Rebalancing Economic and Political Power: a Clean Slate for the Future of American Labor Law
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Rebalancing Economic and Political Power: A Clean Slate for the Future of American Labor Law Literature Review Memo WG III: Collective Action 1. Introduction Working group III is focused on law’s relationship to workers’ freedom to fight for change in their workplaces and beyond. Our vision is that law should protect workers’ political and social engagement, a concept that includes workers’ collective advocacy for workplace and broader social change, free from employer interference. More specifically, we are tasked with considering what forms of collective action can empower workers, including striking, picketing, and boycotting; and collective action in cyberspace. We think of “workers” broadly, including public sector workers, agricultural and domestic workers, independent contractors, supervisors, etc., although the scope of who is covered by labor law is mainly the purview of other working groups. This literature review mainly relies on case studies to discuss how US labor law inhibits and empowers workers’ collective action. Group III RAs Rio Scharf and Joey Cherney have drafted a memo discussing our main case studies in depth; this memo references but does not duplicate their work, and so the two documents should be read together. 2. Under current labor law, workers’ legitimate targets for collective action to improve working conditions are too limited. a. Introduction During our December working group meeting, group members and others seemed enthusiastic about removing the current barriers that workers face in choosing targets of collective action. One option would be to simply remove all legal barriers to workers’ collective action, so that practical constraints on workers’ resources and attention to act as the only limits on the workers’ collective action. Alternatively, we could explore a middle ground that would ensure that workers can target their “economic employers” – entities that have the market power to set wages & working conditions. For example, Mark Barenberg has argued for reform so that “an entity would be deemed an ‘indirect employer’ of a given employee if it has ‘sufficient bargaining power’ (vis-à-vis the direct employer) to determine the employee’s ‘terms and conditions of employment.”1 Or, more simply, “an entity is an indirect employer if, 1 http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Widening-the-Scope-of-Worker- Organizing.pdf 1 Research Draft prepared for Clean Slate Project - Not for Circulation, Citation, or Attribution assuming it had the will to do so, it could approach the direct employer and successfully insist that the direct employer agree to terms and conditions of employment specified by the entity.”2 b. Example cases i. CIW, Justice for Janitors: Successful campaigns that focus on rate-setters & take labor out of competition The Coalition of Immokalee Workers Fair Food Campaign and Program illustrates the importance of targeting rate-setters, which often are not the employers of the relevant employees.3 The CIW launched its Campaign for Fair Food in 2001, with the goal of convincing large buyers – McDonalds, Sodexo, Walmart, and others – to pay one penny per pound more for tomatoes, on the condition that growers comply with the fair Food Code of Conduct.4 This campaign succeeded despite dire working conditions and legal disadvantages facing workers: some workers were survivors of human trafficking who worked in conditions that amounted to involuntary servitude; many were immigrants who spoke either Spanish or indigenous languages and therefore could not always easily communicate with each other or with consumers; and the NLRA’s exclusion of agricultural laborers (and absence of state-level protections for farmworkers’ collective action) meant that workers would have little legal recourse if they were fired in retaliation for their activism. The CIW began its innovative focus on large buyers just as those buyers were accumulating more market power through consolidations, and as increasing gas prices increased cost pressures on growers.5 The CIW’s key insights were that if large buyers could depress wages they could also raise them; and that those large buyers (unlike growers) were household names that cared deeply about their brand image and therefore could be influenced by consumer-focused publicity campaigns. Accordingly, the CIW began this stage of its work by calling for a consumer boycott of Taco Bell. This stage of the campaign involved a multi-city publicity effort that involved customers, shareholders (about 40 percent of whom voted in favor of “resolutions supporting the CIW”, and allied social movement and religious groups.6 It succeeded four years later, with Taco Bell agreeing to work with CIW to improve farmworkers’ wages and working conditions. CIW then replicated this strategy with McDonalds, and then with other brands. 2 Id.; see also Brishen Rogers, Libertarian Corporatism is not an Oxymoron, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1623 (2016) (arguing that an agency could be delegated authority to “determine whether a lead firm is an appropriate bargaining partner with a union representing workers within its supply chain.” 3 There are several other important aspects of the Fair Food Campaign & Program, and the CIW’s work more generally, such as its “popular education” strategy that brings workers together to talk about their lived experiences and strategize potential solutions to shared problems. Susan L. Marquis, I Am Not a Tractor 21; see also Manoj Dias-Abey, Justice on our Fields: Can Alt-Labor Organizations Improve Migrant Farm Workers’ Conditions?, 53 HARV. CR-CL L. REV. 167 (2018) (discussing CIW’s work and situating it against that of other farmworker justice organizations). This memo focuses mainly on the CIW’s campaign to encourage large buyers to require growers to sign on to the Fair Food Program; it does not discuss either CIW’s other activities, or potential legal barriers to replicating CIW’s model that do not bear directly on workers’ collective action. Cf. Heather M. Whitney, Rethinking the Ban on Employer-Labor Organization Cooperation, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1455 (2016) (discussing that because CIW is not a “labor organization,” it may accept money from employers). 4 http://www.fairfoodstandards.org/resources/fair-food-code-of-conduct/. The Code of Conduct governs when, how, and how much workers will be paid; health and safety measures, and more. It also establishes an enforcement mechanism. 5 Marquis at 47. 6 Id. at 64-65. 2 Research Draft prepared for Clean Slate Project - Not for Circulation, Citation, or Attribution As brands started signing on to work with CIW, the Florida Tomato Growers Exchange responded with collective action of its own: it “agreed to a $100,000 fine for every instance of any member grower cooperating with the CIW and the Fair Food Program.”7 The FTGE also claimed that participating in the program violated antitrust law, and raised the specter of other legal problems.8 It then attempted to start its own competitor labor standards verification organization – though that effort fell apart when brands decided to stick with CIW.9 In short, the CIW’s ability to organize brands through relentless, nationwide collective action was critical to overcoming the resistance of the FTGE and its member growers. The Fair Food Program emerged after several years of more traditional collective action that had resulted in some successes, but little enduring change. The CIW had “organized community-wide strikes and work stoppages to pressure Florida growers to increase the tomato harvesting piece rates,” and worked with the Department of Justice on forced labor cases.10 But while that “burst of activity brought new visibility to Florida’s farmworkers, and even succeeded in eliminating proposed wage cuts and the most egregious abuses in the fields, the CIW was unable to significantly raise wages across the board or to even compel growers to join its members at the negotiating table.”11 It was not until the CIW focused on the large buyers that exerted downward pressure on prices (and by extension wages and working conditions) that their campaign succeeded in creating enduring structural improvements for workers. Justice for Janitors began in 1986 in Pittsburgh, and quickly spread. Like the CIW, J4J realized that the customers that hired the small, often fly-by-night companies for which they worked held most of the power over janitors’ wages and working conditions; moreover, if a subcontractor’s workers voted to unionize, its customers could simply move on to another subcontractor.12 Also like the Florida farmworkers, the janitors involved in J4J were a largely immigrant workforce. J4J relied on collective action aimed at building owners and tenants to use union contractors, and to convince janitorial companies to accept neutrality and card check agreements.13 These actions included public-facing actions, civil disobedience, and strikes, including a 1990 strike in during which Century City police brutally attacked strikers; the televised attack ultimately galvanized support for the janitors in Los Angeles and beyond.14 As Erik Loomis recounts, “by 2000, the Justice for Janitors campaign had organized janitors around the country, with companies seeking to sign new contracts in order to stave off bad publicity SEIU had successfully used in Los Angeles and elsewhere.” The result was master contracts that applied to organized employers throughout Los Angeles and other cities. Unlike the CIW, the janitors were employees covered by the NLRA, and the SEIU is a “labor organization.” Among other things, this meant that the janitors had to contend with Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA. As Erickson et al. explained, “many janitors work in office buildings where there are a number of employers. As a result, protests outside the building may be deemed to be pressure against employers other than the janitors’ own. Second, janitors might be prohibited from pressuring building owners because the 7 Id. at 76. 8 Id. 9 Id. at 92. 10 Greg Asbed & Sean Sellers, The Fair Food Program: Comprehensive, Verifiable and Sustainable Change for Farmworkers, 16 Penn.