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Luz Chapa: Bibliografía Tesis Doctoral Bibliografía La bibliografía de este trabajo está ordenada en dos secciones distintas. En primer lugar se relacionan por orden cronológico de edición original los artículos y libros de Popper en las ediciones consultadas y expresamente citadas a lo largo de este trabajo. Por la naturaleza de la investigación se han citado por separado los artículos posteriormente recopilados y publicados en forma de libro. Una bibliografía completa hasta la fecha de su publicación puede encontrarse en P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper, Open Court, La Salle (Illinois), 1974, 1201-1297 y después en http//www.univie.ac.at/science-archives/popper/biblio.html. En segundo lugar se relaciona por orden alfabético de autores toda la bibliografía general consultada y expresamente citada a lo largo del trabajo. Los artículos y libros de Carnap, Feigl, Kraft, Schlick, Russell y Wittgenstein se relacionan por orden cronológico de edición original. 1. Obras de Karl R. Popper (1931) “Die Gedächtnispflege unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Selbsttätigkeit”, Die Quelle, 81, 1931, 607-619. (1933) “Carta al Editor de Erkenntnis” en The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Routledge, London, 1997, 312-314. (1934) “On the so-called „Logic of Induction‟ and the „Probability of Hypotheses‟” en The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Routledge, London, 1997, 315-317. 404 POPPER, EL CÍRCULO DE VIENA Y WITTGENSTEIN (1945) The Open Society and Its Enemies, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1971. (1950-1951) “Indeterminism in Quantum Physics and in Classical Physics”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, I, 2, 1950-1951, 117-133. (1954) “Corroboration, the Weight of Evidence, and Statistical tests” en The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Routledge, London, 1997, 387-419. y J. Bar-Hillel, “Semantic information”, British Journal of the Philosophy of Science, 4, 1954, 145-157 “Degree of Confirmation”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 5, 1954, 143-149. (1955) “‟Content‟ and „Degree of Confirmation‟: A Reply to Dr. Bar-Hillel”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 6, 1955, 157-163. “A Note on the Body-Mind Problem” en Conjectures and Refutations, The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, Rouledge, London 1996, 299-311. (1957) “The Aim of Science”, Ratio, 1, 1957, 24-35. “Probability Magic or Knowledge out of Ignorance”, Dialectica, 11, 1957, 354-374. “Science: Conjectures and Refutations” en Conjectures and Refutations, The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, Routledge, London 1996, 33-65. “The Propensity Interpretation of the Calculus of Probability, and the Quantum Theory” en S. Sarkar (ed.), Logic, Probability, and Epistemology. The Power of Semantics, Garland, London 1996, 135- 140. (1958) “On the Status of Science and of Metaphysics” en Conjectures and Refutations, The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, Rouledge, London 1996, 184-200 (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Routledge, London 1997. (1960) “A Presumably False yet Formally Highly Probable Non-empirical Statement” en Conjectures and Refutations, The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, Rouledge, London 1996, 248-250. BIBLIOGRAFÍA 405 (1962) “Julius Kraft 1898-1960”, Ratio, 4, 1962, 2-10. “On Carnap‟s Version of Laplace‟s Rule of Succession”, Mind, 71, 1962, 69-73. (1963) “The Demarcation Between Science and Metaphysics” en P.A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, 183-226. Conjectures and Refutations, The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, Rouledge, London 1996. (1966) “A Realist View of Logic, Physics, and History “ en Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, Clarendon, Oxford, 1979, 285-318. (1967) “Epistemology Without a Knowing Subject” en Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, Clarendon, Oxford, 1979, 106-152. “Language and the Body-Mind Problem”, Proceedings of the XIth International Congress of Philosophy, 7, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 101-107. “The Mysteries of Udolpho: A Reply to Professors Jeffrey and Bar- Hillel”, Mind, 76,1967, 103-110. (1968) “On the Theory of the Objective Mind” en Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, Clarendon, Oxford, 1979, 153-190. “Theories, experience, and probabilistic intuitions” en I. Lakatos (ed.), The Problem of Inductive Logic. Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London 1965, 285-303. “Obituary. Prof. Rudolf Carnap. One of the most influential philosophers of his time”, The Times, London, 17 de septiembre de 1970. “Reason or Revolution”, Archives Europeennes de Sociologie, 11, 1970, 252-262. (1971) P. Strawson y G. Warnock, “The philosophy of Russell: II. Discussion among Karl Popper, Peter Strawson and Geoffrey Warnock” en B. Magee (ed.), Modern British Philosophy, Secker & Warburg, London, 1971, Capítulo 7. 406 POPPER, EL CÍRCULO DE VIENA Y WITTGENSTEIN (1972) Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, Clarendon, Oxford, 1979. (1974) “Replies to My Critics” en P. A., Schilpp (ed.) The Philosophy of Karl Popper, Open Court, La Salle (Illinois), 1974, 961-1200. Unended Quest. An Intellectual Autobiography, Open Court, La Salle, (Illinois), 1990. (1976) “The Logic of the Social Sciences” en Adorno, T. et al., The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, Heinemann, London, 1976. (1977) y Eccles, J. C., The Self and Its Brain. An Argument for Interactionism, Routledge, London, 1998. (1979) Los dos problemas fundamentales de la epistemología. Basado en manuscritos de los años 1930-1933, Tecnos, Madrid, 1980. (1981) Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics, Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Bartley III, W.W. (ed.), Rowman and Littlefield, New Jersey, 1982. The Open Universe. An Argument for Indeterminism, Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Bartley III, W.W. (ed.), Routledge, London, 1998. (1982) Realism and The Aim of Science, Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Bartley III, W.W. (ed.), Routledge, London, 1996. Sociedad abierta, universo abierto. Conversación con Franz Kreuze, Tecnos, Madrid, 1988. (1992) “Broadcast Review of „History of Western Philosophy‟”, Russell: the Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives, 12, 1992, 19-21. (1994) Knowledge and The Body-Mind Problem. In Defence of Interaction, Notturno, M.A. (ed.), Routledge, London, 1996. (1999) y A. Chmielewski, “The Future is Open. A Conversation with Sir Karl Popper” en Jarvie, I. C. y Pralong, S. (eds.), Popper‟s Open Society After Fifty Years. The Continuing Relevance of Karl Popper, Routledge, London, 1999, 28-38. (2001) “Sir Karl Popper Papers”, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University. Último incremento de material en 2001. BIBLIOGRAFÍA 407 2. Bibliografía general Abbagnano, N., voz “Falsificabilità”, Dizionario di Filosofia, Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, Torino, 1961, 368. Agassi, J., A Philosopher‟s Apprentice, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1993. Ambrose, A. “On Criteria of Literal Significance”, Crítica, 1, 1967, 53-61. Antiseri, D., La Viena de Popper, Unión Editorial, Madrid, 2001. Arana J., “Los dos problemas fundamentales de la filosofía de Popper. Libertad y verdad en una sociedad abierta”, Atlántida, 10, 1992. Artigas, M., Karl Popper: Búsqueda sin término, Emesa, Madrid 1979. ______, Lógica y ética en Karl Popper, Eunsa, Pamplona, 1998. ______, El desafío de la racionalidad, Eunsa, Pamplona 1999 Ashby, R.W., “Verifiability Principle”, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Macmillan and Free Press, New York, 1967, VIII, 240-247. Ayer, A. (ed.), Logical Positivism, Free Press, New York, 1959. ______, “Editor‟s Introduction” en A. J. Ayer (ed.), Logical Positivism, Free Press, New York, 1959, 3-30. ______, “Verification and Experience” en A. J. Ayer (ed.), Logical Positivism, Free Press, New York, 1959, 228-246. ______, Language, Truth and Logic, Gollancz, London, 1962. Baker, G., Wittgenstein, Frege and the Vienna Circle, Blackwell, Oxford, 1988. Baldwin, T., voz “G.E. Moore” en E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Enciclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge, London, VI, 1998, 494-495. Barrett, C. (ed.), Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Beliefs, Blackwell, Oxford, 1970. Bartley III, W. W., “Rationality versus the Theory of Rationality” en M. Bunge (ed.), Critical Approaches to Science and Philosophy, Free Press, London, 1964, 3-31. 408 POPPER, EL CÍRCULO DE VIENA Y WITTGENSTEIN ______, “Theory of Language and Philosophy of Science as Instruments of Educational Reform : Wittgenstein and Popper as Austrian Schoolteachers” en R. Cohen y M. Wartofsky (eds.), Methodological and Historical Essays in the Natural and Social Sciences, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1974, 307-337. ______, Wittgenstein, Cátedra, Madrid, 1982. Bernays, P., “Concerning rationality” en The Philosophy of Karl Popper, Open Court, La Salle (Illinois), 1974, 597-605. Berghel, H., Hübner, A. y Köhler, E. (eds.), Wittgenstein, The Vienna Circle and Critical Rationalism.Proceedings of the Third International Wittgenstein Symposium, 13 a 19 de agosto de 1978, Viena 1979. Biletzki, A., (Over) Interpreting Wittgenstein, Kluwer, London, 2003. Black, M., A Companion to Wittgenstein‟s „Tractatus‟, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1964. Blumberg, A. y Feigl, H., “Logical Positivism: a New Movement in European Philosophy”, Journal of Philosophy, 28, 1931. Braddon-Mitchell, D., voz “Analytic Behaviourism” en E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Enciclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge, London, I, 1998, 689-690. Brand, G., Los textos fundamentales de Ludwig Wittgenstein, Alianza Universidad, Madrid, 1987. Britton, K., “Portrait of a Philosopher” en K. T. Fann (ed.), Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Man and
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