An Islamic Revolution in Egypt? by Rudy Jaafar

The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Spring 2004, Article 3

An Islamic Revolution in Egypt? By Rudy Jaafar

Middle Eastern countries—particularly Egypt would shed some light on the in the second half of the twentieth century— developments of Islamic movements in other have witnessed the rise of sociopolitical Arab countries. I will start my analysis with movements that pressure governments to the obvious: Iran is a Shi’a country, whereas adopt the Shari’a, or holy law of Islam, as Egypt’s population is predominantly Sunni. Is ultimate arbiter of social and public affairs. there an intrinsic characteristic in Shi’a Islam The failures of socialism and pan‐Arabism that allows its adherents to mobilize and fight have, more than ever, strengthened the belief for a religious authority? We will attempt to in political Islam as panacea to political and answer this question by considering, first, the economic woes. These Islamic movements, ideological and doctrinal foundations, as well coupled with other popular grievances, can as the historical positions of Shi’a and Sunni often threaten established regimes and state spiritual leaders vis‐à‐vis temporal authority. structures, resulting in violent armed conflict and chaos. The history of the modern Middle Temporal and Spiritual inter-relations in East is replete with such events: the Syrian Shi’a Islam regime’s assault on the city of Hama in 1982, The Shiʹa, to this day, believe that the the nullification of the 1992 elections and the leadership of the community of Muslims is subsequent civil war in Algeria, and the the divine right of the descendants of the recurrent flare‐ups between militants and Prophet through the first Imam ʹAli. This line security forces in Egypt, to name a few. The of descendants constitutes the line of Shiʹa most significant of them all, however, was the Imams, who have, historically, challenged the Iranian revolution, for it was the sole Islamic prevailing authority of their time. Their struggle that culminated in the establishment rebellious activity resulted in the martyrdom of an Islamic state. Using the Iranian model as of the first three Imams and the subsequent a basis of comparison, I will examine the persecution of their descendants. The Imami possibility, or lack thereof, of the emergence challenge to temporal authority continued of a revolutionary Islamic government in until the ghaiba, or occultation, of the twelfth Egypt, and by extension, evaluate the and last Imam, Muhammad al‐Mahdi, in 874. apparent uniqueness of the Iranian revolution Here, it is believed the twelfth Imam in the history of political Islam. As the Arab miraculously disappeared; however, he is to world’s most populous nation, Egypt is also, return to the temporal plane in the future in quoting Fouad Ajami, the state where “Arab order to institute justice on earth and herald a 1 history comes into focus.” In other words, an golden age for Muslims and humanity. analysis of revolutionary political Islam in

Shi’a Ethos power in Persia, from the seventeenth century The origins of Shiʹa ethos are therefore onwards, further strengthened the ʹulama and found in rebellion and martyrdom. The enabled them to question the legitimacy of the rebellious and disappearing Imams of Shiʹism rulers. Another factor that proved to be a have enabled the development of a dual source of independence and increasing power ideology that could be either revolutionary or for the ʹulama was the location of important quietist. Indeed, the paradigm of the Shiʹa centers of learning and leadership messianic Mahdi can carry, on the one hand, a outside Iran, in the Ottoman cities of Najaf revolutionary significance, similar to the and Karbala. Temporal and spiritual powers rebellions against the temporal authorities of were therefore geographically separated, and the early founding Imams. In contrast, the the clergy could better resist the pressure of ideology can also be quietist in nature, and 3 the Iranian state. here the concept of the ghaiba is of utmost importance, for, in the absence of the Mahdi, The Usuli School the Shiʹa are to mind their own business and The independence of the ʹulama in pay lip‐service to the authorities. eighteenth century Persia led to the Another major aspect of Shiʹa ethos emergence of a school of thought specific to stems from the martyrdom of the early Persian Shi’a Islam. The Usuli, or Mujtahidi, Imams. Aliʹs, and particularly Husseinʹs, doctrine, as it came to be known, centered on deaths at the hands of their enemies have the concept of the mujtahid, a cleric who has created an abhorrence of tyranny and injustice undergone extensive training in theology and in the minds of the followers of Shiʹism. The has become a recognized interpreter of law early Imams have been remembered as and doctrine. This ideology bounds believers, champions of the oppressed in their struggle rulers included, to follow the teaching of an against the impious rulers. The dialectic accomplished mujtahid, sometimes referred between the concepts of justice and rebellion to as marjaʹ‐e taqlid, in the political sphere as in opposition to those of tyranny and in other areas of human activity. Hamid Algar oppression has therefore been central to Shiʹa argues that, under Usuli doctrine, ʺthe thought. We will now examine the influence it monarch was theoretically bound, no less has had on the development of the Shiʹa than his subjects, to submit to the guidance of clergy. a mujtahid, in effect making the state the 4 Iranian Shi’a Clerics executive branch of ʹulama authorityʺ. Usuli The particular historical and ideological doctrine therefore provides the mujtahid with development of Shiʹa identity has led to tremendous power, his rulings carrying far unique results in the evolution of the Shiʹa more legitimacy than any issued by the state. clerical establishment. Beginning in sixteenth The emergence of these particular century Iran, the Safavids bestowed upon doctrines and powers of the Shiʹa clergy in these clerics, or ʹulama (singular: ʹalim) ‐ Persia is, therefore, a direct result of the religious scholars considered guardians of historical conditions arising since the birth of Islamic traditions ‐ economic benefits such as Islam through the early twentieth century. We property and the right to collect religious will now turn to the role of the Egyptian 2 ʹulama, who have had a diametrically taxes from the populous. The Iranian Shiʹa opposed historical path in a land subscribing ʹulama enjoyed, therefore, from the start and to Sunni Islam. as a result of their relative financial independence, strong positions vis‐à‐vis the Temporal and Spiritual inter-relations in state. Moreover, the decline of temporal Sunni Islam

Spring 2004, Article 3 3

Early Sunni doctrinal developments, and financially dependent on the state. The contrasts with Shi'ism Egyptian ʹulama received no cash money for The history of orthodox Islam has their teaching but were paid in rations of produced differing results for the Sunni, bread, donations, gifts of clothing, or financial compared to the Shiʹa, ʹulama. The Sunni 7 endowments. On several occasions, the clerical establishment has historically Egyptian ʹulama were ʺcowed through supported the rulers and they therefore financesʺ by the rulers due to their enjoyed the protection of the state. Unlike 8 their Shiʹa counterparts, the Sunni ʹulama dependence on the state. Unlike the Safavids therefore had to develop their doctrines under or the Qajars, the Ottoman and Mameluk the aegis of a government claiming political rulers of Egypt were therefore very effective legitimacy. The Shiʹa ʹulama possessed no in curtailing the power of the ʹulama. political protectors, and were, as a result, not Moreover, the Egyptian stateʹs successful forced to reconcile their doctrines with official formation of a modernized army and a central temporal creed. Sunni clerics, on the other bureaucracy in the early nineteenth century 9 hand, in return for state protection, had to further reduced the power of the ʹulama. 5 sacrifice their doctrinal independence. There This case contrasts sharply, as we have seen, have been interesting parallel historical with developments in Iran. The financial processes, albeit with different end‐results, dependence of the ʹulama on the state and the between Sunni and Shiʹa doctrinal centralization of Egypt do not explain, developments. The Sunni Abbasid dynasty in however, the absence of political leadership Baghdad as well as the Shiʹa Safavids of Iran on the part of the Sunni clerics. There were had both supported, in their coming to power, many occasions when the state effectively ʹulama with a Muʹtazili outlook. Muʹtazili collapsed and the ʹulama were left with thought emphasizes the application of reason tremendous power on their hands, yet they and educated judgment to questions of law failed to show leadership and take control of and doctrine. This rationalist approach was the situation. Throughout Egyptian history, challenged, however, in both cases, by the ʹulama have temporarily filled a power traditionalists refusing to waiver from the vacuum, when one occurred, only to literal meaning of religious texts. In Safavid relinquish political authority when it was 10 Iran, as we have seen, the ʹulama maintained firmly in their hands. The most notable individual judgment and interpretation in example, occurred following the French legal theory; ijtihad was indeed encouraged invasion in 1798. Napoleon courted the following rigorous training. In the Abbasid ʹulama and lavished them with gifts and case though, the victory, for reasons beyond wealth for he saw them as natural leaders of the scope of this study, was achieved by the the native society. He tried to establish a literalists. Individual interpretation of law native government by offering the ʹulama the and doctrine was prohibited. This event is highest political offices, but the ʹulama would referred to as the ‘closure of the doors of not accept. They informed him that they were ijtihad in Sunni Islam.’ Evidently, this accustomed to having Turkish officials at the development further curtails the power of head of all bureaus of the government, and 6 Sunni ʹulama. Turks were finally retained at the head of the 11 governorship, the army and the police. The 'ulama of Egypt Daniel Crecelius argues that this development The Egyptian ʹulamaʹs financial situation is a reflex from the Sunni ʹulamaʹs centuries‐ was radically different than that of their old submission to political tyranny, as well as Iranian Shiʹa counterparts; they were

4 Al Nakhlah

an admission of their inability to perform the the socialists and the nasserites. He then 12 pushed for support of his policies and used vital functions of government. The Sunni ʹulama could not conceive of a al‐Azhar as a counterweight to the militants, 15 government in which they exercised power. as did his successor Mubarak. The Egyptian Their role, as it has always been, was to government’s takeover of religious advise the government of others; to govern institutions, and their subsequent crisis of the governors. They did not aspire to lead legitimacy, were the most important factors politically. They were preservers of tradition, contributing to the emergence of radical political brokers at most, and they could not Islamic groups, such as Jihad, Gamaa 13 Islamiya, and Takfir wa al‐Hijra, whose shatter this image of themselves. They correspond to the classical Sunni role of the purpose was the violent overthrow of the 16 Muslim thinker, best expounded by Al‐ regime. Another element strengthening the Ghazali, described as “director of conscience recruitment base of these radical groups was for political authority in administering and the explosion of the urban population due to a disciplining men that order and justice may decrease in the mortality rates coupled with 14 massive rural migration. Indeed, the slums of reign in this world”. Cairo constitute perfect environments for the The doctrinal differences we have effervescence of radical Islamic ideologies, explored between the Shiʹa and Sunni ʹulama are numerous and consequential. Alone, feeding on the alienation and destitution of however, they do not explain the large collectives of people. The Egyptian phenomenon of the Islamic revolution. After Islamic militants believed the clerics had all, the Iranian ʹulama had coexisted for surrendered their right as interpreters of the faith because they colluded with the unjust hundreds of years with rulers more temporal authorities. authoritarian and despotic than Mohammad Reza Shah. Moreover, the clerics of Iran had Violent actions against the rulers, carried not, preceding the revolution, advocated the under the banner of Islam, were therefore seizure of political power; on the contrary, legitimate. These extremist groups engaged in they had remained on the margins of politics. assassinations and brutal attacks in order to Based on this analysis, it is safe to conclude destabilize the ruling authorities. The most notable event was President Sadat’s that there happened a specific development in assassination in 1981 by Egyptian army twentieth century Iran which permitted the establishment of an Islamic republic. A members of al‐Jihad. Another important event development, as we shall see, not mirrored in is the November 1997 Luxor attack by Gamaa Egypt. extremists which killed 58 foreign tourists and 4 Egyptians, and which resulted in a massive The rise of the Islamist movement in Egypt reduction in the number of tourists, followed by a serious downturn in the country’s The government, al-Azhar, and the militants economy. Following these operations, As discussed earlier, the ʹulama in Egypt however, there occurred a shift in support had always been an instrument of the state to away from the militants. The Egyptian legitimize the ruling elite. Following the 1952 populationʹs backing for the militant Islamists revolution, however, the abuse of this withered as images of the displays of violence instrument reached absurd proportions, as were broadcast on the news. These actions the following example illustrates. Under appalled a large section of the people, and as Nasser, the services of the ʹulama were used a result, the militants lost the public support to legitimize Arab nationalism and socialism. they had enjoyed. Moreover, the government Sadat then solicited al‐Azhar to delegitimize seized the opportunity and responded with

Spring 2004, Article 3 5 an all‐out war on these extremists before to enlarge their power base and spread their completely neutralizing their operational message. Their targets were the professional capacity. Many militants died or fled the associations of doctors, engineers, country during these ruthless campaigns 21 pharmacists and university teachers. waged by the state security forces. The Throughout the Arab world, these conclusion was an unconditional ceasefire associations are the most active civil announced by Gamaa Islamiya in March 1999, organizations because of the high level of followed thereafter by Al‐Jihad’s declaration education and political conscience of their of the end of military operations in June members, as well as their independent 17 2000. Nowadays, therefore, the violent and financial resources. This new non‐violent direct threat to the integrity of the Egyptian strategy proved very successful and political state has significantly subsided. This Islamic activism developed a substantial development has not spelled the end of the socioeconomic base. For example, the Islamic movement in Egypt however. A 1994 movement created new Islamic banks which al‐Ahram poll declared that 86 percent of amassed deposits surpassing those of state‐ Egyptians believed violent Islamic groups did owned or conventional banks. The movement not work to the benefit of society. The same was also capable of providing better health poll also mentioned that 73 percent thought 22 and social services than those of the state. non‐violent Islamic groups benefited Egypt. Public support for Islamic groupings also There was therefore broad support among the increased, when in times of crisis, these people to give Islam a greater role in state and organizations outperformed the government society; the disagreement was over the means in assisting the victims, as was the case in the employed to achieve that result. October 1992 earthquake. The Brotherhood emerged from the 2000 elections with 17 seats, The path of non-violent political Islam in Egypt the largest group in the opposition. The pillar of Muslim activism in Egypt As we have seen, the stateʹs dominance and in most Arab countries is the Muslim 18 of Al‐Azharʹs completely discredited the Brotherhood. Established in 1928 by Hassan institution. This in turn has provided support Al‐Banna, the Brotherhood’s ideology is to the Islamic militants from a population based on the establishment of an Islamic state disenchanted by the dearth of a viable and and the application of Shariʹa as the only constructive political ideology, as well as by solution to all societal ills. Its commitment is increasing economic and social woes. The to social justice and it perceives its foreign extreme violence perpetrated by the militants 19 enemies as Capitalism and Zionism. In the alienated the people, however, and the eighties, following fruitless bloody conflicts Egyptian government managed to subdue the with the government, the Brethren renounced militant Islamic threat to its integrity. The violence as a means of achieving their growth of the non‐violent Islamic movement political aims. Those members who disagreed seeking to turn Egypt into an Islamic state has and believed in the continuation of violent not been affected though. Indications actually struggle splintered and formed the violent point towards an increase in its popular base. groups Gamaa and Jihad mentioned earlier. With this new non‐violent strategy, the Iranian developments in political Islam Brethren were allowed by Sadat to run for On the other side of the Middle East, 20 Iranian history followed a distinctly different parliamentary elections. The Muslim path. Similarly to the Egyptian case, there was Brothersʹ new focus shifted towards massive rural migration, a destabilization of penetrating the organs of civil society in order the traditional social groups due to rapid

6 Al Nakhlah

23 impacts. His groundbreaking work fused the modernization, and state repression. The regime, however, was unable to weather the two ideologies together, the Islamic and the assaults on its authority. The Pahlavis simply leftist, and their combined effect proved to be could not hold on to power amid the massive far superior than the sum of their individual 24 parts. Khomeini’s ideas spread to large nationwide campaign of civil disobedience. segments of the Iranian population; poor A question arises: how was popular young militants interpreted this new Shiʹa discontent transformed into large‐scale doctrine in a revolutionary context, and the rebellion, before ending in the establishment educated urban middle class joined the of an Islamic regime? We will start our chorus. This intelligentsia deluded itself into analysis with the leader of the revolution, believing that in the end, following the Ayatollah Khomeini. removal of the Shah, it would unseat Khomeini, this ʺcharismatic but impotent old Khomeini's leadership 28 With the publication of Velayat‐e Faqih, manʺ. Their predictions, obviously, failed his seminal work, and in a radical break with miserably. In addition to the poor and the traditional Shiʹa positions of political secular middle class, another important social passivity, Khomeini advocated the acquisition group, the bazaar, joined Khomeini’s 25 revolutionary forces. These merchants of temporal power by the clergy. He argued represented the traditional allies of the clerical that it was the duty of the Faqih to seize establishment in Iran and the two classes had, power and implement the precepts of Shariʹa in the past, joined forces in their hostility to a as best as he could. A society based on the strong state. The bazaar always resented a holy law of Islam, and guided by a Muslim centralized government that could have religious jurisconsult, was the best that could burdened it with heavy taxation. It had be achieved before the coming of the Mahdi. therefore supported the ʹulama in their Though many in the Shiʹa clerical opposition to the state since the late 19th establishment opposed his views, Khomeini century. The alliance between the mosque and was able, nonetheless, to provide the ʹulama the bazaar was old and well established. With with a theoretical and doctrinal justification the first violent incidents in 1978, the for political engagement. In order to expand revolutionary wheel was set in motion. In his message further and unite, under his addition to Khomeini’s leadership, the leadership, the various groups opposed to the popular uprising benefited from the Shah, Khomeini incorporated into his work confluence of several other factors: the ʹulama ideas from another Iranian theoretical thinker, provided logistical and organizational Dr. Ali Shariati. Khomeini substituted the support using their network of 80,000 concept of the faqih for Shariati’s mosques, the bazaaris supplied the funds, and rawshanfekran, or ‘enlightened intellectual’, the rural migration of the previous years as the leader of the Islamic revolution. provided the human potential for mass Moreover, in his discourse post‐1970, he used 29 Marxist terms of class struggle, plentiful in mobilization in every major city in Iran. In Shariati’s analysis, to proclaim himself summary, we can state that though the 26 opposition to the Shah was widespread and representative of the disinherited. S.E. the popular movement benefited from Ibrahim states that “Islamic and leftist favorable causes, most importantly, it was ideologies provide a persuasive intellectual united under the leadership of the Ayatollah, response to the issues of national crises, class as he accomplished two major developments. 27 malaise, and individual alienation”. He first transcended, theoretically, the Khomeini succeeded in magnifying their limitations of the marjaʹ‐e taqlid and

Spring 2004, Article 3 7 established the concept of Velayat‐e Faqih, demand of legal immunity to US personnel in increasing further the power of the clergy. Iran, also damaged his credibility. On the Secondly, he created an umbrella for all the other hand, the radical Egyptian groups face a different political and social movements government possessing stronger credentials opposing the Shah. from the populous. Nasser, for example, was the champion of nationalism and pan‐ Comparative Analysis Arabism, a larger‐than‐life figure who was The Egyptian ʹulama lost their extremely popular in Egypt. Nasser was legitimacy, and the popular religious therefore able to fight the Islamists more leadership of the opposition passed to effectively than the Shah. Even Sadatʹs reactionary organizations created by men position was better than the Shahʹs, for, who were not clerics with traditional religious though he signed a peace treaty with Israel, educations. The ensuing rift between these he had fought a successful war with the two poles of the Islamic movement in Egypt Israelis and managed to regain the Sinai with severely constrained its powers and the Camp David accords. effectiveness in challenging the state. The Iranian religious movement was capable of Conclusion facing the Shah with one united front, I have traced, throughout this study, the whereas the Egyptian Islamic opposition is historical, doctrinal, ideological and political handicapped by its internal conflict, which dimensions of the Islamic movements in both has prevented the emergence of a unifying Iran and Egypt. Both actors sought to initiate figure in the image of the Ayatollah a popular Islamic revolution and topple the Khomeini, an indispensable leader in the case government, though only one was successful. of the Iranian revolution. Today, it seems unlikely that the second event Another important factor is the scope of will occur; in other words, Egypt will not the ideology underpinning the revolt. The experience an Islamic revolution. However, Iranian revolution contained elements of a this conclusion does not exclude the class struggle superimposed on the religious possibility of Egypt becoming an Islamic state. nature of the event. Khomeiniʹs radical Indeed, as it is mentioned in this research, the ideology was the cornerstone of this Egyptian Islamists are gaining ground. They revolution, for it united the multifarious are slowly, but surely, penetrating all forces opposing the Shah under one banner, instruments of civil society; they have shifted that of political Islam. Though Egyptian their strategy from a top‐down to a bottom‐up Islamists attracted people from diverse approach. Nonetheless, their ultimate goal backgrounds, their ideas were opposed by the has remained the establishment of an Islamic clerical establishment, and were therefore government. Vali Nasr distinguishes the two denied their support in becoming a significant 30 movements as Red and Green Islam. Red force for change. The organizational role Islam corresponds to the Iranian case; a played by the mosque in the Iranian revolutionary ideology imbued with elements revolution is a case in point. The legitimacy of of Marxist class struggle. Green Islam, on the the governments the radical Islamists are other hand, is not revolutionary but consists fighting is also of importance to this study. of a slow and gradual evolution towards the The Shah, for example, was alien to his establishment of an Islamic state. Geneive people. His forced modernization policies, as 31 well as his Kemalist attacks on the traditional Abdoʹs work is insightful in this respect, as mores of his society, decreased his legitimacy. it elucidates some of the tactics and progress His strong alliance with the US and Israel, as achieved by the new Islamists of Egypt in well as his capitulation to the American furthering their agenda.

8 Al Nakhlah

The views and opinions expressed in articles are Asia and Islamic Civilization (SWAIC) at The strictly the author’s own, and do not necessarily Fletcher School. represent those of Al Nakhlah, its Advisory and Editorial Boards, or the Program on Southwest

1 Fouad Ajami, The Arab predicament: Arab political thought and practice since 1967 (New York: Cambridge University Press), 13. 2 Nikki Keddie, “The roots of the Ulama’s power in modern Iran,” in Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim religious institutions in the Middle East since 1500, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Los Angeles: University of California Press), 221‐222. 3 Ibid, 226. 4 Hamid Algar, “The oppositional role of the Ulama in Twentieth‐century Iran,” in Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim religious institutions in the Middle East since 1500, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Los Angeles: University of California Press), 235. 5 Nikki Keddie, “The roots of the Ulama’s power in modern Iran,” in Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim religious institutions in the Middle East since 1500, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Los Angeles: University of California Press), 216. 6 Ibid, 223‐224. 7 Afaf Lutfi al‐Sayyid Marsot, “The Ulama of Cairo in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries,” in Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim religious institutions in the Middle East since 1500, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Los Angeles: University of California Press), 154‐155. 8 Ibid. 9 Nikki Keddie, “The roots of the Ulama’s power in modern Iran,” in Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim religious institutions in the Middle East since 1500, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Los Angeles: University of California Press), 213. 10 Afaf Lutfi al‐Sayyid Marsot, “The Ulama of Cairo in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries,” in Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim religious institutions in the Middle East since 1500, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Los Angeles: University of California Press), 159‐163. 11 Daniel Crecelius, “Non‐ideological responses of the Egyptian Ulama to modernization,” in Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim religious institutions in the Middle East since 1500, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Los Angeles: University of California Press), 173‐174. 12 Ibid. 13 Afaf Lutfi al‐Sayyid Marsot, “The Ulama of Cairo in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries,” in Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim religious institutions in the Middle East since 1500, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Los Angeles: University of California Press), 164‐165. 14 Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt (Los Angeles: University of California Press), 229‐ 230. 15 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in contemporary Islam: custodians of change (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 146. 16 Tamir Moustafa, “Conflict and Cooperation Between the State and Religious Institutions in Contemporary Egypt,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 32 (2000): 10.

Spring 2004, Article 3 9

17 The Economist Intelligence Unit, “Country profile 2002: Egypt,” The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited (2002): 9. 18 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Egypt, Islam, and Democracy (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press), 56. 19 Ibid, 24. 20 Tamir Moustafa, “Conflict and Cooperation Between the State and Religious Institutions in contemporary Egypt,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 32 (2000): 17‐18. 21 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Egypt, Islam, and Democracy (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press), 58. 22 Ibid, 60‐61. 23 Gilles Kepel, Jihad – The Trail of Political Islam (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), 108; Hossein Bashiriyeh, The State and Revolution in Iran, 1962‐1982 (New York: St Martin’s Press), 34. 24 Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown – The Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York: Oxford University Press), 191. 25 Gilles Kepel, Jihad – The Trail of Political Islam (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), 40. 26 Ibid, 41. 27 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Egypt, Islam, and Democracy (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press), 26. 28 Gilles Kepel, Jihad – The Trail of Political Islam (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), 7. 29 Hossein Bashiriyeh, The State and Revolution in Iran, 1962‐1982 (New York: St Martin’s Press), 121‐122. 30 Seyyed Reza Vali Nasr, lecture on Latest trends in political Islam, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, MA., 5 November 2003. 31 See Geneive Abdo, No God but God: Egypt and the triumph of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press).