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Robert N. Van Gulick ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS Robert N. Van Gulick Curriculum Vita 1/22/15 Department of Philosophy - 541 HL Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York 13244-1170 315-443-2258 [email protected] ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS: Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York: William P. Tolley Distinguished Professor in the Humanities, 2008-2010. Philosophy Professor of Philosophy 1995-present (Assoc. Prof. 1987-95, Asst. Prof. 1984-87) Department Chair, 2005 – 2008. Director of Graduate Studies, 2002-05. Director of Undergraduate Studies, 1993-2001. Cognitive Science Program Director, 1986-present. Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey: Assistant Professor of Philosophy, 1976 -1984. EDUCATION: University of California, Berkeley, CA, Philosophy: M.A. 1973, Ph.D. 1976 Dissertation: Functionalism as a Theory of Mind, Advisors: H. Paul Grice, George Myro, Eleanor Rosch Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, Philosophy: A.B., Phi Beta Kappa, 1970. Thesis: Intentional Contexts. Advisors: Richard Grandy, Terrence Penner PUBLICATIONS: BOOKS (EDITED): John Searle and his Critics. Co-edited with Ernest Lepore. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991. JOURNAL ARTICLES & BOOK CHAPTERS: • Altogether now - Not! Integrative theories of consciousness and pathologies of disunity. In R. Gennaro (ed.) Disturbed Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (forthcoming 2015). • E pluribus unum: Rethinking the unity of consciousness. In C. Hill and D. Bennett (eds.): Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 375- 92 (forthcoming 2015). • Getting it all together - phenomenal unity and the self. Analysis 74:3, 491-98 (2014). • Scientific reduction (co-authored with Raphael van Riel). In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy online (2014). • Rival views of consciousness and self-awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 20:11&12, 51-68 (2013). • Phenomenal unity, representation and the self. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86:1, 209-13 (2013). • On the supposed inconceivability of absent qualia functional duplicates. The Philosophical Review 121:02, 277-84 (2012). • Subjective consciousness and self-representation. Philosophical Studies 159:03, 457-65 (2012). • Consciousness and Cognition. In S. Stich and E. Margolis (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Cognitive Science,. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2012). • Non-reductive physicalism and the teleo-pragmatic theory of mind, Philosophia Naturalis 47/48:1-2,103-23 (2011). • Drugs, mental instruments and self-control. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30:05, 325- 26 (2011). • Life, holism and emergence: converging themes. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18:5-6, 139-47 (2011). • Concepts of Consciousness. In T. Bayne. A. Cleermans, P. Wiklen (eds.) Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2009). • Functionalism. In. B. McLaughlin and A. Beckerman (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 128-51 (2009). • Jackson’s change of mind: representationalism, a priorism & the knowledge argument. In I. Ravenscroft (ed.) Minds, Worlds and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 189-218 (2008). • Functionalism and qualia. In M. Velmans and S. Schnieider (eds). Blackwells Companion to Consciousness. Oxford: Blackwells Publishing, 181-95 (2007). • What if phenomenal consciousness admits of degrees? The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30:5-6, 528-529, (2007). • Mirror-mirror, is that all? In U. Kriegl and K. Williford (eds.) Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books, 11-40 (2006). • So many ways of saying 'No' to Mary. In P. Ludlow, D. Stoljar and Y. Nagasawa (eds.) There's Something about Mary: Essays on the Knowledge Argument. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 365-405, (2005). • HOGS (Higher-Order Global States) - an alternative higher-order model of consciousness. In R. Gennaro (ed.) Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 67-92, (2004). • Outing the Mind. In R. Schantz (ed.) The Externalist Challenge: New Studies on Cognition and Intentionality. Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 255-84, (2004). • Neural correlates and the diversity of content. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11:1, (2004). • Beautiful red squares. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 26:01, 51-52 (2003) • Maps, gaps, and traps. In, Q. Smith and A. Jokic (eds.) Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford: Clarendon, Oxford Univ. Press, 323-52 (2003). • Nichtreduktiver Materialismus - noch immer das beste Angebot auf dem Leib-Seele Basar (Nonreductive physicalism: still the best buy at the mind/body bazaar). In Michael Pauen (ed.) Phaenomenales Bewustsein: Entstehung und Erklarg. Berlin: Mentis Verlag, 297- 327 (2002). • Still room for representations. The Brain and Behavioral Sciences 25, (2002). • Nonreduction, consciousness and physical causation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9:11, 41-48 (2002). • Inward and upward: reflection, introspection and self-awareness. Philosophical Topics 28:2, 275-305 (2001). • Reduction, emergence and other recent options on the mind-body problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8:9, 1-34 (2001). *Reprinted in The Emergence of Consciousness, Anthony Freeman (ed.), Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic 1-34 (2001). *Reprinted in Polish translation - Polish Academy of Social Sciences 2007. • Is the higher-order linguistic thought model of consciousness adequate? The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23: 218-19 (2001). • Closing the gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7:4 , 93-97 (2000). *Reprinted in N. Humphrey Solving the mind-body problem. Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic (2000). • Out of sight but not out of mind: isomorphism and absent qualia. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22:6 974-75, (1999). • Vehicles, processes and neoclassical revival. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22:01, 170-71 (1999). • Conceiving beyond our means - the limits of thought experiments in the study of consciousness. In D. Chalmers and S. Hammerof (eds.) Tucson III Toward a Science of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 13-22, (1999). • Stepping back from the gap. Proceedings of the World Congress of Philosophy XX, Boston, 123-34,(1999) • Analytical isomorphism and Marilyn Monroe. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21:06, pp.776-77, (1998). • The use of video taping in the improvement of teaching. Co-authored with Michael Lynch. In L. Lambert (ed.) A Graduate Student Guide to Teaching. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 88-94, (1996). • Dennett, drafts and phenomenal realism. Philosophical Topics 22, 443-56, (1995). • How should we understand the relation between intentionality and consciousness? Philosophical Perspectives 9, 271-290, (1995). • Why the connection argument does not work? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55:1, 201-07, (1995). • What would count as explaining consciousness?" In Conscious Experience Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Berlin and New York: F. Schöningen, 61-80 (1995). *Also published in German as “Was würde als eine Erklärung von BewuStsein zuahlen?” In BewuStsein edited by T. Metzinger, Berlin & New York: F. Schöningen, 61-80 (1995). • Prosopagnosia, conscious awareness, and the interactive brain. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, 84-85, (1994). • Are beliefs brain states? And if they are, what might that explain? Philosophical Studies 76: 205-15, (1994). • Deficit studies and the function of phenomenal consciousness. In Philosophy and Psychopathology, G. Graham & L. Stephens (ed.) Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 25-49, (1994). • Who's in charge here and who's doing all the work? In J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.) Essays on Mental Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 233-56, (1993). *Reprinted in W. Crumley (ed.) Readings in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing, 489-503, (2000). • Understanding the phenomenal mind: Are all just armadillos? In, M. Davies and G. Humphreys,Consciousness. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 137-54, (1993). *Reprinted in P. Grimm (ed.) The Philosopher's Annual XVI. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Press, 205-22, (1994). *Reprinted in Readings on Consciousness, N. Block, O. Flanagan, & G. Guzeldere (eds.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 435-442 & 559-566 (1998). *Reprinted in Mind and Cognition, William Lycan (ed.), 2nd edition, New York: Basil Blackwell, 461-73, (1999). • Nonreductive materialism and intertheoretical constraint. In. A. Beckermann,mH. Flohr, J. Kim (eds.). Emergence and Reduction. Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 157-179, (1992). • 3 bad arguments for intentional property epiphenomenalism, Erkenntnis 36:3 311-32, (1992). • Time for more alternatives. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15, 228-29, (1992). *Reprinted in Readings on Consciousness, N. Block, O. Flanagan, & G. Guzeldere (ed.) MIT Press, 181-85, (1998). • Metaphysical arguments for internalism and why they don't work. In S. Silvers (ed) Re: Representation. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 151-60, (1989). • What difference does consciousness make? Philosophical Topics 17, 211-230, (1989). • A functionalist plea for self-consciousness. The Philosophical Review 97, 149-88, (1988). • Qualia, functional equivalence, and computation. In Perspectives on Mind. H. Otto and J. Tuedio (ed.) Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 119-26, (1988). • Consciousness, intrinsic intentionality and self-understanding machines. In A. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds.)Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 79-100 (1988).• Has the case been made against the ecumencial view of connectionism? The
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