20 June 2016

Hall Gardner Professor and Chair, Department of Interna- tional and Comparative Politics, American University of Paris

Résumé at the Fondation pour la Recherche Straté- Cette note est une critique des recomman- gique (June 13, 2016), argues that engaging dations proposées dans le rapport NATO in a much tougher NATO stance toward Rething, Realign, React de l’Institute for Moscow, as proposed by the NATO Rethink, Eastern Studies. Elle vise à montrer qu’un Realign, React report, will cause a greater durcissement des positions de l’OTAN à escalation in NATO-European-Russian l’égard de Moscou pourrait entraîner de tensions that could soon prove nouvelles tensions qui pourraient mener au uncontrollable. What is needed is a new pire. Il est au contraire nécessaire de trouver round of NATO-European-Russian nego- des voies et des moyens d’une ‘désescalade’ tiations that involve concrete proposals and avec Moscou qui pourrait passer par la compromises, such as the mutual recognition reconnaissance d’une Ukraine décentralisée et of a “neutral” and “decentralized” Ukraine, neutre. and which are aimed at the eventual imple- mentation of a new system of Euro-Atlantic Abstract security that thoroughly incorporates legiti- This note critiques policy recommendations mate Russian security concerns. proposed by NATO Rethink, Realign, React, a report produced by the Institute for Eastern  Studies. The note, based on a discussion held

I NATO Rethink, Realign, React examines First, let me thank the organizers François crucial issues ranging from US-European Lafond, Yves Boyer, Timothy Riback, and the relations within NATO (including the defense Institute for Eastern Studies, for putting industry), to terrorism, cybersecurity and together this important discussion on the propaganda, in Chapter 2 by Francois Lafond, report, NATO Rethink, Realign, React.1 Chapter 3 by Greta Tuvkte and Deivisas Stekys and Chapter 5 by Tim Stuchtey. I will never forget the title of Yves Boyer’s chapter for my first edited book, The New Yet for this discussion, I would like take issue Transatlantic Agenda (Ashgate, 2001)2 whose with what I consider the main themes of the publication and policy recommendations I report that deal with NATO strategy and that believe were overshadowed by the Septem- are discussed primarily in Chapter 1 by ber 11, 2001 attacks. Boyer had entitled his Przemyslaw Zurawski vel Grajekski, in chapter, “NATO Forever!” which I understand Chapter 4 by Philip Karber and Phillip to mean the indefinite “open enlargement” of Petersen, and in Chapter 6 by Julian Fota. the Alliance. Each of these chapters argues for a much tougher NATO stance toward Moscow, and for There have been two major consequences of abandoning any ideas of a US-European- “NATO Forever!” after NATO, the Europeans Russian “reset” as generally hoped for in the and were unable to implement a new period 2008 to 2014. system of Euro-Atlantic security in the period immediately after Soviet collapse in 1991. The Instead of abandoning efforts to achieve a new first consequence is that the expansion of rapprochement with Moscow, as generally NATO by 1999 into the so-called Russian proposed by this report, I believe the NATO “near abroad” represented a major factor in Warsaw summit should look to ways to find helping to cause a Russian backlash once the appropriate balance between toughness Vladimir Putin came to power, much as two of and the full-fledged negotiation. The major the major founders of the strategy of “contain- difference between my views and those of ment” against the , George NATO Rethink, Realign, React is that NATO Kennan and Paul Nitze, had forewarned.3 The needs to better re-define its long term objec- second consequence has been the relative tives in such a way as to reach real compro- weakening of the as a mises with Moscow which can lead to a new security and defense identity so that, as the system of Euro-Atlantic security—despite the report NATO Rethink, Realign, React states, fact that NATO is now engaged in a dangerous the US pays for roughly 70-75% of the defense game of power-based bargaining with burden, while the Europeans, as so-called Moscow. “free riders”, pay roughly 25-30%. (Lafond, p. Here, for example, NATO needs to consider 21) At NATO’s origins, George Kennan had the possibility of negotiating a formally expected roughly equal power and burden “neutral,” yet decentralized, Ukraine, for sharing between the US and Europeans. example, while suspending its policy of “open NATO Rethink, Realign, React offers a enlargement.” And instead of demanding number of important observations and policy Moscow “to evacuate Tranistria, Abkhazia, recommendations on contemporary NATO- South Ossetia, as well as Crimea and Donbass” European-Russian relations in the aftermath as proposed by the report, NATO—and the of the 2014 Russian « annexation » of Crimea European Union—should press for joint power and political-military interference in eastern sharing arrangements, joint peacekeeping, Ukraine. A number of these observations and overlapping security accords, and joint policy proposals need to be discussed and political-economic and financial cooperation, debated at the upcoming NATO summit in where possible. Warsaw in July. In a word, NATO and the EU need to better coordinate their own strategies in seeking to 1. Kinga Redlowska, ed. NATO Rethink, Realign, React defuse tensions with Moscow. Here I have (Warsaw: Institute for Eastern Studies, 2016). called for a grand compromise between 2. Yves Boyer, “NATO Forever!” in Hall Gardner and NATO, the EU and Russia, a “neo-Jaures Radoslava Stefanova, eds. The New Transatlantic strategy”.4 Zbigniew Brzezinski has called for Agenda (Ashgate: 2001). 3. On Kennan and Nitze, among others who opposed 4. I have called for a “neo-Jaurés plan” for peace in NATO enlargement, and the failure to implement a new , after the French political leader, Jean Jaures, Euro-Atlantic system of cooperative-collective security, had pressed for reconciliation with Imperial Germany see Hall Gardner, Dangerous Crossroads: Europe, despite the latter’s forceful annexation of Alsace- Russia and the Future of NATO (Praeger, 1997). Lorraine in 1871. See Hall Gardner, Crimea, Global

the “accommodation” of Russia based on a In fear of further disaggregation, Moscow is Finnish-like neutralization of Ukraine.5 now playing hardball and I do not believe we French General Desportes (retired) has called should expect unilateral concessions in res- for a “gentleman’s agreement”6 between the ponse to NATO “toughness” as was the case Europeans and Russia. While I disagree with under Mikhail Gorbachev. Not discussed in the view of General Desportes that NATO NATO Rethink, Realign, React is the proba- should be dissolved at this time, I do agree bility that an even more intransigent leader- that the US, NATO, as well as the Europeans, ship could follow Vladimir Putin—if some should seek a “gentleman’s agreement” with form of grand compromise or accommodation Moscow—even if President Putin does not, at cannot be reached with Putin’s government, or least at present, appear to be acting with a at least proposed, in the near future. “gentleman’s” manners. III II The term « Russian aggression » that is used First, I concur with the general analysis as set in several chapters is not very helpful in forth in NATO Rethink, Realign, React that explaining the deeper roots of contemporary the contemporary situation is not at all similar crisis. The deeper problem is that following to the ideologically-charged the Cold War era Soviet collapse, Moscow has engaged in a (Karber and Petersen, p. 31). But “capitalist” delayed reaction to the largely uncoordinated vs “communist” ideology is not the primary « double enlargement » of NATO and the difference between now and then and European Union. “democratic” vs. “authoritarian” ideology has NATO expansion was seen as potential largely taken its place. « threat » at the time of the 1999 war « over » The main difference between now and then is Kosovo, a war which helped overturn Boris that during the Cold War, US-Soviet relations Yeltsin, who was then replaced by Vladimir were more of a two-power or bipolar balance Putin. In 1999, the US had not only and there was a more clearly demarcated announced that three new states would enter division of Europe into NATO and Soviet NATO as members, it also engaged in the war spheres of influence and security, at least after ‘over’ Kosovo without a UN mandate, which the Berlin crises. By contrast, in contemporary Moscow considered an “illegal” act and which circumstances, the world has entered a more had excluded Russia from the UN co-decision- dangerous period of highly uneven making process. During that year, the US polycentrism in which Moscow is struggling to Senate also passed the National Missile sustain the remnants of the former Soviet Defense Act (97-3), leading to global Missile Union after that empire’s collapse.7 Defense deployments. The US Senate likewise This struggle appears most evident in Russian raised the prospects of the potential efforts to safeguard its naval base at membership of and Ukraine in NATO, Sevastopol and its military intervention in in its debate over NATO’s “open enlargement.” support of Al-Assad in Syria so as to retain These actions provided Vladimir Putin with Russian influence in Syria, and throughout the the grounds to formulate a new Russian ‘wider Middle East’ region as a whole, national security consensus.8 including the northern Caucasus. At the same At the same time, there was nevertheless some time, both NATO and the European Union hope in the period 1999-2014 that the US and have not yet defined their borders and Russia could eventually find a modus vivendi continue to expand into Russian-declared over strategic nuclear weaponry, Missile spheres of influence and security. Defense deployments as well as NATO Rivalry, and the Vengeance of History (New York: expansion. But here, as long as the question of Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). See also, Hall Gardner, The NATO enlargement formally remained on the Failure to Prevent World War I: The Unexpected table, it appeared dubious that Moscow would Armageddon (Ashgate, 2015). ever agree to some form of compromise 5. Zbigniew Brzezinski, interviewed by Adam Garfinkle, accord. The Baltic states, brought into NATO The American Interest (March 3, 2014) http:// www.the-american-interest.com/2014/03/06/coping- in 2004, had already been considered a “red with-crimea-in-ukraine-and-beyond/ line” by the generally pro-Western Yeltsin 6. Vincent Desportes, Discussion « OTAN : Poutine, administration. Georgia and Ukraine now Notre Meilleur Ennemi » FR5 : C’est dans L’Air (June represent the new “red line.” 8, 2016). 7. Hall Gardner, Crimea, Global Rivalry, and the 8. Hall Gardner, NATO Expansion and US Strategy in Vengeance of History, op. cit. Asia (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013).

With respect to the European Union, Moscow Julian Fota argues that Moscow hopes to turn did not see EU expansion as a potential the Black Sea into « Russian lake ». But here it « threat » until the European Union attemp- appears that Moscow can only hope to ted to implement Association Accords with dominate the northern region from Abkhazia former Soviet bloc states in 2007-08 to the to the Donbass, thus partitioning the Black exclusion of Russia. Rightfully or wrongfully, Sea, in large part in order to protect its trade Moscow has tended to see the 2008 European hub at Novorossiysk. Given sufficient Ukrai- Union Eastern Partnership that has been nian resistance, it appears dubious that Russia aimed at bringing six eastern European will be able to expand its influence into neighbors—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Odessa, for example. Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine The NATO Rethink, Realign, React report is into new Association Accords—as a way for the correct that Russian control of Crimea (and new Europe to draw Ukraine, Georgia and the abolition of the Kharkiv accords) permits other former Soviet states away from Russian Moscow to engage in greater power projection spheres of influence and security. The Eastern in the region and beyond. At the same time, Partnership, it was feared by Moscow, would NATO-member Turkey, which has been twist the political-economic allegiance of dangerously augmenting tensions with Ukraine, and other former Soviet republics, Moscow in Syria and throughout the region, toward Europe and away from Russia—if still controls the Straits. A NATO-Russian 9 Moscow did not also form part of the accord. military build-up in the Black Sea region risks Having already “lost” its Warsaw Pact buffer, undermining the 1936 Montreux Convention. and fearing “loss” of its so-called « near abroad » (as well as its so-called “inner abroad” in Chechnya and the northern Cauca- IV sus), Moscow reacted in a form of preclusive It appears dubious that Russia can continue to imperialism to prevent both NATO and the thrive on the “destabilization” and “disinte- European Union from drawing former Soviet gration” of its neighbors—particularly Ukraine bloc states in a NATO-EU sphere of influence as a whole—as generally argued by NATO and security. This action appears to be a Rethink, Realign, React. Such a destabili- flashback to the past when Moscow cracked zation is resulting in major political, economic down on Poland and Czechoslovakia when it and military costs that have begun to backfire was feared that the 1947-48 US Marshall Plan on Moscow itself. And Moscow does generally would draw eastern European states away recognize that it needs a stable Ukraine for its from Soviet influence, particularly if Moscow own political-economic stability and security. itself was not somehow included in the accord. Instead of trying to further isolate Moscow, as Moscow’s efforts to establish full control over the Report proposes, what is needed is a Crimea—at least from a geostrategic persp- concerted framework involving the US, ective—have been intended to prevent what European Union members and Russia that Russian President Vladimir Putin called better balances the interests of the major « NATO sailors » from eventually taking over powers and central and eastern European Sevastopol—in that the 2014 Maidan move- states. As energy prices will probably remain ment had urged Ukraine to join both NATO relatively low for some time and as new energy and the European Union, and intended to producers and new forms of energy come onto press the Russian Black Sea fleet out of its the highly competitive global market, and as base at Savastopol. Russian political military energy demand from appears to drop, interference in eastern Ukraine has concur- Moscow may soon begin to see that it needs to rently been intended to block closer ties bet- engage in major structural economic reforms. ween Kiev and NATO and European Union… Moscow could also realize that only the US and Europeans, and not the Chinese, possess In this view, Russia’s actions can be the technologies and expertise that Russia considered preclusive; at the same time they needs to develop and modernize its industrial are still imperialistic. And because they are and agricultural and consumer sectors. This is imperialistic they generate new tensions not for European and American diplomacy to only in the Black Sea region and Caucasus, but explore. (See discussion on Russia and China throughout the eastern European countries that follows in Section VI of this article.) that border Russia and elsewhere. In Chapter VI of the NATO Rethink, Realign, React, Yet how is a more « concerted » US-European -Russian relationship to be established? How 9. Gardner, ibid. is it possible to reach an accommodation with

Moscow given the ongoing conflict in eastern security and a full willingness to compromise Ukraine and the “illegal” seizure of Crimea, with Moscow over what many may be plus other threats, such as the penetration of considered « vital » interests. NATO defenses by Russian aircraft and Zbigniew Brzezinski11 has argued that the US submarines? and Europeans may need to build up some Chapter 1 of NATO Rethink, Realign, React forces in eastern Europe. (Here I would argue put the matter bluntly in opposing dialogue only on a rotating basis). Yet as Brzezinski also without simultaneously engaging in a military points out: “But we can only do that (build up build-up: « the lifting of sanctions on Mos- US forces and other measures) if we have a cow—without reinforcing NATO eastern larger strategy and a sense of balance flank will be interpreted by Moscow as between deterrence and capitulation on the « consent « to further expansion » and « The one hand, and deterrence and accommo- result of a policy not to « aggravate » Russia dation on the other hand. What enticements and instead to seek « constructive dialogue » could encourage the Russians to find some will be war » (Grajekski, p. 9). way in which we both settle together on an This is a repeat of the anti-« appeasement » arrangement for Ukraine… somewhat like argument in a contemporary situation which Finland. Finland is very much part of the possesses more differences than similarities to West—politically, socially, culturally—but it that of the late interwar period when Hitler has simultaneously good relations with came to power. By contrast, today’s situation Russia and is at the same time not a member 12 can be better compared and contrasted to the of NATO” (My emphasis). early interwar period during the Russian The major point is that the US and Europeans revolution when Russia began to assert its need to define clear objectives that can interests against Poland in Ukraine. It can also convince Moscow that they are sincerely be compared and contrasted to the period seeking to forge a grand compromise. The US before World War I, but in a situation in and Europeans thus need to provide positive which Russia is trying to hold onto its incentives and enticements and not just remaining spheres of influence rather than threats and sanctions in order to convince attempting to obtain new ones, as was the case Moscow that a general militarization of for Imperial Germany, which then lost all Europe and a closer Russian alliance with continental and overseas buffers and spheres China is not in Russian interests. of influence after World War I and prior to the Here, however, with respect to Brzezinski’s rise of Hitler.10 observation, it should be noted that even Thus, despite the report’s implied analogy to Finland’s relations with Russia are changing. Nazi German expansion, I believe there are Finland, along with Sweden, has been moving still ways to bargain from a position of relative closer to NATO, as the NATO Rethink, strength without necessarily « aggravating » Realign, React report correctly observes. The Moscow in return. The promise to lift sanc- question now becomes how close should these tions must be seen as only one of the tools of a formerly “neutral” states of Sweden and much larger and coordinated bargaining Finland move toward NATO and to what strategy that is intended to reduce NATO-EU- extent can the ‘threat’ of these states joining Russian tensions. The problem here is that NATO be considered part of a larger this crisis involves both NATO and the EU, bargaining strategy to create a new system of and thus makes a resolution even more Euro-Atlantic security that includes, not difficult to achieve without a common US- excludes, Russia? NATO-European diplomatic, defense and If bargained cautiously, a resource rich yet political-economic strategy. “neutral” and decentralized Ukraine could The concern raised here is that if it does prove play a significant role as a « gateway » necessary to build up NATO power capabilities between Europe and Russia. A neutral, yet involving a threat to use force, much as a 11. Zbigniew Brzezinski’s anti-Soviet policies eventually number of the chapters of NATO Rethink, worked to draw the US into the “global war on Realign, React advocate, then that military terrorism” yet Russia is ironically now needed as a full build-up will only escalate tensions—if it is not coalition partner. On Brzezinski’s role in making the simultaneously accompanied by a detailed Soviet Union more likely to invade Afghanistan and in building up pan-Islamic movements, see Hall Gardner, plan for an alternative system of European American Global Strategy and the ‘War on Terrorism’ (Ashgate, 2007). 10. See Hall Gardner, Crimea, Global Rivalry and the Vengeance of History, op. cit. 12. Zbigniew Brzezinki, op cit.

decentralized, Ukraine could begin to defuse highly instable partition of the country which tensions between NATO and Russia and thus will not benefit either side and which will minimize the ostensible need to expand NATO create permanent tensions beyond Ukraine… membership to Sweden as well as Finland. At Nevertheless, even if Kiev and Moscow have the same time, it appears dubious the Donbass not yet reached an agreement on the nature of question can be settled without also settling peacekeeping for the Donbass, this proposal the question as whether NATO should even- presumes the absolute need to strengthen tually enlarge to Ukraine. NATO’s Partnerhip for Peace (PfP) which The Warsaw NATO Summit must conse- could be eventually deployed in the Donbass quently determine whether Ukrainian mem- area, or elsewhere, under an OSCE or UN bership in NATO is truly a « vital » interest for mandate. I would accordingly put the need to the US and Europe. I am thus arguing that strengthen the PfP on the agenda of the NATO NATO should formally announce at the Warsaw Summit. The PfP is an underused tool Warsaw Summit a full suspension of NATO that can succeed on the ground in helping to enlargement, as part of a larger negotiation build trust between warring parties—if given process that is intended to reach a deal with the proper resources. Moscow over eastern Ukraine and the Caucasus—among other issues that are dividing the three sides. VI I totally agree with the NATO Rethink, Realign, React report’s statement that, « If V one considers the consequences of the The situation in the Ukraine appears to be conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine, it could be moving toward one of a « mutually hurting said that neither Russia nor the US, but China, stalemate » (in the language of conflict reso- who has emerged the winner. » (Fota, p. 54) lution theorist I. William Zartman). This Yet in contrast with the report’s general situation could well lead to the establishment theme, from a global geostrategic perspective, of yet another « frozen conflict » or else the rise of China as an increasingly global toward social and political compromise political-economic, financial and military between the eastern and western regions of power ironically represents a potential key to Ukraine. The U.S. and European states have helping to resolve the NATO-European- appeared to have granted Kiev sufficient Russian dispute. On the one hand, it is not in financial and military assistance to counter the US/NATO interest to press Russia and autonomist movements that are not-so- China into a tighter alliance, which is a real secretly backed by Russia so that a rough possibility that has largely been ‘mutually hurting stalement’ appears to have underestimated. been achieved. On the other hand, it also does not appear to After a severe critique of the Minsk II accord be in the Russian interest to become an (in which the « victim » Ukraine is seen as increasingly indebted serf to China’s sovereign « being restrained by its Western wealth funds. In other words, does Moscow interlocutors » (Karber and Petersen, p. 34), want to permit itself to become a junior the NATO Rethink, Realign, React report does partner to Beijing? Here, the European Union propose the need for the deployment of a has a major role to play in attracting Moscow « multinational brigade of neutral but armed closer to Europe if the EU could eventually peacekeepers with unrestricted access offer a political-economic accord that meets throughout the Donbas » (Karber and both Russian and Ukrainian political-eco- Petersen, p. 36) in order to enforce Minsk II— nomic concerns as part of a staged reduction otherwise Minsk II will fail. of US and European sanctions on Russia in This proposal has merit and the possibility of exchange for mutual diplomatic compromise peacekeepers is beginning to be considered by over Ukraine in general accord with Minsk II. Russia and Ukraine, even if Moscow has thus I thus believe it is the rise of China in the far agreed only to a temporary and limited background that can potentially provide the presence, while Kiev wants to set up a more US, EU and NATO diplomatic leverage to permanent and expanded peacekeeping reach what I have called a « grand 13 force. The only other option might be a compromise » with Moscow… that is, if such 13. Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, “The www.frstrategie.org/publications/notes/the-political- political and military implications of the Minsk 2 and-military-implications-of-the-minsk-2-agreements- agreements”, Mathieu Boulègue, http:// 11-2016

diplomacy can be played correctly in the not- coupled by a step-by-step joint demi- so-long term. litarization of both regions. Instead of engaging in a full military build-up VII of the Baltic states, which can be relatively We are entering a very danger period. Will easily countered by Moscow, as the NATO NATO’s actions and efforts to build up its Rethink, Realign, React report itself military capabilities in Poland and the Baltic acknowledges (Karber and Petersen, 40-42), I states and strengthen ties to Sweden and propose other options: joint NATO-Russian Finland—in order to make a feared Russian air policing of Baltic region and joint naval advance into the Baltics sometime in the and air patrols in Black Sea region, for future much more costly— represent acts of example. Concurrently both sides need to true “deterrence” or “dissuasion” in French jointly reduce conventional and nuclear terms? Or will such a military build-up be military capabilities in all theatres, while perceived by Moscow as an act of escalation seeking ways to cooperate where possible in that will be met by Russian counter- the “global war on terrorism”.14 escalation? There should be immediate discussions to The answer depends, in large part, upon the reduce, if not eliminate, all tactical nuclear ongoing dialogue in the NATO-Russia Council, weaponry as soon as politically possible. As which not-so-successfully began in April 2016 mentioned in the NATO Rethink, Realign, after breaking off relations in 2014, a dialogue React report, Moscow is enhancing its A2/AD which is hopefully to be continued in July. denial tactics in Kaliningrad by deploying S- NATO has thus far opted for a two-track 400 air defense missiles and tactical, nuclear strategy of military build-up and dialogue. But capable, Iskander surface to surface missiles, there will only be continued military build-up plus shore based cruise missiles (Karber and if there is no real dialogue and no positive Petersen, p. 40) so as to block NATO from compromise. The viability of the 1997 NATO- potentially re-supplying the Baltic states in Russian Founding Act is at stake. case of war. But in addition to the considering the upgrading and deployments of the B-61 The issue is this: If NATO insists on a military tactical nuclear weapon (among other nuclear build-up to protect the Baltic, Central Euro- weapons systems), the US is deploying new pean and Black Sea fronts—and if the US, EU Missile Defense systems and penetrating radar and NATO bargaining position insists that in Romania and Poland—which Moscow sees a Russia be asked to “evacuate Tranistria, potentially capable of protecting a nuclear first Abkhazia, South Ossetia, as well as Crimea strike. To reach a compromise, the US and and Donbass” as proposed by NATO Rethink, Russia should re-visit some of the previous Realign, React (Grajekski, p. 15), then there proposals for joint Missile Defense systems will be no end to NATO-Russian tensions. that were proposed before UN P-5 plus 1 Moscow would definitely consider such a negotiations pressed Iran to give up on its demand as a casus belli. Moscow has gone too nuclear program—while also looking for ways far in annexing Crimea and in interfering in a to reduce conventional and tactical nuclear number of regions, most recently, the weaponry. Donbass, to capitulate to NATO demands. There is almost no strategic nuclear Yet in contrast to the demand to evacuate confidence between Washington and Moscow these regions, I would propose a compromise once the US unilaterally dropped the ABM position: joint NATO-Russian or else multi- treaty in 2002 without seeking a substitute national Partnership for Peace (PfP) peace- treaty with Moscow. It will still take some time keeping deployments (under a general to build up trust, and as I have argued, mandate of the OSCE or UN) in Transnistria, Moscow will not give up unilaterally or even Abkhazia and South Ossetia—in addition to compromise without very tough power-based the deployment of PfP peacekeepers under a bargaining. Nevertheless, I do not believe UN or OSCE mandate in the Donbass region these proposals are utopian. They can succeed as previously discussed. As for Crimea, I if proposed by the US and Europeans in a would suggest pressing for an international 14. For a brief outline of proposals, see Hall Gardner, free trade zone—but that Crimea would “The Reset was Never Reset” NATOwatch Briefing remain under Russian sovereignty despite its Paper No.49 (April 2014) http://natowatch.org/ “illegal” takeover. And I would push for the node/1449 For more detail, see Hall Gardner, NATO same for Kaliningrad to become a free trade Expansion and US Strategy in Asia, op. cit. and Hall Gardner, Crimea, Global Rivalry and the Vengeance of zone as well. These proposals would be History, op. cit.

unified and concerted fashion and if all sides then unexpectedly result in catastrophic war.15 demonstrate a practical effort to forge a new It is crucial that the NATO Warsaw Summit system of Euro-Atlantic security that find ways not to further isolate Moscow in incorporates legitimate Russian security and Europe by keeping open the door to mutually political economic concerns and that protect beneficial political and economic cooperation Moscow’s truly “vital” interests. while concurrently seeking to engage all sides The NATO Warsaw Summit could prove to be in building a new system of Euro-Atlantic a pivotal historical event that could help bring security from the Baltics and Eastern Europe permanent peace to Europe. Or, more to the Black Sea and Caucasus. pessimistically, the Summit could once again 15. Hall Gardner, “Hybrid Warfare: Iranian and lead to down the path of intermittent NATO- Russian Versions of “Little Green Men” and Contemporary Conflict,” No 123 (December 2015) European-Russian confrontation in the form NATO Defense College, http://www.ndc.nato.int/ of “hybrid” or “non-linear” warfare that could news/news.php?icode=885

Works Cited  Hall Gardner and Radoslava Stefanova, eds. Zbigniew Brzezinski, interviewed by Adam The New Transatlantic Agenda (Ashgate, Garfinkle, The American Interest (March 3, 2014) 2001) http://www.the - a m e r i c a n -  American Global Strategy and the ‘War on interest.com/2014/03/06/coping-with-crimea-in- Terrorism’ (Ashgate, 2007) ukraine-and-beyond/  NATO Expansion and US Strategy in Asia Vincent Desportes, Discussion « OTAN : Poutine, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) Notre Meilleur Ennemi » FR5 : C’est dans L’Air  The Failure to Prevent World War I: The (June 8, 2016) Unexpected Armageddon (Ashgate, 2015) Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, “The  Crimea, Global Rivalry, and the Vengeance of political and military implications of the Minsk 2 History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). agreements” http://www.frstrategie.org/  “Hybrid Warfare: Iranian and Russian Versions publications/notes/the-political-and-military- of “Little Green Men” and Contemporary implications-of-the-minsk-2-agreements-11-2016 Conflict,” No 123 (December 2015) NATO Hall Gardner, Surviving the Millennium: Defense College, http://www.ndc.nato.int/ American Global Strategy, Soviet Collapse and the news/news.php?icode=885 Question of Peace (Praeger, 1994) Kinga Redlowska, ed. NATO Rethink, Realign,  Dangerous Crossroads: Europe, Russia and React (Warsaw: Institute for Eastern Studies, the Future of NATO (Praeger, 1997) 2016)

Author Hall Gardner is Professor and Chair, Department of International and Comparative Politics American University of Paris. He is a member of the World Association of International Studies, founded at Stanford University. He participated in Track II diplomacy with the East West Institute in in the af- termath of the 2008 Georgia-Russia War and with the Geneva Center for Security Policy in dealing with is- land and resource conflicts in the Indo-Pacific in September 2014. His books and articles can be found on his website: can be found on his Amazon webpage: http://www.amazon.com/Hall-Gardner/e/B001HPAN6S