Notes Introduction 1 . Bataille talks of an ‘abyss’ ( 1986 , p. 80); Ryle ( 1971b , p. 182) and Dummett ( 1993 , p. xi) talks of a ‘gulf’. 2 . See Reynolds & Chase, 2011 , pp. 254–255. 3 . A recent survey of the field is given in Floyd, 2009 ; see also Beaney, 1998 ; Preston, 2005 . 4 . See esp. Sluga, 1998 ; Stroll, 2000 ; Glock, 2008 ; Monk, 1996a . See also Hylton, 1990 ; Hacker, 2007 ; Glendinning, 2006 ; Preston, 2007 ; Floyd, 2009 , p. 173. 5 . See e.g. Stroll, 2000 ; Glock, 2008 . See also Reynolds and Chase, 2010 ; Reynolds et al., 2010 . 6 . An early variant of this view is proposed by Urmson (1992 ), who divides the history of philosophical analysis into four types: (i) ‘classical’ analysis (Russell), (ii) ideal-language analysis (early Wittgenstein, Vienna Circle, Quine, Goodman), (iii) ‘therapeutic positivist’ (p. 299) analysis (later Wittgenstein, Ryle, Wisdom, Waismann), and (iv) ‘ordinary language’ analysis (Austin). Weitz ( 1966 ) similarly comments that ‘it has become established practice in anthologies and histories of twentieth century philosophy to divide its analytic parts into (a) Realism, (b) Logical Analysis or Logical Atomism, (c) Logical Positivism, and (d) Linguistic, Ordinary Language, or Conceptual Analysis’ (p. 1). Russell ( 1959 , p. 216) talked of three waves in British philosophy 1914–1959, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus , Logical Positivism, and the later Wittgenstein. More recently, Hacker ( 1996 , pp. 4–5; 2007 ) proposed a similar understanding of analytic philosophy as a series of phases in the history of philosophy, rather than defining it as either a set of necessary and sufficient conditions or as a family resem- blance concept. Whereas Urmson emphasises the ‘decisive break’ (1960 , p. 187) between modes of analysis, Hacker emphasises the causal links which connect one phase to another; see also Sluga, 1998 , pp. 107–108. Simons ( 2000 ), drawing from Brentano’s (1998 ) view of the history of philosophy, also proposes a four-phase history of analytic philosophy, beginning with Russell and Moore, followed by Dewey and James, going through Wittgenstein and Quine and culminating with Rorty. In tracing the American aspect of this development, Simons gives an alternative view to Hacker’s, who finds in Quine and his followers ‘the decline of analytic philosophy in all but name’ (1996, p. xi). Simons traces a parallel line of development in continental philosophy, starting with Brentano and Husserl, moving on to Heidegger, then to Sartre and finally to Derrida. For a criticism of Simons’ view, see Dummett, 2010 , pp. 148–149. 184 Notes 185 7 . One may emphasise the British (e.g. Hacker, 1996 ) or the American perspective (Simons, 2000 ; Soames, 2003 ) of this phase. 8 . As Michael Dummett points out, ‘even Japanese philosophy departments are split between analytic philosophers, Heideggerians, Hegelians and so on’ (2010, p. 149). 9 . See Hacker, 1996 , p. 274. 10 . Ayer et al., 1967 . 11 . It is notable, however, that the first use of the term ‘analytic philosophy’ is to be found in a critique against it, launched in 1933 by one of its earliest opponents, R. G. Collingwood. See Beaney, 2001 . Another early use of the term is made by Nagel ( 1936 ), who had seen ‘analytic philosophy’ as a European phenomenon, ‘professed at Cambridge, Vienna, Prague, Warsaw, and Lw ó w’ (p. 6). 12 . Nonetheless, ‘continental philosophy’ is currently taught as a branch of philosophy in the continent; see Gosvig ( 2012 ). 13 . Despite this, there have been attempts at defining continental philosophy in what Reynolds and Chase ( 2010 ) call ‘essentialist’ terms. For example, Cooper ( 1994 , pp. 4–7) points to what he sees as three definitively ‘conti- nental’ themes: ‘cultural critique, concern with the background condi- tions of enquiry, and ... “the fall of the self”’ (p. 4). But these themes do not seem to sufficiently characterise a distinctively continental approach to philosophy (e.g. they have been of philosophical concern since antiq- uity); they are not even necessarily proper to (academic) philosophy. For all these, Cooper notes that they are features which are not admitted by analytic philosophers into their conception of the discipline: Strawson (1992) admits that ‘reflection on the human condition’ belongs to ‘a species of philosophy’ ‘quite different’ (p. 2) in its aims from analytic philosophy (Cooper, 1994 , p. 4); Williams claims that analytic philos- ophy finds Nietzschean genealogy ‘quite embarrassing’ (Williams, 1993 , p. 13, quoted in Cooper, 1994 , p. 6); Ryle’s ( 1949 ) ‘ghost in the machine’ contrasts with Sartre’s ‘bloodthirsty idol which devours all one’s projects’ (Cooper, 1994 , p. 6). By referring to these themes, Cooper unwittingly seems to point to the degree by which ‘continental’ philosophy is shaped by exclusion. Reynolds and Chase ( 2010 ) instead see the differences between analytic and continental philosophy in terms of family resem- blances (i.e. neither in ‘essentialist’ nor ‘deflationary’ terms) regarding respective attitudes towards particular themes and methodological commitments; see Vrahimis, 2011b . 14 . See F ø llesdal, 1997. 15 . Some examples of this include Foucault’s controversy with Habermas (Kelly, 1994 ), as well as Derrida’s polemical exchanges with Foucault (Derrida, 2001 , pp. 36–76), Gadamer (Michelfelder & Palmer, 1989 ), and Habermas (Thomassen, 2006 ). 16 . Some (e.g. Braver, 2007 ; Critchley, 1997 ) might see the division stretching back to Kant or perhaps to some post-Kantian philosopher such as Hegel or Nietzsche (see e.g. Rosen 2001 ; Braver, 2007 , pp. 59–162; Babich, 2003 ; 186 Notes Rockmore, 2005 ; Redding, 2007 ). Though looking at such predecessors of the divide might sometimes be helpful in illuminating some particular philosophical idea which purports to underlie it, there is also an element of anachronism involved in projecting the idea of the divide over two centuries in the history of philosophy. 17 . Mill, 1985 . See also R é e, 2005. When Mill talked of Coleridge as repre- senting ‘continental philosophy’, he was referring to an approach to philosophy that was also flourishing in Britain. 18 . See e.g. Hylton, 1990 ; Nasim, 2008 ; Candlish, 2009 . 19 . See Bell, 1999 . 20 . Ernst Cassirer may count as part of the camp of the ‘non-aligned’. The book’s guest stars include all those philosophers mentioned who were present at Davos in 1928, Royaumont in 1958, and Balliol College in 1967. 21 . By ‘phenomenologists’, here I mean philosophers associated with the tradition of phenomenology broadly construed so as to include figures such as Derrida and Bataille. For similar groupings of these thinkers under the term ‘phenomenology’, see Glendinning, 2007 (on Derrida); and Himanka, 2000 (on Bataille). 22 . See O’Neil and Uebel, 2004 ; Uebel, 1992 . 23 . Adorno et al., 1976 . See also Dahms, 1994 . 24 . Bar-Hillel, 1973 ; Habermas, 2000 , p. 94. 25 . Habermas, 1995 ; Rawls, 1995 . 26 . See e.g. Dennett and Carr, 1996 ; see also Zahavi, 2007 . 27 . Russell, 1992 , pp. 309–346. See Vrahimis, 2011a . 28 . Chomsky & Foucault, 2006 . 29 . Sokal, 2000 ; see also Sokal & Bricmont, 1999 . 1 Frege, Husserl and the Future of Philosophy 1 . The eighteen-seventies also gave rise to advances that brought about the radical transformation of a number of other academic disciplines, such as number theory and analysis, geometry, physics and, of course, logic (Bell, 1999 , p. 196). 2 . Although it is difficult to make out who should or should not count as a ‘psychologicist’, the term was thought to apply primarily to a thesis expressed in the work of John Stuart Mill ( 1843 ). The term ‘psychologism’ can be traced back to the Hegelian response to the psychological theo- ries of Fries and Benecke, and is first coined in Erdmann, 1870 . Among the various Germanophone philosophers who stressed the centrality of psychology to philosophy, one may count e.g. Wundt, Brentano and Stumpf, Nietzsche and Dilthey. See Kusch, 1995 . 3 . A table of such views is given in Kusch, 1995 , pp. 118–120. 4 . Later uses of the term include Popper’s objections to ‘epistemological psychologism’ (see Uebel, 1992 , pp. 175–176); or Wittgenstein and Mises’ anti-psychologism in economics (see Long, 2004 ). ‘Psychologism’ Notes 187 even became a position the rejection of which was formative of literary modernism; see Jay, 1996 . 5 . See Kusch, 1995 , pp. 190–193. See also Chapter 2 , §5. 6 . Natorp, Rickert, Windelband and Riehl may all be considered ‘Neo-Kantians’; see e.g. Heidegger, 1997 , p. 191. 7 . Kusch, 1995 , p. 190. 8 . See Kusch, 1995 , pp. 211–219. 9 . Neo-Kantian philosophers such as Natorp, Riehl, Bauch, and others enthu- siastically endorsed German militarism through various arguments for enlightenment values and social democracy. See Sluga, 1993 , pp. 76–82; Kusch, 1995 , pp. 213–219; Habermas, 2002 . 10 . See F ø llesdal, 1994 ; Mohanty, 1982 ; Dummett, 1993 ; Hill & Rosado Haddock, 2000 . 11 . But see Parsons, 2001 . 12 . See Monk, 1996b . 13 . The importance to scholars of the relation of influence between Frege and Husserl has been a matter of controversy among commentators. For some (e.g. Hill & Rosado Haddock, 2000 , pp. xi–xiv), debunking the myth of Frege’s influence on Husserl allows for important advances to be made in Husserl-studies, since in this way a new, non-Fregean (and perhaps conse- quently in some sense philosophically superior) Husserl may be seen to emerge. For others (e.g. F ø llesdal, 1990), a Fregean reading of Husserl’s thought is superior to the traditional one in so far as it is compatible with Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts in ways in which the traditional reading is not. For still others (e.g. Kusch, 1995 , pp. 12–14), it is perhaps unfortunate that the focus of scholarship has insisted on this issue, since it is not obvious that such a question goes beyond a matter of proving the supremacy of one tradition’s grandfather over another’s. Since hundreds of articles have been written on the matter, I will not attempt to examine it here, or to present it in any depth.