Anatoly Chernyaev. My Six Years with Gorbachev. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000. xxiv + 437 pp. $32.50, cloth, ISBN 978-0-271-02029-7. Reviewed by Kevin O'Connor Published on H-Russia (May, 2001) The Apprentice's Sorcerer: A Perestroika Chernyaev presents readers with a perceptive Memoir analysis of the evolution of Gorbachev's political Historians who study the Soviet Union's fnal thought between 1986 and 1991 as well as a nu‐ years are blessed with an unparalleled wealth of anced portrayal of Gorbachev's enigmatic and of‐ memoirs written by the top leaders of the pere‐ ten frustrating personality. stroika era. Gorbachev's ideological comrades in Born in 1921, Chernyaev is a decade older arms, including former Foreign Minister Eduard than Gorbachev, old enough to have served in the Shevardnadze and ideologist Vadim Medvedev, Soviet military during World War II. Being sta‐ have naturally tended to take a mostly favorable tioned in the Baltic countries at that time, as view of the CPSU's last general secretary and his Robert Service writes in the foreword, gave reform program.[1] Other memoirists, such as for‐ Chernyaev a certain appreciation for the USSR's mer KGB chief and coup plotter Vladimir Kri‐ nationalities issues that was lacking Committee's uchkov, Nikolai Ryzhkov (who was in charge of International Department, in February 1986 the the economy), Valerii Vorotnikov (who headed the nearly sixty-five year old Chernyaev was called RSFSR government), and conservative rival Yegor upon to join Gorbachev's team as a senior foreign Ligachev, are highly critical of perestroika--espe‐ policy aide. cially of the direction that reform took after 1988-- Much of this book consists of Chernyaev's and in most cases share a personal antipathy to‐ journal entries, linked together by remarks and ward Gorbachev and his main ideological advisor, reflections added later for context and narrative Aleksandr Yakovlev.[2] In many ways Chernayev's continuity. While this technique allows Chernyaev book, frst published in Russia in 1993, is among to portray himself, with some justification, as a the most interesting and insightful of all the mem‐ prescient observer of the unfolding realities of the oirs published by members of Gorbachev's circle. 1980s (such as when he writes that in 1986 he ad‐ While sometimes critical of his former boss, vised Gorbachev to begin thinking about the mat‐ H-Net Reviews ter of German unification), it also conveys a very ple, in meetings with socialists like Cuba's Fidel genuine sense of the uncertainty of the times. The Castro, Gorbachev proclaimed that "our" analysis first chapter describes the anticipation of "waiting must be based on "the interests of the working for Gorbachev's coming" (p. 5) in the early part of class and class struggle." He also continued to the decade--and the profound disappointment ex‐ speak to his colleagues about the necessity of perienced by more liberal-minded Communists maintaining control in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozam‐ when the decrepit Konstantin Chernenko was se‐ bique and other countries that were taking the lected to succeed Iurii Andropov as general secre‐ "anti-imperialist path" (p. 52). Yet at the same time tary after the latter's death in February 1984. Ac‐ Gorbachev was frustrated that the West wasn't cording to Chernyaev, Gorbachev's selection for taking his overtures seriously, mistaking his pro‐ the post was just a matter of time. posals as mere propaganda. Despite his bold ini‐ As Chernyaev recalls, the two had frst met in tiatives at Reykjavik in October 1986, when Gor‐ 1972, and even then Gorbachev stood out "for his bachev proposed to cut strategic arms in half singular passion, his desire to change, improve across the board, he was unable to reach an and organize" (p. 3). Chernyaev's Gorbachev is a agreement with U.S. President Ronald Reagan. man who was well aware of the problems of the Nevertheless the two came to trust each other Soviet system even before taking power. Although more, paving the way for future agreements. Such the Soviet leader saw that his country was on the agreements made it possible to move forward on edge of collapse, his initial response upon coming the domestic front of perestroika. to power was entirely traditional: he issued repri‐ Meanwhile, as perestroika foundered at mands and called for greater discipline. A wiser home during his frst two years at the helm, Gor‐ Chernyaev reflects on the early days of perestroi‐ bachev found himself rethinking the very concept ka: "Back then, of course, I was still thinking in of socialism. Calls for "acceleration" and increased the parameters of the old system. And so was Gor‐ discipline in the workplace proved ineffective. bachev" (p. 31). Indeed, one of the most fascinat‐ The Stalinist system itself, built in the 1930s, Gor‐ ing aspects of this memoir is Chernyaev's descrip‐ bachev concluded in 1987, was the problem. On tion of how that thinking began to change. After this matter, Gorbachev revealed himself only two years of tinkering, Gorbachev would begin, as gradually--most openly to trusted advisors like an American corporate executive might put it to‐ Yakovlev and Chernyaev, and more diplomatically day, to "think outside the box." to other Politburo members. The key to rooting Where Chernyaev shows his greatest skill as a out the Stalin/Brezhnev model of socialism was chronicler of perestroika is his consistent linking the glasnost ("openness") policy, with one of its of domestic and foreign policy goals. A vital aim main goals being to rehabilitate the "Bukharin al‐ of perestroika was to ease the military burden on ternative," which was obliterated when Stalin as‐ the Soviet Union's sputtering economy; to achieve sumed supreme power in the USSR. this goal it was necessary to prevent the arms According to Chernyaev, Gorbachev read race from entering a new phase of escalation. Yet widely, was familiar with samizdat and tamizdat for the frst year and a half of Gorbachev's rule, critical of the Stalinist system, and in particular during which he struggled to fnd the CPSU's place was heavily influenced by Stephen Cohen's book in the USSR and in the world, the general secre‐ on Nikolai Bukharin.[3] By 1987-88, the Soviet tary's foreign policy ideas were contradictory. The leader spoke of returning to the "true" Lenin (i.e., old policy of "global confrontation," Chernyaev the Lenin of NEP), whom he constantly "consult‐ writes, coexisted with "new thinking." For exam‐ ed" in seeking answers to contemporary prob‐ 2 H-Net Reviews lems. Even though Gorbachev could never bring rior. But there's less and less of his old spirit left. himself to let go of Lenin, eventually, partly under He's repeating himself, and not only in his words the influence of Aleksandr Solzhenytsin's Lenin in and style. He's repeating himself as a politician, Zurich, he was able to see the frst Bolshevik as an going around in circles. He's almost alone, but he ordinary person capable of making mistakes (p. still can't let go of the past: Ryzhkov, [Stepan] 213). Sitaryan, Maslyukov, Boldin" (p. 310).[5] In the domestic sphere, Gorbachev's biggest Chernyaev's memoir is a highly readable ac‐ problem was the resistance of the Party apparat count of the period, and this is partly because it is and conservative intellectuals to his increasingly very personal. Chernyaev describes himself as a radical reforms. While the general secretary loyal Party member devoted to liberalizing the made overtures to the reform-minded intellectu‐ system from within, a man who therefore had a als for their support, Chernyaev remarks that Gor‐ huge stake in the success of perestroika. He prais‐ bachev was really "more concerned with keeping es Gorbachev for having the courage to take on the leaders of the traditional intelligentsia close such a monumental task in the face of tremen‐ by and making sure that none of them were of‐ dous resistance--how much easier it would have fended" (p. 211). In his desire to bring both camps been for him to rule as a general secretary in the together, he kept one foot squarely planted in Brezhnev mold! each and thereby succeeded in alienating both the However, despite his reverence for Gor‐ liberal intellectuals--many of whom eventually bachev as a politician, Chernyaev pulls no punch‐ defected to Yeltsin--and their conservative coun‐ es in his portrayal of Gorbachev as a man. While terparts. Meanwhile, Chernyaev and Yakovlev Gorbachev could be brilliant, he was also conde‐ consistently urged Gorbachev to purge those ap‐ scending, insensitive, aloof, and dismissive. paratchiks who did not support perestroika. In‐ Chernyaev describes the pain felt by Aleksandr stead of making a frm alliance with the demo‐ Yakovlev when his boss failed to protect him from cratic-minded reformers, Gorbachev felt betrayed the attacks of the Ligachevites. Chernyaev himself when they criticized him--yet, to the consterna‐ complains that over time Gorbachev grew in‐ tion of his liberal advisers, he abided the attacks creasingly distant and never took the least bit of of Soviet hardliners. personal interest in him despite his dogged loyal‐ Chernyaev writes that by the summer of 1990, ty. By January 1991, when Gorbachev had shut out "conditions were ripe for a break with the Party, everyone but the likes of KGB chief Kryuchkov with socialist ideology, and with the old way of and longtime friend Anatoly Lukyanov (both par‐ governance." It was time, in other words, "to ad‐ ticipants in the August coup), and took the blame mit that perestroika is a revolution that means for the shootings in Vilnius, Chernyaev was transformation of the existing order." But, he sad‐ tempted to resign.