Canadian Military History Volume 8 Issue 1 Article 2 1999 “The Development of an Unbeatable Combination”: US Close Air Support in Normandy Michael Bechthold Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Recommended Citation Bechthold, Michael "“The Development of an Unbeatable Combination”: US Close Air Support in Normandy." Canadian Military History 8, 1 (1999) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Bechthold: US Close Air Support in Normandy B. Michael Bechthold n the climactic scene of the highly-acclaimed system which evolved proved to be highly ISaving Private Ryan, the beleaguered Ranger effective, flexible and able to adapt quickly to a and Airborne forces of Captain John Miller (Tom variety of situations. Hanks) are about to be overrun. Against overwhelming odds they have fought to save a crucial stone bridge over the Merderet River. It The First Test: North Africa is a losing battle. With defeat imminent, the Americans retreat across the bridge and prepare he Americans started the war with a basic to blow it. However, before that can happen, Tgrasp of the tenets of CAS. The air and Captain Miller is shot and is unable to detonate ground forces talked of close cooperation, but in the explosives. As a German tank rumbles across reality they remained far apart in their visions of the bridge it appears all is lost. Then, in typical tactical air support. The first serious American Hollywood tradition, the cavalry arrives - two attempt at producing a modern, workable tactical P-51 Mustangs. With uncanny timeliness and air doctrine came in April 1942 with the pinpoint accuracy they knock out the German publication of War Department Basic Field tank on their first pass without destroying either Manual 31-35, "Aviation in Support of the the bridge or the American infantry who are mere Ground Forces." This manual provided sound yards away. principles to guide future air-ground operations. Unfortunately, FM 31-35 was to prove Though this may be a fitting end to a very unsuccessful when given its baptism of fire in good movie, it is not representative of the North Africa in late 1942. capabilities of tactical air power, especially early in the Normandy campaign. Leaving aside the Operation "Torch," the Allied invasion of question of accuracy,1 the system of air support North Africa in November 1942, brought the in place at the outset of the invasion was much problems of conducting effective air support too cumbersome to allow an intervention of this operations to light. Many of the notions, tactics nature. The Americans went into Normandy with and equipment the Americans had brought to a system of Close Air Support (CAS) that was North Africa were found to be unworkable, largely derived from the British experience in outclassed or obsolete. Light bombers, for North Africa. It was based on the belief that instance, expected to perform the majority of centralized control of air assets was the most close support work, were found to be terribly effective method of employment. However, vulnerable to German air and ground defences. following D-Day, the system in place was far too An attempt to fill this unexpected gap with the unwieldy to provide effect support. Over the next use of fighters met with another difficulty. Most three months, most of the existing doctrine was fighter pilots were not trained in ground strafing effectively discarded. An air support organization and their aircraft were not fitted with bomb emerged that was the complete antithesis to that racks.2 with which the Americans had started. The © Canadian Military History, Volume 7, Number 4, Autumn 1998, pp.7-20. 7 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1999 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 8 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 2 Operations during November and December anointed as the creators of a revolutionary new served to show that a large gap existed between system of air-ground cooperation. This was not American air doctrine and its practical quite accurate. Their ideas were not new, but they employment. FM 31-35 seems to have been had been the first on the Allied side to implement virtually discarded once actual operations began. the concepts successfully. The American airmen Army Ground Force commanders moved quickly became disciples of the British doctrine, not to assert their dominance over the Air Forces and because of its originality, but because they could received very little opposition. The ad hoc system use its success to convince the Ground Forces of which developed by the end of 1942 proved to the utility of the new doctrine, something they be quite ineffective. But, there was hope on the had hitherto been unable to achieve. horizon. The British system of CAS that evolved in the Middle East between General B.L. North Africa forced the Americans to Montgomery, commander of 8th Army, and Air overhaul their doctrine for air support. The Vice Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, commander result, published in July 1943, was War of the Western Desert Air Force, had proven Department Field Manual 100-20, "Command enormously successful. With no other and Employment of Air Power."5 The main ideas alternatives, the Americans turned to the British contained in FM 100-20 are explicitly stated in for help. capital letters at the beginning of the manual: In early 1943, Coningham was promoted to LAND POWER AND AIR POWER ARE CO­ command the Northwest African Tactical Air EQUAL AND INTERDEPENDENT FORCES; Forces (NATAF) and he made his presence felt NEITHER IS AN AUXILIARY OF THE OTHER... immediately. The NATAF was designed to provide THE INHERENT FLEXIBILITY OF AIR POWER IS ITS GREATEST ASSET. THIS FLEXIBILITY air support to each of the three armies operating MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO EMPLOY THE in Africa. No longer were his units to be used in WHOLE WEIGHT OF THE AVAILABLE AIR defensive missions. The air umbrella was POWER AGAINST SELECTED AREAS IN discontinued and the control of aircraft was TURN; SUCH CONCENTRATED USE OF THE removed from First Army and II Corps. AIR STRIKING FORCE IS A BATTLE WINNING Henceforth, all requests for air support had to FACTOR OF THE FIRST IMPORTANCE. CONTROL OF AVAILABLE AIR POWER MUST be made through Coningham. Fighters and BE CENTRALIZED AND COMMAND MUST BE fighter-bombers began flying offensive missions EXERCISED THROUGH THE AIR FORCE aimed at destroying the Luftwaffe and gaining air COMMANDER IF THIS INHERENT superiority. As well, the emphasis on ground FLEXIBILITY AND ABILITY TO DELIVER A targets shifted. Tanks were declared to be KNOCKOUT BLOW ARE TO BE FULLY unprofitable targets due to the difficulty, and EXPLOITED. THEREFORE, THE COMMAND OF AIR AND GROUND FORCES IN A THEATER expense, of attempts to destroy them. Instead, OF OPERATIONS WILL BE VESTED IN THE enemy troop concentrations and motor SUPERIOR COMMANDERS CHARGED WITH transport, targets well within the capabilities of THE ACTUAL CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS IN the airmen, became the preferred targets.3 THE THEATER, WHO WILL EXERCISE Though the changes took time to make an impact, COMMAND OF AIR FORCES THROUGH THE the NATAF was to become a very effective force AIR FORCE COMMAND AND COMMAND OF 4 GROUND FORCES THROUGH THE GROUND under Coningham's direction. FORCE COMMANDER. THE SUPERIOR COMMANDER WILL NOT ATTACH ARMY AIR Coningham and his NATAF were to have a FORCES TO UNITS OF THE GROUND FORCES significant effect on the development of American UNDER HIS COMMAND EXCEPT WHEN SUCH GROUND FORCES ARE OPERATING tactical air doctrine. Though it was true that INDEPENDENTLY OR ARE ISOLATED BY American airmen had developed a sound doctrine DISTANCE OR LACK OF COMMUNICATIONS.6 of their own, they had been unable to convince the Army Ground Forces of the applicability of The statements contained in FM 100-20 were a their ideas. As a result, the Air Force found itself deliberate attempt to avoid the pitfalls being utilized by Ground Force commanders in experienced in North Africa. The co-equal status a manner that did not take full advantage of the of the Army and the Air Force, the principle of air weapon. This was where the British influence centralized control and the flexibility of tactical was critical. Coningham and Montgomery were air power are dominant themes in this manual. 8 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol8/iss1/2 2 Bechthold: US Close Air Support in Normandy FM 100-20 also introduced the concept of the consultation or approval sought from General prioritization of the missions of the tactical air McNair and the Army Ground Forces. This force. The first phase of operations was to gain preemptive move, considered by some to be a air superiority. Without this pre-condition, the "Declaration of Independence," tended to support operational advantage passed to the enemy. The the view that the Air Force had only its best second priority was interdiction or the prevention interests in mind and FM 100-20 was merely an of hostile troops and supplies from moving attempt to gain freedom of action from the Army. within, or to, the battle area. Once these first two In spite of this opposition, the new doctrine missions had been accomplished, attention could quickly became part of the curriculum at Army focus on third phase operations - the support of ground schools.8 ground forces in the immediate battle area. The manual stated, "in the zone of contact, missions FM 100-20 provided the structure for the air against hostile units are most difficult to control, support system that the Americans went with into are most expensive and are, in general, least Normandy.