Security Force Assistance, Military Advising, and Recipient Unit Military Effectiveness

A Delicate Balance: Security Force Assistance, Military Advising, and Recipient Unit Military Effectiveness

by Bryce Loidolt

B.A. in Middle East Studies, 2008, Middlebury College M.A. in Political Science, 2013, The University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill

A Dissertation submitted to

The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

May 19, 2019

Dissertation directed by

Alexander Downes Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University cer- tiﬁes that Bryce Loidolt has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy as of March 27, 2019. This is the ﬁnal and approved form of the dissertation.

A Delicate Balance: Security Force Assistance, Military Advising, and Recipient Unit Military Effectiveness

Bryce Loidolt

Dissertation Research Committee: Alexander Downes, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Dissertation Director

Stephen Biddle, Professor of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, Committee Member

Marc Lynch, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Committee Member

iii Acknowledgments

Throughout graduate school I have been blessed with the support and encouragement of numerous family members, friends, colleagues, and mentors. My time at the RAND Corporation exposed me to the excitement of policy research and motivated me to pursue a doctorate. My first deployment as a RAND analyst to Afghanistan would be formative in my development as a scholar, and I am immensely grateful to Todd Helmus for taking the chance and trusting a young researcher to embed with military units in some of the country’s most remote districts. RAND colleagues Daniel Egel, Linda Robinson, Seth Jones, and Rebecca Zimmerman continued to encourage me as I progressed in my studies. Kim Cragin has been a mentor and friend throughout; from my first days as her Research Assistant to my job search as a doctoral candidate and now as a colleague at the National Defense University (NDU). Although my research interests and career goals led our paths to diverge, the Political Science Department at the University of North Carolina (UNC) - Chapel Hill provided much of the training I would need to execute this project successfully. Professors Navin Bapat, Charlie Kurzman, Stephen Gent, Mark Crescenzi, and Patricia Sullivan were all incredibly supportive during my time at UNC. Jeff Harden and Justin Gross’s patience and dedication to methods instruction helped convince a policy-focused, qualitative die-hard to give statistics a chance. Tom Carsey’s methods instruction was also invaluable, and I know he is deeply missed. I was thrilled to have the opportunity to continue and complete my studies at George Washington University. Many made my transfer as seamless as possible. As Director of Graduate Studies, Professor Kimberly Morgan was willing to take a chance on a transfer student. Professors Brandon Bartels and Eric Grynaviski tirelessly worked with me to manage my transition and advancement through candidacy. Colleen Grant and Taylor Poltzer patiently helped me navigate my bureaucratic and administrative requirements. The Institute for Security and Conflict Studies (ISCS) at George Washington’s Elliot

iv School of International Affairs was my intellectual and physical home for most of this study. I cannot imagine a more supportive and collegial community of professors and graduate students pursuing the disciplined study of warfare. Feedback from Professors Charlie Glaser, Elizabeth Saunders, and Caitlin Talmadge through the various stages of this project have improved it tremendously. GW graduate students Daniel Jacobs, Michael Joseph, Ryan Baker, Jackie Schneider, Alex Kirss, Vanes Ibric, and Brian Radzinski all provided insightful comments on this project, as did ISCS’s impressive array of visiting fellows, to include Meredith Blank, John-Michael Arnold, Tyler Jost, Jennifer Spindel, and Alec Worsnop. I am happy to consider them colleagues and friends. Many assisted me as I began carrying out my research. The Freedom of Information Act office at United States Central Command and the Government Accountability Office diligently worked to track down and appropriately release information that made this study possible. Finding interviewees was no simple task and required the support of new and old friends and colleagues, some dating back to High School. I cannot thank them and my interviewees enough. Dr. Fred Allison at the United States Marine Corps University’s History Division went above and beyond the call of duty to help me locate and access archival information on Marine Police Mentor Teams. A number of organizations provided generous financial support and space for this study. The Rumsfeld Foundation supported me through a fellowship for two of my years at GW. More than financial assistance, the foundation has introduced me to a vibrant network of colleagues from other institutions who are dedicated to public service. I am forever thankful to Secretary Rumsfeld and his wife Joyce for their generosity, and to Professor Henry Nau for twice nominating me for this opportunity. GW’s Political Science Department and Institute for Security and Conflict Studies also provided crucial financial support. Critically, the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at NDU, where I now call home, granted me the time and space to complete this dissertation. Bringing this project across the finish line would indeed have been far more challenging without the encouragement of INSS

v leadership and other NDU colleagues, to include Laura Junor, Joe Collins, Denise Natali, and Tom Lynch. I came to GW hoping to conduct research that balanced rigor with policy relevance. My dissertation committee’s guidance over the years has made it clear to me that the two need not be in tension. Professor Stephen Biddle has been a mentor to me since I arrived at GW. Through countless meetings, drafts, redrafts, emails, and phone conversations, Professor Biddle demonstrated remarkable patience and dedication in his role as my adviser. His direction throughout this process has shaped my intellectual development in ways that will endure for many years to come. Professor Marc Lynch’s breadth of knowledge has kept this project situated in broader questions and puzzles relevant to the discipline and Professor Alex Downes provided me with an important sounding board during the project’s incipient stages and remained incredibly supportive of this study as it progressed. Prior to ever agreeing to serve as an external reader, Professor Mike Miller helped to hone the project’s methodological approach. I am thrilled to have Professor Mara Karlin, whose work continues to inspire my own, serving as an external reader as well. My family has perhaps been most essential to this project’s completion. My mother, Christine, has been a source of inspiration and an example of perseverance. Beginning with their accomplishments on the football field and now in their professional and family lives, my older brothers, Travis (who will remain the only Dr. Loidolt capable of performing spinal surgery) and Shane, have continued to serve as role models. Most important has been the support and encouragement I received from my kind and brilliant spouse, Kristin. Kristin endured courtship punctuated with comprehensive exams and prospectus writing, wedding planning with her fiance in an active warzone, and the first year of marriage to a husband elbow deep in data and research interviews. Kristin was a reassuring presence when the project left me frustrated, a source of motivation when I faced obstacles that I thought would be insurmountable, and a life companion before I wrote a word of this dissertation. This dissertation is dedicated to her.

vi Disclaimer

The views expressed here are my own and are not an ofﬁcial policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. Government.

vii Abstract

A Delicate Balance: Security Force Assistance, Military Advising, and Recipient Unit Military Effectiveness

The provision of training, advice, and equipment to assist foreign security forces in combat has long been a prevalent foreign policy instrument for the United States, often with disappointing results. Yet, amidst these frustrating national-level outcomes, there has been considerable subnational variation in the combat performance of recipient security force units, even in cases where the United States is thought to have largely failed to build local partner capacity. In this study I argue that the behavior of these units’ military advisers is a critical variable that contributes to this variance. I first offer an in-depth examination of the microfoundations of security sector corruption. Under these circumstances, unfortunately common in cases of SFA provision, recipient units enjoy the benefits of foreign largess, but also have strong inclinations to avoid cooperating with their advisers and improving in their proficiency. Advisers can motivate the recipient unit to improve by threatening to withhold resources from them. But, these threats generate two countervailing effects. On the one hand, threats erode partner unit apathy, disciplining the recipient unit’s behavior and leading to an increase in proficiency. On the other hand, threats also anger recipient units, leading to cognitive and behavioral coping mechanisms that are harmful to proficiency. Advisers convey these threats through intrusive behaviors, defined as efforts to detect partner unit corruption and coerce them to change their behavior. Highly intrusive advisers will render their partner units less apathetic, but the high level of anger will undermine the recipient’s willingness to cooperate. Unintrusive advisers will produce no anger, but will also lead the recipient unit to remain apathetic and unresponsive to the adviser’s behavior. As a result of the tradeoffs between apathy and anger, the optimal approach for advisers is at neither extreme, but, instead, between them. I thus hypothesize that advisers will be most successful when they are moderately intrusive. I test and find support for the theory

viii through a multi-method research design using original quantitative and archival data from Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom. Beyond touching on a diverse range of scholarship, the ﬁndings have implications for the preparation, training, and ﬁelding of U.S. military advisers, as well as the overall utility of security assistance as an instrument of foreign policy.

ix Table of Contents

Acknowledgments ...... iv

Disclaimer ...... vii

Abstract ...... viii

List of Figures ...... xiii

List of Tables ...... xiv

1 Introduction ...... 1 1.1 Security Force Assistance and U.S. Defense Policy ...... 4 1.2 Determinants of SFA Success ...... 6 1.3 The Puzzle of Subnational Variation ...... 8 1.4 Theory and Research Design ...... 11 1.5 Findings and Significance ...... 12 1.6 Road Map ...... 14 2 Theory and Research Design ...... 15 2.1 The Delegation of Warfare in Counterinsurgency ...... 16 2.2 The Risks of Combat Proficiency in Weak States ...... 19 2.3 Military Advising, Apathy, and Anger ...... 22 2.4 Adviser Intrusion ...... 29 2.5 Case Selection ...... 33 2.6 Selection Effects ...... 35 2.7 Research Design ...... 39 2.8 Comparative Case Studies ...... 41 2.9 Large N Analysis ...... 42 2.10 Medium N Analysis ...... 43 2.11 Roadmap ...... 44 3 Comparative Case Studies ...... 45 3.1 Building the Afghan National Police ...... 46 3.2 Evaluating Adviser Intrusion and Unit COIN Proficiency ...... 55 3.3 Case Selection ...... 60 3.4 “This is their Fight...": Police Advising in Naw Zad ...... 63 3.4.1 Adviser Intrusion ...... 66 3.4.2 Unit Proficiency ...... 68 3.4.3 Conclusion ...... 70 3.5 “The Good Enough Standard": Police Advising in Garmser ...... 70 3.5.1 Adviser Intrusion ...... 73 3.5.2 Unit Proficiency ...... 75 3.5.3 Conclusion ...... 77

x 3.6 “I Should Have Been More Even-Keeled": Police Advising in Golestan . . . . 78 3.6.1 Adviser Intrusion ...... 79 3.6.2 Unit Proﬁciency ...... 82 3.6.3 Conclusion ...... 84 3.7 Confounding Variables and Alternative Explanations ...... 85 3.8 Conclusion ...... 89 4 Quantitative Analysis ...... 90 4.1 Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool (PTRAT) Dataset Overview . . . 91 4.2 Dependent Variable: Measuring ANP Proﬁciency ...... 93 4.3 Independent Variable: Adviser Intrusion ...... 96 4.4 Control Variables ...... 101 4.5 Empirical Approach and Results ...... 103 4.5.1 Parametric Analysis ...... 104 4.5.2 Non-Parametric Analyses ...... 109 4.6 Robustness Tests ...... 112 4.6.1 Evaluating Advisers’ Narrative Comments ...... 112 4.6.2 Considering Alternative Measures ...... 115 4.7 Conclusion ...... 118 5 Medium N Analysis ...... 120 5.1 Method Overview ...... 121 5.2 Data and Measurement ...... 123 5.2.1 Pairwise Matching and Analysis ...... 130 5.2.2 Full Matching and Analysis ...... 133 5.3 Identifying Cases for Further Analysis ...... 135 5.4 ANA Paired Cases Overview ...... 136 5.4.1 Building and Advising the Afghan National Army (ANA) 2002-2010 . . . . 136 5.4.2 “You did this to yourself": Advising the ANA 201st Corps ...... 143 5.4.3 “You Can’t Jump on Every Horse and Ride It": Advising the ANA 203rd Corps 146 5.5 Deviant Case Analysis ...... 148 5.5.1 Building and Advising the Iraqi National Army (IA) 2003-2009 ...... 148 5.5.2 Disconnected Commanders and Leveraging Assessments ...... 153 5.5.3 The Challenges of Ethnic Fault Lines and Competition ...... 156 5.6 Conclusion ...... 159 6 Conclusion ...... 160 6.1 Summary ...... 161 6.2 Theory Generalizability ...... 163 6.3 Implications for Future Research ...... 164 6.4 Implications for Policy ...... 167 Bibliography ...... 171

A Comparative Case Study Codings ...... 190

B Quantitative Analysis Robustness Tests ...... 193

xi B.1 Endogeneity and Contamination ...... 193 B.2 Accounting for Measurement Error ...... 195 B.3 Spatial Dependence ...... 197 B.4 Temporal Sequencing ...... 202 B.5 Considering Alternative Measures ...... 206 C Medium N Analysis Interview Protocol ...... 208

xii List of Figures

1.1 Iraqi and Afghan Security Force Proﬁciency Ratings ...... 9

3.1 U.S. Funding for the Afghan National Police, 2002-2012 ...... 51 3.2 Golestan, Garmser, and Naw Zad Locations ...... 63 3.3 Insurgent Attack Trends in Case Study Districts ...... 86 3.4 Opium Cultivation Estimates in Case Study Districts (2002-2010) ...... 88

4.1 Afghan National Police PTRAT Excerpts ...... 92 4.2 Average Capability Milestone Scores January 2009-February 2010 ...... 95 4.3 PMT Inventory Reporting in PTRAT ...... 97 4.4 PMT Inventories per Advising Period, January 2009-February 2010 ...... 98 4.5 PMT Inventories and Predicted Capability Milestones ...... 109 4.6 Capability Milestones and PMT Inventories (Loess) ...... 110 4.7 Predicted Capability Milestone Values and PMT Inventories (Basis Regression) 111 4.8 Illustrative Cases: (Moving Clockwise) Waza Zadran, Surkh Rod, and Delaram 113 4.9 PMT Inventories and Election Day Insurgent Violence ...... 118

5.1 Interviewee Sample Data ...... 125 5.2 Intrusion Index and Treated Cases ...... 127 5.3 Dependent Variable: Improvement in Unit Proﬁciency ...... 129 5.4 U.S. Funding for the Afghan National Army, 2002-2012 ...... 141

6.1 Transparency International Defense Sector Corruption Ratings ...... 164

B.1 Predicted Values and PMT Inventories, Graded Response Model Scores . . . 196 B.2 Predicted Values and PMT Inventories, Spatial Lag ...... 197 B.3 Ordered Logit Results ...... 203

xiii List of Tables

3.1 Intrusion Coding Criteria ...... 57 3.2 Advising Ideal Types ...... 59 3.3 Unit Proﬁciency Coding Criteria ...... 60 3.4 Comparative Case Study Summary ...... 62

4.1 Capability Milestone (Lagged) and PMT Inventories ...... 100 4.2 PMT Inventories (lagged) and Capability Milestones ...... 100 4.3 Summary Statistics ...... 104 4.4 Random Effects Model Results ...... 108 4.5 Illustrative Case Values ...... 113

5.1 Advising Ideal Types ...... 126 5.2 Medium N Partner Unit Sample ...... 131 5.3 Medium N Partner Unit Sample After Pairwise Matching ...... 132 5.4 Matched Partner Units ...... 133 5.5 Ranked Partner Units, Full Matching ...... 134 5.6 Cases for Further Analysis ...... 136

A.1 Comparative Case Study Monitoring Coding ...... 190 A.2 Comparative Case Study Coercion Coding ...... 191 A.3 Comparative Case Study Proﬁciency Coding ...... 192

B.1 Capability Milestones (Lagged) and PMT Inventory ...... 193 B.2 PMT Inventory (Lagged) and Capability Milestones ...... 194 B.3 Random Effects Model Results, GRM Scores ...... 196 B.4 Queen’s Contiguity Spatial Regression Results ...... 198 B.5 Queen’s Contiguity Spatial Regression Results, GRM Scores ...... 199 B.6 Nearest Neighbor Spatial Regression Results ...... 200 B.7 Nearest Neighbor Spatial Regression Results, GRM Scores ...... 201 B.8 Ordered Logit Model Results ...... 204 B.9 Ordinary Lease Squares Results ...... 205 B.10 Election Violence Negative Binomial Results ...... 206 B.11 Election Violence Zero-Inﬂated Negative Binomial Results ...... 207

xiv Chapter 1: Introduction

2014 was a disappointing year for American-backed partner forces. In June 2014 two Divisions of Iraqi Army soldiers - nearly 30,000 men - faced an assault from 800 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) insurgents. Rather than remain and fight a numerically and materially inferior opponent, the soldiers stripped off their uniforms, dropped their weapons, and fled, abandoning their posts and millions of dollars worth of equipment.1 The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) were similarly challenged. A 2014 Department of Defense report noted, “Within the ANSF, reports of corruption range from ANP extortion at illegal checkpoints to higher-level corruption in the Afghan security institutions (e.g., pay-for-position schemes, taking bribes from contractors, and “land grabbing”). All of these activities have hurt the reputation and efficiency of the security ministries."2 In December 2014, outgoing Commander of the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, Lieutenant General Joseph Anderson, contended that “record casualties of Afghan forces are not sustainable, and neither are their astounding desertion rates."3 Needless to say, these were hardly the outcomes the United States had hoped for. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. had invested considerable amounts of training, equipment, and advice -referred to herein as Security Force Assistance (SFA)- to develop more proficient security forces. In Iraq, America’s investment amounted to approximately $25 billion, in Afghanistan, $70 billion.4 And, a number of advisers lost their lives providing this assistance. Scholars of SFA, foreign aid effectiveness, and conflict intervention would find the poor performance of the Afghan and Iraqi forces unsurprising and even over-determined.

1“Iraq Army Capitulates to ISIS Militants in Four Cities," The Guardian, June 11, 2014. Avail- able at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/11/mosul-isis-gunmen-middle-east- states. 2Department of Defense 2014, p. 95. 3Azam Ahmed, “Misgivings by U.S. General as Afghan Mission Ends," New York Times, December 4, 2018. See also:SIGAR 2015b, p. 95. 4SIGAR 2017; GAO 2010.

1 Indeed, in both countries the U.S. worked with challenging clients more concerned with internal coups and insurrections than external insurgents. This rendered both governments deeply resistant to developing technocratic, professional forces that could effectively execute counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the ﬁeld. And, the United States did not impose systematic, theater-wide aid conditionality or intrusive reform policies that may have more closely aligned the interests between the U.S. and recipient governments. Yet, in both Iraq and Afghanistan there was considerable subnational variance in the combat performance of each country’s security forces. Simply put, some Iraqi and Afghan units performed better than others, even when national-level recipient characteristics and donor policies were suboptimal. In Afghanistan, by December 2012 20 of the 121 assessed Afghan National Army battalions were rated as being capable of independently planning and executing missions, while also coordinating with adjacent units.5 72 battalions were able to do so with some limited assistance from coalition forces, 22 required more routine support, and 7 necessitated constant support to carry out these tasks.6 Similarly, in January 2007 4 of the 27 assessed Iraqi Police battalion headquarters were capable of planning, executing, and sustaining COIN operations with some coalition or Iraqi support, and 23 were capable of partially doing so.7 This type of variance is not unique to Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, Pakistani and Filipino units have demonstrated similar diversity. Filipino units deployed to the country’s southern islands, for example, have shown far greater COIN capabilities than those in other regions.8 Pakistani forces operating in Malakand and the Swat Valley have used force discriminately when clearing territory of insurgent forces. Conversely, Pakistani operations in areas of the FATA and Balochistan have relied on more heavy-handed methods.9 In this project I aim to explain this local variation in the combat effectiveness of SFA

5Department of Defense 2012, p. 93. 6Department of Defense 2012, p. 93. 7Department of Defense 2008a, p. 44. 8Watts et al. 2014, p. 103. 9Watts et al. 2014, pp. 143-147.

2 recipient units. That is, I ask: Why do some security force units who have received foreign training, advice, and assistance perform better than others, even when we hold national- level variables and donor policies constant? What incentives do recipient units operating in challenging or dysfunctional security institutions tend to face on the battlefield? Why are they often resistant to becoming more proficient in the conduct of war? Can advisers from countries like the United States affect these incentives? If so, how, and under what conditions? The answers to these questions are critical to both theory and practice. A more nuanced understanding of the local determinants of SFA success and failure can inform a diverse body of scholarship, from studies examining conflict intervention and enforcement dynamics in international and comparative politics to those tracing the local effects of foreign aid. The relationship between monitoring, coercion, and cooperation this study explores also speaks to a much broader literature on enforcement and the spread of ideas in international politics. A range of phenomena, from post-conflict peace resolutions to trade agreements, require enforcement to ensure compliance and manage cooperation. More important, the study’s findings can help answer important questions relevant to U.S. defense policy. Understanding the extent to which advisers can affect partner unit behavior can help policy makers identify the ceiling in SFA’s effectiveness. The remainder of this introductory chapter is organized as follows. It begins with a brief review of the centrality of SFA to U.S. foreign policy. It then turns to the scholarship that has highlighted SFA donor-recipient interest alignment and donor policies as key intervening variables that can limit SFA’s effectiveness. It follows this review by exploring the considerable subnational variation in the combat performance of Iraqi and Afghan security force units, before summarizing this study’s theory, research design, and findings. This chapter concludes with a roadmap for the following chapters.

3 1.1 Security Force Assistance and U.S. Defense Policy

The provision of training, advice, and assistance to improve the battlefield effectiveness of foreign security forces has long been a critical instrument of U.S. foreign policy. During the 1970s, the Nixon doctrine asserted that US “materiel and training can enable nations...to deal with threats against them..."10 Later, support to proxy forces on the ground was a key component of the so-called “Afghan model" of warfare, wherein local forces were backed with foreign advisers and airpower.11 In 2010 then-Secretary Robert Gates suggested that through SFA, the US can improve “the operational capacity of its partners by training and equipping troops and mentoring them in the field" 12 That is, Security Force Assistance could “help others defend themselves"13 More recently, in discussing the campaign to defeat the Islamic State, then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis suggested, “We will do it through developing their [other nations’] capabilities to do a lot of the fighting...certainly, we can help train them for what they face."14 Across the combatant commands the U.S. works to achieve a number of objectives working, by, with, and through local allies. The commander of U.S. Central Command, General Joseph Votel recently argued, for example, that “ The idea of by, with, and through is one that resonates in this area. It has become the principal way we approach things."15 In his 2018 posture statement, the commander of U.S. Africa Command General Thomas Waldhauser similarly notes, “Security operations are executed almost exclusively by the partnered security forces...The vital objectives of the U.S. and the partnered nation are achieved through a cooperative relationship in which U.S. Africa Command plays a support- ing role."16 United States European Command (USEUCOM)’s posture statement echoes

10Nixon 1971. 11Andres, Wills and Grifﬁth Jr 2006. For a critical review of this approach, see: Biddle 2006. 12Gates 2010, p. 2. 13Gates 2010. 14“Transcript: Defense Secretary James Mattis on ‘Face the Nation’ May 28, 2017." 15Elliason 2018, p. 39 . 16Waldhauser 2018, p. 3.

4 this sentiment: “USEUCOM complements its support to NATO with bilateral partnership and capacity building efforts with allies and partners....Through these and other activities, USEUCOM helps to ensure that NATO hones its operational edge that allies meet defense obligations, and that partners are equipped to defend their sovereign territory."17 Working with local security partners similarly features prominently in Southern Command (USSOUTCHOM) as well.18 The U.S. Army in particular has shown an enthusiasm for the mission. In 2017 the Army fielded its first Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB), a unit designed specifically to train, advise, and assist foreign security forces. The SFABs are intended to serve as “the day-to-day experts combatant commanders need to train, advise and assist our partners overseas."19 Discussing the SFAB’s creation U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley argued, “We are training, advising, and assisting indigenous small armies all over the world...And I anticipate and expect that’ll increase, not decrease, in the years to come."20 This support for SFA as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy and consequent adjustments to U.S. force structure are not without their own logic; on paper SFA appears to be a particularly tempting approach for addressing threats that, while not existential for U.S. survival, can still harm U.S. interests abroad. Building partner capacity was touted as a responsible way to reduce the major commitment of U.S. ground troops dedicated to costly nation-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.21 Others see training, equipment, and advice

17Scaparrotti 2018, p. 9. 18The 2018 posture statement argues, ““we continue to build capability, capacity, and interoperability, expand information sharing, and deepen linkages with the many committed and capable partners we have in the region." Tiff 2018, p. 9 19U.S. Army Public Affairs, “Army Creates Security Force Assistance Brigade and Mili- tary Advisor Training Academy at Fort Benning," February 16, 2017. Available at: https: //www.army.mil/article/182646/army_creates_security_force_assistance_brigade_and_ military_advisor_training_academy_at_fort_benning 20Meghann Myers, "Milley: A bigger Army will mean more soldiers to support training missions around the world," Army Times, October 9, 2017. Available at: https://www.armytimes.com/news/your- army/2017/10/09/milley-a-bigger-army-will-mean-more-soldiers-to-support-training- missions-around\-the-world/ 21As President Trump noted in his Afghanistan strategy speech, “The stronger the Afghan security forces become, the less we will have to do." See “Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia," August 21, 2017. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/ remarks-president-trump-strategy-afghanistan-south-asia/.

5 as a lower cost alternative to the deployment of U.S. ground troops.22 And, in its reliance on indigenous allies with greater local knowledge and cultural sensitivity, SFA can even be more effective than the use of foreign troops.23 Nor are the proponents of this approach lacking empirical evidence. President Obama pointed to Yemen and Somalia to justify the use of SFA in his strategy against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).24 US counterinsurgency doctrine instead highlights El Salvador to bolster its position.25 A number of policy analysts similarly draw on other “success" cases, typically Colombia or the Philippines.26 Nevertheless, more searching analyses are far less optimistic. I turn to these next.

1.2 Determinants of SFA Success

A variety of scholarship touches on the relationship between Security Force Assistance and recipient combat proficiency, but few evaluate it directly. SFA can be considered a type of foreign aid, a case of conflict intervention, or an attempt by donors to spread policies and ideas in the international system. Although work on these topics often does not directly evaluate the relationship between foreign training, advice, and assistance and recipient combat proficiency, it tends to explain other outcomes -recipient economic policies or repression, incumbent victory over insurgent groups, and others- using national-level variables such as regime type, combatant strategies, and the timing of external interventions. For the work that focuses on conflict-related outcomes, an increase in recipient battlefield effectiveness or military power is typically the implied mechanism driving hypothesized relationships, but it is rarely tested.27 That said, a smaller, but growing, body of work more explicitly evaluates the relationship

22Andres, Wills and Grifﬁth Jr 2006. 23Votel 2018, p. 38. 24White House Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on ISIL," September, 10 2014. 25US Army 2014, 11-1. 26Farris 2009; Lambert, Lewis and Sewall 2012; Robinson 2012. 27See, e.g.: Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce 2008; Gent 2008; Sullivan and Karreth 2014; Wood, Kathman and Gent 2012; Jones 2017; Findley and Teo 2006; Regan and Aydin 2006; Savun and Tirone 2011.

6 between SFA and recipient combat proficiency. This work has identified donor-recipient interest misalignment and donor policies as being key intervening variables that can complicate the ability of foreign training, advise, and assistance to increase the battlefield effectiveness of recipient state security forces. A wave of recent scholarship has observed that in political systems typical of SFA recipients, elites will be resistant to making the necessary institutional changes that might produce the technocratic, apolitical security forces that will carry out advanced tactics and operations in the field.28 American SFA is rarely provided to states with incentives to use it effectively.29 Leaders concerned with coups and internal dissent from within their ruling coalition have incentives to resist developing a professional and capable security force.30 Indeed, as Antonio Giustozzi succinctly argues, “what is good military advice may not make sense at all politically."31 Donors have tended to produce more favorable aggregate, national-level outcomes in recipient proficiency by recognizing these misaligned interests and making aid payments contingent on recipient cooperation and/or deliberately working to reform recipient institutions.32 Policies of conditionality entail rewarding recipients for complying with the donor’s demands for reform and witholding aid to punish the recipient if they refuse to cooperate.33 Thus, aid conditionality often goes hand in hand with intrusive donor policies designed to realign or transform the personnel policies and design of the recipient’s security

28Biddle, Macdonald and Baker 2017; Byman 2006; Ladwig 2016; Hazelton 2018; Watts et al. 2014; Karlin 2017; Lake 2016. To be sure, this is not always the case. In Greece, for example, U.S. SFA proved most effective when combined with a commander-in-chief of the Army willing to remove ineffective commanders. See: Karlin 2017, pp. 52-56. U.S. SFA in the Philippines was similarly more successful when Simon Magsasay, who was receptive to reforming the security forces, took over as Secretary of Defense. See: Ladwig 2017, pp. 115-122. Such alignment is rare, however, as if elites had incentives to improve their security forces, it is unlikely that the threats SFA is intended to address -terrorism, insurgency, and interstate conflicts - would have metastasized in the first place. Put simply, foreign materiel is rarely the key missing ingredient to states’ battlefield effectiveness. 29Mott 1999; Sullivan, Tessman and Li 2011; Boutton 2014; Bapat 2011. 30Talmadge 2015; Quinlivan 1999; Biddle and Zirkle 1996; Biddle, Macdonald and Baker 2017; Grissom 2013; Savage and Caverley 2017; Wright 2010. 31Giustozzi 2011, p. 157. 32For the importance (and challenges) of conditionality in foreign aid, see, e.g. Girod and Tobin 2016; Bearce and Tirone 2010; Bermeo 2016. 33Ladwig 2017.

7 forces.34 During the Salvadorian civil war, for example, the Carter administration successfully inﬂuenced Salvadorian government behavior by threatening to withhold a shipment of helicopters until the government took concrete steps to curb human rights abuses, to include relieving unit commanders that were implicated in the use of indiscriminate violence.35 In Korea, the United States similarly conditioned the provision of military equipment on the professionalization of the Korean Army.36 Interest misalignment resulting from adverse recipient characteristics and donor policies are compelling explanations for national-level outcomes in SFA’s effectiveness. That is, these theories can explain why, for any given country where these variables are present or absent, SFA will generally be unlikely to improve the recipient’s conduct in warfare. But, these slow-moving, structural variables offer less explanatory power when we examine the considerable subnational variance in recipient security force unit proﬁciency. I turn to this next.

1.3 The Puzzle of Subnational Variation

The mixed combat performance of security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan - cases that unequivocally had severe interest misalignment between donor and recipient, as well as suboptimal national-level donor policies- highlights some limitation in the explanatory power of these variables. Drawing on declassiﬁed adviser evaluations from Iraq and Afghanistan, Figure 1.1 below illustrates this variance. The upper row consists of Capability Milestone ratings - a structured evaluation used in Afghanistan from 2005-2010 for Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police units.37 The bottom row depicts adviser ratings of Iraqi National Police and Army units, which were evaluated through the Transition Readiness Assessments.38 Although they draw on different criteria, under each rating

34Karlin 2017. 35Ladwig 2016, pp. 113-114. 36Biddle, Macdonald and Baker 2017, pp. 30-38. 37GAO 2008b, p. 6.. 38GAO 2007c, p. 30..

8 system units colored green are those most proﬁcient in the conduct of war, and red units are least proﬁcient. Setting aside any nuances of the assessment criteria, we see clearly that some Afghan and Iraqi units fought better than others even amidst divergent interests between the United States and the recipient governments and donor policies aimed more towards force generation and technocratic capacity building than coercive and intrusive aid conditionality.

Figure 1.1: Iraqi and Afghan Security Force Proﬁciency Ratings39

Qualitative accounts support these ratings in both theaters. The Nirkh district Afghan National Police assessment positively notes, for example, that, “The ANP have been conducting reinforcement training which is evident in their improved performance during operations...The CDR [Commander] has established a rotation plan for check points that

39Sources (Clockwise from the upper left): CJTF-Phoenix, “Training Readiness and Assessment Tool Brieﬁng," October 2019; CJTF-Phoenix, “Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool Brieﬁng," March 2010; Multinational Corps-Iraq, “Transition Readiness Assessment Brief," April 2007; Multinational Corps-Iraq, “Transition Readiness Assessment Brief," March 2007.

9 allows all personnel in the district time to train."40 Conversely, the Deh Sabz advisers pointed out that the “Deh Sabz PD [Police District] chief, Platoon leader, and Personnel Officer are corrupt. [He] taxes businesses in his district. [We are] waiting for their removal.41 The Afghan National Army demonstrates a similar trend; in one report advisers lament the “poor senior leadership, personnel mismanagement, high optempo [operational tempo] and denied leave," that led to poor performance throughout an entire brigade, whereas another notes that an Afghan kandak (battalion) “continues to improve...the Kandak continues to focus training on NATO weapons qualification..."42 Iraqi units were similarly diverse. According to advisers, one Iraqi Army battalion “understands atmospherics and spheres of influence in the AO [Area of Operations] and is working on developing positive improved positive relationships within the AO with key leaders," whereas in another “the leadership turns a blind eye to crimes committed on the population by its officers..."43 With respect to the Iraqi police, one battalion’s advisers expressed “significant reservations that the battalion can effectively operate in a Shia dominated area. Personnel seem reluctant to participate and conduct thorough and fair searches," whereas another unit “executed its missions in a professional manner while interacting with the public."44 Simply put, some recipient units fight better than others, even when we hold national- level variables constant. This project aims to explain why. Beyond contributing to a more discerning theory of SFA effectiveness, understanding the sources of this variance can help uncover variables and political dynamics that might also mediate the effects of foreign aid, conflict interventions, and attempts by powerful states and international governing bodies to affect the policy choices of local actors. It can also contribute to existing SFA doctrine and policy. I summarize my study approach and key findings next.

40CJTF-Phoenix, “Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool Briefing," March 29, 2010. 41CJTF-Phoenix, “Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool Briefing," March 29, 2010. 42CJTF-Phoenix, “Training Readiness Assessment Tool Briefing," September 9, 2009. 43Multinational Corps-Iraq,“Transition Readiness Assessment Brief," January 1, 2007. 44Multinational Corps-Iraq,“Transition Readiness Assessment Brief," January 1, 2007.

10 1.4 Theory and Research Design

To explain why some SFA recipient units fight better than others, I begin by identifying the incentives recipient units tend to face on the battlefield. In typical recipient states, security force institutions are used to distribute resources within networks of armed and contentions elites. As a result, security force dysfunction is political. Resources illegally extracted from units’ coffers, local citizens, and criminal elements are paid up the chain of command and used to support patronage networks. At each level in the hierarchy, commanders receive their cut of the profits, but are also reliant on the dishonesty of their subordinates. If units begin to operate according to foreign doctrine, recipient units face consequences, both in the form of sanctioning from within their own chains of command and insurgent reprisals. Foreign assistance can help allow patronage networks to function. Needless to say, then, under these conditions recipient units will be wedded to the status quo. Put differently, these units will be highly apathetic, refusing to respond to their adviser’s behavior by performing additional tasks. Under these circumstances, advisers can motivate the recipient unit to improve by threatening to withhold resources from them. Conveying these threats generates two countervailing forces, however. On the one hand, consistent with the disciplining effect identified in existing principal agent literature, threats will make recipient units less apathetic, and, as a result, more cooperative with the adviser. This will lead to an increase in partner unit proficiency. On the other hand, threats also generate recipient unit anger. By anger, I refer to the recipient unit’s perception that an adviser has committed an intentional act that interferes with the recipient unit’s welfare. Anger will undermine recipient unit cooperation and proficiency. Advisers convey these threats through intrusive behaviors, defined as efforts to detect partner unit corruption and coerce them to change their behavior. Highly intrusive advisers will render their partner units less apathetic, but the high level of anger will undermine the recipient’s willingness to cooperate. Unintrusive advisers will not produce anger,

11 but will also lead the recipient unit to remain apathetic and unresponsive to the adviser’s behavior. The result of these tradeoffs is an optimum at moderate levels of intrusion, wherein advisers can improve partner unit proficiency by eroding apathy, without triggering the proficiency-inhibiting effects of anger. My research design triangulates findings from three distinct approaches. First, I draw on newly-declassified archival material, command histories, and research interviews to conduct a structured comparison of three Afghan National Police advising teams who employed different levels of intrusion. These comparative case studies closely measure my independent and dependent variables and provide a detailed tracing of my proposed causal mechanism. I expand my inquiry of the ANP to a broader sample of 120 units advised by the United States military from January 2009-February 2010. Using new data on ANP proficiency and adviser behavior, the results identify robust statistical correlations that similarly align with my central hypothesis. Finally, I draw on a medium-n sample of 19 Afghan and Iraqi units, conducting quantitative analysis of otherwise equivalent units that received different levels of adviser intrusion, while also examining cases that align with and deviate from my theory more closely.

1.5 Findings and Signiﬁcance

The results lend strong support to my theory; the best performing recipient units are those whose advisers were moderately intrusive. The comparative case studies reveal that the ANP unit with moderately intrusive advisers showed considerable improvement in proficiency. The statistical analysis also supports the hypothesis, showing an inverted U relationship between adviser intrusion and recipient combat effectiveness. Finally, the medium n analysis similarly finds that recipient units with moderately intrusive advisers showed greater levels of improvement over time. These findings have implications for a variety of scholarship in the social sciences. Most narrowly, future work examining the relationship between SFA and recipient battlefield

12 effectiveness should better incorporate adviser behavior as an important independent variable and consider the theoretical downsides of highly coercive SFA policies. Of course, adviser intrusion is not the only factor that will drive recipient unit proficiency; scholars should more closely trace how variables such as local political structures, unit ethnicity, geography, and other factors might mediate the effects of foreign assistance to combatants in civil conflicts and insurgencies. Research on conflict intervention and foreign aid can similarly benefit from more discerning theories that begin to examine subnational variance in their effects. The tradeoffs I examine in this project between monitoring, coercion, and cooperation also speak to a much broader literature on enforcement and the spread of ideas in international politics. A range of phenomena, from post-conflict peace resolutions to trade agreements, require enforcement to ensure compliance and manage cooperation. Further- more, major powers and international organizations also often try to convince less powerful states to change their domestic polices, be they economic, social, or security-related. The findings of this study suggest that in trying to change the behavior of others, more intrusion may not always yield better results. The emotional tradeoffs I examine thus likely apply to an assortment of phenomena of interest to social scientists and fits within a growing body of research in the International Relations and Comparative Politics subfields that have begun to impact whether, how, and why emotions produce variance in patterns of conflict and cooperation.45 Just as important, this study has considerable implications for future U.S. SFA doctrine and policy. First, adviser doctrine and training should be revised to more explicitly discuss how donor-recipient interest misalignment will manifest itself in recipient unit behavior. Advisers should also receive instruction regarding techniques they might employ to address this divergence, to include intrusive behavior. Second, the U.S. military should calibrate their selection criteria for advisers, focusing on traits such as tolerance for ambiguity. Advisers should also be given greater discretion in the disbursement and withholding of resources.

45See, e.g.: Goldgeier and Tetlock 2001; Mercer 2005; McDermott 2004; Petersen 2011.

13 Finally, absent a consequential reform of recipient political institutions, policymakers should expect any positive effects of SFA to be modest and temporary even when advisers optimize their behavior.

1.6 Road Map

I organize the remaining chapters of this dissertation as follows. I begin with my theory and research design. I argue that in the political systems typical of SFA recipients, security force units face powerful incentives to resist improving on the battlefield. But, advisers partnered with these units can affect these incentives through the use of intrusive behaviors. I argue that advisers will be most capable of producing improvements in their partner unit’s performance when they use these measures with moderate intensity. The chapter then outlines my research design and scope conditions for my theory. The following three chapters then proceed with the analysis. I begin with a detailed case study of three Afghan National Police units whose advisers adopted distinct advising strategies, and, in turn, produced cross-sectional variance in their partner unit’s proficiency in counterinsurgency. I then turn to a large-n statistical analysis using new data on 120 ANP units. The final empirical chapter draws on both quantitative and qualitative analysis to evaluate a sample of partner units from Iraq and Afghanistan. The study concludes with recommendations for scholarship and policy.

14 Chapter 2: Theory and Research Design

As discussed in the previous chapter, SFA has led to well-documented and frustrating national-level outcomes. Yet, there is considerable subnational variation in the combat performance of recipient security force units even when national-level recipient characteristics and donor policies remain constant. That is, some recipient units improve in proficiency, while others flatline or regress. The aim of this chapter is to provide a theory that explains this variation and outline a research design to evaluate the theory. I proceed in four steps. First, I identify the common tasks security forces -be they law enforcement, paramilitary, or conventional military- must perform in population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN). These tasks are often time consuming, and, even if perfectly- implemented, extremely risky. They thus require significant motivation on the part of security force units to carry out. Next, I develop the logic underlying the design of security force institutions in the types of weak states that commonly receive SFA. Rather than being an accidental byproduct of low state capacity, systemic corruption is an intentional feature of security institutions in these states. Units within these institutions face risks if they invest time and resources to fight more effectively. Some of these risks emanate from the battlefield, wherein more effective fighting by counterinsurgents can lead to retaliation from insurgents and criminal groups. But, just as pressing are the limits more honest behavior places on a unit’s profits and ability to pay bribes up the chain of command. Corruption within these institutions thus poses powerful barriers that inhibit the ability of security force units to fight more effectively, and, absent external intervention, yields security force units that are deeply and uniformly resistant to fighting as donors like the United States would prefer. The third section of this chapter explores how tradeoffs between adviser apathy and anger produce variance in recipient unit proficiency. External support is enormously beneficial to

15 these units, as it can provide an important source of largess that fuels patronage networks. As a result, advisee concerns that some of this assistance might be withheld can help motivate them to improve. That is, threats to withhold assistance can undermine recipient unit apathy towards their advisers. But, when advisers threaten to withhold assistance, they also antagonize the recipient units. And, high levels of recipient unit anger can lead to behavior that will necessarily inhibit their proﬁciency in COIN. Conveying threats thus produces two opposing mediating processes: eroding partner unit apathy while also increasing partner unit anger. Anger and apathy are thus in constant tension. As a result, advisers should be most successful in persuading their partners to improve when they are moderately threatening. After tracing this logic, I explore how advisers can strike this balance through the use of intrusive behaviors, deﬁned as actions by the adviser to detect partner unit misconduct and coerce the partner unit to change its behavior. The chapter concludes with my strategy for evaluating this argument and a road map for the chapters that follow.

2.1 The Delegation of Warfare in Counterinsurgency

The United States and other donors provide SFA to delegate warfighting to another state. SFA provision by the United States has often entailed the delegation of a very specific type of campaign to the recipient, known in U.S. doctrine as population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN). U.S. COIN doctrine thus provides a useful set of criteria against which to measure the combat performance of recipient units.1 It is important to note that security force proficiency in the conduct of war is distinct from a state’s ability to prevail in COIN. Victory in counterinsurgency is driven by numerous exogenous factors. Thiese include the stakes involved in the conflict, each actor’s resolve,

1Although the cases I examine in this study renders population-centric COIN the appropriate dependent variable, the theory applies more broadly. Indeed, excelling in conventional wars similarly requires that elites invest in an apolitical, technocratic security sector. See: Talmadge 2015; Biddle and Zirkle 1996.

16 the terrain on which the campaign is being fought, among other variables.2 It is now well- established in security studies that “Victory is an outcome of battle; it is not what a military organization does in battle."3 U.S. COIN doctrine identifies the establishment of a legitimate government capable of providing security to its population as the primary goal for counterinsurgency campaigns.4 Insurgents often do not wear uniforms, and, as a result, rely heavily on the local population for cover and concealment. The key task for the counterinsurgent, then, is to convince the local population to provide intelligence on insurgents and proceed to exercise discriminate force against them.5 Accomplishing this requires a set of interdependent tasks, which, when combined, constitutes the dependent variable for this study. These tasks both enhance internal cohesion and morale within a unit, while also ensuring that they protect the local population from insurgents without prejudice for ethnic, religious, and other cleavages, while also using discriminate force against violent groups. First, effective COIN units must keep their equipment functioning. This influences both unit readiness, as well as morale. A unit’s personnel will have little confidence to conduct operations if they cannot trust that their equipment is in working order, nor will they trust one another for support on the battlefield. This task may seem trivial, but it is critical. An underequipped security force unit may collapse in the face of an insurgent threat or be otherwise unmotivated to carry out operations. Next, security force units must maneuver in the field to generate intelligence about insurgent forces from locals. To do so, security forces need to plan and execute operations, wherein they “leave the garrison" to interact with the population, gather atmospherics about insurgent activities by manning checkpoints, patrol in contested areas, and other activities.6 This often requires that security forces maneuver and operate in small units.7 By operating

2 Biddle 2005; Brooks and Stanley 2007; Talmadge 2015. 3 Millett, Murray and Watman 1986, p. 38. 4US Army 2014, 1-19. 5Kalyvas 2006; Lyall and Wilson 2009. 6Byman 2006, p. 91. 7US Army 2006, 5-12, 7-3.

17 in battalion and smaller-sized elements, counterinsurgent forces can cover far more ground, providing clear operational benefits. Operating in brigade and division-sized formations limits the proportion of the population that can be protected by security forces, and, as a result, restricts the amount of intelligence those forces can generate about the insurgency. As they are maneuvering in small units, security forces need to avoid taking actions that might lead locals to turn to insurgents for protection. Demanding bribes from locals, abusing a rival ethnic group, using drugs while on duty, or sleeping on a checkpoint will undermine locals’ perceptions of the security force’s reliability. This is even more critical in counterinsurgency, as locals are expected to provide intelligence to security forces without fear of reprisal. Security forces generate intelligence so that they can then exercise force discriminately and “strike the right targets at the right time."8 That is, security forces in COIN need to integrate intelligence and operations.9 As noted earlier, security forces must collect intelligence about insurgent forces from the local population. But, security forces must then conduct operations based on that information in such a way that does not inhibit their ability to generate additional intelligence. For example, drawing on a tip from locals to strike an insurgent safe house could actually have negative fallout if counterinsurgent forces accidentally damage neighboring houses in the process. In this section I have outlined the basic tasks that donors such as the United States hope recipients of its training, equipment, and advice will be able to carry out on the battlefield in counterinsurgency. These tasks include tracking equipment and personnel, generating intelligence from locals, and integrating intelligence into their operations. At first glance, these tasks may appear to be obvious -even trivial- for security force units to perform. Surely, with the right training and equipment, any security force would be willing to carry them out. Yet, in the section that follows I describe how the very nature of political systems common to recipient states undermines the willingness of security force units to operate according to

8 US Army 2009, 4-26. 9US Army 2006, 3-25.

18 U.S. doctrine.

2.2 The Risks of Combat Proﬁciency in Weak States

Perhaps one of the most frustrating aspects of SFA provision is that the types of states that tend to receive training, advice, and assistance are those that are least willing to invest these resources to develop the combat proficiency of their security forces.10 Insurgency, terrorism, and transnational criminal organizations do not emerge in a vacuum. Rather, these types of threats metastasize in states where political authority is contested, often violently, and state institutions are designed to manage competition between armed and potentially contentious elites. Institutions play this role by facilitating rent distribution within elite patronage networks. Security forces in these types of regimes, then, allow privileged elites and their associated clients to extract resources from their positions, often in the form of business deals, bribes, kickbacks, and collusion with criminal elements.11 The need for institutional rents to balance between competing elites comes at the expense of security forces’ motivation for and proficiency in warfare against external threats. Paradoxically, the more the security sector comes to resemble a technocratic, apolitical enterprise that can effectively deal with external challengers, the less secure the regime will be, as the elite group that is currently sitting atop the security sector could easily use a professional security force to overthrow the state.12 Because these forces serve as a vehicle for regime patronage, command hierarchies within them often resemble pyramids in which commanders at each level are responsible for extracting resources and channeling them up the chain of command. Officers at the top of the security sector generate rents directly through privileged business transactions

10Biddle, Macdonald and Baker 2017; Sullivan, Tessman and Li 2011. 11North, Wallis and Weingast 2009, pp. 18-21. Developmental economists and scholars of comparative politics use a number of alternative terms to describe similar systems. See, e.g.: Rothstein and Teorell 2008; Mungiu 2006; Diamond 2008; Reno 2000; Acemoglu, Verdier and Robinson 2004; Naím 2012; Roessler and Ohls 2018. This closely mirrors scholarship examining “coup-prooﬁng" strategies. See: Biddle and Zirkle 1996; Quinlivan 1999; Talmadge 2015. 12Biddle, Macdonald and Baker 2017; Grissom 2013; Savage and Caverley 2017.

19 and other forms of state capture. In Yemen under Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh, for example, the military was predominately controlled by two rival elite networks, both of which amassed a fortune by expropriating and distributing land to their loyalist officers, who then sold the land to developers for a profit.13 Senior officers also often accept bribes in return for military procurement contracts. In Namibia, for example, the former head of the Namibia defense force received $ 700,000 in bribes from a Chinese technology firm.14 In Mali, the procurement process is similarly riddled with a series of kickbacks and unethical practices.15 Rent extraction trickles down the chain of command of security forces, driving corruption at all levels. The potential economic benefits command positions afford render them commodities that can be sold to the highest bidder. To make this investment worth their while, though, officers who have bought their positions take actions that generate wealth but are detrimental to their unit’s readiness, morale, and battlefield performance. They must also pay a portion of these earnings to higher headquarters. To generate resources, commanders will sell their unit’s equipment, supplies, and food rations on the black market, while manipulating personnel records to receive surplus salaries. Hollowed out units are thus asked to go into battle under-equipped, undermanned, and with very poor morale. In Nigeria, for example, units were sent to fight Boko Haram without bullets, leading scores of soldiers to refuse to fight.16 These positions also provide ample opportunity to extract resources from citizens and local criminals. Unit leadership will require their foot soldiers demand bribes from local shopkeepers, extract tolls at checkpoints, or simply rob citizens in their homes. They might also selectively enforce the law, accepting kickbacks from traffickers and other criminal organizations. In Northern Mali, for example, officers have become closely-linked to

13Hill et al. 2015, pp. 20-21. 14“Regional Results, Africa: Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index," Transparency International, 2015, p. 10 15“Regional Results, Africa: Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index," Transparency International, 2015, p. 10 16Aryn Baker, “Nigeria’s Army Quails When Faced with Boko Haram,” Time, February 10, 2015; Kevin Sieff, “The Nigerian Military is so Broken, its Soldiers are Refusing to Fight,” Time, May 10, 2015.

20 cigarette and cocaine smuggling, whereas in Cameroon and Cote d’Ivoire security forces have relied on extortion rackets to supplement their income.17 Improving in battlefield effectiveness exposes personnel in these units to personal risk. On its own, population-centric COIN is hazardous. Operating on small, isolated outposts and maintaining the initiative by carrying out dismounted patrols amongst a potentially hostile population places security force units in a great deal of danger. And, beginning to collect information on, arrest, and exercise force against local armed groups or criminals betrays formal or informal “live and let live" arrangements. Abiding by Western doctrine is also less profitable than corruption. Cooperation puts less money in the pockets of unit commanders. Even an action as trivial as having his personnel spend time on the firing range could rid the unit of ammunition, and, thus, valuable resources that could be sold for a profit. Properly maintaining equipment means not breaking it down for parts. Planning and conducting dismounted patrols to generate intelligence from locals requires that the unit accurately track and use, rather than sell, its fuel. Convincing soldiers to man checkpoints, maneuver in the field, and putting themselves at great personal risk to use force discriminately may require, at the very least, paying them their full salaries without skimming. And, of course, a unit interacting positively with the local population will not be shaking them down for bribes. By limiting the resources a unit commander can draw from his unit, cooperative behavior renders patronage networks less profitable, which may in turn lead to hostility from superior commanders. A unit commander who defects from the patronage-based system and refuses or is otherwise unable to pay a kickback up the chain of command inherently threatens the wealth of his superior commander. It can also limit this superior commander’s ability to continue paying a bribe to his higher headquarters. As such, superior commanders will go to great lengths to protect their privileged positions, targeting any honest subordinate with

17“Regional Results, Africa: Government Defense Anti-Corruption Index,” Transparency International, 2015; “Cote d’Ivoire: Extortion by Security Forces: Prosecute Violators; Strengthen Anti- Racket Unit,” Human Rights Watch, July 29, 2015.

21 politicized anti-corruption investigations, arrest, and even violence. Under these circumstances, security force institutions will often welcome foreign assistance, but not for the reasons donors like the United States would prefer. An influx of foreign weapon systems, ammunition, vehicles, salary payments, uniforms, boots, and other material support provide extremely profitable opportunities for unit commanders. This type of support can thus be a critical source of personal affluence on the black market, and allow patronage networks to function. Just as a partner unit enjoys these various forms of largess, however, so too do they fear their removal. Fewer resources means fewer opportunities for corruption, and less stable patronage networks. In sum, in the political systems typical of many SFA recipients, regime stability is predicated on the balance of spoils between elite networks. Elites rely on positions within security force institutions to serve as a mechanism through which they can distribute patronage. Rather than being driven by a lack of technocratic knowledge or capacity, dysfunction within security forces is thus political. Resources illegally extracted from the unit’s materiel, local citizens, and criminal elements are paid up the chain of command. At each level in the hierarchy, commanders receive their cut of the profits, but are also reliant on the dishonesty of their subordinate units. This behavior is necessarily at odds with Western COIN doctrine. Because these institutions provide the foundation of regime stability, though, units operating within them face potentially lethal repercussions if they choose to defect and begin behaving more effectively. Foreign assistance provides a critical source of wealth to fuel these patronage networks and allows for the personal enrichment of unit commanders.

2.3 Military Advising, Apathy, and Anger

To assist building the proﬁciency of foreign security forces, SFA donors often embed advisers with recipient units - be they battalion, brigade, or division-sized elements- in the ﬁeld.18 When deployed to countries with security force institutions like those described 18This is far from a recent phenomena. George Washington, for example, employed a Prussian adviser as the Inspector General of the Army during the American Revolutionary War. After the American Civil War

22 in the previous section, advisers will be interacting with highly apathetic units, who are by default unmotivated to respond to the adviser’s direction. One way advisers might try to motivate units under these circumstances is by threatening them. To be sure, advisers typically have little direct command or authority over the internal affairs of recipient units.19 They cannot hire and fire a unit’s personnel or determine their partner force’s command relationships. Advisers can, however, threaten to withhold a portion of the assistance that the recipient enjoys: they can stop providing a recipient unit with extra fuel, spare parts, and other equipment or enablers. Advisers can also report corruption up their own chain of command to allow their superior commanders to withhold larger shipments of assistance from the advisee as well. The central theoretical claim I advance in this dissertation, though, is that threats produce two mechanisms that influence unit proficiency in opposite directions. On the one hand, threats increase recipient unit proficiency by eroding partner unit apathy, or lack of interest in performing tasks in response to their adviser’s conduct and direction.20 Threatening to withhold resources that are critical to the functioning of a recipient unit’s patronage network and ability to extract rents can certainly discipline the recipient unit’s behavior, making them more responsive to their adviser’s direction. On the other hand, threats also inhibit recipient unit willingness to improve on the battlefield by generating recipient unit anger, defined as the recipient unit’s belief that an adviser has committed an intentional act that interferes with its welfare.21 Anger is a common reaction to externally-imposed control measures. And,

former confederate soldiers assisted with reforming the Egyptian military. For a detailed history of these efforts, see: Loring 1884. European advisers worked extensively to reform the Ottoman military in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Ralston 1996; Shaw 1965. And, of course, military advisers have deployed extensively in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. For reflections on military advising during this period, see: Hajjar 2014b,a; Tupper 2010; Zeller 2012; West 2012. 19Perhaps the most conspicuous exception is the case of South Korea. See: Biddle, Macdonald and Baker 2017, p. 30-38; Ramsey 2011, p. 5-24; Sawyer and Hermes 1962; Gibby 2012. 20This definition aligns most closely with Stuss, Van Reekum and Murphy 2000, who view apathy as “an absence of responsiveness to stimuli as demonstrated by a lack of self-initiated action." On the many definitions of apathy, see: van Reekum, Stuss and Ostrander 2005; Ishii, Weintraub and Mervis 2009. 21This definition aligns with, but is slightly more narrow, than that of Petersen and Zukerman 2010, p. 558, who defines anger as “appraisal that an individual or a group has committed an offensive action against one’s self or group," as well as Petersen 2011, p. 35, who defines it as “cognition that an individual or group has committed a bad action against one’s self or group; action tendency toward punishing that group."

23 anger leads to cognitive processes and coping mechanisms that will undermine the unit’s willingness to cooperate with the adviser. This includes an increase in risk tolerance, deceit, and desire to reassert control over one’s private affairs, all of which can lead the recipient to stubbornly persist in its corrupt behavior. It can also lead to aggression towards perceived perpetrators, which can lead the recipient unit to seek vengeance against their advisers. Whether threats will produce an increase in partner unit proficiency is thus determined by this interaction of apathy and anger, yielding an optimum in recipient unit performance at moderate levels of adviser threats. I explore these concepts and dynamics in greater detail below, before describing how specific adviser behaviors, which I refer to as intrusive measures, convey threats in the section that follows. Before proceeding, it is critical to explain how my theory, which specifies a strong role for emotions as a causal mechanism, might differ from purely rationalist accounts. Under rational choice models, individuals pursue goals “in light of their beliefs."22 Although there is a great deal of diversity within the rational choice framework, the canonical models specify how individuals with transitive, rank-ordered preferences seek to maximize their expected utility or payoff based on the costs and benefits of a set of actions.23 The emotional responses I theorize below, then, are not necessarily irrational. As we will see, emotions shift or constrain the parameters offered in rationalist accounts, to include the ordering and intensity of preferences and the apparent costs and benefits of specific courses of action.24 Apathy refers to a recipient unit’s lack of interest in performing tasks in response to their adviser’s conduct and direction. Apathy renders individuals particularly attached to the status quo and is likely to be the current state of affairs for SFA recipient units.25 As explored in the previous section, units in security force institutions typical of SFA recipients face powerful barriers to developing proficiency in COIN. All units might benefit from their

22Cox 2004. 23For a similar summary, see: Green and Shapiro 1996, pp. 12-15. 24For similar approaches to the inclusion of emotions in the study of civil conﬂict, see: Petersen 2011, pp. 24-28, Petersen and Zukerman 2010, and Wood 2001. 25Ishizaki and Mimura 2011.

24 security sector transforming into an honest, legitimate force working to defeat insurgents and stabilizing their country. But, each unit also knows that shouldering the costs of honest behavior will do little to alter the status quo, and, while they incur casualties in the field and take in less illicit cash, other units will continue safely profiting from illegal activity. As one survey respondent noted in a study of government corruption in Kenya and Uganda, “Everybody does it [corruption], so whether it is bad or good everybody does it anyway. Am I the one who is going to change the world?"26 Naturally, then, recipient units will have a strong bias for maintaining their corrupt status quo, which will be harmful to their proficiency. Population-centric COIN requires that the advisee carry out a number of tasks, which advisers encourage recipients to execute. An apathetic advisee, then, will put little interest in and minimal effort towards complying with an adviser asking them to carry out these tasks. This is not to say that a decrease in advisee apathy is an unqualified positive. A recipient unit may lack apathy vis a vis his adviser, but still be unwilling to improve in counterinsurgency. Under certain conditions, a recipient unit might be motivated to respond to their advisers behavior in ways that are harmful to their proficiency by, for example, actively trying to get rid of or avoiding their meddlesome adviser or becoming more assertive in their corrupt behavior. Just as an apathetic recipient unit will disregard any suggestion that they operate in a manner consistent with modern COIN, so too will they put little effort toward trying to hide their corrupt practices or attempt to dissuade their advisers from intruding into their affairs. Put simply, this definition encompasses only the recipient’s absent response to their adviser’s behavior, with the understanding that this response can take many forms. Related, this definition does not imply that an apathetic recipient unit will be completely lacking in activity or interests.27 An apathetic unit may still have status quo political interests and biases that lead them to demand bribes or food from locals, behave forcefully against a

26Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013, p. 458. For more on the treatment of systemic corruption as a collective action problem, see: Rothstein 2011; Mungiu-Pippidi 2013. 27Thus, my deﬁnition is slightly different from more classical accounts from the literature. See, e.g.: Greenson 1949; Strassman, Thaler and Schein 1956.

25 rival tribe or clan, and develop lucrative schemes to generate wealth. An apathetic recipient unit commander may also meet regularly and share meals with his advisers but show little interest in their adviser’s behavior. Recipient unit apathy should be highest when advisers convey low levels of threats to their partners.28 That is, by maintaining a hands-off posture, advisers provide little impetus for the recipient to show much interest in the adviser’s direction. In situations where security force institutions are thoroughly corrupt, recipient units will simply exploit their adviser’s good will without assuming any of the risk that cooperation entails. Why muster the time and effort required for more proficient behavior if the adviser is so comfortable with the status quo? To help motivate recipient unit cooperation, advisers can threaten their partner unit with aid suspension or withdrawal. Recipient units fear losing the many benefits aid provision affords them. Suspended assistance means fewer opportunities for personal enrichment, a less profitable patronage network for national-level elites, and hostility from their own higher headquarters. Concern over losing some of this assistance, then, can help motivate an otherwise apathetic recipient unit to cooperate with their adviser in order to keep valuable funds flowing. At first glance, eroding apathy through threats might appear to be an unequivocally fruitful advising approach. Indeed, in line with traditional agency theory, we might expect threats to always discipline recipient unit behavior, producing improvements in their proficiency.29 But, corruption provides the basis for the recipient unit’s welfare and goals. It is a way for the unit to generate wealth, pay bribes up the chain of command, and for the unit commander to remain in his position. In fact, corruption is often so normalized and

28The prospect that an adviser might avoid threats is far from remote: perhaps one of the most common themes in U.S. military advising doctrine and practitioner memoirs is the centrality of trust, rapport, and empathy -concepts that conﬂict with threats- to the advising mission. The US COIN manual opines that US advisers must “gain trust and form bonds with HN [Host Nation] security force units and personnel."US Army 2009, 8-5. Indeed, advisers are told to avoid openly criticizing recipient units US Army 2009, 8-21. and to build a relationship based on “understanding, respect, and trust."Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance 2008a, p.11. 29See, e.g.: Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Radner 1981; Ladwig 2017.

26 predictable within these institutions that unit commanders are willing to buy their positions on consignment. Threats thus can also inhibit unit proficiency by generating anger, or a belief by the recipient that an adviser has committed an intentional act that interferes with their welfare.30 We direct anger at another individual or group or individuals due to harm they have inflicted, or threatened to inflict, on us in part because we believe they could have acted differently. That is, the perpetrator had some level of agency and control over the action but chose to take it anyway. Adviser threats generate anger for a number of reasons. First, and most generally, individuals often respond to externally imposed control measures with anger.31 Next, anger can also arise from criticism, a belief that one’s trust has been betrayed, and, ultimately, when an individual wants to “to keep control of that which is [theirs.]"32 Anger thus also has a normative component, as threats can violate recipient units’ sense of entitlement to rent extraction.33 Anger contributes to a number of coping mechanisms which, in turn, can lead to advisee behavior that will not be conducive to COIN proficiency. First, angry individuals are more risk tolerant.34 Extremely angry individuals become less concerned with the scale and magnitude of punishments they may face for a given action. As such, angry advisees might simply continue in their corrupt activities, brushing off the adviser’s threats to withhold assistance. Anger also often gives way to vengeance. An angry recipient might remain stubbornly corrupt as a way of “re-establishing and reaffirming the violated moral standard," namely, their right to extract resources.35 Angry individuals further “lower their

30Of course, low and moderate levels of anger are perhaps best described as annoyance, frustration, or irritation, emotions which some scholarship refers to as “subanger." See: Potegal and Stemmler 2010; Dutton, Webb and Ryan 1994. 31Reeve 2014, p. 407. See also: Stephens and Groeger 2011; De Rivera 1981. 32Fehr et al. 1999, Levenson 2011, p. 380. 33On the moral component of anger, sometimes referred to as “moral outrage," see, e.g.:Batson et al. 2007; Bies 1987. 34Lerner and Keltner 2001; Lerner and Tiedens 2006. 35Batson et al. 2007.

27 thresholds for making attributions of harmful intent and recommending harsh punishment,"36 and attempt to “re-calibrate" the apparently low value that the perpetrator attaches to the individual’s welfare through more confrontational behavior and aggression.37 An angry advisee thus might also lash out at their adviser, even violently. Finally, recent experimental evidence has demonstrated that angry individuals are also more likely to engage in deceptive behaviors.38 Angry advisees, then, may go to great lengths to conceal their corrupt behavior or evade their adviser’s watchful eye. All of the behaviors anger elicits will also be rather durable. Anger has an unfor- tunate “attention funneling" effect, wherein angry individuals “perceive new events and objects in ways that are consistent" with their emotional state.39 This, coupled with anger’s well-documented slow decay over time, leads to a powerful “locking in" effect for these suboptimal recipient unit behaviors.40 An angry advisee will view taking revenge against the adviser as preferable to cooperating with them, and will view the risks of continued corruption and aggression against the adviser as rather minimal or otherwise worth enduring. An angry recipient unit, then, will also perform poorly in COIN. It is important to highlight that anger and apathy are two separate concepts. In another context, an individual could, for example, be both angry and apathetic. Imagine, for example, a student who has received a poor mark on an examination. The student might be angry with the professor he views as having intentionally interfered with his well-being, whether by jeopardizing his prospects of graduating, obtaining a job, or both. Even so, the student might also be simultaneously apathetic, uninterested in taking their professor’s advice to drop the course or improve their study habits. The factor driving the tradeoffs between apathy and anger in this study is the corrupt institutional context within which SFA is provided. Corruption exists as both a barrier to increased proﬁciency, and, by extension, something

36Goldberg, Lerner and Tetlock 1999. 37Sell, Tooby and Cosmides 2009. 38Yip and Schweitzer 2016. 39Lerner and Keltner 2000, p. 473. Cited in Petersen 2011, p. 35. 40Petersen 2011, p. 30.

28 that needs to be minimized to decrease recipient unit apathy, and a source of the unit’s welfare whose apparent removal will anger them. Put simply, adviser threats generate two opposing processes that affect a recipient unit’s willingness to cooperate with their adviser and improve in proficiency in opposite directions. Threats can serve to erode recipient unit apathy, rendering the advisee more responsive to their adviser’s conduct and demands. This is positive for partner unit proficiency, as less-apathetic advisees will have some motivation to act in response to their adviser’s edicts. At the same time, threats discourage recipient unit proficiency by producing anger. Anger generates a number of cognitive and behavioral coping mechanisms that will undermine unit proficiency. This proficiency-inhibiting anger mechanism will dominate when threats are high. Ultimately, then, recipient unit cooperation should be highest when threats are conveyed in moderation. Under these circumstances, the adviser will be able to erode a degree of partner unit apathy through threats. That is, the recipient unit will be less indifferent towards their adviser’s direction. But, a moderately threatening adviser will not generate so much anger as to outweigh the apathy-eroding, positive effects of threats on partner unit proficiency. In the section that follows I examine how this dynamic manifests itself in more tangible ways by describing how concrete adviser behaviors convey threats to the partner unit.

2.4 Adviser Intrusion

In this section I explore how advisers convey threats to their partners through a set of activities I refer to as intrusive behaviors, deﬁned as actions advisers take to detect a partner unit’s misconduct and coerce them to change their behavior. This includes monitoring,through which advisers seek to observe what would otherwise be unobservable recipient unit behavior.41 It also includes the threatened or actual withholding of assistance by advisers or their

41Chalykoff and Kochan 1989; Stanton 2000; Niehoff and Moorman 1993.

29 superior commanders.42 Adviser intrusion thus involves the adviser attempting some level of control over their partner’s affairs in ways that convey a lack of trust, as well as implied and sometimes explicit criticism of partner unit conduct. Although they are best viewed as operating in concert, I describe each of these instruments in turn. Among one of the most influential, if under-appreciated, tasks military advisers perform is monitoring their partner force. An adviser might be able to easily observe high partner unit casualties that result from an engagement with insurgents, decreases in tips from the local population, or increases in violence levels in a given area of operations. Advisers might suspect that partner unit corruption is at the source of these issues, but suspicion is of little use. Without clear, concrete evidence of malfeasance, there is little an adviser can use to justify withdrawing assistance. Monitoring allows advisers to generate information and gather evidence of the recipient unit’s wrongdoing. Monitoring can take many forms. First, advisers can audit their partner unit’s weapons serial numbers, personnel roster, and equipment inventories. Related, advisers can watch as their unit receives their salaries, ensuring that the full amount is disbursed appropriately to fielded soldiers who are dutifully showing up to work each day. Although these administrative tasks may seem trivial, if evaluated, these records can contain a wealth of information related to the internal practices of the recipient unit. They can thus provide evidence of corruption, such as having extra personnel on the roster, inoperable equipment for which fuel is still allotted (and sold), and other indicators of illegal compensation. Advisers can also watch their partner units as they operate in the field. This can include surprise visits to the partner unit’s static locations or actively soliciting locals’ or the team interpreter’s views about their partner unit’s conduct. These activities can allow the adviser to detect behavior such as demanding bribes and other types of behavior that might inhibit their ability to collect intelligence from locals. Viewed in advising doctrine as the “least desirable method of motivation," coercive

42This deﬁnition closely mirrors Byman and Waxman 2002 and Sechser 2011’s deﬁnition of coercion. Notably, this encompasses both compellent and deterrent threats. See: Schelling 1966, pp. 69-91.

30 measures include threatening to withhold and/or refusing to provide material support to the recipient.43 It can also include threatening the partner unit with other consequences, such as leadership removal or having superior commanders no longer provide the recipient units with aid. Threats come in many different forms. Implicit threats are those in which the adviser does not directly convey the specific consequences of their partner’s misconduct. For example, advisers can allude to negative repurcussions that might result from a unit demanding bribes from locals or selling their fuel. Advisers can also explicitly threaten their partner units, tying the unit’s adverse behavior to specific disciplining measures. An adviser might threaten to refuse supplementing their partner’s fuel and supplies, or openly tell their partner unit’s leadership that future aid flows will be halted, or, in more extreme cases, that they will be removed or replaced if they do not cooperate.44 Advisers can also directly refuse to grant some auxiliary forms of assistance from their partner units. This can include denying the partner spare parts, fuel, construction material, bottled water, and other items that advisers can provide to compensate for their partners’ supply shortages.45 In more extreme cases, advisers may request that their superior commanders stop aid shipments as well. Taken together, monitoring and coercive measures work in concert to convey threats to the partner unit. Low levels of intrusion will do little to erode recipient unit apathy. Indeed, avoiding the recipient unit’s property books and records and refusing to threaten or otherwise correct advisee corruption will provide little impetus for the recipient to respond to their adviser’s direction, nor will it serve to deter recipient unit misconduct. Under these conditions, a high level of recipient apathy will coincide with a low degree of recipient unit anger - absent any intrusive behavior by the adviser the recipient unit will have no reason to view its welfare as being under attack. The result, then, should be a refusal by the adviser to improve in its COIN proficiency.

43Department of the Army 2009, 9-1. 44To be sure, advisers do not have the authority to easily remove partner unit commanders. But, trying to intimidate their partner unit with this possibility will certainly trigger anger from the recipient unit. 45Deady 2009.

31 Highly intrusive advisers do just the opposite. An adviser who is consistently monitoring their partner’s behavior, threatening to withhold assistance, and, at times, denying them spare parts and other small amounts of aid, will certainly wear down the recipient unit’s indifference towards their adviser. Such an adviser will indeed increase advisee willingness to respond to his behavior, but, the anger-inducing effects of threats will dominate, leading to responses that will be harmful to the unit’s proficiency. Frustrated by the adviser’s intrusive behavior that violates the recipient unit’s perceived entitlement to rent extraction and less adverse to risk, angry advisees will become more willing to shoulder the perceived costs of continuing or even escalating their corrupt behavior. more evasive recipient unit might work harder to hide his misconduct from the inquisitive and threatening advisers. Under these conditions recipient units might also attempt to remove the apparent obstacle to their well-being - the intrusive adviser- by refusing to meet, train, or otherwise interact with them. Buoyed by a higher risk tolerance, the advised unit could also take more extreme measures and turn their weapons on their relentless advisers or intentionally lead these advisers into potentially lethal situations. These advisees will not be at all apathetic, but they will also be angry and vengeful, leading to a low level of proficiency. Moderately intrusive advisers should be most capable of balancing this tradeoff between the apathy-eroding, proficiency-enhancing and the anger-producing, proficiency-inhibiting effect of intrusive behavior. In practice, this involves advisers carrying out what may seem to be sometimes contradictory behaviors, cautiously gathering information about and issuing veiled threats to their partner unit without appearing too hard or soft on corruption. Advisers might show some restraint in monitoring their partner unit, at times avoiding their partner’s internal records, and instead supplementing these occasional investigations of partner unit records with other forms of surreptitious, but less intrusive monitoring. At the same time, advisers would need to maintain enough pressure on and situational awareness of their partner units to ensure that they do not become too apathetic. Advisers adopting this approach also mix direct threats with more implicit advice regarding partner

32 unit corruption and some measured, temporary punishments designed to discipline the partner unit’s behavior. By balancing the need to motivate the advisee to act in response to the adviser’s conduct and behavior with the simultaneous need to avoid advisee indignation, moderately intrusive advisers, then, will be most capable of convincing the advisee to improve on the battleﬁeld. In the previous three sections I have advanced the deductive logic of my theory. I have explored how advisers will be most successful when, through moderate levels of intrusion, they will be able to successfully balance empathy and anger and convince the advisee to improve in proﬁciency. In the sections that follow I turn to my strategy for evaluating this central claim. I begin by discussing the characteristics that will need to be present in order for my theory to apply, as well as some potential inferential challenges inherent in assessing the behavior of military advisers as an independent variable.

2.5 Case Selection

Identifying scope conditions is critical to understanding the relevant universe of cases where one expects their theory to apply. This can help future work test and build on my theory. Of course, a number of potential cases exist that would presumably provide ample material for my study. Of the 517 cases of government-biased interventions during civil conflicts between 1975-2009, 100 involved an intervening party deploying military trainers and weapons to government forces.46 For the purposes of the theory I present in this study, I expect it to hold in situations where 1) a donor state provides training, advice and equipment to a foreign security force 2) the donor state embeds advisers with recipient tactical and/or operational units, 3) the donor state has preferences over how recipient security forces fight on the battlefield, and, critically, 4) the recipient state has incentives to avoid investing in developing its combat proficiency. Of course With these scope conditions in mind, my research design examines military advising by

46Högbladh, Pettersson and Themnér 2011.

33 the United States during Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom. Although I will explore the minutiae of the Iraqi and Afghan forces in the empirical chapters of this dissertation, in both theaters the United States sought to build the proficiency of security forces who had little incentives to cooperate with their foreign advisers. And, much of this resistance was based on political incentives elites faced within each respective political system. In the wake of the 2001 U.S.-led invasion, governing Afghanistan was no easy task. Decades of civil war had empowered a number of militia commanders who represented an array of ethnic and political factions, all vying for power and influence in the emerging political order.47 Rather than attempting to confront the influence of regional militia commanders, President Hamid Karzai coopted them through patronage, creating an extensive network of clients personally and financially bound to him.48 Pressure from anti-Taliban militia and their associated strongmen led Karzai to slow the professionalization of the Afghan National Police, vetoing attempts to remove corrupt or externally-loyal officers from the police force.49 The Afghan National Army (ANA) fared similarly. Somewhat insulated from Karzai’s direct influence, the professionalization of the ANA was still viewed with suspicion by key Ministry of Defense elites who appointed politically-loyal field officers.50 Iraq under Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki exhibits similar characteristics. Coming to power amidst a bloody ethnic civil conflict in 2006, Maliki was heavily reliant on the tenuous support of two other Shiite factions, both of whom maintained sizable militia forces: the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and the faction associated with Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. In order to prolong his political survival, Maliki bypassed constitutional regulations to consolidate his control over the Iraqi Security Forces.51 Promotions within the Iraqi National Police and Iraqi Army units were highly politicized, and often based on sectarian identity rather than technocratic proficiency.52

47 Giustozzi 2009b. 48 Barﬁeld 2010, 272-336. 49 Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2012. 50Giustozzi 2016. 51 Sullivan 2013. 52A March 2007 Department of Defense report notes, for example, that “Corruption, illegal activity, and

34 To help build the proficiency of units within these institutions, the U.S. deployed teams of embedded military advisers. As part of its effort to build the proficiency of the Iraqi and Afghan Security Forces, the United States embedded 10-15 man teams at the battalion, brigade, and division level. At its peak, the mentoring and training of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) involved approximately 140 Embedded Training Teams (ETT) / Operational Military Liaison Teams (OMLT) partnered with ANA and ANP units across the country.53 In Iraq U.S. efforts were similarly diverse. At the height of the U.S-led surge in Iraq, personnel from all services manned approximately 183 Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) and 223 Police Transition Teams (PTTs) across the country.54 Though the ranks of individuals manning these teams varied depending on the level at which they were advising, they consisted of both commissioned and non-commissioned officers (NCOs). Drawing on active duty and reserve forces, the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps provided the bulk of the manpower for advising teams in each country.

2.6 Selection Effects

Having identified how Iraq and Afghanistan meet the scope conditions of my theory, I now turn to some potential inferential challenges associated with my analysis. Any study of Security Force Assistance should consider the potential for selection bias and engodeneity. And, although my subnational research design holds national-level variables constant, it is still vulnerable on this front. Indeed, senior commanders might assign military advising teams that have a demonstrated propensity for moderate intrusion to already highly-proficient partner units. If this were the case, we might rightly question whether or not a research finding supportive of my theory is really just an outcome of this underlying selection

sectarian influence constrain progress in developing MOI [Ministry of Interior] forces..." and that there were “indications that political forces in Iraq have influenced senior military appointments on the basis of sectarian affiliation." See: Department of Defense 2007. For more on interest misalignment between the United States and the Maliki regime, see: Biddle, Macdonald and Baker 2017. 53Department of Defense 2010a 54Department of Defense 2008a.

35 mechanism, rather than the independent influence of these advising teams’ behavior. I treat each of these in turn. In order for selection bias to occur, advising teams would have to be able to develop intricate strategies for handling partner unit corruption and recalcitrance prior to their deployment. But, the policy for manning and preparing these advising teams would make this enormously difficult. The services manned these teams through two different approaches, both of which would make it tremendously difficult, if not impossible, for a superior commander to evaluate a team’s propensity for monitoring and coercion, and then intentionally assign them to better or worse host nation units based on these propensities. The vast majority of advising teams were staffed with individuals who volunteered for the mission. In these situations the composition of advising teams was rather ad-hoc, with officers and NCOs from different units and with different Military Operational Specialties (MOS) and Areas of Concentration (AOC) assigned to serve together in what were often referred to as “external" or “pickup" teams.55 A minority of teams were taken “out of hide," wherein units organic to a Marine Regimental Combat Team or U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT) were assigned to serve on a team for a host nation unit. On paper this may seem to be optimal. Yet, because units were often not given this mission until they had arrived in theater, they struggled to adequately prepare for their unique deployment and incorporate advising-specific activities into their pre-deployment workup.56 For those who could prepare adequately, the training for the mission left little time for advisers to develop the type of delicate advising strategy my theory predicts will be most successful. Training locations varied by service, though the pre-deployment workups were remarkably similar. Because advising teams are often small, self-contained units, advisers have to train to be a jack of all trades. Training included exposing the advising unit to a

55For more on the idiosyncratic method through post-9/11 advising teams were manned, see, e.g.: Catherine Dale, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, April 2, 2009, pp. 90-92; Rosenau et al. 2013, pp. 39-40; West 2012, p. xi; and Gray 2013, pp. 3-4. 56Rosenau et al. 2013.

36 range of military skills, to include basic combat maneuvers with partner units, operating and repairing communications equipment, medical skills, as well as the ability to operate foreign weapon systems. Often, however, units found that the military tasks for which they were trained were woefully inadequate to prepare these units for the political realities within which they would be operating.57 The improvised manning of ETTs and MiTTs and content of their pre-deployment training produced a barrier to develop an advising strategy prior to deployment. And, even if advising teams did develop these strategies, in order for them to be systematically assigned to more proficient units, commanders within each theater would need to observe the adviser’s development of this strategy, and, have the rotation of that specific advising team into theater serendipitously align with the re-deployment of an advising team from a highly proficient partner unit. The net result of this, then, is a great deal of stochastic adviser behavior in response to challenging partner units. Often hastily-selected advisers deployed to both Afghanistan and Iraq with little preparation for how the politics of each country might manifest themselves in the Iraqi and Afghan National Security Forces’ behavior or how they should best respond to it. This led to a great deal of variation in the extent to which advising teams viewed their role in combating corruption within partner units. Although I examine this variance in subsequent empirical chapters, even a cursory glance at practitioner memoirs suggests that not all advisers viewed their roles the same. For some, monitoring and punitive measures were the logical strategy to correct partner unit

57As one adviser recalls in his memoirs, “[T]he training we received for the mission erroneously prepared us for a traditional Army war in traditional Army ways. We spent three months brushing up our conventional warrior skills at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, with only a couple days’ worth of relevant counterinsurgency training. As perhaps the best example of wasted opportunity at Camp Shelby, more time was spent on the proper wear and use of nuclear/chemical/biological gear and personal decontamination than was spent on learning the culture and history of Afghanistan." Tupper 2010, p. 87. Eventually, advising teams were provided some basic cultural awareness courses and exposed to potential scenarios they might encounter while interacting with their partner unit. This included introductory language courses as well as the basics of Iraq and Afghan culture and society, not to mention skills such as how to best communicate through interpreters. Scenarios often took the form of ﬁeld exercises with role players standing in for partner units and villagers, and advisers reacting to events such as insurgent attacks while working alongside their partners, as well as conducting pre-planned operations.

37 misconduct. Drawing on his frustrated experience in El Salvador, one adviser suggested in an After Action Report that “Advisors should have full access to all HN [Host Nation] activities and materials," and that partner forces should be held accountable by their advisers.58 Other practitioners argue the importance of knowing “where the money has gone and what it is being used for."59 Reflecting on his decades of experience as a military adviser, John Waghelstein similarly endorses punitive measures, contending, “support should not be unconditional."60 Along these lines, former commander of Special Operations Command (Forward) in Yemen opines that “having control of who gets what when is an extremely powerful tool for advisors. If they don’t have that it is very difficult to sometimes motivate the folks we are working with."61 Alternatively, others instead viewed unintrusive advising as the best way to improve their partner unit’s behavior. Reflecting on experience working with advising teams in Iraq, for example, two US Army personnel opined that “empathy is a combat multiplier...."62 Another former adviser similarly noted that “having the cultural awareness and ability to see things from the Iraqi viewpoint, are straightforward ways to build rapport. Being able to provide something that an Iraqi counterpart would not otherwise have is also a good way to build the relationship."63 These very different views about the optimal response to partner unit corruption are suggestive of a much wider variance that exists across advising teams. This poses a unique opportunity to assess the extent to which levels of intrusion produces improvements in partner unit proficiency. Yet, measuring and analyzing these variables is far from trivial. In the section that follows, I turn to my strategy for doing so.

58Banner 2006, p. 77. 59Holdren, Nowak and Klinkenberger Jr. 2014. 60Waghelstein 2008, p. 164, p. 156. 61Brian Dodwell and Marielle Ness, “"A View from the CT Foxhole: An Interview With Captain Robert A. Newson, Military Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations," CTC Sentinel, Volume 8 Issue No. 2, 27 February 2015. 62Battaglia and Taylor 2010. 63Deady 2009, p. 48.

38 2.7 Research Design

No method alone is adequate to evaluating my theory. The field of political methodology has moved from debates regarding the superiority of specific research methods, to a better understanding of their comparative strengths and weaknesses.64 When effectively synthesized, the findings of different analyses can reinforce one another, becoming more convincing as a group than each would be on its own. My research design thus revolves around triangulation, leveraging advantages of three distinct empirical techniques. Outside of allowing for synergy between methods, diversifying my research design in this manner helps ensure that any finding is not an artifact of a single approach. Each method varies in the accuracy and precision with which they can measure my key variables,65 their treatment of random chance, and the granularity they provide in uncovering the causal mechanism my theory specifies. These issues are far from trivial, and no method excels in all three. Given the complexity of my key independent and dependent variables, concerns with effectively measuring them are natural. My independent variable is undoubtedly difficult to assess. It consists of multiple dimensions, including monitoring and coercion. Proficiency in counterinsurgency too is complicated, and evaluating it effectively requires careful thought and consideration. This underscores the importance of measurement validity, the notion that “a variable measures what it is supposed to measure." 66 A treatment of random chance is also a critical issue with respect to this or any study. This is the concern that empirical patterns I uncover are not due to my hypothesized relationships, but instead, due to happenstance or simple luck. Though this is a critical question and one that is at the heart of both qualitative and quantitative methods, when we consider that

64See, e.g.: Brady and Collier 2010; Lieberman 2005; Gerring 2011; Goertz and Mahoney 2012; Gerring 2007. 65By accuracy I refer to the extent to which the measure reﬂects the underlying concept it is trying to measure. Although quantitative measures may be less accurate, by providing a numerical estimate they are often more precise. See: King, Keohane and Verba 1994, p. 151. 66Bollen 1989, p. 184. Cited in Adcock 2001. See also, DeVellis 2016, King, Keohane and Verba 1994 pp. 151-168, and Brady and Collier 2010 pp. 76-81.

39 individuals are, at the time of writing, risking their lives performing the military advising mission, considering and addressing this challenge becomes imperative. Finally, important benefits and drawbacks exist between focusing on the identification of robust correlations between two variables, and interrogating why this relationship exists. The latter requires giving attention to causal mechanisms, or “the causal processes and intervening variables through which causal or explanatory variables produce causal effects."67 Uncovering causal mechanisms is at the heart of proving that the proposed theory is, in fact, driving the relationship between two variables. Because no single method can effectively excel in all three of these important areas, I instead manage the tradeoffs between them. Comparative case studies employ highly- specific and contextual ideal types to measure my independent variable, and greater attention to causal mechanisms. But, these are less robust in their ability to demonstrate that the results are not just an outcome of random chance. My large n analysis does just the opposite. It is most systematic in accounting for random chance, but relies on a proxy measure for my independent variable and can only identify robust correlations in my data. The medium-n analysis strikes a balance between the two; it allows me to measure my dependent variable with greater care and facilitates the incorporation of qualitative information into a statistical framework that accounts for random chance. That said, it offers less attention to causal mechanisms than the comparative cases. I treat each of these methods in the subsequent empirical chapters next, highlighting their potential to offer evidence that confirms or disconfirms my theory.

67Bennett and George 1997, p. 1, cited in Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, p. 363. This definition is perhaps less restrictive than George and Bennett 2005 p.137, which defines causal mechanisms as “ultimately unobservable physical social, or psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities. In so doing, the causal agent changes the affected entity’s characteristics, capacities, or propensities in ways that persist until subsequent causal mechanisms act upon it."

40 2.8 Comparative Case Studies

I begin my empirical evaluation of the theory with a comparative analysis of U.S.-advised Afghan National Police (ANP) units in the country’s restive South. The comparisons draw on new interview and archival data on ANP advising. Often described one of the most corrupt of the forces in Afghanistan, the ANP meets the archetypal description of a dysfunctional security institution per my theoretical discussion.68 As I explore in greater detail in the chapter, the ANP’s institutional pathologies were part of an intentional strategy by Afghan political elites to extract economic rents and expand their political power. It also produced a force that was highly-resistant to operational advice from their American advisers that were eventually deployed to make the ANP more proﬁcient in counterinsurgency. Among the key advantages of examining a small number of recipient units relates to the accuracy of my measurements and my ability to hone in on the hypothesized causal process. Qualitative analysis allows me to use highly contextual and meticulous measures of my key variables. This accuracy comes at the expense of precision, as comparative analysis necessarily requires the use of Weberian ideal types, which “give a bird’s eye view of the broad characteristics of a whole social situation."69 Although perfectly accounting for causal mechanisms would necessitate access to the inner thoughts of recipient unit personnel, examining only three cases naturally facilitates more in-depth analyses, allowing me to pay greater attention causal mechanisms. This is particularly useful in ensuring that the tradeoff between apathy and anger, rather than some alternative set of calculations, is, in fact, driving recipient unit behavior. Through detailed tracing of the causal process, I can indeed increase my conﬁdence in my theory. But, comparative case studies are less able to account for random chance. Although case

68Jones 2008, p. 68 refers to the ANP as the “least competent of the Afghan government forces." A 2010 Department of Defense report similarly points out that “Corruption and the perception of corruption continue to negatively affect the reputation of the AUP [Afghan Uniformed Police] among the Afghan population...If corruption activities continue to go unchecked at current levels, they threaten to keep the population separated from the government." Department of Defense 2010b, p. 38. 69Watkins 1952, p. 24.

41 selection techniques can try to hedge against concerns of sample bias, and, in some cases, measurement error, they do not do so comprehensively. And, comparative case studies do not yield precise estimates regarding the uncertainty of my results. To do so, I turn to statistical methods.

2.9 Large N Analysis

To complement the comparative case studies, I expand the analysis to all U.S. advised ANP units from January 2009-February 2010. Employing new data made available through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, I move from structured qualitative methods to statistical analysis. Through a bevy of statistical techniques that vary in their complexity and assumptions, I am able to evaluate the relationships between adviser intrusion and partner unit proficiency. Statistical methods offer a number of important advantages that compensate for the shortcomings of the comparative analysis. For one, they allow for the precise treatment of random chance. The core of statistical tests is evaluating the probability that the correlations one observes in a given dataset is due to pure coincidence. Statistical methods also allow me to more directly consider potentially confounding variables, and estimate the uncertainty I have regarding the relationship between my variables of interest. A key drawback relates to the need to use potentially less accurate measures of my dependent and independent variables. With respect to the latter, data limitations require me to use an imperfect proxy variable and for the former I use a simple ordinal measure that vastly oversimplifies COIN proficiency. And, of course, statistical methods necessarily place distance between the proposed causal mechanism and the correlation between my variables. The comparative and large N analyses can thus be thought of as opposites when considering measurement, attention to causal mechanisms, and ability to account for random chance. Comparative cases excel at uncovering casual mechanisms and more accurately measuring variables of interest, whereas statistical methods offer less in the way of confirming causal

42 mechanisms, but provide more rigor and precision in accounting for happen stance. My ﬁnal empirical chapter uses a method that occupies a middle ground between these two extremes, allowing me to draw on in-depth case knowledge with objectively-measured variables.

2.10 Medium N Analysis

The final empirical analysis implements the procedures introduced by Rosenbaum 2002 and developed further by Glynn and Ichino 2015 to analyzing small to medium-sized samples of observational data. Cases are first paired with one another based on their values of observable, potentially confounding, variables. I then rank the magnitude in difference in outcomes between these paired cases, followed by a simple Wilcoxon signed-rank test to formally test whether the differences between paired cases - which differ on my key explanatory variable- are statistically significant. Because the number of cases is manageable, I then use these results to inform more in-depth examinations of case pairs that conform with and deviate from my theory.70 I apply the method to a broader sample of ANSF and Iraqi Security Force units, allowing me to expand the analysis beyond the Afghan National Police. Notably, this introduces the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Iraqi Army (IA) into the analysis.71 This method provides a number of benefits that manage the strengths and weaknesses of the comparative and statistical analyses. On the one hand, the method allows for -and indeed encourages- the combination of highly precise quantitative measures of my dependent variable, as well as inclusion of case-specific, qualitative information that can help improve measurement accuracy. This method integrates this qualitative information into a more rigorous statistical framework, allowing for estimates of uncertainty in the differences between units whose advisers were moderately intrusive, and those who were not. The

70This framework broadly aligns with Lieberman 2005’s nested research design, wherein a researcher conducts a large n analysis, and, based on the results, follows this with qualitative case studies. 71Both the ANA and, perhaps more famously, IA, were thoroughly corrupt institutions, often despite U.S. attempts to improve their proﬁciency. See: Giustozzi 2016, Gray 2013, pp. 44, 78, 81-86, 94-96.

43 examination of case studies coupled with this analysis allows me to better understand the limitations of my theory, and, to some extent, trace the causal mechanism at work in the paired cases. Of course, the medium n analysis also has its flaws. First, although it allows me to incorporate nuanced, high-resolution qualitative information for my dependent variable, it still relies on a coarsened measure of my independent variable, reducing it to a binary “treatment." Further, despite the fact that this approach does account for random chance through a randomization framework, its accounting for potential confounding variables does not allow me to estimate the magntitude of their effect. And, finally, the larger sample size does not allow for the same degree of process tracing for the confirmatory and deviant case pairs.

2.11 Roadmap

In this chapter I described the activities SFA donors like the United States hope recipient units will be able to perform on the battlefield. I then proceeded to describe how the political incentives these units face make them particularly resistant to fighting according to Western doctrine. The costs of becoming more proficient on the battlefield are prohibitive for these units. I theorized that variance in their performance can be attributed to the behavior of their military advisers. Specifically, advisers face tradeoffs in eroding recipient unit apathy and generating recipient unit anger. Advisers should be most capable of doing this when they are moderately intrusive. I then turned to considerations for empirically evaluating this theory, and my research design, which relies on triangulation. The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Through detailed process tracing, I explore the institutional features of the Afghan National Police and demonstrate how adviser intrusion led to different degrees improvement in ANP proficiency. I then turn to a large n analysis of the ANP, before evaluating my theory through the medium n analysis. I conclude with recommendations for future research and defense policy.

44 Chapter 3: Comparative Case Studies

In this dissertation I theorize that the advisers face a tradeoff in managing advisee apathy and anger, and, that the more threatening the adviser, the less apathetic and more angry the advisee, and vice versa. One way advisers can convey threats is through intrusive behaviors, which I define as efforts to detect partner unit misconduct and coerce the partner unit to change its behavior. I hypothesize that advisers will be most capable of incentivizing recipient unit improvement when they employ these measures at moderate levels. Case study analysis can carefully evaluate the causal process driving this hypothesized relationship between adviser intrusion and recipient unit proficiency as it unfolds over time.1 Just as important, fine-grained, qualitative analysis allows me to more comprehensively measure my independent and dependent variables.2 The remainder of the analysis is organized as follows. I begin with an overview of the historical development of the Afghan National Police (ANP).3 By identifying the ANP’s institutional pathologies and coalition efforts to combat them, I set the context for this and the following chapter, which systematically examine ANP advising. I then turn to my approach to measuring my independent and dependent variables, followed by the criteria I use to select the ANP units I examine in this chapter. I proceed with the analysis, providing background on each ANP unit’s district and coalition activities that pre-date the advisers’ deployment, before tracing the processes through which advisers influenced the behavior of their recipient units. I conclude the analysis by reviewing alternative explanations for the variation in ANP proficiency that we see across these cases. This includes assessing variables that might confound the relationship between adviser intrusiveness and COIN proficiency, including

1Collier 2011; Bennett and Checkel 2014; Mahoney 2012. 2Brady and Collier 2010, p. 135. 3Although the ANP is an umbrella term that encompasses a range of forces within the Afghan Ministry of Interior, I use it here to refer to the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP). See: Department of Defense 2009, p. 26.

45 advisers’ service, as well as AO violence, corruptibility, and terrain. Overall, I ﬁnd that the qualitative evidence lends strong support to my theory even when we evaluate these variables.

3.1 Building the Afghan National Police

Inter-elite contestation of political power in Afghanistan has long manifested itself in the institutional design and behavior of the country’s security forces. Rather than being a constant feature of Afghanistan’s police, however, politicization has historically increased in tandem with its size, scope, and capabilities.4 After the Taliban takeover of Kabul in 1992, professional policemen were dismissed, as plain clothed Taliban fighters enforced draconian law and order in the areas under their control.5 The post-2001 competition over the Afghan National Police was in many ways an extension of political rivalries that had solidified during the country’s ongoing civil conflict. A decade of war coupled with the U.S. reliance on indigenous, non-state armed forces during the initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) contributed to the influence of local anti-Taliban militia in post-Taliban Afghanistan.6 Competition between these militia would shape the institutional design of the Afghan Ministry of Interior and its component forces, among them the Afghan National Police. The ANP was thus designed to manage competition between armed elites rather than develop technocratic proficiency in counterinsurgency. Within this environment, international donor efforts evolved from an initial narrow focus on technocratic capacity building, to modest attempts to reform MOI systems to reduce corruption. Nonetheless, elite patronage networks proved particularly resilient to these latter efforts. This resistance would manifest itself in a number of ways at the tactical

4Although a full treatment of the history of Afghanistan’s police force is beyond the scope of this chapter, see, e.g.: Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2012; Rasanayagam 2005, pp. 21-38, 60-62;Kakar¯ 1978, pp. 205, Oliker 2011. 5Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2012, pp. 33-34. 6For comprehensive accounts of the Afghan civil war, see, e.g.: Tomsen 2011, pp. 451-512, Jalali 2017, pp. 427-456. On the initial weeks of Operation Enduring Freedom, Biddle 2006; Stanton 2010; Andres, Wills and Grifﬁth Jr 2006, Jalali 2017, pp. 456-504.

46 and operational level, all of them unhelpful for ANP units’ motivation and proficiency in counterinsurgency. The negotiations leading to the Bonn Agreement in December 2001 parceled out Afghan Ministries to various anti-Taliban armed factions. Nonetheless, the agreement described the need for a security force that would serve as a “multi-ethnic, sustainable, and countrywide 62,000-member police service."7 The subsequent January 2002 donor’s conference divided post-war reconstruction among various lead nations, and Germany took the lead for police mentoring. The political realities of post-Taliban Afghan politics complicated international efforts to build an apolitical and credible police force. Drawing on their success in routing the Taliban, the Northern Alliance came to dominate the security ministries, including the Ministry of Interior. This solidified the control of ethnic Tajiks from the Northern Panshjiri valley over senior positions in the police force. Tajik commanders affiliated with the Northern Alliance subsequently appointed regionally-based networks of armed strongmen to leadership positions and allowed the upper ranks of the MOI and ANP to swell considerably. This provided ANP commanders with political cover to neglect their duties, cannibalize their units for material gain, and/or only nominally transfer their men to the government payroll to avoid Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) efforts. This policy of “pragmatic cooptation" meant that unlike the Afghan National Army, the Afghan National Police was not rebuilt from the ground up and instead was based on patronage networks.8 German, and, eventually, U.S.-backed efforts were at first modest in scope, emphasiz- ing training and equipping the Afghan police, giving less attention to professionalization and reform. Under the German Police Project Office (GPPO), German law enforcement advisers focused their attention on establishing a training program for senior officers at the re-opened Kabul Police Academy. These officers would study for three years, whereas

7GAO 2008b, p. 8; For an overview of international efforts to rebuild the Afghan National Police, see: Hammes 2017. 8International Crisis Group, “Reforming Afghanistan’s Police," August 30, 2007, p. 5.

47 non-commissioned officers attended for a nine month course.9 U.S. support to the ANP complemented these efforts. Under the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, who in turn contracted the effort out to the DynCorp Corpo- ration, the U.S. oversaw the expansion of police training centers to seven provinces outside of Kabul and the creation of a “train the trainer" program to develop Afghan instructors and patrolmen.10 Perhaps recognizing the political and military ascendance of his ethnic and regional rivals, by 2003 President Hamid Karzai responded with some cautious support for police professionalization with German and American backing. This included a package of reforms aiming at reducing the senior officer ranks by 44 percent, increasing pay and improving the disbursement of salaries, and more intensive vetting of senior appointments and promotions.11 The number of Generals in the force, for example, was decreased from 319 to 120, whereas the pay for these generals was increased nearly seven fold.12 To ensure that the reduction of senior ranks was executed with some impartiality, the coalition oversaw the creation of a Rank Reform Commission. The commission instituted a three part vetting process, including a written test with questions related to “human rights and policing values," a holistic review of each candidate’s file leading to a numerical score, as well as human rights vetting led by the United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA).13 If an officer did not qualify for his current rank, he was permitted to then compete for the next rank down, until he no longer met the age limits for the position.14 Taken together, the coalition intended these reforms to reduce the top-heavy structure and influence of loyalty-based promotions while simultaneously “breaking the chain of corruption" by increasing pay.15

9Feilke 2010 p. 8. 10GAO 2008b, p. 20, For the variety of training programs available to the Afghan National Police during this period, see: Inspectors General of the United States Departments of State and Defense 2006, pp. 63-67. 11For more on pay and rank reform during this period, see: International Crisis Group, “Reforming Afghanistan’s Police," August 30, 2007, p. 5; Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2012, pp. 135-136, p. 103; Wilder 2007, pp. 37-40; Inspectors General of the United States Departments of State and Defense 2006, pp. 63-67. 12Inspectors General of the United States Departments of State and Defense 2006, p. 27. 13Inspectors General of the United States Departments of State and Defense 2006, p. 69. 14Inspectors General of the United States Departments of State and Defense 2006, p. 69. 15Inspectors General of the United States Departments of State and Defense 2006, p. 27.

48 Although well-intentioned, these reform efforts fell short of undermining the influence of elite networks on the ANP. On the one hand, the reforms did lead to a reduction of the ANP officer corps from 17,800 to approximately 9,000 personnel.16 But, the vetting process eliminated a number of “professional" officers -those who had been trained during the 1970s and 1980s and did not have ties to militia commanders- from the force. Indeed, as one Afghan noted at the time, “pay and rank reform is contributing to de-professionalizing the police by reforming the professionals out of the system."17 Afghan officials also resisted efforts to introduce a more reliable and transparent pay system: a number of ANP zone commanders simply refused to allow coalition teams to validate their personnel numbers to update the pay roster.18 Most critically, President Karzai intervened in the appointment process, likely to quell pressure from Northern Alliance elites. In May 2006 the Afghan government released its list of 86 approved candidates for senior positions within the ANP. Days later, riots broke out in Kabul, encouraged by Northern Alliance politicians who likely felt their grip on the ANP slipping. Succumbing to this show of force, Karzai added 14 officers to the list, all affiliated with Northern Alliance networks.19 This included at least four individuals who had been barred from running for parliament due to their ties to illegal militias, as well as a number of others linked to criminal activities and corruption.20 Though international pressure eventually led Karzai to reconsider a portion of these 14 appointments, no institutional reforms were made to avoid future political intervention into selection and promotion processes. And, as a result, many of the well-connected ANP officials who failed the screening test remained in their positions.21

16GAO 2009b, p. 7. 17Wilder 2007, p. 40 18GAO 2009b, p. 23. 19Forsberg and Sullivan 2017, pp. 24-25. 20Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: Reject Known Abusers as Police Chiefs Time for President Karzai to Show He Is a Genuine Reformer," May 4, 2006. See also: Wilder 2007, p. 41; Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2012, pp. 103-104. 21Integrity Watch Afghanistan, “Senior Appointments and Corruption within Kabul City Police: Practices and Perceptions," December 2015, p. 7.

49 Despite a push for systematic reform, the ANP was thus structured to distribute economic spoils to influential elites. In return for a cut of the profits, senior officials protected their proteges who generated personal wealth through their positions.22 These warlords and their associated elite networks stacked ANP units with loyalists and/or sold command positions to their allies.23 ANP units at all levels in the chain of command were then responsible for generating income and subsequently paying bribes up to higher headquarters. Positions within the ANP provided numerous opportunities for rent extraction. First, like any security force in the country, the ANP was the beneficiary of extensive coalition financial and material support. Figure 3.1 reflects this, depicting the billions of dollars the United States alone spent on the force from 2002-2012.24 This influx of financial resources, particularly after 2005, led to the development of intricate corruption schemes wherein individuals exploited the ANP’s internal systems for personal gain. First, the force was notorious for having ghost or absentee soldiers. The MOI disbursed salaries to police chiefs based on how many personnel they contained on their roster, or tashkil. When soldiers would desert their posts, get killed in action, or otherwise not be present for duty, police chiefs would regularly keep them on the tashkil to continue to draw and pilfer from their salaries. In Mata Khan district, for example, the chief claimed salaries for 70 patrolmen, when only 28 were in fact present.25

22A comprehensive review of regional Afghan elite networks is beyond the scope of this paper. For detailed accounts of post-2001 Afghan politics, see, e.g.: Mukhopadhyay 2014; Giustozzi 2009b; Cassidy et al. 2012. 23The prices of these posts varied based on geography, and may have depended on the access they offered to economic spoils. In some cases police chiefs paid as much as $150,000. Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis 2014 p. 30. 24Dollar amounts adapted from SIGAR 2017, p. 65. 25Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix,“Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool Brieﬁng," December 1, 2009.

50 Figure 3.1: U.S. Funding for the Afghan National Police, 2002-2012

Outside of ghost soldiers, foreign support provided opportunities for the ANP to sell off its supplies for a massive proﬁt. Although fuel was supposed to be provided to ANP units based on consumption, the coalition at times pushed quantities of fuel to units that exceeded these units’ storage capacity. A portion of the 4.6 million dollars worth of fuel deliveries destined for the Helmand provincial police headquarters from 2010-2012, for example, were likely diverted to local markets, in a suspected case of criminal fraud.26 Police chiefs also sold their unit’s food rations, providing a source of wealth and leading to personnel turnover.27 Weapons provided yet another source of income for the Afghan National Police. By November 2013, over 8,500 excess weapons had been provided by the United States to the Afghan National Police, many of which are suspected of having reached the black market.28 In one instance, the Taliban was reported to have routinely sent a trained

26SIGAR 2013b, pp. 5-6. 27One ANP advising team noted in a brieﬁng, for example, “Their [the ANP] turnover rate is high. 9 more were lost. It is suspected that the reason is that the CoP is withholding food from them at times and pocketing the money." Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix,“Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool Brieﬁng," February 25, 2010. 28SIGAR 2014b, p. 21. See also: Jonathan Broder and Sami Yousafzai, “Arming the Enemy in Afghanistan," Newsweek, May 18, 2015. Available at: http://www.newsweek.com/2015/05/29/arming-

51 donkey to be loaded with ammunition at a police checkpoint.29 Further, and perhaps most critically, the ANP was a stationary force that operated within set Areas of Operation for extensive periods of time. Although this ostensibly allowed the ANP to generate knowledge of the local human terrain -giving the ANP an advantage in the collection of intelligence- this also allowed the ANP to extort locals with higher frequency and efficiency. In Deh Sabz district, for example, the ANP regularly taxed local businesses, whereas the Gereshk ANP similarly harassed locals for pay.30 Furthermore, police checkpoints operating along key roads provided opportunities for the ANP to demand illegal tolls from truckers.31 In Delaram district there were allegations of the policemen setting up checkpoints “all over the place," to extract funds from motorists.32 The static nature of the ANP’s posture also made them a more reliable partner for local criminal networks who needed the ANP for protection. The Musah Qaleh police chief, for example, at one point reportedly gathered $20,000 per day by taxing poppy.33 In another instance advisers -through a Ground Based Observation Surveillance System (GBOSS)- in Reg Khanishin district observed ANP units tasked with poppy eradication selectively destroying crops based on whether the farmers paid bribes.34 The ANP were also allegedly involved in opium cultivation, in at least on case reportedly growing poppy within the local police station.35 Beyond involvement in drug cultivation and trafficking, the ANP were also party to other criminal activities, to include stealing land, tax evasion, and involvement in selling legal goods on the black market.36 In the event that criminals would find themselves in prison, they could rely on local police to release them. The Zormat police chief, for

enemy-afghanistan-332840.html. 29Sayed Rahmatullah Alizada, “Afghan Police in Taleban Arms Sales," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, December 19, 2013. Available at: https://iwpr.net/global-voices/afghan-police- taleban-arms-sales. 30CJTF-Phoenix, “Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool Brieﬁng," March 29, 2010; CJTF-Phoenix, “Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool Brieﬁng," October 9, 2009. 31Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2012, particularly pp. 84-89. 32United States Marine Corps History Division, Oral History Interview 10-23-2009. 33Holdren, Nowak and Klinkenberger Jr. 2014, pp. 30. 34Author interview, November 30, 2017. 35Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2012, p. 90. 36Singh 2014, p. 2.

52 example, regularly intervened to release criminals from prison.37 Under these conditions, the rare honest police chiefs and patrolmen were either re- assigned, skipped over for promotion, or, in more extreme cases, targeted. Although international scrutiny was possible with respect to high-profile, senior appointments, it was far more challenging further down the ANP chain of command. This rendered district-level appointments particularly vulnerable to political intervention. And indeed, there was considerable lobbying from Afghan members of parliament, government officials, and tribal elites over the appointment process, particularly for posts near known smuggling routes and border posts.38 These networks also served as gatekeepers, filtering out honest and well-performing officers from the force. A small group of officers and NCOs in the Dand Patan ANP, for example, were not promoted because they refused to pay a bribe up the chain of command.39 In other cases these confrontations were more violent. A reform-minded police chief in Balkh province, for example, found his station and home surrounded by local strongman Muhammad Atta’s men.40 A district police chief in Bala Baluk district who was referred to in the Western press as an “Afghan Frank Serpico" was similarly targeted by a hit suspected to have been placed by his superior.41 To be sure, the ANP could not operate with complete impunity. For one, internal Afghan authorities did at times arrest chiefs of police for corruption, assault, weapons trafficking, and cooperating with drug smugglers.42 With U.S. support, the Afghans stood up the Major Crimes Task Force within the Ministry of Interior, as well as the Anticorruption Unit in the Attorney General’s office, the former of which built a case against a senior border police official for his involvement in drugs and weapons trafficking.43 Furthermore,

37Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix,“Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool Brieﬁng," May 2, 2009. 38Perito 2009, p. 12. 39Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix,“Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool Brieﬁng," March 8, 2009. 40Mukhopadhyay 2014, p. 99. 41Aryn Baker, “Policing Afghanistan," Time, October 21, 2008. Available at: http://content.time. com/time/world/article/0,8599,1852296,00.html. 42For a list of these arrests, see: Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2012, pp. 81-82. 43SIGAR 2016, p. 42.

53 according to an American staff officer, as early as 2006 some Afghan authorities within the Ministries of Defense and Interior were “willing to make those hard decisions and... are attacking corruption."44 The United States and its International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) coalition partners complemented these efforts with an alphabet soup of its own task forces and organizations dedicated to anti-corruption.45 Similar efforts existed in regional commands. The Marine Expeditionary Brigade established a Corruption and Pay team within its Afghan National Security Force Cell, which helped coordinate evidence collection and prosecution of corrupt officials under Afghan law.46 Nonetheless, the U.S. did not have the authority needed to immediately remove corrupt unit commanders, as firing commanders required central government approval.47 The U.S. and its NATO allies were not naive to ANP deficiencies and attempted to address them through police mentoring. By late 2007, the Department of Defense took over training the Afghan National Police under Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-Phoenix. This included placing mentors at the regional level who could make anti-corruption a priority.48 To combat corruption at the district level, CJTF-Phoenix oversaw a number of programs aimed at training and reforming ANP tactical and operational-level units. The motivation for these programs was the concern that “corruption and local loyalties" had undermined previous efforts.49 After having been trained at one of the new police academies, for example, a number of patrolmen were forced by their commanders to demand bribes from

44United States Marine Corps History Division, Oral History Interview 09-15-2016. 45For a comprehensive list of these task forces and their mandates, see: SIGAR 2016, pp. 95-98. 46In describing this effort, a law enforcement professional noted, “Just like any investigation...in the States...we have to find out who is doing what and we can do that through covert and overt means." United States Marine Corps History Division, Oral History Interview 10-28-2009. 47Indeed, according to a 2008 U.S. Department of Defense report: “CSTC-A ANP legal mentors have focused on using the police court and police prosecutor to bring criminal cases against police officers for misconduct that amounts to a crime. Again, these efforts have not yet shown results." Department of Defense 2008b, p. 27. See also: RUSI 2009, p. 119. 48Indeed, in describing his efforts to combat district-level corruption in Southern Afghanistan, a regional police mentor noted, “Well, what we do when we find out–and believe me we know who these guys are, is we work through General [name redacted], and to a lesser degree, General [name redacted], who’s the provincial chief of police. And we have them call MOI directly and say, ‘Hey this guy is doing this, this, this, and this, and we need to get him fired.’...And we have, we have been." United States Marine Corps History Division, Oral History Interview 08-31-2011. 49GAO 2009b, p. 12.

54 locals.50 Most comprehensive among the programs aimed at addressing these issues was Focused District Development (FDD). Districts that were selected for FDD were first assessed by an advising team, who vetted and, where required, selected new ANP leadership. The ANP forces were then removed from the district, retrained at a regional training center, and redeployed to the same district. Once redeployed, FDD graduates continued to be partnered with advisers.51 Due to the considerable manpower requirements of FDD, the coalition also instituted the Directed Development District program, which made use of Afghan trainers, as well as the In-District Reform program, which drew on U.S. Marines for security in districts while half of the ANP force trained at a Regional Training Center. Kabul police districts were retrained under the Capital Jumpstart training program, which was based in part on FDD.52 To support these programs, the U.S. employed Police Mentor Teams (PMT) -both pickup teams of volunteers and out of hide teams organic to Army and Marine units- of approximately 14 soldiers to evaluate, retrain and partner with ANP units in the field during 7-12 month deployments.53 It is the experience of these PMTs partnered with district ANP units that will be the unit of analysis for this chapter. In the section that follows, I discuss the criteria I will use to assess PMT behavior and the proficiency of their partner force.

3.2 Evaluating Adviser Intrusion and Unit COIN Proﬁciency

Evaluating my central hypothesis requires a systematic measure of adviser intrusion and recipient COIN proﬁciency. In this section I discuss my approach to evaluating these

50GAO 2009b, p. 12. 51Department of Defense 2008b, pp. 23-24. 52Department of Defense 2010a, p. 122; “630th MP Company Facilitates Training for Behsud ANP," Combined Joint Task Force 101, September 16, 2010. Available at: https://www.dvidshub.net/news/ 56416/630th-mp-company-facilitates-training-behsud-anp; GAO 2009b, p. 17; “Jumpstarting ANP," Voice of America, July 19, 2008. Available at: https://editorials.voa.gov/a/a-41-2008-07- 22-voa6-84657427/1481533.html. 53GAO 2009b, p. 14.

55 variables across my cases. With respect to my independent variable, I use a categorical ideal type to capture the advising methods of the advising teams. For my dependent variable, I trace changes in the performance of Afghan National Police units using a set of assessment questions designed to capture each unit’s battleﬁeld competence in counterinsurgency. In the previous chapter I described in detail the set of activities I call intrusive behaviors. This includes monitoring, or efforts to detect partner unit misconduct, and coercive measures, actions that threaten the partner unit with consequences of misconduct and/or suspend material support to the recipient. This can include a range of activities, from taking inventory of a partner unit’s weapons and equipment, to threatening to withhold resources or have their leadership ﬁred. Table 3.1 delineates the questions I ask to assess these activities.

56 Table 3.1: Intrusion Coding Criteria

Monitoring

- How often did the advising team directly take inventory of the partner unit’s personnel roster, budget, and equipment inventory? - How often did the advising team visit the partner unit’s static locations? Were any of these surprise visits? - Did the advising team rely on third-party reports of partner unit behavior? - Did the advising team covertly monitor their partner unit?

Coercion

- Did the advising team allow their partner unit to sell fuel, weapons, or equipment without threatening any repercussions? - Did the advising team allow their partner unit to keep ghost soldiers on the personnel roster without threatening any repercussions? - Did the advising team allow their partner unit to demand bribes from locals without threatening any repercussions? - Did the advising team ever threaten to ﬁre or remove partner unit personnel? - Did the advising team ever directly confront the partner unit commander with allegations of corruption? - Did the advising team ever threaten or actually withhold equipment, fuel, or combat enablers from their partner unit?

Although in reality intrusion occurs on a continuum, conducting a case study analysis requires the creation of discrete cut points at which to evaluate their effect on a partner unit’s proﬁciency. The next step, then, is grouping intrusive behaviors into meaningful categories. In this chapter I do so through the use of Weberian ideal types. Ideal types serve as a categorical variable that “give a bird’s eye view of the broad characteristics of a

57 whole social situation."54 Though far from perfect, this approach provides a useful strategy for structuring comparative studies of a small number units without quickly running out of degrees of freedom.55 Of course, military advising is a complex endeavor. And, no single advising team will neatly fit into any category. Nonetheless, a given advising team can be evaluated in terms of these behaviors and actions, and, drawing on this evaluation we can then predict whether the team’s partner units should show significant improvement in the field.56 The number of categories we consider along the continuum depends, in part, on how deeply the researcher examines each case. To help leverage the advantages of comparative case studies, in this chapter I consider three distinct advising ideal types. Unintrusive advising teams avoid monitoring their partner unit, and rarely, if ever, directly confront their partner unit about misconduct or corruption. In practice, advisers applying this model often have a laissez faire approach to partner unit corruption. Highly intrusive advising is just the opposite. In this case advisers heavily and frequently monitor their partner units. Advisers also withhold small amounts of assistance from the unit, threaten to remove unit commanders, and other means of threatening their partners. Balanced advising strikes a middle ground between these two approaches. In this case advisers monitor their partner units with moderate intensity, and only occasionally confront their unit with allegations or proof of misconduct, relying on both implicit and explicit threats to correct it. Advisers adopting this middle ground also often allow for “functional" corruption; actions that, although qualifying as the use of public positions for private gain, do not undermine the unit’s ability to operate in field. The contours of each of these categories is detailed in Table 3.2.

54Watkins 1952, p. 24. 55For more on categorization and ideal types in qualitative analysis, see: Collier and Mahon 1993; Sartori 1991. 56For a similar approach to qualitative analysis of military operations, see: Talmadge 2011, p. 38.

58 Table 3.2: Advising Ideal Types

Unintrusive Advising

- Third party and covert monitoring - Corruption ignored - Rare, implicit threats to partner unit

Moderately Intrusive Advising

- Mix of periodic overt and covert monitoring - Functional corruption tolerated - Regular, implicit threats; Occasional explicit threats and temporary aid suspension

Highly Intrusive Advising

- Regular, intrusive monitoring - Zero tolerance for corruption - Explicit threats and regular aid suspension

Next, for the purposes of this chapter I am interested in the extent to which ANP units improve in proﬁciency over time during an advising team’s deployment. These tasks and behaviors, outlined in detail in the previous chapter, range from generating intelligence to positively interacting with locals.57 Table 3.3 below identiﬁes the questions I ask to make this assessment. 57Because none of the units in this chapter demonstrated measurable improvements in this area, I do not include their ability to maintain accurate personnel rosters and associated administrative tasks in this chapter.

59 Table 3.3: Unit Proﬁciency Coding Criteria

Unit Proﬁciency

- Did the unit properly maintain its equipment? - Did the unit operate without bias for ethnic, tribal, or sectarian cleavages? - Did the unit generate intelligence from locals through activities such as dismounted patrols? - Was the unit able to integrate locally-derived intelligence into its operational planning? - Did the unit otherwise improve its relationship with the local population?

I carefully triangulate a number of sources to properly measure my independent and dependent variables. First, I draw on archival documents generated by advisers, to include the Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool (PTRAT) briefings. These were monthly, PMT-generated briefings that contain nearly 3,000 pages of qualitative reflections relating to my independent and dependent variables. To complement and provide context to the PTRAT reporting, I also leverage other secondary and primary sources, to include official command chronologies and oral histories, journalist accounts, and secondary accounts. Most critically, I draw on semi-structured interviews I conducted with advisers who operated in each district to provide further granularity. In the section that follows I discuss my strategy for selecting the cases I examine in this chapter.

3.3 Case Selection

Case selection is a critical step in any comparative qualitative study, and this one is no exception. Randomly selecting a subset of three ANP units is not a reasonable strategy, as it might lead me to examine a sample of cases that do not vary in my independent or dependent variables. But, intentionally selecting cases poses risks as well. Focusing on idiosyncratic cases can lead to selection bias, wherein any results are a function of irregular

60 cases, rather than the theorized mechanism. How I select the units I examine in this chapter is thus worthy of further elaboration. My strategy for case selection is to maximize variation across my independent variable. This “diverse case" method will allow me to evaluate how the full spectrum of adviser behaviors drives improvements, stagnation, and even regression in partner unit battlefield proficiency.58 Moreover, simulation evidence has demonstrated that selecting deviant cases is best suited to identifying confounding variables and sources of measurement error in the key treatment variable, for my purposes, adviser intrusion.59 In this chapter I thus focus my analysis on three cases that align with each ideal type; Naw Zad (February-September 2010), Garmser (April-November 2009), and Golestan (April-November 2008) district Afghan National Police (see Figure 3.2). Faced with a partner unit whose leadership was tied to local strongman networks, whose men were suspected of having ties to insurgents, and who was performing unequivocally poor on the battlefield, the Naw Zad PMT assumed, for the most part, a live and let live posture vis a vis their partner unit. Garmser advisers were much more balanced in their approach, mixing covert and overt surveillance and regularly making implicit threats to their partners. In Golestan, ANP advisers adopted a highly coercive model to influence their partner unit. The team intrusively monitored their partners and regularly confronted the partner unit’s leadership with threats of removal. Table 3.4 below summarizes these variables for each case.60

58Seawright and Gerring 2008. 59Seawright 2016. 60For the full coding of each case, see Appendix B.

61 Table 3.4: Comparative Case Study Summary

Unit Intrusion Unit Proficiency Low: -Equipment showed minor improvement -Property books and personnel roster -Unit operations driven by tribal affiliation. Naw Zad verification waned over time -No improvement in ability for intelligence-based -Payday operations not observed operations. -No explicit or implicit threats -Relationship with locals stagnant. Balanced: -Joint armory obviated the need for equipment checks. -Equipment maintenance modestly improved -Use of Afghans as interlocutors for weekly -Minimal ethnic or tribal biases within the force. checkpoint visits -Unit increasingly capable of intelligence-driven 62 Garmser -Covert monitoring at night. patrols and operations. -Implicit threats and ultimatums. -Positive relationship with -Corruption during payday operations tolerated local communities within their AO. without implicit or explicit threats. -Equipment maintenance improved High: -Force eventually representative of narrow clique -Weekly observation of property books, within the population. daily visits to static checkpoints, -Unit incapable and unwilling to generate checking of officers’ pupils before operations. Golestan intelligence from locals, integrate intelligence into COIN -Implicit and explicit threats in response to operations. corruption reports, suspected collusion. -Reported collusion with insurgents, graft, -Threats of leadership removal drug use, and corruption undermined relationship -Aid suspension with local population. Figure 3.2: Golestan, Garmser, and Naw Zad Locations

In the sections that follow I examine each case in depth. To outline the broader strategic context within which each PMT operated, I begin each case analysis with an overview of coalition efforts in each district prior to the deployment of the ANP advisers. I then turn to the advising team’s approach to influencing their partner unit, before examining the extent to which the partner unit improved in their battlefield proficiency over time.

3.4 “This is their Fight...": Police Advising in Naw Zad

Naw Zad (March-August 2010) is a case in which little adviser intrusion yielded a force that struggled to operate effectively in the field. The advisers responded to partner unit corruption with persuasion and rapport, attempting to gently convince the recipient unit of the error of its ways. This would certainly render advisees less angry, but also leave them rather apathetic towards improving in proficiency. The unit subsequently performed rather poorly throughout the deployment, leading one member of the PMT to reflect, “Some times you need to step back and say ‘this is their fight...’"61 From 2006-2008 Naw Zad was home to a small British garrison in the vicinity of the district’s capitol.62 The British forces were garrisoned in the town as part of the country’s broader “platoon house" strategy, wherein small, isolated detachments of British soldiers

61Author Interview, November 30, 2017. 62Farrell 2010, p. 575.

63 were sent to Northern Helmand to prevent the Taliban from overunning the district centers.63 The British deployment and engagement with the local police had an inauspicious start, as one of its patrols was attacked by policemen, who some suspected fired on the British out of concern that the foreigners were going to decimate their opium stocks.64 Operating in this hostile environment, British forces quickly found themselves under Taliban siege, able to resupply their forces by helicopter only, and entering into regular armed engagements with Taliban in the area.65 As a result of the heavy, periodic fighting, which led to considerable destruction to local infrastructure, most of the population fled from Naw Zad.66 Throughout 2008 and early 2009, police advising was not a major priority in Naw Zad. In May 2008 a company from 2/7 Marines arrived to reinforce the exhausted British forces. Ostensibly tasked to train the Afghan police in population-centric counterinsurgency, the Marines quickly realized that the deserted town had neither Afghan police nor civilians living there.67 Instead, the Marines spent the vast majority of their deployment in a stalemate with the Taliban, each side unable to mass the necessary firepower to completely repel the other. These trends continued with the arrival of Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force - Afghanistan (SPAGTF-A), whose ground forces from 3/8 Marines conducted deliberate operations against the Taliban, but were still unable to completely dislodge the insurgents from the district center.68As one soldier from 3/8 Marines described the

63For more on the platoon house strategy, see: Farrell 2017, p. 171, House of Commons Defence Committee 2011, pp. 26-29. 64Martin 2014, p. 160. 65Farrell 2010, p. 575 66“U.S. Marines in Afghanistan 2001:2009: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography," U.S. Marine Corps, p. 251. 67Kristin Henderson, “A Change in Mission," The Washington Post Magazine, June 21, 2009. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/12/AR2009061202123. html. 68After one such operation in April 2009, an SPMAGTF-A operations ofﬁcer noted, “We still look to the future when the enemy is completely [defeated in] Now Zad, and the displaced civilians feel safe to return home." See: Scott Whittington, “Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force — Afghanistan: bridge to Marine Corps’ future in Afghanistan," Marine Forces Central Command, June 1, 2009. Available at: https://www.dvidshub.net/news/34343/special-purpose-marine-air- ground-task-force-afghanistan-bridge-marine-corps-future-afghanistan.; A squad leader in Naw Zad similarly described combat there as a dynamic of“us watching them [the Taliban], them watching us." See: Michael M. Phillips, “Stalemate," Wall Street Journal, May 23, 2009. Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203771904574179672963946120.

64 town,“The buildings were rumbled, unsecured, emptied out of positions. It was just a ghost town."69 Unsurprisingly, a plans officer from the Marine Expeditionary Brigade noted in 2009 that “Naw Zad proper is all Taliban controlled."70 In August 2009 the Marines deployed a Police Mentor Team from a Military Police company, 2nd Marine division to partner with the fledgling Naw Zad ANP. The ANP was led by a Chief of Police who, upon returning to the district, was “more concerned about his Land Rovers and getting a gift" than the development of his force.71 Although not interviewed as part of this study, this initial PMT appeared to question their partner units’ loyalty and struggled to “develop a sense of respect" for the ANP due to the force’s “corruption and criminality."72 And, by the time the PMT from 1/2 Marines arrived to replace them, the police chief had been fired, leaving the post with many of the unit’s men and equipment.73 By December 2009 U.S. and ISAF forces made a more concerted effort to clear the town. During Operation Cobra’s Anger, these forces attempted to remove Taliban safe havens in and around district center.74 As a result of this renewed effort, the bazaar began to “return to life, with shops and schools opening for the first time in years." 75 So, when the PMT from the 1/2 Marines arrived in Naw Zad to mentor and advise the ANP in March 2010, “Naw Zad [was] a town again."76

69United States Marine Corps History Division, Oral History Interview 2010-10-04-0004. 70United States Marine Corps History Division, Oral History Interview 11-19-09. 71Rosenau 2011, p. 314. 72Rosenau 2011, p. 314. 73Author Interview, November 30, 2017. 74Lance Cpl. Walter D. Marino II, “Cobra’s Anger: Marines assault into Now Zad," Regimental Combat Team-7, December 13, 2009. Available at: https://www.dvidshub.net/news/42691/cobras-anger- marines-assault-into-now-zad. 75Miguel Marquez, “Afghanistan: Marines Gear up for Biggest Fight Yet," ABC News, February 3, 2010. Available at: https://abcnews.go.com/International/afghanistan-us-marines-face- biggest-fight/story?id=9734858. 76Miguel Marquez, “Naw Zad: A Comeback Complicated by Success," ABC News, February 10, 2010. Avail- able at: https://abcnews.go.com/International/now-zad-afghanistan-town-helmand-sees- turnaround/story?id=9794324.

65 3.4.1 Adviser Intrusion

Arriving in Naw Zad in March 2010, the PMT from 1/2 Marines employed an approach that was largely consistent with adviser doctrine: they avoided intrusion and coercive measures in the interest or preserving their relationship with their counterparts. As such, the ANP showed very little interest in carrying out any counterinsurgency tasks in the ﬁeld. The Marines’ approach was not without its own logic; occupying an isolated outpost in rural Southern Afghanistan and realizing that they would need to be interacting regularly with their force, they opted to avoid alienating or upsetting their partners. When discussing their reasoning for this, an adviser acknowledged that “a lot of Marines come in and think you can treat these guys [the ANP] like [expletive]...but this is their [the ANP’s] life, not their deployment."77 In discussing the PMT’s experience, another adviser noted, “[W]e knew that we wouldn’t be able to force them [the ANP] to [ﬁght] our way."78 The PMT employed monitoring sparingly. Despite some initial intent to perform weekly accountability checks for weapons and create an accurate personnel roster, partner unit hostility towards these activities and general dysfunction within the partner unit discouraged the Marines from intruding into their partner units’ affairs. Performing these checks was indeed the advisers’ “biggest administrative headache,"79 and at least one of the police chiefs (the team cycled through several) viewed these intrusive audits with hostility.80 Eventually, the Marines performed these checks “usually every month," if at all.81 Attempts to perform surprise visits to the ANP’s locations were likely stymied by the partner unit’s broadcasting of the PMT’s movements through the radio ahead of time.82 The advisers also avoided watching the force distribute their salaries on payday.83 Rather than directly auditing their partners’ behavior, the PMT relied more on third party monitoring, to include discussions

77Author Interview, November 30, 2017. 78Author Interview, April 20, 2018. 79Author Interview, November 30, 2017. 80Author Interview, December 8, 2017. 81Author Interview, November 30, 2017. 82Author Interview, November 30, 2017. 83Author Interview, April 20, 2018.

66 with locals and the team’s interpreters. Unsurprisingly, then, when recalling the limitations of the PMT’s situational awareness of its partners, one member of the team reflected that during his deployment, “Frankly, [we did not] know what they [the ANP] were doing."84 The PMT also rarely made direct threats to and did not cut their partners off of coalition resources. After hearing from locals that the district police chief was shaking them down for food, for example, the advising team tried speaking with him during a “heart to heart" conversation.85 Another member of the team recalled that he would only bring his qualms with partner unit corruption -including allegations that the ANP were demanding bribes- up gently over chai to avoid “burn[ing] up good will" with the partner force.86 Accordingly, the advising team did not restrict the flow of resources to their partner unit and, instead, would accompany the unit to the provincial headquarters to ensure pay and logistical support continued to flow from the capitol.87 Only on the rarest of occasions did the advising team directly confront their partners with concerns over misconduct and toxic leadership. In one case, the advisers removed an unmotivated, problematic commander. But, the advisers did so rather surreptitiously, rather than in a manner that might erode partner unit apathy, by inventing a fictitious story as a pretext to send him to Lashkar Gah.88 And, in another, reports of the ANP taxing deminers in the area led to a more direct argument, as the PMT worried that if the deminers no longer performed their duties, it could put the Marines in danger.89 Nonetheless, the adviser team “could never know their [the ANP’s] true intentions," and, instead, opted to avoid “pressing confrontation [with the ANP]."90

84Author Interview, November 30, 2017. 85Author Interview, December 8, 2017. 86Author Interview, November 30, 2017. 87Author Interview, November 30, 2017. The PMT did this primarily due to a lack of support they felt they were receiving from Lashkar Gah. 88Author Interview, December 8, 2017; Author Interview, November 30, 2017. 89Author Interview, November 30, 2017. 90Author Interview, December 8, 2017.

67 3.4.2 Unit Proﬁciency

The Marines’ approach did not lead to meaningful improvement in their partner units proficiency. Upon their arrival, the Marines made a concerted effort to reconstitute the ANP, whose previous commander had looted the unit. As part of this strategy, the advisers focused recruiting policemen from villages near roads where they had encountered Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks. Coupled with the influx of academy-trained patrolmen, this recruiting drive allowed the PMT to grow their partner force considerably, reaching over a hundred individuals. Although the quantity of personnel improved throughout the PMT’s deployment, their quality left much to be desired. And, without sustained attention to the unit’s personnel and equipment records, the adviser’s struggled to keep track of their partner unit’s personnel. An adviser recalled, “It was very warlord-ish...we had police coming in that we had never seen before. They have never been vetted, they’re not registered on any payroll in Lash [Lashkar Gah]...it’s some 17 year old they knew from town and said ‘hey here’s a weapon, here’s a uniform.’"91 Naturally, these forces were not particularly motivated to operate in ways consistent with American doctrine. The ANP’s posture was in part based on static checkpoints in the vicinity of the town’s bazaar. These checkpoints were intended to interdict drug smuggling and infiltration.92 Though the checkpoints allowed the Marines some freedom to maneuver, the policemen manning the checkpoints were quite passive and “didn’t interdict anything."93 Beyond these positions in the bazaar, when the PMT tried to encourage the force to move men between checkpoints in different tribal areas, the ANP simply refused.94 Although the paucity of adviser monitoring made it difficult for the unit to furnish proof, one member of the team noted that there were “a lot of rumors" about ANP corruption in the area and

91Author Interview, November 30, 2017. 92Cpl. Paul Basciano, “Police Mentoring Team in Now Zad," Regimental Combat Team-2, April 10, 2010. Available at: https://www.dvidshub.net/news/48308/police-mentoring-team-now-zad. 93Author Interview, April 20, 2018. 94Author Interview, April 20, 2018.

68 that he was “positive they [the ANP] sold stuff."95 Although they maintained some baseline level of patrolling, the ANP would refuse to operate between 1200-1600 lest it interrupt nap time.96 Nor did the ANP have a particularly positive relationship with locals. At the beginning of the PMT’s deployment, the ANP looted a motorcycle from a local’s house after a firefight. Although the Marines explained to the ANP that actions like this “undermined their legitimacy and goodwill with the local population," the advisers’ efforts appeared to be in vain. One of the teams advisers indeed suggested that this type of behavior was a vestige of “the warlord-led groups that eventually formed local police forces," and that it was “hard for the local police to shift from this mindset."97 After the “heart to heart" conversation mentioned in the previous section, the adviser further intimated that it had little effect on the officer’s behavior, suggesting that “he [the police chief] probably went to those locals [who reported him] and said ‘keep your mouth shut, I’ll be here forever.’"98 In fact, eventually the recipient unit was so indifferent towards their advisers’ direction that they bragged about behaving forcefully in their operations; “they would come and tell you that they went out and beat the [expletive] out of these guys," an adviser described.99 Indeed, “nothing really came" of the advisers’ very few discussions about corruption with their unit commanders.100 To be sure, there were a few possible exceptions to this trend in disappointing performance. The Naw Zad ANP developed some capability to maintain its equipment. And, once reconstituted, the ANP did have some baseline level of tactical proficiency and activity, though an adviser quipped that this was likely due to experience the ANP had gained by “shooting at us [the U.S.] previously," rather than a result of the advisers’ behavior.101 Also, toward the end of the PMT’s deployment, the ANP had generated intelligence about an

95Author Interview, November 30, 2017. 96Author Interview, November 30, 2017. 97Author email correspondence, April 27, 2017. 98Author Interview, December 8, 2017. 99Author Interview, November 30, 2017. 100Author Interview, November 30, 2017. 101Author Interview, April 20, 2018.

69 alleged Taliban gathering. Although the Marine PMT could not accompany the ANP unit on this clearing mission, nor did they direct the ANP to conduct it, they watched on the GBOSS as the ANP unit entered into a gun ﬁght with militants in a village, eventually arresting nearly 20 individuals in the raid.102 And, there was one instance where the population provided a tip on an IED location to the police.103 Outside of these scattered successes, however, the force was “basically a little militia," that “didn’t even know what GIRoA [the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] is."104

3.4.3 Conclusion

Why didn’t the advisers more passive approach alter the Naw Zad ANP’s behavior? The evidence suggests that the unit’s apathy was a major impediment. With passive advisers, the apathetic ANP unit was engaged in considerable amounts of corruption and showed little interest in developing the kinds of technocratic skills needed to execute COIN successfully. Although the ANP may have had some tactical proﬁciency, the team attributed this to skills they had gained prior to joining the force. And, parochial rivalries inhibited the ANP’s ability and willingness to position and maneuver its forces effectively in the ﬁeld, generate intelligence from locals, or improve their relationship with the population writ large. Without any apparent consequences for their misconduct and recalcitrance, the unit had little reason to be responsive to their advising team.

3.5 “The Good Enough Standard": Police Advising in Garmser

Garmser (February-October 2009) represents a case of balanced advising leading to comparatively high unit proﬁciency. Co-located with their ANP partners, the Marine advisers combined a mix of overt and covert surveillance measures to discipline the unit’s behavior.

102Author Interview, December 8, 2017. To be sure, the ANP’s motivation for carrying out this operation was unclear to the advising team. 103Author email correspondence, April 25, 2018. 104Author Interview, April 20, 2018.

70 Furthermore, when needed, the advisers issued indirect and implicit ultimatums to their Afghan counterparts to ensure they cooperated. The net result of these activities was that the Marines could credibly threaten to withdraw support from the unit if they continued demanding bribes from locals, selling fuel and equipment, and other misconduct. But, because they performed these measures with less intensity, the Marines were also able to preserve rapport with their partner unit to ameliorate any resentment that their threats might cause. Ultimately this yielded a police force, that, though flawed, still made tangible improvements in their COIN proficiency over the advisers’ deployment. Much like Naw Zad, from the Fall 2006 to Spring 2008 the coalition’s influence in the remote Garmser district did not extend beyond the district center compound. Outside this small patch of territory, which itself was periodically harassed by insurgent attacks, the “rest of Garmser fell firmly under the Taliban."105 Garmser was “widely-known" as a “Taliban safe haven and entry point for fighters from Pakistan.106 In 2006 the ANP had cleared the Taliban from the area, but after doing so looted locals’ houses, leading many to request the Taliban return to the district.107 In March 2008 the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) deployed to Afghanistan to begin clearing portions of Southern Afghanistan of insurgent control and interdicting fighters entering Afghanistan from Pakistan. The MEU consisted of a 1,200-man 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment (1/6), augmented with an artillery battery and air assets.108 The MEU began staging its forces near the Garmser district center beginning in April, concentrating its forces within a relatively small 10 km by 10 km operations box. Facing between 200-600 foreign and Afghan insurgents, the Marines expected the clearing operation to last 7-10 days.109 But, a resolved, if overconfident, Taliban cadre acting on orders from Quetta, Pakistan, held the line against the Marines for 35 days. During this period, the Marines

105Malkasian 2013, p. 110. 106Malkasian 2013, p. 119. 107Giustozzi 2009a, p. 128. 108Malkasian 2013, p. 119. 109Dynan 2010, p. 13.

71 engaged in over 170 firefights with insurgents who eventually fled South after suffering heavy losses.110 After this successful clearing operation, the Marines held Garmser for the remainder of their tour with few direct engagements with insurgents. During this period the Marines shifted to more classical counterinsurgency operations. Part of this effort included surveying damage to civilian infrastructure and compensating locals for their losses. And, the Marines conducted shuras with local elders in an attempt to encourage civilians to return to the area.111 In September 2008 the Marines passed responsibility for Garmser to a British battalion of 350 men partnered with an Afghan National Army (ANA) kandak of 450. During this period Garmser experienced a degree of backsliding in its security. British forces engaged in near daily gun battles with insurgent forces, who subsequently filled the vacuum left by the Marines and reportedly killed local elders who had cooperated with the coalition.112 As a result, locals in Garmser grew to “despise the British."113 Given their low force density, the British could only devote two men to the advising mission.114 In March 2009 the British were relieved by the 2/8 Marines, who, drawing on their additional manpower, pushed into Southern Garmser during Operation Khanjar in July and were able to re-establish a more robust coalition footprint in the district.115 In April, a Military Police platoon from 5/10 Marines was given the responsibility for advising the Garmser ANP until redeploying from Afghanistan in November 2009. The Garmser ANP was selected for the seventh cycle of FDD, attending the 8 week training course at the Spin Boldak, Kandahar Province Regional Training Center (RTC) in June 2009.116 As a

110Malkasian 2013, pp. 120-126. 111For details on these activities, see: Dynan 2010, particularly Appendix E, G, and H. 112Dynan 2010, p. 20, David Wood, "New Offensive in Afghanistan Hampered by Shortages," Politics Daily, undated. 113Dynan 2010, p. 20. 114Rosenau 2011, p. 52; Author Interview, December 10, 2017. 115Cpl. Daniel Flynn, “2/8 Marines, Afghan Soldiers Continue Operation Khanjar," Regimental Combat Team 3, July 5, 2009. Available at: https://www.dvidshub.net/news/36241/2-8-marines-afghan- soldiers-continue-operation-khanjar. 116CJTF-Phoenix, “Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool Brieﬁng," July 6, 2009

72 reminder, FDD involved removing an entire ANP unit from its district, retraining it at a regional training center, and redeploying it to the district. During the unit’s training cycle, ANCOP were deployed to the district to provide security. Rather than remaining in the district to partner with the ANCOP unit, however, the Garmser PMT attended the FDD training alongside their partners.117

3.5.1 Adviser Intrusion

The Marine PMT in Garmser adopted a moderately-intrusive advising approach. The Marines interacted with an ANP unit who, despite its FDD training, was still demanding bribes from locals, using drugs while on duty, and engaging in other adverse behavior that undermined population security in the district.118 The force was also bifurcated between those loyal to the previous police chief who had been assassinated, and those loyal to his replacement. In addition to consequences more cooperative behavior might instigate from higher headquarters, then, the new police chief had some reason to fear reprisal from patrolmen loyal to his predecessor if he demanded more professional behavior. This would create an enormous amount of latent pressure on the police chief to remain wedded to the status quo. In response to these challenges, the Marines employed a balanced approach to advising their partner units. This included occasional surprise visits to ANP static positions, accountability checks performed through their Afghan counterparts, and observation of payrolls. At times the Marines also made veiled threats to their partner unit. Even so, the PMT endeavored to avoid appearing too threatening to their partner units’ leadership, and, when needed, did not take certain corrective actions. Unlike the Naw Zad PMT, which was decidedly un-intrusive in its monitoring, the

117It is important to note that a celebrated State Department official, Dr. Carter Malkasian, also deployed to Garmser. Dr. Malkasian’s efforts have been credited as a major factor leading to Garmser’s political and economic progress. Arriving in September 2009, however, Dr. Malkasian overlapped minimally with the PMT’s deployment, which ended in October 2009. See: Malkasian 2013 p. 142, Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “In Afghanistan’s Garmser District, Praise for a U.S. Official’s Tireless Work," Washington Post, August 23, 2011. Based on this small overlap, it is reasonable to dismiss Malkasian’s influence as a confounding variable in this analysis. 118Rosenau 2011, p. 52; Author interview, December 10, 2017.

73 Garmser PMT monitored their partner unit using both overt and covert methods. A member of the PMT described this as a “multifaceted approach to collect information" about the Garmser ANP, highlighting the need “to process it [information] in a way that was actionable."119 For one, the Garmser PMT combined their weapons stocks with their partner unit’s, obviating the need for intrusive visits when performing accountability checks of the ANP’s inventories. Even so, the PMT regularly visited a portion of the ANP checkpoints each day, ostensibly to check on the units’ well-being over chai. But, as part of these visits the advisers would shadow their ANP patrolmen as they checked that their comrades were in uniform and had their proper identiﬁcation cards and weapons.120 At the same time, to avoid upsetting their partner unit, the Marines supplemented these methods with indirect monitoring. The PMT regularly conducted structured interviews with locals to check on the behavior of their partner force. When on patrol, the PMT members were instructed to also eavesdrop on conversations the ANP were having with locals.121 In other cases the advisers employed even more creative methods to monitor their partners, setting up observation positions at night and using their night vision to watch over checkpoints they suspected of being involved in illicit activity.122 The team also subtly employed threats and coercive measures to discipline the patrolmen and motivate their timid and ineffective police chief to be less apathetic. To be sure, the police chief needed to tread lightly and “keep the peace."123 The previous chief had been assassinated, and a signiﬁcant portion of patrolmen remained loyal to him. If the Marines pushed the new police chief too hard to confront these loyalists, they might direct their anger (and weapons) towards him or his advisers. Put simply, the Marine PMT was asking this new chief to risk his life to cooperate with them. Unlike the Naw Zad PMT, which for the most part avoided the topic, the Marines

119Author interview, December 10, 2017. 120Author interview, December 10, 2017. 121Author interview, December 10, 2017. 122Rosenau 2011, p. 57; Author interview, December 10, 2017. 123Author interview, December 10, 2017.

74 prodded the police chief with allegations of corruption and misconduct within his force. When their covert surveillance revealed that a checkpoint commander was demanding bribes, for example, rather than giving the chief an ultimatum, the team was able to gradually “wear him [the police chief] down" by identifying the “ramifications" of corruption and telling him “you can’t allow this to go on...this type of stuff is cancerous."124 Yet, in another case when absentee officers showed up on payday to receive salaries, the team resisted its instinct to question the police chief or push him to deny these officers their salaries.125 That is, the Garmser PMT did not try to enforce the correct disbursement of funds.126 The PMT also allowed for some of the officers to sell non-essential pieces of equipment. Indeed, the officers’ “boots were the first thing to go," as the officers instead opted for footwear that could withstand the heat in Garmser.127

3.5.2 Unit Proﬁciency

Though far from meeting a Western standard of community-policing, the Garmser ANP improved steadily in their battleﬁeld performance. Locals initially expressed some appreci- ation for the police immediately upon their return from the FDD training, predominately because the ANCOP units had overstayed their welcome in the village. Yet, there continued to be widespread frustration with graft, drug-use, and overall unit morale. The force was highly apathetic and resistant to their advisers’ advice. The ANP dedicated few men to patrols, and were generally “underequipped, as well as short of...basic supplies such as fuel or ammunition."128 Indeed, a PMT adviser noted that the force had “become stagnant."129 Eventually, the ANP showed steady improvement in their motivation and proﬁciency. The moderately-intrusive PMT pushed the force to become more proactive, and the ANP

124Author interview, December 10, 2017. 125Author interview, December 10, 2017. 126Author interview, December 10, 2017. 127Author Interview, May 4, 2018. 128Ann Scott Tyson, “Shortages of Capable Afghan Forces in South Complicates U.S. Mission," Washington Post, July 25, 2009; Rosenau 2011, p. 53. 129Author interview, December 10, 2017.

75 complied. Whereas the Naw Zad ANP stubbornly refused to even move men between checkpoints, the Garmser PMT was able to convince their partner unit to close two checkpoints to free up more personnel for dismounted patrolling.130 The Garmser ANP regularly patrolled to generate intelligence from locals. An observer noted how the ANP cleared a route of IEDs, and then proceeded to search a compound for insurgent materiel.131 A PTRAT briefing similarly described a partner force that was “eager to patrol with Marines."132 Recognizing that the PMT was aware of the unit’s corruption and likely fearing the consequences of ignoring them, the police chief also shut down a corrupt checkpoint the adviser’s surveillance had uncovered and fired the responsible individual, a loyalist from the previous chief. Visits from the PMT also likely deterred the other checkpoints from engaging in illicit behavior.133 Unlike the Naw Zad ANP, whose relationship with locals was strained, the Garmser ANP eventually was able to establish a good relationship with the local population as a result of their improved behavior. Citizens were indeed “very impressed" with the Garmser ANP.134 Reflecting on the latter half of the deployment, a Marine from 2/8 similarly noted that of the “last 20 IEDs, probably 15 of them the locals told us about."135 Another PTRAT report highlighted how “policemen interact with the local populace regularly, and take pride in their positions."136 ANP improvement was particularly apparent in the behavior of the Garmser police chief, who became less passive and took on the enormous personal risk to push his force to interact more positively with locals. The once timid chief grew more assertive in his role, and he eventually met regularly with checkpoint commanders and delineated a patrol schedule for them to follow.137 Reflecting on this, one adviser from the team noted, “I feel

130Author interview, December 10, 2017. 131Lance Cpl. Dwight Henderson, “Marines Eat, Sleep, Operate Out of Afghan National Police Compound," Regimental Combat Team 7, November 23, 2009. Available at: https://www.dvidshub.net/news/ 41909/marines-eat-sleep-operate-out-afghan-national-police-compound. 132CJTF-Phoenix, “Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool Briefing," October 9, 2009. 133Rosenau 2011, p. 57. 134CJTF-Phoenix, “Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool Briefing," November 7, 2009. 135United States Marine Corps History Division, Oral History Interview 114-2009. 136CJTF-Phoenix, “Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool Briefing," October 9, 2009. 137CJTF-Phoenix, “Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool Briefing," October 9, 2009.

76 our deployment [was] a success [because] at first people came to me to ask for things, and at the end [of the deployment] they would talk to [the police chief]."138 The flow of foot traffic to and from the district center increased markedly.139 The local governor too began to view the police as a more professional force capable of providing security to locals.140 Even so, the Garmser PMT was only able to achieve what they called a “good enough standard" in ANP proficiency.141 An adviser from the team noted that even as the unit improved in its battlefield effectiveness, he was certain corruption was still occurring on some level.142 And, recruiting locals to the force continued to be a challenge for coalition forces.143 Finally, the unit’s ability to maintain its equipment showed only modest improvement.

3.5.3 Conclusion

The Garmser police chief had every incentive to avoid cooperating with his foreign advisers. He had to manage the potential response from the previous chief’s patrolmen that more accountability and performance demands might instigate. The previous chief had also been assassinated, further increasing the risks he faced if he became more proactive. This all put a great deal of pressure on the police chief to maintain the status quo, rather than initiating any activity in response to his advisers. Nonetheless, the advisers were able to convey threats to their partner unit, employing a mix of direct and indirect monitoring that at times used Afghans as interlocutors, direct conversations with their police chief about corruption laced with implicit threats, and, when necessary, tolerated some level of corruption within their partner unit. Though far from a highly-proﬁcient force, the Garmser ANP did improve considerably during the advisers’ tenure.

138Author interview, December 10, 2017. 139Author Interview, May 4, 2018. 140Author Interview, May 4, 2018. 141Author interview, December 10, 2017; see also: Rosenau 2011, p. 59. 142Author interview, December 10, 2017 143As one civilian member of the District Support Team in Garmser noted in November, 2009, “We need to ﬁnd ways to motivate the people to join the police...I don’t know if that’s going to happen or not." United States Marine Corps History Division, Oral History Interview, 06-11-2009.

77 3.6 “I Should Have Been More Even-Keeled": Police Advising in Golestan

The Afghan National Police in the remote district of Golestan (April-November 2008) is a case where a tremendous amount of adviser intrusion led to low unit proficiency. The Golestan PMT adopted a highly coercive approach to deal with the unit’s dysfunction, intrusively monitoring their behavior and conduct, issuing direct threats, and, in one case, even drawing a weapon on their partner force. These measures burned rapport with the partner unit, leading to series of acrimonious confrontations between the PMT and partner unit. The ANP commander in turn tried to lead his intrusive advisers into dangerous situations, and his men regularly deserted the force. Needless to say, the local ANP consequently demonstrated poor battlefield performance, as nepotism and abuse undermined the unit’s readiness, morale, and, most importantly, relationship with the local population during this period. Prior to the arrival of the Marine advisers, Golestan had long been a violent area. In 2006 the Taliban overran the district’s police station, and, though repeatedly cleared by NATO forces, the area was considered “Taliban country" in 2007.144 In October of 2007 a U.S.-Afghan joint convoy headed to Golestan was indeed ambushed, leading to the kidnapping and execution of nineteen Afghan soldiers.145 Once U.S. and Afghan Army troops eventually reached Golestan successfully, they began patrolling the town and holding shuras with locals who had been intimidated by the Taliban. Nonetheless the coalition forces left soon thereafter, allowing the Taliban to reassert itself in the district.146 In April 2008, the 2/7 Marines deployed to southwest Afghanistan to “begin training, mentoring, and advising the Afghanistan National Police."147 The reinforced battalion of 1300 Marines dispersed its components across fourteen fixed Forward Operating Bases and

144Grey 2010, p. 84. “Afghan Forces Retake District HQ," BBC, September 15, 2006. 145Grey 2010, p. 84. 146Grey 2010, p. 86. 147U.S. Marine Corps History Division, “U.S. Marines in Afghanistan, 2001-2009 Anthology and Annotated Bibliography," 2014. xii.

78 Combat Outposts.148 The battalion sent one of its companies to Delaram city, and, in May, a platoon of Marines from this company arrived in the Golestan valley to partner with and advise the local Afghan National Police. They would remain in the valley until redeploying in November 2008.149 Given the limited coalition presence, by the time Marines arrived, the valley was under heavy insurgent influence, being used as a safe haven for Taliban forces to rest and recooper- ate from more active areas.150 The Taliban operated its own shadow government in the area, taxing and controlling the local population.151 And, the Army PMT the Marines came to relieve “had not left the wire in three months."152 Similar to Garmser, in Golestan Marines attached to 2/7 would seek to build local partner capacity through the FDD program. Given the threat environment, the Marines made a concerted effort to increase their patrols to protect and create space for the ANP to operate and develop in proficiency once they returned from training. In coordination with the ANCOP unit deployed to temporarily replace the ANP during the latter’s 8 week training cycle, the Marines spent their initial weeks attempting to expand their influence in the immediate area through intelligence-driven joint patrols and operations.153 Even so, despite their reputation for greater technocratic proficiency, the ANCOP forces still demanded bribes from locals to subsidize their deployment, which, to some extent, undermined local support for the government.154

3.6.1 Adviser Intrusion

The Marine platoon’s advising method was based predominately on intrusive monitoring and coercion, which, consistent with the theoretical mechanism, generated advisee anger and

148Dynan 2010, p. 8. 149Meyerle, Katt and Gavrilis 2010, p. 25. 150Meyerle, Katt and Gavrilis 2010, p. 25. 151Meyerle, Katt and Gavrilis 2010, p. 25. 152Author Interview, December 28, 2017. 153McGowan 2016, pp. 159-160. 154Author Interview, December 28, 2017.

79 indignation. Faced with a partner unit with rampant drug use, corruption, and, in some cases, of questionable loyalty, the Marines closely audited their partner unit’s behavior, directly threatened to have its leadership removed, and withheld resources from their partners. Reﬂecting on his experience, an adviser from the Golestan PMT noted, “I should have been more even-keeled."155 Accordingly, “dealing with the police proved to be the platoon’s greatest challenge."156 The Golestan PMT was deeply intrusive in monitoring their partners’ conduct. For one, unlike the Naw Zad PMT who avoided their partners’ internal records or the Garmser PMT whose creation of a joint armory obviated the need for audits, they performed weekly inventories of the partner unit’s weapons to maintain constant accountability. The Marines similarly visited and observed the ANP’s single checkpoint “everyday, multiple times a day" until it was later shut down. The platoon also took monitoring further than this, checking its partner units’ pupils to ensure “nobody was out of their minds [on drugs]" prior to joint operations. The team regularly checked the miles traveled on ANP vehicles to ensure that the correct amount of fuel as allotted to the unit and that none of the ANP’s fuel was ending up on the black market. One of the advisers from the team recalled thinking at the time, in intrusively monitoring the ANP, “[A]m I walking all over these guys? I obviously don’t want to do anything to truly humiliate them...[but I concluded] I don’t have any other control over this other than just to do it." Although the PMT was less deliberate in third party monitoring of their partners’ behavior, they did solicit locals’ opinions about the ANP regularly and dedicated a riﬂe squad to establish key relationships with communities in Golestan.157 The Marine advisers regularly employed coercive measures, threatening and suspending assistance to their partner unit to deter corruption and misconduct. As will be discussed in the following section, this was not without cause. The Marines believed the police chief was engaging in corrupt behavior and colluding with the Taliban. The ANP were also

155Author Interview, December 28, 2017. 156Meyerle, Katt and Gavrilis 2010, p. 25. 157Author Interview, December 29, 2017.

80 regularly using drugs while on duty and demanding bribes from locals. When discussing the team’s relationship with the district police chief, one adviser noted, “The levels of threat and intimidation between us ranged from him having a pistol drawn on him, all the way down to...sitting him down and saying ‘hey you can continue to do what you want to do, but if this behavior continues...you will not have a job.’"158 Indeed, the PMT was “very bad" at developing “camaraderie" with its partner unit.159 After a meeting at the District Governor’s compound, for example, the police chief enthusiastically volunteered to take the lead on the return patrol. This enthusiasm and bravado were unusual, as typically when insurgents attacked, the “DCoP [District Chief of Police] and his deputy would hide."160 Concerned with the chief’s newfound courage, his insistence on a particular return route, and that the meeting had provided enough time for the Taliban to set an ambush, one civilian attached to the advising team drew his weapon on the police chief as they returned, ordering him to take an alternative route from the district center.161 Beyond these relationship dynamics, unlike the more passive Naw Zad PMT or balanced approach adopted in Garmser, the Golestan PMT often had direct confrontations about pay skimming, corruption, and police loyalty. And, these measures certainly provoked recipient unit anger. After one particularly vocal confrontation, an adviser speculated that the police chief’s response was “ﬁne, screw this guy [the adviser]" and recalls the police chief “seething...with his eyes."162 These confrontations regularly included threats of having the chief removed. These threats were relayed to the police chief through the PMT advisers, as well as their platoon’s higher headquarters. In one instance an adviser recalls a superior commander saying to the police chief, "[I]f you can’t clean up your act, just remember I have Marines everywhere..."163 The Golestan PMT also in at least one instance cut the

158Author Interview, December 29, 2017. 159Author Interview, December 29, 2017. 160Author Interview, December 29, 2017. 161Author Interview, December 29, 2017. 162Author Interview, December 29, 2017. 163Author Interview, December 29, 2017.

81 partner unit off from the Marines’ fuel supply due to concerns about graft and corruption.

3.6.2 Unit Proﬁciency

By most measures, the Golestan ANP consistently performed poorly in the field, showing little to no improvement in proficiency over time. Selected for the third cycle of FDD, the Golestan ANP began their 8-week intensive training at the Herat Regional Training Center in May 2008.164 The 75-man strong ANP unit returned to Golestan from training in July. When the ANP returned from FDD, expectations were naturally high. The unit was one of the first cycles to go through the program, and the Marines had been aggressively conducting operations in the valley to create necessary space for the unit to operate. Despite their new training and equipment, however, the ANP were far from the proficient, reformed unit the FDD program had envisioned. One account notes that the unit “lacked basic infantry and marksmanship skills," not to mention that "they were not trusted by the population."165 Unlike the Garmser ANP, which eventually cut back on its corrupt behavior, corruption was rampant and persistent within the Golestan ANP at all levels of the command. This naturally harmed their relationship with the local population, as well as their willingness to conduct operations. After complaints from local shopkeepers regarding ANP extortion led the PMT to shut down a checkpoint, for example, the ANP simply resorted to stealing locals’ firewood instead. Similarly, though the Marines’ accountability procedures for fuel led the ANP to stop requesting excess amounts from the PMT, they continued selling the fuel they had and would refuse to go on operations because they did not have enough gas.166 Just as pernicious were desertion issues within the force, experienced by neither the Garmser nor Naw Zad ANP, both of which maintained unit cohesion, albeit to different degrees. The Golestan ANP lost around 5-7 patrolmen a week after returning from RTC. Some of this was due to the police chief’s attempts to purge the force of trained men who

164Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix,“Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool Brieﬁng," July 7, 2008. 165Meyerle, Katt and Gavrilis 2010, p. 25 166Author Interview, December 29, 2017.

82 were not from his tribe. He did this both to allow him to increase the number of ghost soldiers on the payroll and ensure that the force was “personally loyal to him."167 Losing men indeed appeared to be a “source of pride" for the police chief who would taunt the PMT about this issue.168 Unsurprisingly, the unit’s poor performance continued after the district chief had purged it of trained personnel. Drug use, corruption, and nepotism remained prevalent in the force, which, once the trained patrolmen had deserted, only represented the district chief’s tribe.169 This inhibited the ANP’s willingness to operate without bias for ethnic or tribal affiliation; indeed, the force would only collect information when it “didn’t interfere with their [tribal] objectives."170 To be sure, unlike the Naw Zad and Garmser ANP, which showed only modest improvement in equipment maintenance, the Golestan ANP oddly demonstrated much greater proficiency in this area by the end of its deployment. Beyond this, however, the kind of technocratic, apolitical proficiency in the conduct of war was beyond the reach of the Golestan ANP throughout the team’s deployment. And, the PMT’s behavior contributed to an immensely hostile relationship between the PMT and its partner unit’s commander during and after the PMT’s deployment. The Golestan police chief “tried several times to lead them [the PMT] into areas where they would be vulnerable to attack,"171 and an adviser caught the police chief speaking to insurgents on the radio during their patrols.172 In late July, three Tajik members of the ANP were slain by the Taliban, reportedly due to the police chief’s reporting the patrolmen’s movements to the insurgents. When a squad of Marines patrolled to recover the bodies, they met a complex ambush of rocket propelled grenade and effective machine gun fire.173 Ultimately, an adviser noted that the PMT “had to keep our eyes in the back of our head. All we could

167Meyerle, Katt and Gavrilis 2010, p. 25; Author Interview, December 29, 2017. 168Author Interview, December 29, 2017. 169Meyerle, Katt and Gavrilis 2010, p. 25. 170Author Interview, December 29, 2017. 171Meyerle, Katt and Gavrilis 2010, p. 31. 172Author Interview, December 28, 2017. 173McGowan 2016, p. 301.

83 do was mitigate his [the district police chief’s] ability to threaten us, by keeping at least two Marines for every one police..."174 Anger’s slow decay and locking in effects also appeared to inﬂuence the ANP commander’s behavior after this PMT left Afghanistan. Indeed, the police chief attempted to take revenge on the intrusive advising team by spreading a rumor that one of the advisers had committed a murder. This was an attempt to undermine that adviser’s career and “throw...[the individual] under the bus."175

3.6.3 Conclusion

Why didn’t the Marines’ intrusive and coercive methods of advising their partner units work? Put another way, why didn’t the Golestan ANP try to ease the Marines’ threats by improving in their battleﬁeld performance or otherwise cleaning up their behavior? Answering this question decisively is challenging without access to the inner thoughts of ANP patrolmen and commanders. Nonetheless, the evidence presented here is consistent with the theory. Intrusive monitoring and coercion generated anger, resentment, and hostility from the partner unit. And, the police chief responded and coped with this anger by attempting to assert his control over his unit and eliminate the PMT. Anger even motivated the police chief to continue seeking vengeance on the PMT after that team had redeployed. This is not to argue that the Marines were not able to unilaterally make considerable security gains in the district. As the subsequent battle space owner noted, “This area was the stronghold in the Golestan Valley where the Taliban had freedom of movement. They could strike us when they wanted in this area, and we removed that by putting a Company Headquarters right in the middle of it and then starting to work with the locals."176 Unfortunately, a more proﬁcient partner unit could not capitalize on these gains.

174Meyerle, Katt and Gavrilis 2010, p. 31. 175Author Interview, December 29, 2017. 176United States Marine Corps History Division, Oral History Interview 2011-01-03-0004.

84 3.7 Confounding Variables and Alternative Explanations

In the above analysis I have demonstrated how three radically different approaches to military advising led to variation in the improvement of Afghan National Police units over time. In Naw Zad, an unintrusive approach yielded an ANP beset by parochial interests and racked with considerable operational shortfalls. In Golestan, a highly-coercive approach may have contributed to desertions within the local ANP and failed to produce improvements in their behavior. The Garmser PMT’s more balanced methods helped create an ANP that, while still flawed, improved in their proficiency over time. A number of variables might have also intervened to effect both adviser intrusion and ANP proficiency during each PMT’s deployment. Some of these potentially-confounding variables can be quickly ruled out. All three advising teams were from the U.S. Marine Corps and received very little (if any) advanced notice that they would be serving as advisers. Although all three districts were not included in the Focused District Development program, both Golestan and Garmser were, meaning we can rule it out as necessary and sufficient for improving ANP unit proficiency in the field. Furthermore, all three districts were in areas with large Pashtun majorities, eliminating ethnic diversity as an alternative explanation. In this section I focus on three remaining variables that require greater elaboration: 1) Insurgent threat, 2) Opportunities for corruption, and, 3) Terrain ruggedness. Of these variables, only terrain ruggedness remains as a potentially confounding factor. That is, neither insurgent threat nor opportunities for corruption provide the analytic leverage to adequately explain why the Garmser ANP would perform better than their counterparts in Golestan and Naw Zad. Even so, at closer examination, terrain ruggedness becomes a less convincing alternative explanation for the variance I uncovered above. Insurgent threat is perhaps the confounding variable that looms largest. If, for example, the Golestan and Naw Zad ANP faced a more pronounced threat environment than the Garmser ANP, this could complicate our ability to attribute differences in ANP performance

85 to the behavior of their advisers. As a first step in analyzing whether this is the case, I draw on the recently-declassified Afghanistan Significant Activities (SIGACT) database, made available by Shaver and Wright 2016. The SIGACTS database consists of routinely- collected, geo-referenced violent events, to include direct fire, indirect fire, small arms fire, and other types of insurgent attacks. Below (Figure 3.3) I plot the number of insurgent attacks in each district 6 months prior to, and during, each team’s deployment. We see that surprisingly, Garmser generally had the largest number of insurgent attacks, followed by Golestan. The violence in Garmser can be attributed to kinetic activity that occurred in the Southern part of the district, which did not directly affect the ANP in the vicinity of the district center.177 Naw Zad had the least amount of violence of the three districts.

Figure 3.3: Insurgent Attack Trends in Case Study Districts

Of course, these district-level quantitative figures have their flaws. Without fine-grained data on troop density, we cannot rule out that these differences merely reflect differences in target availability rather than insurgent strength. And, low insurgent violence does not

177Author Interview, December 10, 2017.

86 necessarily mean less insurgent threat; fewer attacks can indeed mean more insurgent territorial control.178 Caveats and reservations aside, the analysis does not lend itself to the immediate conclusion that insurgent violence, rather than adviser behavior, ultimately determined the proficiency of partner units in the field. Another potential alternative explanation is that units in Garmser simply had fewer opportunities for corrupt behavior. This is also not convincing. Many forms of corruption would be available to all ANP units, regardless of their location. All of the units had fuel and equipment to sell, salaries to skim, and checkpoints from which they could demand bribes from passing motorists. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to assume that other opportunities, such as having the chance to collaborate with criminal networks, would be available to these units equally. To investigate whether this might be the case, I draw on the United Nations Office of Drug Control (UNODC) data to compare opium production for each district. The UNODC data produces estimates of the hectares of opium cultivation for districts in Afghanistan. The data require some important caveats, as the UNODC outlines that they are “indicative only," going on to note that they only “suggest a possible distribution of the estimated provincial poppy area among the districts of a province."179 Figure 3.4 below plots these estimates for 2002-2010 for each case study district. We see that, generally speaking, Garmser had the highest estimated number of hectares, though Naw Zad is a close second.180 178Kalyvas 2006. 179United Nations Office of Drug Control, “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017," November 2017. 180Indeed, Marines operating in Garmser in 2009 referred to one area of the district as “Opiumville." United States Marine Corps History Division, Oral History Interview 114-2009.

87 Figure 3.4: Opium Cultivation Estimates in Case Study Districts (2002-2010)

Third, differences in terrain might also affect recipient unit battlefield performance. Rugged terrain should inhibit the ability of counterinsurgent forces to project power by providing natural cover for insurgents.181 To evaluate whether Garmser has comparatively more rugged terrain, I use the Shaver, Carter and Shawa 2016 high resolution terrain ruggedness measure.182 Shaver, Carter, and Shawa calculate this by comparing the elevation of each kilometer by kilometer grid cell to its neighbors. Comparing terrain ruggedness across the three districts suggests that the terrain in both Golestan and Naw Zad is far more rugged, and, thus, difficult for counterinsurgents, than it was in Garmser. Nonetheless, this is not a convincing alternative explanation for the patterns observed above for a number of reasons. First, terrain is a static feature of these districts. As such, although it might explain the baseline level of ANP proficiency in each district, in cannot, on its own, explain patterns in each unit’s improvement (or lack thereof) over time. Second, this becomes less convincing when we consider that the less mountainous district also witnessed more violence during the time periods examined in this study. If the key mechanism through

181Cross-national literature on civil war has highlighted rugged terrain as a potential determinant of conﬂict onset and duration. See, e.g.: Fearon and Laitin 2003; Buhaug, Gates and Lujala 2009; Buhaug and Gates 2002. 182Shaver, Carter and Shawa 2016.

88 which rugged terrain drives lower unit proﬁciency is insurgent violence, then we can most certainly rule this out as an alternative explanation.

3.8 Conclusion

In this chapter I have closely examined three Afghan National Police units whose Police Mentor Team advisers adopted distinct advising strategies. Whereas the Naw Zad PMT focused their efforts on persuasion and rapport-building, the Golestan PMT adopted a more forceful approach. The Garmser PMT struck a balance between the two, employing moderate amounts of monitoring and coercion. The results were largely consistent with my theory; the ANP performed best in Garmser. Moreover, the response from the ANP units is consistent with the theory: intrusive adviser behaviors antagonized the partner unit, leading to destructive coping mechanisms. The qualitative analysis is limited by a number of factors, none of which are unique to this study. First, qualitative analysis cannot effectively control for all potentially confounding variables. To be sure, the analysis controlled for adviser service, recipient unit training type, and district ethnicity. Subsequent analysis also was able to rule out insurgent violence and opportunities for corruption as factors that would produce the variance we observed here. Yet, the qualitative analysis is limited by its ability to account for the effects of measurement error and sample bias in my results. To help overcome these challenges I turn to a large-n, statistical analysis of ANP units in the next chapter.

89 Chapter 4: Quantitative Analysis

In the previous chapter I explored how, through variations in adviser intrusion, Marine PMTs were able to incentivize different levels of proficiency in their partner units. Overall, I found that the advising team that was moderately intrusive was most able to improve their partner unit’s battlefield proficiency. But, as I concluded the last chapter, the comparative studies have some limitations as an inferential method. The case studies rely on highly accurate, but also heavily coarsened measures of my key variables. And, case study methods do not systematically account for uncertainty in my results. In this chapter I complement the detailed case studies with a series of statistical tests. I do so using original quantitative data on Afghan National Police (ANP) proficiency and adviser behavior from 2007-2009, made available following a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. I find that past a certain threshold, adviser intrusion is associated with declines in ANP unit proficiency. The findings are robust to numerous model specifications and approaches to measuring my dependent variable. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. I begin by introducing the quantitative component of the Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool (PTRAT). The data are original and provide an unparalleled degree of granularity on recipient unit attributes. But, like any dataset collected in an active warzone, they certainly have their flaws that must be acknowledged, and, where possible, addressed. I then turn to discussing the measures I use from the PTRAT for my dependent and independent variables, followed by a detailed discussion and set of statistical tests to detect potential endogeneity in my data. I also draw on existing research on military effectiveness and civil conflict to justify the inclusion of a number of potentially confounding variables. The chapter then proceeds with the main quantitative analysis, which consists of a series of parametric and non-parametric statistical tests. I then identify, and, through robustness tests, attempt to account for, a number of

90 potential shortcomings of these tests, before concluding with a review of the chapter’s ﬁndings.

4.1 Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool (PTRAT) Dataset Overview

To review, this dissertation argues that some recipient units are more proficient on the battlefield than others due to the behavior of their advisers. More specifically, I contend that advisers who employ moderate levels of intrusion will be more likely to be associated with higher-performing recipient units than those who adopt low or high levels. Beyond the limitations of statistical analysis, testing this argument through quantitative methods is perhaps hindered most by data availability. To date, no publicly-available data or evaluation tracks the proficiency SFA recipient units.1 Following a FOIA request, however, U.S. CENTCOM released a comprehensive dataset of ANP proficiency and advising for this project. From 2007-2010, PMTs responsible for advising ANP units reported monthly data on their partner units through the Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool (PTRAT) briefings. The PTRAT briefings include information ranging from ANP salary payment to the unit’s personnel levels and areas of operation. In addition to quantitative data, the PTRAT also has extensive comments made by advisers regarding the behavior of their partner units in the field. Although the data used in this chapter were extracted and properly formatted, slides from the PTRAT briefings for Regional Command - East are provided below, showing how information on ANP salary receipt, personnel status, proficiency, and qualitative narratives were reported.

1On the assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of U.S. Department of Defense-wide security cooperation activities, see: Marquis et al. 2016.

91 Figure 4.1: Afghan National Police PTRAT Excerpts2

It is important to note that the database only covers ANP units that are partnered with U.S. advisers. This does not pose a problem for this project, which is focused on comparing the performance of advised security force units. Nor do I believe this to introduce selection bias, as there is no reason to believe that these advised units were systematically selected to be partnered based on their potential responsiveness to moderate levels of intrusion by their advisers. Nonetheless, this does limit the conclusions we can draw about the effect of intrusion on advised units compared to those that were unadvised. The data are also unbalanced, as ANP units enter the dataset once they are partnered with coalition advisers. Furthermore, due to technical glitches, adviser rotations, and other factors, not every recipient unit was evaluated for every month in the data even once they were advised. This creates the prospect of missing data, which will be addressed later in this chapter. Despite its ﬂaws, the PTRAT provides an unparalleled amount of systematically- collected and objective information related to an SFA recipient unit’s conduct. In sum,

2CJTF-Phoenix, “Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool Brieﬁng," December 2009.

92 it includes data on 120 Afghan National Police units used in the analysis, which average eight time periods each. Most critical for this study, it includes measures of both my dependent and key independent variables. I turn to these next.

4.2 Dependent Variable: Measuring ANP Proﬁciency

The dependent variable for this study is the recipient unit’s aptitude in the conduct of population-centric COIN. As part of the PTRAT, advisers evaluated their partner unit’s proficiency according to the Capability Milestones (CM), an ordinal rating generated by a structured questionnaire advisers filled out each month they were partnered with the ANP unit.3 Although originally measured on a scale wherein Capability Milestone 1 units were most proficient, for ease of interpretation I reverse the original codings, such that the criteria for each rating level are as follows:4

• Capability Milestone 1: The police unit, staff function or installation is formed but not yet capable of conducting basic law and order operations, management or leadership functions without signiﬁcant external assistance from the International Community. An approximation of capability in terms of DOTMLPF [Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities]or other applicable measure is < 49%.

• Capability Milestone 2: The police unit, staff function or installation can conduct basic law and order operations, management or leadership tasks appropriate for local circumstance) with occasional assistance from an IC advisor or Police Mentor Team. An approximation of capability in terms of DOTMLPF or other applicable measure is 50-69%.

• Capability Milestone 3: The police unit, staff function or installation can conduct basic law and order operations, management or leadership tasks (appropriate local

3SIGAR 2010, pp. 6-7. 4These criteria are taken verbatim from the Police Training Readiness and Assessment Tool brieﬁngs.

93 circumstance) with occasional assistance from an IC [International Community] advisor or Police Mentor Team. An approximation of capability in terms of DOTMLPF or other applicable measure is 70 - 84%.

• Capability Milestone 4: The police unit, staff function or installation is capable of basic law and order operations, management or leadership tasks (appropriate for local circumstances). External assistance may be required for speciﬁc operations (i.e. counter-insurgency engagements or narcotics interdiction). Additionally, as the insurgency threat decreases and Justice Sector Reform takes place, IC assistance may be required to increase the professionalism of the police to a higher standard mandated by the GoA, in accordance with the aspirations of the people of the IRoA. An approximation of capability in terms of DOTMLPF or other applicable measure is ≥ 85%.

Figure 4.2 below depicts the average CM rating for the 120 advised ANP units used in the analysis. We see that there is considerable cross-sectional variance in unit proficiency. Notably, advised ANP units are generally concentrated near the ring road, a road that encir- cled the entire country. Districts near the ring road were selected first for the aforementioned Focused District Development program. FDD districts make up the majority of advised ANP units in the PTRAT.5 5Bius 2009, p. 24 notes, “In Afghanistan, the ‘strategic districts’ were chosen to support the overall campaign objective of securing HWY1, which was known as the ‘Ring Route.’ HWY1 was one of the decisive points in the campaign as it was the only road that circled the entire country, allowing freedom of movement for Afghans and coalition forces as well. Thus key districts that were along this route were chosen first in the FDD [Focused District Development] campaign, as opposed to districts not along HWY1."

94 Figure 4.2: Average Capability Milestone Scores January 2009-February 2010

Though they provide a rare measure of operational-level proficiency in COIN, the Ca- pability Milestones certainly have their flaws as a measure of military effectiveness. The overall Capability Milestone ratings have indeed been criticized heavily as weighing quantitative measures of unit readiness more than a unit’s operational behavior.6 Commanders could downgrade the rating produced by the structured questionnaire, but it is unclear how often they exercised this authority. Even if the CM do only measure readiness, this should not preclude their use.The theoretical mechanisms I propose could just as easily apply to a unit’s overall readiness. Indeed, rather than poor performance in the field, we might imagine unit readiness as being the outcome of interest to military advisers. And, maintaining high levels of readiness would necessitate a unit foregoing the monetary benefits of selling off equipment or fuel. That said, I attempt to address measurement error and other flaws of the Capability Milestones in the robustness tests section by using a latent variable measurement model, an alternative measure of ANP proficiency, and by examining advisers’ qualitative narrative comments. Many have expressed concerns that adviser assessment tools were unevenly applied across the theater and/or inflated by advisers.7 If the advisers who were more likely to

6SIGAR 2010, p.7. 7Mausner and Cordesman 2010; SIGAR 2014a; Connable 2012.

95 inﬂate the ratings of their partner units were also more likely to employ moderate levels of monitoring, this would render these data problematic for the purposes of my study. But, there is little reason to believe this is the case. We might instead expect highly intrusive advisers to be most critical of unit performance, and those focused on building rapport to be systematically more positive. That said, I conduct more formal tests for endogeneity, detailed below, and also adopt an alternative measure of ANP proﬁciency to guard against this concern.

4.3 Independent Variable: Adviser Intrusion

As mentioned in the theory chapter, adviser intrusion encompasses any efforts by advisers to detect, deter, or punish partner unit misconduct. Ideally, advisers would have reported through the PTRAT which of these activities they carried out each month. Unfortunately, this was not the case. Likely because the PTRAT was intended to measure ANP behavior, it includes little information on how PMTs were managing their relationship with their partner units. And, measuring this variable directly through retrospective interviews would be immensely challenging, given the need to track down advising teams serving alongside speciﬁc ANP units during alimited timeframe. Rather than attempting to measure my key independent variable directly, then, I instead do so indirectly through the use of a proxy measure. Although the PTRAT does not report on this full range of adviser activities, it does provide a variable that I can use for my analysis. Beginning in 2009, advisers were instructed to regularly take inventory of their partner unit’s weapons serial numbers to maintain accountability.8 Figure 4.3 below depicts how this variable was reported in the PTRAT. This binary variable can serve as a useful proxy for the overall level of adviser intrusion. Indeed, monitoring is a critical instrument, and it is reasonable to expect the amount of adviser monitoring to be commensurate with coercive measures as well. It would be illogical, for example, for an advising team to intrusively

8DODIG 2009, pp. 71-72.

96 and consistently monitor their partner unit’s behavior, but avoid threatening or withholding assistance from them.

Figure 4.3: PMT Inventory Reporting in PTRAT9

Not all PMTs consistently carried out these inventories. Indeed, Figure 4.4 below demonstrates the considerable cross-sectional variance in adviser monitoring, depicting the proportion of advising periods during which advisers took these inventories for each advised unit. Although I believe it to be a strong proxy for intrusiveness, using this measure nonetheless poses some apparent inferential challenges, which I discuss here, and, where necessary, address through subsequent robustness checks.

9CJTF-Phoenix, “Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool Brieﬁng," November 2009.

97 Figure 4.4: PMT Inventories per Advising Period, January 2009-February 2010

A number of factors are likely to influence whether or not advisers performed inventories, many of which are somewhat idiosyncratic. Author interviews with ANP advisers, as well as archival documents from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), shed some light on the sources of this variance. For one, as mentioned in the theory chapter, adviser doctrine assumes a high degree of interest alignment between advisers and advisees, which might discourage some advisers from consistently conducting these inventories. One Afghan Highway Police mentor interviewed for this study reflected this notion, commenting, “I shoudn’t be the guy trying to play the ‘gotcha’ game with my police...that’s only going to create animosity."10 Conducting these inventories could also carry some opportunity costs. As noted by one RC commander in a ANP readiness briefing,“monthly inventories and reporting requirements for the inventories are having a negative impact on overall mentoring as activity increases."11 And, of course, personal safety of the advising teams was a natural consideration. An officer responsible for overseeing the implementation of these inventories recalls a number of Police Mentor Teams expressing concerns over the potential deadly consequences of trying to inventory their potentially hostile partners’ weapons. The officer

10Author interview, November 13, 2017. A seminal study examining counter corruption efforts in Afghanistan similarly highlights the challenges observing corruption posed for “advisers who relied on rapport with their Afghan counterparts." See: Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis 2014, pp. 49-50. 11“Police Training Readiness Assessment Brieﬁng," December 2009.

98 noted the PMT’s responding, “[W]e don’t even know if the police are good guys...we’re gonna get into firefight if we go try to line the police up and say ‘hand in your weapons so we can get serial numbers off of them.’"12 Beyond the sources of variance articulated by the advisers, empirical concerns regarding spatial clustering and endogeneity are also reasonable. Figure 4.4 indeed suggests considerable spatial correlation in PMT inventories. That is, adjacent AOs tend to have very similar levels of monitoring. This becomes an inferential challenge if we believe that this correlation is caused by a spatially-clustered variable that will be omitted from my statistical model. Although below I seek to account for this through my control variables, many of which are highly-correlated with cross-sectional measures of PMT inventories, I also address spatial clustering more directly in this chapter’s Appendix. The possibility also exists that advisers adjust whether or not they perform an inventory based on their unit’s performance in the field. An adviser might cease conducting inventories once his unit reaches a certain level of proficiency or only conduct inventories when units are performing poorly. If this were the case, we would expect a unit’s proficiency in a previous advising period to influence whether or not it is inventoried in the following period. To test whether this is the case, I run both logistic and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions, including ANP unit fixed effects. The key independent variable is the unit’s CM score at t-1 and the dependent variable is a binary measure of whether the unit’s advisers performed an inventory at time t. I also control for the number of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks, the details of which are detailed below. Results from both models (Table 4.1) do not lend support to this concern of endogeneity. That said, I address this possibility below by including a lagged dependent variable in my statistical analyses. PMT Inventories might also contaminate the Capability Milestone ratings, rendering this a problematic measure of my independent variable. An adviser who performs an inventory could be more likely to encounter negative information about a partner unit or observe a

12Author interview, December 20, 2017.

99 Table 4.1: Capability Milestone (Lagged) and PMT Inventories

PMT Inventory (OLS) PMT Inventory (Logistic) Capability Milestone (Lagged) −0.293 −0.045 (0.197) (0.031) IED (Lagged) −0.092∗ −0.007 (0.005) (0.047) ∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01 ANP unit ﬁxed effects included. ANP unit clustered Standard Errors in parentheses.

unit’s poor performance and evaluate them accordingly. If this were the case, we would expect periods during which an adviser conducted an inventory to be followed by a decline in a unit’s Capability Milestone rating. To test whether this is the case I run a similar model to those above. That is, I regress a unit’s inventory status at time t-1 on its Capability Milestone measure at time t. Similar to the analysis above, I include ANP fixed effects and a lagged count of IED attacks in the model. Although statistical analysis (Table 4.2) does not lend support to this contamination hypothesis, I do use of an alternative measure of ANP proficiency to ensure that my findings are not a relic of the CM measures alone.

Table 4.2: PMT Inventories (lagged) and Capability Milestones

Capability Milestone PMT Inventory (Lagged) −0.019 (0.051) IED (Lagged) −0.010∗ (0.006) ∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01 ANP unit ﬁxed effects included. ANP unit clustered Standard Errors in parentheses.

In this section I have justiﬁed using a binary measure of PMT weapons inventories to proxy for the main independent variable in this study. Though far from perfect, this systematic measure can capture the underlying amount of intrusion an advising unit employed. Through interviews and archival documents, I have explored some reasons for variance in these inventories, and, where possible, tested for potential endogeneity and contaminiation in this measure. These justiﬁcations aside, these inventories are certainly not randomly assigned. I turn to measures I use to account for potentially confounding variables in the section that follows.

100 4.4 Control Variables

A number of variables might influence the willingness and/or ability of advisers to monitor their partner units, as well as the ANP unit’s performance in the field. Failure to include these variables in the statistical model risks biasing my results. So, I include a unit’s past proficiency, the type of training it received, as well as a number of geographic covariates in my analysis. In this section I discuss these variables in turn. First, a unit’s previous proficiency could indeed determine its adviser’s desire to perform an inventory and, of course, its future performance. To be sure, in the previous section I did not find that a unit’s past proficiency had a positive or negative association with adviser inventories. However, to account for this possibility, I nonetheless include a lagged measure of my dependent variable in the model.13 The type of training program the partner unit received might also influence adviser monitoring. As described in the previous chapter, the Focused District Development program was perhaps most comprehensive in its approach to reforming ANP units. It seems reasonable, then, to assume that ANP units that went through this program might receive systematically higher levels of scrutiny than those in other programs. I thus include a binary indicator (FDD) for the 98 units in my dataset that were selected for the program. Further, some factors might influence the willingness or ability of advisers to perform serial number accountability by making the overall operating environment more challenging for counterinsurgents. And, a more challenging operating environment would naturally make COIN proficiency more burdensome for partner units. These variables could make what should otherwise be routine activities (e.g. convoy movements or patrols) more difficult, complicating advisers’ ability to inventory their partner units and frustrating ANP COIN proficiency. At the tactical and operational level, rugged terrain should inhibit the ability of coun-

13Beck and Katz 1996.

101 terinsurgent forces to project power by providing natural cover for insurgents.14 Beyond complicating the execution of counterinsurgency, rugged terrain could also inhibit the ability of advisers who are not co-located with their partner unit to travel to their partner unit’s locations and access its inventories. To create this measure, (Terrain Ruggedness) I average the Shaver, Carter and Shawa 2016 high resolution terrain ruggedness measure for each ANP AO.15 Population density is another relevant control variable for similar reasons. Insurgents can indeed use human terrain as cover and concealment. In densely-populated areas counterinsurgents will thus need to operate with greater care to avoid civilian casualties or collateral damage. To calculate this variable (Population Density), I aggregate high-resolution population data to each ANP unit’s area of operations, and calculate the thousands of persons per square kilometer.16 Next, ethnic heterogeneity can also make the counterinsurgent’s task more arduous. Although cross-national studies have not yet identiﬁed a consistent effect of ethno-linguistic diversity on the onset or duration of civil conﬂict,17 linguistic and cultural barriers can make gathering intelligence from locals more challenging.18 More complex human terrain might also lead advisers to be more concerned with making their partner force representative of their local operating area, and, as a result, less concerned with their partner unit’s weapons inventories. To calculate this measure, I draw on the Geo-referencing of Ethnic Groups (GREG) dataset, which provides geospatial data on the settlement patterns of ethnic groups.19 I intersect the GREG settlements with the ANP areas of operation and draw on population data to create estimates of each ethnicity’s population size within the AO.20 With

14Cross-national literature on civil war has highlighted rugged terrain as a potential determinant of conﬂict onset and duration. See, e.g.: Fearon and Laitin 2003; Buhaug, Gates and Lujala 2009; Buhaug and Gates 2002. 15Shaver, Carter and Shawa 2016. 16Population data are from the 2009 version of LandScanTM 2016. 17Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch 2011; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Denny and Walter 2014. 18Lyall 2010. 19Weidmann, Rød and Cederman 2010. 20For details on this approach to generating estimates of ethnic populations, see: Weidmann, Rød and Cederman 2010, pp. 495-496.

102 these population estimates, I then generate a subnational Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization variable, ELF, to measure ethnic heterogeneity.21 The ELF score gives the probability that, if drawn at random from the AO population, two individuals will have different ethnicities. Insurgent violence could lead advisers to worry more about self-preservation than the advising mission. Insurgent violence might also alert advisers that something may be awry with their partner unit, making them more likely to intrude into their partners’ private affairs. Perhaps most critically, violence could impede adviser movements, and, for situations where PMTs were not co-located with their partner unit, limit their willingness to incur risk by traveling to their partner unit’s base and conducting an inventory. To account for these possibilities, I draw on the recently-declassified Afghanistan Significant Activities (SIGACT) database, made available by Shaver and Wright 2016. As discussed in the previous chapter, the SIGACTS database consists of routinely-collected, geo-referenced violent events, to include direct fire, indirect fire, small arms fire, and other types of insurgent attacks. In order to account for types of violence most likely to impede adviser movement, I include a count of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks in my statistical analysis.

4.5 Empirical Approach and Results

In this section I evaluate the relationship between adviser inventories and ANP unit proﬁ- ciency. My data has a time series cross-sectional format with observations clustered at the ANP unit level measured over time. The panel is unbalanced, as units enter the dataset as they become advised, and, once they have entered the dataset, not all units are evaluated for each advising period.22 Table 4.3 below provides summary statistics of each variable used in the analysis. For time variant variables, this includes both cross-sectional (between) and temporal (within) standard deviations.

21Following Roeder 2001, the ELF index is calculated by subtracting each AO’s Herﬁndahl concentration parameter from 1. 22Although I use listwise deletion in this analysis, the results of the parametric analysis hold when missing values are imputed through the Amelia package. See: Honaker and King 2010; Honaker et al. 2011.

103 Table 4.3: Summary Statistics

Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max

Capability Milestone Overall 2.52 0.92 1.00 4.00 Between 0.78 1.00 4.00 Within 0.53 0.18 4.36

PMT Inventory Overall 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 Between 0.34 0.00 1.00 Within 0.40 -0.36 1.36

IED Overall 2.55 7.24 0.00 159.00 Between 5.13 0.00 42.38 Within 4.95 -32.82 119.18

Population Density Between 2.39 7.43 0.00 43.54

Terrain Ruggedness Between 175.63 135.20 10.87 535.12

ELF Between 0.10 0.17 0.00 0.55

FDD Between 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00

To analyze my central hypothesis, I employ both parametric and non-parametric models, each with advantages and disadvantages. With respect to the former, I specify a “hybrid" Random Effects model that accounts for temporal and cross-sectional variance in my variables. The non-parametric analyses includes a bivariate, local regression, as well as a multivariate basis regression, both of which make fewer assumptions regarding model speciﬁcation. The results across these approaches lend strong support to my theory.

4.5.1 Parametric Analysis

A key challenge with modeling time series cross sectional data revolves around unobserved heterogeneity. For my purposes, this is the concern that some unobserved, unit-level variables might explain why some ANP units are more proﬁcient than others in COIN. I have made every effort to account for these variables through the above controls. But, failure to account for this heterogeneity outside of statistical controls can lead to biased estimates,

104 ultimately undermining any results. Opinions differ regarding how to best proceed, though scholars are often presented with two choices: Fixed or Random Effects models. Fixed Effects models account for unit-level heterogeneity by assigning each unit a dummy variable, essentially capturing any time-invariant confounding factors. Random Effects models, on the other hand, assign unobserved heterogeneity a probability distribution and estimate its variance. Although a complete treatment of each approach’s downsides are beyond the scope of this paper,23 I explore these two approaches here, before outlining and justifying my approach. The Fixed Effects approach accounts for unobserved unit heterogeneity through cross- sectional dummy variables. This would entail including a binary indicator for each ANP unit, capturing any time invariant, unit-level heterogeneity.24 By treating unobserved unit-level heterogeneity as fixed, this allows the researcher to focus on estimating the longitudinal effects of independent variables without concern for time-invariant sources of unit heterogeneity.But, most critical among them is its inability to evaluate the effect of time invariant variables. Adopting this approach would thus leave me unable to assess the effects of variables such as terrain ruggedness, ethnic heterogeneity, and population density. As an alternative to the Fixed Effects approach, many practitioners have advocated the use of Random Effects models.25 Rather than fixing each unit’s baseline proficiency with a dummy variable, these models assign unobserved unit-level heterogeneity a probability distribution, the variance of which is estimated from the data. These models thus decompose unobserved heterogeneity into temporal and unit-level error components. Outside of being more efficient when compared to the Fixed Effects model, one key advantage of this approach is that it allows one to estimate the effects of both time variant and invariant variables. Yet, Random Effects models are not without their shortcomings. Perhaps most critical among them is the fact that the model’s coefficient estimates lead to cluster confounding.

23For overviews, see: Clark and Linzer 2015; Bartels 2015; Marx, Scott and Simonoff 2013. 24Wilson and Butler 2007; Beck 2001 25Gelman and Hill 2007; Bell and Jones 2015.

105 Cluster confounding occurs when one assumes that the temporal, within-unit temporal effect of a variable is equal to its cross-sectional, between unit effect.26 Because the random effects model coefficients represent the weighted average of temporal and cross-sectional effects, as it is commonly applied, the model does not allow for us to distinguish between them. Another drawback of this approach is its assumption that the unit-level heterogeneity is not correlated with covariates of interest. For example, if there were an omitted variable that determined an ANP unit’s higher or lower level of proficiency, it would be accounted for in the unit-level error. In order for the estimated results to be unbiased, then, it would require that this omitted variable be uncorrelated with my covariates.27 When this assumption is violated, Fixed Effects approaches are generally more appropriate.28 Both of these drawbacks of the Random Effects model can be addressed by including “within" and “between" unit measures of time variant variables in the model, an approach sometimes referred to as a “hybrid" method.29 The “within" unit measure centers each variable according to the unit-level mean. The between measure averages the variable over the entire time series.30 Including these two measurements within the Random Effects framework thus allows me to identify and evaluate their effects separately. Critically, including the unit level averages also satisfies the often-violated assumption that the time variant variables are uncorrelated with the varying intercepts. It also removes the effect of unit-level unobserved variables that might affect the level of PMT inventories.31 I thus estimate a Random Effects model, including within and between unit measures of time variant variables such as IED attacks, as well as variables such as ethno-linguistic fractionalization and terrain ruggedness that remain static over time.32 To account for any

26Bartels 2015; Townsend et al. 2013. 27This issue is succinctly described in Clark and Linzer 2015, p. 402. 28Hausman 1978. 29Townsend et al. 2013. 30 Formally, the between unit measure for unit j can be written as: X¯ j, andthe within unit measure for unit j w ¯ at time t can be written as Xjt = Xjt − Xj. 31Bafumi and Gelman 2006; Bell and Jones 2015. For a similar application, see: Pierskalla and Hollenbach 2013, particularly p. 216. 32 w ¯ Formally, the model can be written as: Yjt = γ00 + βXjt + γ01X1 j + γ02Z1 j + µ0 j + ε jt Whereβ and γ02 represents the within and between effect of time variant variables respectively, γ02Z1 j the effect of time

106 potential heteroskedasticity, I also include robust standard errors. As a reminder, my central hypothesis is that the relationship between adviser inventories and partner unit proficiency is non-monotonic. In order to test this hypothesis, I include a quadratic term for the between measure of adviser inventories (PMT Inventory). Although I include the entire dataset in the below analysis, the findings from this section hold when the data are restricted to ANP units with ten temporal observations or more. The findings in Table 4.4 below lend support to my hypothesis. We see that the sign on the base term for the cross-sectional measure of PMT Inventory is positive and significant as control variables are added to the model, while the squared term remains negative and significant. This suggests that past a certain threshold, high proportions of adviser inventories are associated with lower measures of ANP proficiency. Yet, PMT Inventory does not appear to have a “within" unit effect; moving from a period during which there was no adviser inventory to a period with an adviser inventory does not have a statistically significant effect on unit proficiency. The results for the control variables are also of interest. Of note, Improvised Explosive Device attacks appear to have a negative cross-sectional effect on ANP unit proficiency. Put simply, units that experience more IED attacks tend to perform poorly. But, this effect does not hold when we examine variance within units over time; an increase in the number of IED attacks over time does not have a negative or positive influence on unit proficiency. Population density also has a positive, statistically-significant relationship with ANP proficiency.

invariant variables, µ0 j the between unit error, and ε jt the within unit error.

107 Table 4.4: Random Effects Model Results

Capability Milestone

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Capability Milestone (Lagged) 0.516∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗ (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) PMT Inventory (Between) 2.167∗∗∗ 1.812∗∗∗ 1.968∗∗∗ 1.992∗∗∗ 2.023∗∗∗ 2.028∗∗∗ (0.660) (0.669) (0.653) (0.646) (0.652) (0.648) PMT Inventory (Between)2 −1.493∗∗ −1.291∗∗ −1.643∗∗∗ −1.666∗∗∗ −1.571∗∗ −1.488∗∗ (0.643) (0.637) (0.622) (0.618) (0.624) (0.618) PMT Inventory (Within) −0.016 −0.017 −0.017 −0.017 −0.017 −0.017 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) IED (Between) −0.033∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) IED (Within) −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Population Density 0.028∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) ELF 0.352 0.340 0.283 (0.411) (0.403) (0.397) Terrain Ruggedness −0.001 −0.001 (0.001) (0.001) FDD 0.236∗ (0.136) Constant 1.902∗∗∗ 2.083∗∗∗ 2.055∗∗∗ 2.012∗∗∗ 2.099∗∗∗ 1.876∗∗∗ (0.153) (0.177) (0.174) (0.168) (0.168) (0.211) N 1,002 1,002 1,002 1,002 1,002 1,002 Log Likelihood −840.123 −837.355 −832.346 −831.907 −830.752 −829.814 AIC 1,694.245 1,692.709 1,684.693 1,685.815 1,685.504 1,685.628 BIC 1,728.614 1,736.897 1,733.790 1,739.822 1,744.421 1,749.455

∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01 Robust Standard Errors in parentheses

The above analysis suggests that past a certain threshold, adviser intrusion is correlated with lower levels of unit proficiency. In Figure 4.5 below I plot the predicted values produced by Models 1-6, allowing only adviser monitoring to vary and holding all other variables at their means. To further test whether this inverted U shape is statistically significant, I follow the steps outlined in Lind and Mehlum 2010, who recommend that researchers also test whether the slopes at low and high values of the independent variable are statistically significant, and that the inflection point falls within the data range.33 The results of this test suggest that this is indeed the case. That is, the slopes are statistically significant, and the

33See also: Haans, Pieters and He 2016; Sasabuchi 1980.

108 inﬂection point (.68), falls within the data range.34

Figure 4.5: PMT Inventories and Predicted Capability Milestones

4.5.2 Non-Parametric Analyses

Thus far the findings are supportive of my theory. Yet, the statistical approach I adopt can only be interpreted as supportive of my key hypothesis assuming the model’s underlying linear functional form is correct. And, like many studies of political phenomena, I do not have a reason to believe that this is the case. As a motivating example, consider the IED variable in the above estimations. The Random Effects model assumes that IED attacks and ANP proficiency have a linear relationship; for every increase in the number of IEDs, ANP proficiency might increase or decrease. But, my estimates would be biased considerably if, in fact, the effect of IED attacks on unit proficiency also followed a non-linear pattern such as an S curve or an inverted U. Moreover, my findings would be similarly biased if the effect of IEDs depended on another variable, such as terrain ruggedness. Furthermore, although my theory suggested a polynomial term may be appropriate for my key independent variable,

34The slopes are signiﬁcant at the .10 level, though when the data is restricted to units for which there are 10 or more temporal observations, p < .05.

109 I have no basis for an a priori assumption that the appropriate term is necessarily squared. Indeed, my key hypothesis does not suggest that there is only a single bend in the curve.35 Put simply, the above approach assumes away a great degree of uncertainty regarding the true specification of the statistical model. To relax these assumptions, I employ two non- parametric statistical approaches. Broadly, non-parametric regression allows for the flexible estimation of non-linear relationships between variables, without imposing a functional form on the data.36 Although not yet widely adopted in the social sciences, non-parametric regression models offer an avenue for directly estimating, rather than imposing, a functional form. The first non-parametric approach I use is a simple local regression estimation, or loess.37 This allows only the data (rather than an imposed functional form) to plot relationship between PMT Inventories and unit proficiency. Figure 4.6 below fits a loess curve to depict the relationship between these two variables. Similar to Figure 4.5 above, we see that past a threshold, the slope of the curve becomes negative.

Figure 4.6: Capability Milestones and PMT Inventories (Loess)

Of course, the downside to the loess is that it cannot account for confounding variables,

35Lupu and Jones 2017 make this point on pp. 10-11. 36See: Beck and Jackman 1998; Faraway 2016. 37Jacoby 2000.

110 as I do in the parametric analysis above. To incorporate the control variables from the parametric analysis and account for non-linearities and interactions between them, I turn to basis regression with variable selection, as developed and introduced by Kenkel and Signorino 2013.38 Broadly, basis regression evaluates the polynomial expansions for, and interaction between, right hand side variables from a statistical model. It then employs variable selection techniques to select the model that best ﬁts the data before computing bootstrapped standard errors for quantities of interest. Using the polywog statistical package, I estimate the basis regression model including the covariates from Model 6 above, restricting only the within measure of the lagged dependent variable to a linear functional form.39 As with all estimates of polynomial and interaction effects, results of this approach are best summarized graphically. Figure 4.7 below thus depicts the predicted Capability Milestone ratings across observed values of the between PMT Inventory measure.40 We see again that the relationship appears non-monotonic.

Figure 4.7: Predicted Capability Milestone Values and PMT Inventories (Basis Regression)

In this section I have demonstrated considerable support for my central hypothesis. Recognizing that no statistical approach is perfect, I have drawn on parametric and non-

38For a recent implementation of this approach, see: Chaudoin 2016. 39I conduct 500 bootstrap iterations, and employ the default penalization technique, adaptive LASSO. Kenkel and Signorino 2016. 40That is, the predicted values are generated using the “observed values approach" outlined in Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan 2013.

111 parametric models that offer distinct advantages and drawbacks. Yet, outside of model selection, there are additional challenges to the validity of my data and research design that could undermine these ﬁndings. I turn to these next.

4.6 Robustness Tests

There are a number of threats to the validity of my data and research design. The first relates to measurement error: the analysis assumes that advisers measured the Capability Milestones perfectly. Given the chaotic nature of performing these assessments in a warzone, this may be an unrealistic assumption. Further, ANP battlefield proficiency in one AO could have “spillover” effects, influencing the willingness of other nearby PMTs to monitor their respective partner units, as well as the behavior of adjacent, un-monitored ANP units. Beyond spillover effects, the possibility exists that units might display high levels of proficiency prior to being monitored. In the supplementary appendix I detail the models I estimate to address these issues. This includes re-measuring my dependent variable using a latent variable model that accounts for measurement error,adding a spatial lag as an additional control variable, and restructuring the analysis entirely to ensure that adviser monitoring precedes a unit’s combat performance. The results, provided in sections 2-5 of the supplementary materials, continue to align with those in the main section; the best performing ANP units are those that are monitored with moderate frequency. Yet, two additional concerns remain. The first is that the CM measure does not at all relate to the ANP’s actual battlefield performance, and, the second is that my measure of monitoring may be systematically related to adviser-biased CM scores. I address these concerns next.

4.6.1 Evaluating Advisers’ Narrative Comments

In this section I draw on the PTRAT to help me ensure that the adviser narrative comments align with their Capability Milestone ratings, and, ultimately, are supportive of my theory.

112 As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the PTRAT contains far more than quantitative measures of adviser behavior and ANP proficiency. Indeed, the briefings themselves are a rich source of fine-grained qualitative information that can also be used to assess the behavior and conduct of Afghan National Police units. In this section I use these comments to illustrate my central findings. Although these cases are used predominately for descriptive purposes, I select the units I examine to maximize their variance in the proportion of inventories their advisers performed.41 Figure 4.8 below identifies where each of the districts I examine in this section are located in Afghanistan and Table 4.5 conveys each of these unit’s quantitative measure on my independent and dependent variables.

Figure 4.8: Illustrative Cases: (Moving Clockwise) Waza Zadran, Surkh Rod, and Delaram

Table 4.5: Illustrative Case Values

ANP Unit Adviser Intrusion Unit Proﬁciency

Delaram Low (0) Low (1.32)

Surkh Rod Medium (.63) High (3.25)

Zadran High (.79) Low (2.30)

A small hamlet in the Northern corner of Nimroz Province, Delaram was referred to 41Seawright 2016.

113 by the Marines operating there as the “end of the Earth" due to its remote location.42 The Delaram PMT conducted weapons inventories sparingly, and the unit’s Capability Milestones were generally low. Accordingly, we should expect the advisers’ narrative comments to reflect some concerns regarding their unit’s poor performance in the field. To be sure, despite the unit’s poor Capability Milestone ratings, the advisers in some cases were somewhat naive regarding the reasons for this poor performance. In one PTRAT, they noted, for example,“The commander here has a true belief in troop welfare. He cares his men and regularly ensures they have food, if minimum at best, but food at least. He consistently makes visits to his check points and asks what they need."43 A month later, however, these advisers expressed stronger frustrations and suspicions regarding their partner unit’s conduct. Indeed, the advisers noted that patrolmen had “little incentive" to train, lamented the high turn over rate within the unit, and reflected their concerns that the“[Chief of Police] is witholding food from them [ANP patrolmen] and sometimes pocketing the money."44 The PMT thus concluded that governance and rule of law were “[o]vershadowed by corruption and security concerns."45 In line with the unit’s CM ratings, comments by advisers serving in the rural district of Surkh Rod, Nangarhar Province reflect the unit’s strong performance in the field. This unit was not without its issues. Indeed, in December 2009, adviser comments noted that 47 of the unit’s 208 assigned patrolmen were missing, an indication, perhaps, that the unit had ghost soldiers on its books.46 The unit also was not training regularly, nor was it maintaining its

42Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “At Afghan outpost, Marines gone rogue or leading the fight against counterinsurgency?" Washington Post, March 14, 2010. 43Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix, “Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool Briefing", 2 February 2010. 44Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix, “Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool Briefing", February 25 2010. 45Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix, “Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool Briefing", February 25 2010. This was consistent with media reporting during this time period, which noted that the Dealaram ANP “are poorly led and undermanned and rarely seem to venture beyond the wire..." See: Drew Brown, “Despite Marines’ presence, fear of Taliban persists in Afghan town," Stars and Stripes, November 14, 2009. 46Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix, “Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool Briefing", December 1, 2009.

114 weapons and equipment.47 Despite not being equipped with its full slate of vehicles, the unit was also short on fuel, perhaps suggesting that rations were being sold.48 That said the advisers’ cautious use of intrusion appears to have paid dividends in the unit’s eventual proficiency. Indeed, by the end of March 2010, the advisers noted, “the ANP as a whole are motivated to get out and work...the unit is very efficient at pre-mission training, as well as pre-mission planning."49 Finally, comments from the Waza Zadran PMT suggest the unit’s dismal proficiency in COIN. Despite having had locals took up arms to fight alongside the ANP during an insurgent attack in August 2008, the Zadran ANP was unable and unwilling to implement population-centric COIN.50 The unit was vastly undermanned, and, although acknowledging that this was changing, in May 2009 the advisers reported that the “local population does not support the ANP."51 Indeed, by March 2010, the Waza Zadran ANP’s relationship with the local population had become so dire that locals would not report insurgent activities to the ANP, and the ANP made no arrests in the district.52

4.6.2 Considering Alternative Measures

The above tests cannot address perhaps the most critical shortcoming of the analysis thus far. This is the notion that my measure of intrusion is systematically related to adviser-biased CM scores. Indeed, intrusive advisers may be more likely to encounter adverse information related to that unit’s battleﬁeld performance or otherwise view their partner unit negatively,

47Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix, “Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool Briefing", December 1, 2009. 48Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix, “Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool Briefing", December 29, 2009. 49Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix, “Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool Briefing", March 29, 2010. 50The November 2008 PTRAT notes, “The locals consider the ANP lawful, but weak. However in an attack on the ANP on 11 AUG 08, LNs actually took up arms and fought alongside the ANP, helping them defeat the AAF." Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix, “Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool Briefing", November 8, 2008. 51Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix, “Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool Briefing", May 30, 2009. 52Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix, “Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool Briefing", March 29, 2010.

115 leading to lower CM ratings. To be sure, this is inconsistent with the above finding that moving from a period with no inventory to a period with an inventory does not have an effect -positive or negative- on unit proficiency that is distinguishable from zero. Nonetheless, this possibility represents an important threat to the validity of my findings. Addressing this concern requires a credible alternative to the Capability Milestones proficiency ratings. Unfortunately, no alternative measures of ANP proficiency exist to supplement or replace the Capability Milestones. With these challenges in mind, I move from adopting a proficiency-based measure of military effectiveness to an outcome-based measure. Rather than directly assessing the ability of security force units to perform certain tasks (e.g. intelligence-driven operations), outcome-based measures of military effectiveness evaluate a unit’s performance based on what it achieves on the battlefield. These outcomes are assumed to be what security forces should achieve if they are, in fact, performing combat tasks efficiently. Because COIN typically does not consist of set battles with clear lines of control, the traditional measure of combat effectiveness -loss exchange ratios- is not appropriate for this analysis, however. Indeed, identifying the optimal measures of effectiveness in COIN has long evaded the military assessment community.53 As an outcome-based measure of police proficiency, I examine insurgent violence that took place during the August 20, 2009 Presidential elections. These elections can be viewed as a critical test for the Afghan National Police, who in the run up to the election would be responsible for day to day security within their AOs.If election day violence can be considered a poor outcome for counterinsurgents, my theory predicts that election day violence will be lowest in AOs where ANP units had moderately intrusive advisers. This approach to account for systematic bias is not without its underlying assumptions. The first is that insurgents uniformly aimed to disrupt citizen attempts to vote in the 2009 Presidential elections through violence. This assumption is critical, because insurgent use of

53On the challenges of assessment in COIN, see: Connable 2012; Schroden 2009; Gons et al. 2012.

116 violence outside of election day may be endogeneous to their level of territorial control.54 It also seems warranted. As noted in a Department of Defense report months prior to the elections, “the 2009 elections...present a period of increased risk throughout Afghanistan. Enemy elements may attempt to disrupt the elections themselves in order to weaken the resolve of the populace and erode the legitimacy of the GIRoA [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]."55 Related, this measure assumes that low levels of election-day violence are an unequivocally positive outcome for counterinsurgents. This seems to be a reasonable assumption, as Minister of Interior Hanif Atmar laid out the provision of “security for free, fair, and transparent elections in 2009" to be a strategic priority.56 Finally, I assume that ANP units that were performing well prior to the election would experience fewer attacks on election day within their AOs. That is, units that executed population- centric COIN effectively should be more likely to disrupt insurgent plots to launch attacks on election day. To measure election day violence I sum all violent events in the SIGACT database that occurred on August 20, 2009 within each advised ANP AO. For my key independent variable, I calculate the proportion of advising periods prior to the election during which PMTs performed a weapons inventory.57 In addition to the covariates introduced above, I also include a spatial lag of election violence in the ANP unit’s neighboring districts. The dependent variable is overdispersed, which indicates that a count model is appropriate.58 I thus estimate a negative binomial model, evaluating the inﬂuence of adviser monitoring on the amount of election day violence.59

54Kalyvas 2006. 55Department of Defense 2009, p. 21. 56Department of Defense 2009, p. 42 57To account for the staggered nature of the data, I also run the analysis examining only districts that experienced three or more advising periods prior to the elections. The negative binomial results hold. 58That is, the variance of my dependent variable is considerably greater than the mean. For similar applications of count models for political violence data, see: Aksoy, Carter and Wright 2012; Wilson and Piazza 2013; Findley and Young 2011. 59I also conduct a Zero Inﬂated Negative Binomial speciﬁcation, which considers whether insurgents use violence at all, as well as the amount of violence they use, to be separate data generating processes. The results hold, though estimating the model requires excluding FDD. For the full results, see the chapter appendix, section 4.

117 The results are consistent with my theory; the base term is negative and the squared term positive. Both are statistically signiﬁcant. Figure 4.9 depicts the predicted count of election day insurgent violence across the range of PMT inventory values, holding the remaining variables at their means.60 Consistent with my theory, we see that election day violence was highest at very low and very high levels of PMT monitoring.

Figure 4.9: PMT Inventories and Election Day Insurgent Violence

4.7 Conclusion

In this chapter I have tested my theory through a bevy of statistical analyses. I ensured that the results were robust to numerous speciﬁcations -including the use of an alternative measure of ANP proﬁciency- and scoured through advisers’ qualitative comments to demonstrate the validity of the Capability Milestone measure. Based on this analysis we can cautiously conclude that the best performing ANP units were those that were monitored with moderate frequency. This analysis is far from ideal, however. For one, it employs an imperfect proxy to measure my key independent variable. Though this is necessary given practical constraints

60The full regression table is in section 3 of this chapter’s appendix.

118 on my ability to measure it with the accuracy of a comparative case study, it is far from perfect. It also pays less attention to causal processes, and instead can only provide evidence of statistically-signiﬁcant correlations between variables. In the section that follows I remedy this shortcoming through my medium N analysis, which allows for a closer measurement of my independent and dependent variables, with the added beneﬁt of some statistical rigor.

119 Chapter 5: Medium N Analysis

Thus far I have drawn on two types of evidence and distinct methodological approaches to test my central hypothesis. The comparative cases drew on new archival information and interviews to trace how variations in adviser intrusion produced different outcomes in combat proficiency across three Afghan National Police units. The qualitative analysis had the advantage of more accurate measures of my variables and greater attention to causal processes, but also the drawback of less concern for random chance and uncertainty in the results. The subsequent statistical analysis had just the opposite problem; it systematically accounted for measurement error and provided precise estimates of uncertainty, but relied on an imperfect proxy measure and could not uncover the mechanism driving the statistical correlations between my independent and dependent variables. In this chapter I use a method introduced by Rosenbaum 2002 and developed further by Glynn and Ichino 2015 that draws on the strengths of both the comparative case studies and statistical analysis. This involves a number of steps. First, I match cases based on observable, potentially confounding, variables. I then rank and sign the magnitude of differences in outcomes between “treated" units with moderately intrusive advisers and “untreated" cases, before using randomization inferential methods to determine whether these differences are statistically significant. I use these results to inform more in-depth examinations of case pairs that conform with and deviate from my theory. Beyond its attention to measurement and statistical rigor, the medium n analysis has the added benefit of examining recipient units beyond the Afghan National Police, providing some external validity to my empirical test.1 The remainder of the analysis is organized as follows. I begin with an overview of

1The sample includes Iraqi National Police (INP), Iraqi National Army (IA), and Afghan National Army (ANA) Units. The units designated as Afghan National Police (ANP) in this chapter include Afghan National Civil Order Police, Afghan Uniformed Police, and Afghan Highway Police units.

120 the chapter’s methodological approach, before turning to the data I use to measure my independent and dependent variables. I proceed with the analysis, which begins with matching and randomization inferential methods to identify whether moderate levels of intrusion have a statistically signiﬁcant, positive effect on improvements in recipient unit battleﬁeld effectiveness. I then draw on this analysis to inform my subsequent qualitative examination of recipient units in the Afghan National Army and Iraqi National Army. I conclude with a summary of the evidence presented in this chapter.

5.1 Method Overview

There is a noticeable dearth of methodological approaches designed to systematically analyze 10-25 cases in the social sciences. Although the beneﬁts of having a moderately-sized sample of cases that allow the researcher to develop greater contextual knowledge are obvious, a methodological lacuna regarding methods to effectively analyze these samples exists.2 The approach I use in this chapter draws on Rosenbaum 2002, 2009; Glynn and Ichino 2015, and Lieberman 2005 and includes both quantitative and qualitative components. The ﬁrst step is matching cases based on observed characteristics that might confound the relationship between intrusion and recipient unit improvement. That is, the goal of matching is to ensure that the “treated" units whose advisers applied moderate levels of intrusion are as similar to “untreated" units whose advisers used very high or very low levels. I use both paired matching, which groups cases into pairs of most similar cases, as well as full matching, which categorizes cases into n groups. The second step is comparing the magnitude and sign of differences in the dependent variable, both within and between groups. For the between group signed ranks, case pairs

2One exception is Qualitative Case Analysis (QCA). Pioneered by Charles Ragin, QCA identiﬁes sets of necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for an outcome to occur. Rather than relying on probability calculus or matrix algebra to do so, however, it employs Boolean logic and algebraic set theory. Because my hypothesis is, at its core, probabilistic rather than deterministic, this method is not appropriate. For the canonical introductions to crisp and fuzzy set QCA, see: Ragin 1987, 2000. For recent applications of QCA in Political Science, see: Haesebrouck 2017; Bretthauer 2015; Pinfari 2011; Schneider and Wagemann 2012.

121 with the largest difference in outcome are given the highest rank, and, with respect to the fully-matched sample, groups with the largest difference between the highest and lowest measure of the outcome are ranked highest. These ranks are “signed" based on whether the difference between treated and untreated cases is positive or negative. For the paired sample, the within rank is simply binary, as the unit with the greater magnitude in improvement is ranked higher than its counterpart. In the full matching sample, this binary rating is expanded to encompass the n units in each matched group. The next step involves determining whether the differences between treatment and control groups is simply due to random chance. To make this determination, I use a signed rank test. This evaluates whether the differences in proficiency improvement are statistically significant between treatment and control groups. Finally, I use the results from the signed rank test to inform subsequent qualitative analyses of case pairs. I examine the first case pair to illustrate my theory and more directly test my central hypothesis. I evaluate the second case pair, which deviates from my theory, to uncover variables that might mediate adviser influence. This analytic approach has a number of distinct strengths. For one, it allows for a closer measurement of my independent and dependent variables than would be possible in a larger sample and pays greater attention to random chance than comparative case studies. And, the use of signed rank statistical tests also eases my reliance on purely quantitative measures. In using signed rank statistics, “debates over the measurement of complex outcome variables need only be settled to the extent that they produce agreement on the signs and ranks."3 Simply put, we need to only agree that one unit improved more than another, and that the magnitude of this improvement is larger or smaller than other pairs or groups of cases. Drawing on the results to inform subsequent case studies can help supplement the analysis and inform future theoretical work on this topic. Of course, in being a “jack" of both qualitative and quantitative analysis, this approach

3Glynn and Ichino 2015, p. 1059.

122 masters neither. Rather than estimating coefﬁcients for control variables, in this chapter I treat them largely as a nuisance. And, the quantitative component of the approach cannot directly evaluate the hypothesized inverted U shape between my key variables, as it considers both units who received very high and very low levels of intrusion as simply “untreated." Furthermore, for practical reasons the qualitative cases in this chapter are necessarily less detailed than those in Chapter 3. In analyzing a moderately-sized sample, I am able know more about each case than statistical analysis allows, but less than is possible in comparative case studies.

5.2 Data and Measurement

To generate the data I use in this chapter, I conducted over 40 semi-structured interviews with active duty and retired U.S. servicemen responsible for implementing or overseeing the implementation of U.S.-led advising programs in Iraq and Afghanistan. The sampling procedure included a mix of convenience sampling, wherein the researcher contacts individuals already identified as being suitable for the study, as well as snowball sampling, which involves asking interviewees to refer the researcher to other interviewees.4 I identified subjects through personal contacts, Linkedin profiles, as well as theses from Professional Military Education institutions and other publications. An interview solicitation notice was also circulated through relevant networks of subject matter experts at the United States Army War College and Air War College. The interviews were semi-structured, containing questions that required numerical, Lik- ert scale ratings, as well as a number of open-ended questions designed to elicit narrative responses. The interview protocol (see Appendix) gathered information related to the respondent’s unit, pre-deployment training, and partner unit, along with background information about their Areas of Operation. The protocol included a battery of questions which aimed to systematically measure adviser intrusion and partner unit proficiency, and, as such, I

4Lynch 2013.

123 used typed notes from each interview to code these variables. Because the interviews were recorded with the subject’s consent, I also used the recordings to clarify any ambiguities in the written notes. Interviews lasted approximately 75 minutes. Of course, retrospective interviews have their shortcomings as a source of data. Most critical and obvious among these is the inability of individuals to remember certain details of their deployment. A number of interviewees were indeed being asked to recall activities they had (or had not) carried out during deployments that occurred almost ten years ago. Some were able to do so ﬂawlessly, but others could not remember these details in such way so as to allow one to credibly code the variables for this study. As a result, I drop from the analysis any unit where multiple responses are missing or the responses could not be coded based on the criteria outlined below. I also dropped observations from the analysis where advisers had spent fewer than three months with their partner unit or otherwise rotated regularly between more than two units in separate AOs. These restrictions, coupled with the focus on combat, rather than headquarters-level, advising of ground forces and the removal of duplicate interviews with advisers from the same unit,5 yields a sample of 19 units I will use in this chapter’s analysis. Figure 5.1 depicts basic descriptions of the interview sample used in this chapter, to include interviewees’ rank at the time of deployment, service, theater in which they served as an adviser, and the type of partner unit they advised.

5Where this occurred I relied on both interviews to code my independent variable, and averaged the advisers’ proﬁciency ratings for the dependent variable.

124 Figure 5.1: Interviewee Sample Data

The methodological approach, detailed below, requires a binary “treatment" variable. For my purposes, this is whether or not the advising team was moderately intrusive. To make this determination, I combine insights gleaned from inductive and deductive approaches to measurement. First, I relied on the narrative responses to a battery of questions, detailed in Table 5.1 below. Using identical criteria to the comparative case study chapter, I coded units as “treated" if the advising team met the criteria for “balanced advising."

125 Table 5.1: Advising Ideal Types

Unintrusive Advising

- Third party and covert monitoring - High tolerance for corruption - Rare, implicit threats to partner unit

Balanced Advising

- Mix of periodic overt and covert monitoring - Functional corruption tolerated - Regular, implicit threats; Occasional explicit threats and aid suspension

Highly Intrusive Advising

- Regular, intrusive monitoring - Zero tolerance for corruption - Explicit threats and regular aid suspension

Next, to create a continuous scale of adviser intrusion, I systematically coded the advisers’ narrative responses to the following open ended questions as follows:

• How often did you examine and verify your partner unit’s budget, personnel roster, and property books? Rarely, if ever = 0; Monthly = 1; Weekly = 2

• How often did you visit your partner unit’s checkpoints and other static positions? Rarely, if ever = 0; Monthly = 1; Weekly = 2; Daily = 3

• How often did you solicit locals’ opinions of your partner unit’s behavior? Never = 0, Otherwise = 1

• Did you ever, for any reason, directly threaten to withhold resources such as money, weapons, or other combat enablers from your partner unit? No = 0, Yes = 1

126 • Did you ever witness your partner unit selling fuel, equipment, having “ghost soldiers" on their personnel roster, taking bribes, or other forms of corruption? If so, how did you ﬁnd out, and how did you respond? No response to corruption = 0; Implicit threats = 1; Explicit threats = 2

To supplement the deductive coding, I used these quantitative codings as composite items in a Graded Response Model, introduced in the appendix to the previous chapter. To review, the GRM models the relationship between ordinal ratings and the latent trait of intrusion. Figure 5.2 illustrates the scores this model generated. The Figure depicts the histogram for the intrusion scale, and, those units coded as being “treated" are colored blue.

Figure 5.2: Intrusion Index and Treated Cases

To measure my dependent variable, I draw on interviewee responses to the following questions: From 0, meaning completely disagree, to 10, meaning completely agree, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements: At the beginning/end of my deployment...

127 • 1. My partner unit could maintain its equipment.

• 2. My partner unit could plan operations and employ OPSEC [Operational Security].

• 3. My partner unit was capable of conducting basic maneuvers (i.e. patrols, linear ambushes, static defenses) in small units within their AO.

• 4. My partner unit collected actionable intelligence (i.e. by carrying out a dismounted patrol).

• 5. My partner unit could integrate intelligence into their operations.

• 6. During its operations, my partner unit expressed no favoritism or ill-will towards any speciﬁc tribal, ethnic, or sectarian group within the population.

• 7. During its operations, my partner unit interacted regularly with the local population in a way that enhanced the legitimacy of the local government.

I used interviewee responses as composite measures in a Graded Response Model, measuring proﬁciency for the beginning and end of units’ deployments in a single model.6 To assess improvement, stagnation, and regression in partner unit proﬁciency at the beginning/end of the deployment, I use the difference between the two measures. The resulting distribution of these differences is depicted in Figure 5.3 below.7

6Due to the limited sample size, estimating the GRM required collapsing responses to the proﬁciency ratings for the ethnic favoritism, intelligence integration, and operational planning questions to ﬁve point scales. See: Muraki 1990. 7The outlier on the far right of the distribution is a treated case. The results from the full matching analysis are robust to the removal of this case.

128 Figure 5.3: Dependent Variable: Improvement in Unit Proﬁciency

Finally, I derived three measures from the interviews to serve as my matching variables. These are the variables that I will use to attempt to render my treatment and control groups as similar as possible. The first of these is the unit type (e.g. Afghan National Army, Iraqi Army, etc.) with which the adviser was partnered. This variable is critical, as it can control for any institutional nuances within each force. The next matching variable is insurgent violence. Matching cases on this variable is particularly important given the findings of the previous chapter. This variable is coded based on a three point, ordinal scale. This reflects, on average, how often the advising team made contact with insurgents (0 = rarely, if ever, 1 = monthly, 2 = weekly). Finally, and perhaps most critically, I match units based on their level of proficiency at the beginning of the advisers’ deployment. A unit with dismal performance at the beginning of an adviser’s deployment may struggle to not improve on some measures, and, conversely, a unit that is already a stellar performer when advisers arrive would have little room for improvement. By matching cases on this variable, I ensure that units are starting from the

129 same or similar levels of proﬁciency. The following section proceeds with the analysis. I ﬁrst match cases based on observed variables that might confound the relationship between intrusion and recipient unit performance. I draw on the magnitude of differences within and between matched case pairs to then evaluate the difference between the matched samples. To provide additional statistical power and make full use of the data, I then conduct the same analysis using full matching procedures. The third portion of the chapter examines two case pairs in greater depth to compare a treated partner units with one that received high levels of intrusion and to analyze a case pair that contradicts my hypothesis.

5.2.1 Pairwise Matching and Analysis

In this section I walk through the paired matching procedure and statistical analysis. To begin, Table 5.2 below provides information on the full sample of interviewees used in this chapter.8 Of course, simply comparing the means between treated an untreated cases would not be prudent, as doing so would fail to account for variables that might potentially confound the relationship between adviser intrusion and partner unit performance.

8Note: Two of ANA units in the dataset were identical. These were two units that were advised by a single advising team who split time evenly between them. Because these units are considered treated and each improved in proﬁciency, I drop one of them to avoid biasing the results in favor of my theory.

130 Table 5.2: Medium N Partner Unit Sample

Partner Unit Type Treatment Insurgent Violence Initial Proﬁciency Proﬁciency Improvement 1 ANP 0 0 -0.77 0.85 2 ANP 0 0 -0.29 0.58 3 ANA 0 2 -1.47 0.74 4 ANA 0 0 -1.38 0.10 5 IA 1 1 0.53 0.27 6 ANA 0 0 1.09 0.54 7 IA 0 0 -0.19 0.38 8 ANA 1 2 -1.94 1.94 9 ANA 1 1 1.52 0.96 10 IA 0 0 0.52 0.76 11 ANA 0 2 1.13 0.05 12 INP 0 1 -0.05 0.58 13 IA 1 2 -0.33 0.43 14 ANA 0 0 -0.64 0.51 15 ANP 1 0 -0.13 1.16 16 ANA 0 2 -0.20 0.66 17 ANP 1 0 -0.82 0.83 18 ANP 0 0 -0.21 0.20 19 ANP 0 1 -0.98 0.32

To account for these variables, in this section I use paired matching.9 This matches each unit with others that are as comparable across my matching variables (unit type, insurgent violence, and initial proﬁciency) as possible. Table 5.3 below depicts the paired cases. AO violence is equivalent in the treatment and control cases, and beginning proﬁciency slightly higher in the control sample. Unfortunately, in one instance an Afghan National Police unit is paired with an Iraqi Army unit, though the results are robust when this pair is dropped from the analysis.

9Imai et al. 2009

131 Table 5.3: Medium N Partner Unit Sample After Pairwise Matching

Partner Unit Type Pair Number Treatment Insurgent Violence Initial Proﬁciency Proﬁciency Improvement Within Rank ANP 1.1 0 1 -0.98 0.32 0 IA 1.1 1 2 -0.33 0.43 1 ANP 1.2 0 0 -0.21 0.20 0 ANP 1.2 1 0 -0.13 1.16 1 ANP 1.3 0 0 -0.29 0.58 0 ANP 1.3 1 0 -0.82 0.83 1 IA 1.4 1 1 0.53 0.27 0 IA 1.4 0 0 0.52 0.76 1 ANA 1.5 0 2 -1.47 0.74 0 ANA 1.5 1 2 -1.94 1.94 1 ANA 1.6 0 2 1.13 0.05 0 ANA 1.6 1 1 1.52 0.96 1

The next step in the analysis is to proceed with the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test.10 This non-parametric method takes into account the signs and magnitude of differences between treatment and control groups. Whereas Glynn and Ichino 2015, who use a binary outcome variable, rely on qualitative analysis to rank these cases and determine the sign in difference, because my dependent variable is continuous I am able to more rigorously make this assessment based on the data.11 Table 5.3 below illustrates the approach, ordering the paired cases based on the differences between each unit in improvement.

Pair Number Treated Unit Proﬁciency Improvement Control Unit Proﬁciency Improvement Difference Between Rank 1.5 ANA 1.94 ANA 0.74 1.19 6 1.2 ANP 1.16 ANP 0.20 0.96 5 1.6 ANA 0.96 ANA 0.05 0.91 4 1.4 IA 0.27 IA 0.76 -0.49 3 1.3 ANP 0.83 ANP 0.58 0.25 2 1.1 IA 0.43 ANP 0.32 0.11 1

Although overall we see that, with only one exception, the units with moderately intrusive advisers improved more than their counterparts, we still need to account for the uncertainty of these patterns. That is, if we were to flip a coin to determine which of the cases in the pairs were treated, what are the odds we would see these results? The resulting p value, reflecting these odds, is significant at the .10 level. This suggests that treated partner units

10Though I use a signed rank test in this section, the results are robust when using a paired t-test. 11 Formally, the sign of the signed rank statistic can be given by sign(Ys1 −Ys2) where Ys1 is the magnitude of improvement for the ﬁrst unit in the pair, and Ys2 the magnitude of improvement for the second unit in the pair. The within pair rank for Ys1 is 1 if its improvement is greater than Ys2, and 0 otherwise. The between ranks are given by the absolute difference in improvement between the treated control units in each pair. Formally, abs(Ys1 −Ys2).

132 improved at signiﬁcantly larger amounts than those whose advisers used very high and very low levels of intrusion.

5.2.2 Full Matching and Analysis

In the previous section I used pairwise matching to match six control units with six treated units. To help reduce mismatches and balance the data on potential confounders, we can make greater use of the entire dataset through full matching.12 Full matching minimizes the weighted average of the distance between treated and control cases within speciﬁc subclasses. Put simply, full matching will place each unit into subclasses that are as similar as possible on the matching variables. Table 5.4 illustrates this division, delineating the classes into which each case was binned after the full matching procedure.

Table 5.4: Matched Partner Units

Partner Unit Type Treatment Improvement Group Difference Matched Subclass Between Rank Within Rank IA 0 0.38 1.56 5 6 1 ANP 0 0.58 1.56 5 6 2 ANA 1 1.94 1.56 5 6 3 ANP 0 0.20 0.96 2 5 1 ANA 0 0.66 0.96 2 5 2 ANA 0 0.74 0.96 2 5 3 IA 0 0.76 0.96 2 5 4 ANP 1 1.16 0.96 2 5 5 ANA 0 0.10 0.85 6 4 1 ANA 0 0.51 0.85 6 4 2 ANA 0 0.54 0.85 6 4 3 INP 0 0.58 0.85 6 4 4 ANA 1 0.96 0.85 6 4 5 ANA 0 0.05 0.22 4 3 1 IA 1 0.27 0.22 4 3 2 ANP 0 0.32 0.11 1 2 1 IA 1 0.43 0.11 1 2 2 ANP 1 0.83 0.02 3 1 1 ANP 0 0.85 0.02 3 1 2

To analyze the sample in a manner similar to above, I use the Quade statistic, a gen- eralization of the signed rank test performed for the paired sample.13 Previously, each group had only two units, meaning the “within" group ranking was a simple binary variable

12Hansen 2004; Rosenbaum 1991. 13Quade 1979.

133 reflecting which of these units had larger improvements in proficiency. The approach I use in this section expands the “within" group ranking to n units, ranking each unit in every matched group based on the magnitude of its improvement. The between ranking is derived by subtracting the largest and smallest proficiency improvements within each subclass, and comparing this difference across groups.14 Table 5.5 below illustrates this, depicting the within and between subclass rankings for the fully matched sample.

Table 5.5: Ranked Partner Units, Full Matching

As above, one might wonder whether the differences within and between matched subclasses are due to random chance. To make this determination, I calculate the Quade statistic and one-sided p value to determine whether the within and between ranks are statistically signiﬁcant. The results suggest that I am able to reject the null that the treatment and control groups are identical in their improvement in combat proﬁciency at the .05 level.

14 Formally, the between rank can be written as rank(abs(max j(Ys j −min jYs j)) where Y is unit improvement in proﬁciency, j a subclass of matched units.

134 5.3 Identifying Cases for Further Analysis

The analysis thus far has demonstrated that within my data sample, units whose advisers met the criteria of balanced advising demonstrated greater improvements in proficiency than those who did not. Yet, the statistical analysis on its own is an incomplete and unsatisfactory test of the theory. For one, the analysis does not explicitly test the non-monotonic relationship between adviser intrusion and partner unit proficiency. Rather, it simply classifies units whose advisers unintrusive and highly intrusive as “untreated." And, as shown in Figure 2 above, most advisers in my sample erred on the side of less intrusion rather than more. A more complete test of the theory, then, requires a closer comparison of cases with moderate and high levels of intrusion. And, an evaluation of the above results reveals in one of the pairs of IA units, the treated unit improved less than the untreated unit. Understanding whether the factors that contributed to this deviation are likely to be present in other cases can help contribute to future work on this topic. To supplement the analysis above, I thus turn to a structured comparison of two pairs of cases. Table 5.7 highlights these cases’ values on the matching variables used in the above analysis, as well as their intrusiveness and improvement based on the Graded Response Model scores. To more explicitly test the non-monotonic relationship, the first pair consists of two Afghan National Army units whose advisers used different levels of intrusion; in one case through high intrusion, in the other through moderate levels. Although the matching procedures did not place the ANA cases in the same subclasses or pairs, a structured comparison of the cases can still yield important insights. In fact, in the treated case the level of violence exceeds the level in the control case. This renders this a harder test for my theory. The goal of the ANA comparison is to help illustrate and test the central hypothesis using the interview data. The second case pair consists of two Iraqi National Army units in which the untreated unit out-improved the treated unit. The goal of this comparison is to better diagnose why

135 the pair appears to deviate from my theory. This in turn will have implications for future theories of military advising and recipient military effectiveness.

Table 5.6: Cases for Further Analysis

Pair Treated Unit Intrusion Index Insurgent Violence Beginning Proﬁciency Improvement ANA 0 2 0 -0.64 0.51 ANA 1 0.30 2 -1.94 1.94 IA 0 -0.14 0 0.52 0.76 IA 1 0.89 1 0.53 0.27

The remainder of this analysis proceeds as follows. I begin each paired case examination with a brief overview of the institutional development of the Afghan and Iraqi National Army during Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom. This provides context to the subsequent examination of the advising teams’ experience advising these forces. Overall, I ﬁnd that the ANA pair aligns closely with my theory. And, the IA pair points to unit-level characteristics that might mediate the effects of adviser intrusion.

5.4 ANA Paired Cases Overview

In this section I draw on the interview data to compare the combat performance of two ANA units whose advisers used high and moderate levels of intrusiveness. The primary goal of this comparison is to identify how variations in adviser intrusion across these two cases produced different amounts of improvement in unit proﬁciency. More speciﬁcally, my theory predicts that the toloy within the 201st Corps will improve less than than the 203rd Corps kandak.15

5.4.1 Building and Advising the Afghan National Army (ANA) 2002-2010

The Afghan army has long been a highly-politicized force. And the internal politics of Afghanistan complicated the bevy of external efforts to professionalize the Afghan army’s

15Although the size of these formations differ, the adviser-advisee ratio in each case is similar, making these cases comparable.

136 cadres throughout the 20th century. Indeed, to varying degrees American, British, Turkish, Czechloslavakian, Russian, and German training, advice, and assistance were ultimately unable to overcome the centrifugal effect that the country’s fragmented polity had on the behavior of its armed forces.16 With the Taliban takeover of Kabul and subsequent civil war, the Afghan army effectively dissolved, with mujahidin factions removing professionally- trained officers from army units, cannibalizing their equipment, and discarding uniforms.17 As discussed in the comparative case studies chapter, in the wake of the Taliban’s collapse in 2001 the establishment of a central Afghan government was complicated by the influence of anti-Taliban militia. In early 2002, the majority of these forces were placed under the nominal authority of the nascent Afghan Ministry of Defense, given the umbrella term Afghan Military Forces (AMF). Initially, the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) called for directly transitioning the AMF into the Afghan National Army, appointing officers based on how many recruits they commanded.18 Yet, donor concerns over factions capturing the Afghan security forces gave way to the AMF’s disbandment and the subsequent creation of the Afghan National Army (ANA). As the force drew on international training, equipment, and assistance to grow in size and sophistication, however, Afghanistan’s fragmented politics influenced its conduct on the battlefield. Although built from the ground up to avoid the adverse effects of patronage networks, the ANA emerged as a divided institution whose tactical and operational units had strong incentives to resist cooperating with their foreign advisers in ways that were strikingly similar to the ANP. Reflecting in part the subdued security situation immediately after the Taliban’s fall, international efforts at building a national Afghan Army were at first modest in scope, which put the international community at odds with domestic Afghan political factions. The Bonn agreement (December 2001) identified the need for an Afghan armed force that

16A history of Afghanistan’s army is beyond the scope of this chapter. See: International Crisis Group, “A Force in Fragments: Reconstituting the Afghan National Army," May 12, 2010, pp. 1-3; Giustozzi 2016; Cronin 2011, Oliker 2011. O’Balance 2002, Chan 2009, Jalalzai 2014. 17Giustozzi 2016, p. 115-116. 18Giustozzi 2016, p. 128.

137 was “nationally respected, professional, ethnically balanced, democratically accountable, organized, trained, and equipped to meet the security needs of the country."19 Whereas Afghan powerbrokers proposed a force of 250,000 that would be built on the foundation of the AMF’s armed factions and militias,20 Bonn II (December 2002) designated the United States as the lead for the development of the Afghan army and outlined the blueprint for an ANA of 43,000 ground combat troops, 21,000 support staff, 3,000 Ministry of Defense general staff, and 3,000 air staff.21 Much like the Afghan National Police, the lion’s share of U.S. initiatives in building the ANA focused on apolitical, technocratic capacity building. And, as the systems needed to support the force developed alongside its growth, it became increasingly vulnerable to corruption. Initially, the U.S.-backed efforts focused on establishing the 12,500-strong ANA Central Corps, a light infantry unit to be stationed in the vicinity of Kabul that could “act on the behest of the central government and move forward into any area of Afghanistan and impose its will upon any contending factional force."22 The U.S. planned to eventually expand the ANA to four additional regional Corps; Kandahar, Herat, Gardez, and Mazar-e- Sharif.23 The 2006 Afghanistan Compact reiﬁed the commitment to establishing a 70,000 strong “nationally respected, professional, ethnically balanced" ANA.24 As the Taliban made inroads back into Afghanistan, though, the need for a larger, and more capable ANA became apparent to the Afghans and international donors. As such, in July 2008 the cap on the ANA was subsequently expanded to 122,000.25 The training of ANA battalions, or kandaks evolved accordingly. Initially, training was led by US Special Forces elements and focused exclusively on small unit tactics. These efforts were largely decentralized and did not establish sustainable headquarters elements at

19Grissom 2013, p. 264 . 20Giustozzi 2003, p. 18, Grissom 2013, p. 264 . 21GAO 2005, p. 6 22Brooks 2010b, p. 17. See also: SIGAR 2017, p. 16. 23Brooks 2010b, p. 17 24“The Afghanistan Compact," February 1, 2006. p. 6. 25SIGAR 2017, pp. 40.

138 the brigade, corps, and national-level.26 Realizing that the Afghan Army would require more robust institutional support, in 2003 the U.S. Department of Defense established Combined Joint Task Force-Phoenix, a brigade-level headquarters tasked with training the ANA on individual, battalion, brigade, and corps-level functions. This was done in parallel with the expansion of the ANA’s training program, which, by 2005, consisted of 14 weeks of training, to include 6 weeks of basic, 6 of advanced, and 2 weeks of collective training.27 With the force’s growth and sophistication came the need for additional equipment, layers of staff, and logistical support. The force at first relied on Soviet-era equipment donated by former Soviet-bloc countries.28 The motivation behind this was sound; the ANA’s modest size and responsibilities did not require more advanced equipment, and, perhaps most important, many Afghans were accustomed to operating these weapons systems. As the ANA expanded and evolved from a light infantry force to a conventional force with combined arms capabilities and organic enablers, the U.S. moved to standardize the ANA per NATO requirements, including the equipping the ANA kandaks with M-16 rifles, Light Tactical Vehicles (LTV), and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV).29 A more robust logistical support structure, codified by U.S. contractors, was put into place to support these units in the field.30 The expansion of the ANA grew in tandem with the involvement and interference of ethnic factions into its affairs. Much like the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defense

26Hammes 2017, p. 280. As noted by General Mark Milley, who served as the commander of subsequent training efforts, “When it comes to things like larger scale command and control, battalion operations and brigade operations, logistics and setting up supply systems, doing the tactics of combined arms operations at battalion and above and so on, SF soldiers at the team level who that actually conduct the training, soon get beyond their former experiences. SF guys are great at smaller unit tactics at the squad- and platoon- level and even up to the company-level but once you start getting up into that level, it really gets beyond their mission proﬁle or their mission set. It takes basically conventional guys that have that kind of experience when you get to large scale operations." Brooks 2010a, p. 98, see also: SIGAR 2017, p. 18. 27GAO 2005, p. 12 . 28SIGAR 2017, p. 22. 29SIGAR 2017, pp. 40-50, Giustozzi 2016, p. 136. 30Valeski 2012. Although the Afghan army was accustomed to “push" logistics systems wherein units are rationed and regularly provided resources based on projected needs, the U.S. introduced a predominately “pull" system where units were supplied based on their requests for supplies.

139 was heavily-dominated by Northern Alliance-affiliated Tajik elites from the Panshjir valley.31 Indeed, ninety percent of the first 100 generals Minister of Defense Marshal Fahim appointed to the Afghan National Army were from this ascendant faction.32 American pressure for the more expedient demobilization of the AMF and ethnic balance in the MOD led Karzai to remove Fahim, who was unable to mobilize the AMF for a show of force to convince or coerce Karzai to reconsider.33 The appointment of Pashtun Rahim Wardak did little to weaken the Northern Alliance’s grip on the MoD’s senior ranks, however. Bismullah Khan, the Chief of Staff, also a Northern Alliance strongman, continued to exercise the real power over appointments, as did the lower echelons of the Ministry, who still fell within Fahim’s orbit. Eventually, a rivalry between Fahim and Wardak’s patronage networks and subnetworks solidified. And, other national-level power brokers, to include Herat-based Ismael Khan, Balkh-based Atta Mohammad Noor, and Abdurasshid Dostum, similarly interfered in the ANA’s affairs.34 The centralization of promotion authority at the General Staff limited merit-based promotions in the force.35 Minister Wardak reportedly complained that he received nearly 30-40 calls a day from elites requesting promotions and appointments for their proteges.36 Positions within the Ministry of Defense and Afghan National Army were so attractive for elites in part due to the numerous opportunities for personal enrichment they provided. Similar to the Afghan National Police, the ANA was the recipient of a considerable amount of external support (Figure 5.4). And, ANA commanders drew on a strikingly similar menu

31Giustozzi 2016, p. 136. 32International Crisis Group, “A Force in Fragments: Reconstituting the Afghan National Army," May 12, 2010, p. 10. See also: Manuel and Singer 2002; Confronting Afghanistan’s Security Dilemma Reforming the Security Sector 2003. 33Giustozzi 2016, p. 136. 34Grissom 2013, p. 277 . As noted by the Department of Defense in 2013, “Reports indicate that corrupt actors and individuals with links to Criminal Patronage Networks (CPNs) have captured key positions within the ANA at the Regional, Corps, Brigade, and Kandak levels. CPN penetration, however, is seen at an individual level, since no single CPN holds a dominant position over ANA ﬁelded force equities. Ethnically and politically-based patronage can be found throughout the ANA. Commonplace illicit ANA activities include theft of fuel and expendable supplies/commodities, pay-for-position scams, and localized collusion with both insurgent entities and narcotics trafﬁckers." Department of Defense 2013, p. 122. 35DODIG 2013, p. 12 36Giustozzi 2016, p. 176.

140 of corrupt activities as their counterparts in the MOI. Ghost and absentee soldiers were common within the ANA. The number of ANA personnel present-for-duty often differed considerably from the number of trained and assigned personnel to ANA kandaks.37 This, coupled with limited oversight and audits, created strong incentives for unit commanders to misrepresent these ﬁgures to draw extra salaries.38

Figure 5.4: U.S. Funding for the Afghan National Army, 2002-2012

The procurement and distribution of equipment and rations provided additional opportunities for corruption within the ANA. Indeed, no-bid contracts contributed to the creation of a “shadow economy dominated by government officials."39 At the most senior ranks of the Ministry of Defense, for example, contracts for fuel were suspected to have been purchased at inflated rates, potentially allowing senior officials to receive a cut of the surplus funds.40 37GAO 2008a. 38SIGAR 2015a, p. 7. See also: Cameron Chippindale, “Afghanistan’s Incompetent Army," The Beaver, March 15, 2017. Available at: https://beaveronline.co.uk/afghanistans-incompetent-army/; Erik Rosales, “Ghost Soldiers: How the Afghan Military Is Defrauding American Taxpayers," CBN News, June 20, 2017. Available at: http://www1.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2017/june/ghost-soldiers- how-the-afghan-military-is-defrauding-american-taxpayers; Tamim Hamid, “Watchdog Warns of More Ghost Soldiers in Security Forces," Tolo News, January 21, 2017. Available at: https://www. tolonews.com/afghanistan/watchdog-warns-more-ghost-soldiers-security-forces. 39International Crisis Group, “A Force in Fragments: Reconstituting the Afghan National Army," May 12, 2010, p. 12. 40“MoD Contract Corruption Exceeds $ 200 Million USD," Tolo News, April 12, 2015; Zahel-

141 The logistics process through which ANA units were supplied and sustained in the field was also prone to graft.41 When the U.S. began refitting ANA units with M-16s, for example, they stored the shipments in a series of supply depots, all of which were subject to minimal coalition oversight, and, by extension, vulnerable to corruption.42 The movement of ANA equipment subsequently relied on a web of subcontractors, some of whom are suspected to have paid bribes to insurgents for safe passage.43 And, of course, predatory commanders would skim from soldiers’ paychecks. These practices occurred at all levels in the ANA command hierarchy, with fuel and equipment being sold regularly within the kandaks and companies (tolay).44 By one estimate, 8 of 10 ANA soldiers had sold their ammunition for personal profit or fired their ammunition unnecessarily to receive more.45 Attrition and desertion were a major problem in the ANA. As one advising team for the 205th Corps noted in a Training Readiness and Assessment Tool briefing, “The Corps is losing soldiers at an alarming rate. This attrition is a result of...corrupt leaders failing to provide for basic needs of soldiers."46 As the ANA grew in size, the United States deployed an alphabet soup of advising teams to help support ANA units in the field. Beginning in 2004, Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) of approximately 16 commissioned and non-commissioned officers embedded with the ANA to help provide additional training, logistical support, and leadership support to wal Named As Suspect in MoD Fuel Contract Investigation," Tolo News, April 16, 2015. Available at: https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/zakhelwal-named-suspect-mod-fuel-contract- investigation. See also: SIGAR 2013a p. 8. 41As one adviser noted, “Logistics is the Corps ‘Achilles heel’. Equipment and materials are not properly taken care of. Most Property Book Offs [Officers] are AWOL and where available they are not up to the task. As a consequence, theft and corruption are rampant." CJTF-Phoenix, “Training Readiness and Assessment Tool Briefing," September 2009. 42GAO 2009a. 43Karen De Young, “Afghan Corruption: How to Follow the Money?" Washington Post, March 29, 2010. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/28/ AR2010032802971.html. 44“Afghan Generals Face Charges in Crackdown on Military Corruption," Washington Post, March 29, 2017. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/afghan-generals-face- charges-in-crackdown-on-military-corruption/2017/03/29/9d6c0dca-1480-11e7-bb16- 269934184168_story.html?utm_term=.b9148dccc0c6. 45SIGAR 2017, p. 135. 46CJTF-Phoenix, “Training Readiness and Assessment Tool Briefing," November 2009.

142 kandaks in the ﬁeld.47 Eventually, Security Force Assistance Teams (SFATs) and Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) were eventually deployed for this purpose as well. I compare the experience of two of these teams in the section that follows.

5.4.2 “You did this to yourself": Advising the ANA 201st Corps

An Embedded Training Team deployed to Kunar and Nuristan provinces in March 2008 to embed with an Afghan National Army kandak within the 201st Corps. The team, a “pickup" team of Marines and sailors, was aware that they would be deploying as an ETT. As such, much of the ETT’s pre-deployment training involved fundamental military skills (shoot, move, communicate), as well as first aid and other skills the team would require on the battlefield. Of course, given the team’s mission, they had to learn these skills in an environment where they were also teaching those skills to a foreign security force. The team’s training consisted of extensive language, cultural training, culminating in a scenario- based exercise, complete with role playing Afghan villagers, in which the team would have to maneuver to conduct Key Leader Engagement or patrols alongside a partner unit. Assigned to their partner unit through CJTF-Phoenix, the ETT was responsible for advising an ANA kandak whose tolays of around 140 people were split among disparate locations. As such, the ETT divided up into smaller teams of around 5 Marines to embed with the kandak’s companies in the field.48 Co-located with a U.S. Army platoon, one of these ETTs embedded on the border between Kunar and Nuristan Provinces. The ETT conducted daily operations with their partner company, to include route security and presence patrols in nearby villages. Although ETTs paired up with other companies within the kandak faced much higher levels of violence, the four man team examined in this section made contact with insurgents approximately 3-4 times during their 9 month deployment. The ETT was highly intrusive. Early in the team’s deployment, the team chief mentoring

47GAO 2005, p. 13. 48Author Interview, August 2, 2017.

143 the kandak commander had caught him embezzling money and stealing from the unit.49 After documenting and collecting concrete evidence of the commander’s corruption, the ETT was able to have him removed early in the team’s deployment. This naturally created an environment of enhanced threat that permeated the ETT’s relationship with their Afghan company commander, staff, and personnel. Indeed, as the adviser interviewed for this study noted, as a result of the commander’s removal, “people saw that we [the ETT] can do this to the man up top."50 The advising team intrusively monitored their Afghan counterparts. Indeed, verifying the unit’s personnel roster and property books took up a “large chunk" of the ETT’s time, as there was “always something we [the ETT] were verifying." Much of this impetus came from the ETT element advising the kandak staff, who was “beating up the kandak leadership about making sure those warfighting functions were done properly, which was a monumental task."51 The ETT at the company level worked in parallel with these efforts. The team also embedded Marines at the unit’s static locations as well, and relied on an adjacent Police Mentor Team for information about their partner unit’s conduct. In order to deter corruption, the Marines “ wanted the Afghans to know we were tracking [their activity] in parallel."52 With the firing of the kandak commander still “in the back of everybody’s [in the partner unit’s] minds," the ETT also regularly made threats and withheld some assistance from their partner unit. Although the Marine’s focus on mission success meant that they were often “making them [their partner unit] whole," providing fuel and supplies when the Afghan unit was unprepared for a mission, the team was constantly trying to “find some opportunity...to make them suffer whatever they had put themselves into."53 Prior to a convoy up a nearby mountain, for example, the partner unit had siphoned and sold off a large amount of its fuel, leaving them without enough to return. Rather than resupplying the unit, the Marines

49Author Interview, July 31, 2017; Author Interview August 2, 2017. 50Author Interview, August 2, 2017. 51Author Interview, August 2, 2017. 52Author Interview, August 2, 2017. 53Author Interview, August 2, 2017.

144 instead made the Afghans call for a fuel truck, making them waste an entire day “in the hot sun where no one wanted to be." “We essentially said, ‘hey, you want to play games? We’ll play games too.’" recalled the adviser.54 The ETT did the same with bottled water. In one instance an ANA squad had inadequate supplies during a patrol and asked their ETT to share, the ETT’s response was “nope, you did this to yourself." When the ANA refused to go out on operations, the team leveraged the provision of flights home for leave and other “carrots we [the ETT] could dangle in front of them" to try to achieve their cooperation.55 Yet, these measures generated recipient unit anger and did not produce improvements in unit proficiency. Indeed, the partner unit resented the adviser’s monitoring and threats.“They were really opposed to us inventorying their stuff with them," an adviser noted.56 When the team withheld resources from the unit, the unit’s personnel responded with moral outrage, proclaiming, “You guys can’t do this to us!"57 The recipient unit was hardly apathetic in response to their adviser’s behavior. Indeed, the unit made attempts to assert their control over their private affairs and evade their adviser’s watchful eye. When the stealing of fuel was discovered by the Marines, for example, the soldiers subsequently began siphoning as much fuel from the tanks as possible without moving the gauge from the “full" position. The team also found that success in eliminating corruption in one area just led the unit to become more corrupt in another. The advisers ultimately felt that dealing with the partner unit’s corruption was a “constant battle," and the unit’s proficiency suffered accordingly.58 The unit was always short on food rations, water, and other supplies, not to mention ammunition. And, ghost soldiers were kept on the personnel roster. The unit would stubbornly refuse to go on patrols with their advisers, and, ultimately, showed little to no improvement.

54Author Interview, August 2, 2017. 55Author Interview, August 2, 2017. 56Author Interview, August 2, 2017. 57Author Interview, August 2, 2017. 58Author Interview, August 2, 2017.

145 5.4.3 “You Can’t Jump on Every Horse and Ride It": Advising the ANA 203rd Corps

The ETT that would end up advising a kandak in the ANA 203rd Corps from September 2006-June 2007 began as a pickup team of U.S. Army soldiers, none of whom had worked together before. One of the first ETTs ever fielded, the 16 man team’s pre-deployment training consisted of basic military skills, learning how to use an interpreter, as well as scenario-based training similar to that of the ETT discussed in the previous section. Upon arriving in theater, the majority of the team was assigned to a kandak within the 203rd Corps. The unit was based on a Combat Outpost in Khost Province in an enormously hostile area of the country, positioned between two warring tribes. The ETT made contact with insurgents periodically, sometimes exchanging fire with insurgents regularly for weeks on end. This would certainly make cooperating with their advisers risky for the ANA. The ETT advising the kandak within the 203rd Corps were moderately intrusive. That is, the team monitored with moderate intensity while making implicit threats and only occasionally withholding resources from their partner unit. Reflecting on the team’s advising approach, the adviser interviewed for this study noted, “we knew it [corruption] was going on...[but] you can’t jump on every horse and ride it."59 As a result of this more subtle approach to detecting corruption, the advising team was able to maintain rapport with their partners, while still addressing its corruption. First, the team conducted quarterly inventories of their partner unit’s weapons and equipment.60 Furthermore, the ETT often observed the unit distributing their pay, checking soldiers’ ID cards against the unit’s personnel roster.61 An adviser argued that this had a disciplining effect on their partner unit’s behavior, “just our presence there helped to keep them [the ANA] in check," he argued.62 And, the team visited the unit’s static locations

59Author Interview, May 14, 2018. 60Author Interview, February 1, 2018. 61Author Interview, February 1, 2018. 62Author Interview, May 14, 2018.

146 roughly once a month. In concert with monitoring, the advising team was moderately threatening to their partner unit. Indeed, when they encountered the unit keeping ghost soldiers on their personnel roster, the adviser recalled relaying to the kandak commander, “hey, we cant be having this."63 Indeed, the team tried to handle unit corruption “politically," avoiding coercive, direct confrontations.64 The team also made selective use of it its Forward Ordering Officer (FOO) funds, cash that was supposed to be used to support U.S. forces but was also used by advisers to help purchase food, fuel, and other items to help the ANA unit maintain readiness.65 That is, during certain interactions the advisers would withhold these resources from their partner units. After the ETT refused to continue providing propane to the ANA due to their selling equipment, for example, the ANA began burning their toilet paper for their fires. In response, the ETT in turn refused to provide the ANA with toilet paper on missions. Even so, there was some corruption to which the ETT turned a blind eye. After successful raids, for example, the ETT averted its eyes and, with a wink and a nod, trusted that when the ANA captured enemy materiel, they would appropriately and legally dispose of it.66 Consistent with the theory, the ANA’s ability and willingness to carry out basic maneuvers in the field, generate intelligence, and, more broadly, interact positively with locals improved. Indeed, the unit demonstrated an increased proficiency in clearing rooms during raids, and, more broadly, showed improvement in their ability to maintain operational security. When taking sniper fire from a hill near the Khost-Gardez pass, for example, the ANA eventually was willing and able to maneuver up the hill effectively. Further, the unit eventually generated intelligence during its own unilateral operations. “They had some

63Author Interview, February 1, 2018. 64Author Interview, May 14, 2018. 65FOO funds are “primarily used by units to purchase mission-critical requirements that cannot otherwise be obtained by the unit through higher headquarters’ logistical air or ground delivery resupply plan or through the Regional Contracting Center existing local contracts." See: Center for Army Lessons Learned 2010 p. 12. On an example of an ETT using FOO funds creatively, see: “FOO," Embedded in Afghanistan (Blog), March 16, 2009. Available at: http://bc235.blogspot.com/2011/11/foo.html. 66Author Interview, February 1, 2018.

147 success going out without us, then coming back and telling us some things they discovered," the adviser recounted.67 Perhaps most important, the local population responded positively to the ANA’s progress. Nonetheless, by the end of the ETT’s deployment local tribal leaders began to come to meet with the kandak’s leadership to “discuss their concerns" about security in the area.68

5.5 Deviant Case Analysis

The Iraqi Army units I highlighted in the beginning of this section pose an interesting puzzle for my theory; an IA battalion with moderately intrusive advisers who failed to outperform a unit from the whose advisers used these measures sparingly. Although their existence does not on its own warrant the rejection of a probabilistic hypothesis, additional analysis of these cases can reveal whether the factors driving their divergence from the theory require a refinement to the theory or not.69 This section begins with a brief overview of the IA’s development, before turning to the paired cases. Overall, I find that national-level patron influence and a politically-sensitive AO can mediate the effects of balanced advising, and, that in the absence of these patrons, advisers could leverage their assessments of partner unit proficiency to help incentivize improvement. The pervasiveness of patronage networks within a recipient unit can thus mediate the optimal level of adviser intrusion.

5.5.1 Building and Advising the Iraqi National Army (IA) 2003-2009

The Iraqi military has long been a threat to the country’s political order. The British, who decided everything from the force’s size and training regiment, to its equipment, contributed considerably to the Army’s development.70 Taking power in the wake of a series of coups, counter-coups, and assassinations, Saddam Hussein had strong incentives to resist the

67Author Interview, May 14, 2018. 68Author Interview, February 1, 2018. 69Lijphart 1971. 70Heller 1977, pp. 80-81.

148 professionalization of his armed forces.71 During the Iran-Iraq War, for example, Saddam restricted officers’ access to Soviet training out of fear that its ideological influence could destabilize his regime.72 Soviet advisers remained in the country through Operation Desert Storm, but struggled to impart their operational concepts to the Iraqis.73 Unlike Afghanistan, Iraq thus had a highly institutionalized -albeit intentionally weakened- Army when the United States invaded. On May 23, 2003, however, the Coalition Provisional Authority decided to dissolve the existing Saddam-era security institutions. Although the wisdom of this decision is beyond the scope of this chapter,74 it further called for the creation of a “New Iraqi Corps," which would be “under civilian control...[and] professional, non-political, militarily effective, and representative of all Iraqis."75 This would involve the training of 27 motorized infantry battalions, designed predominately to maintain Iraq’s territorial integrity against external threats.76 Indeed, the New Iraqi Army (NIA) was prohibited from performing any “domestic law enforcement functions."77 Ba‘athist elites were intentionally isolated from the force; any officer above the rank of Brigadier General was initially prohibited from joining the Army, though this restriction was eventually removed.78 As part of an explicit strategy to transition security responsibility to Iraqi security forces, U.S.-led efforts focused on force generation, training and equipping the force.79 Working

71There is an extensive scholarship related to civil-military relations under Saddam’s regime. See e.g.:Talmadge 2015, p. 150-163, Makiya 1998, Pollack 2004, p. 208-209, Al-Marashi and Salama 2008. 72Talmadge 2011, p. 208. 73Eisenstadt and Pollack 2001 74See: Bremer 2006, pp. 51-55, Michael R. Gordon, “Debate Lingering on Decision to Dissolve the Iraqi Military," New York Times, October 21, 2004, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/21/ world/debate-lingering-on-decision-to-dissolve-the-iraqi-military.html; Mark Thomp- son, “How Disbanding the Iraqi Army Fueled ISIS," Time, May 29, 2015, available at: http://time.com/ 3900753/isis-iraq-syria-army-united-states-military/. 75“Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2: Dissolution of Entities," May 23, 2003. 76Walter B Slocombe, “Status of Rebuilding and Training the Army," Foreign Press Center Brieﬁng, September 17, 2003. Available at: https://2002-2009-fpc.state.gov/24230.htm; Hammes 2017, Frederick Kienle, “Creating an Army from Scratch: Lessons for the Future," American Enterprise Institute, May 2007. 77“Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 22: Creation of a New Iraqi Army," August 7, 2003. 78Hammes 2017, p. 305. Rathmell et al. 2006, p 34. 79MNF-I Commander General Casey noted, “We thought that if we could demonstrate a plan to build credible Iraqi security capacity as rapidly as possible and follow that with a conditions-based plan to transition the security mission to the sovereign Iraqi government, we could come closer to meeting the expectations of Washington, the Iraqi government, and the Iraqi people." See: Casey Jr 2012, p. 56, 29-32.

149 through the Coalition Military Assistance Transition Team (CMATT), later renamed Multi- National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), the CPA originally turned to a contractor to generate, house, clothe, and feed this force.80 Yet, this approach produced suboptimal results; nearly half of the first NIA battalion deserted, and, the portion that did remain was unable to carry out even the most perfunctory of military tasks.81 And, during the April 2004 operation to take control of Fallujah, the 2nd Iraqi Army battalion simply refused to take part in the operation, arguing, “we did not sign up to fight Iraqis."82 In the Spring/Summer of 2004 the establishment of Multi-National Force-Iraq and transfer of authority to the newly-elected Iraqi government led the coalition to emphasize IA growth. Training was bifurcated for individuals with and without military experience; those with experience received a three week refresher course, and, those without, a five week basic training program followed by three to seven week specialization instruction.83 As the IA expanded, inter- and intra- ethnosectarian competition informed its development. Shi‘a militia began to assert influence over a number of battalions in the force. This naturally complicated the willingness of Iraqi forces to operate with apolitical disinterest in their pursuit of insurgents. 84 Untrained officers promoted by political parties (referred to as damaj, or “merger" officers) were similarly problematic. Indeed, party loyalties constituted an enormous vulnerability within the force, with the Shiite Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, Da‘wa, and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan all exerting influence over promotions, and presumably, activities of certain Divisions.85 These trends continued under the tutelage of

80Hammes 2017, p. 305. 81Peter E. Singer, “Lessons Not Learned: Contracting Out Iraqi Army Advising," The Brookings Insti- tution, May 12, 2008. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/lessons-not-learned- contracting-out-iraqi-army-advising/. 82Thomas E. Ricks, “Iraqi Battalion Refuses to ‘Fight Iraqis,’" Washington Post, April 11, 2004. In a report to Congress, DoD also noted that these early battalion had “had inadequate time to develop unit cohesiveness, staff proﬁciency, and a leadership chain of command that is fundamental to a military unit." Department of Defense 2005a, p. 16. 83Department of Defense 2005b, p. 33. 84U.S. House of Resentatives 2006, p. 98. Indeed, a September 2007 GAO report notes, “[S]ome army units sent to Baghdad have mixed loyalties, and some have had ties to Shi’a militias making it difﬁcult to target Shi’a extremist networks." GAO 2007b, p. 42. 85See, e.g.: Najmi al-Jabouri, “For Every Iraqi Party, an Army of Its Own," New York Times, October 28, 2009; Marc Santora, “Sectarian Ties Weaken Duty’s Call for Iraq Forces," New York Times, December

150 Nuri al-Maliki, who viewed the threat from Sunni extremists as more pressing than Shi‘i militias.86 And, drawing on considerable U.S. financial support, corruption was naturally prevalent at the highest levels of the Ministry of Defense. Under the interim government, hundreds of millions of dollars were wasted on “worthless" equipment.87 In 2005, the Ministry of Defense “misplaced" $1.3. billion originally intended to arm Iraqi soldiers.88 The Iraqi Army thus served as a mechanism through which patronage networks associated with political elites could function. This manifested itself at the tactical and operational level in ways that were strikingly similar to the ANA. For one, the sale of many positions was typical within the force. In 2009 for example, one could purchase promotion to Colonel and command an Iraqi Army battalion for a $20,000 bribe. Those promoted through this approach viewed this as an investment of sorts; officers would pay these bribes knowing that they would be able to gain a significant return on their investment.89 To recoup their investment, officers allowed for and encouraged various forms of graft and fraud. Ghost soldiers were common across the IA. One Iraqi official outlined the problem succinctly, noting, “each officer is allowed, for example, five guards. He’ll keep two, send three home and pocket their salary or an agreed percentage, Then the second and bigger group is at the brigade level. A brigade commander usually has 30, 40 or more soldiers who stay at home or don’t exist...The problem is that he too, to keep his job as a brigade commander, has to bribe his own hierarchical superiors with huge amounts of

28, 2006; Florence Gaub, “An Unhappy Marriage: Civil-Military Relations in Post-Saddam Iraq," Carnegie Europe, January 13, 2006; Greg Jaffe, “An Iraqi General Faces Risks from Within his Own Ranks," Wall Street Journal, August 30, 2007. Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118843607054513040. 86Casey Jr 2012, p. 113, notes, “The prime minister believed that the “Ba’athists” (Sunni extremists) were the greater threat, and he expressed concern that we were putting all of our efforts against the militia and not enough against the Sunni extremists." See also: Florence Gaub, “An Unhappy Marriage: Civil-Military Relations in Post-Saddam Iraq," Carnegie Europe, January 13, 2016. 87Cordesman and Sullivan 2006, p. 76, Michael Howard, “Ex-Iraqi Defence Minister Wanted over $1bn Fraud," The Guardian, September 19, 2005. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/ sep/20/iraq.michaelhoward. See also: 88Cordesman and Sullivan 2006, p. 98. 89Tariq Ali, “The Rise of ISIS and the New Middle East War," Counterpunch, September 29, 2014. Avail- able at: https://www.counterpunch.org/2014/09/29/the-rise-of-isis-and-the-origins-of- the-new-middle-east-war/.

151 money."90 Pay officers -soldiers in units who had the responsibility of distributing salaries- were critical to these schemes, as they would ignore this practice, or even add ghost soldiers of their own.91 In other cases, Iraqi officers sold their soldier’s provisions, fuel, weapons, and ammunition.92 In one case, an Iraqi officer became known as “chicken man" due to his reputation for selling his unit’s poultry.93 The U.S. responded to these challenges by partnering Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) of eleven soldiers with Iraqi Army battalions in the field in 2005.94 Similar to the aforementioned ETTs in Afghanistan, these units often contained a wide range of specialties, to include maneuver, logistics, communications, and intelligence. Much to the MiTT’s chagrin, however, IA units were often underequipped, underfed, and, ultimately, unwilling to fight with the initiative their advisers preferred. Declassified reports from IA advisers reflect their frustration with this particularly challenging partner force. In one case, for example, advisers noted that an IA battalion in the 2nd Division was “possibly in an agreement with the AIF [anti-Iraqi Forces] in sector to ensure the unit does not come under any hostile fire."95 In another case, advisers suspected a battalion logistics officer of “selling...soldiers’ equipment on the black market."96 Another advising team noted that an entire Brigade’s worth of IA battalions “cannot be depended upon to operate outside of their current AO. CDR [Commander] and MiTTs believe less than 50% would deploy."97 Another battalion similarly would “not enforce the CP [Checkpoint] mission when encountering elements of

90“Iraq Uncovers 50,000 ‘ghost soldiers,’" al-Jazeera, November 30, 2014. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/11/iraq-uncovers-50000-ghost- soldiers-20141130194439245402.html. 91Gray 2013, p. 95. 92David D. Kirkpatrick, “Graft Hobbles Iraq’s Military in Fighting ISIS," New York Times, November 23, 2014. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/24/world/middleeast/graft-hobbles- iraqs-military-in-fighting-isis.html; Martin Chulov, “Post-war Iraq: ‘Everybody is Corrupt, from top to bottom. Including me,’" The Guardian, February 19, 2016. Available at: https://www.theguardian. com/world/2016/feb/19/post-war-iraq-corruption-oil-prices-revenues. 93David D. Kirkpatrick, “Graft Hobbles Iraq’s Military in Fighting ISIS," New York Times, November 23, 2014. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/24/world/middleeast/graft-hobbles- iraqs-military-in-fighting-isis.html. 94GAO 2006, p. 16, Dale 2009, p. 90. 95“IA Division TRAs," April 1, 2007. Released per PRI-17-202. 96“IA Division TRAs," April 1, 2007. Released per PRI-17-202. 97“Transition Readiness Assessment Executive Brief," March 20, 2007. Released per PRI-17-202.

152 JAM [Jaysh al-Mahdi]."98 Another unit similarly had nearly ninety percent of its soldiers desert the unit when it was deployed to Baghdad.99 A MiTT team perhaps best summarized the frustrations he had with his partner force by suggesting his partner unit “should not be involved in counterinsurgency operations...The major issues revolve around staff work, leadership, and personnel; will require extensive retraining."100

5.5.2 Disconnected Commanders and Leveraging Assessments

The improved proficiency of a battalion in the 9th Iraqi Army Division (September 2007- September 2008) poses as interesting puzzle for my theory: why did a unit whose MiTT was so decidedly unintrusive choose to improve in its proficiency? My theory predicts that this unit should remain rather indifferent towards their advisers and refuse to cooperate. Yet, this did not occur. In this section I examine this case in greater depth. Overall, I find that rather than threatening to withhold resources or confronting their partner unit with allegations of corruption, the MiTT was able to successfully use its own evaluations of the partner unit as a source of leverage. This was effective because the unit’s commander lacked connections to national-level patronage networks, and, as a result, viewed improvement as his only avenue for career advancement. This lack of connections would also significantly lower the risks of sanctioning from his own chain of command if he did start fighting with greater initiative. Rather than pointing to a critical gap in my theory, this case highlights a unit-level characteristic that can determine the optimal level of intrusion needed to incentivize partner unit improvement. Operating as a pickup team -with at least two of the members being “voluntold" for the mission- the twelve man MiTT advising a battalion in the 9th Iraqi Army Division received two months of pre-deployment training. This included a number of courses on Iraqi culture, as well as discussions and seminars with advisers who had returned to the states for their 98“Transition Readiness Assessment Executive Brief," March 20, 2007. Released per PRI-17-202. 99“Transition Readiness Assessment Executive Brief," January 1, 2007. Released per PRI-17-202. 100“Transition Readiness Assessment Executive Brief," January 1, 2007. Released per PRI-17-202.

153 mid tour leave. The team chief also focused on developing his team’s proficiency in small unit tactics, and ensuring that members of the team could perform their tasks correctly. The team’s communications NCO, for example, was able to network computers and run cable, but could not operate a radio.101 From September 2007 - September 2008 the team operated just North of Baghdad in a mixed region evenly split between Sunni and Shia. Although the MiTT had “several close calls" during joint operations, they never took direct fire during routine patrol. Even so, the partner unit had mixed loyalties, at least amongst its Shiite minority; “there were Sadr/JAM [Jaysh al-Mahdi] posters in the barracks," recalled one of the team’s advisers.102 The MiTT’s approach to advising generally involved using very little intrusion. The MiTT monitored with moderate frequency. The team performed occasional “spot checks" of personnel at some of the unit’s static locations, checking the present for duty numbers against the roster at the battalion headquarters. The team also sometimes observed the partner unit’s pay operations and received tips primarily -though not exclusively- from adjacent coalition units regarding their partners’ conduct.103 The team also visited the unit’s static locations each week, sometimes showing up unannounced. Yet, the MiTT’s use of threats and punitive measures was lacking. And, it was not because the unit was without internal dysfunction or corruption. Ghost soldiers were indeed rampant; “I know our numbers never added up," admitted the adviser from the unit interviewed for this study.104 The unit commander had imposed a fine system against his soldiers, and, although he reinvested much of these funds back into the battalion’s coffers, he also likely embezzled at least a portion of it.105 Yet, the team did not threaten to withhold resources or make any veiled or implied ultimatums regarding their partners’ behavior. Despite this more passive approach to advising, the IA battalion demonstrated some

101Author Interview, April 28, 2018. 102Author Interview, April 28, 2018. 103Author Interview, April 28, 2018. 104Author Interview, April 28, 2018. 105Author Interview, April 28, 2018.

154 improvement. The partner unit was responsible for carrying out presence patrols and raids against insurgents throughout the deployment; the MiTT and IA battalion conducted over 200 missions during the twelve month deployment. And, the unit steadily improved in its proficiency. At one point when the battalion arrived in a predominately Sunni village with a strong al-Qa‘ida in Iraq influence, the commander “immediately wanted to meet with tribal elders" and developed appropriate talking points.106 The team’s ability to maintain its equipment similarly improved, as did its ability to deliberately plan operations and employ operational security. The unit commander also actively suspended a commander suspected of running protection rackets and fired another who was incompetent.107 Why did the partner unit improve even when its advisers were so unintrusive? Evidence suggests that a confluence of two factors contributed to the unit commander’s proactive behavior, and, by extension, the unit’s receptivity to the MiTT’s advice. The first relates to the commander’s lack of strong connections to national-level patronage networks. The battalion commander was a veteran of the Iran - Iraq war and had served alongside many of the soldiers in his battalion in a Republican Guard unit under Saddam. His ties to the previous regime made him particularly sensitive to his “personal image," and the fear of scrutiny from higher headquarters likely caused him to try to “distance himself" from being viewed as a Saddam loyalist.108 This rendered the risks of becoming more proficient on the battlefield somewhat less pronounced for the commander. Absent a senior-level patron who might punish him for disrupting a patronage network, the unit commander had few alternatives but to try to improve and hope for the best. Rather than signaling loyalty to a corrupt paymaster, the commander instead had to appear competent to his superiors, in the perhaps vain hope that demonstrating technocratic proficiency might be rewarded. Indeed, the commander tried to “coopt my image of his unit" recalled an adviser. Recognizing this vulnerability, the MiTT actively leveraged its

106Author Interview, April 28, 2018. 107Author Interview, April 28, 2018. 108Author Interview, April 28, 2018.

155 proficiency rating system - known as the Transition Readiness Assessments- to achieve the commander’s compliance.109 In order to convince him to improve in a certain area, the MiTT would at times “lowball" ratings to in turn convince the battalion commander to try to improve. The commander made these improvements because “He figured it [the rating] would eventually get to his leader."110 Unfortunately, the battalion commander’s concern with his unit’s proficiency ratings are more likely to be the exception than the norm. In the political systems typical of SFA recipients, commanders without ties to national-level patrons will indeed be rare. Nevertheless, this review suggests that the depth of a unit commander’s ties to senior-level patronage networks is an important variable to consider moving forward. Weakly-connected commanders, coupled with the clever leveraging of partner unit evaluations, may be enough to incentivize improvement under these rare circumstances.

5.5.3 The Challenges of Ethnic Fault Lines and Competition

In this section I evaluate why, contrary to my theory, a partner unit in the 4th Iraqi Army Division failed to improve. The MiTT advising this unit adopted an advising approach that closely aligns with balanced advising. Yet, the battalion did not increase in its proﬁciency. In this section I explore this case in greater depth. The analysis reveals that the presence of competing patronage networks within the unit, coupled with its politically-sensitive AO, imposed particularly high costs for the unit cooperating with their advisers. From August 2006-October 2007 a U.S. Army-manned MiTT was responsible for advising another battalion in the 4th IA Division. Responsible for an area between Kirkuk, Tikrit, and Baiji, the MiTT made contact with insurgents 12-15 times during their 15 month deployment, predominately in the form of inaccurate small arms ﬁre on their convoys. The team’s partner unit was responsible for maintaining security in their AO, which they accomplished through patrols, checkpoints, and static defenses of key infrastructure. The

109For more on these ratings, see: GAO 2007a. 110Author Interview, April 28, 2018.

156 team went on joint patrols with their partners roughly once a week. When examined holistically, the MiTT adopted a balanced approach to inﬂuencing their partner unit’s behavior. They monitored, but not too often or too intrusively, and used some implicit threats to deter partner unit corruption. Even so, the MiTT adviser interviewed for this study largely felt that “as long as they [the partner unit] could do the missions we required them to do" some corruption was acceptable.111 With respect to monitoring, the team’s logistics mentor did not conduct “hands on, touching-everything" inventories regularly, but still performed less intrusive spot checks. The team would inspect some of the unit’s “major" purchases and maintain some awareness of their vehicles and other property. Because they were so closely partnered with their unit, they avoided constant solicitations of locals’ opinions about their partner unit’s behavior, “that wasn’t part of what we’d do," recalls an adviser. To be sure, in some of the monitoring activities the team was “just going through the motions." Even so, the team did closely monitor the unit’s fuel use and was consistently present during its payday operations.112 The team also made use of some threats and aid suspensions to convince their partner unit to cooperate and cut back on corruption. The unit’s commander often pilfered from the unit for his own personal gain. “In some cases, the property, signed for by the commander, was viewed [by the commander] as his stuff" recalled an adviser from the team.113 The MiTT also knew that the battalion had ghost soldiers on their books and that the unit was selling fuel. Rather than confronting them consistently about these issues, however, the team adopted a more tactful approach. Describe the team’s advising philosophy, an adviser argued that “We [the MiTT] tried to steer the IA away from the practices that were most at odds with our ends (severe corruption, prisoner abuse, graft) and sometimes there was success but sometimes we had to accept that the ideal is not realistic."114 As such, although the MiTT confronted the partner unit commander about many of these practices, it was

111Author Interview, January 3, 2018. 112Author Interview, January 3, 2018. 113Author email correspondence, May 30, 2018. 114Author email correspondence, May 30, 2018.

157 “a soft confrontation."115 Indeed, the MiTT knew to not take their threats too far. In one case, for example, the MiTT had purchased a shipping container for their partner unit’s checkpoints. Instead, it ended up at the commander’s house. The team decided to tolerate this clear case of graft in order to ensure its relationship with its partner unit would endure. Contrary to my theory, the unit showed little, if any, improvement over time.116 A number of variables appear to have contributed to the partner unit’s recalcitrance. For one, at the beginning of the MiTT’s deployment the partner unit already established a comparatively high baseline level of proficiency. Indeed, the unit was “reasonably proficient unit by American standards."117 The MiTT was the fourth to partner with the IA battalion, and, as such, it is also possible that the IA battalion was aware of the limits in the coalition’s influence and reached a proficiency ceiling. Understanding why this ceiling existed in the first place, however, can help shed light on intervening variables that might mediate advisers’ influence. The key mediating variable appeared to be the unit’s ethnic make up, coupled with its heterogeneous AO. The battalion’s rank and file consisted of a mix of Sunni and Shia Arabs. But, the unit’s senior officers were exclusively Kurdish. On its own, this caused some resentment and internal dysfunction. The Kurdish battalion commander and Arab intelligence officer, for example, had different, competing patrons. This led to mutual distrust between the two and would naturally inhibit the battalion’s ability to function more effectively on the battlefield, especially when it came to generating and sharing intelligence.118 These ethno-sectarian divides were particularly salient for the unit given its AO. The unit operated along the “green line" separating Arab and Kurdish territory. This made every single operation a sensitive issue. The Kurdish commander would indeed express his dismay when the MiTT suggested they conduct operations near the Kurdish regions in Kirkuk,

115Author Interview, January 3, 2018. 116To be sure, the unit did show some marginal improvements in its ability to conduct basic maneuvers and collect actionable intelligence. Nonetheless, the unit by and large remained stable across the vast majority of its proﬁcient ratings. 117Author email correspondence, May 30, 2018. 118Author Interview, January 3, 2018; Author email correspondence, May 30, 2018.

158 but was much more enthusiastic when tasked with operations further afield (likely to the dismay of his Arab subordinates). “He [the battalion commander] did things that were good for his career," recalled a member of the MITT.119 And, unfortunately, he answered to a national-level patron who wanted the unit to avoid conducting operations against his ethnic kin. Ultimately, the experience of this unit suggests that a combination of competing external patrons and a politically-sensitive AO placed a limit on what the partner unit was willing and able to achieve on the battlefield. These intervening variables rendered the partner unit uniquely resistant to their advisers’ influence. The unit’s high level of politicization imposed a strong upper bound on its proficiency in the field.

5.6 Conclusion

In this chapter I have presented both quantitative and qualitative evidence in support of my theory. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with former military advisers, I first used inferential methods to demonstrate how comparable units that received different advising approaches improved at different rates. And, units whose advisers were moderately intrusive improved more than those that received very high and very low levels. Based on these results, I then explored two pairs of cases in greater depth. This additional analysis reinforced the chapter’s central findings, while also pointing to additional variables that may mediate the effects of adviser intrusion. Having evaluated my theory through in-depth qualitative case studies, quantitative analysis, and a medium-n approach that draws on the strengths of both, I have found strong support for my central hypothesis. Moderately intrusive advisers were more likely to improve their partner units. This finding has implications for both scholarship and policy. I turn to these in the concluding chapter next.

119Author Interview, January 3, 2018.

159 Chapter 6: Conclusion

Perhaps one of the most frustrating aspects of SFA is that the types of states that tend to receive training, advice, and assistance are those that are least willing to invest these resources to develop the combat proficiency of their security forces. And, donors like the United States has not always made SFA provision conditional on national-level elite behavior. Even in these challenging circumstances, not all recipient units are equally proficient on the battlefield. Moving beyond slow-moving, national-level variables, this study examined how advisers can affect partner unit incentives through the more intentional use of enforcement activities. I have traced how in the political systems typical of recipient states, the need for institutional rents to balance between competing elites comes at the expense of security forces’ motivation for and proficiency in warfare against external threats. Recipient units face punishments from within their own chain of command and earn less money if they become more proficient. Recipient units value foreign assistance as a means of personal enrichment and protection on the battlefield. Advisers can motivate the recipient unit to improve by threatening to withhold resources from them. Conveying these threats through intrusive behavior renders recipient units less apathetic, but also more angry. Highly intrusive advisers produce un-apathetic, but highly angry partner units, undermining the recipient’s willingness to cooperate. Unintrusive advisers will produce less anger, but will also lead the recipient unit to remain apathetic and unresponsive to the adviser’s behavior. The result of these tradeoffs is an optimum at moderate levels of intrusion. In sum, even amidst considerable interest misalignment between donor and recipient and in the absence of intrusive, national-level policies of conditionality, advisers can still influence the performance of their partners. In this concluding chapter I begin by summariz-

160 ing the evidence presented in this dissertation to evaluate my theory. I then explore how my ﬁndings point to important new avenues for future research and imply changes to existing SFA policy.

6.1 Summary

Security Force Assistance is, at its core, a political endeavor. A more proficient security force can be threatening to a leader attempting to stay in power. A technocratic security force capable of operating effectively against external threats can just as easily be employed to overthrow the political order. Leaders thus allow these institutions to distribute resources to networks of armed and potentially contentious elites. Because these forces serve as a vehicle for regime patronage, command hierarchies within them often resemble pyramids in which commanders at each level are responsible for extracting resources and distributing them up the chain of command. To generate resources, commanders will sell their unit’s equipment, supplies, and food rations on the black market, while manipulating personnel records to receive surplus salaries. Security force units operating within these institutions thus face a powerful set of incentives to avoid improving in their proficiency. Cooperating with foreigners exposes a recipient unit to enormous risk. A more honest, less corrupt security force unit yields fewer economic spoils and can lead to punitive measures from elites. Under these circumstances, SFA can provide a critical source of wealth and protection for recipient units. Convincing recipient units to cooperate requires some threat to withhold assistance. Although this threat will make recipient units less apathetic, it will also render them angrier. The tradeoff between apathy and anger has implications for the optimal level of adviser intrusion, efforts to detect partner unit corruption and coerce them to change their behavior. As a result, I argue that advisers will be most capable of incentivizing recipient unit cooperation when they are moderately intrusive. To evaluate the theory I first drew on detailed comparative case studies of Afghan

161 National Police advisers. In Naw Zad district, these advisers were decidedly unintrusive. That is, they avoided monitoring their partners’ behavior, did not threaten them with any potential repercussions if they refused to cooperate, nor did they restrict the flow of resources to their partners. Accordingly, the Naw Zad ANP struggled to improve in the field. The unit was staffed with warlord networks, engaged in corruption, and refused to optimize the maneuvering of their forces to facilitate intelligence collection. Conversely, the advising team in Golestan was far more threatening to their partners. The Marines regularly threatened the partner unit’s personnel, intrusively monitored their behavior, and, due to concerns over corruption, refused to provide them with fuel. Rather than responding to their highly threatening advisers with cooperation, the Golestan ANP commander took steps to reassert their control over their private affairs and intentionally lead the advisers into dangerous situations. The Garmser ANP advisers adopted a more balanced approach to influencing their partners, supplementing their monitoring of adviser behavior with surreptitious and less intrusive measures and making implicit threats to their partners. The result was a more proactive and cooperative unit commander, and, ultimately, a partner force willing to extend the legitimacy of the local government. Next, I turned to a quantitative analysis of 120 ANP units advised by the the United States military from January 2009-February 2010. Using original data I found that adviser monitoring - a proxy for adviser intrusiveness- and ANP combat performance have a non- monotonic relationship. I find this result to survive a series of robustness tests that account for functional form assumptions, spatial dynamics, and temporal sequencing. A separate test using an alternative measure of ANP combat proficiency is also consistent with the hypothesis. Finally, the medium n chapter evaluated a sample of 19 Afghan and Iraqi Security Force units. Drawing on detailed interviews with these units’ advisers, I matched each unit based on confounding variables, and, using standard inferential methods, found that the units who demonstrated the greatest improvements in their proficiency were those whose advisers were

162 moderately intrusive. Based on these results, I then proceeded to examine two case pairs in greater depth; one that aligned with my theory, and another that did not. The latter analysis suggested that a confluence of rather idiosyncratic factors drove the cases to diverge from my theoretical expectations. Each of these chapters offers distinct methodological advantages and drawbacks. And, none on their own is a sufficient test of my theory. Yet, taken together, we can be sufficiently convinced by the collective results: the best performing recipient units were those whose advisers were moderately intrusive. This is consistent with the broader theoretical tradeoff between apathy and anger this project identified. I turn to the theory’s generalizability next.

6.2 Theory Generalizability

My research design revolves around in-depth analyses of SFA recipient units in both Iraq and Afghanistan. As such, questions related to the external validity of my findings are natural. To what extent will the dynamics I have explored in this dissertation travel to other contexts? Put another way, how often will the United States find itself providing SFA to a thoroughly corrupt recipient state? Although the extent of corruption within the Afghan and Iraqi security forces may make them an extreme case of interest misalignment, these forces unfortunately typify what will be characteristics of many U.S. SFA recipients. In the weak, developing states that tend to receive SFA, corruption within the security forces will be common, and a national-level policy of aid conditionality will not always be feasible. Less pronounced – but still strong – interest misalignment between donors like the United States and recipient security forces will persist, limiting the willingness of recipient states to develop a more professional and proficient security force. Figure 6.1 below underscores the prevalence of interest misalignment across a number of SFA recipient states. The figure depicts Transparency International’s ratings of defense sector corruption for 2015. Drawing on systematically coded criteria, Transparency International produces A-F grades of countries’ institutional

163 corruption. One need not be an expert of SFA provision to recognize that in many of the countries across the Sahel, North Africa, Middle East, and South Asia that tend to breed terrorists, insurgents, and criminal groups, defense sectors are given rather poor markings.

Figure 6.1: Transparency International Defense Sector Corruption Ratings, 20151

If these conditions are not unique to either Afghanistan or Iraq, then it seems appropriate to proceed with drawing implications my dissertation has for future research. I turn to this next.

6.3 Implications for Future Research

Scholarship tells us a great deal about why Security Force Assistance yields disappointing national-level outcomes. Yet, existing work does not offer enough granularity to account for subnational variance in recipient unit battlefield performance. In this dissertation I have highlighted the behavior of military advisers as being one variable that drives these local outcomes in SFA effectiveness. Beyond contributing to a more complete understanding of the Afghan and Iraq wars, this study adds to recent SFA scholarship that has focused on national-level variables. These findings in turn have implications for future work examining civil conflict, non-material determinants of military effectiveness, and enforcement dynamics

1Transparency International Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index, 2015. Data available at: https: //government.defenceindex.org/.

164 in international politics. As discussed in the introductory chapter of this dissertation, practice-oriented and academic SFA scholarship has moved from implicitly assuming that more or the right types of assistance will yield improvements in recipient combat performance, to explicitly testing the conditions under which this will be more likely to occur. This project most readily contributes to this second wave of work. By exploiting subnational variance in recipient unit combat proficiency, I am able to offer a more discriminating theory. This can inform SFA scholarship that highlights the superiority of more intrusive or coercive SFA policies. Although the findings of this study underscore the effectiveness of monitoring and enforcement to incentivize recipient improvement, they also point to some downsides in the excessive use of coercion in SFA provision. We can consider this dissertation’s findings to thus provide a friendly amendment to this growing body of research: intrusion is certainly more effective than apolitical capacity building, but, past a threshold, these policies can have a detrimental effect on SFA recipient battlefield performance. This approach and theoretical insight can be readily extended to a broader body of work examining foreign aid effectiveness writ large.2 This project’s conclusions should also inform scholarship examining the subnational consequences of civil conflict interventions. Between 1975-2009 there have been 169 cases of interventions in civil conflict.3 Existing scholarship takes the relationship between SFA and recipient battlefield effectiveness as a given and tends to focus on macro-level outcomes such as government victory and one-sided violence.4 But, based on the results of this dissertation, we know that the effects of these interventions are unlikely to affect target countries or militant groups equally across space and time, nor will they necessarily improve the proficiency of recipients. I have highlighted the behavior of foreign advisers as being one factor that contributes to local variation in subnational dynamics in civil war. Future

2E.g.: Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007; Bearce and Tirone 2010; Wright and Winters 2010. 3Högbladh, Pettersson and Themnér 2011. 4Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce 2008; Gent 2008; Sullivan and Karreth 2014; Wood, Kathman and Gent 2012.

165 work should more closely trace how variables such as subnational political structures, unit ethnicity, geography, and other factors might mediate the effects of foreign assistance to combatants in civil conflicts and insurgencies. Research outside of the Afghan and Iraqi contexts may also seek to examine how variance in the intensity of interest misalignment can lead to different peaks in the optimal level of adviser intrusiveness. One might hypothesize that the tradeoffs between apathy and anger will persist so long as the recipient has an incentive to resist investing in their combat power. Even so, the level of adviser intrusion required to incentivize recipient unit improvement may vary across cases and should form the basis of future inquiries. Of course, SFA entails more than arms transfers. Rather, it is an attempt by the donor to diffuse or transmit knowledge or norms of military tactics, techniques, and procedures to the recipient.5 Indeed, this study has demonstrated that under certain conditions we can consider the behavior of foreign military advisers to be a non-material determinant of a recipient state’s combat proficiency. We might consider advisers to thus be representatives of a “transnational epistemic community" of war-fighting, and, as such, this study is relevant to our understanding of diffusion in international politics.6 Indeed, as noted in a recent review of this literature, “quantitative studies of policy diffusion have focused solely on the policies of governments and how they cluster geographically, but do so without any consideration of the actors involved in bringing these policies into being."7 Through the systematic evaluation of military adviser behavior, this study does just this. Future work in this area might extend this study’s theoretical framework to studies of economic policy, the diffusion of which often involves the deployment of advisers as well.8 The tradeoffs between intrusion and cooperation this paper highlights also speak to a much broader scholarship examining coercion in international politics. A range of phenomena, from post-conflict peace resolutions to trade agreements, require monitoring, threats,

5Farrell 2005. 6Adler and Haas 1992. 7Graham, Shipan and Volden 2013, p. 684. 8Cohen 1992; Dietrich 2016.

166 and coercion to ensure compliance. The ﬁndings of this study suggest that past a threshold, intrusive monitoring, threats, and punitive measures can be “too much of a good thing," and, due to the emotional impact they have on recipients, yield suboptimal outcomes.

6.4 Implications for Policy

Despite its limitations, the U.S. will continue to rely on SFA as a convenient policy instrument to address threats abroad. Undeterred by SFA’s disappointing outcomes, administra- tions of both parties have employed SFA across a range of different contexts. Although this dissertation does not offer a “silver bullet" solution that can overcome powerful national- level determinants of its overall success, it does offer some avenues for making SFA more effective on the margins. This is far from trivial. If the United States can more effectively employ SFA at the unit level, it might be able to achieve enough improvement in partner unit proficiency to secure its interests, even in the absence of comprehensive reforms to the recipient’s defense institutions. Doing so, however, will require some changes to adviser selection, training, doctrine, and policy, as well as a reconsideration of SFA’s overall utility. Recent changes to U.S. COIN doctrine has more explicitly identified the challenges interest misalignment between patrons and clients pose for countries like the United States.9 Even so, doctrine has yet to delineate how advisers might overcome this challenge. Currently, rapport-building measures are explored at great length. The U.S. Army Security Cooperation field manual, for example, notes that “Soldiers [advisers] cannot simply order a specific action; instead, they use interpersonal skills to positively affect the actions and decisions of their foreign counterparts and work toward shared goals."10 In fact, an adviser primer exists focusing exclusively on the topic of adviser-advisee rapport, triumphing, “Quite simply, effective rapport will allow advisors to more successfully complete their missions."11 These assertions are commonplace in doctrine, often with little systematic evidence to support

9See, e.g.: US Army 2013, 2014; Department of the Army 2013; Joint Chiefs of Staff 2013. 10US Army 2013, 6-1. 11Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance 2008b, p. 2.

167 them. If one finds the results of this dissertation to be credible, this doctrine should be updated. First, it should more explicitly include discussions of partner unit corruption. To be fair, joint security cooperation doctrine instructs planners to evaluate the “risks of instability, corruption, and other factors which may undermine the success of the SC [Security Cooperation] program."12 And, the U.S. Army Security Cooperation manual similarly instructs advisers to ask, “What corruption is best left alone in the interest of mission accomplishment?"13 But, advisers are given little, if any, clear descriptions of how corruption might manifest itself in their partner units’ behavior. And, when it does discuss anticorruption efforts, doctrine views them largely as a technocratic skill set that advisers should develop within their partner forces’ institution.14 A better illustration of partner force corruption can facilitate advisers’ use of intrusive measures. Here again, however, doctrine is thin. As alluded to previously, doctrine views rapport as the primary means of adviser influence. This dissertation, however, suggests that a focus on rapport will only contribute to a partner unit’s apathy and ultimately lead to poor outcomes in recipient unit battlefield performance. Doctrine should pay more attention to how advisers might produce less apathetic recipient units. This might include many of the intrusive measures described in greater detail in this dissertation; monitoring the partner unit’s records, observing its payday operations, threatening to withhold, or actually withholding resources. Advisers can, in turn, be better prepared and empowered to operate according to this revised doctrine and navigate the political realities of SFA provision. Interviewees in this study describe their training as largely consisting of learning basic shoot, move, communicate skills in an environment where your forces are working alongside partners. It also covered topics such as how to use an interpreter effectively, and, eventually, some cultural classes and

12Joint Chiefs of Staff 2017, III-11 13US Army 2013, p. 3-7. 14US Army 2013, p. 6-5.

168 scenarios complete with foreign roleplayers. The relatively new Military Adviser Training Academy’s Combat Advisor Training Course is built around many of the same skills, to include joint fires integration, weapons, trauma care, and field sanitation, among others.15 Adviser training cirricula should supplement these important skills with more practical instruction in how to detect, deter, and, in some cases, punish partner unit misconduct and corruption. Advisers should be prepared to encounter issues such as ghost soldiers, partner unit criminal activities, and other forms of misconduct. Successfully balancing apathy and anger in advising will require a specific set of personality traits, which should form the basis of future evaluations aiming to assess individuals’ suitability for this mission. Currently, desired adviser attributes are calibrated for generating rapport. Traits such as “warmth in human relations" or “empathy" are no doubt important, but in many descriptions of ideal advisers these adjectives and their synonyms tend to outweigh others, such as “tolerance for ambiguity," which, based on the conclusions of this study, are likely to be more important.16 Future instances of SFA should also more intentionally provide advisers with greater discretion to disburse assistance packages as they see fit. Advisers interviewed for this study demonstrated impressive ingenuity in leveraging spare parts, fuel, and other resources to their advantage, but this was often a bottom-up innovation on the part of the advisers, rather than an intentional, top-down strategy to influence partner unit behavior. Granting advisers greater control over resources naturally extends from a recognition that SFA is a political enterprise rather than an exercise in technocratic capacity building. Finally, the findings of this study should indeed be sobering for proponents of SFA provision and any consequent adjustments to U.S. force structure to better carry out SFA missions. The advising mission is no doubt a unique one, and moving from the ad-hoc manning approach adopted during the time period for this study is certainly progress. Yet,

15Military Advisor Training Academy Recruitment Brief, Available at: http://www.benning.army. mil/armor/316thCav/MATA/Recruiting.html. 16US Army 2013, p. 6-7; Military Advisor Training Academy Recruitment Brief, Available at: http: //www.benning.army.mil/armor/316thCav/MATA/Recruiting.html; See also: Hajjar 2014b.

169 the U.S. services should be realistic about the tradeoffs any major restructuring of U.S. forces to conduct this mission may pose. Amidst suboptimal structural variables, the U.S. will only be able to achieve limited and temporary improvements to partner unit battlefield effectiveness by, with, and through flawed partners. Ultimately, Security Force Assistance is neither the panacea envisioned by some of its proponents, nor is it as prone to failure as some recent scholarship would lead us to expect. Outcomes in SFA vary, and national-level variables can only tell us so much about why this is the case. The behavior of SFA donors’ own advisers can contribute to this variance. Even when advisers optimize their behavior to build partner unit proficiency, however, the results are unlikely to be immediately apparent. Striking a balance between threats and rapport will be a labor and time-intensive process, where temporary setbacks, frustrations, and even the loss of life are likely to occur. And, absent a major change in the recipient’s political orientation, the results will not be permanent. Ultimately, then, the findings of this study suggest that policymakers should manage their overall expectations regarding the use of SFA as an instrument of foreign policy.

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189 Appendix A: Comparative Case Study Codings

Table A.1: Comparative Case Study Monitoring Coding

Monitoring Naw Zad Garmser Golestan How often did the adviser di- Initially Daily, Weekly rectly take inventory of the weekly, but used partner unit’s personnel roster, then Afghans budget, and equipment inven- monthly. as key in- tory? Less often terlocutors. as the de- Kept joint ployment armory to went on. minimize intrusion. How often did the advising Weekly, Weekly, Daily team visit the partner unit’s none were about half static locations? Were these surprise surprise surprise visits? visits. visits. Did the advising team rely on Yes Yes Yes third-party reports of partner unit behavior? Did the advising team No Yes, used No covertly-surveil their partner night vision unit? to observe checkpoint. Didthe advising team observe No Yes No the unit’s payday operations?

190 Table A.2: Comparative Case Study Coercion Coding

Coercion Naw Zad Garmser Golestan Did the adviser allow his part- Yes No No ner unit to sell fuel, weapons, or equipment without threatening any repercussions? Did the adviser allow his part- Yes Yes Yes ner unit to keep ghost soldiers on the personnel roster without threatening any repercussions? Did the adviser allow his part- Yes No No ner unit to demand bribes from locals without threatening any repercussions? Did the adviser share supplies Yes Yes No with his partner unit? Did the advising team ever No No Yes threaten to remove partner unit personnel without threatening repercussions? Did the adviser ever directly No Yes - Yes - ex- confront the partner unit com- implicit plicit and mander with allegations of threats implicit corruption? threats Did the adviser ever threaten, No No Yes or actually withhold fuel, equipment, or combat enablers to their partner unit?

191 Table A.3: Comparative Case Study Proﬁciency Coding

Unit Proﬁciency Naw Zad Garmser Golestan Did the unit maintain its equip- Yes Yes Yes ment? Did the unit operate without No Yes No bias for ethnic, tribal, or sectarian cleavages? Did the unit generate intelli- Yes, but Yes No gence from locals through ac- not consis- tivities such as dismounted pa- tently trols? Was the unit able to inte- Yes, but Yes No grate locally-derived intelli- not consis- gence into its operational plan- tently ning? Did the unit otherwise im- No Yes No prove its relationship with the local population?

192 Appendix B: Quantitative Analysis Robustness Tests

B.1 Endogeneity and Contamination

The possibility exists that advisers adjust whether or not they perform an inventory based on their unit’s performance in the field. An adviser might cease conducting inventories once his unit reaches a certain level of proficiency or only conduct inventories when units are performing poorly. If this were the case, we would expect a unit’s proficiency in a previous advising period to influence whether or not it is inventoried in the following period. To test whether this is the case, I run both logistic and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions, including ANP unit fixed effects. The key independent variable is the unit’s CM score at t-1 and the dependent variable is a binary measure of whether the unit’s advisers performed an inventory at time t. I also control for the number of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks, the details of which are detailed below. Results from both models do not lend support to this concern of endogeneity. That said, I address this possibility below by including a lagged dependent variable in my statistical analyses.

Table B.1: Capability Milestones (Lagged) and PMT Inventory

193 PMT Inventories might also contaminate the Capability Milestone ratings, rendering this a problematic measure of my independent variable. An adviser who performs an inventory could be more likely to encounter negative information about a partner unit or observe a unit’s poor performance and evaluate them accordingly. If this were the case, we would expect periods during which an adviser conducted an inventory to be followed by a decline in a unit’s Capability Milestone rating. To test whether this is the case I run a similar model to those above. That is, I regress a unit’s inventory status at time t-1 on its Capability Milestone measure at time t. Similar to the analysis above, I include ANP fixed effects and a lagged count of IED attacks in the model. Although statistical analysis does not lend support to this contamination hypothesis, I do use of an alternative measure of ANP proficiency to ensure that my findings are not a relic of the CM measures alone.

Table B.2: PMT Inventory (Lagged) and Capability Milestones

194 B.2 Accounting for Measurement Error

In order to account for measurement error in the CM data stemming from adviser errors or oversights, I employ a latent variable model to measure my dependent variable, rather than relying on the overall CM score alone. Like many variables of interest in the social sciences, proficiency in COIN is very difficult to observe and measure directly. Doing so requires the combination of multiple composite variables or “items" that are thought to be related to COIN proficiency. The PTRAT includes such items, providing the ordinal ratings for ANP units across personnel, equipment, and training in addition to the overall CM score. These items can be thought of as unit “gradings" across a number of dimensions related to the underlying latent variable of unit proficiency. The Graded Response Model (GRM) is well-suited for these types of composite measurements.1 The GRM models the relationship between the ordinal ratings in the PTRAT and the latent trait of combat effectiveness. Notably, the GRM accounts for measurement error that might result from advisers’ oversights or inconsistencies in grading their partner unit. I estimate the GRM based on the ordinal ratings for each advising period separately.2 Below I use the factor scores generated by the GRM as an alternative to the overall CM rating, and run the hybrid model, loess, and basis regressions. The basis regression restricts only the lagged dependent variable to the linear functional form, and employs the default penalization technique, adaptive LASSO. The full results of the random effects model are in Table 5. Figure 10 below depicts the results from these models, demonstrating the robustness of the central findings.

1For an introduction to the Graded Response Model (GRM), see: Samejima 1997. For applications in political science, see: Schnakenberg and Fariss 2014; Treier and Jackman 2008; Kenwick 2016. 2For a terriﬁc discussion of the beneﬁts and drawbacks of estimating a GRM separately for each time period in time series cross-sectional data, see: Kenwick 2016, particularly pp. 15-25.

195 Table B.3: Random Effects Model Results, GRM Scores

Unit Proﬁciency (GRM) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Unit Proﬁciency (GRM, Lagged) 0.487∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗ (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) PMT Inventory (Between) 2.266∗∗∗ 1.785∗∗∗ 1.944∗∗∗ 1.969∗∗∗ 2.011∗∗∗ 2.012∗∗∗ (0.628) (0.606) (0.584) (0.579) (0.576) (0.574) PMT Inventory (Between)2 −1.560∗∗ −1.286∗∗ −1.653∗∗∗ −1.677∗∗∗ −1.537∗∗∗ −1.512∗∗∗ (0.614) (0.590) (0.568) (0.567) (0.574) (0.570) PMT Inventory (Within) −0.023 −0.023 −0.023 −0.023 −0.023 −0.023 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) IED (Between) −0.045∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) IED (Within) −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Pop Density 0.030∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) ELF 0.376 0.363 0.345 (0.390) (0.375) (0.373) Terrain Ruggedness −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗ (0.0005) (0.001) FDD 0.071 (0.134) Constant −0.563∗∗∗ −0.319∗∗ −0.347∗∗ −0.393∗∗∗ −0.267∗ −0.334 (0.147) (0.154) (0.150) (0.149) (0.148) (0.206) N 1,002 1,002 1,002 1,002 1,002 1,002 Log Likelihood −668.819 −663.350 −656.833 −656.241 −653.305 −653.202 AIC 1,351.637 1,344.700 1,333.666 1,334.483 1,330.610 1,332.405 BIC 1,386.005 1,388.888 1,382.764 1,388.490 1,389.527 1,396.231 ∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01 Robust Standard Errors in parentheses

Figure B.1: Predicted Values and PMT Inventories, Graded Response Model Scores

196 B.3 Spatial Dependence

To account for spatial dependence in my analysis, I calculate spatial lags of the Capability Milestone and GRM proﬁciency measures based on a queen’s contiguity spatial weights matrix. That is, each unit’s spatial lag is calculated as the average of the temporally-lagged measures of the dependent variable of all contiguous AOs. I then calculate the within and between measures of this variable, including both in the hybrid model with the same covariates as above. For units without neighbors, the spatial lag is assigned a value of 0. Figure 11 illustrates the predicted values for this model.

Figure B.2: Predicted Values and PMT Inventories, Spatial Lag

I also compute the k =5 nearest neighbors spatial lag. In this specification the direction of the coefficients remains the same, though they are only statistically significant when using the GRM measure. The full regression tables for each measure of my dependent variable and their spatial lags are provided below.

197 Table B.4: Queen’s Contiguity Spatial Regression Results

Capability Milestone Capability Milestone (Lagged) 0.518∗∗∗ (0.044) PMT Inventory (Between) 2.047∗∗∗ (0.706) PMT Inventory (Between)2 −1.492∗∗ (0.629) PMT Inventory (Within) −0.019 (0.037) IED (Between) −0.034∗∗∗ (0.008) IED (Within) −0.002 (0.002) Pop Density 0.030∗∗∗ (0.010) ELF 0.278 (0.397) Terrain Ruggedness −0.001 (0.001) FDD 0.231∗ (0.138) Spatial Lag (Between) −0.023 (0.141) Spatial Lag (Within) −0.011 (0.039) Constant 1.924∗∗∗ (0.305) N 1,002 Log Likelihood −829.688 AIC 1,689.376 BIC 1,763.022 ∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01 Robust Standard Errors in parentheses

198 Table B.5: Queen’s Contiguity Spatial Regression Results, GRM Scores

Unit Proﬁciency (GRM) Unit Proﬁciency (GRM Lagged) 0.486∗∗∗ (0.051) PMT Inventory (Between) 1.152∗∗ (0.567) PMT Inventory (Between)2 −1.053∗ (0.545) PMT Inventory (Within) −0.024 (0.029) IED (Between) −0.028∗∗∗ (0.007) IED (Within) −0.001 (0.001) Pop Density 0.019∗∗ (0.008) ELF 0.208 (0.346) Terrain Ruggedness −0.001 (0.0005) FDD 0.137 (0.127) Spatial Lag (Between) 0.577∗∗∗ (0.134) Spatial Lag (Within) 0.012 (0.051) Constant −0.147 (0.195) N 1,002 Log Likelihood −643.056 AIC 1,316.112 BIC 1,389.758 ∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01 Robust Standard Errors in parentheses

199 Table B.6: Nearest Neighbor Spatial Regression Results

Capability Milestone Capability Milestone (Lagged) 0.519∗∗∗ (0.044) PMT Inventory (Between) 1.022 (0.729) PMT Inventory (Between)2 −0.872 (0.632) PMT Inventory (Within) −0.020 (0.036) IED (Between) −0.021∗∗ (0.008) IED (Within) −0.002 (0.002) Pop Density 0.018∗ (0.010) ELF 0.331 (0.380) Terrain Ruggedness −0.001 (0.001) FDD 0.279∗∗ (0.136) Spatial Lag, Nearest Neighbor (Between) 0.639∗∗∗ (0.187) Spatial Lag,Nearest Neighbor (Within) −0.016 (0.037) Constant 0.498 (0.429) N 1,002 Log Likelihood −821.875 AIC 1,673.749 BIC 1,747.395 ∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01 Robust Standard Errors in parentheses

200 Table B.7: Nearest Neighbor Spatial Regression Results, GRM Scores

Unit Proﬁciency (GRM) Unit Proﬁciency (GRM Lagged) 0.485∗∗∗ (0.051) PMT Inventory (Between) 1.073∗ (0.567) PMT Inventory (Between)2 −0.955∗ (0.547) PMT Inventory (Within) −0.024 (0.030) IED (Between) −0.026∗∗∗ (0.008) IED (Within) −0.001 (0.001) Pop Density 0.016∗ (0.008) ELF 0.290 (0.370) Terrain Ruggedness −0.001∗ (0.0005) FDD 0.174 (0.130) Spatial Lag, Nearest Neighbor (Between) 0.669∗∗∗ (0.149) Spatial Lag, Nearest Neighbor (Within) 0.028 (0.050) Constant −0.216 (0.190) N 1,002 Log Likelihood −642.100 AIC 1,314.199 BIC 1,387.845 ∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01 Robust Standard Errors in parentheses

201 B.4 Temporal Sequencing

A major drawback of the hybrid model’s treatment of between effects relates to temporal sequencing. As a reminder, my empirical approach computes the between effect of monitoring by averaging it over the entire time series for each unit. As a result, temporal sequencing of my independent and dependent variables becomes a challenge. Indeed, based on the above analysis we cannot rule out that units might have been performing well prior to being monitored by their advisers. As a reminder, to run these analyses I restructured my data as follows. First, rather than averaging each unit’s Capability Milestone across the entire time series, I include only the final Capability Milestone rating for each unit as the dependent variable. I average time variant variables over all of the periods preceding this final observation, and include the rest of the geographic variables as covariates. I use both OLS and an ordered logistic regression, each of which has limitations regarding ordinal dependent variables. OLS assumes that the intervals between the ordered categories are of equal length.3 But, ordered logit models make the parallel regression assumption, but a Brant test confirms that this assumption has not been violated.4 Below I depict the predicted probability for each CM level, varying only PMT inventory, holding the remaining values at their mean. The probability of a unit falling within the two highest Capability Milestone ratings peaks at moderate levels of adviser monitoring.

3 King 1998, p. 115. 4Brant 1990.

202 Figure B.3: Ordered Logit Results

The subsequent tables display the ordered logistic and OLS results in full.

203 Table B.8: Ordered Logit Model Results

Capability Milestone y >=2 2.946∗ (0.631) y>=3 0.333∗ (0.653) y>= 4 0.031∗∗∗ (0.750) PMT Inventory 69.320∗∗ (1.783) PMT Inventory2 0.029∗∗ (1.784) IED 0.879∗∗∗ (0.042) Terrain Ruggedness 0.999 (0.002) Population Density 1.110∗ (0.054) ELF 0.593 (1.094) FDD 1.865 (0.459) N 117 R2 0.238 chi2 28.793∗∗∗ (df = 7) ∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01 Odds Ratios; ANP Unit Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses

204 Table B.9: Ordinary Lease Squares Results

Capability Milestone PMT Inventory 1.597∗∗ (0.750) PMT Inventory2 −1.251∗ (0.749) IED −0.051∗∗∗ (0.014) Terrain Ruggedness −0.001 (0.001) Population Density 0.033∗∗ (0.014) ELF −0.277 (0.451) FDD 0.238 (0.190) Constant 2.080∗∗∗ (0.269) ∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01 ANP Unit Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses

205 B.5 Considering Alternative Measures

Below are the full tables from the negative binomial and zero-inﬂated negative binomial models.

Table B.10: Election Violence Negative Binomial Results

Election Day Insurgent Violence PMT Inventory −4.010∗∗∗ (1.502) PMT Inventory2 3.916∗∗∗ (1.518) ELF −0.913 (0.805) Terrain Ruggedness −0.001 (0.001) Pop Density −0.024 (0.026) FDD 1.608∗∗∗ (0.466) Spatial Lag 0.267∗∗∗ (0.049) Constant −0.309 (0.598) N = 82 ∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01 Robust Standard Errors in parentheses

206 Table B.11: Election Violence Zero-Inﬂated Negative Binomial Results

Election Day Insurgent Violence Intercept (Count) 0.726 (0.523) PMT Inventory (Count) −3.797∗∗ (1.466) PMT Inventory2 (Count) 3.639∗∗ (1.441) ELF (Count) −0.444 (0.837) Terrain Ruggedness (Count) 0.001 (0.001) Pop Density (Count) −0.073∗∗∗ (0.022) Spatial Lag (Count) 0.335∗∗∗ (0.077) Intercept (Inflate) −6.824∗∗ (3.365) PMT Inventory (Inflate) 3.671 (3.007) ELF (Inflate) −1.583 (3.984) Terrain Ruggedness (Inflate) 0.013∗ (0.007) Pop Density (Inflate) −0.113 (0.077) Spatial Lag (Inflate) −1.235 (0.958) N = 82 ∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01 Robust Standard Errors in parentheses

207 Appendix C: Medium N Analysis Interview Protocol

1.1. What was your unit? 1.2. What was your partner unit? 1.3. When did you deploy to [country], and when did you leave? 1.4. What was your rank at the time of your deployment? 1.5. Prior to your deployment, were you aware that you would be working as a military adviser? 1.6. Please describe any pre-deployment training you received that was related to your advising mission. 1.7. How were you assigned to your partner unit? 1.8. What was your AO? Did this change during your deployment? 1.9. How large was your training team? Your partner unit? What percentage of your team interacted with your partner unit? 1.10. What was the sectarian, ethnic, and tribal composition of your AO? Did this change during your deployment? 1.11. How often did you make contact with insurgents during your deployment? Did this change during your deployment? 1.12. What was your partner unit’s primary mission? Did this change over time? 1.13. Roughly speaking, what was your unit’s ethnic/sectarian/tribal composition? 1.14. Roughly speaking, what proportion of your unit was originally from your AO? 1.15. To what extent was your partner unit loyal to the central government, rather than a speciﬁc ethnic, sectarian, or tribal group? 1.16. [for Afghan National Police advisers only] Was your unit selected for the Focused District Development (FDD) program? When did it attend training? Did you attend the training with them? Were they backﬁlled by an Afghan National Civil Order Police

208 (ANCOP) unit? When? 1.17. [for those who attended FDD] When did your partner unit return from the regional training center, and when did ANCOP leave? 2. 2.1. Did you and your partner unit occupy a joint base? 2.2. Did you and your partner unit occupy a joint operations center? 2.3. Did you and your partner unit share living quarters? 2.4. Did you and your partner unit share a gym? 2.5. How often did you work out with members of your partner unit? 2.6. Did you and your partner unit share a dining facility? 2.7. How often did you go on joint patrols or other operations with your partner unit? Did you operate alongside them, or observe their patrols from a distance? 2.8. How often did you visit your partner unit’s checkpoints and other static positions? 2.9. How often did you examine and verify your partner unit’s budget, personnel roster, and property books? 2.10. How often did you solicit locals’ opinions of your partner unit’s behavior? 2.11. Are there other ways you learned about your partner unit’s performance and behavior? 2.12. If you carried out any activities in 2.8-2.11, how did your partner unit respond? 2.13. Describe the host nation counterpart with whom you interacted the most. Do you feel he was trustworthy? 2.14. How often did you eat meals with your counterpart? Did your regularly discuss non-work related matters (e.g. family) with him? 2.15. Was your counterpart promoted to his position based on his performance and merit? If not, how did he obtain his position? 2.16. From 0, meaning completely negative, to 10, meaning extremely positive, how would you rate the inﬂuence of your partner unit’s leadership on your partner unit’s battleﬁeld

209 performance? Why? 3. 3.1. Did you ever witness your partner unit selling fuel, equipment, having “ghost soldiers” on their personnel roster, taking bribes, or other forms of corruption? If so, how did you find out, and how did you respond? 3.2. Did you ever encounter a disruptive, challenging, or particularly toxic leader in your partner unit? If so, how did you find out, and how did you respond? 3.3. Did you ever witness your unit acting abusively towards the local population? If so, how did you find out, and how did you respond? 3.4. Did your partner unit ever refuse to carry out an operation (e.g. a raid or patrol)? If so, why were they refusing? How did you respond? 3.5. If you answered yes to items 3.1-3.4, how often did you report this up the chain of command? Did partner unit know you did this? If so, how did they respond? 4. 4.1. How did your partner unit receive its salaries? Were salaries ever dispersed improperly or late? Why? How did your partner unit respond? 4.2. How did your partner unit receive its equipment? Was equipment ever not distributed on time? Why? How did your partner unit respond? 4.3. Was there ever a time when you were unable to follow through on providing resources such as money, weapons, or combat enablers to your partner unit? To a subordinate unit? Why? How did they respond? 4.4. Did you ever, for any reason, directly threaten to withhold resources such as money, weapons, or other combat enablers from your partner unit? From a subordinate unit? Why/Why not? How did they respond? 4.5. Did your superior commander ever, for any reason, threaten to withhold resources such as money, weapons, or other combat enablers from your partner unit due to their behavior? Why/Why not? How did they respond?

210 4.6. Did you ever ask for your commander’s assistance to help address corruption, abusive/criminal behavior, or other adverse behavior in your partner unit? What did your commander do in response, if anything? How did your partner unit respond? 4.7. Reflecting on your deployment, is there any action you wish you had taken to improve your partner unit’s proficiency in population-centric counterinsurgency? 5. 5.1. From 0, meaning completely disagree, to 10, meaning completely agree, rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements. 5.1.1. At the beginning of my deployment: 5.1.1.1. My partner unit had basic familiarity with their weapons. 5.1.1.2. My partner unit could maintain its equipment. 5.1.1.3. My partner unit could plan operations and employ OPSEC. 5.1.1.4. My partner unit was capable of conducting basic maneuvers (i.e. patrols, linear ambushes, static defenses) in small units within their AO. 5.1.1.5. My partner unit was able to coordinate operations with subordinate units. 5.1.1.6. My partner unit was able to coordinate operations with adjacent units. 5.1.1.7. My partner unit was able to call in QRF/MEDEVACs. 5.1.1.8. My partner unit collected actionable intelligence (i.e. by carrying out a dismounted patrol) 5.1.1.9. My partner unit could integrate intelligence into their operations 5.1.1.10. During its operations, my partner unit expressed no favoritism or ill-will towards any specific tribal, ethnic, or sectarian group within the population 5.1.1.11. During its operations, my partner unit interacted regularly with the local population in a way that enhanced the legitimacy of the local government. 5.1.1.12. My partner unit was able to execute population-centric counterinsurgency according to field manual 3-24 5.1.2. By the end of my deployment:

211 5.1.2.1. My partner unit had basic familiarity with their weapons. 5.1.2.2. My partner unit could maintain its equipment. 5.1.2.3. My partner unit could plan operations and employ OPSEC. 5.1.2.4. My partner unit was capable of conducting basic maneuvers (i.e. patrols, linear ambushes, static defenses) in small units within their AO. 5.1.2.5. My partner unit was able to coordinate operations with subordinate units. 5.1.2.6. My partner unit was able to coordinate operations with adjacent units. 5.1.2.7. My partner unit was able to call in QRF/MEDEVACs. 5.1.2.8. My partner unit collected actionable intelligence (i.e. by carrying out a dismounted patrol) 5.1.2.9. My partner unit could integrate intelligence into their operations 5.1.2.10. During its operations, my partner unit expressed no favoritism or ill-will towards any speciﬁc tribal, ethnic, or sectarian group within the population 5.1.2.11. During its operations, my partner unit interacted regularly with the local population in a way that enhanced the legitimacy of the local government. 5.1.2.12. My partner unit was able to execute population-centric counterinsurgency according to ﬁeld manual 3-24 6. 6.1. Is there anything else you feel I should know about your experiences? 6.2. Would you be willing to conduct a follow-up interview? 6.3. Would you like a copy of the manuscript that results from this research, whether for comment or simply for your information? If so, please indicate the email address or mailing address you would like me to use.

212