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Rebuilding and Reforming the Iraqi Security Sector

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Rebuilding and Reforming the Iraqi Security Sector ANALYSIS PAPER Number 9, July 2006 REBUILDING AND REFORMING THE IRAQI SECURITY SECTOR U.S. POLICY DURING DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION PETER KHALIL ANALYSIS PAPER Number 9, July 2006 REBUILDING AND REFORMING THE IRAQI SECURITY SECTOR U.S. POLICY DURING DEMOCRATIC TRAN- SITION PETER KHALIL TABLE OF CONTENTS A C K NOWLEDGEMENT S . V A BB R EV I AT I O N S . VII E XECUTI V E S UMMA RY . IX T HE A UTHO R . XIII I NT RODUCTION . 1 C HALLENGE S . 9 U NDE rs TA N D I N G H I S TO R ICAL D EV ELO P MENT S : T HE K EY T O F UTU R E S UCCE ss . 19 R ECOMMENDATION S F O R R EFO R M . 39 C ONCLU S ION : G UIDING P OLITICAL A ND S ECU R ITY S ECTO R R EFO R M . 49 T HE S ABAN C EN T ER A T T HE B ROOKING S I N st I T U T ION I I I ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank the Saban Center for Middle East Pollack, and Andrew Apostolou for their guidance, Policy at Brookings for providing an open, stimulating support and much needed improvements to early and policy relevant intellectual atmosphere for research drafts of the paper. and analysis. Many people at Brookings worked tirelessly in helping produce this report and making I would also wish to acknowledge and thank Walt my time at Brookings so enjoyable and educational Slocombe, David Gompert, Fred Smith, U.S. Army but special thanks must go to Garner Gollatz for his Major General (ret.) Paul Eaton and Ambassador L. Paul tireless research assistance and his thoughtful and Bremer for their leadership and guidance during my time erudite suggestions to make the paper more readable in Iraq under extremely challenging circumstances. and policy relevant. Lastly a special thank you to my wife Lydia Khalil for Thanks must also go to the Director of the Saban her support, knowledge and intelligent advice on the Center, Martin Indyk, Director of Research, Ken Iraqi political process. T HE S ABAN C EN T ER A T T HE B ROOKING S I N st I T U T ION V ABBREVIATIONS CPA COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY DSA DEFENSE SUPPORT AGENCY ICDC IRAQI CIVIL DEFENSE CORPS ICIF IRAQI CIVIL INTErvENTION FORCE IGC IRAQI GOVERNING COUNCIL IIG IRAQI INTERIM GOVERNMENT ITG IRAQI TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT ING IRAQI NATIONAL GUARD INIS IRAQI NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SErvICE INSA IRAQI NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR IP IRAQ POLICE JIPTC JORDAN INTERNATIONAL POLICE TRAINING CENTER MoI MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR MoD MINISTRY OF DEFENSE MNF-I MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ MNSC MINISTERIAL NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL NCO NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER NGO NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION SWAT SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS TAL TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW USAID UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT T HE S ABAN C EN T ER A T T HE B ROOKING S I N st I T U T ION V I I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY he critical challenge for the United States and democracy depends upon the state possessing modern, Tits Coalition partners in Iraq will be to stabilize capable security forces, ministries and supporting the security situation in the next two years while institutions that are geared to protecting and serving simultaneously continuing to maintain and build the the people and their freely chosen government. underlying structures that are needed to promote stability and security in the long-term. U.S. policymakers The long-term goal of political stability also requires must bear in mind that there are three inextricably linked a security structure that will strengthen democratic tracks of reform: security sector, political and economic. institutions and practices so that U.S. troops will not While improving the overall security conditions and have to return to take over a failed state in Iraq a de- building an Iraqi security sector are necessary elements cade from now. The best way for U.S. policymakers to in ensuring short and ultimately long-term success in encourage this process is to ensure that security reform Iraq, the process of reforming the security sector cannot is closely coordinated with the often volatile process of proceed in a vacuum. It requires a coordinated effort democratic transition and its associated political and that goes beyond security strategy, an effort that cannot economic reforms. be separated from political development and economic reconstruction. Continued and successful reforms in all The values of pluralism, transparency, democratic these areas will require more specific and closely tailored direction of civil-military relations, and state control efforts at building capacity, enhancing effectiveness, over the armed forces need to be instilled in Iraq. An and encouraging genuine democratic practices within indispensable element of a reformed Iraqi security security structures. sector is the systematic inculcation of the legal, regulatory, and institutional principles that govern the American strategy in Iraq is designed to achieve two security sector in liberal democracies. Unfortunately primary goals: first, the withdrawal of most U.S. in Iraq, these reforms are incomplete or have suffered combat troops during the next few years; and second, ad hoc implementation. a free, democratic, stable, and secure Iraq that is able to defend itself from external threats, without posing To reach these goals, the United States and its Coalition a threat to her neighbors or becoming a safe haven for partners must confront three major challenges of Iraqi terrorists. Security sector reform is an important means security sector reform: of reaching both of these goals. While it is important that security sector reforms enable the United States 1. Weakening and defeating the insurgency; to realistically transfer power to the Iraqi authorities, 2. Training modern, capable new Iraqi security ultimately the rebuilding of the Iraqi security sector forces (a new Iraqi military and internal security cannot be separated from political development and forces), with a focus on the quality rather than the economic reconstruction. The successful transition to quantity of recruits and units; and, T HE S ABAN C EN T ER A T T HE B ROOKING S I N st I T U T ION I X 3. Building capable civilian-led security institutions • From May to October 2003, Coalition policy based on underlying democratic principles and introduced sweeping changes to what was left practices. of the Iraqi security sector, including the still controversial dissolution of the Iraqi military To overcome these three challenges, the United States (the old Iraqi Army and other elements of and the government of Iraq must pursue three policies. Saddam’s military such as the Republican Guard First, they must ensure ethnic and religious pluralism and Special Republican Guard) and the Ministry in the security sector. Second, they must establish of Defense. The Iraqi Police and the Ministry of democratic civilian control over the military (the Iraqi the Interior were largely reconstituted during Army, Navy and Air Forces—under the Ministry of this time. This period also ushered in several Defense) and the internal security forces (the Iraqi new Iraqi security entities: in particular, the new Police and high-end internal security forces—under Iraqi military began training, and the embryo of the Ministry of the Interior). Third, they must build a new Ministry of Defense was created; up the capacity of Iraq’s civilian security institutions, especially the ministries of defense and interior. • The period from November 2003 to March 2004 was dominated by the Bush Administration’s The difficulty for the Coalition and the Iraqi government decision in mid-November 2003 to hand over has been that the environment in Iraq has more often sovereignty by June 2004. This decision forced an than not hobbled security sector reform. Over the past abrupt change of course in the reform process. three years the Iraqi security forces have all largely been There was a flurry of activity to push through recruited and trained from scratch. Most security force security reforms and build institutions such as members are new, but significant minorities of recruits the new Ministry of Defense in a dramatically were former officers, soldiers, and policemen who were curtailed time frame. There were also ongoing supposed to have undergone retraining. The rebuilding problems in civil-military relations. The low of Iraq’s security forces has been dogged by problems quality of training given to the new Iraqi security at every stage. Recruitment, vetting, training, and forces was exposed, leading to the subsequent operational capabilities have been uneven. Despite the decision to build high-end internal security and many missteps, it is important to continue to rebuild Special Forces units to fight the insurgency; the entire security apparatus rather than try to rely on • The period of reform, from April 2004 to the Saddam-era force structures. Moreover, it is the quality end of June 2004, was the sprint towards of the Iraqi security forces—not their quantity—that is handing over sovereignty. Key political-security critical to a realistic transfer of security responsibility institutions were established, such as the from U.S. forces to Iraqi security forces over the next two Ministerial National Security Council and the years. Within that, a focus on quality will be important office of the Iraqi National Security Advisor. The as Iraq needs special security forces trained specifically Coalition Provisional Authority also took action in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, to standardize the recruitment and training of forces that can eventually take on the brunt of the war new Iraqi forces and to rectify some of the worst against the insurgents. problems in these areas; • From July 2004 to January 2005 Iraqi political The pace of security sector reform has had to and security developments were characterized continually adjust to meet the challenge of advancing by the handover to sovereignty, the relationship in parallel with a deadly and evolving insurgency over of the Multi-National Forces-Iraq (the Coalition the past two and a half years.
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