Perceptions and Courses of Actions toward Iran Jo-Anne Hart, Ph.D.
AKE THIS QUICK QUIZ: In which Islamic tional Crisis Group.3 That is quite a challenging theocracy were there immediate and repeated idea for most Americans, who continue to imagine Tpublic outpourings of sympathy for Americans Iranians chanting “Death to America” and calling following the 9/11 attacks in 2001? If you did not us the “Great Satan”—rhetoric that dates from 1979 know about the several candlelight vigils in Iran, but is little in play in Iran today. However, concep- you are not alone. In fact, few Americans know tions from the hostage-crisis period of that year that hundreds of Iranians gathered publicly to pay appear to still dominate American interpretation of their respects and to show their solidarity with the current events. That signal event of America held American people, first on 13 September, then in hostage is a collective wound that helps perpetuate two other vigils. The crowds chanted “Death to certain conceptions about Iranian intentions. terrorism!” “Death to Bin Laden!” and, “America: That the hostage-crisis period remains manifest condolences, condolences!” Three days after the in the American emotional perception of Iran after attacks, a moment of silence for the American a quarter century was quickly revealed recently tragedy was held before the start of the World when some of the former hostages mistakenly Cup-qualifying soccer game, the same day the Teh- identified the newly elected Iranian president as ran Friday prayer leader said the terrorist attacks one of their captors. Major news sources featured against America were “heart-rending. . . . Everyone accusatory photos purporting to show Mahmoud condemns, denounces, and is saddened . . . by it.”1 Ahmadinejad with blindfolded American hostages. While note of the candlelight vigils appeared in And, although a month later the stories were finally some Western papers, The Wall Street Journal, for reported as false, the public rehashing of Iran’s example, Iranian sympathy for the U.S. terrorist flagrant disregard for international law and the tragedy is largely unknown here.2 reinscribing of the enemy for the American public Because of widespread predetermined and un- was easily given major attention using the hostage- challenged assumptions about Iran, these sorts of crisis fulcrum, which seemed to be a well-timed, positive public attitudes are not just unfamiliar but politically motivated reaction to the election of a are also nearly inconceivable to many Americans. conservative Iranian president. American misperception and a lack of clear think- In 2002, being included in U.S. President George ing about Iran significantly affect policymaking W. Bush’s speech defining the Axis of Evil was an and unnecessarily close off policy options. offensive surprise to Iranians who felt their sus- Currently, the United States is grappling with tained cooperation with U.S. policy in Afghanistan how to respond to suspected Iranian development made that designation particularly unjust. Both of a nuclear weapons capability while Iran’s 2005 publicly and privately Iran cooperated with the presidential elections just constituted a conserva- United States in supporting the Northern Alliance tive monopoly over domestic political institutions. and in establishing the Karzai Government.4 Iran Significant features of Iranian demographics pres- was a longstanding opponent of the Taliban, and ent both an opportunity for a major political break- throughout U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan, through as well as the conditions for potential seri- Iran has assisted on a range of issues. Linking ous long-term hostilities with the United States. Iran to Iraq and North Korea, Bush declared that “states like these, and their terrorist allies, consti- Capabilities, Intentions, tute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace and Perceptions of the world.”5 Iranians deeply objected that even “The paradox of Iran is that it just might be the their cooperative behavior could not overcome most pro-American or, perhaps, least anti-Ameri- America’s expectations of hostile intent. Bush pro- can, populace in the Muslim world,” says Karim claimed, “Some of these regimes have been pretty Sadjadpour, an analyst in Tehran for the Interna- quiet since September the 11th. But we know their
September-October 2005 MILITARY REVIEW 9 true nature.”6 Americans have difficulty crediting gists to guard against a distorted image of reality positive Iranian behavior or challenging longstand- and false expectations of Iranian behavior. We find ing patterned expectations about a threatening it all but impossible to apply cultural relativity to Iran. This is not to argue that Iranian behavior is consider Iran’s perspective. We risk rationalizing unblemished; however, allowing prejudice to guide what we want to do instead of making the best analysis and interpretation works against good U.S. choices using the clearest analysis. We do not take security policymaking. seriously the priority Iran places on its perceived Strategists tend to ascribe worst-case hostile independence and international reputation. We intentions to enemies. This is regarded as pru- do not credit Iran’s legitimate security interests dent security planning. We regard capabilities as or sovereign national goals to protect itself. We synonymous with intentions when in fact they do not empathize with Iran being surrounded by are uncertain guides. Worst-case planning is not a self-professed antagonist’s forces on two fronts always most effective. Not only can it be wasteful, (American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan). Nor do it can also create unintended consequences for the we countenance Iran’s fears of living in a danger- adversary’s choices as well as false confidence in ous neighborhood. (Israel, Russia, China, Pakistan, our own leaders’ options. Conflating capabilities and India all can target Iran with nuclear weapons.) and intentions without enough regard to the com- But of more significance, perhaps, is that the Unit- plexities of context reveals the inability to conceive ed States disregards Iranian security and assumes of security requirements from the adversary’s Iran’s ambitions must be bellicose. U.S. policy perspective. This is what writer Ken Booth de- discussions about military options against Iran scribes as the detriment inherent in culture-bound might well create an incentive for Iran to acquire ethnocentric strategy: “Strategy is a universal pre- nuclear weapons to deter such an attack.9 occupation, but its meaning is always contextual, Furthermore, these public debates take place set by the peculiar problems, perceptions, interests, within the larger context of an explicitly stated traditions, and ideologies of those with whom we U.S. national security strategy of preemptive use are dealing. Those cannot be understood without a of force. U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan feeling for cultural relativity.”7 This is particularly demonstrate that assertive force is central to our troubling given our widespread lack of knowledge strategy in the region. The dynamic “security and understanding of Iran. dilemma” means that what the United States does Why should it matter if the Bush Administration to enhance its own security can inadvertently be a is not capable of applying relativity to this context threat to itself by appearing to threaten others. or of seeing security through the prism of the Irani- What the United States expects to deter Iranian be- ans? because we risk misperception and poor poli- havior might have the opposite effect. In this spe- cy decisions. Thirty years ago Klaus Knorr argued cific context, sticks are more likely to beget sticks. that “[t]he greatest dangers to realistic threat perception do not inhere in the intellectual dif- Interpreting Nuclear Intentions ficulties resulting from poor evidence and future Iran proposes to develop nuclear fuel-cycle tech- uncertainty. . . . The greater danger lies in rigid pre- nology for civilian energy generation, and a large- conceptions and attitudes of which the perceiver scale nuclear power plant is nearing completion is unaware, or not aware enough. Such precon- in Bushehr. Iran states that its nuclear power will ceptions make him desire to see certain things help free up oil and natural gas resources for ex- happen, and to make what he wants to do seem port to generate necessary hard-currency revenues. justified. And the push and pull of emotions that Under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), are . . . attached also to foreign actors in such forms which Iran ratified in 1970, it is permitted to have as hatred and contempt can lead the perceiver a civilian nuclear-energy program. But because astray. These intervening preconceptions and this technology is dual-use, its development can attitudes produce selectivity in the receipt and use be used to support the view, like that held by the of information; they therefore contribute to a dis- Bush Administration, that Iran intends to acquire torted image of reality and to false expectations.”8 nuclear weapons. Before the U.S. House Interna- Not unlike the mind’s observable preference for tional Relations Committee Subcommittee on the bringing conflicting information and needs into Middle East and Central Asia, John R. Bolton testi- internal consonance (dissonance theory), in strat- fied that “[t]he United States strongly believes that egy there is a tendency to manipulate the interpre- Iran has a clandestine program to produce nuclear tation of enemy capabilities to serve one’s own weapons, and has been warning publicly about preconceived images. When this occurs, it leads Tehran’s weapons ambitions for over a decade.”10 to misperception. In this area, assumptions about Iranian behavior Given the U.S. experience with Iran since the influence the interpretation of what evidence is 1978-1979 revolution, it is difficult for U.S. strate- available, and interpretations vary greatly. Iran’s
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Nuclear reactors of the type that the Russian govern- ment has contracted to build at Bushehr Iran. globatsecurity.com insistence that it is pursuing only peaceful uses pension of enrichment activities as long as nego- for its nuclear program is on the far end from such tiations with Europe continue.15 Iran’s resumption alarmist portrayals as “Tehran’s example of us- of operations to produce uranium gas has revived ing the NPT and the International Atomic Energy conjecture about a UN Security Council resolu- Agency (IAEA) to get within weeks of having a tion against Iran’s development program even as large arsenal of nuclear weapons.”11 The new U.S. EU negotiations are meant to move forward. In National Intelligence Estimate projects that Iran September 2005, the IAEA voted to refer Iran to is “about a decade” from manufacturing needed the Security Council for its violations under the nuclear weapon materials, and Israel has recently NPT. The resolution declares Iran guilty of “many adjusted its estimates of when it believes Iran will failures and breaches of its obligations.”16 Both the have nuclear weapons to as early as 2008 but, more timing and outcome of bringing Iran’s nuclear pro- probably, it will be by 2012.12 gram up for sanctions before the Security Council Since February 1992 Iran has allowed the IAEA are unclear, particularly given the objections of to inspect any of its nuclear facilities. Before 2003 Russia, China, potentially India, and some other no IAEA inspections had reported any Iranian nations. In Iran’s view its pursuit of nuclear energy violations of the NPT. The IAEA has since fault- remains legal and legitimate while this latest effort ed Iranian compliance for some undeclared by the IAEA Board appears more politicized than activities in its nuclear program, while Iran dis- ever. By way of comparison, last year South Korea putes some of the charges.13 It has been alleged was forced to disclose its secret nuclear research that Iran violated its formal responsibilities under program. Subsequently, South Korea was found to the NPT by covertly enriching uranium gas. Iran’s have violated nonproliferation obligations when consistent claims that uranium-enriched particles it had conducted chemical uranium enrichment found during inspections of its facilities were the from 1979 to 1981; separated small quantities of result of contaminated equipment it purchased plutonium in 1982; experimented with uranium externally have been vindicated by ongoing UN enrichment in 2000; and manufactured depleted testing. A considerable literature follows the uranium munitions from 1983 to 1987. Despite dispute.14 the fact that these violations went unreported to Iran and the European Union (EU), represented the IAEA, no demands to totally abandon their by Britain, France, and Germany, have been nego- programs have been made.17 tiating over what Iran sees as its right to have an That Iran has tried to hide any part of its produc- independent civilian nuclear power program, as tion, no matter the details and their significance, is guaranteed by the Nonproliferation Treaty. Under enough for some to conclude that Iran intends to international pressure, Iran suspended its nuclear produce nuclear weapons. Taken alone, Iran’s re- programs in November 2004. In August 2005 fusal to disclose every aspect of its activities does Iran informed the UN it would resume producing not necessarily imply that Iran plans to develop uranium gas but would continue its voluntary sus- nuclear weapons. To conclude Iran’s guilt on the
September-October 2005 MILITARY REVIEW 11 basis of its supposed duplicity is an important logi- on a study it commissioned, “[i]t is clear . . . cal fallacy known as “affirming the consequent.” the arguments as to whether Iran has a genuine The logical misstep would be manifested as the requirement for domestically produced nuclear following: If Iran were secretly trying to acquire electricity are not all, or even predominantly, on nuclear weapons it would engage in long-lasting, one side.”24 Meanwhile, Iran is attempting to signal complex negotiations with the IAEA (if A, then that it will be incapable of using its civilian fuel B). Since Iran is engaging in long-lasting negotia- for bombmaking. According to a pact signed in tions with the IAEA, it is secretly trying to acquire February 2005, Russia will supply the fuel for an nuclear weapons (since B, then A).18 Iranian nuclear power plant and Tehran will return Preconceived notions of Iranian motives can the spent fuel. Still, when Iran quickly rejected the dominate the interpretation of Iran’s intentions. European proposal to give up control of its nuclear Looking at the same information, those who are energy program in exchange for a range of incen- already convinced about the Iranian threat can see tives still to be developed, the dispute heated up no validity in Iran’s claim that its program is con- considerably. To many Westerners, Iran’s refusal sistent with its fossil-fuel resources and that it does to take the deal reinforced assumptions that it is not intend to build the bomb. The U.S. Department determined to build nuclear weapons. Bush said of State argues: “No comparable oil-rich nation has he was skeptical a diplomatic solution could be ever engaged, or would be engaged, in this set of found.25 However, to Iran it looked like their un- activities—or would pursue them for nearly two deniable right to autonomy was at stake with too decades behind a continuing cloud of secrecy and little offered in return. lies to IAEA inspectors and the international com- There are two points here. One is that the United munity—unless it was dead set on building nuclear States has trouble assessing Iran’s nuclear capabili- weapons.”19 In the same article that implies the ties and intentions and could scarcely be persuaded Iranian bomb is only weeks away, Henry Sokolski that Iran is not lying. More important is that even and Patrick Clawson argue: “If Iran wants, it has if Iran is not to be believed and if there is no doubt all that it needs eventually to build a bomb on its about its ambitions to build nuclear weapons, the own.”20 The Bush Administration said, “Ongoing facts do not change basic U.S. policy options, as IAEA investigations confirm many of our most discussed below. troubling suspicions [that] for at least 18 years, Iran has been in serious violation of its NPT ob- Selective Perceptions: ligations.”21 Assessing Pakistan vs. Iran The Nonproliferation Treaty not only legally In analyzing the distinction between capabilities entitles Iran to produce civilian nuclear power, and intentions and the extent to which the United but during the 1970s the United States vigorously States might filter its perceptions about Iran, a coaxed Iran to opt for nuclear energy and initially comparison can help. Consider the three main favored the Bushehr facility. In fact, the United reasons the United States finds Iran threatening: States perceived Iran’s plans for using civilian nuclear weapons, terrorism, and the repressive, nuclear power to enhance its economy as legiti- authoritarian nature of its regime. mate while the Shah controlled the country. Yet, Nuclear weapons. Iran is held to account for as the Islamic Republic of Iran has attempted to what the United States considers defiance of the benefit by restructuring its mix of domestic energy international community in developing nuclear sources, it has faced a far different reaction in the weapons. If we apply this same violations list to United States. Pakistan, there are commonalities. The United With Iran’s large population, energy consump- States did not look on with favor as Pakistan de- tion is rising by around 7 percent annually. Iran veloped nuclear weapons, in part clandestinely, but estimates it might need to generate some 90 the United States did abandon some initial sanc- gigawatts (GW) by 2020, up from about 31 GW tions, despite the destabilizing effect of Pakistan’s at present. Analyst Pavel Baev agrees: “Despite weapons on regional security. The United States [Iran’s] being very rich in energy (resources), nu- also resumed foreign aid to Pakistan, aid unrelated clear energy makes perfect sense.”22 Iran is not the to 9/11 and the Global War on Terrorism. only resource-rich country to diversify its energy A national hero in Pakistan, scientist Abdul Qa- needs away from hydrocarbons. Russia, a major deer Khan, distributed nuclear weapons knowledge, oil exporter with huge gas reserves, is a leading materials, and equipment for two decades using a nuclear-energy power. OPEC member Venezuela worldwide network of associates. Khan is classed meets more than 70 percent of its electricity needs among the gravest threats to current international from hydroelectric power.23 security. In an article for The Washington Quar- The Foreign Affairs Select Committee of the terly, David Albright and Corey Hinderstein wrote, British Parliament said in March 2005 that based “The CIA’s George Tenet reportedly described
12 MILITARY REVIEW September-October 2005 PERCEPTIONS OF IRAN
Khan as being ‘at least as dangerous as Osama bin- sold the means to proliferate nuclear weapons, and Laden.’”26 After Khan’s nuclear capabilities sales is under suspicion of harboring the terrorist whom network was exposed in 2003, little was done. (The the United States most wants to apprehend, U.S. Pakistani president eventually pardoned Khan, who treatment of Pakistan could hardly be more differ- is sequestered in Pakistan but living in admirable ent than its treatment of Iran. If Pakistani behavior style, and the Pakistan Government will not allow does not warrant U.S. opprobrium, does Iranian Khan to be interviewed by outsiders.) behavior? It is useful here to question the role of Terrorism. Iran has primarily targeted its own perception and what Knorr described as the inter- dissidents, which presumably the United States vening preconceptions and attitudes that produce cares less about than terrorism toward Americans selectivity in the receipt and use of information. or their allies. Of more international concern is Iranian support for anti-Israel terrorist groups.27 But The Iranian Context to date, in the public domain at least, there is only Before moving forward to explicitly consider tenuous evidence of any state-sponsored Iranian U.S. policy choices in detail, some background connection with al-Qaeda. discussion of Iran is necessary. A short overview For evidence of Pakistan’s complicity in terror- of key relevant social attitudes, economic issues, ism, Khan’s nuclear proliferation might suffice. current political dynamics, and age demographics But Bin Laden might also figure in the Pakistani provides more of the context of what is ignored ledger. In the United States, the suspicion is that when unexamined U.S. preconceptions guide Pakistan is harboring this “mother of all terrorists.” consideration of the political and military environ- And by its own admission, Pakistan is reluctant to ment. extradite, or even capture, Bin Laden. As recently National pride and honor are elements of Iran’s as July 2005 on primetime American television, political culture, especially as they pertain to rela- Pakistan’s president pointedly refused to agree to tions with outsiders. Since the time when the Per- hand over Bin Laden if he were caught in Pakistan. sian kings literally “sold out” to Western “buyers,” CIA head Porter Goss has said U.S. intelligence to the perfidious colonial period in the early 20th “has an excellent idea of where Bin Laden is but century, through the painful Cold-War decades of we are probably not going to bring Mr. Bin Laden U.S. interventionism that thwarted organic political to justice because (of) very difficult questions development, Iran has sought respect, equal regard, dealing with sanctuaries in sovereign states.”28 and independence from foreign control. Pride, dig- An ABC News interviewer told President General nity, and the need for autonomy are also reflected Pervez Musharraf that “most people read this as in the people’s attitude toward attaining a nuclear Pakistan won’t [allow the United States to] go in capability. In an otherwise divided political society, [to] grab him.”29 Musharraf did not contradict this there is a consensus in favor of nuclear power: statement. “From nuclear negotiators to student dissidents, Repressive authoritarian rule. No serious from bazaar merchants to turbaned mullahs, Irani- external debate is ongoing as to the repressive, ans agree: The right to develop nuclear power is a authoritarian character of the Pakistani regime point of national pride.”31 and its abuse of human rights. Factually, there is Iranians, like many others around the globe, are a strong argument that the flawed Iranian political deeply sensitive to what they perceive as the ar- system is at least no worse than Pakistan’s. By the rogance of the United States. We appear to reserve U.S. Government’s assessment, Musharraf’s con- for ourselves special rights and privileges to act as solidation of power was deeply problematic. U.S. we choose while denying others, like Iran, their Department of State reports describe Pakistan’s legitimate rights and autonomy. Iranians bristle at poor human rights record, citing numerous cases U.S. unilateralism and the disrespect with which of police abuse and rape of citizens, including kill- we treat them and many other states. Among the ing political detainees and shooting protestors in first things Ahmadinejad declared after his election public.30 Yet, the United States plans to give Paki- was that the United States would not be permitted stan $3 billion in aid over the next 5 years. Bush to dictate Iranian behavior; he warned the United accorded Pakistan the status of a major non-NATO States against issuing demands to his country.32 An ally in 2004, making it one of the few countries activist U.S. antinationalist policy in Iran during (along with South Korea and Israel) entitled to the Cold War left major scars on Iranian attitudes generous deals on U.S. military and financial aid. toward the United States. Pakistan provides an example where meeting The political structure of the Islamic Republic some key threat criteria is not sufficient to invite reserves for its conservative religious leaders the U.S. policy condemnation or punitive action. Al- power to avert reforms they do not approve of, though Pakistan’s repressive government has open- even when changes are popular. These conserva- ly produced nuclear weapons, has clandestinely tive arms of the Republic approve laws passed by
September-October 2005 MILITARY REVIEW 13 Parliament and vet candidates for elections. The of closing the gap between rich and poor and curb- Guardian Council (a supra-influential body of mul- ing corruption, Ahmadinejad tapped into economic lahs) and the Supreme Leader (vilayet-e faqih [the burdens borne by many constituents, particularly chief religious leader]) cannot be challenged except the urban poor, who were unmoved by other pres- by constitutional reform. For nearly a decade, the idential candidates. He promised to redistribute push by broadly elected, although far from unified, wealth, hold down prices, and raise salaries. In reform politicians was significantly held back by the first round of voting, fraud likely accounted for institutionally empowered conservative leaders the defeat of a reformist candidate who made the blocking political and economic reform.33 In con- popular promise to distribute the equivalent of $60 sequence, even when in elected office, reformers to each Iranian family if he were elected.35 failed to deliver many tangible economic or politi- Categorical and sustained conflicts in economic cal improvements. policymaking have beset the entire record of the Is- In Iran’s 2005 presidential elections, the relative lamic Republic because of the entrenchment of the outsider and conservative politician Ahmadinejad public sector (including oil) and the Bonyads, or won an unexpected victory. But, despite the defeat “foundations” (well-funded fiefdoms run by lead- of the (highly divided) reformist candidates, the ing clerics), and because of fundamental divisions 2005 vote was not a major political realignment; over the State’s role versus market forces in the the Iranian electorate remains divided. The 17 mil- economy. The relatively inexperienced Ahmadine- lion votes cast for Ahmadinejad were a decisive jad regime is not likely to resolve this. Receptivity electoral victory but accounted for only 36 percent to increased privatization might be a feature of the of the electorate. That does not compare well with new cabinet; at least some of the president’s advis- the previous two elections of the popular reformist ers support a strong market economy. President Mohammad Khatami, whose votes repre- A monumentally important reality about Iran is sented 57 percent of the electorate in 1997 and 49 a demographic one: Iran’s population is dispropor- percent in 2001. Regarding the 2005 presidential tionately young. About two-thirds of its nearly 70 election as a landslide would be a misjudgment. million people are less than 30 years old. Table 1 The conservatives might be in office and control depicts Iran’s current age structure. Table 2 shows political power, but that does not mean they rep- comparable 2004 U.S. figures. Clearly the Iranian resent the majority or reflect consolidated Iranian population is far less evenly distributed over each public opinion. age group than the U.S. population. In Table 1, the Despite being OPEC’s second largest oil pro- significantly higher numbers at the lower levels of ducer, Iran is not a wealthy country. Forty percent the pyramid graphically demonstrate that the ma- of its population is below the poverty line and, jority of Iranians are currently well under 30 years officially, 15 million people are in the so-called “vulnerable strata.” In 2004 the Iranian Population in Millions, 2004 CIA estimated the Iranian Gross Domes- 80+ tic Product (GDP) to be the equivalent 75-79 Male 70-74 Female of $7,700 per capita, but that figure dis- 65-69 60-64 guises the fact that typical salaries are 55-59 50-54 $300 a month. Iran ranks in the middle 45-49 40-44 internationally. The World Bank estimates 35-39 30-34 Iran’s inflation rate at 16 percent with 25-29 20-24 unemployment officially at 15 percent. 15-19
10-14 U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base (Unofficially, unemployment might be as 5-9 high as 30 percent.) Iran announced an 0-4 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 average of 6 percent rate of real economic Table 1 growth during the past 3 years, but some of this success is explained by high world U.S. Population in Millions, 2004 85+ oil prices. In a recent interview, Iran’s 80-84 75-79 Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs and Male 70-74 Female 65-69 Finance, Mohammad Khazaiee, warned 60-64 55-59 50-54 that the number of jobless will reach 45-49 40-44 more than 5 million and that the balance 35-39 30-34 of trade will be negative $20 billion over 25-29 34 20-24 the next 15 years. 15-19 10-14 Economics played a key role in Ah- 5-9 0-4 U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base madinejad’s electoral success. By cam- 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 paigning on the economic justice themes Table 2
14 MILITARY REVIEW September-October 2005 PERCEPTIONS OF IRAN of age. In fact, unlike in the United States, the and is considered partly hardened and buried. To Iranian population quantitatively dwindles after the strike effectively would require difficult-to-acquire age of 40. The numerical spikes from early teens targeting intelligence for multiple simultaneous to mid-20s constitute the Iranian youth bulge. The strikes against several sites using large-yield pene- economic and social, if not political, implications tration munitions.37 However, technical issues are of these figures are nothing short of dramatic. not the main ones here. In the starkest terms, young people strain Iran’s Worth noting is that precision nuclear strikes already burdened economic resources because against Iran probably are and should be outside 18- to 29-year-olds particularly need education, all consideration. Aside from obvious humanitar- employment, and housing. ian issues and concerns about collateral damage Given the understanding of facts on the ground to allies, a U.S. nuclear strike on Iran would be in Iran and the context of political factors affect- absolutely unacceptable to China, Russia, much of ing Iranian choices, it is possible to consider a set Europe, and the entire Islamic world. The Chinese of three broad courses of action available to the alone could significantly harm the U.S. economy United States in dealing with Iran. These are pre- by disinvesting major amounts of U.S. debt they emptive military options, patient noninterference, hold. In the region, local antagonism would likely and rapprochement through trade. bring down both the Iraqi Shi’ite and Afghan Governments, given how closely they are tied to COA 1: Preemptive the United States. Military Options Some have suggested proxy or covert means of It is highly unlikely that military force can attack on Iranian facilities as the most politically change the Iranian regime. The country has four expedient way for the United States to disrupt times the territory of Iraq, and the population is Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program.38 The three times larger (with a predominance of avail- technical feasibility of these ventures falls under able fighting-age males). Given Iran’s popular con- the purview of military specialists, but several con- sensus around nationalism, its ability to coalesce ditions make the success of a proxy or covert attack to resist an invader and/or occupier, and its proven unlikely. One is that the Iranian nuclear program ability to fight and sustain great losses in defense is homegrown; foreigners do not have access to of its homeland, U.S. or U.S.-led coalition forces it, which complicates the use of proxies. Another do not have the resources or the long-term com- condition is that the United States would need to mitment required to replace the Iranian regime by attack multiple, dispersed reprocessing facilities, force. Similarly, military options cannot prevent a which would likely require sustained covert action would-be determined Iranian acquisition of nuclear over time, increasing the likelihood of discovery. weapons. U.S. military action can at best delay and And finally, because American, Middle Eastern, complicate Iran’s potential bid for nuclear status and Western international media have been specu- and hope to forestall weapons capability until lating for some time about the potential for U.S. or the nation is governed by leaders who choose to U.S-backed military actions against Iranian nuclear forego them. sites, the United States would have a hard time Observers who believe Iran’s nuclear-weapon achieving plausible deniability following proxy capability is imminent are likely to wish to see it or covert actions. Whether it attacks directly or destroyed through military action. The formula- indirectly, overtly or covertly, the United States tion runs along the lines of one described in an will be blamed not just by Iran, but by regional opinion piece in The New York Times: “The U.S. and international actors as well. The repercus- may wind up facing in Iran the choice our intel- sions would vary by country, but they cannot be ligence agencies told us we faced in Iraq: between dismissed. Preemptively attacking Iran would military action against a rogue regime or allowing damage political and economic relationships with that regime to assemble an arsenal of nuclear and China, Russia, and several of the United States’ other weapons of mass destruction.”36 European partners. One can easily imagine the Because the United States and Iran are not at Islamic world’s response to such an attack.39 war, a surgical strike on Iran’s facilities would be Even if the United States could find a way to considered a preventive action by the United States. attack Iran successfully, military action is still a Proponents of such a strike frequently cite the 1981 bad choice among better options. The unwanted Israeli attack on inchoate Iraqi nuclear facilities at consequences of a military attack would be too Osiraq as a model for an attack against the Iranian significant and the benefits likely short-lived; program. But technically, the Iranian context does moreover, while an assumed Iranian effort to build not quite match conditions found in the Osiraq a nuclear weapon would certainly be set back, it strike. Unlike the surprise dramatic targeting of a would not be prevented. Following an attack on its single facility by Israel, Iran’s program is dispersed nuclear facilities, Iran should be expected to move
September-October 2005 MILITARY REVIEW 15 Soccer fans after an Iranian victory qualified them for World Cup competition in 2005. (Inset) A Nike ad in Iran. from a potential nuclear prolifer- ate to an active one motivated by a perceived need for self-defense and wanting the weapon for its deterrent value. Iran would cer- tainly abrogate the Nonprolifera- tion Treaty and expel its monitor- ing regime, thereby increasing pressure on Israel to be explicit about its nuclear deterrent. These dynamics could possibly spur other regional states to proliferate and would, in general, degrade security in the entire area. safainla.us Iran by persuading Iranians beforehand of its posi- tive intentions toward them.”40 But that would be a hard sell, if not an impossible one. Iranians overwhelmingly support and take pride in their nation’s efforts to achieve nuclear-energy generation. Furthermore, they would be particu- larly skeptical of the motives behind a U.S attack. Even if Iran has an imminent nuclear-weapons Staunch Iranian nationalism is built partly on an program, military attacks would not assuredly awareness of U.S. opposition to the highly popular prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons. Once nationalization of oil and the closely related CIA- Iran becomes highly motivated to acquire a bomb and British-backed coup that deposed the popular following what it (and the Islamic world) would Mohammed Mossadegh and returned the Shah to perceive as unlawful, arrogant, imperious aggres- the throne in 1953. The United States also— sion, Iran might be able to constitute or reconstitute • Helped form SAVAK, the Shah’s repressive (depending on one’s perception) its program rela- secret security force. tively quickly via the international black market. • Was largely credited with keeping the unpopu- Another likely important result of any mili- lar Shah in power for 25 years. tary action against Iran is that it would engender • Contemplated another coup in 1978, during dedicated, determined hostility against the United the Iranian revolution. States. Despite internal political divisions, Irani- • Permitted the Shah to enter the country for ans should be expected to reject any use of U.S. medical treatment in 1979 after he had fled Iran, force as unprovoked aggression and an attempt which touched off the events that led to hostage- to impose the United States’ will on the country. taking at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.41 Iran’s capacity to retaliate against American and Given the U.S. record of interventionism, Ira- Western interests is considerable: It could disrupt nians would likely support retaliation after an oil exports and other critical Persian Gulf shipping, attack. attack vulnerable U.S. military forces in the area, An additional and less apparent argument attack Americans and/or other foreigners anywhere against the military course of action is that a U.S. in the world, and destabilize the fledging and tenu- strike would poison the Iranian youth bubble with ous Iraqi State. anti-Americanism. As noted, Iran’s population is Iranians are fierce defenders of their homeland: disproportionately young, with over two-thirds In the 1980-1988 war with Iraq, they suffered more of its 70 million people less than 30 years old. A than 200,000 military casualties and weathered preemptive attack on Iran would not just provoke urban chemical-weapons attacks. Some analysts contempt for the United States, it would do so think the United States could win Iranian hearts among current youth—people now in their early and minds in the midst of military action. A re- teens to mid-20s who will form the bulk of the gional specialist for Radio Free Europe/Radio politically active population for the next several Liberty proposes that “[t]he United States could decades. Alienating this group would squander the mitigate the impact of any military action against reservoir of sympathy for Americans generated by
16 MILITARY REVIEW September-October 2005 PERCEPTIONS OF IRAN
9/11. These young people favor talks and repaired Without aggressive provocation, most Iranians relations with the United States. Depending on will continue to be far from preoccupied with the extent of U.S. military action against Iranian contesting U.S. security interests. Iranians are targets, long-term anger and hatred would likely concerned with their own domestic issues. The influence Iranian foreign and national security country’s internal economic and political drives policymaking and could seriously complicate will shift the country’s attitudes over time. Whether United States and regional security. this change occurs quickly or continues gradually The United States does not adequately appreci- depends on many variables, including external ate the extent to which Iranians support their per- investments, but direct U.S. interference, prod- ceived legitimate right to nuclear technology and ding, and hostility make positive change more resent efforts, particularly by the United States, difficult.43 to prevent legal acquisition of such technology. Keeping quiet is important in this course of Military action against Iranian nuclear facilities action. Name-calling, like implicating Iran in the would be, at best, a short-term palliative that risks Axis of Evil, is inflammatory and works against us. reducing the security of the United States and We do not seem to recognize that what we say and others. Such degraded security could take the form do appears unjust to Iranians and provokes them. of determinedSoccer proliferation, fans after Iranian retaliation, Constant U.S. invective against Iran is counterpro- and the likelyan Iranian promotion victory of serious, sustained, ductive: Iranians perceive our contempt as a lack qualified them for hostile IranianWorld Cupattitudes com- where they currently do of respect, and they see a predilection for unequal, not exist. Suchpetition actions in 2005. would damage U.S. policy unlawful treatment in an American attitude they over the long term. reject as imperious and offensive. U.S. condemna- tion, vilification, and lack of respect do not shore COA 2: Patient Noninterference up support against hard-line conservatives; such Internal evolutions are underway in Iran actions only make it more difficult for moderates that need no U.S. meddling to come to fruition. and reformers to call for improved relations. If we manage to be patient, dynamics in Iran A strategy of patient noninterference would be will eventually take care of themselves and re- a struggle for the United States, which typically dress the nuclear-proliferation problem. Patient prefers a more proactive approach to security, es- noninterference requires the United States to pecially if a nuclear threat appears imminent. A avoid statements and actions that help justify policy based on the assumption through knowl- hard-line Iranian positions.42 The United States edgeable assessment that Iran will straighten itself should also not do anything that might under- out would also be difficult for the Israelis to accept. mine ongoing efforts by the European Union They live much closer to the potential Iranian and others to negotiate agreements with Iran. nuclear threat.44 Indeed, U.S. courses of action Despite the conservatives’ ascendance to power, routinely include efforts to gain Israeli coopera- political divisions rife among Iranians will re- tion while reassuring it of our commitment to its sult in political changes, formally or informally. security. But in general terms, current international Since 1997 the political pressure for reform has regimes do not prevent nuclear proliferation, nor been expressing itself within the Iranian system. do military attacks, except potentially in the short Only one-third of the electorate brought the con- term. Therefore, Israel and the United States would servative president into office in 2005, and the be better served by a policy that promotes moderat- reformers remain very much part of the political ing Iranian shifts that would, by themselves, create landscape. more reassurance. While favored by many, the liberal reforms advanced during Khatami’s administration were COA 3: Rapprochement rejected by some during the 2005 elections. The through Trade future, however, bodes well for liberalization. Even if successful in the short run, military Looking around Tehran, it is hard to distinguish action toward Iran would likely degrade security some young Iranians from youth anywhere. over time. The middle course, to stay quiet and Iran’s young people want the usual things: hav- wait while Iran shifts internally, is viable. How- ing choices in education, jobs, and housing. That ever, the United States could take the fastest route the majority of Iranians are young is important toward positive change in Iran if we could aban- because they are amenable to change and will don some of our longstanding notions of Iranian eventually constitute the largest bloc of voting intentions. citizens. Also, Iranians are resourceful, persever- Formal U.S. ties with Iran were broken during ing, and hardworking. They will continue to make the hostage crisis in 1978 and have not been re- progress. The economy and politics will continue stored. Since 1984 the United States has gradually to improve. implemented restrictions on U.S. exports to Iran,
September-October 2005 MILITARY REVIEW 17 U.S. Air Force C-130 crewmembers and Iranian soldiers offload 20,000 pounds of medical supplies two days after a devasting 2003 earthquake in Iran. At this juncture, then, what is the utility of U.S.-led sanctions compared to the potential value in lifting them? The “thunder run to Tehran” can occur via instituting the good old Ameri- can way: better jobs, goods, and investment. Ahmadinejad’s main goal appears to be to improve living conditions in Iran. Iran needs jobs, trade, and economic growth. Demographic pressures mean Iran must create 800,000 to 1 million new jobs each year just to stand still. The country badly needs investment in the primary sector of its economy, the oil fields. These are potent opportunities, and there are clear resources on which to draw. Iranians want foreign policy reform and rapprochement with the United States. A 2002 opinion poll in Tehran found that almost three-quarters of the population favor the resumption of direct U.S.-Iran talks. Many of the ap- proximately 2 million Iranians in the United States, the majority of whom are in regular contact with home, could be a ready platform to encourage improved U.S.- Iranian political and economic re-
DOD lations. The United States should end the web of major sanctions and in late 1987 it banned most imports from Iran. and encourage private investment in Iran.48 The 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act supplemented The need to restructure Iran’s oil industry and the ban on almost all bilateral trade, adding re- “bring it into line with world petroleum market strictions on foreign companies that invested in forces” is vital for the country.49 Iran’s oil produc- new Iranian oilfields worth more than $40 mil- tion capacity is stagnant, despite goals to substan- lion.45 While the United States formally abjures tially increase production. For many years Iran has economic warfare, its focused, unyielding eco- needed foreign capital and technology to modern- nomic-punishment policy can hardly be interpret- ize and further develop its oil industry. U.S.-led ed otherwise by Iranians. Sanctions against Iran international sanctions have prevented investments have constituted a persistent economic hardship.46 that would otherwise have been made and have By actively blocking any economic aid for Iran, helped deprive this sector of needed capital. The the United States implemented a sustained anti- oil sector’s share of the GDP has declined from Marshall Plan against a large Islamic country—a 30 to 40 percent in the 1970s to 10 to 20 percent major regional state—situated astride the world’s today, mainly as a result of OPEC output ceilings energy supplies.47 If sanctions were intended to and war damage to production facilities. (Iranian “break the will of the enemy,” change the Iranian output still stands below its prewar highs.) regime, or cause it to renounce unwanted behav- Iranian energy industry executive Narsi Ghor- ior, then sanctions have not worked. If sanctions ban warns: “Huge investment in the development were intended to keep Iran underperforming so of new fields and gas injection are required to it cannot create the capabilities to reduce U.S. keep Iran’s share of OPEC and world production security (that is, produce nuclear weapons), then intact.”50 The need for future investments pres- according to the Bush Administration’s own as- ents a useful opportunity to contribute to Iranian sessment, sanctions are not working. economic growth. Given U.S. oil consumption,
18 MILITARY REVIEW September-October 2005 PERCEPTIONS OF IRAN improving Iranian oil production for the world have had on Americans; it seems to have created a market is clearly a win-win option. Instead of contempt that continues to cloud policy judgment. sustaining trade sanctions that do not adequately Such preconceptions should be eliminated to make succeed, the United States could partake in, if not the better course of action available. lead, the international investment that revitalizes Significantly beneficial relations can function the Iranian oil and gas industry. Once the flood- as an informal nonaggression pact. Some will gates open, U.S. and international trade would pour object to opening U.S. trade on the grounds that into an industrious country (and a large market) it appears to reward undeserving Iranian behavior. of 70 million people. Major trading networks and Others will insist on a grand Iranian quid pro quo increased economic development comprise the in exchange for this U.S. carrot, but that would be formula on which we have most relied to lead to counterproductive. Instead, our eyes must be on the political stability elsewhere. We can apply the same prize of ultimate security and economic benefits. sound formula in Iran. The United States should not appear to impose The United States does not control all the reins behavior on Iran. Iranians are highly sensitive to of international trade; it would behoove us, in that formulation. The issue of external humiliation economic interests alone, to integrate Iran into and imposed will has historical “legs” for Iranians, the Western market. During the summer of 2005, something Americans find difficult to understand, Iran participated for the first time in a meeting of but it can be seen in historical analogies used in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). internal Iranian discussions. For example, the This nascent alliance, led by China and Russia Iranians referenced the humiliating 1828 Treaty (who, with four Central Asian republics, com- of Turkmanchai (which followed Iran’s defeat prise the current SCO), is seeking expansion. The by Imperial Russia) when describing the recent SCO wants to develop more economic, political, inchoate European offer of economic inducements cultural, and military ties between member states in exchange for Iran giving up autonomy over its who now occupy about three-fifths the territory nuclear-energy program. We must avoid setting of Eurasia and about one-quarter of the world’s perceived unfair preconditions and impositions population. As a prospective member, Iran has an on sovereignty if we want success in negotiations Eastward option. with Iran. When it comes to Iran, the United States con- Respecting Iran’s rights while shifting to intrin- tinues to operate from entrenched assumptions sic shared interests would be more productive for informed by a 25-year-old emotional trauma. both sides. For example, Iran and the United States We can see this in a comparison with Vietnam. clearly share safety and environmental concerns The United States resumed relations with the about locating nuclear materials near Iran’s oil Vietnamese in 1995, offered them a trade agree- production and export facilities. Iran’s economy, ment within a year, and signed a formal bilateral as well as to some extent the health of the U.S. agreement in 2000, less than 25 years after the economy and those of its closest partners, relies end of a war in which more than 55,000 American on exported oil. Approaching Iran on the basis of lives were lost. How can the United States have the common interest of not jeopardizing shipping formally recovered from this staggering loss—by in that vital area would benefit everyone without making peace—more quickly than it has recovered deliberately triggering conditionality. from the foreign policy crisis with Iran in 1979- It would be the work of the best diplomacy 1981 in which not one hostage died?51 No open (and potentially third-party pre-negotiation and conflict was ever declared between Iran and choreography), out of the glare of public scrutiny, the United States (although the United States did to end sanctions and resume U.S.-Iranian relations. provide military assistance to Iraq during its war With proper motivation, a new U.S. policy direc- with Iran). U.S. allegations implicating Iran in the tion could be sold. Increased trade with Iran could Saudi Khobar Towers attack remain unsubstan- change U.S. attitudes at home. Research finds an tiated.52 observable correlation between trade relations and After the significant losses of the Vietnam War, improved warmth of feeling.53 Objections notwith- why is it easier for the United States to restore standing, the fastest, most effective way for the relations with Vietnam (which had and still has an United States to moderate dynamics inside Iran and unrepresentative government and has engaged in eventually allay fears about Iranian intentions is by significant aggression against its neighbors) than it presiding over a flood of trade into Iran. is to do so with Iran? U.S. disdain for the Iranian Ending sanctions against Iran would be a major regime’s ideology and, indeed, the Iranian policy policy departure and a bold political step. It is record, does not seem sufficient to explain the U.S. certainly possible to be daring here; such has been attitude. One part of the answer apparently lies in done under harder circumstances. In 1972, during the brutalizing effect the hostage assault seems to the midst of the Cold War, U.S. President Richard
September-October 2005 MILITARY REVIEW 19 Nixon made dramatic overtures to Communist tion of hostile intentions harden Iranian resolve. China. Formal relations were restored by 1979 How good are the long-term vehicles of nuclear without a regime change (and with the Tianan- nonproliferation likely to be? Our best option is men Square democracy movement still 10 years to create relations such that Iran will not consider off). Bush could select a desired level of drama developing or using capabilities against us. If we for a policy shift on Iran. It is certainly possible to can live with Pakistan, it is plausible to imagine at- achieve transformation because, to an important taining stable conditions with the Islamic Republic extent, the United States controls the flow of trade of Iran. A deluge of job-creating trade and foreign and investment into Iran. We can open that spigot investment can transform Iran nearly irrespective and use the tools and values we most often support: of its governmental structure. thriving market economies that create their own in- Thirty years ago, Princeton’s strategic thinker ducements for nonaggression and political stability. Klaus Knorr might have been anticipating the U.S.- We need the latter from Iran, however it structures Iranian debacle when he wrote, “Man, it seems, not itself internally. In other cases and over time, the only tends to be a prisoner of his perceptions, his United States has strongly supported these prin- perceptions are slaves to his preconceptions.”54 Is ciples. Equal results are attainable in Iran. the United States predisposed against perceiving its best interests when dealing with Iran? Are we, A Better Vision ironically, hostage to our own misconceptions? The The military destruction of Iran’s suspected United States does not have to continue its current nuclear facilities would provoke, in the short run, policy of assuming threat based on blinkered de- Iran’s determination to stand up to the international monization. We can cease picking at the scars of a community, abrogate international treaties, and trauma that dates back so many years and look at retaliate against the United States. Even if U.S. Iran with fewer biased filters. The wisdom in this accusations are correct and Iran does intend to is not new: In his farewell address, George Wash- develop nuclear weapons, we would be better off ington warned that “the nation which indulges standing back while Iranians reform their own towards another a habitual hatred . . . is a slave system. Unprovoked, Iran does not have a record to . . . animosity [that can] lead it astray from its of external aggression. Internal change will pro- duty and its interest. . . . The Nation, prompted by duce its own forms of internationally reassuring ill-will and resentment, sometimes impels to war behavior. There is, however, a proactive course the government, contrary to the best calculations of action: that is, to narrowly avert or mitigate a of policy.”55 potential Iranian nuclear threat and, more broadly, We take pride in being the unchallenged world allay fears about hostile Iranian intentions by superpower. That power gives us the strength and using what people want from us and what we prerogative to boldly pursue change using the know works—our goods and our investment tools we have had great success with elsewhere. capital. We have the opportunity to succeed in Iran if we When choosing courses of action, it is useful to approach it from that perspective. Iran is an aus- ask: How does the course of action rate compared picious case for a nonmilitary U.S. approach to to what we are presently doing? Sanctions are security: proactively going full tilt “the American not garnering their expected political and security Way” to change the dynamics in Tehran through results. Our vilification and perpetual presump- increased mutual prosperity. MR
NOTES 1. Afshin Molavi, “A New Day in Iran,” Smithsonian Magazine (1 March on-line at
20 MILITARY REVIEW September-October 2005 PERCEPTIONS OF IRAN on-line at
Jo-Anne Hart is a Middle East security specialist at the Watson Institute of Inter- national Studies, Brown University, and an Associate Professor at Lesley University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. She received a B.A. from the University of California, Los Angeles, and an M.A. and a Ph.D. from New York University. Since the early 1990s she has traveled and lectured in Iran. She previously taught Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War College and has often participated in the Army’s Unified Quest wargames. She would like to express gratitude to the U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, for generously supporting this article (especially Jacob Kipp and Maxie McFarland) and to Doug Blum and Don Weadon for reading earlier drafts.
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