FORSVARSSTUDIER 3/1999
The Struggle for Western Integration
cela1nd,the United States, and NATO during the First Cold War
Valur lngimundarson Table of Contents
Introduction ...... 4 U.S.-Icelandic Security Relations: The Background, 1940- 1945 ... 12 The Controversy over U.S. Military Rights, 1945-1946 ...... 15 A Reluctant Commitment: Iceland Joins NATO, 1948-1949 ...... 25 «Empire by Invitation>>: The Korean War and the ReentryofU.S. Troops, 1951 ...... 32 Thelmpactofthe U.S. Military Presence, 1951-1955 ...... 38 A Political Challenge to Iceland's Western Integration ...... 46 The StabilizationofU.S.-IcelandicRelations, 1959-1960 ...... 56 Conclusion ...... 3 8
Notes ...... 67
DEFENCE SlUDJES 3/1999 3 and subservient to foreign powers for centuries, made them reluctant Cold Introduction Warriors. Indeed, it was not until 1944 that the last vestiges of Danish rule were shed and that Iceland became a republic. For this reason, the Icelanders were, at best, unsure about the proposition of providing land in return for security. The view that it would infringe Iceland's sovereignty to Musing on the rationale for opting for distance when confronted with maintain close defense relations with the United States was by no means proximity, Robert Frost wrote, in a famous poem, that «Good Fences limited to the Socialist Party. Make Good Neighbors.>> 1 Few expressions come closer to capturing the At the end of World War 11, the Americans judged the importance of ambivalence that characterized the Icelandic attitude toward the defense Iceland solely by its strategic location. American military planners saw the relationship with the United States, 1945-1960. Despite close political and extension of U.S. defense parameters overseas as the logical outgrowth of economic ties, there was bound to be a «Mending Wall>> between a great strategic realities during World War IL Postwar bases requirements were power with global strategic interests, and a tiny island nation, whose determined more by a general sense of vulnerability than by a specific security concerns regularly conflicted with a desire to maintain its own perception of the Soviet Union as a threat.' Because attacks against the distinct national and cultural identity. To be sure, the United States and North American Continent could only be launched from Europe. and Asia, Iceland had one thing in common: they profited tremendously in material the United States would have to encircle the Western Hemisphere with a terms from World War II and suffered minimal war losses. But despite defensive ring of outlying bases. The purpose was to possess control of surface similarities, the differences were, of course, far greater. With a the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and keep potential foes far from North population of about 140 million, the United States emerged from World. War American Continent. On the basis of the Pearl Harbor experience, the II as the predominant power. 2 In contrast, Iceland was a political and advance of technology, and the development of the atomic bomb, the economic non-entity, with only about 130,000 inhabitants and totally Americans concluded that forward bases would enhance the chances of dependent on a single industry-fishing-for its survival. It was inevitable surviving a nuclear attack and of destroying the aggressor. that this enormous gap in power and resources would affect U.S.-Icelandic The other strategic consideration was the need to project American relations during the postwar period. In Iceland, it manifested itself in acute power quickly and effectively into different parts of the world. In the tensions between nationalistic and internationalist impulses--tensions absence of inter-continental bombers, the United States would thus be able aggravated by domestic political realigrunents and by the shifting winds of to launch an air offensive from overseas bases such as Iceland, the Azores, the Cold. War. It was an unpredictable mixture of nationalistic fervor and Greenland against potential adversaries. The base system would enable tempered by realistic calculations. Complicating the political equation was the United States to preserve its access to vital raw materials, deny these the existence of a strong pro-Moscow Socialist party, whose electoral resources to a prospective enemy, contribute to the preservation of peace strength in Europe was only matched by its French, Italian, and Finnish and stability in troubled regions, safeguard sea lanes, and, if necessary, counterparts. True, the vast majority of the Icelandic people were pro conduct an air offensive against the industrial infrastructure of a potential Western in outlook, and the strategic importance of Iceland had been adversary. In short, control of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans was consid starkly brought home to them by the British and American military ered indispensable to U.S. national security. presence during World War II. Yet, the dual experience of being unarmed It was only by 1945 that the perception of the Soviets as likely enemies
DEFENCE STUDIES ~1999 4 DEFENCE STUDIES ~1999 5 came to dominate American strategic thinking. Political and budgetary notion found its expression in efforts to strengthen the Icelandic role in the constraints, however, forced U.S. military planners to scale back their functions of the Keflavik base or-to a lesser degree--to form a Home plans, if not their ambition, for a forward defense in the early postwar Guard or a militia to complement and eventually replace U.S. troops for period. The Americans failed, for example, to persuade the Icelandic both internal and external security reasons. The center-left, on the other Government to conclude a base lease agreement and had to settle for hand sought to eliminate the need for a U.S. military presence in peacetime landing rights for military aircraft enroute to Europe. These transit rights by rclying on Iceland's membership in NATO. Both approaches ultimately would permit the rapid augmentation of American bases in wartime as well proved to be unsuccessful, but they were extremely important in shaping as speed up the movement of air units. 4 It was not until the outbreak of the Icelandic security perceptions. Korean War that the United States eventually achieved its goal of establish Despite the strategic importance of Iceland in the Cold War, few ing a permanent military foothold in Iceland through a bilateral defense historians have done research on U.S.-Icelandic relations. The Icelandic treaty. historian Th6r Whitehead has written most extensively on the bilateral It should not come as a surprise that the asymmetrical nature of U.S. relationship in the early postwar period. He writes from the realist point of Icelandic relations should have become the main source of tension. For the view and stresses the geopolitical logic of the U.S.-Icelandic relationship in Americans, the value oflceland for U.S. national security was only meas the face of a Soviet threat, the revolutionary implications of the Marxist urable in constant terms: it was a strategic certainty so long as there was a Leninist doctrine, and the inability of the Icelanders to defend themselves.' Soviet threat. The intentions of the Soviet Union were regarded less 1n his dissertation, El far Loftsson deals with some of the same issues if on important than its capability to inflict a heavy military damage on the United a less ambitious scale. 6 Steeped in the «revisionist» mould, he is critical of States. The Icelanders never accepted such a definition of the concept of the U.S.-Icelandic relationship, raising suspicions about the «cozy>> rela security. Domestic political reconfigurations and international developments tionship that existed between American Embassy officials and Icelandic always influenced Icelandic threat perceptions. cabinet ministers. He exaggerates the degree of U .S. intervention in Icelan Indeed, the U.S. military base in Iceland was the most hotly contested dic domestic affairs and underestimates the influences oflocal initiatives on domestic political issue during this period. The proponents oflceland's American behavior. But by stressing anti-Communist ideological ties Western military integration argued that a defense relationship with the between American and Icelandic officials, he tackled an issue that warrants United States and NATO was a political and strategic necessity. Given the · further examination within the bilateral context. Several important military importance of Iceland, it was irresponsible to leave the country and biographies and memoirs of leading Icelandic politicians during this period its airfields unprotected. The opponents believed, however, that neutrality have been published, even if they are inevitably marred by self-serving provided more security, because the U.S. military presence served Ameri accounts. 7 Given the intensity of the public debate over the presence of can national interests, made Iceland more vulnerable to enemy attack, and U.S. forces in Iceland, the paucity of scholarly works on U.S.-Icelandic was harmful to Icelandic culture. Of course, there were subtler variations relations during the 1950s' may seem strange. Unfamiliarity with the on these themes. Indeed, one can argue that the debate over Icelandic Icelandic language has undoubtedly kept U.S. scholars from the topic and defense policies 1945-1960 centered on ways to find a non-existent middle the lack of documentary sources has traditionally hampered research in course that would reduce Iceland's dependence on the U.S. without Iceland. In the last few years much has changed for the better in this area: jeopardizing its security. From the perspective of the center-right, this with increased access to the Icelandic archives, it is now possible to
6 DEFENCE STlJDIES ~1999 DEFENCE STUDIES 3/1999 7 complement the rich U.S. documentary material with Icelandic sources. relations 1945-1960. But I believe that two central theories come closest to Using recently declassified records in U.S., Icelandic, and, to a lesser describing the dynamics of the interaction between Americans and Iceland extent, British and German archives, I seek to broaden the scope of the ers during this period. I will argue that the concept of «national security» inquiry both in narrative and theoretical terms. Chronologically, I will focus Jay at the heart ofU .S. interest in Iceland. By seeking a n_'ilitary pre_sence in on several turning points in U.S.-Icelandic relations !945-1960: the debate this strategic location, the Americans were concerned wtth protecting over the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iceland in 1945-1946; Iceland's domestic values-such as territorial integrity, political institutions, and entry into NATO in 1949; the arrival ofU.S. troops in Iceland in 1951; the liberal capitalism-from potential external threats. Such factors as political demand for the revocation of the U.S.-Icelandic Defense Treaty in 1956; stability, social cohesion, and economic productivity were considered and the stabilization in the bilateral relationship in 1959-1960. equally important as preponderant military strength. As Melvyn Leftler, the My purpose is to address four key problems in U.S.-Icelandic relations. most persuasive proponent of the < 9 8 DEFENCE STUDIES 3/1999 DEFENCE STUDIES at"1999 such as bureaucratic politics, 12 cognitive theory, 13 corporatism, 14 and omnipotence, they have sometimes gone too far in the other direction. European revisionism-have important explanatory power, even if at a Despite the limits of U.S. power, there is no reason to deny that the subordinate level. As I will make clear here, jurisdictional and bureaucratic Americans exerted a great deal of influence on developments in Iceland in fights between the Defense Department and the State Department had the 1940s and 1950s through their political and economic strength. considerable influence on American perceptions ofthe political and military threats facing Iceland. Similarly, the need to reach a consensus between two or more parties within·a coalition government in Iceland was a crucial factor in defining the limits of the defense relationship with the United States and NATO. It is, furthermore, impossible to understand U.S. and Icelandic decision making during this period without taking into account the notion of threat perceptions. It is very unlikely that the Icelandic Government would have requested U.S. military protection in the absence of the war scare triggered by the Korean War. Similarly, the U.S. Defense Department's perceptions and misperceptions of the vulnerability of the Icelandic police force to a Socialist coup d 'etat led to unilateral military plans to respond to such an eventuality. The corporatist model's stress on the link between state and society is also of importance here: in few other areas did the interests between American and Icelandic foreign policy elites converge as clearly as in efforts to contain Communism within the trade union movement. Finally, I would like to stress the constraints faced by the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations in their diplomacy and propaganda in Iceland. . This strikes at the heart of the historiographical debate over U.S.-European relations after World War II. European and American «revisionists» have sought to downplay the role of the United States in the economic, political, and military reconstruction of Europe, arguing that the Europeans them- . selves had much more leverage than traditionally assumed." Many of the criticisms leveled by the «revisionists» against American works on the Cold War and on European reconstruction are warranted. 16 I will make the case here that the Icelanders were not only successful in restraining the United States in Iceland in its quest for expanded military rights but also in achieving maximum political and economic benefits at minimal costs. But although the < 10 DEFENCE snJOIES ~1999 DEFENCE ST\JOIES :J/1999 11 movement, but rarely extracted more than about 15% of the vote. In view U.S.-Icelandic Security Relations: The of the likelihood of a German or British occupation in 1940, this govern ment broached-with characteristic Icelandic tentativeness21-the possibil Background, 1940-1945 ity of placing Iceland under the Monroe Doctrine.22 The Americans did not rule out such an agreement, but in the absence of historical precedents, they were unwilling to commit themselves.23 Considering the close political and defense relationship between Iceland and It was only after the British forced the issue into the open that the the United States since World War Il, it may seem surprising that it has no Americans decided to approach the Icelandic Government about a U.S. historical roots. Apart from having practically no trade relations with defense role in Iceland. 24 Having been presented with a fait accompli by the Iceland, the United States did not even have diplomatic representation in British in 1940, the Icelandic Government was unwilling to comply with Reykjavik untill940.17 During the 1930s, U.S. airlines flirted with the idea Roosevelt's wish to request the military protection of the United States. But of securing landing rights in Iceland as part of their efforts to develop it agreed to issue a statement to the effect that the military protection of the transatlantic routes for commercial aviation. But they quickly abandoned it, United States was compatible with Iceland's national interest. Shortly relying instead on other more profitable routes." It was not until World thereafter, Iceland concluded a defense treaty with the United States in War II-or, more precisely, until the British occupation of Iceland in return for economic concessions. 25 On July 7, 1941, a small contingent of 1940-that the United States became interested in the strategic location of U.S. troops landed in Iceland-with thousands more to follow in the next Iceland. Even if historians are still sharply divided over President Franklin two years. It was the first overt American step toward participation in the D. Roosevelt's war strategy, the United States was, at that time, neither war, even if the United States remained, iri theory, a non-belligerent until prepared to abandon its policy of non-intervention nor its status as a non the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor six months later. belligerent and neutral power. 19 But following Hitler's military successes in In Iceland, legitimate questions were raised of whether this was a the Balkans in the spring of 1941, Roosevelt bowed to British pressure and voluntary agreement, since the Icelandic Government had only a few days agreed to replace the British occupation force in Iceland with U.S. troops. to accept the defense treaty.26 But no one could deny that it was based on a This sudden development was not totally unexpected. Since the out stronger legal foundation than the British occupation, which was, of break of the war, Iceland had been looking for ways to establish defense course, a flagrant violation of international law. Therefore, the Icelandic and trade ties with the United States.20 A National Unity Government had to Parliament, the A/thing, approved the treaty with 39 votes against 3. The deal with the wartime emergency, but it was reluctant to give up Iceland's only opposition came from the Socialist Unity Party on nationalistic policy of «eternal neutrality>> as stated in a proclamation issued in connec grounds. As it turned out, the Socialists were, in fact, more sympathetic tion with the Constitutional Treaty with Denmark in 1918. This government toward the military presence than they were willing to admit publicly. was composed of the largest party, the center-right Independence Party, When Hitler repudiated the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact by invading which traditionally captured about 40% of the vote and whose popular the Soviet Union in 1941, they abandoned their anti-Western rhetoric and support cut across class lines; the center Progressive Party, which usually began to support the Allied cause. 27 It is, indeed, a pre-Cold War irony that received about 25% of the vote and represented farming interests, and the in 1941-1942, the Americans considered the pro-Moscow Socialists among Social Democratic Party, which was a strong force within the labor their most loyal supporters in Iceland.28 That view, it turned out, changed t I 12 DEFENCE SfUDIES .1'1999 13 j DEFENCE sriJorES 3/1999 abruptly in I 944-1945, when the Socialists renewed their attacks on American capitalism and raised suspicions about U.S. postwar aims. But The Controversy over U.S. Military their early stance toward the U.S. presence reaffirmed what came close to a rare domestic political consensus on Iceland's external relations. Rights, 1945-1 946 Even if the American military force encountered no popular resistance in Iceland, there were bound to be drawbacks to the abnormal wartime situation. In 1943, the number of soldiers in Iceland reached a peak of Following the entry ofthe United States into the war at the end of I941, 50,000 in a country, whose population did not exceed 130,000. For a the strategic value oflceland became increasingly clear. Having completed, while, the troops outnumbered the whole Icelandic male population. In the in 1942, the construction of a large airfield-the Keflavik Airport-near the first year, several Icelanders were killed by soldiers, and many others capital, Reykjavik, the Americans used it to ferry thousands of bombers became victims of violence. This came as a great shock to the non-violent and fighters to the European !heater. In addition, the U.S. military presence Icelanders, who lived in a near crime-free society. Fraternization between played a vital role in Allied submarine operations in the North Atlantic and soldiers and Icelandic women led to rapid increase in illegitimate births, in keeping open the sea lanes to Britain and the Soviet Union." Given this prostitution, broken marriages, and domestic violence. 29 But troop-commu strategic certainty, it was not surprising that the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff nity relations were, on the whole, more successful than most pessimists (JCS) should already in 1942 have broached the possibility of acquiring had predicted. Economic factors played no small role in mitigating the permanent military rights in Iceland. To them, rapid advances in aircraft social and cultural tensions generated by the military presence. Consistent technology and the Polar route made it imperative to extend U.S. defense with the Defense Treaty, the United States provided Iceland not only with parameters to Iceland. The legal justification for such an arrangement its total imports needs but also committed itself to buying Iceland's fish could be based on Roosevelt's «Four Policemen» idea of a security system exports as part of the Lend-Lease agreement with Britain. The economic under the aegis of the United Nations.32 Future Soviet capability oflaunch consequences were startling: in 1939, Iceland was the poorest country in ing air strikes against the United States via the Polar route could provide the Northern Europe, but in 1945, it had become one of the richest on a per rationale for it. Although American military planners did not initially focus capita basis." on the Soviet Union they came to see it as the preponderant threat at the end of World War 11." The Icelandic Government was well aware of the U.S. desire to main tain a military presence in Iceland after the war. 34 There were, however, two important obstacles to any deal-the national independence question and the growth of the Socialist Party. Following the German occupation of Denmark in I 940, the National Unity Government had promised to sever the remaining constitutional ties with Denmark. Instead of being a sovereign state within the Danish Kingdom, Iceland would become a republic. The Roosvelt Administration managed to persuade the Icelanders to postpone this action until I 944 in an exchange for a pledge to recognize 14 DEFENCE STUDIES J/1999 DEFENCE STUDIES 31'1999 15 the new republic. What it failed to foresee, however, was that the inde Washington in 1944. But the President and the Foreign Minister of the pendence question led to a nationalistic revival that greatly strengthened Government of Experts, Vilhjalmur Th6r, were forced to remove this item neutralist sentiments in Iceland. Indeed, by 1944, no Icelandic politician from the agenda after encountering strong opposition from the leaders of could openly c~mmit himself to the continuing presence of foreign troops the political parties, who claimed that the two had no mandate to discuss on Icelandic soil. postwar defense without parliamentary approval." Socialist participation in Coinciding with the emergence of nationalism as a major political force the Innovation Government made it more difficult for the United States to was the rapid growth of the Socialist Unity Party. Founded in 1938 after achieve its goal of securing a permanent military foothold in Iceland. Since the merger of the Communist Party and left-wing Social Democratic the government was formed to carry out an ambitious economic program, splinter group, it had been isolated in Icelandic politics before the formation it had no desire to revive the defense issue. While the Independents and of the anti-Hitler coalition. Most of the Social Democratic elements left the Social Democrats would have been willing to discuss the continuation of party in 1940 because of the refusal of the Communists to condemn the the U.S. military presence in Iceland, the Socialists were adamantly op Soviet invasion of Finland in 1940. But with the wartime collaboration of posed to it. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, the Socialist Party received respectability Brushing aside all such considerations, the U.S. Ambassador in Iceland, that quickly translated into electoral support. In 1942, the party received Louis Dreyfus brought up the subject oflong-term military rights with the almost 20%, more than doubling the strength of the Communist Party in Icelandic Prime Minister, 6Iafur Thors, for the first time in April 1945. the 1937 elections." More important, the Socialists effectively used their Thors reacted negatively, arguing that if the Icelandic Government would newfound strength within the trade union movement, where they, in enter into negotiations on a base lease, it would trigger its downfall because conjunction with the center-right Independent Party, successfully of the opposition of the Socialists. He wanted to postpone any discussion challenged the dominance of the Social Democratic Party. In 1944, they of the issue until the general elections in 1946 to enable the government to scored their biggest victory by taking control of the board of the all implement its economic program. While the Prime Minister did not rule out powerful Icelandic Federation of Labor. What provided them with the possibility of a base lease in the future, he made it clear that it would additional political leverage was a personal feud between 6Iafur Thors and depend on two things: Soviet conduct and Icelandic UN obligations." Hermann J6nasson-the leaders of the Independent Party and Progressive The Truman Administration, it turned out, was divided on whether it Party, respectively. Because of their differences, the two largest parties in should pursue the matter. On the one hand, many State Department and ' Iceland were unwilling to form a coalition government. 36 Initially, the War Department officials wanted to ignore Thors's warnings and press Governor oflceland, Sveinn Bjllrnsson, resolved the government crisis, in ahead for a long term lease. Since the U.S.-Icelandic Defense Treaty of 1942, by appointing an extra-parliamentary Government of Experts. But in 1941 stipulated that the Americans withdraw their troops from Iceland at 1944, the Independence Party and the Social Democratic Party agreed to the conclusion of the «present war,» they calculated that domestic political form a new coalition government, the so-called Innovation Government, pressure could force them to do so after the end of the war in Asia. 39 On with the participation of the Socialist Party. the other hand, there were elements within the U.S. Air Force that believed Before the formation of the Innovation Government, the Roosevelt that continued U.S. military presence in Iceland would antagonize the Administration had intended to discuss postwar military requirements with Soviets and raise suspicions about Anglo-American intentions. They argued the newly elected President, Sveinn Bjllrnsson, during his official visit to that the UN should make the final decision on the security arrangements 16 DEFENCE snJDIES 311999 DEFENCE STUDIES 3(19911 17 for Iceland." Finally, a third group-encompassing both State and War Bevin, was opposed to a long-term base lease for several reasons. For one Department' officials--wanted to offer the Soviets a quid pro quo: the Red thing, it could undermine one of Bevin 's cherished goals--namely, the Army would be allowed to establish permanent military bases on the establishment of the United Nations as a global security organization. Danish island ofBornholm and on the Norwegian enclave of Spitzbergen in Secondly, he feared that the Soviets would demand bases in Bornholm or exchange for U.S. military rights in Iceland.41 other Scandinavian territories in exchange for approving a U.S. military The internal debate ended abruptly in late August 1945, when the presence in Iceland. To Bevin, a preferable course of action was a short Truman Administration decided to ask for a long term lease of three bases term U.S. base lease that would expire once the UN security mechanisms in the area surrounding Reykjavik. This move, on October I, not only were in place and Iceland had become a member of the world body. There threatened to deplete the reserves of Icelandic goodwill toward the Ameri was certainly more self-interest behind the British position than met the cans but also put into question the viability of the Innovation Government.42 eye: the British JCS considered it imperative to have military access to 6lafur Thors was sharply critical of the timing and was in no doubt about Iceland in wartime, especially in the contingency ofAmerican non-partici the consequences: the Socialists would not only leave the government but pation. In March 1945, they had called for joint U.K.-U.S. military rights in also try to exploit the issue by staging political strikes and by engaging in Iceland. But having no desire to share Iceland with other powers, the other forms of economic warfare.43 The Americans knew, of course, that Truman Administration did not respond to the proposal until nine months they would face criticism in Iceland for their handling of the issue. But later. Despite the snub, the British signalled their willingness to make a they erroneously feared that the Icelandic Government would insist on the compromise with the Americans: to accept long-term U.S. military rights in withdrawal ofU.S. forces after the surrender of the Japanese. Iceland in exchange for landing rights in wartime. When Washington Thors and other pro-Western politicians worried little about the strict decided against it on the rather tenuous grounds that it would be discrimi letter of the U.S.-Icelandic Defense Treaty. To them, the Americans could natory vis-a-vis other nations, London decided to stay on the side lines on stay in Iceland until the UN Security Council decided on the security the base issue. This policy of calculated passivity did much to undermine arrangements of the member states. Besides, since the application of the the U.S. case in Iceland." Icelandic Government for UN membership had been delayed because of its The base request put 6lafur Thors in a difficult position: on the one refusal to declare war on the Axis--a precondition for a founding member hand, he knew that the days of his government would be numbered, if it ship--no Icelandic political party, save for the Socialists, wanted the small would be granted. On the other, he wanted to maintain friendly relations U.S. force that remained in Iceland to be withdrawn.44 What Thors did not with the United States, not least because of its constructive role in resolv know, however, was that the Truman Administration was bent on securing ing the independence question and its economic support during the war. To military rights in Iceland before the UN Security Council was formed, keep his coalition government intact, Thors tried to put on a delicate because it would be able to veto bilateral security agreements. balancing act designed to satisfY both the Icelandic Socialists and the When the U.S. base request ran into trouble in Iceland, Ambassador Americans. He sought to prolong the American military presence by Dreyfus, blamed 6lafur Thors, labeling him an «opportunist,» whose only postponing Iceland's entry into the UN. Of course, this was only a tempo goal was to stay in power." But it was not only Thors, who was miffed by rary solution, but he hoped that both sides would accept it for the time the way the Americans handled the base issue. Aside from the Soviets, being. The Socialists showed some flexibility by agreeing to preliminary who did not conceal their displeasure,46 British Foreign Secretary, Ernes! talks with the United States with no strings attached. But they reiterated 18 DEFENCE STUDIES 3,'1999 DEFENcE ~DIES 3/1999 19 their intention ofleaving the government, if the U.S. received military rights the U.S. request. Oddly enough, Dreyfus interpreted the Icelandic note as a in Iceland. 48 The Truman Administration was in no mood for engaging in positive answer to the American base request. The written note, to be sure, talks with no fixed agenda. To the Americans, the issue boiled down to an was hopelessly ambiguous. It broached unspecified future military de easy proposition: the Icelandic Government could either accept the base mands imposed on Iceland by the UN and failed to mention the real issue: lease request or reject it. There was no middle ground-no room for the base lease. But the oral qualifications should be have left the Ambassa maneuvering. When Thors received this message, he shot back in a fit of dor in no doubt about the negative position of the government." exasperation: «This answer could have been written in Moscow.»49 Dreyfus 's misinterpretation was mostly due to his overreliance on the One important reason for the hard-line position of the Americans was advice ofVilhjalmur Th6r, whom the Ambassador termed < 20 DEFENCE STUDIES 3119119 DEFENCE STUDIES 311999 21 -·-. the American cause. First, the British unilaterally decided to close down obligation to provide military facilities in peacetime. Yet, Thors decided to their small garrison in Iceland that had run the Reykjavik Airport since the enter, on his own initiative, into private talks with an American envoy, Hugh war. Secondly, the Soviets began the withdrawal of their military forces cumming, the head of the Northern European section of the State . from Bornholm-a move that pulled the rug from under those Icelanders Department, about the American proposal for landing rights. The two Sides who had been in favor of granting the United States bases as a quickly agreed on the withdrawal of the U.S. mili~ forces from ~celand counterweight to the Soviet military presence in Scandinavia. Finally, the in exchange for landing rights for 6'/2 years. In addition, the Amencans U.S. Minister of Commerce and former Vice President, Henry Wallace, would run the Keflavik Airport and finance its operations. Thors was now who was a prominent member of the left-wing of the Democratic Party, confronted with the dual problem ofsecuring parliamentary approval of the added insult to injury by publicly calling for the removal ofU.S. troops Keflavik Agreement and of keeping his government coalition intact. It was from Iceland." an undertaking that proved to be too difficult----even for Thors, one of Despite all these warning signs, the State Department decided to renew Iceland's shrewdest politicians. He received parliamentary majority for the the base issue in April 1946. The Icelandic Prime Minister reacted with deal, but failed to persuade the Socialists to stay in the government. All the indignation, reiterating all the familiar arguments against it. 6lafur Thors MPs of the Independence Party and the Social Democratic Party voted for even recommended that the Truman Administration formally withdraw the the agreement, except for two members of the left-wing of the latter. The base request to eliminate it from the political agenda, because it would Progressive Party split right down the middle on the issue. The party never be accepted in its present form.60 This harsh reaction ultimately chairman, former Prime Minister, Hennann J6nasson and a group of convinced the Truman Administration that it would have to make conces supporters voted against the Keflavik Agreement, but another group sions to get any agreement. Instead of a long-term base lease, the Ameri identified with the party's right-wing backed it. 63 cans decided to ask for landing rights for military aircraft in connection The Keflavik Agreement deeply polarized Icelandic society. During the with their occupation duties in Germany. This was, of course, a far more A/thing debate, Socialist, nationalist, and neutralist elements organized modest request. And although Thors refused to discuss it before the protest meetings in Reykjavik, attacking the treaty for infringing Iceland's elections, he thought a compromise could be reached along these lines." sovereignty. 6lafur Thors and other prominent leaders of the Independence The election results showed strong popular support for the Innovation Party were also attacked by an angry mob in what proved to be the most Government. The Independent Party received about 40% of the vote, the serious disturbances since the founding of the Icelandic republic. The Socialist Party 20%, and the Social Democratic Party 18%. The opposi Socialist Party took the most extreme position, accusing the architects of tion, the Progressive Party, was the only party that suffered a marked the agreement of treason by placing the fate of the country in the hands of decline in its electoral strength from 26,5% to 23%.62 But, while the «American imperialists.» Other opponents from the Progressive Party and coalition partners were eager to renew their government cooperation, there the Social Democratic Party found fault with specific clauses of the was bound to be one obstacle: the base request. The Socialists were still agreement, especially the one granting the Americans exclusive rights to adamantly against any concessions to the Americans on this issue. More run Keflavik Airport.64 over, 6lafur Thors's legal argument for maintaining the U.S. military The first argument had no basis, because the Keflavik Agreement was presence had been dealt a blow during the summer of 1946, when ratified by A/thing. The other was more justified: it raised legitimate international legal experts came to the conclusion that UN members had no concerns about jurisdictional issues at the Keflavik Airport. What it failed to 23 22 DEFENCE STlJDIES 3/1999 DEFENCE SfUDIES 3,11999 recognize, however, was that the Icelanders were unable to run the Keflavik Airport because of a lack oftechnical training and financial resources. It maY; be argued that the Keflavik Agreement amounted to an A Reluctant Commitment: Iceland Joins admission that Iceland was within the U.S. sphere of influence. Indeed, it represented the first step toward active political cooperation with the NATO, 1948-1949 United States in the postwar period. But it neither provided the United States with permanent military rights nor constituted a defense treaty: Following the downfall of the Innovation Government, Iceland experienced military aircmft were permitted to make stopovers on their way to Europe, a long political crisis. It was not resolved until February 1947, when the but no ground troops were stationed in Iceland. chairman of the Social Democmtic Party, Stefan J6hann Stefansson, succeeded in forming a coalition government consisting of the Social Democmtic Party, the Independence Party, and the Progressive Party." Together with the Prime Minister, the most important figures in the new government were the Foreign Minister, Bjami Benediktsson, the Mayor of Reylgavik and 6Iafur Thors 's right hand man, and the Minister of Culture and Transportation, Eysteinn J6nsson. Despite a huge parliamentary majority, the new government proved to be weak. It was not only because of the preponderant influence of the opposition Socialist Party within the trade union movement but also because of the refusal of 6Iafur Thors and Hermann J6nasson to set aside their personal differences and join it. The government was decidedly pro-Western and turned into an anti Communist bulwark with the emergence of the Cold War. Still, ideological solidarity-anti-Communism-had little do with its formation. The Ameri cans, in conjunction with such Icelandic anti-Communists as Vilhj ahnur Th6r, had surely tried behind the scenes to keep the Socialists out of the government. But 6Iafur Thors, who had established close personal rela tionships with the leaders of the Socialist Party-Einar Olgeirsson and Brynj6lfur Bjamason-wanted to include them in a coalition government if they abandoned their demand for the repudiation of the Keflavik Agree ment.66 When the Socialists rejected this condition, they condemned themselves to a 10-year period of isolation in Icelandic politics. Icelandic party leaders-with the exception of the Socialists-wanted to maintain good relations with the United States. Like other Western European leaders, they had reservations about the harsher features of 24 DEFENCE STUDIES 3/1999 DEFENCE STUDIES 311999 25 :'I ''·I i I American capitalism and were much more inclined to favor state interven in 1949, but on a much smaller scale than originally envisioned. Plans to tion in the economy. Traditionally, Icelandic cabinet ministers and politi reduce the influence of the Socialists in government were also diluted. cians had more intimate contacts with their European and Scandinavian Hampered by laws guaranteeing civil service protection, the Icelandic counterparts. But they had much respect for the political and economic Government made little use of its power to remove persons from sensitive might of the United States and shared its opposition to Soviet Communism. posts. 69 There were several examples of such practices, but no comparison From 1947 to 1949, they established close relations with the Americans in is warranted to the McCarthyist witchhunts that were to grip the United the struggle against the Socialist Party, partly because of ideological affinity States in the early 1950s. The Czech coup not only raised concerns about and partly because of a perceived political necessity in their efforts to stave internal security but also about the defenselessness of Iceland against off Socialist attacks. external attack. In view of the strategic importance of Iceland, the In 1947-1948, the political forces that coalesced in opposition to the Icelandic Government knew that the United States would hardly stand idly Keflavik Agreement continued to contest its validity and to question its by in the case of an attack. But since the Keflavik Agreement provided no enforcement. Although the agreement yielded clear economic benefits, it security guarantee, it could not count on U.S. intervention. On his own was never popular. The Socialists skillfully used nationalistic arguments initiative, Premier Stefansson suggested, in the spring of 1948, that a secret against it and uncovered instances of smuggJ.ing and black market activities understanding be reached with the United States on the defense oflceland. to' support their case. The Icelandic Government was also dissatisfied with Together with Benediktsson and Eysteinn J6nsson of the Progressive Party, certain U.S. interpretations of the agreement, especially with respect to he sought a security guarantee without turning the Keflavik Airport into a operational costs." But during this period, the Icelanders were more military base in peacetime. During the summer of 1948, Benediktsson also concerned about the deteriorating economic situation than about the made overtures on behalf of the cabinet to the Americans, broaching the Keflavik Agreement or security issues in general. It was not until the possibility of using the Keflavik Agreement as a defense treaty. The imme Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia in February 1948- diate concern was not the Czech coup, but the presence of a large Soviet coupled with the Berlin Blockade-that the Icelandic government began to fishing fleet off the North coast of Iceland. Benediktsson did not rule out look for ways to strengthen the defense oflceland by translating the that the fishing crews were a disguised military force, whose real aim was Keflavik Agreement into a bilateral defense treaty. to occupy Iceland in cooperation with the «fifth column>>--the Icelandic Like in Western Europe, the Czech coup raised deep suspicions in Socialists. 70 The Americans did not think that the Soviets had such inten Iceland about the Socialist Party and its ties with the Soviet Union. Since tions. But because of their own military interest in Iceland, they appreciated the Icelandic police force consisted of only I 00 officers, Foreign Minister the growing awareness of the defenselessness of the island. Bjarni Benediktsson of the Independence Party and Premier Stefan J6hann In mid-1948, the Truman Administration had no contingency plans for Stefansson of the Social Democratic Party wanted to create militias within the defense oflceland. But while discounting possible Soviet aggressive their respective parties to counter possible Socialist subversion. The designs, it was intent on capturing Iceland as soon as possible after the Americans offered both encouragement and military support.68 But outbreak of war. The reason was simple: U.S. war plans relied heavily on Icelandic political leaders eventually balked at the idea, probably because the retaliatory power of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) in the case of a the events in Czechoslovakia did not result in similar Communist moves in Soviet invasion of Europe. U.S. nuclear monopoly-particularly SAC's Western Europe. True, the Independence Party formed an unarmed militia offensive capability-was not only seen as the most effective deterrent 26 DEFENCE STUDIES 311999 DEFENCE STUDIES 311999 27 against such a contingency. Considering Soviet superiority in conventional even soldiers lay over at Keflavik.» The government wanted to make sure weapons, U .S military planners had ruled out the feasibility of defending that the United States would be ahead of the Soviet Union in the competi Europe in favor of counterattacks against the Soviet Union from bases in tion for Iceland in wartime. Judging by their experience in World War 11, other countries, especially Britain, the Middle East, and North Africa. If the Icelanders knew, of course, that there was a distinct possibility that the SAC bases in Britain were destroyed by the Soviets, the Americans planned United States would capture Iceland in the event of war-with or without to proceed with the counteroffensive from Iceland. Hence, the need to their consent. Indeed, that was exactly what the Americans planned to do. ensure access to' Iceland for medium range bombers. But Benediktsson wanted to make it clear that consultation and cooperation The early military plans were surely sketchy at best and grossly defi were in the interest of both countries. 73 cient at worst. Initially, the United States overestimated its own nuclear The Icelandic Government was not prepared to take any further steps capability and the readiness of SAC-a problem confounded by internal toward formal military arrangements with the United States. Domestic criticisms of the reliance on retaliatory nuclear strikes. The highly secret political constraints-nationalistic sensitivity on the defense question Pentagon discussions in the spring of 1948 between top American, British, coupled with a lack of a military tradition--forced cabinet ministers to and Canadian military officials sought to address it by focusing on ways to proceed with caution and restraint. This also explains why the Icelandic reduce the vulnerability of Europe to a Soviet attack and devise a formula Government insisted that the initiative to enter into negotiations on the for the defense of the Continent. But since these plans were only in their formation of NATO in late 1948 come from the Western Europeans and the early stages, the Americans felt that they had to continue to rely on their Americans. A key rationale for U.S. participation in «entangling alliances» 71 nuclear retaliatory capability. Having been unsuccessful in 1946, to was the prospective military access to «stepping stone countries» like establish military bases in Iceland in peacetime, the Truman Administration Iceland, the Azores and Greenland. 74 Therefore, it did not come as a decided, in 1948, to press for the lengthening of the runways at the surprise, when in January 1949 the Icelandic Government received a Keflavik Airport for SAC use in wartime. Because of the offensive conno formal invitation to join the talks. 75 Before committing itself, the govern tations of the project, the initial reaction of the Icelandic Government was ment had to overcome several hurdles. The most important one was a negative. But bowing to,strong American pressure, it relented in early 1949 disagreement over the preconditions for NATO membership. The leaders of 72 and approved the lengthening of one runway. the Independence Party and the Social Democratic Party were receptive to This episode reflects the dilemma faced by the Icelandic Government: it the idea of allowing a small military contingent to be stationed in Iceland wanted to strengthen the defense of Iceland without making it a launching for the protection of the airfield at Keflavik. The Progressive Party leader, pad for offensive operations against the Soviet Union. To resolve it, the Eysteinn J6nsson, was, however, opposed to any peacetime military cabinet ministers groped for a middle ground. At an important meeting with presence. 76 It reflected his reluctance to enhance the military value of U.S. Ambassador, Richard Butrick, in August 1948, Foreign Minister Iceland and to prevent a split within the Progressive Party on the issue. Benediktsson made it clear that the United States would need Icelandic Another complicating factor was the uncertainty about the creation of a approval for the use of!celand in wartime. To do otherwise would consti Scandinavian Defense Union. Without the participation of Denmark and, tute a gross violation of the Keflavik Agreement as well as international law. especially, Norway in the prospective North Atlantic Alliance, the Icelandic Having said that, however, Benediktsson added that the Americans could government would probably not have opted for membership. n Finally, the interpret the Keflavik Agreement liberally by having «sufficient planes and cabinet ministers had to take into account domestic political opposition to DEFENCE STUDIES 3/1999 28 DEFENCe STUDIES 311999 29 any Icelandic participation in a military alliance. Already in December, with overwhelming support: 37 were in favor and 13 against. It is the same,political forces that came together to oppose the Keflavik ironip, however, that Iceland-which had made its unarmed tradition Agreement had begun agitating against the prospective involvement of the precondition for joining NATO---should have witnessed the most Iceland in the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) talks. 78 Like in 1946, this serious disturbances. 83 mov,ement was divided into two segments: on the one hand, there were non-Communist nationalistic and neutralist elements. Prominent among those were members of the left-wing of the Social Democratic Party and Progressive Party. On the other hand, there were the Socialists, who used both nationalistic as well as anti-American propaganda in their campaign against NAT. Initially, it was far from clear whether the government would be able to overcome these hurdles. To be sure, the failure of the Scandinavian Defense Union-and the subsequent Norwegian and Danish decisions to join the NAT talks in March-increased the chances oflcelandic participation. 79 But continued internal squabbles almost led to the downfall of the government in February. 80 In the end, the coalition partners agreed on a formula to resolve their differences: as a precondition for Iceland's NATO membership, there would be no military presence in peacetime. The Americans were perfectly willing to accept this solution. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, even stated disingenuously that the United States did not want have a military force in Iceland." Of course, the Americans had not abandoned their interest in negotiating a base agreement with the Icelanders, but they realized that they could not get more at this stage. Following intensive discussions between an Icelandic delegation composed of Benediktsson, Eysteinn J6nsson, and Emit J6nsson, an influential Social Democratic politician-and Acheson and State De partment and Defense Department officials in Washington, the Icelandic Government decided to join NATO at the end of March. 82 This move evoked strong nationalistic and Socialist protests that culminated in the most serious postwar riots in Iceland. The A/thing building was stoned and government ministers were attacked by : I I protesters. The riots did not prevent the A/thing from approving NAT I! I i 30 DB'ENCE STUDIES 311999 DEFENCE STUDIES 311999 31 I In an effort to bridge the differences between the State and Defense «Empire by Invitation»: The Korean War Departments, the NSC approved a compromise in the summer of 1949. The Pentagon was entrusted with the task of preparing contingency plans and the Reentry of U.S. Troops, 1951 for sending a U.S. military force to Iceland to protect U.S. and NATO interests in the event of a Communist coup. The State Department was instructed to make plans to prevent the Communists from seizing power by Before Iceland's entry into NATO, the United States had been looking for political means. This compromise did not solve the basic contradiction ways to address the Icelandic Government's security concerns. Bjami embedded in this policy: on the one hand, the policy paper argued along Benediktsson's suggestion that the United States interpret the Keflavik Pentagon lines that the internal danger was the most acute problem facing Agreement by keeping military aircraft permanently stationed in Iceland Iceland. On the other, it seconded the State Department view that the received much attention within the Department of Defense. While possibility of a Communist coup was remote.86 Benediktsson calculated that by maintaining a visible military presence in Nonetheless, CINCLANT'S contingency plans for quashing a Socialist Iceland, the United States would deter the Socialists from attempting a i coup were, in 1949, merged with U.S. plans to fight a war with the Soviet I ' coup, he was mainly concerned about the potential Soviet threat: U.S. Union. The idea was to enable SAC to have access to Iceland on a standby military officials, however, believed that the Socialist capability of seizing basis ifU.S. bases in Britain were destroyed." What the plans failed to do, power posed a more immediate threat than a Soviet invasion. Thus James however, was to answer two key questions. First, what would have Forrestal, the Secretary of Defense, ordered contingency plans, in late happened, if the British had denied the Americans the use of bases in 1948, for the capture of Iceland in the event of a Communist coup d' etat. Britain for retaliatory nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union? This ques A plan developed by the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic tion was pertinent and never really resolved to the satisfaction of either the (CINCLANT) to deal with such a contingency was first discussed at a British or the Americans. Second, would the Americans have asked the National Security Council meeting in April 1949. Pentagon officials reiter Icelandic Government for permission to use Iceland for SAC's offensive ated on the basis of comments made by Benediktsson during the NAT talks operations? that the possibility of a Communist coup was the most serious danger There is no evidence to suggest that the Icelandic Government was facing Iceland. 84 The Icelandic Foreign Minister had, in fact, never inti aware of these U.S contingency plans. Icelandic politicians paid, in fact, mated that the internal threat was more important than the external one, limited attention to military questions in the latter part of 1949 and early even though he was in favor of establishing a Home Guard to protect the 1950 because of a domestic political crisis. The three-party government airport against potential subversion. State Department officials did not broke up in the fall of 1949 over disagreements over economic policy. A believe that the Soviets intended to seize power in Iceland by proxy new coalition government---i:omposed of the Independence Party and the through the Socialist Party-and attached far more importance to finding a Progressive Party-was not formed until February 1950.88 Earlier in the political than a military solution to the problem oflceland's internal year, NATO had informed Icelandic officials of the need for stationing a security. Moreover, they questioned the value of a unilateral U.S. military small military force of 200 to protect the Keflavik Airport against sabo intervention in the event of a Socialist coup, preferring instead to deal with tage. 89 Without committing himself to what was bound to be a very sensi the crisis on a multilateral basis through NATO." tive issue because oflceland's precondition for NATO's membership, 32 DEFENCE STUDIES 3/1999 DEFENCE STUDIES 3/1999 33 Benediktsson argued that if this force was, indeed, needed it should be die Government had not agreed on permitting a foreign military presence in composed of Icelanders, not foreigners. The Truman Administration, Iceland or on forming a Home Guard. But the ice had been broken: the 94 which had not given up its aim of achieving permanent military rights in stationing of a military force in peacetime was no longer a taboo. In a Iceland, preferred to have U.S. or other NATO forces assume this duty meeting withBenediktsson in September in Washington, the Standing because of the Icelandic lack of military training.00 But it did not press th.e Group pressed for the establishment of a security force of 1200 to protect defense issue, which was not revived until the North Korean invasion of the Keflavik Airport instead of the earlier estimate of200. Without commit South Korea in late June. ting himself, the Icelandic Foreign Minister requested additional information Like in other European countries, the Korean War triggered a war scare about such questions as stockpiling, the force size, the location of radar in Iceland. Benediktsson feared that the presence of a large Soviet fishing stations, air defenses, and the costs involved. Although the Icelandic fleet near Iceland~oupled with suspicious behavior of Russian diplo Government was sympathetic toward the NATO request, it did not want to mats-was an indication of possible ulterior motives. The Americans did make the fmal decision until the Standing Group had provided the details of not think that the Soviets were planning to invade Iceland, but t~ calm its defense plan." Icelandic cabinet officials, they sent several destroyers to Iceland to keep Despite pressure from both Dean Acheson and Bjarni Benediktsson, the an eye on the Soviet fleet." Although U.S. officials calculated that the Standing Group was unable to answer the questions of the Icelandic Korean War had made the Icelandic Government more susceptible to the Government until January 1951, because most NATO military experts were peacetime presence of military forces in Iceland, they realized that too in Europe during the last months of 1950 to prepare for the establishment 96 much pressure could result in a nationalistic backlash. True, U.S. Ambas ofthe Supreme Allied Headquarters in Europe (SHAPE). But shortly sador, Edward Lawson, used the opportunity to remind Benediktsson of thereafter the Icelandic Government agreed to a NATO request to enter into the need for collective sacrifice in the face of a common enemy.92 But he negotiations with the United States on a defense treaty. It insisted, how did not take his case further during the summer of 1950. While the British ever, on bearing no costs of the military presence and on being able to revoke the treaty unilaterally on a reasonably short notice. 97 The cancella- agreed with the Americans on the need for strengthening Iceland's 1 • • • defenses, they preferred a multilateral approach through NATO instead of a tion clause proved to be the sticking point in the secret bilateral negotiations unilateral U.S. one. In collusion with the Americans, the British decided to that began in Reykjavik in mid-February 1951. ask Halvard Lange, the Foreign Minister of Norway, to prod the Icelandic Since the Truman Administration was reluctant to spend vast sums of Government into ac.cepting additional defense measures. Lange was willing money on military projects in Iceland without securing a long-term corn· to undertake this task and promised not to reveal its real sponsors. In mitment, it proposed to tie the treaty's duration clause to that ,of NAT. The addition, the Standing Group ofNATO's Military Committee submitted a Icelandic Government, in contrast, demanded a one-year revocation clause letter to the Icelandic Government, requesting information about its defense as a price for abandoning Iceland's precondition for joining NATQ-the needs and intentions. 93 insistence on no peacetime military presence. In the end, the Truman By pure coincidence, the Icelandic Government had decided, on its own Administration relented and accepted a «compromise» that corresponded i I ' initiative, to approach NATO on defense a few hours before Lange had the closely to the Icelandic position. Either side could revoke the treaty on 18 1,1. opportunity to discuss the matter with Benediktsson. Thus Lange 's and months notice. In addition, the North Atlantic Council was to give its opinion on whether it deemed such action warranted from a military point 'I I NATO's overtures did not influence its decision directly. True, the Icelan- ',11 35 34 DEFENCe STUDIES :l/1999 DEFENCE STUDIES 311999 11:1 I " of view, but it had no veto power. Another difficult issue in the negotiations die people through the Marshall Plan and NAT0. 101 The Icelandic Socialists was also resolved to the satisfaction of the Icelanders. The Americans reacted in a similar way, accusing the government of committing treason wanted to double the number of troops considered necessary by the like in 1946. 102 But the opposition to the treaty proved to be much weaker Standing Group {which had already raised its estimate again from 1200 to than to the KeflavikAgreement or to Iceland's NATO membership. The 3,300). But for nationalistic reasons, the Icelanders succeeded in keeping a coalescence of nationalistic, neutralist, and Socialist forces never material tight lid on the size of the force and on limiting the initial number to ized this time, because members of the left-wing of the Progressive Party 98 3,900. and the Social Democratic Party voted in favor of the Defense Treaty. The When in late April, a draft defense treaty had been prepared, the nego reason for this rare display of unity on foreign policy can be traced to the tiations hit a snag. State Department officials wanted to leave out any impact of the Korean War on the domestic political situation. By blaming special mention of the defense oflceland in the treaty and to limit its scope the West for instigating the hostilities in Asia, the Icelandic Socialists to the defense of the Nortb-Atlantic Treaty area. They feared that Congress isolated themselves politically and became more closely associated with would interpret the defense arrangement as exceeding the obligations set Moscow. To be sure, the opponents of the agreement had one powerful forth in NAT. Bjarni Benediktsson adamantly refused to budge on this argument at their disposal. The Defense Treaty was broader in scope than question. While acknowledging that the Americans were thinking of their NAT: 1• 3 it entrusted the Americans exclusively with the defense oflceland own security and that of NATO, he made it clear that the Icelandic without spelling out how it would be used in war. According to Article 5 of Government's motive for entering into a military relationship with the NAT, member countries could decide, on their own, on their response to an United States was to ensure the defense of Iceland. He even threatened to armed aggression against one of them. The Socialists and nationalists also refuse to sign the treaty, if the United States did not abandon its position. made the point that the U.S. military presence contradicted Iceland's When the Americans realized that the issue could scuttle the negotiations, precondition for NATO membership. The government defended itself by they backed off and accepted the original wording. 99 arguing that the treaty was < 36 DEFENCE STUDIES :N'1999 DEFENCE STUDIES 3{1999 37 Iceland in wartime. The Socialists had argued that it would be a launching The Impact of the U.S. Military Pres ad for strategic attacks on the Soviet Union as part of America's «aggres ~ive war plans.» The Icelandic Government denied the charges, arguing ence, 1951-1955 that the Iceland Defense Force main mission was to defend Iceland and other North Atlantic security interests. But statements made by American military officials and Congressmen about the importance of Iceland for . Compared to the passionate public debate over the Keflavik Agreement and SAC harmed the government's case. In the fall of 1951, a U.S. Senator, NATO, the reaction to the entry ofAmerican troops-soon-to-be called the called on the Truman Administration to move American nuclear weapons Iceland Defense Force-was strangely anti-climatic. Most Icelanders from Britain to bases in Iceland, Turkey, and North Africa. When the greeted th_e _ne':s with ~ixed feelings. To them, the Defense Treaty was a Socialists demanded an official explanation, Bjarni Benediktsson asked the result of nsmg mternational tensions, perhaps a necessity but not an Americans to make it clear that they had no such intentions. The State occ~ion f~r celebration. There was no desire to experience again the Department. recommended that Benediktsson be informed in strictest soctal tenswns generated by the U.S. presence during World War rr. The confidence that the U.S. was not planning to store atomic weapons in Americans had, of course, first-hand knowledge of Icelandic nationalism Iceland. The Department of Defense was, however, reluctant to be so both in its dormant and eruptive state. But they were relatively slow to specific, because it was working on plans to establish ~ strategic air base in grasp the significance to which many Icelanders attached to the fraterniza Iceland. In the end a compromise was reached: Benediktsson was told that tion issue. Although the American soldiers were in no way a threat to the the United States would not do anything that violated the letter and spirit of Icelandic social and moral fabric, as some nationalists claimed their the Defense Treaty. All military projects involving Iceland would be pre presence in bars and restaurants in Reykjavik sparked local re;entment. sented to the Icelandic Government for approval.'06 This si~a~ion was made worse by a display of open hostility on the part of The Air Force was eager to expand its military rights in Iceland by the ~o~taltsts. As a result, the Icelandic Government decided to put some constructing an additional airfield at Rangarvel/ir in the Southern part of restrictwns on the movement on U.S. troops in Iceland. It was a move that the country. SAC would use this airfield to support a heavy strategic did not sit well with the U.S. soldiers, but it was clearly in the interest of 04 mission in wartime and for training purpose in peacetime. The request both sides.' Apart from protecting the Keflavik Airport, U.S. forces in reflected lingering doubts of many U.S. military officers about the ultimate Iceland facilitated air and naval patrol in this strategic area. With an im control of SAC bases on British soil. Winston Churchill and Harry S. proved Distant Early Earning system, the Americans wanted to be in a Truman had made an ambiguous oral agreement that provided for a joint positio~ to react more effectively to a surprise Soviet attack on Iceland or decision on the use of nuclear weapons stored in Britain. To be sure, the the Umted States. In the case of a Soviet invasion, a small contingent of SAC bases in Britain and North Africa would remain the most important ~Y troops were meant to hold the country as long as possible-or until ones for the counteroffensive. But in the case of a conflict with the British ret~force~ents arrived. In wartime, the mission of the fighter planes on the question of the use of SAC base, the Americans wanted to have stattoned m Iceland was to defend Iceland and destroy Soviet bombers access to Iceland.107 enroute to America."' Benediktsson's first reaction to the U.S. request was one of skepticism: One of the questions raised by the Defense Treaty was the use of a government approval would depend on whether it interpreted the project 38 DEFENCE STUDIES 3/1999 DEFENCE STUDIES :1.'1999 39 as a contribution to the defense of Iceland. U.S. Ambassador, Lawson, the party adopted a far more negative stance toward the military presence assured Benediktsson of the exclusively defensive use of the airfield--a than before. Together with the National Defense Party and the Socialist suspect argument because it failed to take into account the offensive role party, it was totally opposed to granting the American additional military of SAC. But in early 1953, a Norwegian General, who had been asked by rights in Iceland. the Icelandic Government to give a third opinion on the American request, These new trends undermined the foreign policy agenda of the Progres recommended the approval of the Rangtirvellir project. To him, it would sive Party and cut into its electoral strength. In the 1953 parliamentary be better to have two airfields instead of one. If the Keflavik Airport would elections, it lost votes to the National Defense Party, which captured 6% of become the target of Soviet attacks, retaliatory strikes could be launched the vote and 2 parliamentary seats. Together with the Independence Party, from the other one. "13 What he failed to stress was that the new airfield which solidified its position as the largest party, the new National Defense served offensive as well as defensive purposes. This raises the question of party was the clear winner. The left-wing of the Progressive Party had whether the General was, in fact, neutral. traditionally been reluctant to permit the peacetime stationing ofU.S. forces The Icelandic Government wanted to make the additional military in Iceland, but for the sake of party unity, it had not challenged the govern facilities conditional on U.S. support for diversifying Iceland's economy. ment on the question of its pro-American foreign policy course.110 But State Department officials were reluctant to make such an obvious link when the Progressives decided---somewhat reluctantly-to revive the between the military and economic questions, fearing that it would set a government coalition with the Independence Party under the premiership of bad precedent. After all, Iceland, which had profited tremendously in 6Iafur Thors, it decided to chart a different foreign policy course than material terms from World War 11, had received more Marshall Aid than pursued by Bjami Benediktsson. From now on, the Americans had to any other country on a per capita basis. But Defense officials wanted to worry about keeping what they already had instead of receiving additional grant the Icelandic wish to facilitate acceptance of the base request. Before military rights. It was not only the leftward drift that influenced the political the issue was resolved, the Icelandic Government decided to postpone any climate, but also the unexpected propulsion of the Soviet Union into the top negotiations on the new airfield for domestic political reasons--the forth rank of Iceland's trading partoers. Since 1948, there had practically been coming parliamentary elections in the summer of 1953.109 This move was no trade relations between the two countries. But the Soviet Union decided inevitable. The opposition to the U.S. military presence had increased to fill the vacuum created by the 1952 British landing ban on Icelandic fish slowly but steadily in 1952 and early 1953. In the fall of 1952, a new party, following the Icelandic decision to extend Iceland's fishery zone from three the National Defense Party, had been formed exclusively for this purpose. to four miles. 111 It signified the revival of nationalism in an organized form--a movement This political realignment greatly undermined the position of the United made up of intellectuals and left-of-center political elements that had been States in Iceland. In December, Kristinn Gudmundsson, the new Foreign mostly dormant since Iceland's entry into NATO. Another bad sign for the Minister, a protege ofHermann J6nasson, the Chairman of the Progressive Americans was the failure offormer Prime Minister Stefan J6hann Party, delivered the first blow by demanding the revision of the Defense Stefansson to retain his position as the chairman of the Social Democratic Agreement. The goal of the Progressi;ves was to seal off the military area in Party. He was defeated in late 1952 by a prominent member of the left Keflavik by erecting a sort of a «Mending WalbH-a fence around it and by wing, Hannibal Valdimarsson---a populist and something of a maverick, imposing far stricter rule on off-base movements.! Moreover, they insisted who exerted much influence within the trade union movement. As a result, on replacing all foreign workers at the base with Icelandic ones and on 40 DEFENCE STUDIES 3,11999 DEFENCE STUDIES 3/1999 41 I, ___ ! ,il' IJI withdrawing the business license of the American contractor, whose labor and political and economic stability had not changed. But the NSC wanted practices had been the source of much criticism in Iceland. Finally, the to do more to counter Soviet influence in Iceland and to encourage more Progressives wanted the Iceland Defense Force to bring construction cooperation among pro-Western Icelandic politicians.114 For this reason, the activities at the base into line with those of other sectors of the economy. United States Information Agency (USIA) invited more political leaders, The rationale for this was to prevent the Iceland Defense Force from artists, trade unionists and journalists to the United States. One target group attracting manpower from other parts of the country and to ease labor were intellectuals, who, like their European counterparts, were traditionally shortages in the seasonal fish processing industry. critical ofAmerican culture and society. Despite the propaganda aim of The bilateral negotiations, which began in the spring of 1954, were long these visits, they often proved to be beneficial to both sides, not least and arduous and put a strain on U.S.-Icelandic relations. The Eisenhower because they led to increased contacts between educational and cultural Administration was prepared to meet some of the Icelandic demands, but it institutions."' was reluctant to do so in others. For one thing, the Americans argued that Efforts to improve U.S. position in Iceland and to combat Communism the erection of a fence to close off the base was bound to lower the morale were also directed at the trade union movement."' In 1948, the Social of the troops and to cause a great deal of resentment. They also doubted Democrats, Independents, and Progressives had wrested control of the that an Icelandic contractor would be in a position to assume the functions Federation in Labor from the Socialists. To buttress the anti-Socialist bloc, of the American one. It was not until the Progressives threatened-indi the Americans partly financed the publication of the Federation ofLabor rectly-to revoke the Defense Agreement that the Americans finally gave official organ, organized visits of trade unionists to the United States, and in. Fearing the worst, they accepted the replacement of the U.S. contractor helped devise political strategies before important trade union elections. In and the erection of a fence around the base. The Eisenhower Administra 1954, however, U.S. policy suffered a major setback, when the Socialists tion did not return empty - handed from the negotia!ions, because it was and the left-wing of the Social Democratic Party joined forces to defeat the allowed to raise the ceiling of the number of its troops from 3,900 to old majority in elections to the Board of the Federation ofLabor. This 6,200. 112 But the Americans did not get their biggest prize: the Rangarvellir occurred shortly after Hannibal Valdimarsson had been defeated in his airfield. When the Icelanders refused, during the negotiations, to discuss reelection bid as Social Democratic Party chairman.117 The < 42 DEFENCE STUDIES ~1999 DEFENCE STUDIES 311999 43 argument to resist U.S. and NAlD requests for additional military rights in bower Administration decided to side-step U.S. laws, stipulating the Iceland. imposition of countervailing duties on fish products from subsidized fish The Americans realized, of course, that propaganda measures alone industries like that oflceland.122 What was more, Eisenhower personally would not change Icelandic public opinion on the base question. Economic introduced the idea of buying up the entire Icelandic fish production and to inducements might also help. Ironically, coinciding with the slide in Ameri give it away to poor countries as a humanitarian gesture. This proposal can popularity from 1953 to 1955, Iceland was reaping enormous eco was never implemented, however, because it was feared that it would set a nomic benefits from the base. Indeed, the suspension of Marshal! Aid in bad precedent and open a floodgate of similar requests from other coun 1953 had no impact on the Icelandic economy because of the military tries.!'' Second, the Americans offered to finance the construction of a construction activity at the Keflavik. What amounted to a new industry cement factory in Iceland-a project that the World Bank had refused to was created during this period-an industry that the Icelanders profited underwrite, because the factory was supposed to be government-owned. from without investing a penny. It has been calculated that the purchasing The rationale for this action was not only to improve the U.S. position in power in Iceland jumped 13% in 1953-1954 because of the base rev Iceland but also to forestall the acceptance of a Soviet loan offer. 124 The enues."' Beneath the surface, however, there were deep problems. For one Icelandic Government received the bulk of the loan in the spring of 1956. thing, the base economy increased inflationary pressures that led to easy But since these measures were too modest and came too late, they failed to credit, excessive investments, and an unstable labor market. Since the improve the U.S. position in Iceland or to stabilize the center-right coalition Icelandic Government was also to blame for its lax economic policies, it government. would have been possible to isolate the base economy. But the Icelanders were not keen on such schemes. They did not want to be deprived of the benefits of the base, even if they wanted to control the pace of construction activity. The net result of these economic changes was a long general strike in the spring of 1955, which effectively sealed the fate of the center-right coalition government between the Progressive Party and the Independence Party. 120 Adding an ironic twist to the story, the Eisenhower Administration unwittingly facilitated this domestic political reconfiguration by refusing to slow down the construction program at the base. By doing so, the Americans expressly violated one of the main tenets of the Marshall Plan-the need to keep inflation in check. State Department officials were aware of this contradiction and tried to address the problem. But their colleagues at the Pentagon were fixed on the military aspects of the base economy at the exclusion of all others. 121 As a last ditch effort to reverse their fortunes in Iceland, the Americans did two things to assist the Icelandic Government in the economic sphere. First, on the initiative of Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, the Eisen- DEFENCE STUDIES 3/1999 44 DEfENCE STUDIES 3,'1999 45 struction at Keflavik pending the outcome of the negotiations over the base. A Political Challenge to Iceland's West This move was bound to have a major· economic impact, because the base revenues accounted for almost I 0% of Iceland's national income and 20% ern Integration, 1956-1958 of its foreign currency receipts.128 Understandably, this type of economic warfare did not sit well with the Progressives and Social Democrats. Foreign Minister Kristinn Gudmundsson accused the Americans of inter Since the end of the 1940s, the dream of the chairman of the Progressive fering in Icelandic domestic politics by supporting the Independence Party, Hermann J6nasson, had been to form a left-of-center electoral Party. 129 While there was no collusion between the Americans and the alliance with the Social Democratic Party as a counterweight to the Inde Independents, 130 it was self-evident that the Eisenhower Administration was pendence Party. 125 It was not until 1955, however, that the two parties felt in favor of the only party that supported the Defense Treaty. But its efforts strong enough to combine forces, paving the way, in the spring of 1956, to assist it in the election campaign by indirect means were unsuccessful. for the formation of an electoral alliance-the < ! the Defense Treaty. To drive home the point, it decided to cease all con- Fear>> received 34%, and the Popular Alliance about 19%. Capturing only ! .lil 1'1 DEFENCE STUDIES 3(1999 DEFENCE STUDIES 311999 47 '·' 46 ! '.1.'11 '! i I ,,,IJ 4,5%, the National Defense Party lost both of its seats.133 But American evoked until NATO had given its opinion. As was to be expected, NATO relief over the failure ofthe «Alliance of Fear>> to achieve absolute major strongly recommended, in an opinion largely drafted by the Americans, that ity-and over the defeat of the National Defense Party-soon turned into U.S. forces be allowed to stay in Iceland. But the Icelandic Government disappointment. Despite its impressive showing, the Independence Party seemed to be bent on charting a different foreign policy course.'" From had become isolated in Icelandic politics."' The strong third place finish of the U.S. perspective, the only hope rested with the new Icelandic Foreign the Socialist-Valdimarsson ticket made it possible for Hermann J6nasson to Minister, Gudmundur i. Gudmundsson, and other members of the right form a left-wing government, comprising the Progressives, the Social wing of the Social Democratic Party, including the President of Iceland, Democrats, and the Popular Alliance. The main foreign policy plank of Asgeir Asgeirsson. Most of them were deeply skeptical of the A/thing what was to become known as the «Leftist Government» was to imple resolution and worked toward achieving a compromise with the Ameri ment the A/thing resolution on the cancellation of the Defense Agreement. cans. According to one plan, the Iceland Defense Force would leave the The news from Iceland came as a great shock to Washington. The country but U.S. and NATO planes and troops would be stationed at the Eisenhower Administration could hardly believe that for the first time in the Keflavik base on a rotation basis.139 Initially, the Americans did not respond history of the Atlantic Alliance, a member government included pro favorably to such overtures, for they wanted to avoid as much contact Moscow Socialists. The mood in NATO's headquarters in Paris was with the «Leftist Government>> as possible."' But in September, they equally gloomy. In conjunction with NATO's Secretary General, Lord abandoned their rigid position, sensing a willingness on the part of the lsmay, the Icelandic Permanent Representative even stopped sending Social Democrats and Progressives to fmd a solution acceptable to both confidential documents to Iceland out of fear that they would land in sides and to achieve a split in the Popular Alliance. 141 Moreover, their Socialist hands. This decision caused a crisis in Iceland's relations with bargaining position had strengthened because of the inability of the Icelan NATO. The Progressives and Social Democrats reacted angrily. After dic Government to receive foreign loans to finance its ambitious economic making it clear to NATO that they were in full control of Iceland's foreign plan. policy and that the ministers of the Popular Alliance would be barred from When the «Leftist Government>> took office in late August, it did not ,:! viewing the documents, they demanded full access to them. But when expect the Eisenhower Administration to provide it with large-scale eco NATO--on U.S. insistence-refused to resume the document transfers to nomic assistance because of its foreign policy agenda. The Progressives Iceland, Prime Minister Hermann J6nasson threatened to leave NATO «in and Social Democrats, however, put their bets on the West Germans one hour,» if this policy would not be lifted. Faced with this prospect, because of the loan offer to Olafur Thors before the elections. Prime NATO finally gave in and met the Icelandic demand at the end of Septem Minister, Hermann J6nasson, wasted no time and sent former Foreign ber. Still, Iceland did not receive top-level strategic-military plans during the Minister, Kristinn Gudmundsson, to Bonn to start negotiations on the loan. i i 1950s and 1960s. 135 NATO could point to the lack of an adequate security Yet, since Adenauer had wanted to reward the Independence Party for its il system in Iceland, 136 and for this reason, COSMIC documents were not pro-Western course, Kristinn Gudmundsson 's efforts met with no success. forwarded. 137 This situation did not change until the late 1960s, when new When the «Leftist Government>> turned to France, it received a similar I ' security measures were implemented in Iceland for the purpose of treatment. The French-and other NATO..governments-agreed with the receiving confidential documents. Americans about the undesirability of granting economic concessions As stipulated in the Defense Treaty, the cancellation clause could not be before the settlement of the base issue.142 Despite this setback, the 48 DEfENCE STUDIES 3119!19 l:lEFENCE STl.JOIES a-'1999 49 Progressives and Social Democrats resisted Socialist calls for receiving Soviets had given oral assurances of a large loan on advantageous terms, economic assistance from the Soviet Union. Since the barter trade with the the Progressives and Social Democrats, decided to use this offer to Soviet Bloc represented already about 35% oflceland's total trade volume strengthen their bargaining position vis-a-vis the Americans. They sug (the comparable figures for other Western nations were 3-4%), they feared gested that the Icelandic Government would be hard pressed to accept the that closer ties with it would have negative political as well as economic Soviet offer, if U.S. aid would not be forthcoming. 145 The Americans were consequences. For this reason, the Progressives and Social Democrats sensitive to see-saw politics--attempts to play the United States and the saw no other alternative than to ask the Eisenhower Administration for Soviet Union against each other. But they were equally worried about the economic assistance. 143 implications of Iceland's dependence on Communist economic aid for the The U.S. and Icelandic governments decided to hold preliminary talks continued operation of the base. Therefore, on October 25, Herbert Hoo on the defense issue in early October in Washington. The Icelandic Gov ver, handed Vilhjalmur Th6r an aide-memo ire designed to solve both the ernment wanted to achieve two goals: to reach a modus vivendi on the military and economic questions. It entailed a quid pro quo: economic aid in defense question and to receive economic aid. In the first meeting with exchange for continued military rights. The Americans were willing to John Foster Dulles, Acting Foreign Minister, Emil J6nsson, expressed his grant an emergency loan of$3 million before the conclusion of the defense desire for a compromise, hinting that a solution could be found somewhere negotiations. But they insisted that the deal would depend on a < 50 DEFENCE STUDIES 3/1999 DEFENCE STUDIES 311999 51 served no other function than to ratifY the status quo ante. But as a sign of I 956, the Progressives and Social Democrats felt that they could hardly their gratitude, the Americans reaffirmed their secret pledge from October turn down the Soviet offer, if Western countries would not come to the 25 to provide the Icelandic Government with economic aid.i49 The leaders rescue. Indeed, in the spring of 1957, the Soviets renewed their oral pledge of the opposition Independent Party, former Prime Minister 6Iafur Thors to provide a $25 million loan to be repaid in Icelandic fish.t'2 and former Foreign Minister, Bjarni Benediktsson, reacted by accusing the The Social Democrats and Progressives wanted to exhaust all other government of treating the security oflceland as a barter item. They also means before turning to the East bloc. After intimating that they would vented their anger at the Americans for,propping up a left-wing govern have to resort to inflationary financing of the projects, they began pressing ment that included pro-Moscow Communists.150 The Eisenhower Adminis the West Germans and British for economic aid. Both governments were tration was fully aware of this irony and had been divided on the question willing to grant government guarantees for short-term loans with market of providing the government with financial aid. But in the end, strategic interest rates. But the Icelanders were seeking large long term loans with considerations--the need to maintain the military presenctl--{)utweighed low interests--in short, political loans. 153 When the Americans decided to ideological concerns about the spread of Communism. honor their part of the bargain in connection with the settlement of the Although the Icelandic Government denied that there were any links defense issue, the Social Democrats and Progressives saw this as a small between the defense and economic questions, it was determined to let the step in the right direction. The U.S. provided the Icelandic Government Americans make good on their promise to provide economic aid. In with a $5 million loan for the Sag project and a $2.2 million PL-480 loan on January 1957, Vilhjalmur Th6r asked for a $40 million loan to fmance the very generous terms in line with the October 25 aid-memoire.I" government's economic plan. In the October 25 aide-memoire, the The main purpose of the aid-memoire was to facilitate the negotiations Eisenhower Administration had only agreed to provide emergency aid of $3 on the base question, but it was also meant to make sure that the Icelandic million together with an unspecified amount to cover the foreign exchange Government would not receive a Soviet loan. In late spring 1957, the costs of the Sag project estimated at $5 million and a modest PL-480 loan Americans felt that the Sag and PL-480 loans were insufficient to prevent to finance the buying of U.S. agricultural surplus goods. The Americans Iceland from slipping further into the Soviet economic orbit. For one thing, had made it clear that it would depend, to a large extent, on the soundness Einar Olgeirsson was actively working on a plan to force the Icelandic of the government's economic policies whether additional aid would be Government to accept Soviet economic assistance. One of its features was . forthcoming.ISI to have the Soviets finance the construction of 12 fishing vessels in East When the Social Democrats and Progressives realized that the govern Germany with a $3 million loan. Adding a twist to the plot, Olgeirsson ment could only expect a fraction of what it sought in U.S. economic aid, received the permission of Otto Grotewohl, the East German Prime Minis they had great difficulty fignring out their next move. Despite the exhorta ter, to have the Socialist Minister of Fisheries, Ludvik J6sepsson, sign the tions of the Socialist leader Einar Olgeirsson, they were still opposed to loan document in East Berlin. Two things would be gained by this scheme: turning to the Soviets for economic assistance. They knew that it could on the one hand, Communist economic assistance would bolster the spoil their chances of receiving Western loans and stymie efforts to mod position of the Popular Alliance within the Icelandic Government. On the ernize the Icelandic economy, whose reliance on export subsidies, barter other, the signing ceremony would constitute an important step toward the trade, currency controls, and import restrictions had much in common de jure recognition of the German Democratic Republic-a move ada with the command economies of Eastern Europe. But like in the fall of mantly opposed by the West Germans. 155 52 DEFENCE STUDIES 3/1999 DEFENCE STUDIES 311999 53 Sensing that the loan question could turn into a Soviet Cold War victory, Americans immediately supported the proposal. The British reiterated their the Eisenhower Administration suggested that the Icelandic Government opposition, but they did not try to block it, not least because they were the discuss its economic problems at a NATO-forum. Some Icelandic cabinet only ones who were holding back. It was decided that several member ministers had already broached this possibility, but the Americans were nations, including the Americans, West Germans, Danes, Norwegians, and probably instrumental in persuading the Progressives and Social Democrats Canadians would share the burden of providing the loan. 158 to act on it. On July I, 1957, Iceland's Permanent Delegate to NATO An intervention by the Icelandic Government, however, threatened to submitted a letter to the new Secretary General, Paul-Henri Spaak, request unravel the deal. The Progressives and Social Democrats insisted that no ing economic assistance from NATO. Citing recent Soviet loan offers of more than three NATO-countries take part in the loan. Because economic $25 million and $3 million respectively, the Icelandic Government argued aid of this sort would require parliamentary approval in several NATO that it would be deplorable if Western countries would not counter Soviet countries, they wanted to avoid an open discussion about Iceland's eco intentions of taking advantage oflceland's economic problems and under nomic problems abroad. Domestic political considerations were also mine its commitment to the Western Alliance. undoubtedly part of the reason. The Independence Party could exploit the The Icelandic Government stated that it was only seeking normal issue by renewing its charge that the government was using the security of commercial credits, but the letter showed that it had political loans in Iceland as a bargaining chip to extract economic concessions. 159 In the mind.156 Spaak reacted sympathetically to the request, arguing that it served end, the Americans and West Germans were the only ones who provided the purpose of expanding the cooperation ofNATO-members in other than the loan. A third member could not be found, because ultimately other military areas. Adopting a similar stance, the Americans declared their member states wanted to avoid participation if possible to save money. The willingness to provide part of the loan on the condition that the Icelandic U.S.loan of$5 million was granted in December 1957,160 but the West Government put its economic house in order and take steps to reduce its German loan of$2 million in April1958. The price for this uneven mixture dependence on the Soviet market. Other NATO-members such as Den of charity and self-interest was a promise made by the Icelandic Govern mark, Norway, Italy and Canada also viewed the request positively. The ment in writing that it would reject the Soviet loan offer as a sign of good British, however, were adamantly opposed to granting any special favors to faith.'" the Icelanders. Arguing that NATO was not established to serve as a banking institution, they added that it would set a bad precedent to offer one member something that others could not expect to have. The West Germans were also skeptical of providing direct economic aid to Iceland, although their opposition was not as vociferous as that of the British. m Spaak freely admitted that there was no economic rationale for provid ing the Icelanders with assistance. But to him, it was imperative that NATO resort to a «political rescue operation>> to prevent the Soviets from exploit ing Iceland's economic problems. In an unprecedented move in the history of the Western Alliance, he recommended a long-term loan of $9 million with low interest rates. Together with several other European members, the 54 DEFENCE STUDIES 311999 DEFENCE SlUJIES 3(1999 55 Americans and other NATO-members had persuaded the Icelandic Govern The Stabilization of U.S.-Icelandic Rela ment to wait for the outcome of the Law of the Sea Conference at Geneva in the spring of 1958 before resorting to any unilateral measures."' But tions, 1959-1960 since the Conference was unable to agree on a universal formula on territorial waters and fishery zones, the Socialist Minister of Fisheries, LUdvik J6sepsson, succeeded in pressuring his cabinet colleagues into For strategic reasons, the Americans had decided to strengthen a left-wing issuing the regulation. When it took effect on September I, 1958, the government to maintain their military presence and to reduce Soviet British not only refused to honor it but sent war ships to Iceland to protect influence in Iceland. The first test oflceland's Western commitment came their fishing boats within the 12-mile zone--a move that sparked a «Cod in late 1957 and early 1958, when Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin submit War» between Iceland and Britain. ted two letters to Prime Minister Hermann J6nasson, containing proposals The United States was in a very delicate situation in the crisis. Gripped for postponing nuclear tests, the creation of a nuclear free zone in Central by nationalistic fervor, Icelanders of all stripes were enraged, when the Europe, and a non-aggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Eisenhower Administration prevented the adoption of a proposal at the Law In the first letter, Bulganin stated his willingness to guarantee the neutrality of the Sea Conference that would have sanctioned Iceland's action.164 The of Iceland on the condition that all foreign troops be removed from it. In Americans knew that if the British would use violent force within the 12- the second one, the Soviet leader intimated that Iceland was in grave mile zone, it could easily lead to Iceland's withdrawal from NATO and to danger because the United States had the capability of stationing atomic the abrogation of the Defense Agreement with the United States. Therefore, weapons in Iceland. These letters were modeled on similar ones submitted the Eisenhower Administration tried to maintain a position of neutrality in to the prime ministers of the other Western states in response to the the fishery dispute, even if it was against the unilateral Icelandic decree. It decision-made at the NATO-meeting in December 1957-to create a was understandably worried about the potential consequences of the British NATO nuclear stockpile and to consider the possibility of stationing inter decision to send war ships to Iceland.165 But persistent U.S. efforts to bring mediate nuclear missiles in member countries. J6nasson replied to about a peaceful resolution of the dispute within NATO failed in 1958. It Bulganin's overtures by stating that the U.S. military base was for defense was not until the spring of 1960 that the British agreed to cease fishing purposes only and that there were no plans to store nuclear weapons in inside the 12-mile zone as a goodwill gesture before the another Law of the Iceland.162 This forceful response was, of course, welcomed by the Sea conference that things calmed down. But when the conference failed Americans and showed how far the Icelandic Government had moved to produce an agreement and the British hinted that they would resume away from its initial stance on the U.S. military presence in 1956. their naval protection. Bjarni Benediktsson, the architect oflceland's NATO The second test oflceland's Western orientation involved a far more membership, even threatened to leave the Western Alliance in an informal explosive issue with potentially wide-ranging implications for Iceland's conversation with the U.S. Ambassador in Iceland. The threat was relations with the United States and NATO: the fishery dispute with Britain. probably intended to improve Iceland's bargaining position in the fishery Only a month after the Icelanders received the West German NATO-loan, dispute. The Americans, however, took it seriously and urged the British to they triggered a crisis within the Alliance by declaring their intention of show restraint. It is not known whether the British decision not to unilaterally expanding Iceland's fishery limit from 4 to 12 miles. The intervene within the 12-mile zone was influenced by Benediktsson's threat 56 DEFENCE STUDIES 311999 DEFENCE STUDIES 3/1999 57 or U.S. pressure. But in the summer of 1960s, boths sides showed tionship. The government managed to keep public discussion on defense to willingness to negotiative a deal. This paved the way for an eventual a minimum in its effort to avoid another domestic political showdown over settlement of the dispute in 1961. The British recognized the 12-mile zone the American military presence. in return for fishing rights within it for three years.166 Since this was a clear A case in point was a plan to reduce the U.S. military presence in victory for the Icelanders, they stopped considering the option of leaving Iceland. Already in 1957, the Defense Department had recommended NATO because of the British show of force. with President Eisenhower's support-the withdrawal of army forces What facilitated the solution of the fishery dispute was the downfall of from Iceland as a cost-cutting measure.167 Instead, it wanted to provide the «Leftist Government>> in 1958. Disagreements over economic policy Iceland with NIKE and HAWK anti-aircraft missile systems with nuclear destroyed the first leftist experiment in Icelandic politics since the founding warheads. This would not have meant a major realignment ofU.S. military of the Icelandic Republic. Despite verbal commitment to NATO to under structure in Iceland: about 4,000 Air Force and Navy personnel would take economic reform based on the recommendation of the IMF or OEEC, remain in Iceland. But the measure was bound to be sensitive, because the the < 58 DEFENCE STUDIES 3/19119 DEFENCE STUDIES 3/1999 59 unlikely that Iceland would have accepted the NIKE missiles, for it would remarkably few cases of civil-military friction. almost certainly have led to a political crisis and to the downfall of the The most important strategic change at the Keflavik Base occurred in government. To be sure, Iceland had no firm policy on nuclear weapons. 1961, when the Air Force relinquished control of the base to the Navy. m In Premier Hermann J6nasson's response to the Bulganin overture, he did Due to improved aircraft and missile technology, the base became less not rule out the stationing of nuclear weapons in Iceland. But like the important for the Air Force, which did not have to rely on intermediate Danes and the Norwegians, who voiced their skepticism ofU.S. and staging areas on the transatlantic route anymore. The strategic value of NATO's increasing reliance on nuclear weapons by adopting the policy of Iceland for the Navy was obvious. It was impossible to control the North not allowing the stationing of such weapons on Danish and Norwegian soil, Atlantic exit for submarines from the north of the Soviet Union except the Icelanders were very sensitive about their use. The United States, it through the Icelandic straits. This also entailed a functional change: the turned out, stored similar types ofNIKE missiles at its Thule Base in headquarters of the Barrier Forces of the U.S. Atlantic were moved to Greenland between 1959 and 1965 to those it planned to station in Iceland. Keflavik from Argentia, Newfoundland. The purpose was to extend the This was only revealed for the first time in 1995 and the decision was Distant Early Warning System to the GIUK (Greenland, Iceland, UK) line to made with the explicit approval of the Danish Prime Minister, H.C. Hansen. provide an earlier warning time in the event of a Soviet air attack on the 172 It was, of course, in clear violation of the Danish non-nuclear policy But North American Continent. It meant more emphasis on anti-submarine since the Americans never discussed their nuclear plans with Icelandic activities between Greenland and the Faroes.178 Despite Socialist protests, officials, they had no impact on bilateral relations. Instead, the Americ~s there was little public opposition to the change. Indeed, except for minor decided to rely on a significant deployment of ground forces to Iceland m irritants, the relations between Iceland and the United States during the 12- an emergency. m As it happened, the decision to withdraw the forces was year tenure of the Reconstruction Government proved to be very good. It postponed twice because of political developments that could reopen the was not until 1971 that the American military presence was challenged defense question-the escalating «Cod War» between Iceland and the again. Following a similar domestic political reconfiguration that took place 174 United Kingdom and the Icelandic parliamentary elections in 1959. It was in 1956, a «Leftist Government» renewed the demand for the withdrawal not until 1959 that the troops left without any adverse publicity in Ice- ofU.S. forces from Iceland. But like in 1956, it failed to make good on its land.'" promise and was brought down by internal squabbling. The long-term Another issue, however, threatened to do much harm to U.S.-lcelandic result was another period of stability in U.S.-Icelandic defense relations-a relations. In the fall of 1959, a series of incidents involving Iceland Defense period that wituessed no major disruptions despite escalating East-West Force personnel disrupted U.S.-Icelandic relations. The incidents tensions in the early 1980s, the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe in themselves were not serious, involving illegal fishing, prisoners' escape, 1989, and the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. and jurisdictional conflicts between the Icelandic and U.S. police at Keflavik. But they received banner headlines and sensationalist press coverage. The Icelandic Government responded by insisting that the U.S. withdraw its new IDF Commander at the base, who had only been there for seven weeks.'" Whether it was for this action or not, the incidents stopped and tensions soon eased. In the following years, there were DEFENCE STUDIES 3/1999 60 DEFENCE STUDIES 3/1999 61 governments received military and economic security in return for granting the Americans base rights. Conclusion This is not to deny that the United States had considerable political and economic leverage vis-a-vis Iceland. The U.S. decision to cease construc tion activity at the base in the wake of the A/thing resolution in 1956 and to The dual strategic role of Iceland in U.S. military planning remained fairly pressure the Western Europeans to refrain from extending loans to the constant from the end of World War 11 to the middle of the 1950s. It had «Leftist Govemmenb> undoubtedly contributed to the softening of the greater potential offensive value for the United States than any other area Icelandic position on the defense question. But this worked both ways. By short of England and the area encompassing North Africa and the Middle denying the Americans a long-term base lease in 1946, by making the East, and was second only to Greenland for defensive purposes. In Soviet peacetime absence of foreign troops a precondition for NATO membership hands, the Americans calculated, Iceland would pose a direct threat to the in 1949, and by resisting U.S. requests for a SAC base in Iceland in 1953- security of the United States. Although U.S. military planners envisioned 1954, the Icelanders managed to restrain U.S. military ambitions. The the use of Iceland for strategic air operations in wartime, they were never Icelanders were also extremely skillful in extracting economic aid from the able to achieve their goal of establishing a SAC base there. In accordance Americans, receiving almost $70 million in grants and loans between 1948 with Icelandic wishes, the peacetime mission of the base reflected a and 1960. In addition, the annual base revenues amounted to $12-15 million defensive posture. The advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles and sea from 1954 to 1960-or about 15-20% of Iceland's foreign currency launched intermediate missiles in the late 1950s further reduced the impor receipts. Despite record fish catches, Iceland would never have experi tance of Iceland for the Strategic Air Command. But it continued to be a enced, 1952-1957, an average annual rise in national income of about 11% key link in air and sea communications between the United States and without U.S. development loans and base revenues. The same applies to Europe as well as in the Early Warning system. By the end of the decade, it the modernization process: domestic savings accounted for only a part of had also become an important base for anti-submarine operations in an investment program that equalled about 35% of GNP in 1957. But this connection with the establishment of the Greenland, Iceland, UK sea-air was the price, the Americans paid for political and economic stability, for barrier. their military presence, and for containing Soviet influence in Iceland. One American conceptions of «national security» entailed more than such can, indeed, argue that Iceland benefited from two «Marshall Plans.» strategic calculations. It also meant defending what Melvyn Leftler has Despite huge war profits, it received about $38 million in Marshall Aid I termed «core values». Thus political and economic stability would not only from the Americans between 1948 and 1953, more than any other Euro help maintain U.S. military presence at Keflavik but also lessen the appeal pean country in relative terms. And after a hiatus of two years, the United of Communist ideology in Iceland. U.S. economic aid for Icelandic devel States granted Iceland $34 million from 1956 to 1960---the «Leftist opment projects and military plans to deal with internal subversion were Govemmenb> $20 million and the «Reconstruction Government» $14 r, part and parcel of this Cold War strategy. But the United States would million in direct or indirect aid to assist in its efforts to "westernize" the ·.. ···.·1' ,,' never have been able to project its power and influence into Iceland with economy. This economic aid served the same goal as the original Marshall out some kind of receptivity and reciprocity on the part of the Icelanders. Plan: to ensure economic and political stability and to stave off Communist The U.S. presence was, indeed, an «empire by invitation.» Icelandic encroachments. And this time, it worked: the economic reforms adopted 62 DEFENCE STUDIES 311999 DEFENCE STUDIES :?/1999 63 j by the «Reconstruction Government>> in 1959-1960, effectively reversed United States. To the Icelanders, the need to maintain their cultural and the trend toward increased dependence on the barter trade with the Com national identity was considered as important as physical security, except munist bloc and paved the way for a period of stability in U.S.-Icelandic during international emergencies. Although Bjarni Benediktsson genuinely relations, which lasted throughout the decade. believed that the Icelandic police was unprepared to handle potential Although Icelandic politicians had forged far stronger personal and political disturbances, he believed that the U.S. military presence would political relationships with Scandinavia and Western Europe than with the deter the Socialists from attempting a coup. 180 The Americans, on the other United States, many shared American suspicions of Communist intentions. hand, falsely interpreted his concerns about internal security as an exhorta Because of Socialist participation in the «Innovation Government,>> these tion to develop unilateral military plans to deal with such a contingency ideological ties were not cemented right away. Indeed, outside events-the both before and after the conclusion of the Defense Treaty. Compounding Czech coup and the Korean War-proved to be the catalyst for the conver the issue was the bureaucratic clash between the State Department and the gence of U.S. and Icelandic security interests. The Icelanders themselves Defense Department on the question of a U.S. role in quelling potential I', initiated discussions about the use of the Keflavik Agreement for defensive Socialist disturbances. purposes in 1948 and about the invitation of foreign troops in 1950. Of This leads to the question of domestic political opposition to Iceland's course, the Americans had been seeking to establish a military presence in policy of Western integration. During this period, the Socialist position was Iceland since World War 11. But that the normally cautious and passive the only consistent element in the Icelandic response to U.S. interests in Icelanders showed some initiative in both cases reflected a sense of Iceland. But the Socialists were never able to flex their muscle without the vulnerability and insecurity. While the main source of this threat perception support of neutralist and nationalistic elements within the Social Demo were international developments, it was reinforced by the large Soviet cratic Party and the Progressive Party. The arrival of the Iceland Defense fishing fleet near Iceland. Finally, Iceland would undoubtedly never have Force in 1951 was a good case in point: in the absence of the coalescence abandoned its traditional policy of neutrality without the leadership of such of these forces, resistance was both muted and weak. In 1946, 1949, and internationalist and pro-Western politicians as Bjarni Benediktsson and 1956, in contrast, these diverse elements could, with far more effective Stefan J6hann Stefansson. ness, rally around specific goals such as neutralism, cultural nationalism, or But convergence was also accompanied by cultural diffurences and the rejection of the U.S. military presence. Only in 1956 did this movement misunderstandings. The Americans viewed Communism as a constant temporarily manage to reverse Iceland's policy on the presence ofU.S. threat to Icelandic security and pushed for measures aimed at eliminating troops. Despite the failures of the Icelandic Left to curtail drastically the Socialist capability of internal subversion. The Icelanders, on the other defense relationship with the United States, it played an important func hand, were far more inclined to reassess their security policies in terms of tional role in the debate over Iceland's place within the Atlantic Alliance. domestic and international developments. To be sure, Bjarni Benediktsson Indeed, domestic political criticisms had a constraining influence on and Hermann J6nasson had publicly broached the idea, in early 1953, of Iceland's foreign policy. Thus, when the three-party coalition government establishing a National Guard for internal and external purposes. But this contemplated the question ofjoining NATO, it was forced to make Ice «trial balloon>> received limited public backing and was shelved. 179 This was land's commitment contingent upon the lowest common denominator: the as much a reflection of a different psychology and cultural experience. The absence of military forces in peacetime. Similarly, domestic political concept of < 64 OE;FENCE STUDIES ~1999 DEFENCE STUDIES ~1999 65 Party and the Federation of Labor coupled with the electoral success of the Notes National Defense Party-were important in thwarting U.S. plans to expand its military presence in Iceland. 1Robert Frost, «Mending Wall.» in EdwaniConnery Lathem (ed). The Poetry of The history ofU.S.-Icelandic relations in the 1940s and 1950s is full of Robert Frost (New YorA; Chicago, and San Francisco. I969). pp. 33-34. surprises. Despite the adoption of cultural and economic programs de 7See Melvyn P. Lejjler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the signed to stem the leftward drift in Icelandic politics, the Americans Truman Doctrine, and the Cold Wax (Stanford. I992),p. 2. 1 unwittingly facilitated the formation of the «Leftist Government>> by failing John Lewis Gaddis, «The Insecurities of Victory: The United States and the Perception ofthe Soviet Threat after World War /f.» in The Long Peace: Inquiries to slow down the construction program at Keflavik Airport. Equally into the History of the Cold Wax (New YorA; I987), p. 27.. unexpected was the decision of the United States and NATO to come to the "See Melvyn P. Lejj/er, «National Security and U.S. Foreign Policy,» in idem and economic rescue of the «Leftist Government>> that included pro-Moscow Davld S Patiner (eds.), Origins of the Cold Wax: An International History Socialists in an attempt to safeguard broader Cold War interests .. Con (London and New YorA; I994), pp. I 7-20. .I versely, it is ironic that the «Leftist Government,» whose aim was to 'Thor Whitehead, «Leidinfra hlutleysi I945-I949» [/'he Abandonment of reduce Iceland's reliance on the United States, should have ended up Icelandic Neutrality, I945-I949], Saga. 37 (I99I), 105-I20; idem., «Lydveldi og herstodvar I 94I-I 946» [/'he Republic and the Military Bases, I 94I- I 946], becoming more dependent on it than most since the end of World War Il. Sklmir, I 50 (I976), I26-I7I; «St6rveldin og lfoiveldid I94I-I944,» [/'he Big The result was another domestic political realignment in Icelandic politics: Pawersandthe Republic, I94I-I944], Skirnir,l47 (I973), 202-241. See also the formation of the coalition government between the Independent Party Whitehead~ recent survey In English: ,The Ally Wbo Came in from the Cold: A and the Social Democratic Party. The defeat of the Left-both politically Survey oflcelandic Foreign Policy 1946-1956 (Reykjavik, .1998). and economically-greatly strengthened the U.S. position at the expense of 'E/far Lojlsson, Island i NATO~ partiema och forsvaxsfh\gan [Iceland in that of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the success of the economic program of NATO: The Political Parties and the Defonse Question], Doctoral Dissertation (Gotheuburg, I98I). See also idem., «The Disguised Threat Iceland during the the Reconstruction Government was made possible by the failures of its Cold War.» Scandinavian Journal of History, 10 (1985), 226-238. See also predecessor. The collapse of the «Leftist Government>> weakened the Fridrik Haukur Hal/sson, HerstMin. Felagslegt umbverfi og lslenskt thjodllf Socialist Party and led to a rapid decline in tjte barter trade with the Soviet [/'he Military Base: Social Errvironment and the Icelandic Way ofLife] (Akureyri, Union and Eastern Europe. Thus the tenure of the < DEFENCE STUDIES 3/1999 66 DEfENCE STUDIES :1.'1999 67 Endunninningar [Memoirs], 11 (Rey/gavi/c, 1964). Richard R Lau and David Sears (ede.), Political Cognition (Hil/sdale, 1986); 8See Valur Ingimundarson, «Ahrifbandarisks.fftirmagns ti stefnubreytingu Richard Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics vinstri stjOrnarinnar i varnarmtilum tiriO 1956» [American Financial Leverage (Princeton, 1979). and the Decision ofthe «Leftist Government» to Abandon its Policy ofExpe/ling usee Michael J. Hogan, «Corporatism: A Positive Reappraisal,» Diplomatic U.S. Troops from Iceland in 1956]; Winfried Heinemann, «Die NATO und History 10 (Fal/1986), 363-72. See also Thomas J. McCormic/c, «Drift or Island Kommunistische Regierungsbeteiligung und StUtzpunktfrage» [NATO and Mastery? A Corporatist Synthesis for American Diplomatic History.» Reviews in Iceland: Communist Government Participation and the Military Base Question}, American History 10 (December 1982), 318-330. See also Michael J. Hogan, Militlirgeschichte, ill, 2 (1993), 6-13. For an overview ofIcelandic foreign policy The Marsh all Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, during the 1940s and 1950s, see Ntur Thorsteinsson, Utanrfkisthj6nusta Islands 1947-1952 (Cambridge, New York, 1987). og utanrikisma.I [The Icelandic Foreign Service and Foreign Policy], 1-/JI 15As for the economic aspects ofEuropean revisionism, see A/an S. Milward, The (Reykjavik I 992); Benedikt Grondal, Orlog islands [The Fate ofIceland] Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, (Reykjavik, 1991); andThOrarinn Thrirarinsson, S6kn og sigrar. Saga 1984); and Wemer Abelshauser. «Hilfo und Selbsthi/fe. Zur Funktion des Frams6knarflokksins 1916-1976 [Fighting for Victories: The History ofthe Marshal/plans beim westdeutschen Wiederaujbau, » Vierteljahrshefte :tnr Progressive Party, 1916-1976], II-III (Reykjavik, 1986-1987). See also Albert Zeitgeschichte, 37, 1 (January, 1989), 85-Il3. Coinciding with the opentngofthe Jrinsson, Iceland, NATO, and the Keflavik Base (Rey/gavi/c, 1989) Bjorn British archives, several British historians have sought to maximize Britain S role Bjarnason, «Iceland~ Security Policy,» in C. Bertram and J.J. Hoist, New in the Cold War, in general, and in determining U.S. policies, in particular: See, Strategic Factors in the North Atlantic (Guildford, 1977); Geir Lundestad, for example, Fraser J. Harbutt, The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War (New York, 1980). Origins of the Cold War (New York. 1986); and Donald Cameron Watt, Succeed 9See Melvyn P. Lefl/er. «National Security» in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G ing John Bull: America in Britain's Place, 1900-1975 (Cambridge, England, Paterson. Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations (Cambridge, 1984). The «revisionist» views have been challenged by both American and 1991), p. 203; see also idem, A Preponderance of Power, and, «National Security European scholars. See, for example, Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: and U.S. Foreign Policy,» in idem and David S Patiner (eds.), Origins of the America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952; and Cold War: An International History, pp. 15-52. Geir Lundestad, «Moralism, Presentism, Exceptionalism, Provincialism, and 10Geir Lundestad «Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, Other Extravagances in American Writings on the Early Cold War Years,» 1945-1952,» in Charles Maier (ed.), The Cold War in Europe: Era of a Divided Diplomatic History, 13, 4 (Fall 1989), 527-545. Continent (New York, 1991), pp. 143-165; see also idem, The American «Em 16See Sally Marks, «The World According to Washington,» Diplomatic History, pire» and Other Studies of US Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective 11, 3 (Summer 1987), 265-282. (Oxford, New York. 1990). "National Archives [NA] Washington, D. C. and Maryland, Record Group [RG] 11See P. Melvyn Leffler, «New Approaches, Old Interpretations, and Prospective 84, Confidential File, Box 2: Report (Berte/ Kuniholm), «Arrival and First Reconfigurations,» Diplomatic History, 19, 2 (Spring 1995), 189. Impression ofIceland,» July 8, 1940; see also Petur Thorsteinsson, 12The most influential work in this area is Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Utanrfkisthj6nusta !stands og utanrikismAI. L pp. 35, 206-207. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, 1971). Even ifusefol in dissecting 18NA, RG 84, Confidential File, Box 2, Report, «The Strategic Importance of decision making, the bureaucratic politics approach has a tendency to overem Iceland,» April5, 1940. phasize policy processes and underestimate the power ofkey policymakers. See J. 19About this controversy, see Justus D. Doenecke, « U.S. Policy and the European Garry G/ifford, «Bureaucratic Politics,» in Michael J. Hog an and Thomas G. War. 1939-1941,» Diplomatic History, 19, 4 (Fal/1995), 669-698; see also Paters on, Explaining the History ofAmerican Foreign Relations, pp. 141-I 50. Robert Dal/e/c, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 13See Kenneth M Goldstein and She/don Blac/anan, Cognitive Style (New York, (New York, 1979); Waldo Heinrich Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and 1978); Susan Fiske and Shelley Taylor. Social Cognition (Reading, 1984); American Entry into World War 11 (New York. 1988); Wan-en F. Kimball, The 68 DEFENCE STUDIES 311999 DEFENCE STUDIES 311999 69 Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (Princeton, I99I); Frederick about the civil-military relations in Iceland (Valdimar Bjiirnsson), no date; WMarks, Wind over Sand: The Diplomacy ofFranklin Roosevelt (Athens, Gunnar M. Magnrlss, Virkid! Nordri [The Fortress in the High North], I/ Georgia, I988). (Reykjavik, I984) [second edition], pp. I38-I55; Benedikt Gronda/, Orlog "See NA, RG 59, General Records ofthe Department ofState, Central Decimal Islands, p. 79; Hrafn Joku/sson og Bjarni Gudmarsson, Astandid Marmlif a File, 711.9A.I2/I840, Box 2I93, Memorandum ofDiscussion, StefdnJohann hem8ms8nmum [Fraternization between Icelandic Women and Foreign Soldiers Stefdnsson an DEFENCE STUDIES ~1999 70 DEFENCE STUDIES 3/1999 71 r "NA, RG 165, Records ofthe War Department General and Special Staffs, Top Iceland, Box 128, Dreyfus to Secretary ofState, December 3, /945. 7 Secret «American - British- Canadian Correspondence, 1940-48, »Box 621, -' See PRO, FO 371147486, Memorandum «Allied Forces in Iceland» dated S.D. Embick to John D. Hickerson, June 8, 1945. August 10, /945, contained in a cable from the British Admiralty to the U.S. State "See FRUS, 1945, V (Washington, 1967), U.S. Ambassador (Oslo) to Secretary Department, August 23, 1945; see also ibid., Memorandum (ML. Clarke), ofState, July5, 1945, pp. 91-92; see also ibid., Memorandum (Joint Chieft of September 28, 1945; ibid., FO 371/47483, Memorandum for the British Joint Stajj), July 23, 1945, pp. 96-97; Olav Riste, Londonregjeringa Vegen heim [The Chieft ofStaff. October 17, 1945; ibid., Report (British JCS), «American Demand London Government in Exile: The Way Home],ll (Oslo, 1979), pp. 332-335; for Bases in Iceland,» October 18, 1945; ibid. Memorandum by the Secretary of about the Scandinavian reaction to potential Soviet and American military bases State for Foreign Affairs, October 30, 1945; NA, RG 34/, Air Force-Plans in the Nordic countries, see Knut Einar Eriksen, «Svalbard 1944-1947 -et Project Decimal File, OPD 686 Iceland, Box 837, Report,» Post-War Iceland brennpunkt i ost-vest-rivalisering» [Spitzbergen. 1944-1947: A Battleground in Bases,» October 5, 1945; the Eost-WestConf/ict], Intemasional Politikk. I (1976),/09-137; idem, «Great "Matthias Johannessen, Olafur Thors. II, pp. 8, 12, /6, 20-21, 36-37; see also Britain and the Problem ofBases in the Nordic Area, 1945-1947, » Scandinavian Kristinn E. Andresson, «Minnisblod um /eynifondi thingmanna um Journal of History, 7, 2 (1982), 135-163; idem, «Norge i detvestlige samarbeitet herstOdvamiilid 1945 »[Notes on Secret Me'etings ofParliamentarians on the [Norway and Western Cooperation],» in T. Bergh and He/ge @. Pharo (eds.), Military Base Question /945], Timarit Mli.ls og menningar, 38, I (1977), 13-14. Vekst og Velstand Norsk politisk historie 1945-1965 [Growth and Prosperity: A 49See Matthias Johannessen, 6Iafur Thors. II, p. 29; see also NA, RG 84, Box 4, Political HistoryofNorway,/945-1965] (Oslo, 198/),p. 188; Helge @. Pharo, Memorandum ofDiscussion, Dreyfus and 61afor Thors, October 20, 1945. «The Cold War in Norwegian and International Historical Research,» '"See Th6r Whitehead. « Lydve/di og herstodvar, » 138-139; see also NA, RG 84, Scandinavian Journal ofHistory, 10,3 (1985),.171-174. Box 4, Dreyfus to State Department, October /5, 1945. "NA, RG 84, Box 4, Dreyfus to State Department, August 24, 1945; ibid., Dean ' 1NA, RG 263, Records ofthe Centra/Intelligence Agency, the MurphyCollection Acheson toDreyfos, September 14, 1945, see also Th6r Whitehead, «Letdinfrii on International Communism, 1917-1958, Iceland, Box 128, Dreyfus to Secretary hlutleysi, » Saga. 29 (1991), 68-69; idem, « Lydveldi og herstiidvar, » 143-147. ofState, October 18, 1945; see also PRO, FO 37/147483, Gerald Shepherd to Matthias Johannessen, Olafur Thors, If, pp. 7-43; Benedikt Grondal, OrlOg Foreign Office, October 3/, /945. islands, pp. 104-105. "Skjalasafn Framsoknarj/okksins [Political Archives ofthe Progressive Party] "NA, RG 84, Box 4, Dreyfos to Secretary ofState, September 18 and /9, 1945; (Reykjavik), Executive Committee Minutes, 12, October 30, 1945; see also ibid., Dreyfos to State Department, October I, 1945. FRUS, /945, V. Averell Harriman, to Secretary ofState, October 17, 1945, p. 99; "'NA, RG 218, Records ofthe Joint Chieft ofStaff. Geographic File, 1942-1945, ibid., U.S. Ambassador (Oslo) to Secretary ofState, October 24, 1945, pp. 99- Box 94, Folder; CCS 660.2Ice/and (8-20-43), Section /, Memorandum for the 100; ibid., U.S. Ambassador (Oslo) to Secretary ofState, November 24, 1945, Secretary of War and the Joint Chieft ofStaff. July /9, 1945; see also Thor pp. 104-105; FRUS, /945, Iv; Washington. 1969, Memorandum ofConversation, Whitehead, «Lydveldi og herstiidvar,» 127-128; NA, RG 218, Records ofthe U.S. Hugh S. Gumming and de Kaujfmann, October 22, 1945, pp. 579-580; NA, RG Joint Chieft ofStaj[. Geographic File, 1942-45, Box 94, Folder; CCS 660.2 /65, Records ofthe War Department General and Special Staffs, Top Secret Iceland (8-20-43), Dreyfus to Secretary ofState, May 17, /945; NA, RG 59, Box America-British-Canadian Correspondence, 1940-1948, Box 623, Memorandum 6506, 859A.00/6-l/45, John H Morgan toH Freeman Matthews, June 11, 1945. for General George A. Lincoln, October 22, 1945; NA, RG 59, Box 6506, "NA, RG 263, Records ofthe Central Intelligence Agency, the Murphy Collection 859A.20/I0-1245, Memorandum ofConversation, Hugh Gumming and Tor on International Communism, 1917-1958, Iceland. Box 128, Dreyfos toS~cretary Hugo Wistrand, October 12, 1945; PRO, FO 371147483, Gerald Shepherd to ofState, March 5, 1946. Foreign Office, October 29, /945. "'See NA, RG 59, Box 6507, 859A.20/12-145, Averell Harriman to Secretary of "MatthiasJohannessen, Olafur Thors. If, pp. 34, 41-42; fee alsoNA, RG 84, State, December/, 1945; NA, RG 263, Records ofthe Central Intelligence Box 5, Report, «Chronolo~Iceland Base Proposals,» April/8, 1946. Agency, the Murplry Collection on International Communism, 1917-1958, "NA, RG 263, Records ofthe Central Intelligence Agency, the Murphy Collection 72 DEFENCE STUDIES :!/1999 DEFENCE STUDIES 311999 73 "* on International Communis;,, 1917-1958, Iceland. Box 128, Dreyfus to Secretary dum for General George A. Lincoln, April 19, 1946; ibid., James Bymes to U.S. ofState, November 8, 1945. I Embassy (Reykjavik), April 19, 1 946; NA, RG 84, Box 5, Memorandum of "M'atthiasJohannessen, Olafur Thors, I/, pp. 32, 41; see alsoNA, RG 263, Conversation, Dreyfos and 0/afor Thors, April 26, 1946; NA, RG 84, Box 5, Records ofthe Central Intelligence Agency. the Murphy Collection on Interna Car/son to Secretary ofState, Apri/30, 1946; PRO, FO 371156252, D. D. tional Communism, 1917-1958, lee/and, Box 128, Dreyfos to Secretary ofState, I Mac/ean to C.F.A. Warners, May 15, 1946. November 10, 1945; TlifOdrkja/asafn/siands [Icelandic National Archives] "Hagstofa islands, TOlftaedihandbok 1984, p. 243. [Th.I] (Reykjavik), Records ofthe Embassy in Washington, 1990 B/134, 0/afor 63 The Political Archives ofthe Progressive Party, Executive Committee Minutes, Thors to Thor Thors, November 13, 1945; Their Whitehead, «Lydveldi og 13, September 19, 1 946; ibid., September 22, 1946. herstodvar, » 145. · "Aithingistidindi 1946, B (Reykjavik. 1948), 193, 137, 139, 141-147, 151, 165, "See Uls)'n. October 15, I945; see also Timinn, November 16 and 30 1945; 206, 222, 238, 262; Einar 0/geirsson, «i.sland og Ameriial» [Iceland and Visir, October 27, 1945; Thor Whitehead, «Lydveldi og herstodvar,» 139; America], 105; Althingistidind~ A (Reykjavik. 1948), 103. Timarit Mals og menningar, 6, 3 (November 1945). "See Steftin Johann Steftinsson, Minningar Stefans Johanns Stefanssonar, I/, pp. "Matthfas Johannessen, Olafur Thors, I/, p. 19; see also Th.L, Records ofthe 16-28. Embassy in Wash(ngton, 1990 B/134, 0/afor Thors to Thor '!'hors, November "See NA, RG 59, 859A.00/1-2447, Box 6506, Thomas to Secretary ofState, 16, 1945; ibid, Thor '!'hors to 0/afor '!'hors, November 29, 1945; ibid, Thor January 24, 1947; see also Matthias Johannessen, Olafur Thors, //,pp. 62-63, '!'hors to 0/afor Thors, December 12, 1945; PRO, FO 371147483, Shepherd to 66-67, 71-72. Foreign Office, December 20, 1945; ibid, British Embassy (Washington) to "See Jon Vidar Signrdsson, Keflavikurflugvollur 1947-195 I [The Kejlavik Foreign Office, December 6, 1945; NA, RG 84, Box 4, Dreyfus to State Airport, 1947-1951J (Reykjavik. 1 984), pp. 41 -42; see also NA, RG 263, Records Department, December 28, 1945. ofthe Central Intelligence Agency. the Murphy Collection on International "NA, RG 59, Box 6505, 859A.00/2-246, Dreyfus to State Department, February Communism, 1917-1958, Iceland, Box 128, William C. Trimble to Secretary of 2, 1946; NA, RG 263, Records ofthe Central Intelligence Agency. the Murphy State, October 8, 1 946; Thj6dviljinn, October 7, 1 947; NA, RG 319 (Army Staf!}, Collection on International Communism, 1917-1958, Iceland, Box 128, Dreyfus Plans and Operations Division, Decimal File, 1946-1948, Folder: 091 Iceland, to Secretary ofState, February 2, 1946; NA, RG 84, Box 4, Dreyfus to State Box 80: Trimble to Secretary ofState, November 13, 1947; see also ibid., Department, March 4, 1946; PRO, FO 371/56251, Shepherd to Foreign Office, Memorandum ofConversation, Bjarni Benediktsson and Trimble. November 13, February 11, 1946. 1947. I , "NA, RG 59, Box 6507, 859.A. 20/2-346. American Embassy (Moscuw) to State "NA, RG 59, 859A.00/3-0348, Box 6505: Memorandum ofDiscussion, Bjarni. Department, February 3, 1946; see also NA, RG 59, Box 6506, 859.A. 2012-446, Benedilrtsson and Trimb/e, March 3, 1948; see also NA, RG 263, Records ofthe Dreyfos to State Department, February4, 1946; NA, RG 165, Records ofthe War Central Intelligence Agency, the Murphy Collection on International Communism, Department General and Special Staffs, Top Secret America -British- Canadian 1917-1958, Iceland, Box 128, Trimble to Secretary ofState, March 16, 1948; Correspondence, 1940-1948, Folder: ABC (6 Nuv 43), Section 18, Box 623, "See NA, RG 59, 859A.00/3-2948, Box 6505: Trimble to Secretary ofState, Report, «Wallace says U.S. Force Should Quit Iceland Base»; ibid, J.E. Hull to March 23, 1948; see ibid. 859A.00/5-1148, Box 6505, Memorandum ofConver ArmyChiefofOperations,April 10,1946. sation Steftin Johann Stef6nsson, Villiftilmur Thor. and Richard P. Butrick, May "See NA, RG 84, Box 4, Memoranda ofConversation, 0/afor '!'hors and Harry 11, 1948; Thor Whitehead, «LeyniskjiJI i lj6si sogunnar» [Secret Documents in E. Car/son,Apri/6, 9,11, 15,1946. the Light ofHistory], Morgunbladid. October 22, 1988. "NA, RG 165, Records ofthe War Department General and Special Staffi, Top "NA, RG 59, 859A.00/5-1148, Box 6505, Memorandum ofConversation Steftin Secret America- British- Canadian Co"espondence, 1940-1948, Folder: ABC (6 JohannSteftinsson, Vi/hjtilmur Their, andRichardP. Butrick. May 11, 1948; see Nov 43), Section 18, Box 623, MemorandumforJ.E. Hull, April 10, 1946; ibid. a/so NA, RG 263, Records ofthe Central Intelligence Agency. the Murphy Report, »US. Military Requirements in Iceland.» April 15, 1946; ibid, Memoran- Collection on International Communism, 1917-1958, Iceland, Box 128, Ragnar 74 DEFENCE STUDIES 3/1999 DEFENCE STUDIES :1/1999 75 Stefdnsson to Butrick. November 8, 1948. States and the Cold War in the Higb North. pp. 4I-44; and Geir Lundestad. 71See Harry S. Truman Presidential Library (Independence, Missouri), Papers of America. Scandinavia. and the Cold War, 1945-1949, pp. 247-249, 309, 324. Harry S. 'Iruman, President Secretary :S Files, National Security Council Meet "Th.l., Records ofthe Embassy in Washington, NATO I948-I952, B/135, ings, Box 203: Report, »National Security Agenda,» November 13, 1947; see also Folder: December 1948-December 1950, 8.A.2, Memorandum ofConversation, ibid., NSC minutes, November /4, I947; NA, RG I65, Records ofthe War Bjarni Benediktsson and Richard Butrick, December 7, 1948; ibid., Thor Thors Department General and Special Staffs, Top Secret «American- British to Bjarni Benediktsson, January 8, 1949; Bjarni Benediktsson, Utanrikismat Canadian Con-espondence, 1940-1948,» Box 623: Memorandum for the Army islands (Reykjavik. I949), p. 42. Chief ofOperations, November 13, I948; NA, RG 330 (Secretary ofDefense), "See Th6r Whitehead, «Leidin.fra hlutleysi,» pp. 97-98; see also PRO, FO 37II Office, Administrative Secretary Correspondence Control Section, Box 183: 77423, Charles Baxter to Foreign Office, January 5, I949; Matthias Report, »Significant Developments with Respect to U.S. Requirements/or Base Johannessen, 6lafur Thors, 11, pp. 88, 97-98; Morgunbladid, December 3I, Rights,» no date; NA. RG 341, Air Force- Plans Projects Decimal File, Box I949; Althydubladid, December 3I, I949. 833: Report, «Future Operations inlce/and.»January I2, I949; ibid. Box 837: "See Stefan J6hann Stefansson, Minningar Stef!lns J6hanns Stefanssonar, II, pp. Memorandum to the Chiefof Planning Operations February I 8, 1948, Steven T. 47-48; see also FRUS, I949,JV (Washington, I976), RichardButrick to Acting Ross and David A/an Rosenberg, America's Plans for War Against the Soviet Secretary ofState, January I 2, I 949, p. I 2. Union, 1945-1950. The Strategic Environmen~ I (New York and London, I990), "See Baldur Gudlaugsson and Pall Heidar Jonsson. 30. marz. Innganga islands i pp. 3, 26; Steven T. Ross, American War Plans 1945-1950 (New York and Atlantshafsbandalagid og 6eirdimar aAusturvelli [March 30: Iceland's Entry into London, I 988), pp. I 2, 46-48, 74; Melvyn P. LejJ/er, A Preponderance of Power: NATO and the Riots at Austurv6llur Square] (Reykjavik. I976),pp. I39, I40- National Security, the Truman Doctrine and the Cold War, p. 96; Waiter Boyne, 141 ,· see also Gunnar Benediktsson, Saga thin er saga vor. Saga islands fh\ Boeing B-52: A Documentary History (London, I98/), pp. 89, JI3-Jl4; The vord6gum 1940 til jafulendgar 1949 [Your History is Our History: The History of Office ofthe Historians, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, The Develop Iceland, I940-I949] (Reykjavik. I952), pp. 227-228. ment of the Strategic Air Command. 1946-1976 (Maryland, I 976), pp. Jl-I 2; "See FRUS, I949,JV, U.S. Ambassador (Copenhagen) to Acting Secretary of Harry R. Borowski, A Hollow Threat· Strategic Air Power and Containment State, January IO, I949; see a/soNA, RG 59, General Records ofthe Department before Korea (Westport, Connecticut and London, I982), pp. 72-75; Simon Duke, ofState, Subject File, I 944-I 952, Papers Relating to the North Atlantic Pact, « U.S. Basing in Britain, 1945;_1960, » in Sim on Duke and Wolfgang Krieger Report, «Conversations on the North Atlantic Pact with Countries other than (eds.), U.S. Military Forces in Europe. The Early Years. 1945-1970 (San Canada and the Brussels Pact Powers,» Apri/2I, I949; Geir Lundestad. Francisco, I993),pp. I22-I23. American, Scandinavia, and the Cold War, 1945-1949 (Oslo, I 980), p. 253; Tk 72NA, RG 341, Air Force-Plans Projects Decimal File, Box 837: Memorandum 1., Records ofthe Embassy in Washington. NATO I948-I952, B/I35: Folder for the Chiefof Planning and Operations, February I 8, I 948; ibid., Report of December 1948-December 1950, 8.A.2, Memorandum ofConversation, Bjarni Survey Flight to Air Bases in Iceland, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, Benediktsson and Gustav Rasmussen, January 27, 1948,· ibid., Memorandum of March 17, 1948; ibid., Memorandum, «Conference Regarding Extension of Conversation, Bjarni Benediktsson and Halvard Lange, January 28, 1948; Runways in Iceland,» July 2I, I 948; NA, RG 84, Box 10: Richard Butrick to Stefan Johann Stefansson, Minningar Stefans Johanns Stef!lnssonar, 11, p. 5 I. Francis Cunningham, August I6 and 26, I948; NA, RG 34I, Air Force-Plans "'Matt hias Johannessen. 6lafur Thors. 11, p. 97. Projects Decimal File, Box837, Robert Lovett toJames Forrestal, January 19, "FRUS, I949, JV; Acheson to Butrick. January 27, I949,p. 50. I949. "See Stefan Johann Steftinsson, Minningar Stefans J6hanns Stef!lnssonar, 11, p. 73NA, RG 341, Air Force-Plans Projects Decimal File, Box 833, Butrick to 52; Matthias Johannessen, 6tafur Thors.JI, p. 85; PRO, FO 37I/77423: British Hickerson, «Operations in Iceland,» August 18, 1948. Embassy (Reykjavik) to C.H. Bateman. Apri/26, I949; FRUS, I949IV. Memo usee Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic randum ofConversation, Bjarni Benediktsson. Eysteinn JOnsson. Emil JOnsson. Treaty, 1947-1949 (Toronto, I977), p. I98; see also RolfTamnes, The United Hans G Andersen, Thor Thors, Charles Bohlen, John D. Hiclrerson and 76 DEFENCE STUDIES 3/1999 DEFENCE STUDIES 3/1999 77 L i I Benjamin Hulley), March 14, 1949, pp. 204, 206; ibid, Memorandum of 12, 1950; ibid., Folder: OCPD, Iceland, Box 837, Memorandum for Vandenberg Conversation, Bjami Benediktsson, Eysteinn Jimsson, Emil JOnsson, Hans G. [no date],· ibid., Memorandum about SAC, December 9, 1950; NA, Air Force, Andersen, Thor Thors, Charles Bohlen. John D. Hickerson, S.E. Anderson. Atomic Warfare, Declassified, USA-Documents/Operations, Assistantfor Edmund Woo/ridge, and Gray Bream, March 15, 1949, pp. 227-228; Atomic Energy, Report, «Extract from OperationDua/ism,»January 1950; Morgunbladid March 24, 1976; Th. L, Records ofthe Embassy in Washington, Steven T. Ross and David A/an Rosenberg, America's Plans fur War Against the NATO 1948-1952, B/135, Folder: December 1948-December 1950, 8.A.2, Soviet Union, 1945-1950. Long Range Planning: Dropsbot 14 (New York and Bjarni Benediktsson to cabinet, March 17, 1948; Althingistldindi 1948 London), 1989,pp. 256,425,457, 492; SimonDuke, «U.S. Basing in Britain, (Rey/gavik, 1950), 917. 1945-1960,» in Simon Duke and Wo!fgang Krieger (eds.), U. S. Military Forces "See Ba/dur Gudlaugsson and Pall Heidar Jonsson, 30. marz, pp. 143, 147, in Europe. The Early Years, 1945-1970, pp. 122-123; Steven T. Ross and David 151-152, 239, 278; see also Stefan Johann Stefansson, «Andofgegn erlendri A/an Rosenberg, America's Plans for War Against the Soviet Union, 1945-1950. hersetu afslandi 1945-1951,» 37-44; Althingistldindi 1948, A (Rey/gavik, 1950), Evaluating the Air Offensive: The WSEGJ Study, 13 (New York and London, 922, 925-926, 929-930; Thj6dviljinn, 30. mars 1949; Emi/ Jonsson, A milli 1990), p. 164. Washington og Moskva, pp. 138-139; Jon 6slrar, Tjndir snillingar [Forgotten 88See Agnar K/emenz Jonsson, Stj6marrad islands, 1904-1969 [The History of Geniuses] (Rey/gavik, 1979), pp. 156-162; Einar 0/geirsson, island [ skugga Government Departments, 1904-1969], I (Rey/gavik 1969), pp. 272-274; see heimsvaldastefuunnar, p. 297; NA, RG 263, Records ofthe Centra/Intelligence also PRO, FO 371177424: Baxter to Bateman, November 16, 1949; Bjarni Agency, the Murphy Collection on International Communism, 1917-1958, Benediktsson, «61afor Thors, » Andvari, 91 (1966), 44-45; Political Archives of Iceland. Box 128: Butrick to Secretary ofState, March 30, 1949. the Progressive Party, Executive Committee Minutes, 16, March 13, 1950. ,, "NA, RG 341, Air Force-Plans Projects Decimal File, Box 833, Memoran 89Th. I., Records ofthe Embassy in Washington, NAW 1948-1952, B/135, dum, (S.E. Anderson] «Future Operations in Iceland.» September 28, 1948; Folder: December 1948-December 1950, 8.A.2, Embassy to Foreign Minister. ibid. Memorandum /or Lauris Norstad, November 17, 1948,· ibid., «Future January 30, 1949. Operations in Iceland,» January 5, 1949, ibid, «Report by the Joint Strategic "'See NA, RG 59, Box 3505, 740B.513-3150, Lawson to State Deportment, March Plans Committee to the Joint' Chiefs ofStaff on Fu.Jure Operations in Iceland,» 31, 1950. January 12, 1949; ibid, James Fo"estal toDeanAcheson, February 7, 1949. "SeeNA, RG 59, Box 3502, 740B.00!7-150: U.S. Embassy (Rey/gavik) to State "See NA, Records ofthe Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Lot 64D 563, Box 18, Department, July 1, 1950; see also ibid., 740B. 2216-2750: U.S. Embassy George Kennan to Sidney W. Souers, June 23, 1949; see also ibid. Report, «The (Rey/gavik) to Secretary ofState, June 26, 1950; ibid, 740B.0017-550: U.S. Position ofthe United States with Respet;t to Iceland in the Even't ofan Internal Embassy (Rey/gavik) to State Department July 6, 1950; Tk. L, Ministry of CommuniSt Coup D 'Etat or Threat thereot »June 22, 1949; ibid., George Butler Foreign Affairs, Historical Collection, Defonse and NATO, 1950-1951, Box 15, to Me Williams, June 15, 1949. Memorandum (Bjarni Benediktsson), July 4, 5, and 14; August 14, 1950; ibid, 114See Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, President :r Secretary :r File, Records ofthe Embassy in Washington, NATO 1948-1952, B/135, NAW 1951- National Security Council Meetings, Folder: NSC Meeting No. 44, Box 206: NSC 1952, 8.AJ,2, Thor Thors to Foreign Ministry. July 10 and 13, 1950; PRO, FO Meeting Minutes, August 4, 1949; see a/so ibid. Memorandum for the President, 371186501: C. W. Ha"ison to C.R. Price, July 17, 1950. ibid, Baxter to Foreign August 5, 1949; ibid, «A Report to the Nah'ona/ Security Council on the Position Office, July 20 and 28. 1950; ibid, British Embassy (Washington) to Foreign ofthe United Stat,s with Respect to United States and North Atlantic Security Office, July 19 and August 1, 1950. Interests in Iceland» [NSC 4011 ], August 4, 1949; ibid, Memorandum, «Tactical "NA, RG 59, Box 3503, 740B.5/8-950: U.S. Embassy (Rey/gavik) to State Air Command,» May 17, 1949. Department, August 7, 1950. "NA, RG 341, Air Force-Plans Projects Decimal File, Box 833, Memoran "See PRO, FO 371186501, Memorandum, (R.GA. Etherington-Smith), August 3, dum, January 30, 1950; see also ibid, «Report by the Joint Strategic Plans 1950; see also ibid., British Embassy (Washington) to Foreign Office, August 1, Committee,» March 20, 1950; ibid., Memorandum (w.E. McDonald), January 1950; ibid, Memorandum (R.GA. Etherington-Smith), «Attitude ofIcelandic 78 DEFENCE STUDIES 311999 DEFENCE STUDIES 3/1999 79 l Government towards needfor improving their defences,» August 16, 1950; ibid., "FRUS, I95 I, IV. U.S. Embassy (Reykjavik) to Icelandic Foreign Ministry, British Embassy (Washington) to Foreign Office, August 23 and 24, I950; ibid, February I7, I95I, pp. 489-492; see also ibid. Lawson to Secretary ofState, British Foreign Office to Embassy (Washington), August 23, I950; British February I7, I95I, pp. 492-493; ibid, Lawson to Secretary ofState, February Foreign Office to Embassy (Oslo), August 24, I950; British Embassy (Oslo) to 2I, I95I,p. 493; ibid. Lawson to Secretary ofState, February27, I95I, pp. Foreign Office, August 25, I950; NA, RG 59, Box 3503, 740B.5/8-2350: U.S. 494-495; see also ibid,footnote, p. 494; ibid, Lawson to Secretary ofState, Embassy (London) to Secretary ofState, August 23, I950; ibid, 740B.5/8-2550, March 4, I95I, p. 497; ibid. Memorandum ofConversation with Thor Thors, I Caspar D. Green to H Freeman Matthews, August 25, 1950. March 8, I95I, pp. 497-498; NA, RG 34I, Air Force-Plans Projects Decimal 94 Th. I., Ministry ofForeignA.ffairs, Historical Collection, Defonse and NATO File, Box 833: U.S. Negotiating Team to State Department, February 23, I95I; I950-I95I, Box I5, Memorandum (Bjarni BenedikJsson) August 29, I950; see ibid. Lawson to State Department, March 30, 1951,· Th.l, Historical Collection. also ibid. Memorandum ofConversation Bjarni BenedikJsson and Edward B. Defonse and NATO, I950-I95I, Hans G Andersen to Thor Thors, March 2, Lawson, September 4, I950; NA, RG 59, Box 3503, 740B.519-I50, Lawson to I95I; Pt!tur Thorsteinsson, Utanrfkisthj6nusta Islands og utanrlkisrrull, I, p. 3 70. State Department, September I, I950; PRO, FO 37I/8650I, British Embassy 99NA, RG 341, Air Force- Plans Projects Decimal File, Box 833: Lawson to (Oslo) to Foreign Office, September 7, 1950,· Petur Thorsteinsson. Secretary ofState, Apri/24, 1951; see also ibid., Lawson to Secretary ofState, Utanrlkisthjonusta Islands og utanrlkisrrull, /, p. 36I. Apri/25, I95I; ibid., Secretary ofState to U.S. Embassy (Reykjavik), April "NA, RG 2I8, Records oftheJointChieft ofStaff, Geographic File, I948-I950, 27,I95I; ibid, Acheson to U.S. Embassy (Reykjavik), Apri/29, I95I; ibid. Box Box 28, CCS 660.2 Iceland (8-20-43), Section 4, Memorandum ofMeeting with 834: H. FreemanMatthews toJ.H. Burns, May3, I95I; Tk l, Embassy in , Representatives ofIceland on September 25, 1950; see also NA, RG 59, Box Washington, B/I36, NAW I952-I953, 8.A.2, Report,»Defense Treaty between 3503, 740B.5/I0-2650, Memorandum ofConversation, Lawson and Bjarni Iceland and the United States on the Basis ofthe North Atlantic Treaty,» no date. BenedikJsson, October I9, I950; NA, RG 84, Foreign Service ofthe Department ,,.See The New York Times, May 8, I95I; The Washington Pos~ May 8, I95I. ofState, Classified General Records, I950-I952, Box I8, Report (Edward '"Pravda, May 9, I95I. Lawson), Nuvember I, I950; "'Thj6dviljinn, May 6, 7, IO, 17, I95I; see also Einar 0/geirsson, Island i 96 NA, RG 2I8, Records ofthe Joint Chieft ofStaff, Geographic File, I948-I950, skugga heimsvaldastefuunnar, p. 308. Box 28, CCS 660.2 Iceland (8-20-43), Section 4, «Report to the Director, The 1ruSee Petur Kr. Hafstein, «Um Varnarsamning islands og Bandarilganna 6 Joint Chieft ofStaff,» December I2, I950; ibid, Memorandum (J.H. Burns), grundvel/i Nordur-Atlantshaftsamningsins» [I'he Defense 'lreaty between Iceland October 29, I950; NA, RG 330 (Secretary ofDefense), Office, Administrative and the United States on the Basis ofthe North Atlantic Treaty], Law Degree Secretary Correspondence Control Section, Decimal File, Folder: 092 (Iceland) Essay (University ofIceland I975),pp. 13-I8; see alsoAibert J6nsson, Iceland, I950, Box I77, Memorandum for the Secretary o[Defense, (J.H. Burns); ibid., NATO, and the Keflavik Base, pp. 22-24. George C. Marshal/ to DeanAcheson, October 26, I950; Ibid. DeanAcheson to 10WA, RG 59, Box 3495, 740B.00/5-255I, U.S. Embassy (Reykjavik) to State George C. Marshal/, November 30, I950; NA, RG 330 (Secretary ofDefonse), Department, May 25, I951; see also ibid 740B.00/7-275I: U.S. Embassy Office, Administrative Secretary Correspondence Control Section, Decimal File, (Reykjavik) to State Department, July 27, I95I; ibid. Box 3496, 740B. OOII-I852: Folder: 092 (Iceland) I950, Box I77: George C. Marshal/ toJCS, December 7, «Political Review for the Year I95I,»January I8, I952; ibid. Box 3502, 740B. I950; NA, RG 59, Box 3503, 740B.5/I2-950, Acheson to U.S. Embassy (Reykja 00!7-65I: U.S. Embassy (Reykjavik) to State Department, July 6, I95I; NA, RG vik), December I2, I950; Tk l, Records ofthe Embassy in Washington, NAW 469, Records ofthe U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, I948-I96I, Mission to I948-I952, B/135, December I948-December I950, 8.A.2., 2: Thor Thors to Iceland, Office ofthe Director, Subject Files, I948-I953, Legislation-NATO, Box Foreign Ministry (Reykjavik), December I2, I950. 9, «lee/and Post Report,» March I95I; NA, RG 84, Classified General Records, "Th. l, Records ofthe Embassy in Washington, NATO I952-I953, BII37, I950-I952, Box I9: Report, «Sources ofTension between Military and Civilians NATO. 8.A.I,2: Report. «Extract from- Records ofMeeting ofthe Standing in Iceland: Suggestions for Ameliorating such Tensions,» September 26, 1951; GroupNorthAtlantiC Military Committee,»January 16, 1951. ibid., N.W. Olson to Lawson, September 5, I95I; ibid., Memorandum o[Conver- DEFENCE STUDIES :J/1999 80 DEFENCE STUDIES :V1999 81 sation, Magnzls MagnUsson and MN. Hughes, October 5, 1951; Helgi and27, 1953; Th.L, MinistryofForeignAffairs, Historical Collection, Defonse Hannesson, «Koma Bandar£/rjahers 1951. Addragandi ogvidbrOgd» [The and NATO, 1952-1953, Box 15, Memorandum ofConversation, Bjarni Prelude and Reaction to the Arrival ofU.S. Troops to lee/and 1951], BA Essay Benediktsson and Lawson, March 12, 1953; see also Pitur Thorsteinsson, (University oflee/and, 1980), pp. 73-74; Kristinn Gudmundsson, FraRaudasandi Utanrikisthj6nusta islands, /, p. 385; Political Archives ofthe Progressive Party. til Russia, pp. 135-136. Executive Committee Minutes, 18, February 16, 1953; NA, RG 59, Bureau of "'See NA, RG 319, General Staff, Assistant ChiefofStaff(G-3), 1955, Box 13, European Affairs, Subject Files, Relating to European Defense Arrangements, Report, «Strategic Importance o[Ice/and,»September 27, 1955. 1948-1954, Lot File No. 55D 258, Box4, Memorandum ofConversation with "'NA, RG 59, Box 2352, 5ll.40/l-2452, «Semi-annual Evaluation Report as of Bjarni Benediktsson, Thor Thors and others May 17, 1950; NA, RG 59, Box November 30, 195/,»January 24, 1952; see also ibid., Box 3180, 711.56240B/ 3499, 740B.00/4-353, Memorandum ofConversation, Raynor and Thor Thors, 11-2451, U.S. Embassy (Rey/gavik) to State Department, November 24, 1951; Apri/3, 1953. ibid., Box 3180, 711.56340Bill-2451: State Department to U.S. Embassy 110See Hagstofa islands, Kosningaslcyrslur [Election Results]. IJ (Reykjavik, (Rey/gavik), December21, 1951; ibid., 7ll 56340B/12-2951, U.S. Embassy 1988), pp. 556-558, 612-515; Matthias Johannessen, 6lafur Thors. IL pp. 228, (Reykjavik) to State Department December 29, 1951; NA, RG 341, Air Force 231; Political Archives ofthe Progressive Party, Executive Committee Minutes, Plans Project Decimal File, Folder: OPD 091/ce/and, Section 8, Box 835, U.S. 20, September 9, 1953. Embassy (Reykjavik) to State Department, November 24, 1951; ibid., Draft 111See Th6rarinn Th6rarinsson, S6kn og sigrar, IL pp. 244-245,· see also, NA, Letter, Matthews Freeman to U.S. Embassy (Reykjavik) December 3, 1951; ibid., Department ofState, Qffice ofIntelligence Research. IR 6425, Report, »Outlook Memorandum for Arthur Vandenberg, December 7, 1951; Simon Duke, «U.S. for Additional Base Facilities in Iceland,» October 14, 1953. Basing in Britain,» pp. 132-133, 138; Thj6dviljinn. November 25, 1951. 111FRUS, 1952-1954. VI, Raynor to Merchant, November 25, 1953, pp. 1523- msee NA, RG 341, Air Force- Plans Project Decimal File, Folder: OPD 091 1525; see also ibid, Kristinn Gudmundsson to Lawson. December 4, 1953, pp. Iceland, Section 6, Box 834: R.M Ramey to SAC, August 29, 1951; see also ibid., 1526-1527; Lawson to State Department, May 11, 1954,pp. 1531-1533; ibid., Memorandum (Orva/ R. Cook) « USAF Requirements for Iceland, August 30, Dulles to Lawson, May 14, 1954, pp. 1533-1535; Kristinn Gudmundsson, Fra 1951; ibid., Memorandum (Haro/d R. Maddux), October 9, 1951; ibid., Raudasandi til Russia, pp. 142-143, 146; Ntur Thorsteinsson, CINCLANT [Commander in Chief, Atlantic] to CNO [Chiefof Naval Opera Utanrikisthj6nusta islands og utanrikismill, L pp. 386-387, 389-391; Th. L, tions]. October 24, 1951; ibid., Section 3, Box 834, Memorandum for General Ministry ofForeign Affairs, Historical Collection, Defonse and NATO, Box 15, Vandenberg, November 14, 1951; Ntur Thorsteinsson, Utanrikisthj6nusta Meeting Minutes, February 18, 24, 27, and May 11, 1954; ibid., Records ofthe Islands, I, pp. 376-379; Simon Duke, «U.S. Basing in Britain, 1945-1960,» p. Embassy in Washington, B/137, B.A.2. NAW I, 1954-1958, Icelandic Embassy to 132; Office ofthe Historian, Headquarters ofthe Strategic Ai'r Command, The Foreign Ministry, June 2, 1954; NA, RG 59, Box 26, Lot File No. 59 D 233, Development of the Strategic Air Command, p. 31; FRUS, 1952-1954. VI, Memorandum «Negotiations on the Implementation ofUS-Icelandic Defense (Washington, D. C., 1986), Perkins to Matthews, June 12, p. 1516. Agreement ofMay, 195l,»January28, 1954; ibid, MerchanttoBonbrtght, April 108Th. I., Ministry ofForeign Affairs, Historical Collection, Defense and NATO 13, 1954; ibid., Box 3502, 740B.00/4-154, U.S. Embassy (Rey/gavik} to State 1952-1953, Box 15, Letter (Fhor '!'hors) January 21, 1952, Memorandum of Department, April/, 1954; ibid., Hanos to Raynor, May 21, 1954; Tfminn, May Conversation, Bjarni Benediktsson and Lawson, February 5 and 15, 1952,· NA, 14. 1954. RG 319, Army Operations, General Decimal File 1952, Box 13,/ce/and 091, "'See NA, RG 59, Lot File No. 59, D 233, Box 26, Report,»Biographic Data: Chiefof Naval Operations to Secretary ofDefonse, February 5, 1952; FRUS, JohnJ. Muccio,»Ju/y 11,1955. 1952-1954, VI, Memorandum about additional military rights, March 4, 1952, 1uDwight D. Eisenhower Library, White House Ojjice, Ojjice ofthe Special pp. 1519-1520; ibid., Lawson to State Department, January 16, 1952,pp. 1518- Assistant for National Security Affairs, Box 12, Folder: NSC 5426, Policy toward 1519; Pitur Thorsteinsson, Utanrlkisthj6nusta islands, L p. 383. Iceland, 7112/54 (28), July 12,1954. '"NA, RG 59, Box 3504, 740b.5!3-1753. Lawson to Hoyden Raynor, March 17 "'NA, RG 59, Box 2352, 511.40B/3-1254: USJS (Rey/gavik) to State Department, 82 DEFENCE STUDIES 3f1999 DEFENCE STUDIES 3f1999 83 'i!l''ik I March 23, 1954. 1"'Althingistidindi, 1955, A, 662-663. 116NA, RG 469, Records ofthe U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-61, "'NA, RG 59, Box 3174, 740B.00/4-656, State Department to Embassy (Paris), Mission to Iceland, Office ofthe Director, Subject Files, 1948-53, Funds-Labor, Apri/6, 1956. Box 8, Chief, MSA Special Mission to Iceland (Lawson) to SRE/Paris, Chief, 128See NA, RG 59, Records Relating to State Department Participation in the Information Division, February 23, 1953. Operations Coordinating Board and the National Security Council, 1947-1953, msee ThOrarinn ThOrarinsson, S6kn og sigrar, If. pp. 254-255; see also NA, RG Box 19, «Analysis ofInternal Security Situation in Iceland and Recommended 59, Box 3502, 740B.OOI9-2454, U.S. Embassy (Reykjavik) to Secretary ofState, Action,» May 2, 1956; ibid, Report, «Importance ofthe Icelandic Action to US. September 24, 1954; Thor/eifor Fridrik.sson, Undirheimar islenskra stj6numlla andNATOSecurityP/ans,»Apri//8, 1956. {The Underworld ofIcelandic Politics] (Reykjavik. 1 988), p. 44. "'NA, RG 59, Box 3174, 740B.00/4-656, Muccio toDulles, Apri/7, 1956. msee Althingistidindi, 1955, D (Reykjavik /956), 228-231, 235-253; '"NA, RG 59, Box 3174, 740B.00/5-3056, C. Burk Elbrick to Herbert Houver, msee Jngimundur Sigurptilsson. «Herinn og hagkerfid. Efnahagsleg tihrif July 11,1956. varnar/idsins» [The Military and the Economy: The Economic Impact ofthe "'See PRO, F03711122491, MemorandaJuneB and 11, 1956; seealsoNA, RG Icelandic Defense Force],Fjanm\latfdindi, 23,1 (January-June 1976), 35. 59, Box 4421, 840B.254/6-1456: Winthrop Wi/liams Aldrich to Dul/es, June 14, 120See ThOrarinn ThOrarinsson. S6kn og sigrar, If. pp. 250-251,· see also 1956. Thor/eifur Fridrik.sson, Undirheimar islenskra stj6mm!lla, pp. 78-83. m see Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Band 122, No. 546, Report, West German 121 Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, White House Ojjice ofthe Special Assistant for Embassy (Reykjavik) to Foreign Ministry (Bonn), May 25, /956; see also NA, National Security Affairs, Policy Papers, Box 12, NSC 5426, Folder: Policy RG 59, Box 4418, 840B.00/4-1857, Memorandum ofConversation, Apri/18, Tuward Iceland, 91755 (8), «Progress Report on Iceland by the Operations /957; Pitur Thorsteinsson, Utanrfkisthj6nusta islands og utanrikism!ll, //,pp. Coordinating Board,» September 7, 1955. 577-588; Matthias Johannessen, OlafurThors, 11, p. 275; Politisches Archiv des 112See Th. 1, Records ofthe Prime Minister Office, B-64, Economic Matters, AuswdrtigenAmtes [PAAA] [Political Archives ofthe German Foreign Ministry], 1955-1965, Icelandic Embassy (Washington) to Foreign Office, May 6, 1955; Bonn, Abteilung [Abt.] 4, 410, Band 88, Hilger van Scherpenberg to West ibid, Aide Memoire, Apri/6, 1954; ibid., 0/afor Thors to Thor Thors, May 20, German Embassy in Washington and Reykjavik. August 16, 1956; ibid; 1955; ibid., Thor Thors to Kristinn Gudmundsson, May 23, 1955; ibid. Adenauer to 0/afur Thors, June 22, 1956 signed by State Secretary Waiter Memorandum ofConversation, Kristinn Gudmundsson and John Foster Dulles, Hallstein,· Th. 1., Records ofthe Prime Minister Y Office, B-163, Hannes J6nsson June 15, 1955; NA, RG59, Lot File No. 59D233, Box 26, Memorandum of to Foreign Office, June 22, 1956; ibid., 0/afor Thors to Dr. H. Kuh/, June 23, Conversation, Raynor, Stanford and Thor Thors, May 2, 1955. 1956. 113Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Ann Whitman File, Box 5, Folder, 207th "'Hagsky.-slur island& Althingiskosningar 1953 [Economic Statistics: The 1953 Meeting ofthe NSC. Folder: Memorandum ofDiscussion, NSC Meeting, July 22, Elections] (Reykjavik. 1953),p.29; ibid., Althingiskosningar 1956 (Reykjavik, 1954; FRUS, 1952-1954. V1, «Progress Report NSC 5426,»December 7, 1954, 1956),pp. 13-15. p.1543. "'See NA, RG 59, Box 3124, 740B.00/6-2756, Muccio to Marse/is Parson. June "'Th. L, Records ofthe Embassy in Washington, B-127, ECA, 1949-1960, Thor 27, 1956. Thors to Foreign Ministry, March 6, 1954; FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, «Progress "'Public Record Office [PRO], Foreign Office [FO] 3711102550: Curie to Report NSC 5426, » December 7, 1954, p. 1546; NA, RG 59, Box 3502, 740B. 00/ Gi/christ, July 7, 1953. 12-1654: Muccio toDulles, December 16, 1954; ibid. Bax4421, 840B.332111- '"PRO, FO 371//08060: J. Thyne Henderson to J.N.O. Curie, April 15, 1953. 1755, Memorandum, International Cooperation Administration and State m PRO, FO 3711137817: United Kingdom NATO Delegation (Paris) to Foreign Department, November 17, 1955. Office, Apri/22, 1958. 115 Political Archives ofthe Progressive Party, &ecutive Committee Minutes, 16, mNA, RG 59, Box 3175, 740B.00/7-1656, Muccio to Dulles, July 16, 1956. November 19, 1949. "'NA, RG 59, Box 3178, 740B./517-3/56, U.S. Embassy (Oslo) to Secretary of 84 DEFENCE STUDIES 3/1999 DEFENCE STUDIES 3/1999 85 I I _l_ State, July 31, 1956; ibid., 740B.JJ/8-456, MucciotoDul/es, August 5, 1956; Operations Coordinating Board and the National Security Council, 1947-1963, ibid., Box 3180, 740B,5/8-756, Muccio to Secretary o[State, August8, 1956; Box 19, Memorandum, «Recent Reports Concerning Possible Soviet Loan to Thor/eifor Fridriksson, Undirheimar !slenskra sij6mm31a, p. I 27; Steftin Johann Iceland,» no date,· see also Th. 1., Records ofthe Prime MinisterS Office, Steftinsson. Minningar Stefans J6hanns Stefanssonar, IL pp. I 08-111. Economic Matters, I955-I965, B-64, HermannJOnasson to Vilhjdlmur ThOr, "'See Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. White House Office, NSC StaffAprii-Nav. October 12, 1956. /956, Box 36, Folder: Ice/and#4 (6), Memorandum for Ray M Melbourne, "'NA, RG 59, Box 4418, 840B.JO/J0-256, Memorandum, «Discussions between August 3, 1956; FRUS /955-1957, IV (Washington /986), Memorandum the UnderSecretary and Mr. Thor.» October 25, 1956; see a/so ibid., Box 3182, «Northern European Chiefs ofMission Conference, London, September 19-21, 740B.5-MSP/I0-2256: E/brick to Hoover, October 22, 1956; Th. /.,Records of 1957, Summary ofProceedings,» pp. 621. the Prime MinisterS Ojjice, Economic Matters, 1955-I965, B-62, Vi(lifdlmur "'NA, RG 59, Box 3175, 740B.00/9-2656, Memorandum ofConversation, Th6r to Hermann JOnasson, October 26, I956. Vil/!itilmur Th6r, September 26, 1956; ibid., 740B.00/9-1956: Muccio to Parson, "'NA, RG 59, Box 4417, 840B.OOII0-2556, Muccio to Dulles, October 25, 1956. September 10, 1956. usstiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganizationen der DDR im "'NA, RG 59, Box 3175, 740B.00/7-3056, Elbrick to Hoover, July 30, 1956; see Bundesarchiv (Berlin) [East German Communist Party Archives], also ibid., NA, RG 59, Box 4418, 840B./019-JJ56, U.S. Embassy (Paris) to State Zentralkomitee der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschland.r [ZK der SED], IV Department, September 11. /956; Th. L, Records ofthe Prime Minister~ Qffice, 2120/286, Memorandum ofConversation with Einar Olgeirsson, February 28, B-/63, Kristinn Gudmund.rson and He/gi Briem to Foreign Ministry. August 10, 1957; Arni Snaevan; «Flokkurinn ogfyrirmyndarrikin» [The Socialist Party and I 956; PAAA, Abt. 4, 4 I 0, Band 88; Memorandum ofConversation, Kristinn the Model States], in idem and Valur lngimundarson. Lidsmenn Moskvu. Gud.mund.rson and Hi/ger van Scherpenberg, August 8, I 956; ibid., Kurt Opp/er Samskipti !slenskra kommunista vid austan\ialdsrfkin [Moscow~ Allies: The to Foreign Ministry. August 3/, 1956; ibid., Memorandum (von Lupin), Relationship between Icelandic Communist Party and the East Bloc] (Reykjavik, September 3, /956; Meseck to von Lupins, October 26, 1956; Memorandum of /992),pp. 127-128; Thj6dviljinn, October 27, 1956; Tlminn, November 6, 1956; Conversation, Hilger van Scherpenberg and Elim 0 'Shaughnessy, August /0, Althydubladid, November 6, 1956; Althingistldindi, 1956, A. (Reykjavik, 1957), 1956; ibid., West German Embassy (Washington) [Heinz Krekeler] August 21, 214-215; PRO, F03711122492: Andrew Gilchrist to Foreign Qffice, November 1956. 14, 1956; NA, RG 59, Box 2887, U.S. National Security. 1955-1959, 71/.56340BI "'NA, RG 59, Box 3175, 740B.00/9-2656, Memorandum ofConversation with I1-I2356, Memorandum ofConversation with Vilhjdlmur ThOr, November 12, Vilhjtilmur Th6r, September 26, 1956. 1956. "'Th. L, Records ofthe Embassy in Washington. NA1V 1958-1962, 1990 B/138, "'NA, RG 59, Box 2887, U.S. National Security, 1955-1959, 711. 56340/JJ-2756, 8.A.2, NA1V /958/, Meetings in State Department, October I and 3, 1956; see Hoover to Muccio, November I 7, /956; ibid., Box 2887, U.S. National Security, alsoNA, RG59, Box 2887, U.S. National Security. 1955-1959, Memoranda, 1955-1959, 711.56340B/JJ-2756, Hoover to U.S. Embassies (Paris and Reykja «lnformal-Confltkntial Discussions between the Secretary ofState and Under vik), November 27, 1956; NA, RG 84, Classified General Records, /956-1959, SecretOry and the Icelandic Interim Foreign Minister Emit J6nsson, October 1 Box I: U.S. Embassy (Reykjavik) to State Department, December 4, I 956; ibid., and 3, 1956; ibid., Box 2477, 611.40B/I0-256, Memorandum, «Discussions Muccio to Secretary ofState, December 4, I956,· Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, between the Under Secretary and Mr. Vilhjalmur Thor, General Manager, White House Qffice, NSC Staff, April-November 1955, Box 36, Folder: Iceland National Bank ofIceland,» October 25, 1956; ibid., Box 4421, 840B.2514!10- #5 (2), Memorandum, «OCB [Operations Coordinating Board] Minutes - 2356, Memorandum, «Iceland- Upper Sog Hydroelectric Project,» October 23, Briefing on the Icelandic Base Negotiations,»November 30, 1956; Emil J6nsson, 1956; ibid., Box 2887, U.S. National Security, 1955-1959, 711.56340BII0-256, A milli Washington og Moskva, p. I 56. Elbrick to Hoover, October 2, I 956; Emil Jonsson, A milli Washington og "'Morgonbladid, December30, 1956; see also PRO, F037/l/2876/, Andrew Moskva,pp. 151-152. Gilchrist to State Department, January 2, I 957. I4JSee NA, RG 59, Records Relating to State Department Participation in the mNA, RG 59, Bax 4421, 840B.2614/2-/57, Memorandum ofConversation with 86 DEFENCE STUDIES :.\'111911 DEFENCE STUDIES 311999 87 Vilhjtilmur Th6r. February 1. 1957; ibid., Box 4418, 840B. 1012-857: John 1958. Hollister to John Foster Dulles, February 8, 1957; ibid., Box 4420, 840B.14!2- '"See Th6rarinn Th6rarinsson. Sokn og signrr, Ill (Reykjavik. 1987), pp. 17-20; 1157: ElbricktoMurphy. February 11. 1957; ibid., Box 4419. 840B. 1012-557, NA, RG 59, Box 3176, 740B.00-112-1957, U.S. Embassy (Reykjavik) to State Dulles to U.S. Embassy (Reykjavik), February 13, 1957. Department, December 19, 1957; ibid., 740B.OOI2-558, U.S. Embassy (Reykja "'PAA, Abt. 4, 410, Band BB: Hirschfeldto Foreign Ministry. April9, 1957. vik) to Department ofState, February 6, 1958; Thjodviljinn, December 18, 1957; m pRo, 371/128761: Gilchrist to Foreign Office, March 15, 1957. February 9 and 13, 1958; Timinn, December 17, 1957; FebruaryB and 11, mNA, RG 59, Box 4418, 840B. 0014-1857, Memorandum ofConversation with 1958; Morgunbladid, December 18, 1958. Vilhjtilmur Th6r. April18, 1957; see also ibid., Box 3175, 740B. 0015-357, '"See NA, RG 59, Box 3176, 740B.00/4-2457, Memorandum, «British Views and Memorandum ofConversation with Vilhjtilmur Th6r. May 3, 1957. Plans with Regard to Iceland,» April24, 1957. "'PRO 3711128750, Andrew Gilchrist to Foreign Office, April B. 1957; NA, RG '"See Morgunbladid, April15, 1958; see also Timinn. Apri/15, 1958; NA, RG 59, Box 3175, 740B. 0014-2457, Memorandum ofConversation. D.L. Benest and 59, Box 3176, 740B.00/4-1758, U.S. Embassy to State Department, April17, Ernest de W. Mayer. April24, 1957; see also PAAA (Berlin), A13159, Memoran 1958. dum ofConversation, Walkow, Handke, Astawin, May 24, 1957; ibid., Memoran "'See NA, RG 59, Box 3176, 740B.0022-15-958, State Department to U.S. dum, «Kredit an Island.» May 20, 1957; ibid., A13159: Handels:vertretung Embassy (Reykjavik}, May 9, 1958; see also ibid., Box 3178, 740B.022-16-558, Island [Commerce Representation· in Iceland] to East German Foreign Ministry, State Department to U.S. Embassy (Reykjavik), June 5, 1958. May 21. 1957; ibid., Memorandum, May 27, 1957; ibid., Handke toFred 166NA, RG 59, Box 3178, 740B. 022-16-558, Permanent U.S. Representative to Oe/ftner, June 3, 1957. NATO to Secretary oJState, June 26, 1958; see also ibid.. Box 3176, 740B.00/8- 1"PRO, FO 3711128756, Hans G. Andersen to Paul-Henri Spaak. July 1, 1957. 288, U.S. Embassy (Reykjavik) to State Department, August 28, 1958; ibid., Box "'PRO, FO 3711128755, Permanent British Delegation to NATO to Foreign 1654, 740B.022-12-2360, February 23, 1960; ibid., Box 1654, 740B.022-15-2660, Office, July 9 and 10, 1957; ibid., British Foreign Office, July 12, 16, 17, 1957; USRO/Paris to Secretary ofState, May 26, 1960; PRO, FO 371/143075, British ibid., FO 3711128756: Permanent British Delegation to NATO to Foreign Office, Embassy (Reykjavik) «Annual Report for 1958,» February 9, 1959; ibid., FO July 25, 1957; ibid., Paul-Henri Spaak to Representative ofNATO Member 3711151651; «Annual Report for 1959,»January 26, 1960; ibid.. FO 3711 States, August 8, 1957; ibid., British Embassy (Washington) to Foreign Office, 166063; «Annual Report for 1959,» January 1, 1960; Th6rarinn Th6rarinsson, August 10, 1957; ibid., Memorandum (Thomas Brimelow), «NATO Aid to S6kn ogsigrar.I11,pp. 74-75, 81-93. Iceland.»August8,1957. H>1Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 8, Folder: m PRO, FO 371112856; British Embassy (Washington) to Foreign Office, August NSC, 32 meeting, May 16, 1957 (4), NSC Minutes, «U.S. Policy toward Iceland,» 10, 1957; see also ibid., FO 371/12857, Permanent British Delegation to NATO May 16, 1957. to Foreign Office, September 11, 1957; ibid., British Foreign Office to Permanent "'NA. RG 59, U.S. National Security 1955-1959, Box 2888, 711.56340B/8-1657, Delegation to NATO, October 1; ibid, FO 371112858, Permanent Representative Robert Murphy to Donald Quarles, August 18, 1957; see also ibid.. 711.56340BI to NATO (FrankRoberts) to Foreign Office, October3 and 8, 1957. 8-1657, Robert Murphy to John Foster Dulles, October3, 1957. m pRo, FO 371112858, Permanent Representative to NATO (FrankRoberts) to "'See NA. RG 218. Records ofthe Joint Chieft ofStajf. Geographic File, 1957, Foreign Office, October3, 1957. Chairman's File, Admiral Rat!ford, 091, 1953-1957, Iceland. Box 9, Memoran ~''NA, RG 59, Box 3182, 740B. 5-MSP/12-1957, Memorandum ofConversation dum/or Admiral Radford, July 1, 1957; see alsoNA, RG 469, Records ofthe with Vilhjtilmur Th6r. December 19, 1957; see also ibid., Box 4419, 840B.10/2- US. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948·1961, Mission to Iceland, Office ofthe 358, U.S. Embassy {Reykjavik) to Secretary ofState, February 3, 1958; Petur Director, Subject Files, 1948-1953, NATO Program, Box 10, Jerauld Wright to Thorsteinsson, Utanrlkisthjonusta islands og utanrlkismal, /1, p. 581. theSecretaryofDefense, October 11,1957. ~''See PAAA. Abt. 4, 410-85.00-9411, Band 254, Memorandum (Curtius), March 170See NA, RG 59, Records ofthe Policy Planning Staff. 1957-1961, Box 140, 28, 1958; ibid., Telephone Conversation. Curtius and Mittendorff, March 29, Memorandum ofConversation with Secretary McElroy on Withdrawal ofGround 88 DEFENCE STUDIES 3/1999 DEFENCE STUDIES 3/1999 89 Troupsfrom Iceland (D. E. Boster), March 28, 1958; see also NA, RG 59, U.S. m see Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Policy National Security 1955-1959, Box 2888, 711.56340B/4-1158, John Foster Dul/es Papers Subseries, Box 21, NSC 5712/1 U.S. Policy /award Iceland, 5/1157 (9), to U.S. Embassy (Reykjavik), April 11, 1958. «Progress Report on Iceland,» May 1, 1957. m see NA, RG 59, U.S. National Security 1955-1959, Box 2888, 711.56340B/7- I"See NA, RG 218, Records ofthe Joint Chieft ofStaff, Geographic File, 1957, 258, Robert Murphy to John Foster Dul/es, February 7, 1958. Box 9. Chairman~ File, Admiral Radford, 091 1953-1957, Memorandum, H.D. 172About nuclear weapons and Greenland see the publication by the Dansk Felt to Arthur Radford, «Withdrawal ofArmy Forces from Iceland,» July 1, 1957; Udenrigspolitisk /nstitut [Danish Foreign Policy Institute], Gnmland under den see also ibid., Box 24, CCS 660.2 Iceland (8-20-43), Facilities in Iceland. Section kolde Krieg: Dansk og amerikansk sikkerhedspolitik 1945~8 (Copenhagen, J, «Report ofIceland Defense Force Capability to Perform Assigned Missions,» 1997). no date [Navember 1954?]; ibid., Section 13: Commander-in-Chiet Iceland "'NA, RG 59, U.S. National Security 1955-1959, Box 2888, 711.56340B/7-758, Defonse Force (COMICEDEFOR) to C/NCLANT Apri/10, 1956. Memorandum for Robert Murphy. July 7, 1958. "'NA, RG 59, U.S. National Security 1955-1959, Box 2888, 711.56340B/9-155, C. Burke ElbricktoMansfie/d Sprague, September 13, 1958; NA, RG 59, U.S. National Security 1955-1959, Box 2888, 711.56340B/12-2258, Muccio to DepartmenJ ofState, December 22, 1958. "'See NA, RG 59, U.S. National Security 1955-1959, Box 2888, 711.56340B/11- 2559, State Department to U.S. Embassy (Reykjavik), Navember 25, 1959; see also ibid., 711.56340B/12-1159, U.S. Embassy (Reykjavik) to State DepartmenJ, December 11, 1959. 176See Th. I. Ministry ofForeign Affairs, Historical Collection, «Frettatilkynningar» [Press Releases], August 7, 29, 31; September8, 12, 18; see also, NA, RG 59, U.S. National Security 1955-1959, Box 2888, 711.56340BI 8-859, State Department to U.S. Embassy (Reykjavik), August 11, 1959; ibid., 711.56340B/8-2659, Muccio to Secretary ofState, August 26, 1959;711.56340B/ 9-559, Muccio to Secretary ofState, September 5, 1959; ibid., 711.56340B/9- 1059, U.S. Embassy (Reykjavik) to Secretary ofState, September 11, 1959; ibid., 711.56340B/9-1159, Memorandum ofConversation, «Icelandic Protest aver Defonse Incidents,» September 11. 1959; ibid., 711.56340B/9-1959, September 19, 1959. 177NA, RG 218, Records oftheJointChieft ofStaff, CenJra/ Decimal File, Folder: 9191.213410, Iceland (12 Oct 1959), Box 151, Repart,»Transfor ofKejlavik Airport and Support ofIceland Defonse Force to U.S. Navy.» Apri/15, 1960. "'See NA, RG 59, Box 1655, 740B.5631114-2160, Memorandum, «Siate-Defonse Examination ofFuture Defense Require_ments in Iceland.» Apri/21, 1960,· see also ibid., 740B.5631111-661, CINCLANT to Secretary ofState, January 7, 1961; ibid., 40B.56311/2-2461, State Department to U.S. Embassy (Reykjavik), February 24, 1961; NA, RG 2-73, Mill Papers, «Review ofUnited States, Military Bases,» April 1960. DEFENCE STUDIES S/1999 90 DEFENCE STUDIES 3/1999 91 l