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Perceptions and Courses of Actions Toward Iran Jo-Anne Hart, Ph.D

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Perceptions and Courses of Actions Toward Iran Jo-Anne Hart, Ph.D Perceptions and Courses of Actions toward Iran Jo-Anne Hart, Ph.D. AKE THIS QUICK QUIZ: In which Islamic tional Crisis Group.3 That is quite a challenging theocracy were there immediate and repeated idea for most Americans, who continue to imagine Tpublic outpourings of sympathy for Americans Iranians chanting “Death to America” and calling following the 9/11 attacks in 2001? If you did not us the “Great Satan”—rhetoric that dates from 1979 know about the several candlelight vigils in Iran, but is little in play in Iran today. However, concep- you are not alone. In fact, few Americans know tions from the hostage-crisis period of that year that hundreds of Iranians gathered publicly to pay appear to still dominate American interpretation of their respects and to show their solidarity with the current events. That signal event of America held American people, first on 13 September, then in hostage is a collective wound that helps perpetuate two other vigils. The crowds chanted “Death to certain conceptions about Iranian intentions. terrorism!” “Death to Bin Laden!” and, “America: That the hostage-crisis period remains manifest condolences, condolences!” Three days after the in the American emotional perception of Iran after attacks, a moment of silence for the American a quarter century was quickly revealed recently tragedy was held before the start of the World when some of the former hostages mistakenly Cup-qualifying soccer game, the same day the Teh- identified the newly elected Iranian president as ran Friday prayer leader said the terrorist attacks one of their captors. Major news sources featured against America were “heart-rending. Everyone accusatory photos purporting to show Mahmoud condemns, denounces, and is saddened . by it.”1 Ahmadinejad with blindfolded American hostages. While note of the candlelight vigils appeared in And, although a month later the stories were finally some Western papers, The Wall Street Journal, for reported as false, the public rehashing of Iran’s example, Iranian sympathy for the U.S. terrorist flagrant disregard for international law and the tragedy is largely unknown here.2 reinscribing of the enemy for the American public Because of widespread predetermined and un- was easily given major attention using the hostage- challenged assumptions about Iran, these sorts of crisis fulcrum, which seemed to be a well-timed, positive public attitudes are not just unfamiliar but politically motivated reaction to the election of a are also nearly inconceivable to many Americans. conservative Iranian president. American misperception and a lack of clear think- In 2002, being included in U.S. President George ing about Iran significantly affect policymaking W. Bush’s speech defining the Axis of Evil was an and unnecessarily close off policy options. offensive surprise to Iranians who felt their sus- Currently, the United States is grappling with tained cooperation with U.S. policy in Afghanistan how to respond to suspected Iranian development made that designation particularly unjust. Both of a nuclear weapons capability while Iran’s 2005 publicly and privately Iran cooperated with the presidential elections just constituted a conserva- United States in supporting the Northern Alliance tive monopoly over domestic political institutions. and in establishing the Karzai Government.4 Iran Significant features of Iranian demographics pres- was a longstanding opponent of the Taliban, and ent both an opportunity for a major political break- throughout U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan, through as well as the conditions for potential seri- Iran has assisted on a range of issues. Linking ous long-term hostilities with the United States. Iran to Iraq and North Korea, Bush declared that “states like these, and their terrorist allies, consti- Capabilities, Intentions, tute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace and Perceptions of the world.”5 Iranians deeply objected that even “The paradox of Iran is that it just might be the their cooperative behavior could not overcome most pro-American or, perhaps, least anti-Ameri- America’s expectations of hostile intent. Bush pro- can, populace in the Muslim world,” says Karim claimed, “Some of these regimes have been pretty Sadjadpour, an analyst in Tehran for the Interna- quiet since September the 11th. But we know their September-October 2005 MILITARY REVIEW 9 true nature.”6 Americans have difficulty crediting gists to guard against a distorted image of reality positive Iranian behavior or challenging longstand- and false expectations of Iranian behavior. We find ing patterned expectations about a threatening it all but impossible to apply cultural relativity to Iran. This is not to argue that Iranian behavior is consider Iran’s perspective. We risk rationalizing unblemished; however, allowing prejudice to guide what we want to do instead of making the best analysis and interpretation works against good U.S. choices using the clearest analysis. We do not take security policymaking. seriously the priority Iran places on its perceived Strategists tend to ascribe worst-case hostile independence and international reputation. We intentions to enemies. This is regarded as pru- do not credit Iran’s legitimate security interests dent security planning. We regard capabilities as or sovereign national goals to protect itself. We synonymous with intentions when in fact they do not empathize with Iran being surrounded by are uncertain guides. Worst-case planning is not a self-professed antagonist’s forces on two fronts always most effective. Not only can it be wasteful, (American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan). Nor do it can also create unintended consequences for the we countenance Iran’s fears of living in a danger- adversary’s choices as well as false confidence in ous neighborhood. (Israel, Russia, China, Pakistan, our own leaders’ options. Conflating capabilities and India all can target Iran with nuclear weapons.) and intentions without enough regard to the com- But of more significance, perhaps, is that the Unit- plexities of context reveals the inability to conceive ed States disregards Iranian security and assumes of security requirements from the adversary’s Iran’s ambitions must be bellicose. U.S. policy perspective. This is what writer Ken Booth de- discussions about military options against Iran scribes as the detriment inherent in culture-bound might well create an incentive for Iran to acquire ethnocentric strategy: “Strategy is a universal pre- nuclear weapons to deter such an attack.9 occupation, but its meaning is always contextual, Furthermore, these public debates take place set by the peculiar problems, perceptions, interests, within the larger context of an explicitly stated traditions, and ideologies of those with whom we U.S. national security strategy of preemptive use are dealing. Those cannot be understood without a of force. U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan feeling for cultural relativity.”7 This is particularly demonstrate that assertive force is central to our troubling given our widespread lack of knowledge strategy in the region. The dynamic “security and understanding of Iran. dilemma” means that what the United States does Why should it matter if the Bush Administration to enhance its own security can inadvertently be a is not capable of applying relativity to this context threat to itself by appearing to threaten others. or of seeing security through the prism of the Irani- What the United States expects to deter Iranian be- ans? because we risk misperception and poor poli- havior might have the opposite effect. In this spe- cy decisions. Thirty years ago Klaus Knorr argued cific context, sticks are more likely to beget sticks. that “[t]he greatest dangers to realistic threat perception do not inhere in the intellectual dif- Interpreting Nuclear Intentions ficulties resulting from poor evidence and future Iran proposes to develop nuclear fuel-cycle tech- uncertainty. The greater danger lies in rigid pre- nology for civilian energy generation, and a large- conceptions and attitudes of which the perceiver scale nuclear power plant is nearing completion is unaware, or not aware enough. Such precon- in Bushehr. Iran states that its nuclear power will ceptions make him desire to see certain things help free up oil and natural gas resources for ex- happen, and to make what he wants to do seem port to generate necessary hard-currency revenues. justified. And the push and pull of emotions that Under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), are . attached also to foreign actors in such forms which Iran ratified in 1970, it is permitted to have as hatred and contempt can lead the perceiver a civilian nuclear-energy program. But because astray. These intervening preconceptions and this technology is dual-use, its development can attitudes produce selectivity in the receipt and use be used to support the view, like that held by the of information; they therefore contribute to a dis- Bush Administration, that Iran intends to acquire torted image of reality and to false expectations.”8 nuclear weapons. Before the U.S. House Interna- Not unlike the mind’s observable preference for tional Relations Committee Subcommittee on the bringing conflicting information and needs into Middle East and Central Asia, John R. Bolton testi- internal consonance (dissonance theory), in strat- fied that “[t]he United States strongly believes that egy there is a tendency to manipulate the interpre- Iran has a clandestine program to produce nuclear tation of enemy capabilities to serve one’s own weapons, and has been warning publicly about preconceived images. When this occurs, it leads Tehran’s weapons ambitions for over a decade.”10 to misperception. In this area, assumptions about Iranian behavior Given the U.S. experience with Iran since the influence the interpretation of what evidence is 1978-1979 revolution, it is difficult for U.S. strate- available, and interpretations vary greatly. Iran’s 10 MILITARY REVIEW September-October 2005 PERCEPTIONS OF IRAN Nuclear reactors of the type that the Russian govern- ment has contracted to build at Bushehr Iran.
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