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The Following Question Was Submitted to Ground Force Units: Their Comments Are Summarized in These Replies: TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

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The Following Question Was Submitted to Ground Force Units: Their Comments Are Summarized in These Replies: TWELFTH ARMY GROUP Part Il-C Planning!; The following question was submitted to 26TH INF. DIV.: "This mission (counter-flak) ground force units: should always be fired in coordination with close med­ To what extent do you consider it practicable to ium bomber missions. This usually takes place before divert artillery to counter-flakfire for the purpose of assur­ troops have left their line of departure and artillery ing more effective air bombing in conjunction with can then best be spared by the Infantry battalions. assault operations? Even as the assault progresses, counter-flak fire can Their comments are summarized in these be delivered in coordination with fighter-bomber replies: attacks by at least one Divisional artillery battalion. If battalions are displacing, if the TAI-O does not TWELFTH ARMY GROUP: "It is considered have telephone or voice radio communication with practicable, and advisable, to divert artillery to coun­ Division Artillery FDC and if the target is on a flank ter-flak fire to the limit of ammunition supply, and, and the guns cannot lay on the flak concentrations in the opinion of the Corps commander, to the extent there without shifting trails, counter-flak missions which it can be spared from support of the advancing may be difficult to work out without commiting ar­ troops. Artillery, a supporting arm, in such a role is tillery urgently needed for close Infantry support. performing a dual function of assisting the air forces, Corps Artillery should then be called for by the and reducing opposition to the ground by destroying squadron leader over R/T." dual purpose weapons." 87TH INF. DIV.: "From the aspect of obtaining THIRD ARMY: "We have had sufficient artillery accurate bombing by fighter-bombers, some counter- and cooperation from artillery commanders to en­ flak fire by Division Artillery is highly desirable, but able us to fire counter-flak fire on all known enemy this Division has often encountered the factor which flak and any unknown positions picked up during the would mean the shifting of trails by a battery of Ar­ mission. The period during which the aircraft are in tillery if heavy counter-flak fire was desired. As this the area is usually of short duration. Ammunition disrupts the Artillery fire plan in support of the ground supply has at times been somewhat short particularly troops, from the ground forces aspect, this would when a very large flight of bombers needed protec­ seriously impede the progress of the troops being tion over a longer period." supported and have a tendency to partly nullify the NINTH ARMY: "Diversion of artillery for coun­ effects of bombing and strafing in support of those ter-flak" is not an altogether correct term because same troops." during the advance from the Roer to the Rhine, it was frequently the case that fire on ground forces was 9TH INF. DIV.: "It is practical to divert division largely from enemy anti-aircraft artillery. When this artillery 100% to counter-flak missions during air condition prevails the normal counter-battery fires attacks. Fifteen minutes notice should be given to of the artillery can, to a certain extent, be coordinated alert artillery. It must be understood that counter- so as to fire the counter-flak — counter-battery fires battery missions only neutralize the enemy batteries; simultaneously, and when desired by the cooperating they do not often destroy them." aircraft." 10TH ARMD. DIV.: "In the usual tactical em­ V CORPS ARTILLERY: "The use of artillery for ployment of an Armored Division on a wide front counter-flak fire is a very important mission. It is not employing many Task Forces and small Teams it is a diversion. Consistent with artillery ammunition considered impractical to divert Artillery to counter- allowances, fire possibilities and the number and loca­ flak fire. Only when the Armored Division is employed tions of the enemy flak installations, it is practicable in a narrow divisional front is it practical to divert to use all artillery within a sector for counter-flak Artillery to counter-flak fire." fire for a limited period of time. Certain artillery units 3RD INF. DIV.: "It is felt when enemy AA is pre­ can readily be designated to maintain sustained neu­ sent in a target area to any degree of organization, tralization, should that be necessary." that artillery should fire counter-flak fire if any of the XVIII A/B CORPS: "It is practicable to divert AA positions are known. It is believed this assures artillery to counter-flak fire for the purpose of assur­ much more effective bombing and is a definite aid ing more effective air bombing in conjunction with to morale of the pilots and in gaining their coopera­ assault operations under certain circumstances. Ar­ tion." tillery fire, to be effective must: {a) Have a specific target. FIRST FRENCH ARMY: "It is difficult to give the number of artillery pieces which can have their (b) Be fired simultaneously with arrival of air­ usual missions eliminated in preference to counter- craft over area to be fired upon. battery against enemy flak. The question depends upon (c) Be advised of any change in the time over the result which is desired within a minimum period target in order for (b) above to be possible. of time. (100 tons of bombs can be dropped in one (d) Not fire blindly into an area designated as minute by a formation of 50 Marauders, whereas to the line of flight of the aircraft as this is a waste of obtain similar material results, concentration of fire artillery ammunition;" i by 100 155 mm batteries would be required.) In 358 Part Il-C Communications short, if decisive results are expected from an aerial TACs and Bombardment Division Headquarters, attack, it must be effective and must therefore not be while primary communications circuits of 12th Army unduly hampered by enemy flak. In this case, the Group extended forward to the subordinate corps. amount of means to be loaned, and for a short time Therefore, as the headquarters moved forward, the only, to counter-battery against the enemy flak can communication lines of the Air Force Headquarters be considerable. On a lesser scale, counter-battery became longer, while those of the Army Group were fire can be employed to facilitate close support fighter- being shortened. bomber attacks in a heavily defended area. In several instances, First French Army Flak batteries were suc­ After the temporary stabilization of the front cessfully used for counter-battery in coordination in the Siegfried Line, Ninth Air Force Headquarters with medium bomber attacks on the Chalampe (Adv) was able to maintain close contact with 12th Bridge." Army Group (TAC) Headquarters through the ex­ tensive use of VHF/FM radio equipment, which was XV CORPS: "Whenever the location of hostile available at that time in greater quantities than pre­ flak positions are in the vicinity of the target to be viously. Radio circuits were supplemented by wire attacked by fighter-bombers, or on the path to be facilities as rapidly as the latter could be constructed. followed by medium supporting the Corps, Corps When it became necessary for advanced headquarters artillery normally fires counter-battery missions just to operate from a new site on fewer wire circuits prior to arrival of the aircraft, and during the attack. than were required to meet the minimum opera­ For example: when fighter-bombers were attacking tional requirements, a speech and teleprinter switch Bitche and Camp de Bitche, friendly artillery was was established at the previous headquarters site and successful in neutralizing hostile AA positions. When was maintained in operation until static wire circuit medium bombers were attacking targets in the St. requirements could be extended forward to the new Wendel and St. Ingbert area, counter-battery on AAA site. positions in and around Saarbrucken completely si­ lenced the hostile AAA positions. On several oc­ Substantially the same situation existed in the casions, medium bombers reported receiving no flak, case of the Tactical Air Commands which, when although many hostile AAA guns were located in that moved forward in keeping with their associated Army Headquarters, were extending the line of com­ area. munications to the rearward airfields. In siting the 2. COMMUNICATIONS AND CONTROL CHANNELS. headquarters, consideration was necessarily given to the operating requirements of the large amount of a. COMMUNICATIONS. VHF and FM equipment located at command head­ (1) General Conditions: Air Force Headquarters quarters. Since FM equipment operates in the VHF was divided normally during the operational phases range, it is necessary that the FM site be sufficiently into two echelons. Advanced headquarters comprised high to permit line of sight transmission to the next a small operational group of personnel required to station. It is necessary, therefore, that a suitable hill conduct the combat operations and main headquar­ or other high ground be located within five miles of ters comprised the remainder of the personnel and the headquarters. In addition, the headquarters VHF ancillary units. Since the function of main head­ and FM sites should be at least four miles from any quarters was primarily administrative, its communi­ other large concentration of VHF or FM equipment, cations problems are not pertinent to this report. and at least ten miles from any radar installation, due to interference. The headquarters of the Tactical Air Commands and the 9th Bombardment Division were also divided (2) Axis of Communication: Prior to D-Day, an into an advanced and main echelon during periods of agreement was reached by the Chief Signal Officer, rapid forward movement. During static periods these 12th Army Group, and the Director of Communica­ headquarters were consolidated, if practicable, for tions, Ninth Air Force, to establish a Joint Wire improved efficiency.
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