PROXY

THE CHALLENGE POWER OF RUSSIA’S PRIVATE MILITARY & SECURITY COMPANIES PER CONCORDIAM ILLUSTRATION

56 per Concordiam By James K. Wither, Marshall Center professor | Photos by The Associated Press

n the early post-Cold War period, there was hope fighting against pro-Soviet governments in Nicaragua and that the great powers would cooperate to stabilize Afghanistan. In the 21st century, the use of proxy forces has conflict-affected countries and promote peace- increased significantly, and the current tendency to outsource ful development around the world. However, warfare to nonstate agencies seems set to continue. Proxy such optimism proved ill-founded. Great power forces can reduce the political and financial costs and risks competition has returned and with it the commen- of a direct confrontation, especially in circumstances where surate risk of military conflict. The United States’ there is a danger of wider conflict and limited public support status as the world’s strongest military power is increasingly for military involvement. In Syria, the U.S. has partnered challenged. Russia and China, along with less powerful with the Syrian Democratic Forces, which took the lead Iadversaries such as Iran and North Korea, contest U.S. reach in military operations against the Islamic State. Iran has and influence, a development acknowledged in recent U.S. built a network of ideologically committed nonstate proxies defense and security strategies. China’s territorial claims in to provide a so-called resistance axis against Israel, Saudi the South China Sea have strained relations with neighbor- Arabia and hostile Western powers. ing states and could potentially draw China and the U.S. into Proxy forces can include local militias, insurgents and, direct armed conflict. Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014 and most important in this context, private military and secu- violent support for pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine rity companies (PMSCs). A PMSC can be defined as an have generated tensions between Russia and Western states enterprise organized along corporate lines that is formally unprecedented since the Cold War era. contracted to provide military and related security services. Nevertheless, a traditional war between the major powers These services can be restricted to training and support would pose huge military, political and financial risks for the functions but may also include combat activities. The media states involved, as well as unimaginable destruction even if and some lawyers routinely refer to PMSCs as mercenaries. nuclear weapons were not employed. Therefore, great power But according to the relevant United Nations convention of armed conflict remains less likely than aggravated great 1989, mercenaries are individuals hired to fight for private power competition. This competition is evolving toward a gain who are not members of the armed forces of a party zero-sum contest not unlike the rivalry between the West to an armed conflict. Although the legal status of private and the Soviet bloc during the most challenging years of companies that engage in direct combat remains ambiguous, the Cold War. Rather than use direct military force, conflict PMSCs are not proscribed by the U.N. takes place in the so-called gray zone between peace and Until the 19th century, the private sector supplied much war. States employ information and cyber operations, covert of the armed forces of most European states. However, for special forces deployments and proxy warfare to advance most of the last two centuries, a state monopoly on armed their objectives, while seeking to stay below the threshold force was a characteristic of national sovereignty and the that would prompt a robust military response. In an environ- accepted norm for developed states. This changed after the ment of increased tension between the most powerful global Cold War as political, technological and societal develop- players, any low intensity war in which one of these powers ments combined to change the character of armed conflict, is involved, even peripherally, tends to be viewed through the state armed forces shrank in size, and many logistical and lens of great power competition. This includes contemporary training functions were contracted to the private sector. All armed conflicts in Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and Ukraine. major powers now employ PMSCs, and civilian contractors provide critical combat support and combat service support PMSC: THE GLOBAL CONTEXT to state military forces. PMSCs also perform peacekeeping Proxy forces are not a new phenomenon in armed conflict. tasks for the U.N. and other nongovernmental organizations. There are many historical examples where major powers The South African-based PMSC, Executive Outcomes, have provided support for terrorist or insurgent groups conducted successful offensive military operations in Africa in operating on a rival’s territory. The use of proxy forces the 1990s. In 2015, a successor group took the lead in opera- can provide a government with “plausible deniability,” tions in Nigeria against Boko Haram. However, Western states a term that refers to covert activities against rival states have not accepted direct combat operations as a legitimate role executed in such a way that the antagonist can, if necessary, for PMSCs. Although not hired to take part in direct combat, disclaim responsibility with a measure of credibility. Cold PMSCs in Iraq, notably Blackwater and Triple Canopy, War examples include Soviet support for left-wing terrorist engaged in firefights with insurgents early in the conflict. groups in Western Europe and U.S. backing for insurgents These events and reported abuses by private contractors

per Concordiam 57 Members of the elsewhere led to a backlash against PMSCs and China was one of the original signatories pro-Russian 1st Cossack the introduction of regulatory regimes. of the Montreux Document, and its approach Regiment guard a Blackwater, in particular, generated signifi- to PMSCs is broadly similar to that of Western checkpoint just outside Pervomaisk in eastern cant controversy over its heavy-handed use of states. Although China employs a proxy mari- Ukraine, in 2014. lethal force and the apparent lack of oversight. time militia controlled by its military to back Blackwater’s notoriety led the U.S. to reinforce territorial claims in the South China Sea, it does existing limits on the combat role of PMSCs, not employ PMSCs in this role. There are a restricting them to self-defense and the protec- number of domestic and foreign private security tion of clients against unlawful attack. The companies providing protection for Chinese Montreux Document of 2008 established an personnel and assets abroad, but there is no international, nonbinding, regulatory framework Chinese equivalent of Blackwater or the Wagner for PMSCs. It emphasized the defensive role Group from Russia. of these companies and their obligations under international humanitarian law. Most major RUSSIAN PMSCs states signed the agreement and it has had a Russia does not subscribe to the international major effect on the way in which Western states PMSC regulatory regime and, unlike other employ PMSCs. The Montreux Document was powers, deliberately employs PMSCs offensively also welcomed by legitimate military-service in direct combat as well as in supporting roles. providers anxious to protect the reputation of Much about the relationship of Russian PMSCs their businesses. Major PMSCs also instituted with the state remains opaque. Russian journal- a code of conduct to provide ethical and legal ists investigating the Wagner Group have been accountability for their clients. murdered in mysterious circumstances. However,

58 per Concordiam operating alongside the Russian Army, special forces and local with other proxy forces and organized crime groups to desta- militias, PMSCs are well-suited to what Russian analysts refer bilize pro-Western states on NATO’s periphery. Militarized to as “new generation“ or “new type” warfare. In terms of Cossacks, for example, have a central role in Kaliningrad- great power competition, Russian PMSCs act as a force multi- based paramilitary formations prepared for both defensive plier for the Russian armed forces, allow plausible deniability and offensive operations in and around the enclave. In 2019, for gray zone operations, and provide a means by which there were about 200,000 government registered Cossacks Russia can seek to reestablish influence in regions of strategic in Russia. The Cossacks provide a considerable reserve of or economic interest. manpower, although in general they do not have the military Military provider companies are illegal under the Russian skills of the PMSCs that recruit retired military personnel constitution and criminal code, but these enterprises are and train with heavy weaponry. registered abroad, allowing the state to distance itself from The third category is military provider companies such their activities. The Kremlin, for example, has denied that as Wagner. These PMSCs are the major nonstate actors for Russian “volunteers” in Ukraine and Syria are accountable Russia’s new type of warfare. Although technically private, to the state or its armed forces. However, Russian President these enterprises often act as state proxy forces working directly Vladimir Putin acknowledged in an interview in 2012 that or indirectly with the Russian armed forces. PMSCs are also PMSCs were “a way of implementing national interests used to further their owners’ business interests, while the threat without the direct involvement of the state.” Like their of potential prosecution ensures that their profit-generating Western counterparts, Russian PMSCs are also significantly activities do not clash with Russian state interests and priorities. cheaper to employ than regular contract soldiers. Using Wagner director Yevgeny Prigozhin, for example, is believed to PMSCs in combat also reduces casualties in the official have received 25% of the proceeds from recaptured oil wells in armed forces, while the loss of operatives widely considered Syria. Conversely, two leaders of the Slavonic Corps, an earlier to be illegal mercenaries provokes little public concern. The PMSC, were convicted of mercenary activities after falling memory of the negative impact on Russian public opinion afoul of the Federal Security Service. of conscript casualties during the Afghan and Chechen wars The Vostok Battalion was Russia’s first modern military is certainly a major factor in the state’s readiness to employ provider PMSC. Vostok was formed during the second PMSCs in war zones. Chechnya war, where it distinguished itself by terrorizing Wagner is by no means Russia’s only PMSC, although the civilian population. Despite engaging in criminal activi- it is by far the most prominent. The U.S. Army’s Foreign ties during the war, the company’s activities were clearly Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, sanctioned by the state as it worked closely with the Main estimates that there are roughly 700,000 security contrac- Intelligence Directorate (GRU). Vostok also fought alongside tors in Russia. Operatives belong to three distinct types of Russian forces in South Ossetia during the 2008 invasion of nonstate irregular forces, although the differences between Georgia and played a significant operational role in eastern categories are often blurred. First, there are PMSCs that Ukraine. This reportedly included coercive action against provide personnel and infrastructure security and logistic local separatists who threatened to become too independent and training support in a similar fashion to Western PMSCs. of Russian control. These companies are profit-seeking enterprises that, unlike military providers, have been technically legal in Russia since THE WAGNER GROUP: RUSSIA’S PREMIER PMSC 1992. Examples include the Russian Security Service (RSB) The Wagner Group also has close links with the GRU and and the Moran Security Group. These companies provide was led in Ukraine by Dmitry Utkin, a retired senior officer services for Russian and international clients, including the of Spetsnaz, the Russian special forces. Despite being an U.N. Although RSB, in particular, claims not to take part in “illegal” organization, Wagner’s training bases are on military conflicts, its founder, Oleg Krinitsyn, has boasted Russian soil and its leaders have received state gallantry about his group’s ability to supply highly trained fighters. awards. The Wagner Group first came to prominence Elements of Moran Security also set up the ill-fated military- operating alongside covert special forces in Crimea. The provider company, Slavonic Corps, to take advantage of Wagner Group also fought in eastern Ukraine, including opportunities provided by the war in Syria. at the major battle of Debaltseve in 2015. Like the Vostok The second category is volunteer citizen militias. These Battalion, it enforced a pro-Kremlin order on local militias. have historically exercised security, combat and civil admin- Wagner deployed over 2,000 troops in Syria organized istrative functions on behalf of the state. Cossack groups into four brigades, structured and commanded similarly to are the most significant. Their reach has increased since the Russian Army. The group was used in direct combat Putin came power and they have been used as an informal in lieu of Russian troops, notably in the battle for Palmyra arm of the state to suppress street protests against his rule. in March 2016. However, after 2016, the Russian Defense The major Cossack group, the All-Powerful Don Host, has Ministry ceased direct involvement with the Wagner Group. operated with Russian troops or independently in combat Instead, the PMSC was contracted by the Syrian govern- in Chechnya, Georgia and Ukraine. Cossack organizations ment to recapture Islamic State-held oil and gas facilities. tend to share the current Russian government’s ideological Consequently, the Syrian authorities took over pay, logisti- antipathy to the West and could, therefore, be used along cal and tactical support.

per Concordiam 59 This business center in The Wagner Group received unwelcome rivalry between the Russian Defense Ministry St. Petersburg, Russia, is global publicity when, along with Syrian and Wagner’s director, Prigozhin, a prominent home to a “troll factory” militias, it mounted a major attack against a oligarch and convicted criminal who is close to that practices internet sabotage and is said to U.S.-supported, Kurdish-controlled military base Putin. He has developed a portfolio of enter- be controlled by Yevgeny at Deir el-Zour in February 2018. U.S. retalia- prises, including the Wagner Group, which, like Prigozhin, director tory airstrikes caused hundreds of casualties. other oligarch-owned Russian businesses, gener- of military-provider Both before, during and after the attack, the ates profits and serves the interests of the state company Wagner Group. Russian high command denied involvement or when required. any responsibility for the fighters. However, the The Wagner Group has expanded its area Kremlin was aware of the attack, and wounded of operations since 2018 and increasingly can be Wagner fighters were evacuated on Russian mili- regarded as something of an umbrella organiza- tary aircraft to Russian military hospitals. The tion. Working with Russian military advisers and Deir el-Zour battle illustrates the complicated instructors, Wagner and affiliates provide military, nature of the Russian state’s relationship with security and training services in Burundi, the PMSCs, what Mark Galeotti and other analysts Central African Republic (CAR), Libya, Sudan describe as Russia’s “hybrid state,” where public and a number of other states. Russian PMSCs and private, military and civilian, legal and are cheaper and tend to be less squeamish illegal all interact under Putin’s patrimonial about human rights abuses than their U.S. or rule. There remains much speculation as to British counterparts. Wagner, for example, has why the assault was allowed to take place. Some been linked to the torture of prisoners in Syria. have suggested that official indifference to the Russia’s activities combine strategic and commer- fate of the Wagner operatives was the result of cial interests. Libya, Mozambique and Venezuela

60 per Concordiam are rich in natural resources, which Russian oligarchs seek to insurgents. This failure suggests that Russian PMSCs may get exploit. PMSC operations also provide Russia with political sucked into counterinsurgency operations in Africa for which influence in client states, confounding Western interests by they have no experience or aptitude. protecting authoritarian and repressive regimes, such as those in CAR, Nicaragua and Venezuela. CONCLUSIONS Private contractors are also involved in “patriotic” As noted, Russia wages its gray-zone, hybrid competition with education and information warfare, including operations the U.S. and its allies through psychological and information directed at the West. The E.N.O.T. Corp, for example, warfare, political subversion, espionage and proxy forces. organizes military training in youth camps in Russia and Contemporary Russia operates in a way that would be recog- elsewhere in the post-Soviet space, including a camp held in nized by its Soviet predecessor, employing “active measures” Serbia in 2018. It is believed to act as a recruitment agent for the 21st century. In comparison to China, the U.S. or the for the Wagner Group and may also have been involved in Europan Union, Russia lacks persuasive economic or soft- training far-right extremists from the West. Prigozhin also power resources with which to influence client states. Except funds the troll factory known for its hard-power, military, as the Internet Research strategic assets, it operates from Agency in St. Petersburg, a position of relative weakness. which notoriously sought to Nevertheless, Russia effectively influence the outcome of the leverages these means to project U.S. presidential election in power and influence with mili- 2016. Wagner and affiliates tary assistance, including direct have also conducted disinfor- combat, arms sales and informa- mation campaigns in Africa on tion warfare capabilities. It has behalf of client governments also been willing to capitalize on through local media. Since current American unwillingness the cyber denial of service — following bruising campaigns attacks against Estonia in 2007, in Iraq and Afghanistan — to Russian private cyber opera- intervene in fragile states or tives, including members of against rogue states and oppres- leading PMSCs, have mounted sive rulers. consistent information warfare Although plausible deniability against Western targets as has its limits, Russian PMSCs, proxies for the Russian intel- along with other proxy forces, ligence services. offer the state a means of power Most Russian military- projection with relatively low provider contractors have Yevgeny Prigozhin risks to the state’s diplomatic and proved motivated and deter- military reputations. Despite a mined fighters, even when overmatched as at Deir el-Zour. growing awareness of Russian stratagems, the lack of incontro- Despite relatively high casualty rates, Russian PMSCs have vertible evidence of Russian state involvement might confuse no trouble attracting recruits, especially in the current and complicate NATO and EU members’ decision-making economic circumstances. However, the military provider in a crisis, as was the case with Ukraine in 2014. Like Western PMSCs are not nearly as effective as Russian regular forces. states, Russia uses PMSCs to reduce the human and financial Combat successes to date have been achieved against costs of military intervention. But unlike the West, the leaders weakened Ukrainian opponents or technologically limited of the Russian state use its notionally private military compa- enemies, such as anti-Assad militias. In Syria and Libya, nies to mix geostrategic considerations with business interests. the Wagner Group has suffered significant casualties and Western policymakers and military and security officials reversals when undertaking offensive operations against have yet to focus on the hybrid threat from Russian PMSCs sophisticated opponents. In May 2020, Russian aircraft were as instruments of Russia’s foreign and security policy. In deployed to Libya to provide close air support to the Libyan 2017, the U.S. Treasury Department applied sanctions National Army and its Wagner Group proxies after they against the Wagner Group and Prigozhin, but there has had suffered a series of defeats at the hands of the Turkish- been a general reluctance in NATO to link the Russian backed Government of National Accord. Despite hard state directly to the activities of PMSCs. As PMSC scholars evidence to the contrary provided by U.S. Africa Command, Christopher Spearin argued in 2018, naming and shaming Russian officials continued to deny any involvement, stretch- the Russian state for employing mercenaries in contrast to ing “plausible deniability” to the limit. Wagner operatives the regulations that govern Western PMSCs — and asserting that deployed to Mozambique in 2019 were ill-suited to the that states cannot deny the activities of private companies terrain and the tactical situation in Cabo Delgado and had to undertaking military activities on their behalf — would at be withdrawn from operations against Islamic State-affiliated least be a start. o

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