DOCSLIB.ORG

Anger in Buddhist Philosophy: in Defence of Eliminativism

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Anger in Buddhist Philosophy: in Defence of Eliminativism Anger in Buddhist Philosophy: In Defence of Eliminativism Thippapan Chuosavasdi PhD University of York Philosophy October 2018 Abstract The thesis I hope to develop here aims to contribute to recent discussions in ethics on the merits of anger. In particular, it focuses on the debate between moderationists, who contend that anger is, in some way, good, and thus should be retained and utilised, and eliminativists, who contend that anger should be eliminated, i.e. that we should never allow it to arise. By the end of this thesis, I hope that I have shown that (despite its current popularity) the moderationist defence of anger is not without its difficulties. This should hopefully carve out a space for a contemporary defence of eliminativism. The eliminativist view I defend is essentially Buddhist, though it also draws upon Buddhist-inspired accounts in the Western philosophical literature. I advocate a pedagogical reading of the difficult (and perhaps seemingly unattractive) Buddhist metaphysics, that I suggest — when put into practice — might eventually lead to an openness to that metaphysical view. The consequence of both the practice and the metaphysical outlook is the elimination of anger. Far from being the loss of something beneficial or apt, I suggest that the elimination of anger is both beneficial and (from the metaphysical viewpoint) apt. I attempt to demonstrate this by applying the position I defend to the kind of case where moderationists are at their most persuasive — cases of social injustice. I hope to have at least shown that such a position can be a viable alternative to the moderationist suggestion that we harness anger for social change. 2 List of Contents Abstract 2 List of Contents 3 Acknowledgements 5 Declaration 6 Introduction: Overview of the Thesis 7 Chapter 1: Buddhist Characterisation of Anger Introduction 24 1. Approaching Anger 25 2. Characterising Anger 30 2.1 Occasions of anger 31 2.2 Anger and perception 37 3. Experiencing Anger 39 3.1 Anger and pain 41 3.2 Anger and pleasure 46 3.3 Anger as conative 48 3.4 Anger and intentionality 53 4. Anger Unleashed 57 Conclusion 62 Chapter 2: Buddhist Arguments for the Elimination of Anger Introduction 64 1. Happiness and Enlightenment 65 2. Eliminativism and Moderationism 74 3. Anger and its Negative Effects 82 4. Anger and Virtue 94 5. Anger and Epistemic Failure 100 6. Suffering and Enlightenment 107 Conclusion 114 Chapter 3: Moderationist Arguments for Anger Introduction 115 1. The Transformation of Anger 116 2. McRae’s Tantric Anger 121 3 3. The Supposed Benefits of Anger 130 4. ‘Apt’ Anger 138 5. Anger and Compassion 143 Conclusion 147 Chapter 4: In Defence of Eliminativism Introduction 149 1. The Moderationist Challenges 150 2. The Metaphysics of Eliminativism 153 3. Eliminating Anger 158 3.1 Patience and perspective 161 3.2 Patience and virtuous life 167 3.3 Aptness, again! 169 4. Why Eliminating Anger is Apt 171 Conclusion 176 Chapter 5: Eliminativism and Social Injustice Introduction 177 1. Anger? #MeToo 177 2. Turning Theory into Practice 179 2.1 Eliminativism and punishment 183 3. The Benefits of Eliminating Anger 185 Conclusion 189 Appendix 191 Abbreviations 194 Bibliography 195 4 Acknowledgements Throughout the course of writing my PhD thesis, and in my wider life, I have received a lot of support in various forms from colleagues, friends and family, old and new. Thanks are due to my supervisor, Amber Carpenter, for her patience and unwavering support for me. She has introduced me to the Buddhist pragmatism that I have subsequently become attracted to. I am also indebted to Peter Lamarque for the many pleasurable conversations we had, and for his support. I also want to thank Christopher Jay for his many offers to read my work. Any mistakes in this thesis are not reflection of anyone’s deficiency but my own. I am deeply grateful for my family who, despite not knowing what research I have been doing, are always happy to support me in every way; my in-laws who have embraced me as their own and been my family in this foreign country; M, who has always shown concern about my progress and decided that cooking for me is the best form of support. Most importantly, I cannot express my gratitude enough for Andy, my partner in life, who has been by my side through ups and downs in the process of finishing this thesis. 5 Declaration I declare that this thesis is a presentation of original work and I am the sole author. This work has not previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, University. All sources are acknowledged as References. 6 Introduction: OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS Chapter 1: Buddhist Characterisation of Anger Chapter 1 surveys the Buddhist characterisation of anger (focusing specifically on the Indian Buddhist tradition). I first note the multitude of difficulties we face when attempting to work with texts that pose linguistic and cultural barriers to interpretation. The central concept under consideration — ANGER — is shown to pose many difficulties as an object of study, simply in virtue of the nature of the texts. Translations from different source languages (Pāli, Sanskrit, Tibetan etc.) often yield different results — sometimes the same passage is interpreted as discussing ‘hatred’ rather than ‘anger’, for example. As such, a rather broad approach is taken, incorporating all anger-related terms just as long as the topic seems to broadly match a familiar phenomenology of anger. Taking this phenomenology-centred approach, I suggest, helps us to ensure that we are dealing with the same emotion across both Buddhist texts and those from Western literature. This approach thus relies upon a focus on the occasions of anger in the Buddhist texts, i.e. situations that give a description of the circumstances under which the emotion arises. That way we can hopefully avoid some of the linguistic ambiguities posed in translation. Of course, there may still be some cultural difficulties that cannot be overcome using this method — for instance, a Westerner may not understand why a Thai might be angry when you point and gesture towards the TV remote with your foot, rather than your hand. However, many of the occasions of anger described in the Buddhist text provide examples of situations in which we can be highly confident are associated with the emotion we are focused on. Characterising anger by examining the occasions of anger, the accompanying phenomenological character, and its effects as they appear in the Buddhist literature is also a deliberate attempt to avoid imposing a twenty-first- 7 century Anglo-European understanding of anger onto our reading of these texts. The characterisation of the occasions of anger that emerges in the first chapter is that anger occurs when we perceive ourselves, or something or someone we value, to be harmed. Sometimes the cause of this harm can be impersonal — such as when we are irritated constantly by mosquitos, provoking our anger. At other times, the cause is personal — such as when someone insults us, or physically assaults us. What is notably absent in the Buddhist texts is any discussion of social injustice; the examples found in the texts are typically centred on the individual. This is perhaps unsurprising given the meditative or pedagogical purpose of many Buddhist texts, however. Moreover, the Buddhist characterisation of occasions of anger also leans on the notion of perception, i.e. what we perceive as harmful to us. This emphasis on perception reflects the possibility that we can sometimes get it wrong when it comes to anger — sometimes we believe we have been harmed, when we haven’t, or we believe that person A harmed us, when it was person B etc. However, we see in later chapters that the Buddhist Eliminativists don’t concern themselves with this particular kind of epistemic error, but with what they see as a much deeper and more significant kind arising from their distinctive metaphysical position. Chapter 1 goes on to outline a variety of phenomenological aspects of anger. Firstly, I discuss the association of anger and pain. Discussions of anger are rife with fire metaphors, expressing the unpleasantness of the experience of anger. Similarly, metaphors of poison abound. On the Buddhist view, we see that anger is associated with a mental pain which operates over and above whatever pain comes directly from the harm we have suffered. However, we see that anger can also be associated with pleasure. In one Buddhist text, anger is described as having a “poisoned root and honeyed tip.” This acknowledges that anger, or at least some aspects of anger, can be pleasurable — for instance, anticipating revenge — but the scarcity of examples in the Buddhist texts discussing examples of pleasure (there is, in fact, just a single example) reveal a lot about the Buddhist 8 conception of anger. Even this single example sees anger’s roots as poisonous, so the pleasure does not come without suffering. Two further phenomenological aspects of anger are identified and discussed. Anger is shown to have a conative aspect i.e. it desires something. The Buddhist texts focus specifically on our desire for the suffering of the wrongdoer, however they are quick to stress that this suffering will not be brought about by our desires but instead by their own transgressions. Our desire might be for some awful fate to befall an enemy, or it might be a desire for an apology, but each involves some harm to the subject. We also seem to desire to end our own suffering, whether that involves avoiding the cause of it, or destroying that cause. Since anger involves desire, it is perhaps unsurprising that we often also see anger characterised as intentional i.e.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • A Study of the Saṃskāra Section of Vasubandhu's Pañcaskandhaka with Reference to Its Commentary by Sthiramati
    A Study of the Saṃskāra Section of Vasubandhu's Pañcaskandhaka with Reference to Its Commentary by Sthiramati Jowita KRAMER 1. Introduction In his treatise "On the Five Constituents of the Person" (Pañcaskandhaka) Vasubandhu succeeded in presenting a brief but very comprehensive and clear outline of the concept of the five skandhas as understood from the viewpoint of the Yogācāra tradition. When investigating the doctrinal development of the five skandha theory and of other related concepts taught in the Pañcaskandhaka, works like the Yogācārabhūmi, the Abhidharmasamuccaya, and the Abhidharmakośa- bhāṣya are of great importance. The relevance of the first two texts results from their close association with the Pañcaskandhaka in terms of tradition. The significance of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya is due to the assumption of an identical author of this text and the Pañcaskandhaka.1 The comparison of the latter with the other texts leads to a highly inconsistent picture of the relations between the works. It is therefore difficult to determine the developmental processes of the teachings presented in the texts under consideration and to give a concluding answer to the question whether the same person composed the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and the Pañcaskandhaka. What makes the identification of the interdependence between the texts even more problematic is our limited knowledge of the methods the Indian authors and commentators applied when they composed their works. It was obviously very common to make use of whole sentences or even passages from older texts without marking them as quotations. If we assume the silent copying of older material as the usual method of Indian authors, then the question arises why in some cases the wording they apply is not identical but replaced by synonyms or completely different statements.
    [Show full text]
  • Reason, Desire, and the Will: in Defense of a Tripartite Moral Psychology
    Reason, Desire, and the Will: In Defense of a Tripartite Moral Psychology By Jeremy Carey A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Hannah Ginsborg, Co-Chair Professor R. Jay Wallace, Co-Chair Professor Kinch Hoekstra Summer 2017 Abstract Reason, Desire, and the Will: In Defense of a Tripartite Moral Psychology by Jeremy Carey Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy University of California, Berkeley Professor R. Jay Wallace, Co-Chair Professor Hannah Ginsborg, Co-Chair Which aspects of our psychology are most central to explaining our intentional actions, and how should we conceive of them in light of their abilities to play those explanatory roles? These are key questions in moral psychology, and my dissertation tries to answer them, or at least to provide a beginning. As with much else in philosophy, the basic contours of this debate first came to us in Plato. Though I am not primarily concerned with the historical details, the initial argument of the dissertation and its distinctive approach reflect these Platonic origins in an interesting way. In Plato’s Protagoras, he presents Socrates as having an intellectualist moral psychology; that is, as claiming that all intentional action is motivated by a belief about what is best. This leads him to argue against the possibility of weakness of will. Plato himself later rejected this view, most notably in the Republic. There he argued that properly accounting for psychological conflict required dividing the soul into three “parts” - rational, spirited, and appetitive.
    [Show full text]
  • Summa Theologiae with Reference to Contemporary Psychological Studies
    Concept of Happiness in Summa Theologiae with Reference to Contemporary Psychological Studies Von der Fakultät für Geisteswissenschaften der Universität Duisburg-Essen zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Doktor der Philosophie (Dr. phil.) genehmigte Dissertation von Jaison Ambadan Chacko Ambadan aus Areekamala, Kerala, Indien Erster Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Ralf Miggelbrink Zweiter Gutachter : Prof. Dr. Markus Tiwald Vorsitzender des Prüfungsausschusses: Prof. Dr. Neil Roughley Tag der Disputation: 02.07.2018 1 Concept of Happiness in Summa Theologiae with Reference to Contemporary Psychological Studies General Introduction 6 Chapter I The Ethical Perspective of Happiness in Aquinas´s Concept of Human Acts Introduction 27 1. Human Acts 31 1.1 Voluntary 52 1.2 Involuntary 53 1.3 Circumstances 54 1.3.1 Nature of Circumstance 55 1.3.2 Role Circumstances in Moral Evaluation 56 1.4 Cognitive Participation 57 1.4.1 Three Acts of the Speculative Intellect 58 1.4.2 Three Acts of the Practical Intellect 60 1.5 The Will 62 1.5.1 Cause of the Movement of the Will 62 1.5.2 Manner in which the Will Moves 63 1.5.3 Characteristics of the Act of the Will 64 1.5.3.1 Enjoyment 65 1.5.3.2 Intention 65 1.5.3.3 Choice 67 1.5.3.4 Counsel 68 1.5.3.5 Consent 68 1.5.3.6 Use 69 1.6 Human Acts Commanded by the Will 70 1.6.1 Good and Evil in Human Acts 71 1.6.2 Goodness and Malice in Human Acts 72 1.6.3 Impact of the Interior Act 75 1.6.4 Impact of the External Act 76 1.6.5 Impact of Disposition 77 Conclusion 79 2 Chapter II Thomas Aquinas´s Cognition of Passion and Happiness Introduction 82 2.
    [Show full text]
  • On the Experience of Encountering Art in Museum Spaces: an Inquiry with Gilles Deleuze's Concepts of Desire and Assemblage
    ON THE EXPERIENCE OF ENCOUNTERING ART IN MUSEUM SPACES: AN INQUIRY WITH GILLES DELEUZE'S CONCEPTS OF DESIRE AND ASSEMBLAGE by Marie-France Berard B.A., The University of Montreal, 1992 M.A., The University of Montreal, 2004 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES (Curriculum Studies) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) November 2017 © Marie-France Berard, 2017 ABSTRACT Framed by the theoretical concepts of assemblage and desire from philosopher Gilles Deleuze, and his collaborative writings with psychoanalyst Félix Guattari (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, 1987), this study inquires into the qualities and productive potential of the art encounter in a gallery setting. The study brings together my practice in the field of art museum education, and my interest in the art encounter to inquire what the art encounter does. Thinking with Deleuzian concepts enacts a view of the art encounter as a milieu of experimentation where affects move a body to create assemblages, connections with things, human and non-human bodies, expressions, qualities, ideas, spaces. Assemblages allow desire (as a force) to circulate; desiring-assemblages move bodies to produce connections with other human or non-human entities, thoughts, they produce subjectivation as a mode of existence. For Deleuze, one does not 'have' an experience of an artwork or exhibition detached against the background of life; experience is a milieu which contributes to actually making life. My study inquires how working within a philosophy conceived in terms of relationality, connections, flows and multiplicity (rather than fixed identities) enact a view of the art encounter as a milieu of immanent ethics.
    [Show full text]
  • ABSTRACT the Conversion and Therapy of Desire in Augustine's
    ABSTRACT The Conversion and Therapy of Desire in Augustine’s Cassiciacum Dialogues Mark J. Boone, Ph.D. Directors: Thomas S. Hibbs, Ph.D., and Michael P. Foley, Ph.D. The philosophical schools of late antiquity commonly diagnosed human unhappiness as rooted in some fundamental disorder in our desires, and offered various therapies or prescriptions for the healing of desire. Among these only the neo-Platonic treatment for desire requires redirecting desire towards an immaterial world. Although Augustine agrees with the neo-Platonists on the need to redirect our desires to an immaterial world, he does not adopt their therapy for desire. Instead he adopts a thoroughly Christian approach to the healing of desire. The conversion of desire results from the Trinitarian God’s gracious actions taken to heal our desires. Augustine does not recommend fleeing from the influence of the body, as neo-Platonism encourages, but fleeing to Christ, immersing ourselves in the life of the Church, and practicing the theological virtues. In this dissertation I examine Augustine’s Cassiciacum dialogues. In Contra Academicos (Against the Academics), Augustine argues that we must vigorously desire wisdom in order to attain it; that we must have hope in the possibility of attaining wisdom; and that our desire for wisdom must be bound in faith to Christ. In De beata vita (On the Happy Life), Augustine argues that the Trinitarian God is the only perennially satisfying object of desire and shows that the pursuit of God is the activity of a prayerful community of believers who are practicing faith, hope, and charity. In De ordine (On Order), Augustine recommends that the reordering of our desires be pursued through a liberal arts education and through Christian morals.
    [Show full text]
  • L'abecedaire De Gilles Deleuze, Avec Claire Parnet
    1 L'Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze, avec Claire Parnet Directed by Pierre-André Boutang (1996) Translation & Notes: Charles J. Stivale Credits (shown at the end of each tape): Conversation: Claire Parnet Direction: Pierre-André Boutang, Michel Pamart Image: Alain Thiollet Sound: Jean Maini Editing: Nedjma Scialom Sound Mix: Vianney Aubé, Rémi Stengel Images from Vincennes: Marielle Burkhalter --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Translated and edited by Charles J. Stivale --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prelude \1 A short description of the trailer and then of the interview "set" is quite useful: the black and white trailer over which the title, then the director’s credit are shown, depicts Deleuze lecturing to a crowded, smoky seminar, his voice barely audible over the musical accompaniment. The subtitle, “Université de Vincennes, 1980,” appears briefly at the lower right, and Deleuze’s desk is packed with tape recorders. A second shot is a close-up of Deleuze chatting with the students seated closest to him. Then another shot shows students in the seminar listening intently, most of them (including a young Claire Parnet in profile) smoking cigarettes. The final shot again shows Deleuze lecturing from his desk at the front of the seminar room, gesticulating as he speaks. The final gesture shows him placing his hand over his chin in a freeze-frame, punctuating the point he has just made. As for the setting in Deleuze’s apartment during the interview, the viewer sees Deleuze seated in front of a sideboard over which hangs a mirror, and opposite him sits Parnet, smoking constantly throughout. On the dresser to the right of the mirror is his trademark hat perched on a hook.
    [Show full text]
  • History of Structuralism Volume 2 This Page Intentionally Left Blank History of Structuralism
    DJFHKJSD History of Structuralism Volume 2 This page intentionally left blank History of Structuralism Volume 2: The Sign Sets, 1967-Present Francois Dosse Translated by Deborah Glassman University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis London The University of Minnesota Press gratefully acknowledges financial assistance provided by the French Ministry of Culture for the translation of this book. Copyright 1997 by the Regents of the University of Minnesota Originally published as Histoire du structuralisme, 11. Le chant du cygne, de 1967 anos jour«; Copyright Editions La Decouverte, Paris, 1992. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Published by the University of Minnesota Press III Third Avenue South, Suite 290, Minneapolis, MN 554°1-2520 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper http://www.upress.umn.edu First paperback edition, 1998 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Dosse, Francois, 1950- [Histoire du structuralisme. English] History of structuralism I Francois Dosse ; translated by Deborah Glassman. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. Contents: v. 1. The rising sign, 1945-1966-v. 2. The sign sets, 1967-present. ISBN 0-8166-2239-6 (v. I: he: alk. paper}.-ISBN 0-8166-2241-8 (v. I: pbk. : alk. paper}.-ISBN 0-8166-2370-8 (v. 2: hc: alk. paper}.-ISBN 0-8166-2371-6 (v. 2: pbk. : alk. paper}.-ISBN 0-8166-2240-X (set: hc: alk. paper}.-ISBN 0-8166-2254-X (set: pbk.
    [Show full text]
  • Body, Mind and Sleepiness: on the Abhidharma Understanding of Styna and Middha. Journal of the International
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Explore Bristol Research Gethin, R. (2017). Body, Mind and Sleepiness: On the Abhidharma understanding of styna and middha. Journal of the International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies, XXI (Professor Junkichi Imanishi Felicitation Volume on the Occasion of His Retirement), 254-216. Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record License (if available): CC BY-NC-ND Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research PDF-document This is the final published version of the article (version of record). It first appeared online via the International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies at http://id.nii.ac.jp/1153/00000396/. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher. University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research General rights This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms.html 国際仏教学大学院大学研究紀要 Journal of the International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies 第 21 号（平成 29 年) Vol. XXI, 2017 Body, Mind and Sleepiness: On the Abhidharma understanding of styāna and middha Rupert Gethin 国際仏教学大学院大学研究紀要第 21 号 平成 29年3月 123 Body, Mind and Sleepiness: On the Abhidharma understanding of styāna and middha Rupert Gethin 1. Listing dharmas Our modern textbooks of Buddhist thought inform us that the Theravāda tradition recognises seventy-two or eighty-two
    [Show full text]
  • Twentieth-Century French Philosophy Twentieth-Century French Philosophy
    Twentieth-Century French Philosophy Twentieth-Century French Philosophy Key Themes and Thinkers Alan D. Schrift ß 2006 by Alan D. Schrift blackwell publishing 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5020, USA 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK 550 Swanston Street, Carlton, Victoria 3053, Australia The right of Alan D. Schrift to be identified as the Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher. First published 2006 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd 1 2006 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Schrift, Alan D., 1955– Twentieth-Century French philosophy: key themes and thinkers / Alan D. Schrift. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-1-4051-3217-6 (hardcover: alk. paper) ISBN-10: 1-4051-3217-5 (hardcover: alk. paper) ISBN-13: 978-1-4051-3218-3 (pbk.: alk. paper) ISBN-10: 1-4051-3218-3 (pbk.: alk. paper) 1. Philosophy, French–20th century. I. Title. B2421.S365 2005 194–dc22 2005004141 A catalogue record for this title is available from the British Library. Set in 11/13pt Ehrhardt by SPI Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India Printed and bound in India by Gopsons Papers Ltd The publisher’s policy is to use permanent paper from mills that operate a sustainable forestry policy, and which has been manufactured from pulp processed using acid-free and elementary chlorine-free practices.
    [Show full text]
  • Editorial: Postanarchism
    Editorial: Postanarchism SAUL NEWMAN Postanarchism is emerging as an important new current in anarchist thought, and it is the source of growing interest and debate amongst anarchist activists and scholars alike, as well as in broader academic circles. Given the number of internet sites, discussion groups, and new books and journal publications appearing on postanarchism, it is time that the challenges it poses to classical anarchist thought and practice are taken more seriously. Postanarchism refers to a wide body of theory – encompassing political theory, philosophy, aesthetics, literature and film studies – which attempts to explore new directions in anarchist thought and politics. While it includes a number of different perspectives and trajectories, the central contention of postanarchism is that classical anarchist philosophy must take account of new theoretical directions and cultural phenomena, in particular, postmodernity and poststructuralism. While these theoretical categories have had a major impact on different areas of scholarship and thought, as well as politics, anarchism tends to have remained largely resistant to these developments and continues to work within an Enlightenment humanist epistemological framework1 which many see as being in need of updating. At the same time, anarchism – as a form of political theory and practice – is becoming increasingly important to radical struggles and global social movements today, to a large extent supplanting Marxism. Postanarchism seeks to revitalise anarchist theory in light of these new struggles and forms of resistance. However, rather than dismissing the tradition of classical anarchism, postanarchism, on the contrary, seeks to explore its potential and radicalise its possibilities. It remains entirely consistent, I would suggest, with the libertarian and egal- itarian horizon of anarchism; yet it seeks to broaden the terms of anti-authoritarian thought to include a critical analysis of language, discourse, culture and new modalities of power.
    [Show full text]
  • Ignorance, Epistemology and Soteriology1 Part II
    Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology1 Part II Vincent Eltschinger For Jacques May The fi rst part of this essay (Eltschinger 2009) concentrated on the basic features and likely sources of Dharmakīrti’s understanding of ignorance (avidyā). Against the Vaibhāṣikas, but with Vasubandhu the Kośakāra, Dharmakīrti defi nes ignorance as a “counter-” or “anti-knowledge,” i.e., as a cognition that counteracts true (percep- tual) knowledge (vidyā) by displaying contrary/erroneous object- supports and aspects (viparītālambanākāra). According to him, ignorance amounts to pseudo-perception (pratyakṣābhāsa), hence conceptual construction (vikalpa), superimposition (samāropa) and concealment (saṃvṛti). The core of Dharmakīrti’s philosophy, the so-called apoha theory, provides an exhaustive picture of both ignorance as conceptuality and inference as a corrective (though conceptual) principle. This conception of ignorance, however, fails to account for the most dramatic form of the Buddhist ignorance, viz. its being responsible for defi lements, rebirth and suff ering. In 1 This study has been made possible by the generous fi nancial support of the Austrian Science Fund (FWF-Projekt P19862 “Philoso phi sche und religiöse Literatur des Buddhismus”). Most sincere thanks are due to Isabelle Ratié, Birgit Kellner, Helmut Krasser and Ernst Steinkellner. Lambert Schmithausen also deserves my wholehearted gratitude for having gone through this essay with incomparably great care and erudition. My most sin- cere thanks are due to Cynthia Peck, who kindly corrected my English. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 33 • Number 1–2 • 2010 (2011) pp. 27–74 28 Vincent Eltschinger order to account for this eschatologically valued form of ignorance, Dharmakīrti equates avidyā with the personalistic false view (satkāyadṛṣṭi).
    [Show full text]
  • "Cutting the Roots of Virtue:" Tsongkhapa on the Results of Anger
    ISSN 1076-9005 Volume 2 1995 "Cutting the Roots of Virtue:" Tsongkhapa on the Results of Anger By Daniel Cozort Assistant Professor of Religion, Dickinson College Abstract: Anger is the most powerful of the kle"sas that not only "plant seeds" for suffering but also "cut the roots of virtue" for periods of up to a thousand aeons per instance. This article examines and assesses the exegesis by Tsongkhapa, founder of the Tibetan Gelukba order, of Indian sources on the topic of anger. It argues that despite Tsongkhapa's many careful qualifications he may not be successful in avoiding the conclusion that if the sūtras are to be accepted literally, there almost certainly will be persons for whom liberation from saṃsāra is precluded. INTRODUCTION Among the six root afflictive emotions (nyon mongs, kle"sa) identified in the Buddhist Abhidharma literature as the causes for episodes or entire lifetimes of suffering, anger (Tibetan: khong khro, Sanskrit: pratigha) holds a singular place. It is one of a few mental states[1] that not only establish "seeds" or "roots" of nonvirtue, but also nullify the seeds or roots of individual virtue planted by exemplary actions such as giving and patience. Among these states, anger is uniquely destructive. The Mañju"srīvikrīḍita Sūtra warns that a single moment of anger can result in a person's loss of a hundred aeons of virtue.[2] "Sāntideva, the ninth century author of the greatly influential Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra multiplies this dire warning tenfold (chapter 6, verse 1): anger wipes out not just a hundred, but a thousand aeons of virtue.
    [Show full text]