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Home , Anatoly Lukyanov, Eduard Shevardnadze, Konstantin Chernenko, Nikolai Ryzhkov

Anatoly Chernyaev. My Six Years with Gorbachev. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000. xxiv + 437 pp. $32.50, cloth, ISBN 978-0-271-02029-7.

Reviewed by Kevin O'Connor

Published on H- (May, 2001)

The Apprentice's Sorcerer: A Chernyaev presents readers with a perceptive Memoir analysis of the evolution of Gorbachev's political Historians who study the 's fnal thought between 1986 and 1991 as well as a nu‐ years are blessed with an unparalleled wealth of anced portrayal of Gorbachev's enigmatic and of‐ memoirs written by the top leaders of the pere‐ ten frustrating personality. stroika era. Gorbachev's ideological comrades in Born in 1921, Chernyaev is a decade older arms, including former Foreign Minister Eduard than Gorbachev, old enough to have served in the Shevardnadze and ideologist Vadim Medvedev, Soviet military during World War II. Being sta‐ have naturally tended to take a mostly favorable tioned in the Baltic countries at that time, as view of the CPSU's last general secretary and his Robert Service writes in the foreword, gave reform program.[1] Other memoirists, such as for‐ Chernyaev a certain appreciation for the USSR's mer KGB chief and coup plotter Vladimir Kri‐ nationalities issues that was lacking Committee's uchkov, (who was in charge of International Department, in February 1986 the the economy), Valerii Vorotnikov (who headed the nearly sixty-fve year old Chernyaev was called RSFSR government), and conservative rival Yegor upon to join Gorbachev's team as a senior foreign Ligachev, are highly critical of perestroika--espe‐ policy aide. cially of the direction that reform took after 1988-- Much of this book consists of Chernyaev's and in most cases share a personal antipathy to‐ journal entries, linked together by remarks and ward Gorbachev and his main ideological advisor, refections added later for context and narrative Aleksandr Yakovlev.[2] In many ways Chernayev's continuity. While this technique allows Chernyaev book, frst published in Russia in 1993, is among to portray himself, with some justifcation, as a the most interesting and insightful of all the mem‐ prescient observer of the unfolding realities of the oirs published by members of Gorbachev's circle. (such as when he writes that in 1986 he ad‐ While sometimes critical of his former boss, vised Gorbachev to begin thinking about the mat‐ H-Net Reviews ter of German unifcation), it also conveys a very ple, in meetings with socialists like 's Fidel genuine sense of the uncertainty of the times. The Castro, Gorbachev proclaimed that "our" analysis frst chapter describes the anticipation of "waiting must be based on "the interests of the working for Gorbachev's coming" (p. 5) in the early part of class and class struggle." He also continued to the decade--and the profound disappointment ex‐ speak to his colleagues about the necessity of perienced by more liberal-minded Communists maintaining control in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozam‐ when the decrepit was se‐ bique and other countries that were taking the lected to succeed Iurii Andropov as general secre‐ "anti-imperialist path" (p. 52). Yet at the same time tary after the latter's death in February 1984. Ac‐ Gorbachev was frustrated that the West wasn't cording to Chernyaev, Gorbachev's selection for taking his overtures seriously, mistaking his pro‐ the post was just a matter of time. posals as mere propaganda. Despite his bold ini‐ As Chernyaev recalls, the two had frst met in tiatives at Reykjavik in October 1986, when Gor‐ 1972, and even then Gorbachev stood out "for his bachev proposed to cut strategic arms in half singular passion, his desire to change, improve across the board, he was unable to reach an and organize" (p. 3). Chernyaev's Gorbachev is a agreement with U.S. President . man who was well aware of the problems of the Nevertheless the two came to trust each other Soviet system even before taking power. Although more, paving the way for future agreements. Such the Soviet leader saw that his country was on the agreements made it possible to move forward on edge of collapse, his initial response upon coming the domestic front of perestroika. to power was entirely traditional: he issued repri‐ Meanwhile, as perestroika foundered at mands and called for greater discipline. A wiser home during his frst two years at the helm, Gor‐ Chernyaev refects on the early days of perestroi‐ bachev found himself rethinking the very concept ka: "Back then, of course, I was still thinking in of . Calls for "acceleration" and increased the parameters of the old system. And so was Gor‐ discipline in the workplace proved inefective. bachev" (p. 31). Indeed, one of the most fascinat‐ The Stalinist system itself, built in the 1930s, Gor‐ ing aspects of this memoir is Chernyaev's descrip‐ bachev concluded in 1987, was the problem. On tion of how that thinking began to change. After this matter, Gorbachev revealed himself only two years of tinkering, Gorbachev would begin, as gradually--most openly to trusted advisors like an American corporate executive might put it to‐ Yakovlev and Chernyaev, and more diplomatically day, to "think outside the box." to other Politburo members. The key to rooting Where Chernyaev shows his greatest skill as a out the Stalin/Brezhnev model of socialism was chronicler of perestroika is his consistent linking the ("openness") policy, with one of its of domestic and foreign policy goals. A vital aim main goals being to rehabilitate the "Bukharin al‐ of perestroika was to ease the military burden on ternative," which was obliterated when Stalin as‐ the Soviet Union's sputtering economy; to achieve sumed supreme power in the USSR. this goal it was necessary to prevent the arms According to Chernyaev, Gorbachev read race from entering a new phase of escalation. Yet widely, was familiar with samizdat and tamizdat for the frst year and a half of Gorbachev's rule, critical of the Stalinist system, and in particular during which he struggled to fnd the CPSU's place was heavily infuenced by Stephen Cohen's book in the USSR and in the world, the general secre‐ on Nikolai Bukharin.[3] By 1987-88, the Soviet tary's foreign policy ideas were contradictory. The leader spoke of returning to the "true" Lenin (i.e., old policy of "global confrontation," Chernyaev the Lenin of NEP), whom he constantly "consult‐ writes, coexisted with "new thinking." For exam‐ ed" in seeking answers to contemporary prob‐

2 H-Net Reviews lems. Even though Gorbachev could never bring rior. But there's less and less of his old spirit left. himself to let go of Lenin, eventually, partly under He's repeating himself, and not only in his words the infuence of Aleksandr Solzhenytsin's Lenin in and style. He's repeating himself as a politician, Zurich, he was able to see the frst Bolshevik as an going around in circles. He's almost alone, but he ordinary person capable of making mistakes (p. still can't let go of the past: Ryzhkov, [Stepan] 213). Sitaryan, Maslyukov, Boldin" (p. 310).[5] In the domestic sphere, Gorbachev's biggest Chernyaev's memoir is a highly readable ac‐ problem was the resistance of the Party apparat count of the period, and this is partly because it is and conservative intellectuals to his increasingly very personal. Chernyaev describes himself as a radical reforms. While the general secretary loyal Party member devoted to liberalizing the made overtures to the reform-minded intellectu‐ system from within, a man who therefore had a als for their support, Chernyaev remarks that Gor‐ huge stake in the success of perestroika. He prais‐ bachev was really "more concerned with keeping es Gorbachev for having the courage to take on the leaders of the traditional intelligentsia close such a monumental task in the face of tremen‐ by and making sure that none of them were of‐ dous resistance--how much easier it would have fended" (p. 211). In his desire to bring both camps been for him to rule as a general secretary in the together, he kept one foot squarely planted in Brezhnev mold! each and thereby succeeded in alienating both the However, despite his reverence for Gor‐ liberal intellectuals--many of whom eventually bachev as a politician, Chernyaev pulls no punch‐ defected to Yeltsin--and their conservative coun‐ es in his portrayal of Gorbachev as a man. While terparts. Meanwhile, Chernyaev and Yakovlev Gorbachev could be brilliant, he was also conde‐ consistently urged Gorbachev to purge those ap‐ scending, insensitive, aloof, and dismissive. paratchiks who did not support perestroika. In‐ Chernyaev describes the pain felt by Aleksandr stead of making a frm alliance with the demo‐ Yakovlev when his boss failed to protect him from cratic-minded reformers, Gorbachev felt betrayed the attacks of the Ligachevites. Chernyaev himself when they criticized him--yet, to the consterna‐ complains that over time Gorbachev grew in‐ tion of his liberal advisers, he abided the attacks creasingly distant and never took the least bit of of Soviet hardliners. personal interest in him despite his dogged loyal‐ Chernyaev writes that by the summer of 1990, ty. By January 1991, when Gorbachev had shut out "conditions were ripe for a break with the Party, everyone but the likes of KGB chief Kryuchkov with socialist ideology, and with the old way of and longtime friend (both par‐ governance." It was time, in other words, "to ad‐ ticipants in the August coup), and took the blame mit that perestroika is a revolution that means for the shootings in Vilnius, Chernyaev was transformation of the existing order." But, he sad‐ tempted to resign. In his letter to that efect (never ly admits, "this didn't happen" (p. 293). The result submitted), Chernyaev wrote: was that Gorbachev remained beholden to a Cen‐ "The point is that I faithfully and honestly tral Committee that was full of Ligachev's and served 'that' Gorbachev, the great innovator and Polozkov's people, and therefore the Soviet leader father of perestroika. But now I don't recognize or was rendered powerless before the Party.[4] A understand him...Mikhail Sergeyevich! Since I've journal entry for late November 1990, when Gor‐ been with you, I never thought that I would ever bachev appeared to be moving closer to the hard‐ again be tortured by such burning shame for the liners, refects this conundrum: "It's so sad. It policies of the Soviet leadership as I was under hurts to see Gorbachev 'swaggering,' acting supe‐

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Brezhnev and Chernenko. Alas! That's what it has "deep personal trust" (p. 239) that allowed Ger‐ come to..." (p. 323) [ellipsis included] man unifcation to proceed with Soviet acquies‐ Anyone interested in Gorbachev's nationali‐ cence despite the occasional misunderstandings. ties policy, especially in regard to the Baltics, To his credit, Gorbachev understood the in‐ would be well advised to read this book. evitability of this process, and was willing to let go Chernyaev believes that Gorbachev's Marxism- of the GDR despite the ideological ramifcations clouded his understanding of the power for the socialist world. On the other hand, of . In Gorbachev's thinking, the Baltic Chernyaev subtly suggests that Gorbachev was countries would not leave if they fully appreciat‐ helpless on the matters of Germany and Eastern ed the economic benefts they derived from being Europe, as any attempt to use force to stop events part of the USSR. Economic bonds were greater would have meant the end of perestroika (p. 240). than national ones. Still, one wonders why didn't Nevertheless, perestroika came to an end in Gorbachev go further in meeting the nationalities August 1991, when a group of high-ranking Soviet halfway earlier, say, in 1989? Chernyaev writes: ofcials attempted to depose Gorbachev. "[W]hat restrained him was not the anticipated Chernyaev, who was vacationing with Gorbachev reaction from the Central Committee and the Par‐ at Foros at the time, seeks to lay to rest the persist‐ ty leadership as a whole; at that time he was sure ing rumors that Gorbachev was party to the con‐ he could handle them. He was more concerned spiracy (pp. 400-423). Although the coup was de‐ about the reaction of the Russian people. Several feated, Gorbachev's days as Soviet leader were times he told me that the wouldn't for‐ numbered. The Soviet Union was coming unrav‐ give him for 'the collapse of the empire,' and that eled. As Chernyaev concludes, Gorbachev "didn't 'great-power forces are rumbling louder and loud‐ want to believe that people in their right minds er'" (p. 189). For Gorbachev, presiding over the would act against what seemed to be the obvious disintegration of the empire was as out of the advantages of a common life. What apparently let question as using force to maintain it, hence the him down was his Marxist-Leninist training in ra‐ protracted negotiations for a new Union treaty in tionalistic thought" (p. 394). If one wants to under‐ the spring of 1991. But for several Soviet re‐ stand the thought and actions of the last Soviet publics, notably the Baltics and , it was too leader, one could hardly do better than this book. late for such a compromise. Notes: As the Soviet Union experienced its greatest [1]. , The Future Be‐ crisis since World War II, Gorbachev was enjoying longs to Freedom (New York: Free Press, 1991); tremendous popularity in the West. One senses Vadim Medvedev, V komande Gorbacheva: Vzgli‐ that Gorbachev felt far more comfortable with ad iznutri (: Bylina, 1994). George Bush and , [2]. Vladimir Kriuchkov, Lichnoe delo, 2 vols. and John Major, Helmut Kohl and Hans-Dietrich (Moscow: Olimp, 1996); Nikolai Ryzhkov, Pere‐ Genscher, than he did with his own inner circle of stroika: Istoriia predatelstv' (Moscow: Novosti, Soviet advisers. In contrast to his impersonal rela‐ 1992); V.I. Vorotnikov, A bylo eto tak... Iz dnevnika tions with his fellow Soviet politicians, Gor‐ chlena Politbiuro TsK KPSS (Moscow: Sovet veter‐ bachev's relations with the Westerners were often anov, 1995); Yegor Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev's of a more personal nature; moreover, by 1990 he Kremlin (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992). could count on nearly unqualifed moral support from the West for his domestic program. With the German leaders in particular Gorbachev shared a

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[3]. Stephen F. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bol‐ shevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888-1938 (New York: Knopf, 1973). [4]. Ivan Polozkov was an infuential Party boss from Krasnodar who, beginning in June 1990, headed the reactionary of the RSFSR. [5]. These were some of the conservatives upon whom Gorbachev increasingly relied from autumn 1990 through the following spring. Copyright 2001 by H-Net, all rights reserved. H-Net permits the redistribution and reprinting of this work for nonproft, educational purposes, with full and accurate attribution to the author, web location, date of publication, originating list, and H-Net: Humanities & Social Sciences Online. For any other proposed use, contact the Reviews editorial staf at [email protected].

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Citation: Kevin O'Connor. Review of Chernyaev, Anatoly. My Six Years with Gorbachev. H-Russia, H-Net Reviews. May, 2001.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=5144

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