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Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-88060-2 — the Ottoman Road to War in 1914 Mustafa Aksakal Index More Information Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-88060-2 — The Ottoman Road to War in 1914 Mustafa Aksakal Index More Information Index Abdulhamid II, Sultan, 9, 24–5, 58 battleships. see Breslau, SMS; dreadnoughts, Adana massacres (1909), 9 Ottoman order for; Goeben, SMS; Adrianople (Edirne), impact on attitudes Greece; purchase of American of recovery of, 23–4 battleships Ahenk (newspaper), 21 Baykara, Tuncer, 14–15 Ahmad, Feroz, 14 Bayur, Yusuf Hikmet, History of the Turkish Ahmed Hilmi, S¸ehbenderzade, 29–31 Revolution,11–13 Ahmed I˙zzet Pasha, 188 Bedirhan, Abdürrezak, 88 Ahmed Res¸idBey, 106, 121 Benckendorff, A. K. Ahmed Rıza Bey, 59, 62 and Liman von Sanders affair, 81 Ahmed Saib, 25 doubts regarding Ottoman neutrality, 131 Akçuraog˘lu Yusuf (later Yusuf Akçura), intervention over British–Ottoman 55–6 dreadnought sale, 126–7 Ali Fethi Bey, 121 proposed Russian–British alliance, 47 Ali Fethi, Bulgarian reaction to Ottoman Berchtold, Leopold, count von naval attack, 184 attitude to Ottoman–Romanian Anatolia alliance, 89 as Turkish homeland, 30–1 promotion of German–Ottoman alliance, ethnic cleansing, 48–9 93–4, 95 see also Will Turkey Survive in Anatolia? rejection of Habsburg–Ottoman (Naci I˙smail) alliance, 84 Armstrong. see dreadnoughts, Ottoman support for German–Ottoman treaty order for extension, 184–5 Asquith, H.H., 81, 126 Berlin Congress (July 13, 1878), 5, 72–3 Austria-Hungary Bernhard von Eggeling, Russia and and German–Ottoman alliance, 93–4 Ottoman war, 82 annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 58–9 Bethmann Hollweg, Theobald von issue of Ottoman loan, 62 attitude to Ottoman neutrality, 116 refusal of alliance, 61, 84 German–Ottoman negotiations during July Crisis, 100–1 bab-ı âli baskını (the Raid on the Sublime initial rejection of German–Ottoman Porte), 79 treaty extension, 185 Baghdad Railway on Entente attack on Straits, 117 and German investments in Syria, 57 report on implications of First Balkan disagreements settled, 83 War, 71 London’s hindrances to extension of, 60 report on German–Ottoman alliance, strategic importance, 69–70 70–1 use to colonize Anatolia, 27 requires declaration of war before further Balkan Wars funding, 150–1 psychological impact in Ottoman Empire, suggestion of attack on Suez Canal, 147–8 21–3 telegram ordering Ottoman naval attack see also First Balkan War (1912–13) in Black Sea, 155–6 208 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-88060-2 — The Ottoman Road to War in 1914 Mustafa Aksakal Index More Information Index 209 Bompard, Maurice, 112, 181 official statement on Black Sea naval Bratianu, Ion, 87 attack, 181–2 Breslau, SMS on national position in 1914, 19 and balance of power, 117–18 rejection of funding for Suez Canal arrival at Istanbul, 91 expedition, 17 arrival at the Straits, 110–18 response to confiscation of Ottoman “purchase” of, 118 dreadnoughts, 109 requested by Enver, 103–4, 113 written orders for naval attack on Britain Russia, 176 and Arab nationalism, 66 Cemil Bey attitudes towards in contemporary and Goeben going to Istanbul, 103 literature, 34 meetings with Moltke and Falkenhayn, military mission in Istanbul. see Limpus 105–6 naval mission negotiations regarding Bulgaria, 119–20 refusal of Anglo–Ottoman alliance, 59, 77 news of German need for Ottoman rejection of Ottoman reform proposals, 60 help, 165 response to Ottoman mobilization, 126 request for Dardanelles cannons, 149–50 responsibility for hostilities, 54–5 request for German naval mission, 136 seizure of Ottoman territories, 57 Charykov, M., 82–3 withholding of loans, 60 Chios, 5, 42 Büyük Duygu (journal), 36–8 see also Talat Pasha, (Mehmed), proposed Bulgaria Bulgarian–Ottoman–Romanian alliance with Central Powers, 122 alliance and attack on Thrace after alliance, 121 Churchill, Winston, 91–2, 126 declaration of independence, 58 Constantinople Agreement (1915), 55 likelihood of Ottoman alliance, 94–5 covert operations neutrality, 156–7 by Ottomans, against Russia, 89 position in Greek–Ottoman war, 52–3 by Russia, against Ottoman Empire, 88 rumored Ottoman alliance, 43 Crete, announced unification with Greece, 58 see also Radoslavov, Vasil CUP (Ottoman Committee of Union and Bulgarian–Ottoman alliance, 120, 122–3 Progress) coup against Grand Vezir Kâmil Pasha, 79 Cami (Abdurrahman Cami Baykut), 33–6 rise to power, 9 Capelle, Eduard von, 136 vote for war, 182 capitulations, 14 Carol I, king of Romania, 87 Demidov, E.P., 49 Caucasus Desk (Tes¸kilat-ı Mahsusa), 89 Doumergue, Gaston, views on Straits Cavid Bey question, 3–4 agreement of loan from France, 85 dreadnoughts, Ottoman order for exclusion from German–Ottoman loan, 167 and balance of power in Eastern mission to obtain loans, 60 Mediterranean, 49, 110–11 potential to redirect Ottoman policy, 171 attempt to reassure Russia regarding, 86 protest at outbreak of war, 180–1 demands for compensation for, 91 urges cabinet to demobilize, 169 Greek plans for pre-emptive war before Cemal Pasha delivery, 87 alliance attempt with the Entente, 90 Greek plans for war to prevent delivery, 43 and Black Sea operation decision, 159 non-delivery and seizure of Russian approval of naval attack on Russia, merchandise, 108–9 171–2 provoking Russian–British alliance, 47 Bulgarian–Ottoman alliance Russia blocking collection of, 61, 126–7 negotiations, 120 Russian opposition to, 45–6 congratulatory note over naval attack on Russia, 181 Eberhardt, Admiral, 134–5, 173–4 negotiations after start of First World Edirne (Adrianople), recovery of, 23–4 War, 91–2 education, and military effectiveness, 32–3 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-88060-2 — The Ottoman Road to War in 1914 Mustafa Aksakal Index More Information 210 Index Emanuelidi Efendi, 52 request for arms while promising future Enver Pasha action, 123, 138 Aegean islands dispute, 46 request for German naval mission, 135–6 against declaration of jihad,16–17 resignation letter, 188 and Bulgarian entry against Entente, 121 response to Kaiser Wilhelm II’s demand and German ships in the Straits, 115 for action, 137–8 arguments justifying German loan, 168–9 seizure of Entente ships and citizens, 186 attempt to make Balkan action submission of war plan, 172 conditional on Bulgaria, 154 successful recovery of Edirne attempts to postpone Ottoman (Adrianople), 23 intervention, 111, 112, 119–20 support of Liman’s proposed Odessa Black Sea operation, 157, 162 attack, 155 Bulgarian–Ottoman alliance negotiations, war ministry budget, 22 120, 122–3 ethnic cleansing, 43–4, 47–8, 51–2 complaint about Liman von Sanders, 17–18, 139–40 Fahreddin Bey, and alliance with Russia, congratulatory note over naval attack on 129–30 Russia, 181 Falkenhayn, Erich von congratulatory telegram from Goltz, 17 approval of Ottoman war plan, 172, 173 CUP coup against Grand Vezir Kâmil instruction to Liman on Ottoman Pasha, 79 action, 156 death, 15–16 meeting Cemil Bey, 105–6 false claim of Romanian offer of alliance, 85 “No aid without hostilities” statement, 149 German refusal of loan, September 10, Ferdinand, king of Bulgaria, 119 147–50 First Balkan War (1912–13), 22–3, 71 German–Ottoman alliance negotiations Fischer, Fritz, 64 during July Crisis, 96–8, 99, 101, France 102–3 agreement of Ottoman loan, 84–5 grandiosity, 15 intentions for French rule in Syria, 55 historical view of, 1–17, 190 postponement of Ottoman loan, 80–1 holy war rhetoric, 35–6 letter calling for revenge, 38 Germanos V, 53 naval attack on Russia German–Ottoman alliance attempt to delay, 176–7 casus foederis,99 authorization for, 177 crisis over Ottoman inaction, August concerns over, 174–5 1914, 137–41 ordered by Enver, 63, 64 crisis over Ottoman inaction, September proposal, 170–1 1914, 156–63 report to Said Halim of Russian existence revealed to Bulgaria, 120 “attack”, 180–1 main provisions, 100, 102 written orders, 176 mention of, 99, 100–1 negotiations after start of First World negotiations during July Crisis, 93–102 War, 91–2 reasons for, 191–3 note from Said Halim Pasha on likelihood Russian knowledge of, 110 of war, 10–11 September 10, 147–52 offer of Black Sea naval demonstration, signing of, 102–4 148–9 treaty extension, 184–5 Ottoman mobilization, 104–10 Germany pledged support for Vienna, 96 attitudes towards in contemporary power conflict with Said Halim, 106–7 literature, 34–5 preference for Caucasus campaign, 148 consideration of alliance, 35 proposal of alliance with Russia, hopes from Ottoman entry into war, 127–8, 129 156, 166 rejection of funding for Suez Canal initial rejection of alliance, 62 expedition, 17 investments in Syria, 57 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-88060-2 — The Ottoman Road to War in 1914 Mustafa Aksakal Index More Information Index 211 military mission in Istanbul, see Liman Greece von Sanders mission Aegean islands dispute, 43 naval mission in Istanbul in August attempt to play on Russian fears over 1914, see Usedom mission Straits, 49 plans for interim administration in Great Power recognition of sovereignty Istanbul, 78 over Aegean islands, 46–7 protectorate over Ottoman Empire, 90–1 June 12 demands, 50–1 role in Ottoman entry into non-support from Serbia, 50 war, 62–72 purchase of American battleships, 111 supply of warships and funds, 62 rejection of Romanian mediation, 43–4 use of German ships by Ottomans, 106 Russian concern over Aegean islands war plans, 144–5 dispute, 44–6, 49–50, 51 Giers, M. N. Greek–Ottoman negotiations, 144 Aegean islands dispute, 43–4 Grey, Sir Edward and Russian occupation of eastern and Istanbul as international city, 78–9 Anatolia, 75 and Liman von Sanders mission, 80–1 apparent belief in Ottoman neutrality, 112 defense of Limpus mission, 46 ascribed Strait’s closure to German justifying war with Ottomans, 134 military mission, 108 on Egypt, 68 at Livadia meeting, 86–7 refusal of British–Ottoman alliance, 59 attempts to contain Ottoman–Greek warning to Istanbul, 131 crisis, 51–2 Gulkevich, K.
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