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Security Force Assistance, Military Advising, and Recipient Unit Military Effectiveness A Delicate Balance: Security Force Assistance, Military Advising, and Recipient Unit Military Effectiveness by Bryce Loidolt B.A. in Middle East Studies, 2008, Middlebury College M.A. in Political Science, 2013, The University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill A Dissertation submitted to The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy May 19, 2019 Dissertation directed by Alexander Downes Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University cer- tifies that Bryce Loidolt has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy as of March 27, 2019. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation. A Delicate Balance: Security Force Assistance, Military Advising, and Recipient Unit Military Effectiveness Bryce Loidolt Dissertation Research Committee: Alexander Downes, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Dissertation Director Stephen Biddle, Professor of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, Committee Member Marc Lynch, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Committee Member ii c Copyright 2019 by Bryce Loidolt All rights reserved iii Acknowledgments Throughout graduate school I have been blessed with the support and encouragement of numerous family members, friends, colleagues, and mentors. My time at the RAND Corporation exposed me to the excitement of policy research and motivated me to pursue a doctorate. My first deployment as a RAND analyst to Afghanistan would be formative in my development as a scholar, and I am immensely grateful to Todd Helmus for taking the chance and trusting a young researcher to embed with military units in some of the country’s most remote districts. RAND colleagues Daniel Egel, Linda Robinson, Seth Jones, and Rebecca Zimmerman continued to encourage me as I progressed in my studies. Kim Cragin has been a mentor and friend throughout; from my first days as her Research Assistant to my job search as a doctoral candidate and now as a colleague at the National Defense University (NDU). Although my research interests and career goals led our paths to diverge, the Political Science Department at the University of North Carolina (UNC) - Chapel Hill provided much of the training I would need to execute this project successfully. Professors Navin Bapat, Charlie Kurzman, Stephen Gent, Mark Crescenzi, and Patricia Sullivan were all incredibly supportive during my time at UNC. Jeff Harden and Justin Gross’s patience and dedication to methods instruction helped convince a policy-focused, qualitative die-hard to give statistics a chance. Tom Carsey’s methods instruction was also invaluable, and I know he is deeply missed. I was thrilled to have the opportunity to continue and complete my studies at George Washington University. Many made my transfer as seamless as possible. As Director of Graduate Studies, Professor Kimberly Morgan was willing to take a chance on a transfer student. Professors Brandon Bartels and Eric Grynaviski tirelessly worked with me to manage my transition and advancement through candidacy. Colleen Grant and Taylor Poltzer patiently helped me navigate my bureaucratic and administrative requirements. The Institute for Security and Conflict Studies (ISCS) at George Washington’s Elliot iv School of International Affairs was my intellectual and physical home for most of this study. I cannot imagine a more supportive and collegial community of professors and graduate students pursuing the disciplined study of warfare. Feedback from Professors Charlie Glaser, Elizabeth Saunders, and Caitlin Talmadge through the various stages of this project have improved it tremendously. GW graduate students Daniel Jacobs, Michael Joseph, Ryan Baker, Jackie Schneider, Alex Kirss, Vanes Ibric, and Brian Radzinski all provided insightful comments on this project, as did ISCS’s impressive array of visiting fellows, to include Meredith Blank, John-Michael Arnold, Tyler Jost, Jennifer Spindel, and Alec Worsnop. I am happy to consider them colleagues and friends. Many assisted me as I began carrying out my research. The Freedom of Information Act office at United States Central Command and the Government Accountability Office diligently worked to track down and appropriately release information that made this study possible. Finding interviewees was no simple task and required the support of new and old friends and colleagues, some dating back to High School. I cannot thank them and my interviewees enough. Dr. Fred Allison at the United States Marine Corps University’s History Division went above and beyond the call of duty to help me locate and access archival information on Marine Police Mentor Teams. A number of organizations provided generous financial support and space for this study. The Rumsfeld Foundation supported me through a fellowship for two of my years at GW. More than financial assistance, the foundation has introduced me to a vibrant network of colleagues from other institutions who are dedicated to public service. I am forever thankful to Secretary Rumsfeld and his wife Joyce for their generosity, and to Professor Henry Nau for twice nominating me for this opportunity. GW’s Political Science Department and Institute for Security and Conflict Studies also provided crucial financial support. Critically, the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at NDU, where I now call home, granted me the time and space to complete this dissertation. Bringing this project across the finish line would indeed have been far more challenging without the encouragement of INSS v leadership and other NDU colleagues, to include Laura Junor, Joe Collins, Denise Natali, and Tom Lynch. I came to GW hoping to conduct research that balanced rigor with policy relevance. My dissertation committee’s guidance over the years has made it clear to me that the two need not be in tension. Professor Stephen Biddle has been a mentor to me since I arrived at GW. Through countless meetings, drafts, redrafts, emails, and phone conversations, Professor Biddle demonstrated remarkable patience and dedication in his role as my adviser. His direction throughout this process has shaped my intellectual development in ways that will endure for many years to come. Professor Marc Lynch’s breadth of knowledge has kept this project situated in broader questions and puzzles relevant to the discipline and Professor Alex Downes provided me with an important sounding board during the project’s incipient stages and remained incredibly supportive of this study as it progressed. Prior to ever agreeing to serve as an external reader, Professor Mike Miller helped to hone the project’s methodological approach. I am thrilled to have Professor Mara Karlin, whose work continues to inspire my own, serving as an external reader as well. My family has perhaps been most essential to this project’s completion. My mother, Christine, has been a source of inspiration and an example of perseverance. Beginning with their accomplishments on the football field and now in their professional and family lives, my older brothers, Travis (who will remain the only Dr. Loidolt capable of performing spinal surgery) and Shane, have continued to serve as role models. Most important has been the support and encouragement I received from my kind and brilliant spouse, Kristin. Kristin endured courtship punctuated with comprehensive exams and prospectus writing, wedding planning with her fiance in an active warzone, and the first year of marriage to a husband elbow deep in data and research interviews. Kristin was a reassuring presence when the project left me frustrated, a source of motivation when I faced obstacles that I thought would be insurmountable, and a life companion before I wrote a word of this dissertation. This dissertation is dedicated to her. vi Disclaimer The views expressed here are my own and are not an official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. Government. vii Abstract A Delicate Balance: Security Force Assistance, Military Advising, and Recipient Unit Military Effectiveness The provision of training, advice, and equipment to assist foreign security forces in combat has long been a prevalent foreign policy instrument for the United States, often with disappointing results. Yet, amidst these frustrating national-level outcomes, there has been considerable subnational variation in the combat performance of recipient security force units, even in cases where the United States is thought to have largely failed to build local partner capacity. In this study I argue that the behavior of these units’ military advisers is a critical variable that contributes to this variance. I first offer an in-depth examination of the microfoundations of security sector corruption. Under these circumstances, unfortunately common in cases of SFA provision, recipient units enjoy the benefits of foreign largess, but also have strong inclinations to avoid cooperating with their advisers and improving in their proficiency. Advisers can motivate the recipient unit to improve by threatening to withhold resources from them. But, these threats generate two countervailing effects. On the one hand, threats erode partner unit apathy, disciplining the recipient unit’s behavior and leading to an increase in proficiency. On the other hand,
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