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Handbook on the Management of Munitions Response Actions

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United States Office of Solid Waste and EPA 505-B-01-001 Environmental Protection Emergency Response May 2005 Agency Washington, DC 20460 EPA Handbook on the Management of Munitions Response Actions Interim Final 000735 EPA Handbook on The Management of Munitions Response Actions INTERIM FINAL May 2005 000736 This page intentionally left blank. 000737 Disclaimer This handbook provides guidance to EPA staff. The document does not substitute for EPA’s statutes or regulations, nor is it a regulation itself. Thus, it cannot impose legally binding requirements on EPA, States, or the regulated community, and may not apply to a particular situation based upon the circumstances. This handbook is an Interim Final document and allows for future revisions as applicable. 000738 This page intentionally left blank. 000739 TABLE OF CONTENTS GLOSSARY OF TERMS ..................................................... xiii ACRONYMS ...............................................................xxv 1.0 INTRODUCTION ..................................................... 1-1 1.1 Overview...................................................... 1-1 1.2 The Common Nomenclature ....................................... 1-2 1.3 Organization of This Handbook .................................... 1-5 2.0 REGULATORY OVERVIEW ........................................... 2-1 2.1 Regulatory Overview............................................. 2-2 2.1.1 Defense Environmental Restoration Program .................... 2-2 2.1.2 CERCLA ................................................ 2-3 2.1.3 CERCLA Section 120 ...................................... 2-5 2.1.4 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) ............... 2-6 2.1.5 Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB) ......... 2-8 2.2 Conclusion..................................................... 2-9 SOURCES AND RESOURCES ............................................... 2-10 DoD and EPA Management Principles for Implementing Response Actions at Closed, Transferring, and Transferred (CTT) Ranges ............................... 2-15 3.0 CHARACTERISTICS OF MUNITIONS AND EXPLOSIVES OF CONCERN ..... 3-1 3.1 Overview of Explosives........................................... 3-1 3.1.1 History of Explosives in the United States ...................... 3-1 3.1.1.1 Early Development .................................. 3-2 3.1.1.2 Developments in the Nineteenth Century ................. 3-2 3.1.1.3 World War I ........................................ 3-3 3.1.1.4 The Decades Between the Two World Wars ............... 3-3 3.1.1.5 World War II ....................................... 3-4 3.1.1.6 Modern Era ........................................ 3-4 3.1.2 Classification of Military Energetic Materials ................... 3-5 3.1.3 Classification of Explosives .................................. 3-7 3.1.3.1 Low Explosives, Pyrotechnics, Propellants, and Practice Ordnance ................................................ 3-7 3.1.3.2 High Explosives .................................... 3-10 3.1.3.3 Incendiaries ....................................... 3-11 3.2 Characteristics and Location of MEC............................... 3-11 3.2.1 Hazards Associated with Common Types of Munitions ........... 3-11 3.2.2 Areas Where MEC is Found ................................ 3-13 3.2.3 Release Mechanisms for MEC ............................... 3-14 INTERIM FINAL Table of Contentsiii May 2005 000740 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) 3.2.4 Chemical Reactivity of Explosives ........................... 3-15 3.3 Sources and Nature of the Potential Hazards Posed by Conventional Munitions..................................................... 3-15 3.3.1 Probability of Detonation as a Function of Fuze Characteristics .... 3-16 3.3.2 Types of Explosive Hazards ................................ 3-18 3.3.3 Factors Affecting Potential for Munitions Exposure to Human Activity.......................................... 3-19 3.3.4 Depth of MEC ........................................... 3-20 3.3.5 Environmental Factors Affecting Decomposition of MEC ......... 3-21 3.3.6 Explosives-Contaminated Soils .............................. 3-23 3.4 Toxicity and Human Health and Ecological Impacts of Explosives and Other Munitions Constituents ..................................... 3-24 3.4.1 Human Health Effects ..................................... 3-24 3.4.2 Ecological Effects ........................................ 3-28 3.4.3 Human and Ecological Effects from Exposure to Specific Compounds ............................................. 3-31 3.5 Other Sources of Conventional Munitions Constituents ................. 3-33 3.5.1 Open Burning/Open Detonation (OB/OD) ..................... 3-33 3.5.2 Explosives Manufacturing and Demilitarization ................. 3-34 3.6 Conclusions................................................... 3-34 SOURCES AND RESOURCES ............................................... 3-35 4.0 DETECTION OF UXO AND BURIED MUNITIONS ........................ 4-1 4.1 Introduction .................................................... 4-1 4.2 Selection of the Geophysical Detection System ........................ 4-3 4.2.1 Geophysical Sensors in Use Today ............................ 4-3 4.2.1.1 Electromagnetic Induction (EMI) ....................... 4-3 4.2.1.2 Magnetometry ...................................... 4-4 4.2.1.3 Multisensor Systems ................................. 4-4 4.2.1.4 Ground Penetrating Radar ............................. 4-4 4.2.2 Selection of the Geophysical Detection System .................. 4-5 4.2.3 MEC Detection System Components .......................... 4-7 4.2.3.1 Positioning Systems ................................. 4-8 4.2.3.2 Anomaly Identification .............................. 4-10 4.2.4 Costs of UXO Detection Systems ............................ 4-10 4.2.5 Quality Assurance/Quality Control ........................... 4-11 4.3 Emerging UXO Detection Systems ................................. 4-11 4.3.1 Advanced EMI Systems .................................... 4-11 4.3.2 Airborne Detection ....................................... 4-12 4.4 Use of Processing and Modeling To Discriminate UXO ................ 4-14 4.5 MEC Detection Demonstration Programs............................ 4-15 4.5.1 Jefferson Proving Ground Technology Demonstration Program .... 4-16 INTERIM FINAL Table of Contentsiv May 2005 000741 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) 4.5.2 Former Fort Ord Ordnance Detection and Discrimination Study (ODDS) ................................................ 4-18 4.5.3 UXO Technology Standardized Demonstration Sites ............. 4-19 4.6 Fact Sheets and Case Studies on Detection Technologies and Systems ..... 4-20 4.7 Conclusion.................................................... 4-20 SOURCES AND RESOURCES ............................................... 4-34 5.0 RESPONSE TECHNOLOGIES .......................................... 5-1 5.1 Treatment and Disposal of MEC: An Overview........................ 5-3 5.1.1 Safe Handling of MEC ...................................... 5-6 5.1.2 Render-Safe Procedures ..................................... 5-6 5.2 Treatment of MEC............................................... 5-6 5.2.1 Open Detonation .......................................... 5-6 5.2.2 Open Burning ............................................. 5-9 5.2.3 Alternative Treatment Technologies ........................... 5-9 5.2.3.1 Incineration ........................................ 5-9 5.2.3.2 Contained Detonation Chambers ....................... 5-12 5.3 Treatment of Soils That Contain Reactive and/or Ignitable Compounds .... 5-13 5.3.1 Biological Treatment Technologies ........................... 5-13 5.3.1.1 Monitored Natural Attenuation ........................ 5-14 5.3.1.2 Composting ....................................... 5-15 5.3.1.3 Soil Slurry Biotreatment ............................. 5-16 5.3.1.4 In-Situ Chemical and Biological Remediation ............ 5-17 5.3.2 Soil Washing ............................................ 5-18 5.3.3 Wet Air Oxidation ........................................ 5-18 5.3.4 Low-Temperature Thermal Desorption ........................ 5-19 5.4 Decontamination of Equipment and Scrap ........................... 5-19 5.5 Safe Deactivation of Energetic Materials and Beneficial Use of Byproducts . 5-20 5.6 Conclusion.................................................... 5-21 SOURCES AND RESOURCES ............................................... 5-22 6.0 EXPLOSIVES SAFETY................................................ 6-1 6.1 Introduction to DoD Explosives Safety Requirements and the DoD Explosives Safety Board (DDESB).................................. 6-1 6.2 Explosives Safety Requirements.................................... 6-3 6.2.1 General Safety Rules ....................................... 6-4 6.2.2 Transportation and Storage Requirements ....................... 6-4 6.2.3 Quantity-Distance (Q-D) Requirements ........................ 6-5 6.2.4 Protective Measures for UXO/EOD Personnel ................... 6-6 6.2.5 Emergency Response and Contingency Procedures ............... 6-6 6.2.6 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) .......................... 6-7 INTERIM FINAL Table of Contentsv May 2005 000742 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) 6.2.7 Personnel Standards ........................................ 6-7 6.2.8 Assessment Depths ........................................ 6-8 6.2.9 Land Use Controls ......................................... 6-9 6.3 Managing Explosives Safety.....................................
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