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Arthur Pap Archive I. Manuscripts and Typscripts I.1 Arthur Pap Archive Inventory of the „Nachlass“ of Arthur Pap at the Institute Vienna Circle, by Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau I. Manuscripts and Typscripts I.1 Pap „Absolute Motion and the Clock Paradox“ [1953], 34 p., A4, Typscript Box 1/Folder 1 “Are Physical Magnitudes Operally Definable?” 1959, Typscript with a few handwritten corrections, 19 p., A4, 9 carbon copies. Published in: Box 1/2 Abstract for: “Are Physical Magnitudes Operally Definable?” 1956, Typscript, 3 p., A4 Box 1/3 “Are Physical Magnitudes Operationally Definable?” 1959, Typscript, 19 p., A4, Typscript, Box 1/3 “Are Physical Magnitudes Operationally Definable?” 1959, Typscript, 19 p., A4, Typscript, 8 Copies Box 1/3 “Basic Propositions, Certainty, and Intersubjective Language” [1958], Typscript, 21 p., A4 Box 1/4 “Basic Propositions, Certainty, and Intersubjective Language” [1960], Typscript, marginal handwritten corrections, 21 p., A4 Box 1/4 “Belief and Natural-Language-Intentions” No Date, Typscript, 5 p., A4 (from “Manila Folder”) Box 1/4 Abstract for: “Belief and Proposition” No Date, Typscript, 1 p., A4 Box 1/ 4 “Comments on M. Scriven´s `Certain Weaknesses in the Deductive Model of Explanation´” [1955], 5 p., A4, Typscript, Copy, (Original in the letter of M. Scriven from May 9, 1955) Scriven´s Reply is “Reply to Pap General Points-Specific Points”. Box 1/ 4 Critical Comments on Paul Weiss´ “Real Possibility” No Date, 3 p., A4, Typescript Box 1/ 4 “Mr. O´Connor on Incompatibility” [1955 or later], 4 p., A4, Typescript Box 1/ 4 Criticism of Sellars´ “On the Logic of Complex particulars” (from a letter of July 28) No Date, Typscript, 3 p., A4 (from “Manila Folder”) Box 1/4 1 “The Dispensibility of Material Implication for Applied Logic” 1959, Typescript with handwritten additions, 13 p., A4 (Contains a letter of rejection by John Rawls, see Correspondence “Rawls” (No. ??) Box 1/ 5 “Disposition Concepts and Extensional Logic” [1958], Typscript, with handwritten corrections, 21 p., A4 Box 1/ 5 “Disposition Concepts and Extensional Logic” [1958], Typscript, with handwritten corrections, 21 p., A4 Box 1/ 5 “Lewis on Contrary-to-Fact Conditionals” No date, Typscript with numerous handwritten corrections, 35 p., A4 Published in: Schilpp (ed.) The Philosophy of C. I. Lewis, Open Court, 1968. Box 2/ 1 “Lewis on Contrary-to-Fact Conditionals” No date, Typscript, 38 p., A4 Published in: Schilpp (ed.) The Philosophy of C. I. Lewis, Open Court, 1968. Box 2/ 1 “The Mind-Body Problem in Analytic Philosophy” [1954], Typscript with hand-written corrections, 21 p., A4. Published in German as: “Das Leib-Seele Problem in der Analytischen Philosophie”, Archiv für Philosophie, Vol. 5: 113-129. Box 2/ 1 Manuscripts related to the Discussions at the Minnesota Center: „Intervening Variables, Reduction Sentences, and Partial Interpretation“ July 25 1955, Typsript with minor hand-written corrections, 4 p., A4 Box 2/ 1 “A Complication of the Burks-Carnap-Sellars Schema of Explicit Definition of Disposition Concepts” July 13, 1955, Typscript, 2 p., 2 Copies, A4 Box 2/ 1 Summary and Critical Comments on: Paul Feyerabend “Carnap´s theory of Interpretation of Theoretical Systems” (Theoria, 1955 Part 1)” July 12, 1955, Typscript, 7 p., A4 Box 2/ 1 “Pragmatic Predispositions and the Problem of Causal Necessity” July 11, 1955, Typscript, 11 p., A4 Box 2/ 1 “A Gross Inconsistency in Tolman´s `Operational Behaviorism´” 1955, 2 p. A4, Typscript (written for Discussion at the Minnesota Center). Box 2/ 1 „A Sketch: Burks on Dispositions and Causal Implication“ July 6, 1955, Typscript, 3 p., A4 Box 2/ 1 „Laws and Individual Constants“ July 14 1955, Typscript, 4 p., A4 Box 2/ 1 “Reflections on Phenomenal Propositions and Private Knowledge” July 28 1955, Typscript with handwritten corrections, 5 p., A4 Box 2/ 1 2 “Explicit Definability: Another Attempt” 29 June 1955, Typscript, 5 p., A4 (from “Manila Folder”) Box 2/ 1 “Second – but not third – thoughts on Dispositions, States, Events” July 19, 1955, Typscript, 7 p., A4 (from “Manila Folder”) Box 2/ 1 “The Modern Form of the Nominalism – Platonism Controversy” No Date, Typscript, 2 p., A4 Box 2/ 1 “Nominalism, Empiricism and Universals” No Date, Typscript, 2 p., A4 Box 2/ 2 “Nominalism, Empiricism and Universals” [1959], Typscript, 13 p., A4 Box 2/ 2 “Nominalism, Empiricism and Universals” [1959], Typscript, 13 p., A4 Box 2/ 2 “Nominalism, Empiricism and Universals” [1959], Typscript, 46 p., A4 Published in: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 9, Nr. 37, p. 330-40 and Vol. 10, Nr. 38, p. 44-60. Box 2/ 2 “Names, Descriptions, and Logical Truth” No date, Typscript with hand-written marginal notes, 2 p., A4 Box 2/ 2 “On the Logical Foundations of Classical Statistical Mechanics (with special reference to the method of GIBBS)” [after 1954], Typscript, 17 p., A4, 2 copies (from “Manilla Folder”) Box 2/ 2 “On the Logical Foundations of Classical Statistical Mechanics” [after 1954], Typscript, 18 p., A4 “Whiting Folder” Box 2/ 3 “Phenomenal Propositions and Psycho-Physical Dualism” July 28 1955, Typscript, 6 p., A4 Manilla Folder Box 2/ 3 “Philosophies of Today III: Analytic Philosophy”, Discussion on the Radio with Wilfrid Sellars, 22 march 1959 1959, Typescript, 7 p., A4 Box 2/ 3 “Pragmatic Presuppositions and the Problem of Causal necessity” No Date, 16 p., A4, Typscript Box 2/ 3 „Reply to `Arthur Pap on Meaning Rules´” A Reply to Grover Maxwell “Arthur Pap on Meaning Rules”, 1959 3 [1959], Typscript, 2 p., A4 Box 2/ 3 „Reply to `Arthur Pap on Meaning Rules´” [1959], Typscript, 3 p., A4 Box 2/ 3 “Remarks on the Analysis of Scientific Explanation” Abstract for a “Lecture at Brown University, Nov. 21” No Date, Typscript, with handwritten additions, 2 p., A4 Box 2/ 3 “Reduction Sentences and Disposition Concepts” with a “Postscript” 1954, Typscript with handwritten corrections, 56 + 2 p., A4 Box 2/ 3 “Reduction Sentences and Disposition Concepts” No Date, Typscript, 55 p., A4 (from “Manila Folder”) Box 2/ 3 Stevenson´s “Ethics and Language” No Date, Typscript with handwritten correpctions, 19 p., A4 (“Thesis Folder”) Box 2/ 4 “Types, Meaninglessness, and Analyticity” No Date, Typscript, 14 p., A4 Box 2/ 4 „Types of Meaninglessness“ [1959], Typscript with numerous handwritten corrections, 23 p., A4 Published in: Mind, 1960, Vol. 69: 41-54. Box 2/ 4 „Types of Meaninglessness“ [1959], Typscript Copies, 20 p., 11 copies, A4 Published in: Mind, 1960, Vol. 69: 41-54. Box 2/ 4 and Box 3/ 1-2 Semantics and Necessary Truth [c. 1958], Typscript, A4 Box 3/ 3 Summary of Semantics and Necessary Truth, Containing: Abstract of the book, Table of Content, Bibliography, Summary of part 1 and 2. No Date, Typscript, 25 p., A4 Box 3/ 4 “Bibliography”, for Semantics and Necessary Truth No Date, Typscript, 4 p. A4 Box 3/ 4 Glossary for Semantics and Necessary Truth No Date, 11 p., A4, Typescript Box 3/ 4 Typescript for “An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science” No Date, 35 p. Typescript with numerous handwritten additions, A4 Box 3/ 5 Typescript for “An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science” No Date, 29 p. Typescript with handwritten additions, A4 Box 3/ 5 4 “Preliminary Orientation” for: “Elements of Analytic Philosophy” No Date, Typscript, 30 p., A4 Box 4/ 1 “5. Phenomenalism with Respect to the Construct-Language” No Date, 36 p., A4, Typscript with handwritten additions (probably a draft for the revised edition of Elements of Analytic Philosophy) with Folder “Mimeographed question sheets” Box 4/ 1 “5. Phenomenalism with Respect to the Construct-Language” No Date, 36 p., A4, Typscript with handwritten additions (probably a draft for the revised edition of Elements of Analytic Philosophy) Box 4/ 1 “Chapter 6: Logic and Mathematics” Chapter for the revised edition of Elements of Analytic Philosophy No Date, Typscript, 8 Copies, 9 p., A4 Box 4/ 2-3 Revisions of Elements of Analytic Philosophy No Date, Typscript, 77 p., A4 Box 4/ 2 Functional Analysis of the Distinction between Apriori and Empirical Propositions by Arthur Pap, Dissertation, Typescript, A4, 259 p. Box 7 Typescript of Semantics and Necessary Truth A4, 243 p. Box 7 “A Priori, Analytic and Metaphysical Truth” [c. 1947], Typscript, 13 p., A4 K8 “Whiting Folder” „Laws and Individual Constants“ July 14 1955, Typscript, 4 p., A4 K12/M7 “A Gross Inconsistency in Tolman´s `Operational Behaviorism´” July 13, 1955, Typscript, 2 p., A4 “A Note on Causation and the Meaning of `Event´” 1957, Pre-Print from The Journal of Philosophy, 5 p., A4 K9 “Once More: Colors and the Synthetic A Priori” 1957, Pre-Print from The Journal of Philosophy, 6 p., A4 K9 “Mathematics, Abstract Entities, and Modern Semantics” 1957, Galley proofs with handwritten corrections, 11 p. K12/M7 “Historisches” [On the Vienna Circle] [probably 1953/54], Typescript, 2 p., A4, in German, with marginal notes by Pap 5 “Philosophie und Wissenschaft” [probably 1953/54], Typescript, 3 p., A4, in German, 2 copies (last page missing in the second copy) “Analytic Truth and Implicit Definition (chapter 8)” First page of a draft for chapter 8 of Semantics and Necessary Truth No Date, Typscript with handwritten corrections, 1 p., A4 K9 “Nominalismus, Empirizismus and Universalien” No Date, Typscript (in German), 2 p., A4 K8 “Absolute Motion and the Clock Paradox” No Date, Typscript, 29 p., 3 page missing (p. 22-24 of the Typscript), A4 K12/M7 “Comments on M. Scriven´s `Certain Weaknesses in the Deductive Model of Explanation´” No Date, Typscript, 6 p. A4 K12/M6 “Extension and the Axiom of Infinity” No date, Typsript, 3 p., missing pages, A4 K12/M4 “Revision of Glossary” for: “Elements of Analytic Philosophy” with a to Paul Feyerabend No Date, Typscript, 4 p., A4 K12/M8 “A `Progressive´ Method of College Education” No Date, unfinished Typscript, 2 p., A4 K8 “Whiting Folder” “Report on `A Short Course in Logic´, by W.
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