the discipline: Strawson (1992) admits that ‘reflection on the human condition’ belongs to ‘a species of philosophy’ ‘quite different’ (p. 2) in its aims from analytic philosophy (Cooper, 1994 , p. 4); Williams claims that analytic philos- ophy finds Nietzschean ‘quite embarrassing’ (Williams, 1993 , p. 13, quoted in Cooper, 1994 , p. 6); Ryle’s (1949 ) ‘ghost in the machine’ contrasts with Sartre’s ‘bloodthirsty idol which devours all one’s projects’ (Cooper, 1994 , p. 6). By referring to these themes, Cooper unwittingly seems to point to the degree by which ‘continental’ philosophy is shaped by exclusion. Reynolds and Chase (2010 ) instead see the differences between analytic and continental philosophy in terms of family resem- blances (i.e. neither in ‘essentialist’ nor ‘deflationary’ terms) regarding respective attitudes towards particular themes and methodological commitments; see Vrahimis, 2011b . 14 . See F ø llesdal, 1997. 15 . Some examples of this include Foucault’s controversy with Habermas (Kelly, 1994 ), as well as Derrida’s polemical exchanges with Foucault (Derrida, 2001 , pp. 36–76), Gadamer (Michelfelder & Palmer, 1989 ), and Habermas (Thomassen, 2006 ). 16 . Some (e.g. Braver, 2007 ; Critchley, 1997 ) might see the division stretching back to Kant or perhaps to some post-Kantian philosopher such as Hegel or Nietzsche (see e.g. Rosen 2001 ; Braver, 2007 , pp. 59–162; Babich, 2003 ; 186 Notes

Rockmore, 2005 ; Redding, 2007 ). Though looking at such predecessors of the divide might sometimes be helpful in illuminating some particular philosophical idea which purports to underlie it, there is also an element of anachronism involved in projecting the idea of the divide over two centuries in the history of philosophy. 17 . Mill, 1985 . See also R é e, 2005. When Mill talked of Coleridge as repre- senting ‘continental philosophy’, he was referring to an approach to philosophy that was also flourishing in Britain. 18 . See e.g. Hylton, 1990 ; Nasim, 2008 ; Candlish, 2009 . 19 . See Bell, 1999 . 20 . may count as part of the camp of the ‘non-aligned’. The book’s guest stars include all those philosophers mentioned who were present at Davos in 1928, Royaumont in 1958, and Balliol College in 1967. 21 . By ‘phenomenologists’, here I mean philosophers associated with the tradition of phenomenology broadly construed so as to include figures such as Derrida and Bataille. For similar groupings of these thinkers under the term ‘phenomenology’, see Glendinning, 2007 (on Derrida); and Himanka, 2000 (on Bataille). 22 . See O’Neil and Uebel, 2004 ; Uebel, 1992 . 23 . Adorno et al., 1976 . See also Dahms, 1994 . 24 . Bar-Hillel, 1973 ; Habermas, 2000 , p. 94. 25 . Habermas, 1995 ; Rawls, 1995 . 26 . See e.g. Dennett and Carr, 1996 ; see also Zahavi, 2007 . 27 . Russell, 1992 , pp. 309–346. See Vrahimis, 2011a . 28 . Chomsky & Foucault, 2006 . 29 . Sokal, 2000 ; see also Sokal & Bricmont, 1999 .

1 Frege, Husserl and the Future of Philosophy

1 . The eighteen-seventies also gave rise to advances that brought about the radical transformation of a number of academic disciplines, such as number theory and analysis, geometry, physics and, of course, (Bell, 1999 , p. 196). 2 . Although it is difficult to make out who should or should not count as a ‘psychologicist’, the term was to apply primarily to a thesis expressed in the work of John Stuart Mill ( 1843 ). The term ‘psychologism’ can be traced back to the Hegelian response to the psychological theo- ries of Fries and Benecke, and is first coined in Erdmann, 1870 . Among the various Germanophone philosophers who stressed the centrality of to philosophy, one may count e.g. Wundt, Brentano and Stumpf, Nietzsche and Dilthey. See Kusch, 1995 . 3 . A table of such views is given in Kusch, 1995 , pp. 118–120. 4 . Later uses of the term include Popper’s objections to ‘epistemological psychologism’ (see Uebel, 1992 , pp. 175–176); or Wittgenstein and Mises’ anti-psychologism in economics (see Long, 2004 ). ‘Psychologism’ Notes 187

even became a position the rejection of which was formative of literary ; see Jay, 1996 . 5 . See Kusch, 1995 , pp. 190–193. See also Chapter 2 , §5. 6 . Natorp, Rickert, Windelband and Riehl may all be considered ‘Neo-Kantians’; see e.g. Heidegger, 1997 , p. 191. 7 . Kusch, 1995 , p. 190. 8 . See Kusch, 1995 , pp. 211–219. 9 . Neo-Kantian philosophers such as Natorp, Riehl, Bauch, and others enthu- siastically endorsed German militarism through various for enlightenment values and social democracy. See Sluga, 1993 , pp. 76–82; Kusch, 1995 , pp. 213–219; Habermas, 2002 . 10 . See F ø llesdal, 1994 ; Mohanty, 1982 ; Dummett, 1993 ; Hill & Rosado Haddock, 2000 . 11 . But see Parsons, 2001 . 12 . See Monk, 1996b . 13 . The importance to scholars of the relation of influence between Frege and Husserl has been a matter of controversy among commentators. For some (e.g. Hill & Rosado Haddock, 2000 , pp. xi–xiv), debunking the of Frege’s influence on Husserl allows for important advances to be made in Husserl-studies, since in this way a new, non-Fregean (and perhaps conse- quently in some sense philosophically superior) Husserl may be seen to emerge. For others (e.g. F ø llesdal, 1990), a Fregean reading of Husserl’s thought is superior to the traditional one in so far as it is compatible with Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts in ways in which the traditional reading is not. For still others (e.g. Kusch, 1995 , pp. 12–14), it is perhaps unfortunate that the focus of scholarship has insisted on this issue, since it is not obvious that such a question goes beyond a matter of proving the supremacy of one tradition’s grandfather over another’s. Since hundreds of articles have been written on the matter, I not attempt to examine it here, or to present it in any depth. That does not necessarily imply that I endorse Kusch’s view, but rather that I see the question of influence as irrelevant to the central goal of this chapter, which is to undermine another prevailing view that underlies these disputes, i.e. the view which has Husserl and Frege to have grandfathered one tradition each. 14 . The that Husserl had used Frege’s Grundlagen in his Philosophie der Arithmetik , and had been one of the few authors to have commented on Frege’s work (as Frege notes in their correspondence), implies, as Hill points out (Hill & Rosado Haddock, 2000 , pp. 95–109), that Husserl had already been familiar with the anti-psychologistic arguments propounded by Frege while working on his own psychologistic account of arithmetic. This serves to deflate the myth which has Husserl’s psychologism crumble before Frege’s surprise attack. 15 . Frege’s views against psychologism were already expressed in his criti- cisms of Mill and Kant’s of arithmetic in the 1884 Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1980b, pp. 12–24). His subsequent criticism of psychologism in the 1893 first volume of his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 188 Notes

comes closer to Husserl’s criticisms in the 1900 Prolegomena to the Logische Untersuchungen . 16 . Interestingly, in a letter to Paul F. Linke written in 1919 (1976 , pp. 153–156), Frege refers to a passage from Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen in order to explain his distinction between . 17 . See also Rosado Haddock, 2008 , pp. 102–103. 18 . Followed by a second volume in 1901. 19 . See Hill & Rosado Haddock, 2000 , pp. xiii–xiv; Rivenc, 1996 . For a defence of F ø llesdal’s Fregean reading of Husserl see F ø llesdal, 1990. 20 . See e.g. F ø llesdal, 1969; Langsdorf, 1984 . 21 . Many of the terminological affinities between Husserl’s work and that of his contemporary philosophers of have been lost in the English translation of his early works; see Hill & Rosado Haddock, 2000 , p. xii. 22 . See also Thiel & Beaney, 2005 . 23 . See Kneale & Kneale, 1984 . The idea of ‘modern logic’ in contrast to tradi- tional Aristotelian logic is often overstated, given that: (i) already medieval logicians had considered their logic to be new in comparison to ’s (Oliver, 1999 , p. 262) and (ii) the Stoics developed propositional logic (see Sellars, 2006 , pp. 58–59; Gabriel, H ü lser & Schlotter, 2009). 24 . Frege did not use the existential quantifier but rather used the quantifier to express existential statements, e.g. in the form of ‘¬  x ¬ ( ... )’. 25 . Frege’s term ‘thought’ may be taken to refer to what one may today call , rather than sentences (or utterances of sentences). Whereas sentences have -values, i.e. have a referential function which can be mapped either to the true or the false, propositions (or, following Frege’s terminology, ) do not, but rather only have a sense. Any utter- ance of any , according to Frege, must express a thought (or ). See e.g. Dummett, 1959. 26 . It is important here to note that what Dummett calls Frege’s ‘myth of the third realm’ (1996, p. 249) only gets introduced by Frege in 1918. Such a myth may be seen as an attempt to account for the Platonistic of , i.e. to answer the question of what kind of entity a non- psychological thought is. 27 . See also Chapter 2 , §10. 28 . See Church, 1996 , pp. 56–57. Malatesta (1997 , p. 13) claims that using the term ‘logistic’ is more precise than ‘’ or ‘symbolic logic’. 29 . Following Kant, logic was divided into a doctrine of (examining fundamental concepts of thought such as quantity, number, time, place, quality, subsumption), of judgements (concerning the various meanings of the propositional copula ‘is’ or the relation of grammatical and logical sentential form) and of (examining forms of syllogisms); K ä ufer, 2005 , pp. 142–143. The third was the only part of logic that relates Notes 189

to its content and was widely taken to have been conclusively given by Aristotle. 30 . The extent of ground which Husserl’s term ‘logic’ may be said to cover is not clear. According to Smith (2002 , p. 52), there are three possible approaches to the issue: (i) the whole of Logical Investigations is about logic (construed in its nineteenth century sense as a kind of ), (ii) only a small part of Logical Investigations is about logic (construed as what in the nineteenth century would be called Logistik ) (iii) in the Logical Investigations , ‘logic as conceived today is integrated with speech-act theory, ontology, phenomenology, and ’ (p. 52). Although the twenty-first-century view of logic (what Smith calls the ‘Copenhagen’ interpretation of Husserl) is anachronistic when applied to Husserl, it is not completely implausible, given (i), that Husserl may have held it. Ryle offers an interpretation of Husserl which assumes the separability of his (‘quasi-Platonist’) ontology from his phenomenology – perhaps this view is due to Ryle’s assumption of (ii); see also Chapter 4, §5. 31 . Husserl inherits the idea of eigentliche Wissenschaftslehre from Bolzano (Bolzano 1972 ). However, whereas Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre is tied to the notion of objective ideas, the notion of object we find in Husserl is more nuanced; see also Simons, 1987. 32 . The of logic as a normative discipline is the common point between Frege’s arguments against psychologism in his 1893 first volume of the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (1997, p. 202) and those which Husserl makes here. The discussion of the is-ought distinction becomes instru- mental in the attack on psychologism, in different ways for each author. Frege sees a direct link between defining logic as a discipline of the way in which thought ought to be, contrary to the way in which thought is, which is the study that pertains to the field of psychology. Husserl criti- cises this approach to arguing against psychologism in the Prolegomena of the Logische Untersuchungen (2001, pp. 31–35, §§19–20), although not explicitly directing his criticism against Frege. For a detailed exposition of the arguments Husserl makes, see Kusch, 1995 , pp. 43–58, and the subsequent comparison between Frege and Husserl’s arguments in Kusch, 1995 , pp. 60–62. 33 . Husserl, for example, compares his account of logic as a technology to the idea of l’ de penser (2001, p. 21). See also Mormann, 1991 (esp. p. 67). Interestingly, the term ‘technology’ is also used by Ryle (1971a , ix) in describing Carnap’s formalist project of utilising modern logic in philosophy. 34 . Husserl, 2001 , p. 78; see also Chapter 4, §9 on Husserl’s categories of . 35 . Aristotle, , 983a27. 36 . Chapter 2, §19 and Chapter 4, §5 give a more detailed account of Husserl’s theory of meaning. 190 Notes

37 . Among others, Brentano, Meinong, Natorp, Rickert, Sigward, Stumpf, and Wundt, had seen Husserl’s criticism of psychologism as psychologistic. As Kusch (pp. 90–91) points out, there were various views as to how Husserl, it was argued, relapsed into psychologism: (i) some thought that his view of self- was psychologistic, (ii) some saw his Platonism as a form of psychologism, (iii) others thought the division between the ideal and was psychologistic, while (iv) others still saw ‘phenomenology’ or ‘descriptive psychology’ as psychologistic. 38 . It is interesting to note that the derogatory term ‘’ had been coined during the Psychologismus-Streit to denote some doctrine slightly less offensive to psychologism, according to which the realm of logic is dependent on existing ; see Kusch, 1995, p. 11. 39 . See also Chapter 2 , §2. 40 . See Rickert, 1904 , p. 88; Rickert, 2002 , pp. 195–196 & 211; Kroner, 1908 , pp. 241–242. 41 . See Schlick, 1918 , pp. 120–121; Husserl, 2001 , p. 269. Following Husserl’s complaint, Schlick withdrew his previous comments, rewriting them in a footnote (1985, p. 139). See also Van de Pitte, 1984; Livingston, 2002 . 42 . See Schlick, 1985 , pp. 139 & 153. Schlick had already criticised Husserl’s first volume of the Logische Untersuchungen in his Habilitationsschrift (1910). 43 . Natorp, 1901 . 44 . See also Kusch’s table of all the types of objections to and accusations levelled against Husserl (1995, p. 93), and Kusch’s table of the accusations of ‘psychologism’ weighted from one ‘school’ against another (1995, p. 99). 45 . In a footnote, Husserl refers to Frege’s arguments (along with those of the Neo-Kantian Paul Natorp) for the separation of psychology and math- ematics (2001, p. 406), taking them as a given for his own . In the same footnote, he also withdraws the criticisms he made against Frege in his Philosophie der Arithmetik . Heidegger’s ( 1978a ) mention of Frege’s work is another notable exception. 46 . See Heidegger, 1978a ; Kusch, 1995, p. 89. 47 . See Mendelsohn, 2005, pp. 2–3. For a sociological account of Frege’s recep- tion, see Pulkkinnen, 2000. As Kusch points out (1995, pp. 205–206), the University of Jena was, at the time Frege was working there, an impov- erished institution at the margins of German academia. See also Dathe, 2005 ; Carnap, 1963a , pp. 3–5. 48 . See Dathe, 2005 ; Kusch, 1995 , pp. 205–206. 49 . British had already developed a form of anti-psychologism; in particular F. H. Bradley in his Principles of Logic (1883 ) had attacked the empiricist view that judgements and inferences are ideas, construed psychologically. For a discussion of the anti-psychologistic influence on Moore of F. H. Bradley, G. F. Stout and J. Ward, see Preti, 2008 . 50 . See Russell, 1905 . See also Beaney, 2003 , pp. 129–131. 51 . See e.g. Carnap, 1963a , p. 3; Mendelsohn, 2005 , p. 5. Notes 191

52 . To a large extent, it was through his reading of Peano (who had read Frege’s work) that Russell had received a lot of Frege’s insights; see Beaney, 2004 , pp. 130–131. 53 . On the question of the relation of influence between Frege and Wittgenstein, see e.g. Green, 1999 ; Reck, 2002. 54 . Nevertheless, Husserl’s attitude to the history of ideas is generally a nega- tive one – this is important in some of his later writings where he sees philosophy on the path towards rigorous science; see Husserl, 1965 , p. 128. 55 . Husserl insisted on continuously introducing phenomenology anew – most of his books’ subtitles include the word ‘introduction’ or some variant thereof (Husserl, 2001 , 1962 , 1960 & 1970); see Cumming, 2001 , pp. 3–4; see also Glendinning, 2007, pp. 31–33. 56 . Various French philosophers of science and epistemologists (e.g. Cavaillè s, Bachelard, Canguilhem) who opposed themselves to this particular line of phenomenological philosophers (see Foucault, 1998 ) were also informed by Husserl’s early work; see Schrift, 2006, pp. 36–37. 57 . See e.g. Alweiss, 2003 . 58 . See Monk, 1996b . 59 . There might be something distorting (and, as Majer notes (1997, p. 37), mistaken) about reading Husserl through the perspective of either side – it is possible that a more interesting approach to Husserl is one which is neither analytical nor continental/‘Husserlian’. 60 . Though the Vienna Circle’s manifesto refers explicitly to Brentano and his students as contributing to the scientific Weltauffassung , emphasising their development of Bolzano’s insights in logic, no mention of Husserl is made, but only of Hö fler, Meinong, Mally, and Pichler (Carnap, Hahn & Neurath, 1973 , pp. 302–303). Perhaps this omission had been due to Schlick’s polemical exchange with Husserl. 61 . Note also that Husserl was in close contact with various philosophically- minded mathematicians of the time, for example, Weierstrass, Hilbert, and Cantor. The significance of this aspect of Husserl’s life and thought is discussed in Chapter 4 , §13. See also Hill & Rosado Haddock, 2000. 62 . See Chapter 2 , §19. 63 . See Chapter 4 . 64 . See Chapter 5 , §5. 65 . See K ü ng, 1993; Miskiewicz, 2009 ; Lukasiewicz, 2009 . 66 . See Huemer, 2003 . See also Kaufmann, 1940 & 1941. 67 . In this list, one may find included almost all of the ‘analytic’ protago- nists of our subsequent chapters. Another, lesser known, member of the Circle associated with Kaufmann and interested in phenomenology was Robert Neumann. Huemer also shows, quoting from ’s diary, that the Vienna Circle ‘phenomenologists’ were considered by other members to lie quite close to the ‘Wittgensteinians’; Waismann ‘in private recommended reading Husserl’ (Bergmann, 1993 , p. 200), leading to a meeting in which Hahn asked Waismann ‘how he 192 Notes

distinguished himself from a phenomenologist’ (p. 200). See Huemer, 2003, p. 153. 68 . was to review Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen during the time he served in prison (1986, p. 327; see Ryle, 1970a, p. 9), but for unknown he did not. Russell also received reports of the ‘intellectual contortions’ (1998, p. 263) involved in Husserl’s phenom- enology from Norbert Wiener (the mathematician later made famous for his invention of cybernetics); see Russell, 1998 , p. 263. Thus, whereas Russell had successfully imported the thought of other Germanophone authors relevant to the Psychologismus-Streit , such as Frege and Meinong, his role as the importer of new Germanophone philosophy of logic to Cambridge, coupled with his lack of attention to Husserl, may have partly caused Husserl’s obscurity. To this may be added the fact that one of the early importers of Husserl’s philosophy into Cambridge, the self-professed amateur philosopher T. E. Hulme, was one of the few British philosophers to have died in the First World War. Hulme had seen Husserl’s views as closely linked with those of Russell (Hulme, 1915 , p. 187) and Moore (Hulme, 1916 ). Husserl’s idea of phenomenology as a rigorous science was deemed by Hulme to be more or less aligned with Russell’s ideas regarding scientific philosophy; Husserl’s anti-psychologism in logic was considered by Hulme to go hand in hand with Moore’s anti-psychologism in . Similar views were also expressed later on by Ryle (see Chapter 4 , §3) and Ayer (see Chapter 3 , §4). Hulme’s disagreement with Russell about the war (Hulme had a pseudonymous polemic exchange with him on the matter following a lecture by Russell throughout which, Russell claims, Hulme had insisted on reading his newspaper (North Staffs, 1916 ; Russell, 1916 )) possibly disabled him from convincing Russell himself on his proximity to Husserl. See also Russell, 2003 , pp. 321–326. Interestingly, Hulme’s anti-psychologism was an influence on extra-philosophical literary and artistic modernism, particularly on T. S. Eliot; see Jay, 1996 ; Avery, 2006 . Moore was, in fact, indirectly influenced by Husserl, through his reading of Husserl’s pupil August Messer; see Milkov, 2004 . Both Russell and Moore studied in Germany during the rise of the new experimental psychology and were influenced by Brentano (as well as his import into Britain by Ward and Stout). See Bell, 1999 ; Beaney, 2007 , pp. 205–206. 69 . Husserl, 1970 & 1950 . 70 . The lecture series was rapidly deemed a fiasco; see Spiegelberg, 1970 (notice that Spiegelberg’s article was published in the first pages of the first publi- cation of a British attempt to practise phenomenology). Nevertheless, it did bring about two important results: (i) Husserl described phenome- nology as a ‘transcendental idealism ’ which might have misled his audi- ence of British philosophers into thinking this an apt of his views, and some of his later Anglophone commentators into seeing a break in his work which might have led to the analytic-continental split (see e.g. Dummett, 1993 , pp. 76–83), and (ii) subsequently Notes 193

took an interest in Husserlian phenomenology. During his stay, Husserl briefly met Moore, Stout and Broad; see Spiegelberg, 1970 , p. 15. 71 . Part of this chapter was published as Vrahimis, 2012c.

2 Questioning Metaphysics in Weimar Germany: Carnap, Heidegger, Nonsense

1 . Gatherings of the Davos Hochschule between 1928 and the last session in 1932 included among the participants Albert Einstein, , , and , to name a few; see Kleinberg, 2005 , p. 39; Gordon, 2004 , p. 229. 2 . Peter Gordon attributes this phrase to the press (2004 , p. 229), while Sallis ( 1992 , p. 209) attributes the phrase ‘intellectual Locarno’ to Jean Cavaill è s. 3 . , , 245e6–246e1. 4 . In his commentary on the dispute, Rosenzweig saw it as a ‘representative encounter between the old and the new thinking’ (1984, p. 236). 5 . The notion that Neo- was defeated at Davos has been repeated in many of the works of scholarly regarding the debate. See e.g. Coskun, 2007 ; Waite, 1998 . Levinas, who had been present at Davos, talks more subtly of Cassirer as representing ‘an order which was to be undone’, while ‘Heidegger announced a world that was going to be turned over’ (Levinas & Robbins, 2001 , p. 35). 6 . The journal had been founded by Carnap and Reichenbach the previous year. 7 . Arthur Pap translated the title as ‘The Elimination of Metaphysics through the Logical Analysis of Language’ (Carnap, 1959 ). The German term Ü berwindung was incorrectly translated as ‘elimination’. The term ‘elimination’ was employed by Ayer (1936 ), influencing Pap’s translation. The term ‘overcoming’ is more appropriate; see Friedman, 2000 ; Gabriel, 2003 . Pap’s translation also mistakenly cites the date of publication as 1932 (Carnap, 1959 , p. 60). 8 . Cassirer is no orthodox Neo-Kantian, and it is questionable whether he was still in 1929 somehow a representative of this movement. His later work includes themes from neo-, Lebensphilosophie , and even (following Davos) Heideggerian existentialism. See Ferrari, 2010 ; Verene, 1969 ; Skidelsky, 2008 , pp. 160–219; Coskun, 2007 , pp. 223–244; Friedman, 2000 , p. 101. 9 . See Friedman, 2000 , pp. 25–39; Crowell, 1999 , pp. 187–190; K ö hnke, 1991. 10 . Carnap was also educated within the Neo-Kantian tradition, having been influenced particularly by Bruno Bauch, who leaned towards the Southwest school but was also in dialogue with the Marburg school. See Friedman, 2000 , pp. 63–64. 194 Notes

11 . The Grammaticae speculativae , on which Heidegger’s thesis was a commen- tary, was at the time attributed to Scotus, before it was found in 1922 (six years after Heidegger’s dissertation was written) by Martin Grabmann to have been written by Thomas of Erfurt: ‘ has shown that the Grammatica speculativa hitherto attributed to Duns Scotus, is compatible with Husserl’s terms and overall outlook, obscuring the struc- ture and distinctiveness of the medieval original’ (1926, p. 118). This put an end to Heidegger’s aspirations towards becoming a Scotus scholar. See Grabmann, 1922 . 12 . See Friedman, 2000 , p. 26; K ü hn, 2010. 13 . Nevertheless Neo-Kantianism (especially Cassirer) was not absolutely opposed to German Idealist Kantianism; see Gordon, 2010 , pp. 17–18. 14 . This change of focus between metaphysics and epistemology is often seen as caused by Kant’s own shift in emphasis between the first and second editions of his Critique of Pure ; for example Heidegger ( 1997 ) sees the second edition as ‘Kant’s Shrinking-Back from the Transcendental Power of Imagination’ (p. 112). The preface to the first edition Kant clearly sets up his problem as that of providing a critique of dogmatic metaphysics, while the preface to the second edition attempts to relate the Critique of Pure Reason to the other two critiques; see Hanna, 2001 , pp. 14–22. On the meaning of the term ‘epistemology’ for the Neo-Kantians (in contrast to the empiricist view), see e.g. Friedman, 1996a, pp. 375–379. 15 . See e.g. Beiser, 2009 . 16 . Thus, Neo-Kantian epistemology paved the way for the later development of Logical Positivism; see e.g. Uebel, 1992, pp. 17–19. 17 . This phrase was first coined by Liebmann ( 1865 ), who repeated this as a refrain at the end of each of the book’s chapters. (Husserl’s famous slogan ‘Back to the “things themselves”’ (2001, p. 88) may have been intended as a response to Liebmann’s phrase (see Moore, 2012 , p. 447).) 18 . See Richardson, 2006 . 19 . These are, however, over-generalisations, imposed over a wide diversity of approaches to philosophy covering a span of more than half a century; see K ö hnke, 1991. 20 . See e.g. Kusch, 1995 , p. 99. Carnap was influenced by Vaihinger; see Carus, 2007 , pp. 23–24. 21 . See e.g. Gabriel, 2002 . 22 . During the disputation, Heidegger claims that Husserl had fallen ‘into the clutches of Neo-Kantianism between 1900 and 1910’ (1997, p. 193). See e.g. Beaney, 2007 , pp. 209–210. 23 . See Anderson, 2005 , p. 289. 24 . See Copleston, 1963 , p. 436. 25 . See Kusch, 1995 , p. 99. 26 . See Chapter 1 , §1; Kusch, 1995 , pp. 190–193. 27 . See Kusch, 1995 , p. 243. 28 . According to Hohendahl ( 2010 ), the Neo-Kantian establishment faced an overall crisis at the end of the Great War; the challenge posed by Lebensphilosophie may be seen as an initial phase of such a crisis. Notes 195

29 . See Skidelsky, 2008 , pp. 160–194. This was paralleled by the vitalist oppo- sition to Neo-Kantianism in interwar . 30 . See e.g. Windelband, 1915 , pp. 273–289. 31 . Most Marburg Neo-Kantians were social-democrats or socialists, whereas the Southwesterners were predominantly conservative, and sometimes reactionary; see e.g. Mormann, 2000, p. 45; Gordon, 2010 , pp. 22–24. 32 . See Cassirer, 1929 . On Cassirer’s see Skidelsky, 2008 , pp. 220–238. 33 . See Cooper, 1999 . 34 . See e.g. Spengler, 1926 , pp. 41–43. 35 . See e.g. Luk á cs, 1980 and Marcuse, 1969 . 36 . Kusch ( 1995 , pp. 211–212) claims that these may be divided into those (e.g. Rickert) who took Lebensphilosophie as a new term that, like ‘psychol- ogism’, one may use as an accusation against other philosophers, and those who attempted to appropriate its force (e.g. Scheller). Kusch briefly examines Neurath’s response to Spengler and finds it to ‘not deviate much from other contemporaneous reproaches’ (p. 250). Yet, Neurath’s ‘Anti-Spengler’ introduces (albeit perhaps too quickly) an idea of verifica- tion which slowly came to be transformed into the positivist ‘elimina- tion’ of metaphysics. Neurath distinguishes between world-feeling and world view in a manner which leads to the later distinction between Weltanschauung and Weltauffassung , and to Carnap’s distinction between Lebensgef ü hl and theory. Kusch mentions the political tone of the Vienna Circle’s manifesto (10 years after Neurath’s ‘Anti-Spengler’) and notes that it might have functioned to fashionably distinguish the Circle from apolitical Professorenphilosophie (which was seen as abstaining from real- life matters). Yet, he fails to add to this the biographical fact that Neurath’s ‘Anti-Spengler’ had been written by a Marxist who had been imprisoned for his political activities; see also Cartwright, 1996, p. 76. 37 . Rickert (1920 ) criticised Lebensphilosophie by arguing for a philosophical a priori status of values which is distinct from the alignment of values with life. 38 . Although Neurath’s ideas were worlds apart from Rickert’s, Neurath cites Rickert’s attack on Lebensphilosophie more or less approvingly in his critique of Spengler (1973, pp. 209–210). 39 . Despite Neurath’s early rejection of Spengler’s views, several concerns derived from Lebensphilosophie lingered around the Vienna Circle. The question of the relation of science to life was already set out in the Circle’s 1929 manifesto, which identifies the development of the scientific Weltauffassung it proposes with its service to life and vice versa (Carnap, Hahn & Neurath, 1973 , p. 318). Surprisingly, Schlick (1927 ) emphasised the role of Lebensphilosophie in developing a conception of the meaning of life. Wittgenstein’s conception of life has an ambiguous relation with Spengler and Lebensphilosophie; see e.g. DeAngelis, 2007 ; Haller, 1988 , pp. 74–89. Most importantly for our topic, Carnap’s questioning of the theme of the relation between science and life leads him gradually to his thesis against metaphysics. The earliest development of this thesis, as well as 196 Notes

his earliest mentions of Heidegger, are to be found in a series of lectures he presented to the Bauhaus school of Dessau in 1929 (and particularly the lecture titled ‘Science and Life’); see Galison, 1990 ; Krunkowski, 1992 ; Dahms, 2004 ; Potochnik & Yap, 2006 ; Vrahimis, 2012b . 40 . Scheller, 1972 . 41 . See Mormann, 2007 ; Gabriel, 2003 . 42 . K ö hnke ( 1991 ) shows that none of the members of the Neo-Kantian schools saw themselves as falling under such a description, and goes as far as to claim that there is no such thing as a Neo-Kantian school or movement. 43 . Heidegger might be seen here as ‘almost deliberately unfair’ (Makkreel & Luft, 2010 , p. 5). 44 . This point is further explicated in Gordon, 2004 , pp. 238–239. 45 . But see Sluga, 2001 . 46 . See Ott, 1993 , pp. 84–86. 47 . Philipse (1998 ) identifies five ‘leitmotifs’ (p. 75) in Heidegger’s oeuvre : (i) meta-Aristotelian, (ii) phenomenologico-hermeneutical, (iii) transcen- dental (and perhaps the Neo-Kantian influence might enter here), (iv) Neo-Hegelian, and (v) post-monotheist. 48 . As Levinas recalls, during the Hochschule , he, together with Bulnow, paro- died the dispute in a theatrical sketch, with Levinas his hair white to play the role of Cassirer and Bulnow playing Heidegger. Levinas offered Bulnow a caricature of Heidegger’s interpretative skill, asserting that ‘to interpret is to put things upside down’ (Levinas & Robbins, 2001 , p. 34). 49 . In the third and fourth editions of the Kant book, Heidegger (1997 , p. xviii) admits that his interpretation had less to do with Kant than with his own philosophy and thus retracts it. 50 . If there is any evidence for such ‘cowardice’ in Kant, an inability to live up to his discoveries, it is to be found in the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. Heidegger’s attempt to go where Kant had not dared go before is justified, for Heidegger, by Kant’s prescription to remain true to that which is unthought in a philosopher’s work. It is interesting to see here how Heidegger’s book on Kant thus becomes a predecessor for Deleuze’s approach to the history of philosophy (see Sellars, 2007 ), as well as Derrida’s. 51 . See Sadler, 1996 , p. 129. 52 . Yet, Cassirer had already deviated from that establishment himself, moving in his Philosophie der symbolischen Formen ( 1923 ) away from the strict epistemological project of his Marburg predecessors and turning towards a metaphysical philosophy of symbolic forms; see Krois, 1992 . 53 . Translated in Hamburg, 1964 , p. 209. 54 . See also Levinas & Robbins, 2001 , p. 36. Naturally, being on the Alps, Heidegger spent a lot of time skiing. Skiing was in fact part of the attrac- tions of the Hochschule ; see Kleinberg, 2005 , p. 39. Yet, according to Peter Gordon, Heidegger frequently appeared at lectures in his ski-clothes – not because he did not have the time to change into more formal attire, but Notes 197

because he seemed to enjoy the effect: he wrote to Elisabeth Blochmann upon his return from Davos that ‘my hope for the new powers among the youngest [students] has grown stronger ... it was wonderful, when on intermittent days Riezler and I could get out for excursions,’ and then, afterwards, ‘fatigued, full of the sunlight and freshness of mountains ... we made our entrance every evening in our ski-suits amidst the elegance of evening attire.’ ‘For most of the Docents and audience,’ he adds, ‘this was something unheard of.’ Some found Heidegger’s informality refreshing, but Toni Cassirer, Ernst’s wife, seems to have found it displeasing. (2004, p. 228) It is interesting to note here that Carnap was also a ski aficionado. One may find in his correspondence with Quine references to his skiing trips (Quine & Carnap, 1990 , pp. 162 & 227). According to Quine (1994 ), Carnap ‘was vigorous, apparently quite regular about his exercise ... I knew from his correspondence and conversation, he’d go for long skiing week- ends with other philosophers on the Tyrolese Alps’. 55 . See also Gordon, 2004 , pp. 219–220. 56 . This is noted in his wife’s memoirs (Cassirer, 2003, p. 165). 57 . As with many of the regarding the dispute, this is uncertain. Jean Cavaill è s notes that among the French, only Levinas defended Husserl and Heidegger (Ferri è res, 1982, p. 52), while Hamburg notes the courage of Cassirer in facing the overwhelming presence of ‘post-Kantians’ ‘drawn by Heidegger’s presence’ (Hamburg, 1964 , p. 208). Perhaps the French saw Neo-Kantian followers of the French Lé on Brunschvicg where the Germans counted Heideggerians. 58 . It is possible that the political of the event has been overempha- sised (e.g. by its presentation in newspapers at the time) when envis- aged as a dramatic political conflict (rather than an honest philosophical exchange); see e.g. Friedman, 2000 , p. 5; Gordon, 2004 , p. 242; Gordon, 2010 , pp. 1–42. 59 . By the time of the dispute, Cassirer had been the only active German proponent of Neo-Kantianism. All other Neo-Kantians had either retired or died. See Kusch, 1995 , p. 243. 60 . See Kant, 1929 , §A142; Kant, 2004 , §34. 61 . According to Aristotelian logic, in (1) All S are P, (2) M is S, Therefore, (3) M is P . (2) is the subsumption of a particular object, M, to a general category S. For Kant, the question which schematism comes to answer (i.e. the ques- tion of how an intuition comes to be subsumed under a pure concept) becomes methodically resolved through the application of the categories to time through a series of syllogisms. The form that these syllogisms take is roughly one in which the major consists of the subsumption of the under a category to which it corresponds, the minor premise is the subsumption of an object under the schema, and the conclusion brings us to the subsumption of an object under a category. See also Patton, 2004 , pp. 66–68. 198 Notes

62 . ‘Numerus est quantitas phaenomenon, sensatio realitas phaenomenon, constans et perdurabile rerum substantia phaenomenon, aeternitas neces- sitas phaenomenon, etc’ (Kant, 1929, p. 186). 63 . Whereas in Being and Time finitude denotes death, in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, finitude evolves into the origin of (metaphysical) thought, that element which renders it both possible and necessary. For an infinite being, (metaphysical) thought is neither possible nor necessary, whereas for a finite being, its finitude, by being an issue for itself, demands meta- physical thinking. For an infinite being, it makes no sense to differentiate between intellect and sensibility – infinite beings require no mediation between their concepts and time. Finite beings are required, by their finiteness, to institute a certain relation between their concepts and their temporal intuitions – they require a schematism. Humans as finite beings are required to move from concepts to objects, to think of objects, some- thing which would have been impossible for infinite beings. See also Inwood, 1999 , pp. 69–71. 64 . Cassirer’s response to Heidegger focused on the question ‘how are synthetic a priori possible?’ (Heidegger, 1997 , p. 195), extending his criticism on the one hand to the claim that Heidegger’s interpretation does not account for the necessary universality of mathematics (Heidegger, 1997 , p. 195; see also Kant, 2004 , §§6–13) and on the other hand the centrality of ethics to the whole of Kant’s philosophy (momentarily in the dispute (Heidegger, 1997 , p. 196), and later on in writing (Cassirer, 1967 )). The detail of Cassirer’s response (and Heidegger’s answer) will not be presented here; one may consult further Skidelsky, 2008 , pp. 195–220; Gordon, 2010 ; Gordon, 2004 , pp. 240–243; Friedman, 2000 , pp. 129–145. On the criticism regarding ethics see e.g. Harries, 2007 , pp. 80–85. The thesis that the ethical is absent from Heidegger’s thinking is disputed in Hodge, 1995 . On the influence of Cassirer’s critique of Heidegger on Levinas, see Leask, 2005 . 65 . Pos links the attraction of ‘younger’ philosophers to Heidegger to his extreme emotional nature – his expression of ‘feelings of loneliness, of oppression, and of frustration’ (1949, p. 68). 66 . Friedman ( 2000 , p. 7) points to Carnap’s diaries as evidence of Carnap’s dialogue with Heidegger at Davos. Rosado Haddock (2008 , p. 3) speculates that Carnap had possibly already met with Heidegger nine years earlier, at Husserl’s seminar in Freiburg. 67 . See Friedman, 2000 , p. 8. 68 . See Friedman, 2000 , p. 8. 69 . See e.g. Witherspoon, 2003. 70 . Carnap first presented these ideas (mentioning Heidegger) in September 1929. See Dahms, 2004 , pp. 368–370. 71 . Confusingly, in a later presentation to a British audience (Carnap, 1935, p. 16), Carnap mentions Pythagoras and Spinoza as metaphysicians. Yet Carnap later acknowledges that his attack simply does not apply to philos- ophers who were close to the scientific thinking of their time. He gives the Notes 199

examples of Aristotle and Kant, noting that their metaphysical views were not deemed by him as meaningless, but as false (1963b, p. 875). 72 . Carnap does not clarify how far the ancient sceptics opposed metaphysics. It is perhaps to particular aspects of ancient scepticism that Carnap is alluding to here (for example, their development of Agrippa’s trilemma rather than their ethics). See also Quine, 1974, pp. 2–3. 73 . See Anderson, 2005 , p. 302. 74 . In his introduction, Carnap (1959 ) alludes to this when among his failed predecessors he talks of those who believe metaphysics ‘to be uncertain, on the ground that its problems transcend the limits of ’ (p. 60). 75 . See Carnap, 1936 for a clarification of the shift in Carnap’s concerns from epistemology to and the logic of science. See Richardson, 1998 , p. 91. 76 . This view falls within a more general interpretative framework which sees Neo-Kantianism as the central influence on Carnap’s early writings (rather than, for example, Russell, which is the view established by Quine and Goodman); see e.g. Haack, 1996 ; Sauer, 1989 ; Richardson, 1998 ; Friedman, 2000 . 77 . The Neo-Kantians were not, in their totality, averse to metaphysics. 78 . These metaphysicians belong to a Kantian tradition insofar as they are not ‘pre-critical’ dogmatic metaphysicians: in other words, Carnap is partly mistaken when he attributes to them knowledge of the essence of things. Nevertheless, he is also partly correct, insofar as these thinkers are striving, within the limitations set out by Kant, to establish an ontology rather than an epistemology. See Limniatis, 2008 (esp. pp. 152–190). 79 . Though from 1929 to 1931, Heidegger might have appeared, for Carnap, to be a metaphysician, Heidegger’s views on metaphysics were not always favourable, and changed throughout his career; see Inwood, 1999 , pp. 126–128. 80 . For example, Heidegger held a very ambivalent attitude towards Hegel; he later set as the task of his historical lectures ‘to place Hegel’s in the commanding view and then to think in a totally opposite direction’ (Heidegger, 2000 , p. 123). 81 . It is likely that by ‘metaphysician’, Carnap simply means whoever produces nonsensical (i.e. metaphysical) statements. 82 . See Inwood, 1999 , p. 126. 83 . Heidegger is here criticising Cohen’s conception of das Nichts ; see Gordon, 2005 , p. 50. 84 . See Crowell, 2001 , p. 81. 85 . See Chapter 1 , §4b. 86 . See K ä ufer, 2005, pp. 141–144. 87 . Heidegger was ‘one of the first German philosophers seriously to read Frege’ (Simons, 2001 , p. 299); see Heidegger, 1978, p. 20. For his negative remarks on Russell’s logic as mere calculus see Heidegger, 1978, pp. 42–43 & 174. See also Friedman, 2001, p. 39. 88 . See Heidegger, 1978a , 1978b , 1978c . 200 Notes

89 . See Priest, 2001 ; Kä ufer, 2005, pp. 144–146; Crowell, 2001 , pp. 76–114; Mohanty, 1988 . 90 . See K ä ufer, 2005, p. 144. 91 . See Martin, 2006 , pp. 103–146. 92 . See Friedman, 2000 , pp. 46–47. 93 . Heidegger, 1996 , pp. 62–67. 94 . See Heidegger, 1996 , pp. 70–77. 95 . See Heidegger, 1996 , pp. 68–69. 96 . See Heidegger, 1996 , p. 63. 97 . Heidegger, 1996 , §§39–42. 98 . Heidegger, 1996 , §45. 99 . Heidegger, 1996 , §§46–53. 100 . See Heidegger, 1996 , §40. 101 . See Heidegger, 1998 , p. 88. 102 . See Heidegger, 1998 , p. 89. 103 . Here, ‘more originary’ does not imply temporal priority. To be thrown in the midst of ready-to-hand entities is always temporally prior to ontology (but not prior to an understanding of Being). An authentic relation to the world is temporally posterior but ontologically prior. 104 . Heidegger, 1998 , p. 85. 105 . The sphere of the ontological must be further divided into its pre-on- tological and ontological components. The pre-ontological is the onto- logical before it is made explicit, before an account can be given of it. For example, the movement from anxiety to the understanding of its refer- ence to nothing is a movement from the pre-ontological to the onto- logical. See also Inwood, 1999 , p. 109. 106 . It is not clear, though, that this understanding may be applied to modern post-Aristotelian (e.g. non-binary logics). 107 . See Heidegger, 1996 , p. 42. 108 . The context in which Heidegger makes the distinction quoted above (between categories and existentials ) is that of the general differentiation between what he calls ‘the Analytic of ’ and the disciplines of psychology, , and biology (1996, pp. 42–47). 109 . Carnap, 1967 , p. 148. The condition is singular and may be applied to either of the four different ‘’ Carnap specifies (, , epistemology or ‘phenomenology’). 110 . In this, Carnap has been influenced by Lebensphilosophie , in particular through Dilthey’s student Hermann Nohl; see Gabriel, 2003 ; Gabriel further cites Naess, 1968 and Patzig, 1966 . 111 . It must be noted here that Carnap had first presented this thesis to a group of artists and architects at the Bauhaus school of Dessau in 1929 under the title ‘The misuse of Language’ ( Der Miß brauch der Sprache ). This may be taken as a clue towards also reading his turn against meta- physics as a protreptic towards artists to take over the gap that will be left once metaphysicians realise their proper place. See Dahms, 2004 , pp. 368–370; Vrahimis, 2012b . (As Dahms notes, his use of Heidegger Notes 201

as an example of his thesis was posed in this presentation. Carnap had asked the Bauhauslers to guess who came up with the phrase Das Nichts Nichtet , and they suspected it might have been Kurt Schwitters.) 112 . A discussion of Carnap’s thought on philosophical style is given in Wolters, 2004 . 113 . Anon., 1988 . 114 . Lange’s notion of Begriffsdichtung was influential on Nietzsche, who viewed metaphysics as a kind of Begriffsdichtung , an art of concepts; see Wolters, 2004 , p. 28. 115 . Intriguingly, Nietzsche was also a musician and composer. 116 . For example, the term Ü berwindung itself is one that is consistently employed in Nietzsche’s Zarathustra (1883 ), albeit in a poetic manner; see Friedman, 2000 , p. 23; see also Luchte, 2007 . 117 . Carnap’s obvious target here is Frege and the ‘Julius Caesar problem’ (which Frege introduced as an objection to Hume’s Principle, in order to demonstrate the necessity of his ‘Basic Law V’ that was subject to Russell’s paradox). Frege states the problem thus: ‘we can never – to take a crude example – decide by means of our whether any concept has the number Julius Caesar belonging to it, or whether that conqueror of Gaul is a number or is not’ (Frege, 1980b , p. 68); an over- view of the problem is given in MacBride, 2000. Carnap implies here that Frege’s objection is meaningless. 118 . Carnap further expounds this later on: ‘Another very frequent violation of logical syntax is the so-called “type confusion” of concepts. ... We have here a violation of the rules of the so-called theory of types. An arti- ficial example is the sentence we discussed earlier: “Caesar is a prime number.” Names of persons and names of numbers belong to different logical types, and so do accordingly predicates of persons (e.g. “general”) and predicates of numbers (“prime number”)’ (1959, p. 75). 119 . The word arch ē already had at least two meanings prior to being put to use by the Pre-Socratics; on the one hand, we can back to Homer’s Iliad its being used to mean ‘temporal beginning’ ( Iliad 22.116) in the way Carnap points out, but in the same text the verb arch ō , from which the noun arch ē is derived, is used to indicate governance (Iliad 2.494) (we later find Pindar and other texts pre-dating the Pre-Socratics using archē to indicate sovereignty) connoting something spatial rather than temporal (the word may be used to indicate a place of governance). See Lidell, Scott & Jones, 1883, p. 227. Furthermore, one might claim that the word arch ē is transformed into a cosmological, quasi-meta- physical concept precisely because of its earlier . Thus, from Anaximander to Plato’s Timaeus, one can say that the term arch ē desig- nates a temporal origin which (by of its being a first cause) has some form of authority over the physical organisation of the cosmos. 120 . On the ‘nonsense’ which results when Heidegger translates the Pre-Socratics by going back to the ‘original’ Pre-Platonic uses of their terms ( legein , logos , al ē theia , physis ), see Adkins, 1962 . 202 Notes

121 . It is important to note here that Husserl’s talk of the archai of the sciences was one which was made in parallel with Husserl’s early rejection of metaphysics; see e.g. Schmitt, 1962a & 1962b ; Zahavi, 2003 ; Priest, 1999 . 122 . See Heidegger, 1993 , 1998d , 2007 . 123 . See e.g. Rorty, 1991 ; Derrida, 1991. 124 . See also Stone, 2006 , pp. 221–222. 125 . It is possible that Carnap might have meant that the sentence ‘Nothing is outside’ (p. 70) is here translated in another language (according to the relevant rules of transformation), into the sentence ‘There is nothing (does not exist anything) which is outside’ (p. 70), which has a different logical structure. 126 . Heidegger agrees that he does not use ‘nothing’ as a neologism; see Stone, 2006 . 127 . E.g. Conant, 2001 ; K ä ufer, 2005. 128 . In his response (though not explicitly addressed to Carnap), Heidegger ( 1998c ) claims that ‘the question “What is metaphysics?” ... springs from a thinking that has already entered into the overcoming [ Ü berwindung ] of metaphysics’ (p. 231). Another implicit response to Carnap is found in Heidegger, 1998d . 129 . See Friedman, 1996b , p. 48. 130 . See e.g. Friedman, 2000 , p. 12. 131. See Stone, 2006 ; Gabriel, 2003 . 132 . Heidegger later discusses the Ü berwindung (Heidegger, 1969 , p. 43) and afterwards Verwindung (Heidegger, 1959 ) of metaphysics. 133 . Aristotle, Metaphysics , 1026a. 134 . See Atkins, 1962. 135 . In an earlier translation, ‘illusory problems’ is more appropriately trans- lated as ‘pseudo-problems’ (Heidegger, 1962 , p. 262). 136 . See Heidegger, 1971 . 137 . See Friedman, 2003 , p. 20. 138 . See Reck, 2007 . On the relation of logical positivism to the ‘soft’ sciences, see Hardcastle, 2007 ; Uebel, 2007 ; Nemeth, 2007. 139 . See also Friedman, 2000 . 140 . See also Gabriel, 2003 . 141 . See Gordon, 2010 , pp. 43–48. 142 . Carnap studied under Frege in 1910 and 1913–14; see Thiel & Beaney, 2005 , p. 30. 143 . See Rosado Haddock, 2008 ; Mayer, 1991 , 1992 ; Ryckman, 2007 ; Gabriel, 2007 . 144 . On the Husserlian influence on Der Raum see e.g. Sarkar, 2003 . 145 . See Rosado Haddock, 2008 ; Ryckman, 2007 ; Roy, 2004 . 146 . See Friedman, 1996a . 147 . Nieli (1987 , pp. 61–64) traces the change of attitude back to Carnap, 1967 , whereas Mormann (2007 ) points to Carnap, Hahn & Neurath, 1973 as an important turning point. Notes 203

148 . See e.g. Carnap, 1950 ; Quine & Carnap, 1990 , p. 406. On the question of the influence of Husserl on Carnap’s notion of explication (devel- oped from his earliest work to 1950), see Beaney, 2004 . See also Beaney, 2007 . 149 . See Ryckman, 2007 , pp. 91–92; Rosado Haddock, 2008 , p. 2. 150 . Rosado Haddock (2008 , p. 3) points to the resemblance with Carnap of a person in the seminar photograph but goes on to also question this resemblance. 151 . See Rosado Haddock, 2008 , pp. 1–2; Carnap, 1967 , pp. 4–5. 152 . Wittgenstein (1922 ) announces that most philosophical propositions are nonsense (4.003), which throughout the Tractatus can be taken (through a problematically proto-verificationist reading) to mean neither true nor false (e.g. 5.5351, 6.51). Furthermore, in the passage which follows his announcement, he attributes to Russell’s theory of the view that ‘the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one’ (4.0031). Both Russell and Wittgenstein’s reading of Russell are certainly sources for Carnap’s division between logical and historico-grammatical syntax. Carnap’s views on nonsense may have resulted from Carnap’s break with Wittgenstein’s conception of meaning; see Carus, 2007 , p. 33. 153 . See e.g. Conant, 2001 ; Hacker, 2003 . 154 . See Carnap, 1963a , pp. 25–26. Carnap’s relations with Wittgenstein ended traumatically in 1932; upon reading the offprint of Carnap’s latest publication in Erkenntnis Wittgenstein became enraged, thinking that Carnap was stealing his ideas; see Hintikka, 1996 , pp. 131–132. 155 . The text referred to here consists of notes typed by Waismann in the presence of Schlick in 1929, later published as the ‘Lecture on Ethics’ (Wittgenstein, 1965 ), which excluded his very explicitly approving comments on Heidegger; see also Murray, 1974 . Wittgenstein remarks that ‘Ich kann mir wohl denken was Heidegger mit Sein und meint’ (Wittgenstein, Waismann & McGuinness, 1967 , p. 68) (‘I can readily think what Heidegger means by Being and Dread’ (Wittgenstein, 1978 , p. 80)). Given the date in which the discussion took place, Wittgenstein must have been referring to ‘Was ist metaphysik?’ In the undated notes he dictated to Waismann for Schlick, titled ‘On the character of disquiet’ (Wittgenstein, Waismann & Baker, 2003 , pp. 69–77), Wittgenstein also quotes Heidegger’s ‘Das Nichts Nichtet’, perhaps less approvingly this time. As Gordon Baker suspects (Wittgenstein, Waismann & Baker, 2003 , p. xvi), it is probable that he dictated these notes in December 1932, which makes it likely that here Wittgenstein is responding to Carnap. This might, in turn, imply that Wittgenstein’s attitude is one of replacing the kind of criticism Carnap weighed against Heidegger. Instead of looking for a criterion for differentiating between sense and nonsense, Wittgenstein produces a series of aporetic remarks on Heidegger’s view. 156 . On Frege’s views of senselessness, see e.g. Diamond, 1991 , pp. 73–93; Conant, 2000 . The Fregean notion of nonsense which both Diamond 204 Notes

and Conant find in Wittgenstein is one which they contrast with the Vienna Circle’s positivistic interpretation of Wittgenstein’s conception of nonsense. Frege held that expressions such as ‘There is Julius Caesar’ (1997, p. 189) are senseless (meaning neither true or false) because they employ a proper name (i.e. an object) as a concept word. Frege’s notion of a sentence being senseless if and only if it is neither true nor false is undoubtedly important in the development of Carnap’s thoughts on the subject (as well as Russell and Wittgenstein’s). 157 . See Gabriel, 2007 , pp. 70–73. As we have seen, Frege (and his ‘Julius Caesar problem’) is one of the targets of Carnap’s criticism in this paper. 158 . See Bar-Hillel, 1957 . 159 . This view is originally ‘not Carnap’s, nor Frege’s, nor Russell’s or Whitehead’s or Hilbert’s, but Husserl’s’ (Rosado Haddock, 2008 , p. 100); see also Bar-Hillel, 1957 , p. 367. 160 . For Husserl, this distinction is particularly important, since meaningless- ness is a method for the detection of differences between categories of meaning; thus, this method becomes central to Husserl’s development of his system of categories; see Thomasson, 2009. 161 . The term ‘developed’ should be understood to imply here that a priori grammatical rules appear in languages which already have certain ‘linguistic habits’ (and thereby it might seem that the a priori rules somehow presuppose the historical formation of the a posteriori ones, though they are logically prior). 162 . In the Logical Investigations, Husserl misleadingly gives the expression (8) ‘a round square’ as an example of an absurd expression. He later clarifies (Husserl, 1969 & 1975 ) that he is referring only to formal combinations of meanings (as in the example given above), excluding the ‘material of knowledge’ (Husserl, 2001 , p. 194) entailed in the more concrete aspect of (8). See Bachelard, 1968 , pp. 7–8. Husserl emphasises that the laws of formal grammar (what Husserl calls ‘the laws of complex meaning’ ( 2001 , p. 183)) guard against nonsense, while ‘the laws of pure logic establish what an object’s possible unity requires in virtue of its pure form ’ thus guarding against formal absurdity. 163 . ‘An object (e.g. a thing, of affairs) which unites all that the unified meaning conceives as pertaining to it by way of its “incompatible” meanings, neither exists nor can exist, though the meaning itself exists’ (Husserl, 2001 , p. 193). See also Tugendhat, 1982, pp. 107–120. 164 . Formal absurdity results if an object is a priori impossible (due to the laws of pure logic), while material absurdity is ultimately ontological (e.g. results from combining ‘round’ and ‘square’). In 1931, Carnap would have objected to the latter (though not the former). 165 . Bar-Hillel (1957 ) points out that Husserl’s laws for avoiding nonsense and formal countersense are ‘an interesting anticipation of the modern conceptions of rules of formation and rules of transformation’ (p. 366) central to Carnap’s work. Though the former may be true, it is possible Notes 205

that the latter is not as straightforward as Bar-Hillel would have it, given the between Husserl’s ontological conception of mate- rial countersense and Carnap’s semantic conception of the rules of transformation. 166 . See e.g. Alweiss, 2003 . Complicating things further, Kusch ( 1988 ) claims that Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s theory of meaning brings him to a view of meaning which is also held by Frege and Wittgenstein. 167 . See Glendinning, 2007 , pp. 40–48. 168 . See Zahavi, 2003 , pp. 5–8. 169 . One criticism of both the positivism that Carnap had stood for and Heideggerian metaphysics comes from Horkheimer, who polemically (and perhaps unfairly) relates the positivist view of science to the rise of fascism (Horkheimer, 1982). 170 . ‘ ... my Marxist views on how metaphysics will be overcome through reformation of the substructure’ (Friedman, 2000 , p. 21). 171 . See Galison, 1990 ; Carus, 2007 . See also Stadler, 2007, pp. 19–31. 172 . See Friedman, 2000 , pp. 17–21. 173 . See Bestegui, 2005 , p. 162. 174 . See Matar, 2006 , pp. 29–44; Cooper, 1999 .

3 Was There a Sun before Men Existed?: Ayer, Sartre, Bataille, and Merleau-Ponty

1 . Ambrosino, Wahl, and Bataille were members of the Coll è ge de Sociologie and possibly also of ‘Ac é phale’, the secret founded by Bataille. It is still unclear which members of Bataille’s circle, apart from Bataille, were really members of Ac é phale . (1937 ) did write an article which was published in the Ac é phale journal, though he most prob- ably did not take part in their meetings. See also Surya, Fijalkowski & Richardson, 2002 , pp. 235–254. 2 . Ayer seems to have been introduced to the Parisian intelligentsia by his various girlfriends. For example, regarding , Ayer remarked that ‘I don’t know his work well, but he and I were friends: we were making love to twin sisters after the war’ (Rogers, 2002 , p. 197). 3 . He met Merleau-Ponty through Francette Drin, the sister of his girlfriend Nicole Bouchet de Fareins (Rogers, 2002, pp. 192–193). 4 . Delmer was a British painter and artists’ , famously depicted by Epstein, Picasso, Giacometti, and Bacon. Born Isabel Nicholas, she had married several times and was later known as Isabel Lambert and Isabel Rawsthorne. 5 . Delmer also had an affair with Bataille; Francis Bacon mentions this in an interview given to the Paris Match magazine the year he died (Maubert, 1992 ), in the context of confessing his own love affair with Isabel. On her collaboration with Bataille, see Bataille, Waldberg & Lebel, 1995 ; Waldberg & Waldberg, 1992 . 206 Notes

6 . See also Rogers, 2002 , pp. 191–206. 7 . See Trakakis, 2007 . 8 . Ayer’s film criticism was published in the Nation (February–May 1942) under the nickname P. H. Rye, an allusion to the Heraclitean ta panta rhei (everything flows), as well as the area called Rye in New York, where his children had been evacuated to in the period of 1940–1943. See Ayer, 1977 , p. 259; Rogers, 2002 , p. 176. 9 . Ayer, 1945 , 1946a . Ayer went on to write numerous pieces on Sartre; see Ayer, 1946b , 1948 , 1950 , 1961 , 1967 , 1968 , 1969 , 1984 . Ayer, together with Stuart Hampshire, also participated in a discussion of Sartre’s philos- ophy on BBC radio in 1958. 10 . What is important about these dates is, obviously, the ascent of Hitler to power during this time, which would lead to the gradual dispersal of the Circle. Given these circumstances, the political stance of the Circle was also intensified during these years. It is thus quite surprising that Ayer would later downplay the role of politics in the development of Logical Positivism. See e.g. Magee, 1982 , pp. 119–120. 11 . Ayer & Honderich, 1991 , p. 209. 12 . According to Ayer, Ryle had explained that ‘We know roughly what Wittgenstein’s doing at Cambridge but we don’t know what’s happening in Vienna. Go there, find out, and tell us’ (Magee, 1982 , p. 128). 13 . Ayer cites Carnap’s article (Ayer, 1936 , p. 36) but does not identify any differences between their respective theses. 14 . In fact, even as late as 1988, Ayer talked of Heidegger and Derrida as ‘modern charlatans’, saying that he is ‘very sad to learn that their rubbish is acquiring popularity in this country, appealing to those who mistake obscurity for profundity’ (Ayer, 1991 , p. 3). 15 . In other words, whereas in 1932, when Carnap published the article, Hitler had not yet come to power, by 1936 and the publication of Language, Truth, and Logic , Heidegger had already failed in his attempt at becoming the official philosopher of Nazism. 16 . Russell’s import of Meinong into an Anglophone context led to the use of the phrase Meinongian to mean, among other things, someone who thinks ‘nothing’ is a name, a view which, as Oliver (1999 ) shows, was closer to those held by early Russell (pp. 263–264) than by Meinong (pp. 265–267). 17 . E.g. Friedman, 2000 ; Gabriel, 2003 ; Stone, 2006 . 18 . In all his later, more detailed, restatements of his criticism of Heidegger (e.g. 1969 , p. 213), Ayer repeats this misreading of Carnap and even gives a more generally erroneous and implausible interpretation of Heidegger’s work. For example, in both his article ‘Reflections on Existentialism’ (1969) and his chapter on ‘Phenomenology and Existentialism’ in his Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (1984), he attributes to Heidegger the position of deriving a theory of time based on ‘psychological concepts with metaphysical frillings’ (1969, p. 208). This demonstrates a funda- mental misunderstanding of Heidegger, insofar as Heidegger’s work is Notes 207

concerned with a certain anti-psychologistic turn in the philosophy of logic (following Husserl). Heidegger, in Being and Time , is concerned with arguing that those concepts, which Ayer is describing as psychological, are precisely not so – they are fundamentally ontological. 19 . Ayer draws a line between religiously-minded Heideggerian phenom- enology and Sartrean atheistic existentialism, being perhaps more sympa- thetic to Sartre than to Heidegger precisely because of his disagreement with the latter on the moral implications of his claims. For example, he claims that ‘Sartre is not so ponderous as Heidegger, but his method is basically the same. On the subject of time and negation he follows Heidegger closely, though without the extravagancies of the “clear night of the nothing.” But he has some views of his own ... ’ (1969, p. 214). Ayer is ambiguous on the difference between Sartre’s concept of nothingness and Heidegger’s. Although he appears, as late as 1969 , to bundle them together, in a later text, perhaps catching up with Sartre scholarship, he claims that Heidegger’s ‘Das Nichts selbst Nichtet’ (the nothing itself nothings) was ‘mistranslated by Sartre ... as “le n é ant se n é antis é ” (“the nothing negates itself”)’ (1984, p. 229). 20 . See Ré e, 1993 . As R é e points out, the quintessential work of British exis- tentialism was Colin Wilson’s 1956 The Outsider . 21 . A discussion of the relation between these two philosophical movements and modernism (in which the title of modernism is claimed for the Logical Positivists) is given in Quinton, 1982. 22 . E.g. Sartre, 1946 . 23 . A review of the fundamental points of agreement between positivistic and existentialist approaches to ethics is given in Meyerhoff, 1951 . See also Wiggins, 1988 . 24 . The radical separation between Sartre’s work in Being and Nothingness on metaphysics and the philosophy of on the one hand and his ethics on the other, is perhaps more problematic than Ayer found it to be; see Glendinning, 2007 , pp. 100–118. 25 . A concise polemic against Ayer’s criticisms may be found in Knight, 1958 , p. 190. 26 . The critique of Sartre’s concept of nothingness as nonsensical is only one of the criticisms which Ayer, in 1944, levelled against Sartre’s doctrine. He also objects to Sartre’s use of Husserlian intentionality (Ayer, 1945 , p. 13) and more generally to his distinction between l ’en-soi (which he translates as ‘object-in-itself’ opposing it to Kant’s ‘thing-in-itself’) and le pour- soi (1945, pp. 12–15) with its consequent account of and mauvais-foi (1945, pp. 16–18). Also, following his critique of Sartre’s account of the Nothing, Ayer dismisses Sartre’s account of temporality ( 1945 , pp. 20–26). It is interesting to note that Ayer’s criticism of the Sartrean account of temporality based on his objection to Sartre’s use of ‘nothing’ is very much in parallel with the debate between Ayer and Merleau-Ponty, which is discussed in the following pages. Ayer that, since Sartre’s conception of nothingness is nonsensical (and since 208 Notes

his distinction between l ’en-soi and le pour- soi is not sustainable), then Sartre cannot meaningfully distinguish between a temporality which exists for le pour- soi only, and l ’en-soi which does not occupy any temporal realm. Merleau-Ponty also criticised Sartre’s distinction between l ’en-soi and le pour- soi , although along different lines than those taken by Ayer. Merleau-Ponty’s account of temporality is one which is at least partly a consequence of his criticism of Sartre’s dichotomy. 27 . A similar use of Carnap and Lewis Carroll is made by Quine in his Word and Object ( 1960 , p. 133), where he also links this confusion regarding the use of the word nothing to Plato’s Parmenides and to Hume’s unsympa- thetic interpretation of Locke’s defence of universal . As in Ayer’s use, this further complicates what Carnap’s argument is taken to imply, since the cases Quine discusses are quite distinct from that of Heidegger. Whereas, for example, Hume’s interpretation of Locke concerns the use of ‘nothing’ where a contradiction ensues if nothing is considered as some- thing, Heidegger, as we have seen, is well aware of this contradiction, and in fact Carnap distinguishes between nonsense and absurdity when he accuses Heidegger of uttering nonsense. 28 . See Richmond, 2007 . 29 . Manger (1961 ), perhaps confused by Ayer’s formulation of his objection, claims that Sartre could not have made the elementary contradiction (i.e. the mistake of confusing nothing for something) which Ayer attributes to him. 30 . There is, of course, a fundamental difference between Sartre and Heidegger’s accounts of nothingness, which eventually leads to their dispute over . It is perhaps important here to note that Sartre’s criticism of Heidegger’s use of nothing amounts to the claim that Heidegger treats nothing as if it did something (rather than man, who is the real doer according to Sartre). 31 . Ayer’s review was summarised by Acton (1947 , p. 164). To an extent, the effect was negative; for example, C. A. Mace wrote a highly polemic review of P. J. R. Dempsey’s 1950 The Psychology of Sartre, in which Sartre is ridiculed (see R é e, 1993, p. 14), while in 1954, Russell included ‘The Existentialist’s Nightmare: The Achievement of ’ (1954, pp. 36–39) in a collection of quasi-satirical stories. 32 . See e.g. Murdoch, 1953 ; Warnock, 1965 ; Plantinga, 1958 . According to Murdoch, Ayer is (despite not claiming the title) an existentialist as much as Sartre, the common characteristic being ‘the identification of the true person with the empty choosing will’ (Murdoch, 2001 , p. 34). Collini ( 2006 ) calls him ‘ plus Existentialiste que l’ Existentialiste ’ (p. 398). 33 . Gilbert Ryle had previously compared Husserl’s philosophical endeavours to the early work of Moore and Russell, as well as Frege; see Ryle, 1932b , 1971b . Similar views were expressed by T. E. Hulme as early as 1915 (Hulme, 1915 , p. 187; 1916 ). It is not clear whether Ayer had already come to such a conclusion independently in 1951; it is possible that he learned that forms of analytic philosophy might be related to phenomenology Notes 209

from the 1958 Royaumont colloquium. He expressed a similar view in 1959, when he argued that linguistic analysis is comparable to phenom- enology (Taylor and Ayer, 1959 , pp. 121–123). 34 . Nevertheless, this is not altogether true; Ayer’s attempts at criticising Merleau-Ponty’s views (Taylor and Ayer, 1959 ; Ayer, 1984 ) are much more detailed, sustained (and perhaps plausible) than his all-too-quick attacks on Heidegger. 35 . Ayer comes close to this point when he notes that Merleau-Ponty’s quasi- idealistic thesis (i.e. the position over which the two were arguing in 1951) is a form of anthropocentrism (Ayer, 1984 , pp. 225–226), which he also links to ; unfortunately, Ayer in 1984 does not elaborate on the relation of this thesis to the Heidegger-Sartre dispute which he had earlier rejected as nonsense. 36 . Heidegger’s letter (1998b ), written to Jean Beaufret in 1946, was published in 1947. 37 . Sartre’s quite elaborate conception of nothingness exceeds the bounds of this study. A more complete introduction, followed by an account of Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of Sartre’s humanism, is given in Descombes, 1980 , pp. 48–74. 38 . Cf. Taylor and Ayer, 1959 , pp. 123–124. 39 . Merleau-Ponty correlates the notion of ‘scientific ’ with both the metaphysical position of realism, and more generally with empiri- cism (though he does acknowledge that leads to idealism); see e.g. Priest, 2003 , pp. 90–92; Martin, 2003 ; James, 2007 . Empiricism is connected with what Merleau-Ponty calls realism insofar as it holds that a world that exists independently of any subject is the cause of perceptual . Note that Merleau-Ponty (2002 , p. 27) explicitly refers to the Vienna Circle’s atomism as an example of empiricism. 40 . By idealistic analysis, Merleau-Ponty is referring to the insights of Neo-Kantian idealism as primarily developed in France by Lé on Brunschvicg. See e.g. Flynn, 2004 . 41 . The aporia between realism and idealism was one that played a central role in shaping the phenomenological tradition, particularly since the early Husserl thought phenomenology overcame this metaphysical issue; see Zahavi, 2003 . Heidegger and Carnap, both students of Husserl, similarly saw this aporia as a paradigmatic pseudoproblem. By contrast, Merleau-Ponty did not reject the problem itself, but rather the opposed theses associated with it. The drive towards rejecting this aporia may be seen to originate in nineteenth century science, from Fourier to Mach and beyond, and its move away from claims as to the ultimate of its objects. Thus, it is strange that Merleau-Ponty associates scientific explanation with realism, given the actual rejection of such a view by scientists (who came closer to his own middle-ground between realism and idealism). 42 . See Hammond, Howarth & Kent, 1995 , chapter 5. See also Glendinning, 2007 , p. 131. 210 Notes

43 . Merleau-Ponty attempts to show the limitations of the idealist-realist dilemma by offering an account of ‘embodied subjectivity’. He finds the question of embodiment interesting precisely because he sees the body as a site which is neither in consciousness nor for it, neither subject nor object, but in between this bi-lateral opposition. Husserl’s attempt to describe the body in terms of an ‘ownness sphere’ is not the strongest aspect of his phenomenology. Heidegger’s criticism of Husserl’s assump- tion of a pure consciousness opens up a path away from the purity of subject and object. Thus, it becomes Merleau-Ponty’s task to follow this path and to offer a phenomenological description of a consciousness that is not ‘pure’ but embodied. 44 . Baldwin claims (albeit very briefly) that this theory of meaning is made redundant by the discussions of meaning from Logical Positivism to Putnam and Kripke; see Merleau-Ponty & Baldwin, 2004, p. 20. 45 . Note here that talk of a ‘world’ (both by Merleau-Ponty and Sartre) refers to an anthropocentric concept, a human world. 46 . Merleau-Ponty ascribes to a species of phenomenological presentism, i.e. the view according to which one may only understand time from the inside, as it is lived. Merleau-Ponty uses the image of a boat floating in a river: from the perspective of the traveller, there is a kind of deceivingly non-moving horizon (analogous to the distant past) which is contrasted with the visible motion of the nearby scenery (analogous to the move- ment towards the future). The past and the future are only accessible from the point of view of the present and do not exist independently of that perspective. This, in turn, implies that without such a perspective, there could be no meaningful reference to past or future time – there could be no ‘objective’ past out there that existed prior to a being-in-the-world for which it would be meaningful. See also Romdenh-Romluc, 2009, pp. 218–250. 47 . This is also Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of Sartrean humanism, with its assumption of a strict dichotomy between being-for-itself and being-in-it- self, in which the former only is identified with what is properly human. 48 . Ayer’s puzzlement is undertaken in the context of his criticism of Merleau- Ponty’s account of temporality (1984, pp. 224–226). Ayer employs here the idea of two types of time series, (a) one in which events are related by being either before or after one another and (b) one in which events are related in terms of past, present and future; this idea may be orig- inally found in McTaggart, 1908 . Merleau-Ponty points out that series (b) is always relevant to the temporal position of a subject. Ayer’s criti- cism consists in pointing out that series (a) need not be so. This, for Ayer, renders the ‘idealist thicket’ (Ayer, 1984 , p. 224) into which Merleau- Ponty is led redundant. 49 . Wahl, who was an important ‘existentialist’, introduced pragmatism and early analytic philosophy to France; see Wahl, 1925 ; Wahl, 1932 . As we shall see in Chapter 4 , Wahl was also involved in organising the Royaumont colloquium. Notes 211

50 . ‘The depth of this distinction may be questioned, but the fact that he frames it in these terms does not diminish the force of Merleau-Ponty’s argument’ (Ayer, 1984 , p. 220). 51 . Cf. Carman’s (2007 ) comparison of analytic and continental notions of intentionality. 52 . Ayer is here replying to Taylor’s exposition of the phenomenological view that ‘ is a kind of behaviour’ (Taylor and Ayer, 1959 , p. 96), i.e. that it is active. Taylor contrasts this phenomenological view with the empiricist view of perception as passive, whereby impressions acquire their significance by ‘in the sense of a physiologically-defined stimulus’ (Taylor and Ayer, 1959 , p. 96). Taylor sees empiricism as aligned with a problematic behaviourism; Ayer concedes that behaviourism ‘faces obvious difficulties, but I am not so easily persuaded by Mr. Taylor that they are insuperable’ (Taylor and Ayer, 1959 , p. 115). 53 . See Merleau-Ponty, 2002 , pp. 17–18. 54 . In 1961, Merleau-Ponty gave a lecture (hitherto unpublished) at Manchester on the subject of Wittgenstein’s philosophy (Mays & Brown, 1972 , p. 20). 55 . It is followed, a year later in Britain, by a brief made in a review of Croce’s My Philosophy by Isaiah Berlin, who claims that ‘no student of , however superficial, can fail to observe that it is divided by a chasm which divides the main portion of the conti- nent of Europe on the one hand, from the Anglo-American world with its Scandinavian, Austrian and Polish intellectual dependencies’ (Berlin, 1952 , p. 574). Note the similarity in the imagery involved (‘chasm’, ‘abyss’), as well as the closeness of the dates; this might imply that Ayer had been Berlin’s source. See R é e, 1993. 56 . See Himanka, 2000 and Critchley, 2001 , pp. 35–36. 57 . One phenomenon related to Bataille’s claim is the lack of imports of French books into England during the Second World War; see Acton, 1947 . (Note that Acton, in giving a survey of at least eight years in which had been neglected in England, cites Ayer’s criticism of Sartre in Horizon – but no other authors critical of Sartre.) 58 . Sartre, 1975 . See also Heimonet, 1996 ; Hollywood, 2002, pp. 25–36.

Chapter 4 ‘La Philosophie Analytique’ at Royaumont: Gilbert Ryle’s Ambivalent Phenomenology

1 . See Gellner (1959 , p. 242). Some mistakenly thought the colloquium took place in 1960; see R é e, 1993, p. 14. 2 . See e.g. the report on the colloquium in the Times Literary Supplement (Anon., 1963 ). 3 . Royaumont was followed, in Britain, by a Symposium of the devoted to ‘Phenomenology and Linguistic Analysis’ (discussed in Chapter 3, §6); see Taylor & Ayer, 1959 . Another effort which attempted 212 Notes

to ‘avoid ... a repetition of the Royaumont Colloquium’ (Mays & Brown, 1972 , p. 20) was the ‘Philosophers into Europe’ series of symposia, organ- ised in 1969 by the University of Southampton; see Mays & Brown, 1972 . 4 . See Apostel, 1962 ; Beth, 1962 . 5 . See Batens, 1996 , p. 137. 6 . See Feferman & Feferman, 2004 , pp. 181, 206 & 249–252. 7 . See Gross & Dearin, 2003 , pp. 1–13. Perelman had been Apostel’s super- visor and, together with Devaux, they formed a Belgian ‘school’ of philos- ophers affiliated with (and also critical of) early developments in ‘analytic’ philosophy; see Gochet, 1975 . 8 . Boche ń ski, 1961 & 1963 . 9 . See Whitehead, 1939 & 1969 ; Russell, 1965 , 1969 , 1971a & 1971b ; Devaux, 1967 & 2007 . 10 . See Wahl, 1925 & 1932 . Wahl’s commentary on Whitehead and Russell had been particularly influential on Deleuze; see Sellars, 2007, p. 555. 11 . See Berger, 1972 . 12 . See Cournand & L é vy, 1973 . 13 . See Van Breda & Taminiaux, 1956 & 1959 ; Van Breda, 1959 . 14 . See Brun, 1965 , 1981 & 1988 . 15 . See Alqui é , 1950 , 1955 , 1974 & 1981 ; Deleuze & Parnet, 2007 , p. 12. 16 . See Acton, 1939 & 1947 ; Ryle, Hodges & Acton, 1932 . 17 . See Gewirth, 1996 , pp. 28–29. 18 . Williams describes himself as ‘both deniably and undeniably, an analytic philosopher’ (2006, p. 201). 19 . See e.g. Gochet, 1975 . 20 . See R é e, 1993. 21 . See Smith, 2006 . 22 . R é e (1993) confusingly claims that ‘the French hosts manifested a respectful curiosity about “Anglo-Saxon philosophy”, and “the Oxford School”, but “the chorus of Oxford analysts” huddled together in self-defence, as if they feared some kind of intellectual infection from the over-friendly conti- nentals’ (p. 15). Ré e cites as the source of his quotation Beck, 1962 , p. 230; here ‘le choer des analystes d’Oxford’ are in fact responding with cries of ‘Hear, Hear’ to Austin’s pleasure in finding a kindred spirit in Leo Apostel. This is far from self-defence against ‘intellectual infection’ – in fact it reaf- firms the irreducibility of Royaumont into a strict division between two sides, which would render the ‘infection’ of Oxford philosophy by some unique continental other impossible. Furthermore, Ré e claims that ‘Ayer earned gratitude for making it clear to van Breda that he was wasting his time: analytical philosophy as a whole, he explained, had a “nega- tive attitude ... towards all philosophical work on the continent”’ (p. 15). Here it is perhaps obscured that it is Van Breda, not Ayer, who is quoted as speaking. Van Breda inferred this ‘negative attitude’ (Beck, 1962 , 344) from Ayer’s mistaken differentiation (prompted a question by Van Breda (p. 339)) between philosophy concerned with language (either Russellian Notes 213

or Oxonian) and Husserl’s non-linguistic phenomenology (which, he implies following Ryle, leads to a conception of philosophy as ‘surpa- science’ (p. 340)). Van Breda concludes that the ‘pure and simple truth’ (p. 344) is that neither many continentals are interested in Anglophone philosophy, nor vice versa. (Note that he does not talk of Anglophone philosophy but ‘your philosophy’, addressing the Oxonians in the second person – and one might imagine him turning towards some place where all the non-continentals were seated together.) 23 . See Brandl, 2002 , p. 149. 24 . Ryle might mislead one into seeing his affair with phenomenology as an ‘early flirtation’ (Urmson, 1967 , p. 269) which he soon overcame; yet his writings on the subject span from his earliest published work to at least 1958; see Thomasson, 2002 , p. 118; Brandl, 2002 , pp. 144–145. 25 . See Chapter 2 , §19. 26 . See Thomasson, 2002 , esp. pp. 123–128. 27 . See Chapter 2 , §§18–19. 28 . This fact only became widely known in the Anglophone world through the work of Fø llesdal (1958), and Ryle may be excused for having, in the nineteen-seventies, ignored it. 29 . Ryle’s expertise on Husserl led to his supervising Theodor Adorno’s crit- ical study of Husserl, undertaken at Oxford between 1934 and 1937. See Kramer & Wilcock, 1999 ; M ü ller-Doohm, 2005, pp. 190–194. 30 . Ryle, 1927 , 1932b , 1971b , 1929. 31 . Ryle, Hodges & Acton, 1932 . 32 . See Schuhmann, 1977 , p. 340; Moran, 2000 , p. 87. 33 . See Simons, 1992 , p. 155. 34 . In the same month, Ryle met and ‘struck up a friendship’ (Monk, 1990 , p. 275) with Wittgenstein at the joint session of Mind and the Aristotelian Society in Nottingham; see also Ryle, 1970a , p. 5. As Beale (2010 , p. 15) shows, it is possible that Wittgenstein had become aware of Ryle’s review of Heidegger, and this may have influenced his own sympathetic comments on Heidegger, dictated to Schlick later that year. 35 . Ryle later unofficially notes (in his correspondence) that he ‘may well have found in Sein und Zeit (not the Meaning/Nonsense theory that I wanted), but anti-dualistic cum pro-behaviouristic thoughts which were later congenial to me’ (Murray, 1992 , p. 339). 36 . See also Ryle, 1970b , p. 14. 37 . In a letter to George Dawes Hicks dated 15 March 1930, Husserl writes: ‘I am acquainted with Mr. Ryle’s careful review in Mind of Heidegger, in which he also talks about my phenomenology; but he has not grasped its entire meaning nor its import. Since Heidegger in no way follows my method, and cannot be said to continue along the lines of my descriptive and intentional phenomenology as sketched in the “Ideas”, objections raised against him do not affect my position in the slightest. ... Mr. Ryle is incidentally very much in the wrong in thinking that phenomenological idealism is . He has underestimated the full significance of the 214 Notes

phenomenological reduction, and this through my own fault, since the “Ideas” have remained a fragment: it was only the second part that was to deal with the phenomenology of ’ (Mays, 1970 , pp. 14–15). 38 . This reservation seems to be withdrawn when Ryle later claims (in a filmed discussion with Urmson) that ‘a good many philosophers of what I vaguely call of the English-speaking type ... are rather taken aback when they find people, say, like Sartre. He picks on some particular emotion for example Heidegger’s Angst which I vaguely translate as anxiety, or Sartre’s favourite one, nausea, and you find this particular emotion being built up into something terribly important, as if everything was really governed or should be governed or shouldn’t be governed by Angst or by nausea’ (Chanan, 1972 ). 39 . ‘Bankruptcy’ is the term also used by Searle (2001 , p. 277) in describing phenomenology. 40 . Despite these criticisms, Ryle later (privately) wrote: ‘I did work hard over my Sein und Zeit review; but don’t think it got as deep under my skin as did some of the other things. But it is not now for me to say! I’m pretty sure I never lent (or refused to lend!) my Sein und Zeit copy to any colleague or pupil. But this could all have been “cover up” for an indebt- edness that I wanted to keep dark’ (Murray, 1992 , p. 339). This statement, though unofficial, may be added to the long list of ambiguous utterances made by Ryle regarding his relation to phenomenology. 41 . ‘I “went all Cambridge”. It was Russell and not Moore whom I studied, and it was Russell the logician and not Russell the epistemologist’ (Ryle, 1970a , p. 7). Russell’s feelings were not mutual: ‘I don’t like Oxford philos- ophers. Don’t like them. They have made trivial something very great. Don’t think much of their apostle Ryle. He’s just another clever man’ (Russell, interviewed in Mehta, 1962, p. 41). 42 . It is important to note here that it was only after Ayer’s return from Vienna in 1936 that Ryle’s interest in the work of the Vienna Circle manifested itself in his writings: e.g. Ryle, 1936, 1971c . 43 . See Van Inwagen, 2006 , pp. 83–64. 44 . It is not clear that Ryle was right in thinking that Husserl’s theory of meaning is Platonistic or quasi-Platonistic; see e.g. Thomasson, 2007 , pp. 275–277. 45 . Elsewhere, Ryle notes that Husserl ‘had piled into the second edition ( 1913 ) of his Logische Untersuchungen, what had not been in its first edition, a load of what he called “Phenomenology”’ (1970b , p. 13), a doctrine which Ryle (questionably) thought ‘re-Lockeanized’ (p. 13) its anterior Platonism. 46 . For Ryle’s account of the development of through the division of psychology from philosophy, see Chanan, 1972 . 47 . See Thomasson, 2007 . 48 . Ryle elsewhere describes phenomenology as being ‘from its birth, a bore’ (Ryle, 1946 , p. 223). Notes 215

49 . Thomasson (2002 , 2007 , 2009 ) and Brandl (2002 ) construe Ryle’s ambiva- lent stance towards Husserl as an inheritance of his methods, coupled with a rejection of his doctrines. Yet this distinction between method and doctrine does not map onto Ryle’s problematic divorcing of phenom- enology from Husserl’s theory of meaning. 50 . Though ‘partly sympathetic’, these articles did not necessarily effect sympathy; see Gallagher, 2005 , pp. 293–296. 51 . Hereby referred to as SME . 52 . See Ryle, 1932a , p. 158. 53 . See Ryle, 1932a , pp. 142–143. 54 . Ryle opens SME with the meta-philosophical argument that to under- stand the task of philosophers as that of analysing concepts and judge- ments ‘is only a gaseous way of saying that they are trying to discover what is meant by the general terms contained in the sentences which they pronounce or write’ (Ryle, 1932a , p. 139), since ‘concept’ and ‘judge- ment’ are themselves systematically misleading expressions. 55 . As Ayer elsewhere says, the intuition of essences may be better envis- aged as a study of ‘concepts at work’ rather than ‘as Husserl sometimes seems to imply, in gazing at concepts like stars in a planetarium’, bringing phenomenology ‘very close in practice to the linguistic analysts’ (Ayer and Taylor, 1959 , p. 121). (Ayer might have been told by Ryle that Husserl implies phenomenology is an ‘observational science’.) Ryle’s insistence on presenting Husserl as a kind of Platonistic geographer of essences, in contrast to his own ‘logical ’ of mental concepts is misleading, given that what Husserl really meant by ‘intuiting essences’ is, precisely, a method of eidetic variation. Ryle may have inherited part of Husserl’s method of eidetic reduction through imaginative variation; see Thomasson, 2007 . 56 . Compare this with Russell’s ( 1905) views on Meinong. 57 . See also Ryle, 1971b , p. 183. 58 . Ryle links his early anti-psychologism and his interest in Husserl with his eventual turn against Cartesianism; see Murray, 1992 , p. 339. 59 . See Ryle, 1927 . 60. See Thomasson, 2007 , pp. 281–282. 61 . In this passage, Ryle is attributing these words to Brentano, in the context of describing the kinds of questions particular to descriptive psychology (i.e. ‘psychognosy’ or ‘phenomenology’), e.g. ‘what is it to be a case of remembering’. 62 . See also Mays, 1970 . 63 . See Mays, 1970 . The phenomenological tradition gave a series of answers to this threat against Husserl’s approach: (a) for Husserl, relating the problem to a form of transcendental subjectivity is the key to both preserving the world and engaging in the epoch ē , and (b) Heidegger and Merleau- Ponty retain some form of the phenomenological method while rejecting Husserl’s Cartesianism; see Glendinning, 2007 , pp. 48–58. Perhaps Ryle may be counted among the latter, insofar as he rejects the existence of 216 Notes

Cartesian ‘mental stuff’ through a methodical analysis of various kinds of what Husserl calls ‘mental acts’ (which Ryle finds not to be acts at all). 64 . This is a poor introduction of the term ‘phenomenology’, particularly in its simplistic fusion with Cartesianism. Husserl for example stated that Cartesian phenomenology meant ‘to reject nearly all the well known doctrinal content of the Cartesian philosophy’ (Husserl, 1960, p. 1). 65 . See also Chapter 2 , §19. 66 . Husserl’s work on categories of meaning is acknowledged as innovative by Tarski (1936, p. 215) (who claims that Husserl’s ‘semantic categories’ influenced Leś niewski) and Quine (1970, p. 18) (the latter being rather critical of it). But see Oliver, 1999 , pp. 254–255. 67 . On Heidegger’s criticism of Husserl’s notion of ‘categorial intuition’, see Philipse, 1992 . 68 . See Husserl, 2001 , pp. 171–172. 69 . Thomasson, 2009 , §1.3. 70 . See Husserl, 2001 , p. 172. 71 . The thesis that Ryle had derived the notion of category mistake from Husserl is also upheld in O’Connor, 2012 . 72 . See Thomasson, 2002 , pp. 125–128. 73 . See Thomasson, 2002 , p. 118. 74 . See Chapter 1 . 75 . See R é e, 1993, p. 8. 76 . See Beaney, 2007 , pp. 207–210. 77 . The centrality of this claim to phenomenology is highly questionable, even by Ryle’s account. We have seen that Ryle holds the relation of phenom- enology to psychology as that of a descriptive a priori investigation to an empirical one to be ‘true and generalizable’. Yet, having acknowledged the truth of such a position, he goes on to distort it by claiming that it makes out philosophy to be superior to the sciences. Ryle is wrong when he accuses Husserl of assimilating philosophy and science – furthermore, he is wrong in doing so for reasons which he himself has pointed out; see Glendinning, 2007 , p. 30. 78 . ‘Nor were intuitions of essences the sorts of accomplishments of which any Anglo-Saxon could boast with a straight face’ (Ryle, 1970b , p. 13). 79 . See Husserl, 1960 , esp. §§3–4. 80 . The claim of the Germanic origins of the idea of philosophy as a ‘govern- ess-science’ was already made in Ryle, 1951 , pp. 1–3; here Ryle implicitly links his differentiation between English and German speaking philos- ophy to their differences in relation to psychologism. 81 . Compare this with an earlier remark about Husserl inheriting Brentano’s ‘Messiasbewusstsein’ (Ryle, 1946 , p. 223). 82 . Cf. Ryle, 2002 , pp. 15–16. 83 . Ryle notes on the same page that his account of Husserl is no more than a caricature ‘intended to show up by contrast some of the predominant features of recent philosophy and in particular of the philosophy of mind in the English-speaking world’ (Ryle, 1971b, p. 181). Notes 217

84 . Akehurst (2010) links a particular aspect of analytic philosophy with the rejection of continental philosophy as a theoretical enterprise due to its that it gave rise to, and backing for, Nazism. 85 . Obviously Ryle is referring here to Frege and his lack of influence on his Germanophone contemporaries (see Chapter 1, §5). Gillies ( 1999 , p. 172) points out that Husserl, by working on the philosophy of mathematics in a philosophy (not mathematics) department, is the ‘striking’ exception to the norm. (Other exceptions are the Marburg Neo-Kantians: Cohen, Natorp and Cassirer). 86 . See Glendinning, 2006 , pp. 69–74; Glock, 2008 , pp. 62–63; Critchley, 2001 , p. 35. See also R é e, 1993. 87 . His reference to ‘our logical theory’ ignores the contributions of Austrian thinkers to the development of logic; see Monk, 1996; Textor, 2006 . 88 . See Thomasson, 2002 , p. 123. 89 . Ryle refers here to Russell’s insight that expressions such as ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘all’, and ‘some’ are not reducible to Platonic universals such as ‘and- ness’ and ‘someness’. Yet, this idea goes back to scholastic logic’s notion of ‘syncategoremata’ (see Ariew & Gabbey, 2003, pp. 445–447), and in the Fourth Investigation of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen the distinc- tion between categorematic and syncategorematic expressions is central to Husserl’s theory of meaning. 90 . See also Ryle, 1970a , p. 9. As Ryle unofficially hints (Murray, 1992 , p. 339), it is possible that he was partly responsible for this solitude, as one can surmise from the parable of his refusal to lend his copy of Sein und Zeit to his colleagues and pupils. Perhaps the closest that Ryle had come to encountering an Anglophone phenomenologist was his encounter with J. N. Findlay three years after Royaumont (Ryle & Findlay, 1961 ). Mentions of Husserl in this text are brief and only made in passing in comparison with ‘analytic’ thinkers; Ryle quickly compares Husserl and Wittgenstein’s notions of logical grammar, the breach of which is consti- tutive of nonsense (p. 230), while Findlay mentions Husserl and Broad’s ideas about memory (p. 239) and also briefly mentions Husserl in the context of explicating the capacity of ordinary language to reflect upon its own meanings (p. 240). 91 . See Ryle, 1971a , pp. xxiii–xxiv. 92 . See Schrift, 2006 , pp. 70–71; Sorell & Rogers, 2005 . 93 . See e.g. Majer, 1997 . 94 . The fact that Ryle here alludes to the previous Royaumont collo- quium on Husserl (where Van Breda had presented ‘La Ré duction Phé nom é nologique’ (1959)) seems to be left out in most references to Ryle’s rudeness in response to Van Breda, e.g. Glock, 2008 , pp. 62–63; Critchley, 2001 , p. 35. 95 . Van Breda forgets to mention the Eastern European logicians present at the colloquium, and the influence of Polish logic (not unrelated to Husserl) on Quine who questions Ryle after him. 96 . See Lapointe, 1979 . 218 Notes

97 . Translation: ‘When Merleau-Ponty enquired “is our programme not the same?”, he received the firm and clear response “I hope not”’. 98 . Similar versions of the same tale may be found in Glock, 2008 , p. 63; Solomon, 2003 , p. 5; Pudal, 2004 , p. 75. 99 . ‘It was a distance within the analytic movement that he was insisting on at that point, not a distance between that movement and phenom- enology’ (Glendinning, 2006 , p. 73). 100 . Merleau-Ponty read Wittgenstein, and claims to have worked with Ryle’s Concept of Mind . Yet, he seems to have posed a question which was the subject of J. O. Urmson’s paper on the history of analysis, previ- ously presented at the colloquium. Merleau-Ponty had not been present at Urmson’s presentation, which had clearly differentiated between various kinds of approaches to analysis, distinguishing among what may be roughly seen as Russellian, Wittgensteinian, and Oxonian types; see Urmson, 1992 . 101 . John Cottingham ( 2005 ) claims that because analytic philosophers ‘take a derogatory attitude to the history of philosophy’ (pp. 26–27), this implies treating their contemporaries like the historian of philosophy might have treated the great philosophers of the past; Ryle’s position here contradicts this claim. See also Ryle, 1971a, pp. xxiii–xxiv. 102 . See also Urmson, 1992 ; Strawson, 1992 . 103 . For example, Ayer’s logical positivism, in particular his The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (Ayer, 1940 ), was used by Austin as his ‘stalking- horse’ (Austin, 1962a , p. 1) in Sense and Sensibilia . Ryle ( 1971c ) also produced an ‘unrepentantly polemical’ (1971a, p. viii) essay against Carnap’s Meaning and Necessity . 104 . But see Husserl, 2001 , pp. 184–186. 105 . Part of this chapter was originally published in Vrahimis, 2012a.

Chapter 5 Derrida and Searle: The Abyss Stares Back?

1 . In 1967, Derrida also simultaneously published three of his major works, ( 1967a , 1967b , 1967c ). See also Dosse, 1997 , pp. 76–87. (‘La Diffé rance’ was published in 1968 .) 2 . Austin, who in twenty years of philosophical activity had published only three lectures, four symposium papers, some reviews and a translation, is perhaps exemplary of a philosophical insistent on a quasi-So- cratic laconism with regards to writing (in almost complete opposition to Derrida’s prolific publication record); see R ée, 1993, p. 8. 3 . Bell (2004 , pp. 158–160) even imagines Derrida questioning Austin at Royaumont in lieu of Jean Wahl. 4 . This is not exclusive, of course, to Oxonians: in 1967, few people had read (in French) the three quite complex and interlinked books which Derrida had simultaneously published. 5 . The impact of Austin’s work on French philosophers after the ‘demise’ of existentialist phenomenology in the nineteen-sixties is another Notes 219

important factor to be taken into consideration here. Besides Derrida’s use of Austin’s speech-act theory, other examples of Austin’s influence in France following Royaumont might include such central figures as and Felix Guattari (see e.g. Deleuze & Guattari, 2004 , p. 96; Deleuze, 2005 , pp. 216–251) or ( 2002 , pp. 89–99). 6 . ‘A Plea for Excuses’ was presented to the Aristotelian Society in 1956. 7 . See e.g. Urmson, 1992 ; Strawson, 1992 . 8 . See also Arrington, 1975 ; Harris, 1976 ; Lock, 2005 . See also Ricoeur, 2003 , p. 380. 9 . See Spiegelberg, 1981 . 10 . See e.g. Manger, 1975 ; Mulligan, 1987 ; Laugier, 2005 . 11 . Austin had originally written and subsequently presented this paper at Royaumont in French. 12 . Phatic acts are, according to Austin, series of words constructed with a certain grammatical order; therefore, phemes in themselves are nonsen- sical (1962b, p. 98) prior to being seen in their rhetic dimension, i.e. as having a certain sense and reference (although, as Austin points out, not all rhemes necessarily name or refer to something , as for example in the case of ‘a triangle has three sides’ (p. 97)). Austin distinguishes phatic acts as acts of language from rhetic acts as speech acts (p. 98). Phemes and rhemes are mimetically reproducible, and the difference between phemes and rhemes can be seen in the case where the mimesis of a pheme may produce different rhetic acts. 13 . In the Logische Untersuchungen , from which the last two ‘parts’ are derived (2001, pp. 118–119, 192–193), Husserl considers the latter two together, while it is not clear that he considers the three parts which Derrida refers to as interlinked, or forming together a greater phenomenon of a ‘crisis of meaning’. 14 . See Derrida, 1989 . 15 . Husserl, 2001 , p. 118. 16 . See also White, 1987 . 17 . See Schmalfu ß -Plicht, 2009 . 18 . (1996 ), looking at Derrida’s relation to Austin, points to the affinity between Derridean and positivism (pp. 83–85) in what he perceives as their insistence on metaphysics (in contrast to Austin or Wittgenstein’s insistence on the ordinary). 19 . Husserl’s interest in logical grammar is logical/epistemological in that it pertains to a certain anti-psychologistic conception of logic as a theory of science (as we have seen in Chapter 1, §4b); but ultimately Husserl moves from categories of meaning to ontological categories. 20 . Husserl claims that nonsense (Unsinn ) occurs when violating the rules of a priori universal grammar whose laws are non-psychological and prior to any linguistic . Yet, he distinguishes between nonsense ( Unsinn ) and absurdity ( Widersinn ) precisely by his contention that absurdity ( Widersinn ) results from breaking the contingent linguistic habits of a community. Materially-absurd statements, according to Husserl, are 220 Notes

not nonsensical but refer to some meaning, precisely because they do not break any a priori rules of logical grammar. Yet, their objects are, as Derrida would say, necessarily absent , they are impossible, and therefore these statements are absurd. 21 . This is what Carnap calls ‘designative meaning’, which he distinguishes from expressive components of meaning (1959, pp. 80–81). 22 . Derrida claims that ‘the green is either’ could make sense when placed in quotation marks and uttered as an example of nonsense in Husserl’s theory of meaning. As we shall see, Searle objects to this, claiming that Derrida fails to acknowledge the distinction between use and mention. 23 . The original paper, written in French, had been first presented in Montreal at the Congr è s international des Soci é t é s de Philosophie de Langue Francaise in 1971, and published in Marges de la Philosophie (1972); it was then trans- lated and published in the first issue of Glyph in 1977. 24 . Searle’s alliance with Foucault further undermines the claim that the Searle-Derrida exchange exemplifies some gulf that exists between Anglo- American and Continental philosophy; Derrida does not speak in the name of Continental philosophy. 25 . Nevertheless, Derrida later points out that Searle must have read the English version of the text (1988b, p. 38). 26 . Although Searle does not use the term, his charge of misunderstanding coupled with his subsequent construction of Derrida’s claims into argu- ments point to the implication that Searle considers Derrida’s Austin to be a straw-man. 27 . Derrida clearly thinks there is no such thing as a meaningless expression by itself , since for him expressions are always related to a context. 28 . For a reply, see Derrida, 1988b , pp. 80–83. See also Richmond, 1996 , pp. 48–49. 29 . Searle and Derrida both fail to mention the relation between Husserl’s account and Austin’s in their exchange. Though Husserl’s account is mentioned here because cited by Derrida, a number of other thinkers could have been used (e.g. Carnap or the early Wittgenstein). 30 . This is perhaps due to Derrida’s dismissal of Searle’s reply as having misun- derstood his text (1988b, p. 47). Derrida assumes that a reply is already to be found in ‘Sec’, if only one were to look at it closely enough. 31 . This does not preclude their successful rational reconstruction into logi- cally well-formed arguments. See e.g. Richmond, 1996; Moore, 2001 . 32 . Derrida (1998, p. 31) justifies this by citing Searle’s acknowledgement of the help of other people who had discussed his paper with him. Derrida notes that one of these people is his own friend , with whom Derrida had various discussions in the past. Derrida thus concludes that he also is included in ‘Sarl’. Interestingly, in 1951 Bataille had also used Ayer’s name as a pun, confusing ‘d’Ayer’ with ‘d’hier’ (Bataille, 1986 , p. 80). 33 . Searle ( 1983 ) connects his attack on Derrida (and Culler (1983 ), or ‘decon- struction’) with a defence of enlightenment values against postmodernist Notes 221

attacks. Although the term ‘’ was employed in American academia to cover a range of ‘French thinkers’ who wrote in the late nineteen-sixties and seventies, it would be highly inappropriate within a French context to have called Derrida a ‘postmodernist’; see Schrift, 2006 , pp. 54–55. See also Mackey & Searle, 1984. 34 . Searle, a self-pronounced ‘analytic philosopher’, rarely employs the term ‘continental philosophy’ in any of his writings (and in some of the few cases in which he does, he prefaces it with a ‘so-called’, e.g. in Searle, 1992 , p. 249). Searle seems to have less difficulty in employing terms such as ‘postmodernism’ in describing some general trend against Enlightenment thought. 35 . In Martin Ritt’s The Front (1976 ), Woody Allen plays the leading role of Howard Prince, a cashier who becomes a ‘front’ for a number of screen- writers who have lost their jobs due to the McCarthy purges (which were particularly forceful in Hollywood). Prince becomes a star writer by presenting the work of these writers as his own, since his name is not on the McCarthyites’ lists. (Coincidentally, Searle was secretary of the Wisconsin (McCarthy’s home state) group called ‘Students against McCarthy’; see Searle, 1971 .) By using the term front, Derrida might be taken to imply (once again) that Searle’s authority is somehow not his own, but only a ‘front’ for Sarl , and perhaps also for something else called ‘analytic philosophy’, which in turn is a ‘front’ for continental writing. 36 . A similar claim is made by Hubert Dreyfus, who lumps together Searle’s views with those of Husserl in his attempt to show how Heidegger may dispute the various Husserl-Searle positions (see e.g. Dreyfus, 1993 ). In his discussion of Dreyfus’ 1991 Being-in-the-World , Searle (2000 ) attributes Dreyfus’ bundling of his views with those of Husserl to misunderstanding; Searle claims that Dreyfus is mistaken in his attempt to fuse his analytic approach with a phenomenological one. 37 . See also Derrida, 2001 , pp. 36–76. It is perhaps ironic that Searle later uses a term he borrows from Foucault ( obscurantisme terroriste) against Derrida. 38 . See Derrida, 1998. 39 . As Alan Schrift notes ( 2006 , p. 56), there is a shift in the late nineteen- sixties and seventies (i.e. during Derrida’s as a prominent theorist) from the early anti-philosophical climate which characterised , towards a reclaiming by structuralist theorists of the title ‘philosopher’. 40 . See e.g. Hare, 1960 . See also Chapter 4 . 41 . See e.g. Hacker 1996 , pp. 183–227; Corradini, Galvan, & Lowe, 2006 . 42 . See e.g. Sacks, 2006 ; Pihlströ m & Siitonen, 2005 . See also Rorty, 2008 , pp. 162–164. 43 . See Brandom, 2008 , pp. 201–202. 44 . From the parallel movements which today go under the banner of ‘conti- nental philosophy’ it is which was perhaps the most contested import in the US, particularly as is attested to in the case of 222 Notes

Marcuse (and his being forced out of the University of California by the then governor Ronald Reagan). See e.g. Cobb, 2004. 45 . For example, the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy was founded in 1962, while the British Society for Phenomenology was founded in 1967. See also McCumber, 2001 , pp. 83–85; Mays, 1971 , pp. 262–263. 46 . See e.g. Koestenbaum, 1971 ; Van Peursen, 1972 ; Mays & Brown, 1972 ; Piv č ć , 1975 ; Durfee, 1976 . 47 . Marcello Dascal observes that the Derrida-Searle exchange is seen as an altogether different sort of entity by Derrida and Searle. Dascal empha- sises the fact that the type of exchange is perceived differently between the two parties involved, with Searle starting out by engaging Derrida in a form of discussion , to which Derrida responds as if it were a controversy , leading to the violent dispute which ensues. See Dascal, 2001 . 48 . The catastrophic continuation of the Derrida-Searle dispute, with Searle’s comments on Derrida published in the New York Review of Books (Searle, 1983 ), leads to the notorious 1992 ‘Cambridge affair’, i.e. the dispute over the granting of an honorary doctorate to Derrida by Cambridge University. Although the event may be conceived as yet another clash between analytic and continental philosophers, a mere glance at the list of signatories of the letter sent to the Times will allow its reader to find among the names present there those of a number of philosophers whose work (in the history of analytic philosophy) has contributed to the breakdown of the ‘analytic-continental barrier’, e.g. Peter Simons, Kevin Mulligan and Barry Smith. But see Smith, 1997 on his views of ‘conti- nental’ philosophy in North America.


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abyss, 1, 103–5, 108, 149, 181, and Sartre, xii, xiii, 1, 89, 91–5, 184, 211 96, 97, 101, 105, 108, 109, 206, Acton, Harry B., xiii, 112, 208, 211, 207–8, 209, 211 212, 213 and Vienna Circle, xi, 89–91, Adorno, Theodor, xii, 186, 213 108, 119–20, 165, 185, 193, Allen, Woody, 221 206, 214, 218 Alquié, Ferdinand, 112, 212 at Royaumont, 148, 153, 156–7, Ambrosino, Georges, 87, 99, 182, 209, 211, 212 105, 205 Anglo-Saxon, 29, 111, 128, 138–40, back to Kant, 33, 38, 194 145, 147, 148, 154, 157, 158, 159, back to things themselves, 194 179, 181, 212, 216 Badiou, Alain, 180 anti-Semitism, 41 Bar-Hillel, Yehoshua, xiv, 7, 186, Apostel, Leo, 111, 212 204, 205 Aquinas, Thomas, 27 Bataille, Georges, xii–xiv, 6, 87–8, archē, 65–7, 72–3, 75, 85, 94, 98–9, 103–9, 149, 161, 182, 201, 202 184, 186, 205, 211, 220 Aristotelian Society, 101, 118, 122, Bauhaus, 196, 200–201 123, 211, 213, 219 Beck, Leslie, 110, 111, 114, 149–50, Aristotle, 21, 27, 73, 145, 188, 189, 152, 156, 212 196, 199, 202 Bentham, Jeremy, 4 Austin, John L., xiii, xiv, 5, 6, 153, Berger, Gaston, 112, 212 161–6, 168–77, 181, 184, 212, Bergson, Henri, ix, 7, 35, 48 218–20 Berlin, Isaiah, xiii, 211 Avenarius, Richard, 34 Beth, Evert Willem, 111, 212 Ayer, Alfred J. Bocheński, Józef Maria, 111, 212 and Austin, xiii, 165, 218 Bollnow, Otto Friedrich, 32 and Bataille, 87–8, 99, 104–9, 161, Bolzano, Bernard, 114, 115, 118, 182, 220 126, 189, 191 and Camus, 205 Brentano, Franz, x, 14, 114, 115, 118, and Carnap, 89–91, 94–5, 105, 126, 128, 163, 184, 186, 190, 108, 109, 206, 218 191, 192, 215, 216 and Derrida, 160–2, British Idealism, 4, 190 165, 206 British Society for Phenomenology, and film criticism, 206 xiv, 222 and Heidegger, 89–91, 94, Brun, Jean, 112, 212 206, 207 Brunschvicg, Léon, 32, 197, 209 and Merleau-Ponty, xii, xiii, 6, Bühler, Karl, 47 87–8, 96, 99–103, 109, 148–9, 161, 182, 192, 205, 207, 208, Camus, Albert, 89, 205 209, 210, 211 Cantor, Georg, 145, 191

251 252 Index

Carnap, Rudolf and Carnap, 169, 220 and Austin, 165, 170 and ‘Continental philosophy’, and Ayer, 89–91, 94–5, 105, 108, 176–81, 185, 220, 221 109, 206, 218 and Foucault, 172, 177, 185, 221 and Derrida, 169, 220 and Heidegger, 169, 196 and Frege, ix, xiii, 14, 26, 190, and Husserl, 5, 6, 162, 166–71, 201, 202, 203–4 174, 219, 220 and Husserl, x, xiii, 14, 29, 66, in 1967, xiv, 160–2, 218 78–84, 168–9, 171, 189, 191, and phenomenology, 5, 166–71, 198, 202, 203, 204–5, 209, 220 177–80, 186 and Neo-Kantianism, 49, 63, 76–7, and Searle, xiv, 1, 6, 171–80, 83, 90, 193, 199 184, 220–2 and Quine, 197, 199, 203, 208 at Oxford, xiv, 6, 160–2 and the Royaumont colloquium, Devaux, Philippe, 111, 212 111, 116, 117 Dilthey, Wilhelm, 35, 186, 200 and Wittgenstein, 79, 82–3, 195, Dreyfus, Hubert, 16, 180, 220, 221 203–4 Duhem, Pierre M. M., 148 Carroll, Lewis, 94–5, 208 Dummett, Michael, 2, 12–13, 29, 78, Cassirer, Ernst, xi, xii, 5, 31–3, 184, 185, 187, 188, 192 35–42, 59, 66, 104, 186, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 217 empiricism, 101, 103, 209, 211 Cassirer, Toni, 40–1, 197 enlightenment, 36, 176, 178, 187, Cavaillès, Jean, 32, 148, 191, 220, 221 193, 197 epistemology, xi, 78, 142, 169, 170, Chomsky, Noam, 7, 186 186, 189, 191, 194, 196, 199, Cohen, Hermann, ix, 35, 199, 217 200, 214, 219 Coleridge, Samuel T., 4, 186 Eucken, Rudolf, 10, 35 Collingwood, Robin G., 185 European Union, 150 Condillac, Etienne de, 166 existentialism, 3, 4, 77, 89, 91–2, Couturat, Louis, 148 94–7, 104, 111–13, 118, 162, 179, Critchley, Simon, 3, 149–50, 185, 190, 193, 206, 207 211, 217 Croce, Benedetto, xiii, 211 Fichte, Johann G., 48–9 Culler, Jonathan, 161, 220 Findlay, John N., 148, 217 Fink, Eugen, 32 Dascal, Marcello, 222 First World War, ix, 4, 11, 25, 29, 31, Dawes Hicks, George, xi, 213 35, 78, 192, 194 deconstruction, 3, 162, 169, 171, Føllesdal, Dagfinn, xiii, 14–15, 17, 176, 219, 220 185, 187, 188, 213 Deleuze, Gilles, 112, 180, 196, 212, 219 Foucault, Michel, 7, 172, 177, 185, Delmer, Isabel, 88, 205 186, 191, 219, 220, 221 Delors, Jacques, 150 , 3, 7, 104, 221 Dempsey, Peter J. R., xiii, 208 Frege, Gottlob, ix, x, xiii, 1, 3, 5, Derrida, Jacques 11–22, 25–30, 34, 53–4, 77, and Austin, 6, 161–2, 166–71, 78, 79, 114, 115, 117, 121, 126, 218, 219 140, 182, 187–92, 199, 201–5, and Ayer, 160–2, 165, 206 208, 217 Index 253

Freud, Sigmund, 175 humanities, 7, 23, 34, 76, 77, 135, Friedman, Michael, 38, 40, 46–7, 177, 181 85, 193, 194, 197–200, 202, Hume, David, 102, 201, 208 205, 206 Husserl, Edmund and Adorno, xii, 213 Gandillac, Maurice de, 32, 41 and Austin, 163, 164, 166, 170–1, Gewirth, Alan, 112, 212 174, 220 Glendinning, Simon, 2, 3, 113, 150, and Ayer, 96, 156, 207, 208, 215 155, 160–1, 177, 184, 186, 191, and Carnap, x, xiii, 14, 29, 66, 205, 207, 209, 215, 216, 217, 218 78–84, 168–9, 171, 189, 191, Gomperz, Heinrich, 47 198, 202, 203, 204–5, 209, 220 gulf, 1, 4, 138, 147, 148–51, 154, 176, and Derrida, 5, 6, 162, 166–71, 181, 183, 184, 220 174, 219, 220 in England, x, 29, 192–3 Habermas, Jürgen, 7, 185, 186, 187 and Frege, ix, xii, 1, 5, 11–18, 21, Hahn, Hans, 47, 191, 195, 202 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 34, 126, 182, Hampshire, Stuart, xiii, 206 187–8, 189, 190, 205, 208, 217 Hare, R. M., xiii, 3, 221 and Heidegger, x, xi, 5, 26, 27, 28, Hartmann, Nicolai, 33 30, 31, 40, 54–5, 58, 66, 78, Hegel, Georg W. F., 48, 63, 97, 148, 83–4, 184, 194, 197, 198, 205, 185, 186, 193, 196, 199 207, 209, 210, 213, 215, 216, 220 Heidegger, Martin and Lebensphilosophie, 36, 40 and Ayer, 89–91, 94, 206, 207 on logic, 21–4, 28, 54, 58, 140, and Derrida, 169, 196 189, 219 and Frege, 25, 190, 199, 205 and Merleau-Ponty, 5, 27, 96, 150, and Husserl, x, xi, 5, 26, 27, 28, 184, 210, 215 30, 31, 40, 54–5, 58, 66, 78, and Neo-Kantianism, x, 10, 25–6, 83–4, 184, 194, 197, 198, 205, 34, 54, 188, 190, 194 207, 209, 210, 213, 215, 216, 220 and psychologism, ix, x, 5, 10, and Neo-Kantianism, 4, 32, 33, 11–18, 20–7, 134–5, 187–8, 189, 35–41, 59, 76–7, 83, 193, 196 190, 207, 215, 219 and Russell, 199 response by Tarski and Quine, and Ryle, 118–19, 121, 213–14 216, 217 and Wittgenstein, xi, 203, 213 and the Royaumont colloquium, Hempel, Carl, 111 112, 113, 128, 136–48, 152–6, , 3, 59, 75, 76, 77, 84, 213, 217 177, 196 and Russell, ix, x, 96, 120, 153, Hilbert, David, 145, 191, 204 192, 204, 208 history of and Ryle, x, xi, xii, 6, 29, 113–18, analysis, 184, 218 120–9, 131–48, 152–5, 163, 168, analytic philosophy, 2, 111, 184, 222 171, 189, 192–3, 208, 213, 214, ideas, 191 215–16, 217 metaphysics, 66 and Schlick, x, 25, 29, 190, 191 philosophy, 30, 66, 135, 144, 184, theory of meaning, 5, 6, 79–83, 186, 196, 218, 223 115–17, 121, 131–3, 140–1, 164, Horkheimer, M., xii, 7, 205 167–71, 174, 189, 204, 214, 216, Hulme, Thomas E., ix, x, 192, 208 217, 219, 220 254 Index

Ingarden, Roman, 126 logical positivism, 34, 40, 74, 77, 89, intentionality, 98, 101–2, 126–7, 92, 105, 106, 111, 184, 194, 202, 207, 211 206, 210, 218 logicism, 19–20, 26, 77, 188 Jaensch, Erich R., 35 Lvov-Warsaw school of Logic, Jaspers, Karl, 27 29, 185

Kant, Immanuel Mace, Cecil A., xiii, 208 interpretation of, 5–6, 31, 32–4, Mach, Ernst, 34, 209 37–40, 41–6, 49, 59, 66, 76, 194, Mandelbaum, Maurice, xiii 196, 198 Marx, Karl, 175 Kantian consensus, 179 , 85, 111, 195, 205 and logic, 23, 188–9 McCarthyism, 221 Platonism (quasi-Platonist, McCumber, John, 222 semi-Platonic) McDowell, John, 179 and psychologism, 20, 187 Meinong, Alexius, x, 90, 114–16, schematism, 42–6, 197, 198 118, 124, 126, 190, 191, 192, on the term ‘phenomenon’, 128 206, 215 Kaufmann, Felix, 29, 191 Meister Eckhart, 119 Kierkegaard, Søren, 63, 112, 118 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice Kraft, Viktor, 47 and Ayer, xii, xiii, 6, 87–8, Kusch, Martin, 9, 11, 186, 187, 189, 96, 99–103, 109, 148–9, 161, 190, 194, 195, 197, 205 182, 192, 205, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 Lange, Friedrich Albert, 63, 201 against empiricism, 101–3, Lask, Emil, ix, 33, 54 209, 210 Lebensgefühl, 62–3, 72, 74, 195 and phenomenology, 5, 27, 97–8, Lebensphilosophie, 5, 35, 36–9, 77, 83, 112, 209, 210, 215 90, 193, 194, 195, 200 and Ryle, 114, 149–54, 180, 218 Levinas, Emmanuel, 27, 32, 104, against Sartre, 97–8, 209, 210 193, 196, 197, 198 on temporality, 99–103, 208, 210 Liebmann, Otto, 194 and Wittgenstein, xiv, 211, 218 Lipps, Gottlob F., 35 metalogic, 73–4, 139 logic meta-philosophy, 2, 4, 18, 30, 33, Aristotelian, 19, 58, 37, 70, 74, 113, 119–21, 133–7, 188, 197 139, 142, 215 logical grammar, 82, 115, 140, metaphysics 169, 217, 219, 220 as Begriffsdichtung, 62–4, 201 logical syntax, 50, 64, 68, 79, 115, ‘Continental’, 177 116, 201 of Dasein, 46 modern, 8, 11, 19, 25, 49, 64, 82, and deconstruction, 169, 177, 219 83, 84, 117, 188 descriptive, 48 non-Aristotelian, 19 Destruktion of, 39, 45, 47, 51, 60, post-Aristotelian, 200 72, 76 logical idealism, 33 elimination of, 32, 51, 90, 91, 95, logical , 118 193, 195 Index 255

as an expression of Lebensgefühl, on the interpretation of Kant, 62–3, 72 33–4, 194 as first philosophy, 73 and Lebensphilosophie, 5, 35–8, laying the ground for, 38, 39, 43, 193 44, 46, 66 not a unified school, 25, 34–5, 37, meaninglessness of, 49, 50, 60–6, 76, 196 70, 73, 74, 76, 91, 94 and psychologism, 25, 34, 121, and modernism, 200 187 naturalistic ontology, 48 Neo-, 3 and Neo-Kantianism, 49, 63, Neurath, O., x, xii, 7, 36, 191, 84, 199 195, 202 overcoming of (Überwindung), 5, Nietzsche, Friedrich W., 35, 63, 90, 6, 47, 48, 49, 62, 64, 76, 117, 175, 185, 186, 201 193, 202 nonsense and poetry, 62–4, 75–6 Sinnlosigkeit, 80, 116, 131, 167, and politics, 85, 200, 205 168, 169 post-Kantian, 48, 91 Unsinn, 80, 81, 116, 131, traditional, 49, 50, 75, 168, 219 85, 91 and Widersinn (absurdity), 80, 81, under attack, 47, 50, 75 116, 131, 167, 168, 219 Verwindung of, 202 Nowell-Smith, Patrick H., xiii Mill, John Stuart, 4, 20, 21, 115, 186, 187 obscurantism, 50–1, 53, 101, 106, Mohanty, Jitendra Nath, 15–16, 17, 172, 194, 206, 221 187, 200 Ockham’s razor, 123, 125 Montefiore, Alan, 161 Moore, George E., ix, xiii, 3, 4, 13, Paton, Herbert J., 114 96, 114, 115, 184, 190, 192, 193, Perelman, Chaïm, 111, 212 208, 214 petition against experimental Mora, José Ferrater, 111 psychology, ix, 10, 35 Murdoch, Iris, 95, 208 Pfänder, Alexander, 126, 163 music, 63–4, 201 Planck, Max, 145 mysticism, 107, 118–19 Plato, 27, 147, 160, 193, 201, 208 poetry, 62–4, 74–6, 201 Nagel, Ernest, xii, 185 Poincaré, Henri, 123, 148 National , 31, 41, 47, 85, polemics, ix, xiii, 7, 28, 30, 35, 62, 143, 206, 217 84, 90, 91, 109, 110, 111, 114, Natorp, Paul, 10, 25, 26, 33, 187, 121, 138, 139, 141, 146, 150, 190, 217 152, 172, 174, 181, 182, 185, Neo-Kantianism 191, 192, 205, 207, 208, 218 and Carnap, 49, 63, 76–7, 83, 90, Pos, Hendrik, 41, 46, 198 193, 199 Positivismusstreit, xiv, 7 in France, 195, 197, 209 postmodernism, 176, 178, 220–1 and Heidegger, 4, 32, 33, 35–41, pragmatism, 100, 112, 209, 210 59, 76–7, 83, 193, 196 Pre-Socratics, 66, 201 and Husserl, 25, 84, 190 , 3, 177 256 Index

Psychologismus-Streit, 5, 6, 8–11, 14, and Merleau-Ponty, 114, 149–54, 16–18, 24, 26, 34–5, 70, 77–8, 180, 218 83, 146, 190, 192 and Sartre, 139, 185, 214 psychology descriptive, 190, 215, 216 Sartre, Jean Paul distinct from logic, 15, 21–3, 189 and Ayer, xii, xiii, 1, 89, 91–5, 96, distinct from mathematics, 190 97, 101, 105, 108, 109, 206, distinct from philosophy, 8–11, 207–8, 209, 211 21–3, 30, 59–60, 70–1, 120, against Bataille, 107, 108 134–5, 200, 214 and phenomenology, 5, 27, 97, empirical, 60, 134 101, 184, 207–8, 210 experimental, ix, 4–5, 8–11, 14, and Ryle, 139, 185, 214 19, 30, 146, 192 Scheller, Max, 36, 195, 196 Gestalt, 98, 101 Schelling, Friedrich W. J., 48 important to mathematics, 14 Schlick, Moritz, x, xi, xii, 25, 28–9, important to philosophy, 186 34, 190, 191, 195, 203, 213 Pythagoras, 198 Schopenhauer, Arthur, 63 Schröder, Ernst, 15–16 Quine, Willard V. O., xi, 14, 48, 89, Schütz, Alfred, 126 153, 179, 184, 197, 199, 203, science 208, 216, 217 advances of, 32, 33, 37, 49, 120 rapprochement, 150–1 conditions of possibility of, 23, 33 Rawls, John, 7, 186 critical relation to philosophy, 28, realism, 4, 98, 100, 101, 112, 70, 121, 134 184, 209 exact, 34, 135 Reinach, Adolf, x, 126, 163–4 inductive, 48 Rickert, Heinrich, 10, 25, 26, 33, 35, and logic, 22, 53, 54, 72, 73, 84, 36, 38, 54, 187, 190, 195 115, 199 Riehl, Alois, 10, 34, 187 and metaphysics, 48–9, 51, 52, 60, Ritter, Joachim, 32 72, 76, 84, 202, 209 Rosenzweig, Franz, 193 Mistress Science, 136–8, 142, Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 161 145, 216 Russell, Bertrand, ix–xiv, 3, 4, 7, 13, natural, 48, 76 18, 19, 26, 53–4, 82–3, 90, 111, and nothing, 52 114, 115–17, 119–20, 126, observational, 124, 215 139–41, 147, 151–5, 184, 186, philosophy as a rigorous science, 190, 191, 192, 199, 203, 204, 27, 28, 136, 137, 141, 191, 192 206, 208, 212, 214, 215, 217, 218 science of, 27, 54, 137 Russell’s paradox, 19, 26, 201 social, 24, 177 Ryle, Gilbert special, 59, 60, 66, 70 and Heidegger, 118–19, 121, theory of, 22, 24, 27, 84, 174, 219 213–14 unified, 22, 23, 48 and Husserl, x, xi, xii, 6, 29, scientific Weltauffassung, 32, 76, 113–18, 120–9, 131–48, 152–5, 191, 195 163, 168, 171, 189, 192–3, 208, , 7, 176 213, 214, 215–16, 217 Scotus, Duns, 33, 194 Index 257

Searle, John, xiv, 1, 5, 6, 29, Twardowski, Kazimierz J. S., 29 162, 171–8, 180–2, 214, 220, 221, 222 Urmson, James O., 153, 184, 213, Second World War, xiii, 1, 4, 87, 89, 214, 218, 219 92, 104, 120, 135, 165, 205, 211 Sellars, Wilfrid, 179 Vaihinger, Hans, 34, 194 Snow, Charles P., 181 Van Breda, Herman L., 6, 112, 117, Society for Phenomenology and 143–8, 151, 154, 212, 213, 217 Existential Philosophy, xiv, 222 Vienna Circle, 25, 26, 29, 36, 47, Sokal hoax, 7, 186 89–91, 93, 148, 184, 191, 195, Solomon, Robert, 15, 218 204, 209, 214 Special Operations Executive, 87 speech-act, xiv, 6, 7, 162–5, 170, Wahl, Jean, x, xiii, 87, 108, 111–12, 171, 176, 189, 219 149, 155, 205, 210, 212, 218 Spengler, Oswald, 36, 195 Waismann, Friedrich, xi, xiv, 184, Spinoza, Baruch, 112, 198 191, 203 Stoicism, 19, 188 Warnock, Mary, 95, 208 Strawson, Peter F., 48, 153, 160–2, Weimar Republic, 35–6 179, 185, 218, 219 Whitehead, Alfred N., 26, 53, 111, structuralism, 3, 179, 221 147, 204, 212 Stumpf, Carl, 186, 190 Williams, Bernard, 112, 185, 212 subjectivism, 98, 119 Windelband, Wilhelm, ix, 10, 25, subsumption, 40, 41, 42, 46, 102, 33, 187, 195 130, 188, 197 Wisdom, John, 184 Wissenschaftslehre, 22–3, 27, Tarski, Alfred, 111, 216 48, 189 Taylor, Charles, xiii, 101–3, 110, Wittgenstein, Ludwig, x, xi, xiii, xiv, 209, 211, 215 3, 26, 79, 82–3, 115–16, 119–20, Thatcher, Margaret, 150 139–41, 150–7, 184, 186, 191, Thomasson, Amie L., 133, 204, 195, 203–4, 205, 206, 211, 213, 213–17 217–20 Trakakis, Nick, 88, 206 Wundt, Wilhelm, 9, 19, 186, 190