Public School Desegregation in Memphis Author(S): Roger Biles Source: the Journal of Negro Education, Vol
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Journal of Negro Education A Bittersweet Victory: Public School Desegregation in Memphis Author(s): Roger Biles Source: The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Autumn, 1986), pp. 470-483 Published by: Journal of Negro Education Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2294831 Accessed: 13-03-2017 22:23 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms Journal of Negro Education is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Negro Education This content downloaded from 141.211.4.224 on Mon, 13 Mar 2017 22:23:22 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms A Bittersweet Victory: Public School Desegregation in Memphis Roger Biles, Department of History, Oklahoma State University The 1954 United States Supreme Court ruling on school desegre- gation sent southern white supremacists in search of means to resist or at least delay implementation. Their tactics varied. Some states invoked the aged doctrine of interposition, along with the implied threat of secession; others sought simply to ignore the decision and its call for compliance "with all deliberate speed." Organizations like the Ku Klux Klan and the Citizens' Councils sprang to life to lead the counteroffensive. To some, "massive resistance" meant boycotts, picketing, even violence. In the most celebrated case of southern recalcitrance, President Dwight D. Eisenhower dis- patched federal troops to Arkansas to ensure the peaceful deseg- regation of Little Rock's Central High School. In countless other locations, from New Orleans, Louisiana, to Clinton, Tennessee, the absence of such restraining action led to widespread rioting. Throughout the South, by word and by deed, citizens and their political representatives gave stern notice that public school deseg- regation would not pass quickly and quietly from the scene.1 In recent evaluations of post-Brown public school desegregation in the South, historians have noted the remarkable ability of many of the region's communities to thwart the Supreme Court's ruling. In The Burden of Brown, Raymond Wolters traced the progress of change in five school districts involved in the 1954 decision. (In 'On the southern reaction to the Brown decision, see: Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950s (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969); Benjamin Muse, Ten Years of Prelude: The Story of Integration Since the Supreme Court's 1954 Decision (New York: Viking Press, 1964); Reed Sarratt, The Ordeal of Desegregation: The First Decade (New York: Harper and Row, 1966); James W. Vander Zanden, Race Relations in Transition: The Segregation Crisis in the South (New York: Random House, 1965); James W. Ely, Jr., The Crisis of Conservative Virginia: The Byrd Organization and the Politics of Massive Resistance (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976); and Neil R. McMillen, The Citizens' Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, 1954-1964 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971). Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 55, No. 4 (1986) 470 Copyright ? 1986, Howard University This content downloaded from 141.211.4.224 on Mon, 13 Mar 2017 22:23:22 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms addition to the suit against the Topeka, Kansas, school system, the Court considered jointly appeals from Delaware, Virginia, and South Carolina; a fifth case, decided the same day, found segregation unacceptable in Washington, D.C.) With the exception of Topeka, where compliance was relatively painless due to a tiny black pop- ulation of roughly eight percent, conditions changed more halt- ingly. "In the other districts where blacks constituted between 25 and 90 percent of the students," Wolters said, "there was protracted litigation as the communities struggled to comply with-or in some cases to evade-the Court's ruling." Similarly, J. Harvie Wilkin- son's chronicle of public-school integration in the South from Brown to Bakke noted that compliance came grudgingly and only after the painstaking exposure and destruction of myriad tactics of resis- tance. And even as the final barriers to "massive integration" fell, a new phase-that of "resegregation"-began to emerge in many southern localities. These historians highlighted the painfully slow pace of change and the fruitful attempts at avoiding actual school desegregation in southern communities.2 In some southern cities, by contrast, a more moderate temper seemed to prevail. Notable for its success in desegregating its public schools was the Mississippi River town of Memphis, Tennessee. Though situated in the heart of Dixie, Memphis escaped the don- nybrooks over public-school integration that plagued so many of its neighboring communities. In September, 1962, for example, only fifty miles to the south in Oxford, Mississippi, violence erupted and U.S. marshals intervened to protect James Meredith as he became the first black student to matriculate at "Ole Miss." One year earlier, President John F. Kennedy had lauded Memphis for its peaceful toppling of segregation in the schools, noting that the city "reflected credit on the United States throughout the world." In the following years, as integration proceeded apace, first haphazardly and later stimulated by court-ordered busing, Memphis continued to avoid the disorder rampant elsewhere. For all intents and purposes, the 2Raymond Wolters, The Burden of Brown: Thirty Years of School Desegregation (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, From Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School Integration, 1954-1978 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979). Historian William H. Chafe found that Greensboro, North Carolina "opted for stability of school assignments over wholesale redistrict- ing" and the result was a more effective and tranquil desegregation process. William H. Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black Struggle for Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 344. In examining the role of businessmen in desegregation, Elizabeth Jacoway, David R. Colburn, and their fellow co-contributors found a mixed bag: in Norfolk, New Orleans, Birmingham, and Jackson, businessmen acted as obstructionists. In other locations, such as Tampa, Columbia, and Dallas, they took the lead in preparing for change. Elizabeth Jacoway and David R. Colburn, eds., Southern Businessmen and Desegregation (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982). The Journal of Negro Education 471 This content downloaded from 141.211.4.224 on Mon, 13 Mar 2017 22:23:22 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Bluff City seemed a model of peaceful integration, a genuine success story, and a triumph of moderate leadership.3 And yet, a closer examination reveals a less satisfying picture. Passive, not massive, resistance unfolded with a most effective result: whites avoided integration by fleeing the public schools. Once integration became a genuine threat, the majority of white students took to their heels and left behind an almost totally black student population. By the 1970s the successes of the 1950s and 1960s merely constituted Pyrrhic victories. Moderate leadership paved the way for only token changes, and the Supreme Court's goal of an integrated student populace went unrealized. The forces for moderation in Memphis surfaced almost imme- diately after the landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision. Both daily newspapers called for restraint. The day after the Court announced its decision, the Commercial Appeal urged its readers to "approach this issue with calmness, reason, and a genuine spirit of cooperation." It concluded: "Whether for good or bad, the Supreme Court has ruled segregation unconstitutional, and it has been tra- ditional for the American people to respect the dignity of the law." The Press-Scimitar went even further, arguing that adherence to the new law would improve America's image abroad. It suggested that "our preachments on democracy and dignity and equal opportunity of man will ring truer to Asia's fermenting millions when they learn that here in America equality was not graded by complexion."4 Mayor Edmund Orgill, a successful businessman elected in 1955 as the reform candidate, similarly staked out a relatively enlight- ened position. Orgill had campaigned against the stultefying con- servatism of the entrenched Democratic machine, whose grip on the city had been broken with the death of Boss E. H. Crump in 1954, and called for a new progressive image for the city. Recog- nizing the need for quiescent race relations, Orgill cautioned Mem- phians against intemperate action. First, he assured them of his own convictions. "I, along with other members of the present City Commission," he said, "am on record as being in favor of segre- gation." Integration in the public schools would be limited, the mayor promised. Most important, the city must behave with dig- nity, aspiring to the most vital goals of "keeping the peace, uphold- 3New York Times, March 24, 1962. For an analysis of public school desegregation in Nashville,