British Views on Their Invasion of Punjab

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THE RETRIBUTION Of THE ARCHIVE: BRITISH VIEWS ON THEIR INVASION OF PUNJAB

Jason R. B. Smith

HE event known as “The Sikh War,” “The First and Second Silth TWars,” and “The Anglo-Such War,” received considerable attention from former British officers in the aftermath of the episode. From 1845to 1849 the British invaded and reinvaded Punjab, an area in modern northwestern India and north Pakistan whose name literally translates as “Five Rivers,” for the five rivers the territory resides within. Histories written by British administrators and former British soldiers explained the military conquest ofthe Punjab as a decidedly just annexation. These administrators and soldiers described a territory in chaos, to which they brought enlightened rule. In contrast, contemporary historians and scholars suggest that the British manufactured the conditions of disorder in the Punjab prior to bringing it stability. These latter historians make use of revealing documents that the former did not take into account, while the former concerned themselves mostly with a vivid account of a victorious campaign against an aggressive enemy. British acting- historians immediately following the military subjugation of Punjab inaccurately represented the violence they brought to the region as a heroic and justified military engagement, whereas the Punjabi people defending their home received the part of barbaric but brave people urgently in need of western values and styles of government. British historiography from the period following the conquest does not stray far from the themes of chaos, instability and culpability. G. Kharana’s British Historiography of the SikhPowerin the Punjab serves as an excellent source of analysis on the nature of British historiography,’ Initially, as the British came into contact with Sikhs, they sought out all the knowledge they could get. Khurana notes, “British historiography on the Sikhs was a result of British interest in the rise and growth of the

‘G. Khurana, British Historiography of the Sikh Power in the Punjab (London: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1958). 24 Jason R. B. Smith

Sikhs and the political power they had come to wield.”2A History of the Sikhs written in 1849 by Joseph Davey Cunningham, a lieutenant of engineers in the British army is one such example. With regards to who was writing this history, there existed a genuine lack of trained histo rians: ‘The authors were either military officials of civil administrators, and, for the most part, their writings aimed at influencing the course of British policy towards the Sikhs.”3Concerning what information might be included in their stories Khurana explains, “It must be admitted that the means of collecting information at the disposal of these writers were limited, particularly because of the language barrier.”4 This barrier had little impact on the decision to withhold vital information about the intentional participation in the destabilizing of the Punjab. Sources this paper will examine reveal that though letters between British officials were available to nineteenth century military acting-historians, they often did not include them in their productions.5 Contemporary histo rians have since piloted considerable revisions on the history of the encounter upon the examination of many of these correspondences. Khurana also identified a dreadful trend within this episode among the British concerned with what versions of this epoch reached readers at home. He wrote that “the writers were also influenced by the attitude of the Government. .. the punishment was equally rigorous where authors tried to transgress the norms of official propriety;” even “During the Ranjit Singh period the British Government wanted to suppress the facts.”6These realities no doubt seriously impacted the manner in which the early British histories were manufactured. Regarding Ranjit Singh, both British and Punjabi sources gave considerable praise to him for the stability his reign enjoyed. Khurana’s analysis is key in any examination of these texts.

Invasion, Occupation, and Rebellion

Before we look at the earlier texts and inspect their constitution, it would be opportune to develop a stronger sense of the nature and chronology of the events in question. We will use a few scholars to do this and later mobilize additional historian’s works to buttress the claims made here. Muzaffar Alam’s The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India

“Ibid.,i37. Ibid., 737-140. 4lbid,, 140. Hasrat, Bikrama Jit, ed., The Punjab Papers. (Hoshiarpur, India: V.V.Research Institute Press, 1970). 6 Khurana, British Historiography, 141.

Ex POST FACTO THE RETRIBUTION OF THE ARCHIVE 25 delineates a clear period of instability in Punjab as its population resisted the Mughal imperial center at Delhi. Relative autonomy followed in Punjab and a separate sphere of politics emerged therein. J.S. Grewal, a noted Sikh scholar and current president of the Indian Institute of Advanced Study at Shimla, wrote a text in 1994 entitled The Sikhs of the Punjab and makes use of relevant information previously neglected by British acting-historians.7 He begins his chapter on the assault by remarking about the state of Punjab under Maharaja Ranjit Singh: “Paying personal attention to revenue administration and trade in his large dominions he revived prosperity in the Punjab... In the rulin class too, Hindus and Muslims came to form a substantial element.” Therefore, according to Grewal, Ranjit Singh provided a space in which the people of the five rivers were able to thrive and develop a viable society. It was just less than a decade after the death of Ranjit Singh that the British launched their bloody invasion into the region. Grewal makes a strong case that the Punjab thrived under Ranjit Singh. He wrote, “Increase in agricultural production was paralleled by an increase in manufacturing and the volume of trade. Cities and towns expanded with the expansion of Ranjit Singh’s dominions.”9 further, Ranjit advanced trade in the region by securing trade routes and main taining light taxes on tradesmen coming in and out of the area.’° Grewal further recognizes the developments of a host of arts and crafts during this period, from painting to new monumental architectural structures in Sikh temples and secular structures as well.” As further proof of the economic prosperity the Sikh kingdom enjoyed, Grewal notes, “the Austrian traveler Baron Charles Hugel remarked that the state estab lished by Ranjit Singh was ‘the most wonderful object in the whole world.”2 Thus following the period of Mughal imperial rule the region came into an interlude of stability.’3Grewal explains that Ranjit made it possible during his reign for anyone to advance his or her social position and that political and social oppression were practically absent.’4 The Maharaja died in Lahore in 1839,having elected Kharak Singh to replace him. tntrigue in the court began immediately and with “Cher Singh Bajwa, [heavily influencing] the new Maharaja, and [with] Chet

7J.S. Grewal, The Sikhs of the Punjab (New Dehli: Cambridge University Press, ‘Ibid.,99. Ibid., lb. Ibid., in. “Ibid. “Ibid., H3. ‘ Muzaffar Alam, The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India: Awadh and the Punjab, 1701—48 (Dehli: Oxford University Press, 1986). ‘ Grewal, 113.

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Singh’s aspiration to oust Dhian Singh, [he] induced the latter to conspire with Prince Nau Nihal Singh. [Consequently] Chet Singh was murdered in early October.”5 Prince Nau took indirect control over the Khalsa and the kingdom, and in spite of the British claims to the contrary following their bloodletting, this new court maintained peace and order until British agents brought chaos to them in the form of conspiracies. Grewal notes that under the de facto rule of Prince Nau Nihal Singh “the attempts of the British officers like MacNaughten to favor the fugitive Shah Shuja at the cost of Maharaja Kharak Singh in the Peshawar region were foiled.”6 But shortly after this, the de jure ruler Maharaja Kharak Singh died.’7Thus Sher Singh took the title of Maharaja four days later 1841l8 and “Prince Sher Singh occupied the fort of Lahore on 20 January Ominously the British, explains Grewal, became increasingly interested in the internal affairs of the Punjab during the period in which Sher Singh was enthroned as Maharaja.’9 British involvement came in the form of a coup, which seriously des tabilized the Punjab. Grewal explains, “It was on the suggestion of a British political Agent that Maharaja Sher Singh pardoned Sardar Attar Singh and Ajit Singh Sandhanwalia allowed them to return to Lahore.”2° After they regained the Maharaja’s trust Lehna Singh and Ajit Singh murdered him and his son, Prince Pratap Singh, on 15 September 1843.21 The faith of the Khalsa in the leadership began to falter and disorder began to reign in earnest in the region. Thus, the British had a major hand in the production of disorder among the Khalsa. Different factions of the Khalsa began to take opposing positions and infighting began. The Maharaja Ranjit Singh may have come from the Sandhanwalia Sardars.22 They worked with the British, who intended to install Dali Singhwith his mother as regent.23In this way, the British no doubt hoped to capitalize on their assistance in bringing their ally to power. The Sardars partici pated, believing they would have a stronger influence over the affairs of state with Dali Singh on the throne. Because of the failure of this plan, chaos ensued, which British acting-historians then cited as a significant reason for British military intervention. Thus, the British played a major

‘ Ibid., 120. 6 Ibid. ° Ibid. His death took place on 5 November 1840 and was due to illness. 8 Ibid. ‘ ibid., 121. ibid. Ibid.,121—122. ‘2She Singh, TheSansis ofPunjab: a Gypsyand De-notified TribeofRajput Origin (Dehli: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1965). Grewal, 122.

Ex Posr FACTO THE RETRIBUTION OF THE ARCHIVE 27 role in destabilizing the region before exclaiming it unstable and thereby claiming the necessity to introduce British dominion. The British did not desire the Punjab to fall into the chaos that it did. Their decision to intervene in the affairs of Punjab aimed at establishing beneficial relations with those they brought to power. Their correspon dences confirm that they in fact regretted the collapse of order within the region.24Governor General Henry Hardinge’s secretary, frederick Currie wrote a private correspondence to Major George Broadfoot on January 19, 1845in which he exclaimed that:

We shall be forced to cross the Sutlej sooner or later, and you willsee that we are sending up troops to be readyfor whatever may turn up. We must not have a Muhammadan power on this side of the Attock. The Rajpoots of the hills could not hold the Punjab; and if it can’t be Such,it must, I suppose be British.25

British officers’ correspondences reveal that they hoped they would not need to extend their dominion, de jure, to include the area, but their meddling contributed to disorder. After the consequent refusal of the Khalsa to side with the British- selected incumbent powers, Maharani Jindin “approach[edJ the British with the suggestion that they may destroy the army and take the Maharaja under their ‘protective wings’. . . The British had been collect ing men and war materials on the Punjab frontiers. The stage was set for a war.”6 The British, desirous to make this war appear as the fault of the Khalsa and the chaos unfolding there, insisted, “The army of Lahore should cross the river Satlej to make it appear that the state of Lahore was the aggressor.”27Grewal describes Lal and Tej Singh as treacherous and furthermore as giving away troop movements and the readiness of the Khalsa. After the end of this part of the conflict the Treaty of Bhyrov al was signed on March 9, which gave the British the official right to install a regent and demand twenty-two lakh rupees to finance their occupation: “By a supplement added on, a British force was kept in Lahore at the expense of the state” and those who aided the British in their invasion won seats of nominal power.28

Hasrat, Bikrama Jit, ed., The Punjab Papers: Selections from the Private Papers of Lard Auckland, Lord Ellenborough, Viscount Hardinge, and the Marquis ofDalhousie, 7836-1849 on the Sikhs (Hoshiarpur, India: V. V.Research Institute Press, 19-70). Ibid., 8o-8i. 26 Grewal, 123. Ibid. Ibid., 124.

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The British in a series of letters and ceremonies, voiced their great pleasure at this outcome; all the while, Sikhs resented occupation by a foreign power. for example, in a letter to Henry Lawrence, Governor General Henry Hardinge of India from 1844 to 184$, made clear that ‘the native prince is in fetters and under our protection, and must do our bidding.”29After the occupation began, a grass roots rebellion against British developed. By 1848, the Marquis of Daihousie, the governor general of India from 1848 to 1856, described the “Dewan of Mooltan [asj in open revolt” in a letter to Sir George Cooper.3°The following excerpt from a letter from Lord Daihousie clarifies the Britishview on the matter: “I have for months been looking for, and we are now not on the eve of but in the midst of war with the Sikh nation and kingdom of the Pun- jab.”3’ Other correspondences indicate that British officers explicitly acknowledged that Sikhs sought the restoration of an independent Sikh kingdom.32A long letter by Dalhousie to Sir John Hobhouse explained that the British sought the quelling of the rebellion but also indicated outrage at the failure of the British puppet government to pay for the British military occupation: “The State of Lahore owes us now 53 lac[k]s.”33He also prematurely claimed here, on August15, 1848, that the io,ooo troops at Lahore would adequately contain the development of open rebellion. This turned out to be false and tens of thousands of additional troops rushed to the region in order to suppress the Sikh independence movement. Responding to Lord Daihousie, Sir John Hobhouse explained his distaste for the loyalty of the Sikh among themselves:

I cannot help remarkingthat the Sikhs. .. seemto have no symptoms of disaffection.A fact that goes far to showthat much of the fidelityof the newlyconquered, halfcivilized,barbarians depends on the charac ter and control ofthose who are immediatelyand personally in authori ty over them.34

Sir Hobhouse wrote this to his superior, Lord Dalhousie, and constantly sought his favor throughout their correspondences. Throughout these correspondences, Lord Daihousie remarked on his great faith in the character and decisions of Sir Hobhouse. He praised Sir Hobhouse’s discretion in dealing with the Sikh rebellion against their occupation and

Ibid. ° Hasrat,i. ‘ Grewal, 125. ‘ Hasrat, i’. Ibid., i8z. Ibid., 192.

Ex PosT FACTO THE RETRIBUTION OF THE ARcHIVE 29 gave Sir Hobhouse reason to favor his good character. Thus, Sir Hob house accused the Sikh of loyalty as a moral weakness while simulta neously demonstrating an identical characteristic. Despite this odd contradiction, Hobhouse’s intense distaste for loyalty expressed within the Sikh community demonstrates his obvious aversion to Sikh self-rule. The fight to maintain British occupation and annexation of the territory into British dominion cost both sides dearly. Various accounts depict the loss of life as significant and the British at home kept apace of the developments with keen interest. Ultimately, Maharaja Dalip Singh signed the region over to the British on March 29, 1849.

British Acting-Historians

The British represented themselves through their own narratives as heroic and justified. In these narratives, the Punjabi people appeared as obstacles to the former’s implementation of good and enlightened governance. Within the body of texts examined here, these themes appear repeatedly in different variations. These texts aimed to tell military stories of troop movements and the battles fought, but each also spent time establishing the just nature of the undertaking and supported these claims throughout. Captain J.H. Lawrence-Archer’s history Commentaries on the Punjab Campaign, published in 1878, 29 years after the end of the campaign, argued for the culpability of the Khalsa, the army of the Sikh. CaptainJ. H. Lawrence-Archer was not a historian. His authority to narrate the event came from his role as a Captain in the British army, having participated in the invasion of the Punjab. from his first paragraph, culpability took a central position in his argument. He emphasized that in 1848, the rebellion of the Khalsa threatened the British controlled Indian frontier and that the Khalsa had marched into British controlled India forcing the British to respond. Lawrence-Archer noted that upon the arrival of Lord Dalhousie, who was to replace Governor General Hardinge, that “English officers, civil and military were quietly drilling’ their late enemies, and ‘givinglessons in good government’ to respectful Sikh officials.”6 Thus, Lawrence-Archer painted a textual picture of the British as the bringers of enlightened government to the otherwise backward Sikhs.

Grewal, 727. 36J.H. Lawrence-Archer, Commentaries on the Punjab Campaign, 1848—49(London: Wm. H. Allen & Co., 1878), 2.

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Most of the subsequent pages in Captain Lawrence-Archer’s work focus on the specifics of British troop movements. The author paid close attention, throughout his detailed analysis of the troop’s movements, to the state of troop morale. The author noted, “The faith of the army was profound in the personal gallantry and ultimate success of the brave Lord Gough.”37Lawrence-Archer wrote in terms of endearment for the British whether they were advancing or retreating, whereas the Khalsa’ actions were consistently cast in a negative light. For instance, British forces “sought safety in flight” when retreating and when advancing he described them as moving “at the point of a bayonet.”8 When the Khalsa retreated, he depicted them as “scattered and in disorder, flailing] back in gloom, like dusty shadows” and when successfully advancing, he described them thus: “the dusky forms again dashed.”39 It is hardly surprising that a former British officer involved in the campaign and writing just less than thirty years after the event chose to paint the British as heroic when slaying their fallen opponents. Moreover, when the Punjabis, defending their own locality from an advancing army returned the example, he exclaimed that “a fearful massacre” and “butchery,” had transpired.4° The text is replete with such descriptions. Another text from the period is George Burton’s TheFirst and Second Sikh Wars: an Official British Army History, originally published in 1911. He began by describing the militant nature of the Khalsa, and set about casting it as purely a conquering force, and not a force for the establish ing peace in the region. He wrote, “for a period of three decades up to Ranjit’s death in 1839 the Sikh army dominated the region, defeating Afghan, Kashmiri and other neighbors. In 1802 it took Amritsar, in i8i8 Multan fell, in 1819 Kashmir was annexed.”4’Burton also tried to establish the size of the Khalsa at 150,000 in 1845, but others have estimated the number at less than half of that. He described the Khalsa as driven by a desire to ravage the countryside, in order to make them out to be a threat to the British for his reader, writing, “As control of government over the Khalsa slackened, so the latter marauded in the countryside and assassinated a series of leading officials.”42After fully demonizing the Khalsa, much of Burton’s commentary, outside of exhausting reports of troop movement, concentrated on reconciling the failure of the British to

Ibid., 34. 38 Ibid., 35, 48. Ibid., 49. ° Ibid., 5o. ‘ Reginald George Burton, The First and Second Sikh Wars: an Official British Army History (Government Central Press: India, 1911), VII. ‘ Ibid.

Ex PosT fAcro THE RETRIBUTION OF THE ARCHIVE 31 defeat the Khalsa more quickly and this comprised much of his story’s argument. Burton was in the company of other British acting-historians from this period when he represented the British in positive terms while narrating the Sikh and the Khalsa as standing in the way of the stable governmental order he saw the only the British as capable of providing. He noted, “The Second Sikh War was occasioned by the Silth military caste’s nonacceptance of defeat in the First Sikh War and by feelings of betrayal by their nominal political masters. The British sawthis ‘revolt’as treachery and determined early on to annex the Punjab to solve the Sikh problem permanently.”43 He, like his predecessors, praised Ranjit Singh, for whom the Punjabis had great respect. Ranjit Singh “moulded the congeries of confederacies into a nation, established his ascendancy throughout the Punjab, and in 1809 concluded a treaty with Sir David Ochterlony, handing over the Sikhs between the Sutlej and the Jumna to the British protection.”44 There are at least two factors at play here. One is that the British used the former Khalsa troops in later campaigns and would not want to have alienated them. Secondly, by painting Ranjit Singh as working with the British through the signing of treaties and then praising him, he may have hoped to influence Sikhs to follow this example and meet the British on their turf: the contract. He exclaimed that Ranjit Singh’s “death [in 18391was the signal for internal dissen sions, and a mutinous spirit arose in the army which in the course of time rendered the troops the principle political power in the state.”45 Though the British played a significant role in this development, Burton made no mention of it. Instead, he explained that “acondition of military anarchy supervened ... a conflict became inevitable, in view of the overbearing character of the Sikh soldiery, and the geographical and political necessity for British expansion.”6 Allthe while, he beat the dead horse of British justifications for military intervention. He narrated how “one minister after another succeeded to power, and the court became a centre of intrigue and debauchery in which good government was impossible.”47 Had Burton examined the letters and evidence, which Grewal discusses later, he would have been forced to a very different conclusion, unless of course he was deliberately misrepresenting the facts; there is not enough evidence for this latter claim though. Sufficeto

Ibid., xii Ibid., 6—7. Ibid., 8. Ibid. Ibid.

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as a THE RETRIBUTION OF THE ARCHIVE 33 selves.”5’This narrative presents another example of how British authors of the subject at the time commonly mobilized misrepresentation. These writers, however, did differ amongst themselves on some points. Gough noted that upon hearing of the murder of Shere Singhand the minister that “Hira Singh promptly appealed to the army, making effective use of the argument that the Sindwala faction looked to the British for support, and would increase British influence in the Punjab.Sz This quotation demonstrates that Gough was at least aware that the divisions among the Khalsa were exacerbated by their allegiances to the British. It also clarifies the point that the British actively sought more influence over the region through more than just military engagement. This text regurgitated the accepted narrative regarding who started the conflict and put the blame on the Khalsa. Gough explained, “Exagge rated reports did reach the Sikhs, who were already quite prepared to believe that the British were designing an invasion.”53Based upon the fact that perhaps the greatest invading force the British had hitherto formed waited on the border regions of the Punjab, it is clear that they were planning to take military action.54 furthermore, we have already established that Tej and Lal Singh had agreed to instigate the conflict.55 Gough hung onto the established means of determining fault by blaming the Khalsa for crossing the Sutlej: “On the i3th December Sir Henry Hardinge received the intelligence that the body of the Sikh army had crossed the Sutlej on the irth; and he then issued the proclamation which was the virtual Declaration ofwar.”6 Gough tried to establish the blanket innocence of the British with regards to the instability developing by remarking, ‘Before the Sikhs crossed the Sutlej in 1845, every effort had been made by Sir Henry Hardinge to avoid a collision with them.”57 Given the nature of British involvement with rivalfactions and the arrival of such a large contingent of British troops on the border, this explana tion looks like rhetorical smoke and mirrors. Gough, like his counterparts in producing this history, also favored the British system ofgovernance. These writers’ tales find unity here too. Gough concluded with “Into this chaos, law and order had to be intro duced; oppression and violence had to be put down; the arts of peace

‘ Sir Charles Gough and Arthur D. Innes, TheSikhs and the Sikh Wars (London; A. D. Innes & C0., 1897), 2. Ibid., 55. Ibid., 58. Bikrama Jit Hasrat, Essays in Indian History, ed., Donovan Williams and E. Daniel Potts (London; Asian Publishing House, 1973), 46-47. J.S. Grewal. The Sikhs of the Punjab (New Dehli; Cambridge University Press, ‘994). 6 Gough and Innes, TheSikhs and the Sikh Wars, 6i. ‘ Ibid., 261.

VOLUME XIX 2010 34 Jason R. B. Smith had to be encouraged. . . respect for the government had to be, may we say, invented.”8 Though the Austrian traveler had remarked that Punjab, prior to its harassment by the British, was ‘wonderful,’ the British had their own ideas of what would constitute or warrant governmental wonderment.59

The Accounts of Historians

Historians other than J.S. Grewal and G. Khurana have written on this episode. The historian, N. M. Khilnani, in British Powerin the Punjab published in 1972, argues many of the points brought out by Grewal and Khurana. He notes at the outset, “The Punjab was ripe for annexation and the British who had been eager to plant the Union Jack on the Khyber Pass hastened the process by playing one faction against the other and provoking the Khalsa Army to measure swords with them.”6° He backs this statement up, “Lord Ellenborough’s private correspon dence with the Duke of Wellington and Queen Victoria clearly and conclusively shows that the Punjab was regarded as a fruit which when ripe would automatically into the mouth of the British.”6’This narrative of Khilnani marks a dramatic change in the depiction of events from the British acting-historians of the time of the Sikh war. He backs this statement up: “Lord Ellenborough’s private correspondence with the Duke of Wellington and Queen Victoria clearly and conclusively shows that the Punjab was regarded as a fruit which when ripe would automati cally into the mouth of the British.62 furthermore, Khilnam notes, “letters show the British were not—as they then publicly professed— mere passive and disinterested spectators of the anarchic conditions in the Punjab; but they were making systematic preparations for active intervention.”6 He stands with others in the field in understanding the instability of the region as a cause of British involvement. Another contemporary historian, who notes the British hand at play in preparing the region for invasion, is Bikrama lit Hasrar in his book General Sir Hugh Gough and the Punjab Campaign, published in 1973. Hasrat received his master’s degree from the University of the Punjab and his doctorate from Calcutta University. At the time of this piece’s

58 Ibid., 269. Grewal, 113. 6o N. M. Khilnani, British Power in the Punjab, 1839—1858(New York: Asia Publishing House, 1972), VII. 6 bid., iz. 6 Ibid. 63 Ibid., 13.

Ex Posr FACTO THE RETRIBUTION OF THE ARCHIVE 35 publication, he was a full professor and head of the Department of History in Katmandu, Nepal. Instead of portraying the British as res ponding to the aggression of those in Punjab, Hasrat argues that the campaign amounted to an invasion. He also explains that British inten tions to subdue the region become clearer with the inclusion of the fact that a large force had recently arrived in the Punjab under the command of General Sir Hugh Gough, well before the second set of hostilities broke out. He also comments that the British had seen themselves as heroic even when they lost battles and often celebrated them as victories. After a significant loss during the battle of Chillianwala for example, the British were decisively defeated and General Gough was forced to order a full retreat losing well over two thousand troops the General declared a victory. According to Hasrat, “salutes were fired” to which the Governor General noted of the ‘victory’that “another such would ruin us.”6’The British solidly self praised during the campaign but also afterwards in the very liberal renderings of both their battles but also their justifications. Instead of portraying the British as responding to the aggression of those in Punjab, Hasrat notes that the campaign “amounted to a surrep titious invasion of the Punjab by the de facto rulers of the Punjab. . . in direct contravention of the political obligations imposed upon them by the treaties of Lahore and Bhyrowal.”6 Thus, on February 21,1849, with a massive assault, where “never perhaps had the British amassed so many guns and men in any single battle” the war turned favorably to the British invaders.66This was done using eighteen-pound guns and eight- inch howitzers to demolish Sikh positions for two hours before the British infantry pressed forward to seize Sikh positions. The British, in Hasrat’s view, had prepared to invade the region, and took every step in order to ensure their success. They advanced their weaponry within reach of the Sutlej and stood waiting for their plans to destabilize the Lahore government to reach fruition. As soon as Lal and Tej Singh crossed the river, the British began their assault in full.

Concluding Remarks

A few decades after these events, the British wrote of themselves as victorious bringers of order and enlightenment. Historians have since brought evidence to light that contextualizes the events in question. In

64 Bikrama Jit Hasrat. General Sir Hugh Gough and the Punjab Campaign, 1848—49 (Lon don: Asia Publishing House, ‘973), 6 g. Ibid., 43. 66 Ibid., 62.

VOLUME XIX 2010 36 Jason R. B. Smith this case, the victors, after writing pseudo-history, received a corrective in the form of evidence. With the help of the archive, additional data has come out which has vindicated those who suffered not just under the invading force but also as a result of the deliberate obscuration of the facts of history. British historians, immediately following the military subjugation of Punjab, represented themselves as justified and heroic. Punjabi people, though defending their territory, were made out to be barbaric and urgent in need of western values and styles of government. These early acting-historians did not inaccurately represent every thing they described. The material they provided on the movement of troops and their dispositions remains critical to the study of how the invasion took place. Their texts, however, failed to include the consider able evidence detailing the level of British involvement in the politics and intrigue of the Khalsa kingdom and thus warped an accurate understanding of the intentions of the British at this time and in this place. Their accounts worked to establish the culpability of their per ceived enemy. They argued the issue in order to justify a story of their own nation’s heroism, as they wanted it understood by their readers. They lived through an experience in which they felt and perceived themselves as acting valiantly and in keeping with the values their culture had imparted to them. Likely,they distorted the causalityso that their readers would focus on the bravery of deeds their soldiers had committed on the field, instead of questioning them.

Jason R. B. Smith earned his BAfrom SFSUin European History with a minor in Philosophy and is now completing his MA in Modern World History. He is a writer and contributor for the blog: The Notes Taken (http://notes-taken.btogspot.com/). He also has upper intermediate complication skills in German and Hindi.

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