Leadership, Message, and Rhetorical Style Dissertation

The Language of Cultural Policy Advocacy: Leadership, Message, and Rhetorical Style

Dissertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillments of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

Brea M. Heidelberg, M.A.

Graduate Program in Arts Administration, Education and Policy

The Ohio State University

2013

Dissertation Committee:

Margaret J. Wyszomirski, Advisor

Wayne P. Lawson

Gerald Kosicki

Brea Heidelberg

2013

Abstract

Since the creation of the NEA in 1965, arts advocates have had an established venue, at the federal level, to advocate for favorable policy incomes, usually in the form of continued or increased public arts funding. Engaging in advocacy as part of a larger policymaking process requires actors inside and outside of government to employ various methods of persuasion. My dissertation explores some of these methods, particularly rhetorical techniques as a way to investigate policy change management. I employ theories from political science, public policy, and rhetoric to analyze advocacy arguments employed by NEA chairs. To conduct the study, I constructed a theoretical lens that provides a foundation, rooted in the policymaking process, that incorporates the importance of ideas and their rhetorical expression. This project explores the ideas used to construct arts-advocacy arguments, their rhetorical evolution, the various ways rhetorical leaders use them, and finally, how those arguments are used to create or manage policy change.

Although some previous research discusses advocacy arguments, the role rhetoric plays in the strategic navigation of the policymaking process deserves additional scholarly attention. This is especially true in the specific context of public art funding. To date, research about arts advocacy has not provided a holistic view of the policymaking process, or of the range of advocacy arguments. By addressing both these gaps, though, I do not seek to imply a causal relationship between particular advocacy arguments and

financial rewards. Instead, I identify and present themes in past arts-advocacy arguments to assist with the construction and deployment of future arts advocacy.

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Dedication

To my best friend, Alex C. Wood, who, through random acts of support, never allowed

me to feel guilty about my ambition.

To my mother, who may not have always understood, but never doubted.

Acknowledgments

I would like to sincerely and humbly thank my committee for their help and guidance throughout this process. To Wayne Lawson, whose personal experience with my research, along with his unwavering support, was instrumental in my successful completion of my work. To Jerry Kosicki, whose interest in multiple, seemingly disparate pieces, or my work has provided me with insight into how my research could serve a larger audience. I would especially like to thank my advisor, Margaret Wyszomirski, for sharing her expertise and her insight.

I would also like to thank Nan Johnson, whose teaching and expertise had a profound impact on the initial phases of my work.

I also want to thank my family, whose support and pride has sustained me.

Finally, I would like to thank the administrative loves of my life: Kirsten Thomas and Dawn Pickarski. Your non-judgmental support as I messed up forms, missed deadlines, and asked the same question multiple times will always be greatly appreciated.

Vita

June 2002 ...... Winchester Thurston (high school)

2007...... B.S. Business Administration & B.A. International Area Studies

(Drexel University)

2009...... MA Arts Policy and Administration

2012 to present ...... Assistant Professor, Arts Administration, Education and Policy,

Department of Fine Arts, Rider University

Publication

Heidelberg, B. (2010). The need for arts researchers in arts organizations. The Journal of

Arts Management, Law and Society, 40, 235–237.

Field of Study

Cultural Policy and Arts Management

Table of Contents

Abstract(...... (ii(

Dedication(...... (iv(

Acknowledgments(...... (v(

Vita(...... (vi(

List(of(Tables(...... (xv(

List(of(Figures(...... (xvii(

Introduction(...... (1(

Personal(Significance(...... (1(

Statement(of(the(Issue(...... (3(

Policy(Actors(...... (4(

Policy(Arena(...... (5(

Policy(Entrepreneur(...... (6(

Related(Research(...... (6(

Conclusion(...... (12(

Chapter(1:(Literature(Review(...... (13(

Kingdon’s(MultiplePStreams(Framework(...... (13(

The(Problem(Stream(...... (16(

The(Policy(Stream(...... (18(

vii

The(Political(Stream(...... (19(

Policy(Windows(...... (21(

AdvocacyPCoalition(Framework(...... (23(

PunctuatedPEquilibrium(Theory(...... (28(

Combining(Theories(...... (30(

Guiding(Questions(...... (32(

Policy(Entrepreneurs(...... (34(

Policy(Entrepreneurs(and(Interest(Groups(...... (38(

Policy(Entrepreneurs(and(Rhetoric(...... (42(

Chapter(2:(Conceptual(Framework(...... (52(

Typology(of(Rhetorical(Situations(...... (63(

Key(Concepts(...... (69(

Less$varied$coalitions$(square$1$and$2)$...... $72$ Varied$coalitions$(squares$3$and$4$...... $73$ Research(Goals(...... (73(

Chapter(3:(Defining(the(Political(Context(...... (75(

Timeline(Item(Rationale(...... (75(

Policy(Analysis(Framework(and(Timeline(Construction(...... (76(

Multiple

Arts

viii

Regional$arts$organizations$(RAOs)$...... $86$ National$Assembly$of$State$Arts$Agencies$(NASAA)$...... $87$ National$Endowment$for$the$Arts$(NEA)$...... $87$ Presidential$action$...... $87$ House$and$Senate$...... $88$ Open$opposition$(from$opposing

Reinforcement$...... $96$ Deflection$...... $97$ Conflictual$deflection$...... $97$ Conclusion$...... $98$

Chapter(4:(Establishing(ArtsPAdvocacy(Arguments(...... (99(

Background(of(Direct(Government(Involvement(With(the(Arts(...... (100(

The(Players(...... (103(

Data(Selection(...... (105(

Arguments$from$the$arts$constituency$...... $107$ Government$has$a$role$to$play$...... $107$ Quality$...... $108$ Increased$demand$for$the$arts$...... $110$ Field$comparisons$...... $111$ Access$to$the$arts$...... $112$ The$cost$disease$...... $114$ Diversified$patronage$...... $115$ Seal$of$approval$...... $116$ Baumol$and$Bowen$...... $117$ National$pride$...... $120$ Legacy$...... $121$ Arguments$against$public$arts$funding$ath$te$federal$level$...... $123$ Rationales$in$the$policy$arena$...... $125$ ix

Presidents$...... $126$ Hearings$to$establish$a$national$foundation$on$the$arts$and$humanities$...... $127$ Cluster(2(Represents(Policymakers’(Top(Six(Rationales(...... (129(

ANTI$arguments$in$the$policy$arena$...... $130$ The$National$Foundation$on$the$Arts$and$Humanities$Act$of$1965$...... $132$ Legislative$hearings$...... $134$ Arguments$against$public$arts$funding$...... $139$ Conclusion$...... $140$

Chapter(5:(Methodology(...... (143(

Investigating(Language(Use(Among(Chairpersons(of(the(NEA(...... (143(

Data(...... (146(

Data$identification$and$rationale$...... $146$ Data

The(Constituency(...... (148(

General$public$...... $148$ Arts

Confirmation$hearings$...... $153$ Newspaper$articles$...... $154$ Logos$...... $155$ Annual$reports$...... $155$ Policymakers$...... $155$ Arguments$from$the$arts$constituency$...... $156$ Congressional$arts$caucus$...... $156$ Oppositional(Advocacy(Coalitions(...... (158( x

Appropriations(Hearings(...... (158(

Reauthorization$hearings$...... $160$ Conclusion$...... $161$ Codebook(Construction(...... (162(

Advocacy$argument$codebook$...... $162$ Rhetorical

Rationale(for(Choosing(NVivo(...... (168(

Methodological(Issues(...... (170(

Documenting(NVivo(Use(...... (174(

Conclusion(...... (178(

Chapter(6:(Biddle—Access(to(the(Best(...... (179(

Data(Selection(...... (179(

Players(...... (181(

Presidents$...... $181$ Policymakers$...... $182$ The$arts$constituency$...... $182$ The$NEA$...... $183$ Confirmation(Hearing(...... (186(

Tenure$overview$...... $193$ Concerns(of(the(Arts(Subgovernment(...... (195(

The$arts$constituency$...... $195$ Access$...... $197$ Increased$demand$...... $200$ Government$control$of$the$arts$...... $203$ Economic$impact$...... $205$ Quality$...... $207$

Art$education$...... $209$ Additional$note$...... $211$ AdvocacyPCoalition(Strength(At(the(Start(of(Biddle’s(Tenure(...... (212(

Rationales(Used(by(the(Chair(...... (213(

Strength(of(the(Advocacy(Coalition(During(Biddle’s(Tenure(...... (219(

Rationales(In(the(Policy(Arena(...... (219(

FY80(...... (222(

FY81(...... (225(

FY82(...... (226(

Policy

Policy$situation$...... $229$ Argument(Action(...... (230(

Diversified$patronage$...... $234$ Economic$impact$...... $234$ Access$...... $235$ Art$education$...... $236$ Subgovernment(Impact(...... (237(

Advocacy(Outcome(...... (238(

Policy

Conclusion(...... (242(

Chapter(7:(Frohnmayer—The(Perfect(Storm(...... (243(

Data(Selection(...... (244(

Players(...... (245(

President$...... $245$ Policymakers$...... $245$ xii

Arts$constituency$...... $245$ Oppositional$advocacy$coalition$...... $246$ Agency$context$...... $247$ The$chair$...... $249$ Confirmation(Hearing(...... (250(

Tenure(Overview(...... (257(

Concerns(of(the(Arts(Subgovernment(...... (260(

The$arts$constituency$...... $260$ Anticensorship$...... $262$ Artistic$freedom$...... $265$ Access$...... $267$ Conclusion$...... $268$ Advocacy(Coalition(Strength(at(the(Start(of(Frohnmayer’s(Tenure(...... (269(

Oppositional$Advocacy$Coalition$...... $270$ Bad$art$...... $271$ Accountability$...... $273$ No$need$...... $274$ Conclusion$...... $275$ Rationales(Used(During(the(Chair’s(Tenure(...... (276(

Rationales(In(The(Policy(Arena(...... (280(

Reauthorization(...... (282(

FY92$...... $282$ Policy(Change(Management(Assessment(...... (286(

Policy$situation$...... $286$ Argument$action$...... $286$ Subgovernment$impact$...... $288$ Advocacy$outcome$...... $289$ Policy

Conclusion(...... (295(

Future(Research(...... (305(

References(...... (308(

Appendix(A:(Codes(...... (323(

Appendix(B:(Strategies(...... (327(

Appendix(C:(Timeline(...... (330(

Appendix(D:(Data(by(Case(...... (342(

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List of Tables

Table 1 Research Questions ...... 33$

Table 2 Types of Policy Action Taken ...... 39$

Table 3 Research Subquestions ...... 43$

Table 4 Categories of Services Offered by Arts-Service Organizations ...... 82$

Table 5 Punctuation ...... 91$

Table 6 Equilibrium ...... 92$

Table 7 Word-Frequency Analysis of Biddle’s Confirmation Hearing ...... 189$

Table 8 Appropriation Increases by Year ...... 194$

Table 9 Word-Frequency Investigations by Category ...... 197$

Table 10 Biddle Case, Arts Constituency: Access Argument Scorecard ...... 200$

Table 11 Biddle Case, Arts Constituency: Increased Demand Argument Scorecard ...... 202$

Table 12 Biddle Case, Arts Constituency: Government Control of the Arts Argument

Scorecard ...... 205$

Table 13 Biddle Case, Arts Constituency: Economic-Impact Argument Scorecard ...... 207$

Table 14 Biddle Case, Arts Constituency: Quality-Argument Scorecard ...... 209$

Table 15 Biddle Case, Arts Constituency: Art Education Argument Scorecard ...... 211$

Table 16 Biddle and Arts Constituency’s Rationale Preferences ...... 212$

Table 17 Biddle and Arts Constituency’s Later Rationale Preferences ...... 219$

Table 18 Top Three Rationales Used by the Main Groups in the Policy Arena, FY79 ..221$

Table 19 Top Three Rationales Used by the Main Groups in the Policy Arena, FY80 ..224$

Table 20 Top Three Rationales Used by the Main Groups in the Policy Arena, FY81 ..226$

Table 21 Top Three Rationales Used by the Main Groups in the Policy Arena, FY82 ..228$

Table 22 Appropriation Awarded to the National Endowment for the Arts ...... 240$

Table 23 Common Words Used to Express Each Rationale ...... 252$

Table 24 Indicators ...... 262$

Table 25 Frohnmayer Case, Arts Constituency: Anticensorship Argument Scorecard ...264$

Table 26 Frohnmayer Case, Arts Constituency: Artistic Freedom Argument Scorecard 266$

Table 27 Frohnmayer Case, Arts Constituency: Access Argument Scorecard ...... 268$

Table 28 Frohnmayer’s and the Arts Constituency’s Rationale Preferences ...... 270$

Table 29 Word Indicators From the Opposition-Advocacy Coalition ...... 271$

Table 30 Frohnmayer Case, Opposition-Advocacy Coalition: Bad Art Argument

Scorecard ...... 272$

Table 31 Frohnmayer Case, Opposition-Advocacy Coalition: Accountability

Argument Scorecard ...... 274$

Table 32 Frohnmayer Case, Opposition-Advocacy Coalition: No Need Argument

Scorecard ...... 275$

Table 33 Strength of the Advocacy Coalition During Frohnmayer’s Tenure ...... 279$

Table 34 Top Three Rationales Used by the Main Groups FY91 ...... 281$

Table 35 Top Three Rationales Use by the Main Groups FY92 ...... 283$

Table 36 National Endowment for the Arts Appropriations ...... 292$

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List of Figures

Figure 1. Policy streams combining to create a policy window...... 53$

Figure 2. Convergence of the problem and policy streams...... 55$

Figure 3. Chairperson’s task when the problem and policy streams converge...... 56$

Figure 4. Convergence of the political and problem streams...... 57$

Figure 5. Chairperson’s task when the political and problem streams converge...... 58$

Figure 6. Chairperson’s work to separate the political and policy streams...... 59$

Figure 7. Convergence of the political and policy streams...... 60$

Figure 8. Chairperson’s task when the political and policy streams converge...... 61$

Figure 9. Punctuated-equilibrium theory...... 64$

Figure 10. Advocacy coalition framework...... 66$

Figure 11. Externally empowered agency changes...... 67$

Figure 12. Size and cohesion of advocacy coalition...... 72$

Figure 13. Role of the Chairperson of the NEA...... 95$

Figure 14. Chairperson can reinforce arguments...... 96$

Figure 15. Conflictual definition...... 97$

Figure 16. ANTI arguments: Constituency...... 124$

Figure 17. Competition and comparison in the policy arena...... 126$

Figure 18. Arts constituency concerns at National Foundation for the Arts and

Humanities hearings...... 128$

xvii

Figure 19. Policymaker concerns at hearings...... 129$

Figure 20. ANTI arguments in the policy arena...... 131$

Figure 21. Appropriations FY67, Coding by node for all players...... 135$

Figure 22. Appropriations FY67, Coding by node for artists and arts administrators. ...135$

Figure 23. Process for choosing NVivo...... 169$

Figure 24. Process of analysis in NVivo...... 169$

Figure 25. Issues discussed at Biddle’s confirmation hearing...... 187$

Figure 26. Concerns of the arts constituency while Biddle was chair...... 196$

Figure 27. Increased demand rationales...... 202$

Figure 28. Rationales used by the chairman during his tenure...... 214$

Figure 29. Arguments used in the policy arena FY 79...... 220$

Figure 30. Arguments used in the policy arena FY80...... 223$

Figure 31. Arguments used in the policy arena FY81...... 225$

Figure 32. Arguments used in the policy arena FY82...... 227$

Figure 33. Hypothesized timeline of Biddle’s actions...... 229$

Figure 34. Amended hypothesized timeline of Biddle’s actions...... 230$

Figure 35. Issues discussed at Frohnmayer’ confirmation hearing...... 251$

Figure 36. Arts constituency concerns during Frohnmayer’s tenure...... 261$

Figure 37. Concern of the opposition-advocacy coalition during Frohnmayer’s tenure

as chair...... 271$

Figure 38. Rationales used during the chair’s tenure...... 277$

Figure 39. FY91 arguments...... 280$

Figure 40. FY92 arguments...... 282$

xviii

Figure 41. Policy change management assessment...... 286$

Figure 42. Policy change...... 287$

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Introduction

Personal Significance

My interest in rhetoric began in high school, when I was first introduced to

Aristotle’s work. I was amazed by the power of carefully chosen words: they could get someone into or out of trouble. Although my undergraduate studies were unrelated to rhetoric, the concepts of ethos, pathos, and logos stuck with me, permeating my other interests. However, it was not until I entered graduate school that opportunities to formally investigate rhetoric arose.

Research experiences at the master’s level set me on a path that would later lead me back to rhetoric through my interest in arts advocacy. During my first summer of graduate school, I was invited to be part of a research team at the 2008 National

Performing Arts Convention, where our team investigated convention participants’ potential for collective action. I went into the project thinking that the possibilities for these practitioners were endless. Although all convention participants had a wealth of knowledge about their respective art forms and their organizations, I was surprised to find that many of them knew little about organized arts advocacy. That is, they were interested in advocacy as it pertained to their organizations’ daily operations, but were not actively contributing their knowledge to any large-scale advocacy efforts at the state or local level.

In my naiveté, I was surprised that arts advocacy, a topic that been of immediate interest during my first year as a graduate student. However, I quickly learned that this lack of

participation in organized arts advocacy was not at all due to ignorance, but to a combination of immediately pressing organizational concerns and perhaps some misunderstanding about the importance of advocacy work.

Practitioners’ lack of familiarity with the policy arena also played a significant role in my work with the State Arts Agency’s Oral History project. Here, after other researchers interviewed State Arts Agency Executive Directors from 1995–2005 to discuss their experiences over the years, my job was to review the transcripts and group the information into themes. Here, my interest in language and rhetoric began to converge with my interest in arts advocacy. While issues related to training, professionalization, and interagency relationships all emerged as important themes, it was the Arts and Government category that truly caught my interest. Many participants commented on their lack of knowledge about arts advocacy when they first took their positions. Although they all eventually learned how to maneuver in the policy arena, the initial lack of information and training made for a steep learning curve.

My experience on both projects led me to a series of preliminary research questions: What is effective arts advocacy? How does it manifest? How can people learn about arts advocacy in a way that lets them understand the how and why of the policy process for them and their work? Based on my observations from the aforementioned projects, rhetoric plays a significant role. But finding out what that role is, how that information can be distilled, investigated, and perhaps enhanced, presented an interesting research area that directly spoke to my longstanding intellectual interests.

Statement of the Issue

One rationale for culture’s emergence in the public-policy arena is provided by

Swaim (1982): “culture has emerged as one of those areas where segments of the public do not accept what the market provides; rather, they expect government to guarantee greater cultural availability and protection from the vagaries of the market” (p. 1).

Although this rationale is not perfect, it does speak to reasons for government intervention in the free-market system: market failure, the inability of the market to provide enough goods and services to meet public demand. Government subsidy of the arts created additional responsibilities for those seeking and receiving these subsidies, especially in light of all of the budgetary constraints commonly associated with government (Mulcahy, 1982). The main responsibility directly linked to public subsidy is engagement in the public-policy process. The overarching goal of my research is to investigate and assess how arts advocates engage in this process. To achieve this goal, the primary purpose of my research is to create a framework for analyzing arts-advocacy efforts at the federal level.

My overall research goal is loaded with many underlying assumptions expressed with terminology that can, and has been used in different ways for various purposes.

Because purposeful language is a key component of my work, I will briefly describe some of the terms central to my investigation: policy arena, policy actors, and policy entrepreneur. The discussion of these terms is meant to clarify the boundaries of my work and provide a clear description of my research. A fuller explanation of these terms, including an intellectual history and theoretical connections to my research will be provided in the literature review and methodology chapters, respectively.

Policy Actors

Public policy, as it pertains to the arts, has multiple influences. According to

Lowry, several “pluralistic components” describe the key players in the mixed arts- funding system. These components include “private patrons, philanthropic foundations, business corporations, federal, state, and local governments, and the influences of the marketplace” (Lowry, 1984, p. 2). One important group in my research is the arts constituency, comprised of artists, arts managers, and arts audiences. The title arts patron refers to individual donors, and to arts organizations and experiences. For the purposes of my research, philanthropic foundations are referred to simply as foundations. These organizations are responsible for providing funds to a variety of nonprofit institutions, including arts organizations. Of particular importance in the various levels of government are congresspersons directly linked to the Senate and House Appropriations Committees, other congresspersons with a vested interest in supporting or opposing public arts funding, and arts-agency leaders at the state and local levels. In my research, the influences of the marketplace are best described in the policy context. The policy context includes the amount of leisure time and disposable income of most Americans, as well as the political climate in Congress and surrounding the President. These factors may not appear to be directly linked to the arts; they can significantly impact issues discussed in the policy arena. For example, during the presidency of Kennedy, increased leisure time coupled with an increase in disposable income created a larger market for arts audiences than had previously existed. Although each of these policy actors and policy contexts have been studied individually, my choice to look at public arts funding at the federal level mandates that I take all stakeholders into consideration, as they are all present in the

policy arena and the processes that directly impact the policy arena. The term I will use to discuss the interplay between all of these actors is arts subgovernment. This term has been used in literature that has guided the development of my research, discussed later in this chapter. These various stakeholders directly and indirectly influence the rationales and rhetoric used to construct arguments for and against public funding for the arts in the policy arena.

Policy Arena

The policy arena is the space where policy actors engage with one another to influence policymakers and, ultimately, public policy. The event most often associated with the policy arena is committee hearings. For my research, I am specifically interested in Appropriations Subcommittee hearings. During these hearings members of Congress meet with representatives from the agency under review, in this case the National

Endowment for the Arts (NEA), and discuss budget requests, justifications, and alterations for the upcoming fiscal year. In these hearings, each agency provides information about the work they do, rationales for why the work should continue, and often requests for additional funding. It is also common for members of the issue subgovernment to come and testify on behalf of an organization. At NEA appropriations hearings artists, arts administrators, arts educators, and researchers come in to provide supplemental information, personal stories, and additional rationales in support of the agency. In addition to Appropriations Subcommittee hearings, there are other ways policy actors engage in the policy arena.

Policy Entrepreneur

Policy entrepreneurs are the central focus of my research. They are actors who are credited with a variety of tasks that help shape policy outcomes. Policy entrepreneurs organize and/or mobilize other actors in the subgovernment. These actors can be anyone with an interest in a policy issue.

I seek to construct a framework that can be used to identify and investigate advocacy arguments made by, and on behalf of, actors in the policy arena. Specifically, I want to see how arts-advocacy arguments have changed or remained constant overtime. I also want to investigate how arts-advocacy argument changes (or not) and contributes to the creation or management of policy change. To do so, I will examine the rhetoric of arguments made both in favor of and against public arts funding. These arguments, in content and rhetorical framing, have been a factor in the relative success of policy-change management. Although some arts advocacy arguments, in conjunction with other actions and strategies, have resulted in increased policy power for the NEA, counterarguments for the elimination of the agency have also been successful in decreasing the policy power of the organization. This cyclical conflict requires both sides to carefully consider the best way to articulate their positions in order to create, or deflect, policy change.

Related Research

Although the history of arts advocacy does influence this study, as a policy analyst I am most interested in the effects of previous advocacy efforts on current advocacy practices. In the work Congress and the National Endowment for the Arts:

Institutional Patterns and Arts Funding, 1965–1994, Moen (1997) took a longitudinal look at Congress, focusing on bicameral differences in public arts-funding support. Moen

demonstrated the important role structure plays in the policy process, and identified and discussed different ways members of the House and Senate respond to advocacy messages regarding public arts funding.

In Budgetary Politics and Legislative Support: The Arts in Congress,

Wyszomirski (1988) discussed the importance of tracking budgetary patterns as a demonstration of “the practical as well as symbolic embodiment of government priorities”

(p. 9). This analysis tracks budgetary patterns in Congress to help predict the future of budgetary concerns affecting the arts. Wyszomirski discussed the underdeveloped arts subgovernment of the late 1970s and early 1980s. At this time, the arts subgovernment showed signs of becoming a strong political force, due to an increase in interest-group activity. However, a lack of politically powerful supporters among both Democrats and

Republicans significantly hindered its development. Of particular importance was

Wyszomirski’s discussion of the Congressional Arts Caucus. Founded in 1981, the

Congressional Arts Caucus serves as an additional actor in Congress as well as the advocacy portion of the arts subgovernment. The rise of the Congressional Arts Caucus changed the way arts advocacy was conducted, altering the landscape of congressional arts support.

In a study The Politics of Congressional Arts Policy: National Decisions, Local

Needs and the Public Interest, Weaver (1988) chose to focus on “the longer term, more substantial trends” that are often “more difficult to discern, but have far more impact on the eventual outcome of most policy decisions” (p. 35). Weaver noted the significance of appropriations subcommittees, and emphasizes the political intersections between

Congress and interest groups. In Congress, members serve on various subcommittees that

deal with specific policy issues or areas, or with specific functions. Appropriations subcommittees handle budgetary concerns for a variety of departments in the government.

Mainly, these subcommittees set each department’s appropriation, or budget, for the fiscal year. In the analysis, Weaver outlined the role each player in the arts subgovernment should play. Ideally, the NEA and interest groups are “responsible for providing information and support to Congress” and Congress “in return provides authority and financial resources” (Weaver, 1988, p. 37). Weaver’s article has two important implications. First, the role of the various actors in the arts subgovernment, and the methods they employ to satisfy those roles, should be based on their rhetorical strengths. Second, by including all actors in the subgovernment—those who define the issues, the politicians directly involved in policymaking, and the general public—Weaver provided insight into some of the inner workings of the complete policy process.

Past discussions of advocacy strategies focused mainly on the content used to construct advocacy arguments. In The Case for the National Endowment for the Arts:

Federal Funding for the Arts in America in the 1960s and 1970s, author Saunders (2005) investigated uses of the term public good by those advocating for an increased federal role in public arts funding. Saunders discussed how use of the economic concept of public good by those outside the technical field of economics is a demonstration of practitioners strategically using technical scholarship. Saunders focused the investigation on Hanks, the second chairperson of the NEA. Hanks’s tenure was from September 1969 to October 1977. Saunders concluded that arts advocates are influenced by the political environment; changes in the political context inform changes in the way arts advocates define the value of the arts. Of particular significance is the way arts advocates define

problems facing arts organizations. Those definitions were designed to align the issue of public arts funding with concepts already familiar to policymakers and to many members of the general public. As part of the investigation, Saunders provided information on

America’s economic and political conditions to contextualize economic arguments in the

1960s. Although this contextualization was an important part of Saunders’s work, it did not consider Hanks’s role as a rhetorical leader in a relationship with various parts of the arts subgovernment, and how that might have impacted the response to the use of specific advocacy strategies. However, although rhetoric was not explicitly discussed, this work does address the issues of argument creation and alteration as well as the importance of technical information and policy context.

Similarly, in Old Pictures in New Frames: Issue Definition and Federal Arts

Policy, Strom and Cook (2004) conducted a content analysis of congressional debates on arts funding from 1965 to 2000. The content analysis is supplemented with a review of arts coverage in The New York Times and other arts periodicals. Strom and Cook focused their discussion of rhetorical shifts in public arts-funding arguments on the connection between the arts and economic development. This was done to trace the creation of a rhetorical link between the arts and local economic development. Strom and Cook then demonstrated how this linkage is expressed at the federal level in congressional debates.

This work is significant because it acknowledges the shift from arguments based on intrinsic benefits, such as personal fulfillment, to instrumental arguments. The argument that arts advocates consciously reformed their arguments to broaden their political appeal and to combat opposition is also an important addition to field knowledge. Strom and

Cook demonstrated how arts-advocacy arguments are changed to align with other policy-

relevant concerns, often through alliances with partners in different advocacy areas. As with the work of Saunders, Strom and Cook connected the issues of advocacy and rhetorical strategy. However, as with Saunders, a specific and explicit discussion of rhetorical leadership, and the means through which different rhetorical strategies were employed and received is absent.

Research has been conducted on many actors involved in the federal arts-funding process, such as policymakers, researchers, presidents, and advocates. However, by focusing on a single type of actor, this body of work often overlooks how multiple actors intersect in the arts-policy network at the federal level. My research will thus expand on previous work by considering all of the actors involved in a given decision, creating a holistic view of the advocacy and policymaking processes. Operating from this holistic view, I investigate the advocacy rhetoric used by all actors involved in the process of public arts funding at the federal level.

My research is situated between the aforementioned studies. It will incorporate information about the actors involved in the policy process, the content of advocacy arguments, and their strategic use. At the heart of my research is a focus on rhetoric.

While the connection between advocacy and rhetoric has been investigated, it has not been done in a way that places the role of rhetoric and rhetorical leadership on a level equal to the attention given to the content of advocacy arguments. In the context of the arts, I seek to answer several questions about the political role of rhetoric: Who uses it?

How is it used? And to what end? I have chosen to focus on the NEA because it is the leading national arts organization, directly linked to the policy arena and policymaking process at the federal level. Its presence on the national stage provides information for

data collection, such as appropriations hearings and agency documents, that may not be available or readily accessible for arts organizations operating in a smaller policy arena.

I based my decision to investigate the rhetoric of NEA chairpersons on the

Aristotelian concept of rhetoric: ethos (authoritative appeal), pathos (emotional appeal), and logos (logic-based appeal). My choice to focus specifically on chairpersons was also guided by the power they have to make arguments on behalf of the NEA based solely on their position. Each chairperson is charged with representing the NEA in the public arena: both to the general public, and in the policy arena. It is the chairperson’s responsibility to discern what they think the ethos, pathos, and logos of the organization is, then translate that to various audiences. Acting as the agency’s filter, each chairperson embodies what they perceive to be the persona of the NEA. However, because the NEA is not actually a person, the chairperson’s acts on behalf of the organization are significantly influenced by each chairperson’s own ethos, pathos, and logos. This turns their interpretations of the agency’s goals and plans for the achievement of those goals into an interpolation based on their own personal experiences, connections, and knowledge of the arts and political arena.

Although NEA chairs are representatives of a federal-level arts organization, the filtering process they go through in an effort to advocate for their organization and its mission connects them to all arts advocates, as I believe the advocacy filtering process to be universal. Therefore, although I will not argue that this research is universally generalizable, I believe that investigating the advocacy rhetoric of NEA chairs will provide insight into arts advocacy with generalizable aspects.

Conclusion

I am conducting an investigation of arts-advocacy rhetoric under the assumption that the strategic construction and use of arts-advocacy arguments has the potential to manage, and even create, policy change. This assertion puts forth the notion that there is much to be learned from the rhetorical history of arts-advocacy arguments. Of particular importance are questions such as What information was used to create the arguments?

Where did the information come from? Who constructed the arguments, and who used them? How does the rhetoric used to express the argument vary among actors? I hope that the results of my research will help inform the efforts of arts advocates at the federal level, and provide an intellectual foundation for advocates at the state and local levels.

For arts advocates, this research will determine if there is a means of judging the impact of rhetorical strategies, highlighting both successful and unsuccessful strategies at the federal level. Although the aforementioned questions are particularly important to arts advocates, answers to the research questions can be used to inform the work of political scientists and public-policy analysts as well. It is my hope that identifying instances of effective and ineffective advocacy will help illuminate key factors to success, which can be applied to a variety of advocacy circumstances. Additionally, information about the role of ideas in the policymaking process, the role of advocacy rhetoric in political communication, and the importance of agency leaders operating as policy entrepreneurs has scholarly relevance in a broader policy context.

Chapter 1: Literature Review

This research will investigate how chairs of the NEA work through the policy process to procure favorable policy outcomes. Doing so involves multiple factors, including the beliefs, values, goals, experiences, and perceptions of actors inside and outside of government. To investigate this process, theorists have constructed frameworks that delineate “what factors are likely to be critically important versus those that can be safely ignored” (Sabatier, 1999, p. 4). My interest in the rhetorical history of the NEA led me to place strong emphasis on the following frameworks: Kingdon’s policy window, . Baumgartner and Jones’s punctuated-equilibrium theory (P-E theory), and

Sabatier’s advocacy-coalition framework (ACF). Each provides a rationale to focus on the chair of the NEA, and each offers organizing concepts about policy formation. The complex policymaking process has been distilled into four steps: problem identification, formulation of possible solutions, implementation of a chosen solution, and evaluation of the chosen solution. Each theory emphasizes and analyzes different aspects of each of these steps. Kingdon’s multiple streams (MS) framework specifically addresses the first two steps. Sabatier’s ACF looks at solution formation. Finally, Baumgartner and Jones’s

P-E theory) focuses on implementation and evaluation.

Kingdon’s Multiple-Streams Framework

Despite my focus on the role of the chairs, they do not act alone. When discussing political issues, particularly the policy process, it is common to group important actors

into subgovernments. These subsystems have many names: iron triangles, issue niches, issue networks, and policy subsystems (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, p. 6). The present research is concerned with the arts subgovernment, a group consisting of policymakers, an arts-advocacy coalition, and an antiarts-advocacy coalition. The policymaker facet of the arts subgovernment, of which the NEA chairs are part, focuses on policymakers directly involved in arts policy. They include politicians on the House and Senate Interior

Subcommittees of Appropriations, which have jurisdiction over the NEA’s budget, and other congresspersons who actively support or directly oppose government interaction with the arts. The arts-advocacy-coalition portion of the subgovernment is a varied group that includes the arts constituency: artists, arts administrators, and arts scholars, as well as members of the general public who are supportive of public arts funding. Those who oppose government interaction with the arts are part of the antiarts-advocacy coalition.

Each of these actors plays important roles in each step of the policymaking process.

As leader of the NEA, it is the chair’s role to represent the agency to policymakers and the public. As a member of the arts subgovernment, it is also the chair’s responsibility to represent the subgovernment to both the general public and policymakers. Both responsibilities require the chair to operate within various rhetorical contexts. In addition to addressing constituents, the general public, and policymakers on behalf of the NEA, the chair must also interpret and translate the preferences and interests of artists, arts administrators, and arts advocates. The chair, in other words, is charged with facilitating communication among different facets of the subgovernment and with helping the subgovernment convey its wishes to the general public. When addressing policymakers, the chair has a direct opportunity to place policy ideas generated from

within the agency and the arts constituency into the policy arena. Ideally, the chair would structure those policy ideas in ways that gain political traction. The chairperson’s work is under the theoretical umbrella provided by Kingdon’s MS framework.

Kingdon’s MS framework is centered on the process of policy formation: agenda setting and decisionmaking (Zahariadis, 2007). Specifically, it poses four primary questions: Where do policy ideas come from? How do they get to the policy arena?

Where do alternative policy ideas come from? How do some ideas gain salience while others fade away? I investigated these questions from the perspective of the chairs of the

NEA to see how these agency leaders shape and manage policy change. The organizing concept of this framework is based on the limitations of individuals and the opportunities provided by organized government. Although individuals may only process one issue at a time, the structure of government allows for multiple issues to be considered simultaneously (Jones, 2001; March & Simon, 1958). However, policymakers operate under time constraints, and may only consider each issue for a given (often short) period of time.

The MS framework assumes that government operates with an inherent sense of ambiguity. Feldman (1989) defined this ambiguity as “a state of having many ways of thinking about the same circumstances or phenomena” (p. 5). This assumption is based on Cohen, March, and Olsen’s (1972) garbage-can model of choice. The garbage-can model departs from previous linear notions of the policy process, which stemmed from an assumption that each phase was separate. Along similar lines, the MS framework establishes a decision-making process that is both dynamic and interactive. Government’s inherent ambiguity plays a role in three important ways: fluid participation, problematic

preferences, and unclear technology (Zahariadis, 2007). Fluid participation in government means relatively high turnover, both of the people involved and the policy ideas and preferences that accompany them. Ambiguity likewise causes problematic preferences that often require decisions to be made despite a lack of clearly defined choices (Sharkansky, 2002). Finally, technology, “an organization’s processes that turn inputs into products,” is unclear (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 67). This lack of clarity is a major point of contention among organizations, legislators, and voters.

Kingdon (1995, 2003) argued that these effects of ambiguity require that an issue experience special circumstances, which Kingdon called open policy windows, to emerge in the public agenda and undergo the policy process. According to Kingdon (2003), a policy window opens when three distinct streams converge: the problem stream, the policy stream, and the political stream. The problem stream involves actors inside and outside of government; the policy stream focuses on proposed solutions; and the political stream is concerned with reception of the issue in the broader context of the entire political landscape. This last stream is based on the actions of legislators, political parties, interest groups, and public opinion. The MS framework assumes that each stream flows independently of the others; it thus places significance on the moments when two or more streams join together. It is the role of policy entrepreneurs, or in the case of this research, the chair, to coordinate advocacy efforts in the problem stream and work with actors in the policy and political streams to facilitate the opening of a policy window.

The Problem Stream

The problem stream consists of issues legislators and the public wish to have addressed. What differentiates problems is the attention policymakers give them. Factors

such as issue indicators, focusing events, feedback, and problem load impact the amount of attention afforded a particular issue. Issue indicators can emerge from various places within and outside of government. Research indicates government intervention as a solution is one of the oft cited sources of issue indicators (Kingdon, 1995). Focusing events, although they can occur inside or outside of subgovernment, are universal in that they promote the “emergence and diffusion of a powerful symbol,” serving as a catalyst in the problem stream (Kingdon, 1995, p. 102). Feedback refers mainly to evaluative comments that stem from solutions to previously identified problems. For instance, in

1981, amid charges of elitism, the NEA promoted programming and infrastructure building in rural areas. Supportive statements from members of Congress representing those rural areas created a positive feedback system. The success or failure of a particular solution can affect new problems in two ways. First, similar or associated problems may be identified and a relevant solution may be provided. Second, a solution that has proven successful in one policy area may be applied to a different, and seemingly unrelated problem (Zahariadis, 2007). For example, in their work Performing Arts: The Economic

Dilemma, Baumol and Bowen (1966) applied theories that characterized education as a quasipublic good to make a case that the arts were also a quasipublic good. Problem load varies depending on the number of pressing issues on the policy-agenda at a given time.

An increase in the overall number of pressing issues will negatively impact the amount of time and resources legislators have available for each individual issue. These decreases also negatively impact legislators’ ability to use information that promotes issue solutions

(Cobb & Elder, 1972).

A significant component of Kingdon’s (1995) problem stream is a process

Kingdon called problem definition. This name reflects Kingdon’s broader research, which focuses on the identification of social problems, such as pollution or welfare. In the interest of using precise language, this process will hereafter be referred to as issue definition, as public arts funding includes a variety of issues and is not a singular problem.

Problematic preferences make this task very important. Problem definition refers to the way actors in the policy process articulate the issues they want addressed. Issue definitions clearly delineate which items are considered in the context of the issue, and which items are not. The way an issue is defined incorporates a set of values, beliefs, and assumptions that play a significant role in the way policymakers address the problem.

Although the actual issue definition is important, researchers (Cobb & Elder, 1972;

Kingdon, 2003) have found that it may not have as much impact as “the perception of the definition of the [issue] and the perception of the [issue] itself” (Baumgartner & Jones,

1993, p. 47). Due to conceptual similarities, and the fact that rhetoric is a key component of both the perception of an issue and its definition, a deeper discussion of issue definition will accompany my investigation of rhetorical strategies later.

The Policy Stream

Issue definitions are comprised of several idea components, or ideation kernels.

An initial problem definition is seldom, if ever, defined entirely the same way by the end of an issue cycle. To break apart and analyze the components of a given issue, actors in the policy stream are concerned with the consideration, formation, re-formation, and purposeful exclusion of various ideation kernels. This analysis and reconfiguration is conducted in a community of specialists that can include researchers, congressional staff

members, agency leaders, and interest groups (Kingdon, 2003). Although some idea components are discarded, others are updated and/or combined with elements of definition variations from the same issue. For a definition to receive serious consideration, its value assumptions must be accepted by relevant policymakers and it must be technically feasible (Zahariadis, 2007). In the case of the NEA, although previous attempts at a federal-level arts organization were thwarted, factors such as an increase in arts demand, decreased availability of private funds, calls for professional artists and arts organizations as a demonstration of national pride, and the desire to increase America’s image internationally, resonated with policymakers enough that they passed legislation forming the NEA in 1965.

The Political Stream

The political stream is comprised of three main elements: “national mood, pressure-group campaigns, and administrative or legislative turnover” (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 73). The national mood refers to public-opinion polls, which scientifically establish public sentiment, and policymakers’ perception of national mood, a far less scientific but frequently used measure. Pressure-group campaigns are designed to promote particular political motivations. Kingdon (1995) argued that political motivations stem from politicians’ attention to voter reactions and perceptions. Political motivations also manifest themselves in politicians’ efforts to obtain support from important interest-group leaders in policy networks (Kingdon, 2003).

Fluid participation refers to legislative and administrative turnover. Both types of turnover impact the political stream by affecting “choice in quite dramatic ways”

(Zahariadis, 2007, p. 74). Legislative turnover applies both to congresspersons directly

connected to the arts subgovernment and to those outside it. To differentiate between the two groups, I will refer to general changes in Congress as legislative turnover. Turnover of congresspersons directly connected to the arts subgovernment, such as members of the appropriations subcommittees, will be labeled decision-maker turnover. Administrative turnover refers to presidential terms, whereas agency turnover will be used to discuss

NEA chair terms. Fluid participation is evident when it is the source of an abrupt change in the political stream, causing subgovernment actors to adjust their work in the issue and policy streams. While legislative turnover applies to a change of players in the policymaking process, a change in the political make-up of Congress and the Senate and

House appropriations committees can significantly impact the work of NEA Chairs.

Values turnover, where the collective ideals and goals of political parties shift, is especially important when political polarization increases. Political polarization often precipitates periods of radical change in the political stream that significantly impact the work necessary in the problem and policy streams.

Some legislative turnover is routine, and does not significantly impact the policy process. However, instances of substantial legislative turnover may be an indicator of value turnover or additional factors such as national mood and pressure campaigns. At a time when the national mood appeared to be against public arts funding as the result of a few controversial, highly publicized grants, politicians who ran on platforms that denounced public arts funding, such as the 1994 Contract with America, became increasingly popular. As a result of the 1994 midterm elections, a legislature that was more unfriendly to the NEA emerged. In such circumstances, it is the role of invested

actors to work in the problem and policy streams to counteract the negative effects of this value turnover in the political stream.

Policy Windows

According to Kingdon (2003), when the problem, policy, and political streams converge, a policy window opens. Kingdon (2003) identified several factors that cause policy windows to open: (a) a problem becomes pressing, (b) substantial changes occur in the political stream, (c) a crisis, and (d) scheduled renewal of enabling legislation.

Changes in the political stream were previously discussed as various forms of turnover.

Pressing problems are issues that were previously identified, but had a low agenda status with policymakers. Issues become more pressing as their importance increases among the general public, decision makers, or both, as policymakers attempt to prevent the situation from worsening and becoming a crisis. When a crisis occurs, it often creates a policy window with minimal effort from the actors involved in each stream. A crisis can be an accumulation of factors that drive a problem from mere existence, to pressing, and finally, to a crisis. In contrast, a crisis can result from an unanticipated event that suddenly brings a low-priority issue to high agenda status in a dramatic fashion.

When first discussing the importance of scheduled reviews of enabling legislation,

Kingdon (1995) was referencing the reauthorization process. All involved actors can plan for a scheduled renewal of enabling legislation. This event provides space for discussion of the policy issue, the effectiveness of current solutions, and the feasibility of additional proposed solutions. It may also allow for the identification and consideration of new problems. For actors interested in maintaining the current status of the issue, it is important to reassert their preferred issue definition and its associated solutions. For those

actors interested in changing the current status of the issue or denying that there are problems, it is similarly important to provide alternative issue definitions and solutions.

Due to the nature of this event, actors favoring or opposing have an opportunity to present their respective cases. In Kingdon’s theory, the annual appropriation process became a more significant agenda item. Annual budget consideration provides another predictable occasion to reassert, and potentially redefine, policy issues and solutions. In a biography of the start and rise of the NEA, Mark (1990) noted that the chairperson

(Stevens) was apprised of questions likely to be asked prior to the actual appropriations hearings, allowing NEA officials time to prepare their arguments and requests. Therefore,

I also consider appropriations hearings a potential catalyst for a policy window.

Depending on an advocacy coalition’s point of view, a policy window may be either auspicious or inauspicious. The polarity of the policy window depends on how and why the window was opened. Similarly, the polarity of a policy window often dictates the appropriate type of action the chairperson should undertake. During times of policy success such as was the case in 1972, Chairperson Hanks talked of the agency’s accomplishments and asked for increased funding and autonomy to continue its work. In contrast, in more hostile policy environments such as in 1993, Chairperson Alexander spent more time explaining the particular details of an unpopular program, or attempting to draw attention away from negative-focusing events.

In the MS framework, policy actors commonly use manipulation. According to

Zahariadis (2007), manipulation is the “effort to control ambiguity” by providing

“meaning, clarification, and identity” for policymakers (p. 69). Technical information is one of the most common means of manipulation. It is important to note that technical

information is not value neutral (Baumgartner & Jones, 2002). In the policy process, technical information is “strategically manipulated to serve different aims for different elements in the process” (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 69). In the case of NEA chairs, it is their duty to translate the preferences of the arts constituency to congresspersons in the arts subgovernment. It is the work of the chairperson either to create an auspicious policy window or effectively navigate an inauspicious policy window in ways that favor the arts constituency. Displaying social acuity when defining issues to different facets of the arts subgovernment allows the chairperson to elicit support and synchronize the preferences of the arts constituency and decision makers. Effective issue definitions can manage subgovernment cooperation, even when the two groups have disparate viewpoints. A chairperson’s ability to manipulate information thus helps them prevent competition from opposing advocacy coalitions.

Advocacy-Coalition Framework

The significance of information, the way it is disseminated and advocated, coupled with the premise that information is not inherently value neutral, has led researchers to ask several questions: Where does information come from? Who is responsible for presenting the information? How trustworthy is technical information?

Whereas MS offers general suggestions to help answer this question, the ACF offers theories that specifically address this issue. The ACF, developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-

Smith (1988), addressed specific aspects of the second step in the policymaking process: the formulation of solutions. It does so by specifically addressing Kingdon’s (1995) question about where policy ideas come from. This framework emerged from a commitment to dealing with issues such as the creation and use of technical knowledge,

and disputes over technical information that arise from goal conflicts in the policy process (Jenkins-Smith, 1994; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1988).

In the context of this framework, as well as my study, technical information refers to the knowledge that someone in a specialized field of study would have. This implies that those outside the particular field of study, such as the general public or policymakers, would need someone to explain the details of this information. ACF’s emphasis on information best suits my research if it is situated in the problem and policy streams, where issue definition and solution identification occur. Here it is the chairperson’s task to manipulate the existence of problematic preferences and unclear technology to promote the chairperson’s issue definitions and associated solutions. To maintain issue- definition dominance, where the chair’s definitions and solutions are given preference, it is necessary for the chairperson to deal effectively with all actors in the arts subgovernment, including opposing-advocacy coalitions. Opposing-advocacy coalitions create different contexts for the chair, testing the ability to control or channel information to and from various sources.

Although the ACF was originally conceived in 1993, use of the framework in the research community has facilitated the process of theory refinement, with slight additions or alterations to the theory occurring in 1999 and 2006 (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 208).

Although Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1988) have been criticized for their revisions

(Dowding, 1995), they maintained that they “reserve the right to revise the framework in response to criticisms so long as those revisions are consistent with the basic principles of the ACF” (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 208). The original version of ACF was based on

the following five premises, which are primarily concerned with information (Sabatier,

1999):

• Theories of the policy process and policy change must address the role of

technical information.

• A time frame of a decade or more is required to understand the process of

policy change.

• Instead of looking at a specific government organization, the most useful unit

of analysis is a policy subsystem.

• The concept of a policy system should be expanded from administrative

agencies, legislative committees, and interest groups to include journalists,

researchers, policy analysts, and actors at all levels of government involved in

policy formulation and implementation.

• Public policies can be conceptualized as belief systems because they

incorporate implicit theories about solutions.

At the heart of ACF, two foundational assumptions hold true throughout the revisions, and both significantly influence my work: (a) a macrolevel assumption that a majority of policymaking occurs in a policy subgovernmental system, with the acknowledgement that actors in the broader political context can impact the subgovernmental system; and (b) a mesolevel assumption that the most effective way to investigate the various actors in a subgovernmental system is to group them into

“advocacy coalitions” (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). The macrolevel assumption accounts for my focus on the arts subgovernment. Investigating the work of policy entrepreneurs at the subgovernment level is an efficient way of seeing how chairs interact with members

of the arts constituency, policymakers, and those in direct opposition to their work. By dividing the actors in the arts subgovernment into two advocacy coalitions, I am able to discern consensus or conflict between chairs and other proponents of public arts funding, while simultaneously considering the work of those against public arts funding who are also operating in the same policy arena.

Sabatier and Weible (2007) argued that advocacy coalitions exist due to the complex nature of the policy subsystem. In this subsystem actors must specialize at a functional level (e.g., the arts) as well as a territorial level (e.g., nationwide) if they hope to influence policy action. Traditional “iron triangles” include agency officials, interest- group leaders, and legislators, while advocacy coalitions also include researchers and judicial officials (Helco, 1978; Kingdon, 1995). Studies using the ACF have demonstrated the central role researchers and the work they present in the policy arena play in the policy process (Herron, Jenkins-Smith, & Silva, 2005; Meijerink, 2005;

Weible, 2005; Zafonte & Sabatier, 2004). The ACF assumes that technical information plays an important role in “modifying the beliefs of policy participants” either for or against a particular issue definition or course of action (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 192).

Methods used by subgovernments to translate their beliefs into policies vary depending on two sets of exogenous factors: stable and dynamic (Sabatier & Weible,

2007). Relatively stable factors include “basic attributes of the problem, the distribution of natural resources, fundamental sociocultural values and structure, and basic constitutional structure” (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 193). Basic attributes of the problem and fundamental sociocultural values are an integral part of the issue definition process that occurs in the subgovernment system (Kingdon, 1995). As previously stated,

each issue definition includes a set of value assumptions. For example, in the NEA push for “excellence” lies an assumption that it was not the government’s place to provide funding for amateur artists and arts activities. These factors, and the way they are articulated in the issue definition, are more likely to change incrementally, if at all, during times of stability (Kingdon, 2003). Stable factors help create and maintain the behavioral and value norms of the advocacy coalition while simultaneously “establishing the resources and constraints within which subsystem actors must operate” (Sabatier &

Weible, 2007, p. 193). Although stable exogenous factors rarely provide the impetus for behavioral or policy change in a policy subsystem, these factors may become problematic if there is dissension in the advocacy coalition. Internal disputes over core values and basic-issue attributes will weaken the coalition and leave it vulnerable to attack from opposing advocacy coalitions. Instances where the NEA was unable to satisfy the desires of artists, a core part of the arts constituency and an active part of the advocacy coalition usually precipitated or occurred in conjunction with periods of organizational instability, due to hostile opposition from those outside the coalition.

Dynamic external factors include “changes in socioeconomic conditions, changes in the governing coalition, and policy decisions from other subsystems” (Sabatier &

Weible, 2007, p. 193). Changes in socioeconomic conditions often affect issue definitions in the problem stream and associated solutions presented in the policy stream. This is due to dramatic changes in available resources. Changes in governing coalitions may cause shifts in issue-definition power dynamics, taking the ability to create dominant issue definitions away from actors who previously enjoyed little or no opposition. Finally, policy decisions from other subsystems may impact decision makers’ resources and

attention. Pressing issues in unrelated policy areas may decrease financial resources and the amount of time decision makers can afford to dedicate to additional issues. The ACF hypothesizes that change in one of the dynamic factors is a necessary condition for punctuated policy change (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Sabatier & Weible, 2007).

Punctuated-Equilibrium Theory

Baumgartner’s P-E theory addresses the last two steps in the policymaking process: implementation and solution evaluation. P-E theory was designed to explain periods of stability and instances of dramatic change in the policy process, demonstrating a progression from previous theories that focused on either periods of equilibrium or of punctuation but were not concerned with information on both. While ACF and the MS framework acknowledge differences in times of equilibrium and times of punctuation, P-

E theory fully explicates those differences. Founded on theories of political institutions and rational decision making, this theory focuses on issue definition and agenda setting

(Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Dodd, 1994; Kingdon, 1995). It is important to note that periods of equilibrium do not indicate periods where tastes, values, and preferences are uniform and stable among all actors in the policy process. Instead, periods of equilibrium are marked by subgovernment actors working to define issues in hopes of gaining and maintaining agenda access and dominant-issue definition, at the expense of subgovernment actors with conflicting viewpoints. As a result, it is common to see long periods of equilibrium, punctuated by periods of relatively quick changes (Baumgartner

& Jones, 1993).

One indicator of equilibrium is a strong advocacy coalition. When an advocacy coalition is functioning, it can experience a policy monopoly. Incrementalism, where only

small policy changes occur, is often a benefit of policy monopolies due to maintenance of a negative-feedback system (True, Jones, & Baumgartner, 2007). The negative feedback system “maintains stability in a system” (True, et al., 2007, p. 160), and is effective as long as actors excluded from the dominant group of issue-defining actors are apathetic or unable to shift the power dynamic of the subgovernment (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).

Although policy theorists have named this system “negative,” that term appears to be from the perspective of those outside the advocacy coalition or issue subgovernment. For the purposes of my research, I will thus refer to this as positive feedback. The positive feedback system presents the opportunity for policy monopolies to emerge. Policy monopolies occur when a policy subsystem finds an issue niche where a small number of individuals can have a disproportionate amount of influence without concern for the activities of other, opposing-advocacy coalitions (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).

Organized opposition in an issue subgovernment can result in periods of punctuation. In these cases, actors outside the subgovernment become involved in a particular policy issue due to “a change in preferences or a change in attentiveness” (True, et al., 2007, p. 163). Changes in preferences or attentiveness can result from changes in either the problem stream or the policy stream. Issue definitions can affect the strength of the subgovernment, the number of actors involved in the subgovernment, and the number of competing subsystems. As issue definitions are redefined and refined different actors become interested, new actors may seek access to the decision-making process and encourage a negative-feedback process (True, et al., 2007, p. 159). Negative feedback occurs when “a change, sometimes a fairly modest one, causes future changes to be amplified” (True, et al., 2007, p. 160). Changes that promote a negative-feedback process

are most associated with large-scale focusing events. However a slow, steady buildup of smaller-scale changes can have the same effect (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; True, et al.,

2007). In instances of negative feedback, actors in issue subgovernments choose one of the following options: policy action, policy action accompanied by a change in rhetoric, or a change in rhetoric that is offered in lieu of policy action.

Increases in the number and attention levels of actors interested in the decision- making process are also seen as issue solutions, and are proposed in the policy stream.

Baumgartner and Jones (1993) attributed times of punctuation to interactions between issue images. Issue images, linguistic symbols of a complete issue definition, are constructed by the issue subgovernment to promote agenda access. When they are contested, an issue can make its way to the macropolitical agenda. Issues on the macropolitical agenda are taken out of their incubated position in the issue subgovernment and pushed onto a larger political stage, where actors who are usually excluded from the decision-making process can influence policy decisions. After an issue solution is presented and accepted, the evaluation phase begins. As a policy or rhetoric representing a policy is implemented, actors within and outside of the subgovernment offer feedback—either action, rhetoric, or a combination of both. In many cases, whether or not the policy or rhetoric was successful, policy entrepreneurs will incorporate information gathered from the feedback in reformulating old issue definitions or creating new ones.

Combining Theories

As I noted above, these three theories address each of the four steps of the policymaking process: identification of a problem, formulation of a solution to the

problem, implementation of the solution, and evaluation of the solution. The MS framework specifically addresses the issue-identification phase and provides insight into the solution-formulation process. Sabatier and Weible’s (2007) ACF specifically addresses the solution-formulation process, noting the role technical information plays.

The MS framework also highlights some of the issues involved in the implementation phase in the political stream. Finally, Baumgartner and Jones’s (1993) P-E theory addresses the results of the evaluation phase and identifies key factors in the link between evaluation and issue identification. By using all three theories, I am able to provide a more robust picture of the policy process as it pertains to federal arts policy, and to view the policy process at different levels. P-E theory “accounts for system-level patterns of decisions or policy adoptions surrounding a policy subsystem” (Schlager, 2007, p. 297).

The ACF provides a narrower view, by attempting to explain policy changes at the subsystem level (Schlager, 2007, p. 298). Finally, the MS framework provides the most fine-tuned view by focusing on a particular policy issue in an attempt to explain why policymakers “adopt some policies and not others” (Schlager, 2007, p. 297).

Although they focus on different variables at different scales, the MS framework and the ACF complement each other, due to their “focus on pre-decision- and decision- making processes and policy subsystems” (Schlager, 2007, p. 297). As stated previously,

P-E theory “examines the ‘residue’ of collective action” (Schlager, 2007, p. 303). This

“residue” includes changes in issue definitions and images, which situate punctuated- equilibrium in a place that will identify the consequences of actions in the problem and policy streams. Therefore, P-E theory picks up where ACF leaves off in its discussion of how individuals involved with a particular policy issue organize themselves.

Each theory points to similar events and factors that result in policy change, including “dramatic events or crises, changes in governing coalitions, and administrative and legislative turnover” (Schlager, 2007, p. 310). ACF incorporates endogenous factors such as internal shocks, focusing events, and negotiated agreements as sources of policy change that will prevent the exclusion of important factors in the subgovernment

(Schlager, 2007, p. 310). I will use the MS framework, ACF, and P-E theory to investigate how policy issues involving the NEA have evolved over time, and how the agency, personified by its chair, has handled this evolution. Specifically, I will analyze the rhetoric used by chairs in instances of potential or actual policy change.

Guiding Questions

Each set of theories will guide my investigation into the following research questions (see Table 1).

Table 1

Research Questions

Theory: Questions relevant to my research:

Kingdon’s Why do policy windows open? Multiple Do policy windows only open in the subgovernment? Can they open Streams outside of the subgovernment? (MS, 1995) What are the different characteristics of auspicious and inauspicious policy windows? What happens to issue definitions over time?

Sabatier & What determines the technical feasibility of proposed solutions? Weible’s How are proposed solutions linked to coalition values? Advocacy How do proposed solutions align with issue definitions? Coalition Does the configuration of the subgovernment change in the process of Framework opening and addressing a policy window? (ACF, 2007) What are indicators of changes in the subgovernment or extrasubgovernment conditions? What indicates changes in the subgovernment resulting from changes in the governing coalition?

Baumgartner How do various actors respond to negative feedback: action, action and and Jones’ rhetoric, or rhetoric? Punctuated- What indicates changes in preferences and/or attentiveness to the policy Equilibrium issue? Theory (P-E What demonstrates cooperation in the subgovernment? What theory, demonstrates dissension? 1993) What indicates that policy change has occurred? How are subgovernments led to accept change?

Policy Entrepreneurs

The MS framework, ACF, and P-E theory pay particular attention to the role of policy entrepreneurs (Schlager, 2007). In the MS framework, policy entrepreneurs are credited with joining the problem, policy, and political streams to create policy windows

(Zahariadis, 2007). Kingdon (1995) charged policy entrepreneurs with the primary focus of coupling the problem and policy streams in ways that promote successful coupling with the political stream. In the ACF, policy entrepreneurs recognize the importance of developing and working with coalitions to promote policy change (Mintrom & Norman,

2009). Successful policy entrepreneurs create large, diverse coalitions, ensuring that they include those directly associated with their particular policy issue (such as public arts funding) as well as those associated with seemingly peripheral issues (such as arts education or cultural diplomacy). Policy entrepreneurs work to demonstrate not only the strength, but also the breadth of their coalition (Mintrom & Norman, 2009). In P-E theory the “task for the policy entrepreneur is to bring the policy issues out into the public domain and attempt to invoke a swell of interest intended to induce major change”

(Mintrom & Norman, 2009, pp. 656–657). Regardless of where policy entrepreneurs are located in the policy process, each theory identifies them as central actors during times of stability as well as of change. Policy entrepreneurs are also credited with promoting positive policy change, and preventing negative policy change. Therefore, their actions will guide me to times of successful and attempted policy change that would affect the

NEA. Although I have chosen to focus on policy entrepreneurs as a key variable in the process of creating and managing policy change, I acknowledge that explaining the work

of the chair is not a full explanation of advocacy effectiveness or of the many ways it can be achieved by various actors in a subgovernment.

In my research, I have identified chairs of the NEA as policy entrepreneurs.

Although many scholars have tried to define and characterize policy entrepreneurs, given my use of the MS framework as a foundation for my study, Zahariadis (2007) provided the most useful definition: “policy entrepreneurs are individuals who attempt to couple the three streams. They are more than mere advocates of particular solutions; they are power brokers and manipulators of problematic preferences and unclear technology”

(p. 74). Kingdon (1995) identified policy entrepreneurs as those people who have some claim to be heard in the policy arena based on any one of, or a combination of, three criteria: their expertise, a right to speak for others (whether through election or self- promotion), or an authoritative decision-making position. Each of these criteria relate directly to the speaker’s ethos, or the speaker’s ability to project competence to the audience. By the nature of their position in the NEA, chairs are expected to act as policy entrepreneurs to further the position of the arts on the federal agenda.

Policy entrepreneurs must be capable of the following four activities: displaying social acuity, defining problems, building teams, and leading by example (Mintrom &

Norman, 2009). Although each activity is important, there is no requirement for every policy entrepreneur to engage in each activity in equal measure. However, the extent to which policy entrepreneurs do so is expected to vary between positive- and negative- feedback systems. In a positive-feedback system, policy entrepreneurs spend more time maintaining their position through team building and leading by example. This is because a positive feedback system assumes that issue definitions are well established, and actors

outside the policy subsystem do not have the political power to interfere. In negative- feedback systems, it is imperative that policy entrepreneurs display social acuity to combat organized opposition. Negative-feedback systems also require larger-scale adjustments to issue definitions. It is expected that each policy entrepreneur, or chair, will have various strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, the degree to which each activity is undertaken will vary by chairperson (Mintrom & Norman, 2009). However, successful engagement in each activity is imperative for creating and managing policy change

(Kingdon, 1995; Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996; Zahariadis, 2007).

Social acuity becomes important early in the policymaking process. Policy entrepreneurs must be able to recognize conditions in which they can provide an issue definition and solutions. This type of perceptiveness is crucial if policy entrepreneurs are to recognize the potential for, or take advantage of, policy windows. Policy entrepreneurs must also display social acuity through team building, or the construction and maintenance of advocacy coalitions. To successfully build and maintain a coalition, policy entrepreneurs must be aware of the “ideas, motives, and concerns” of actors within and outside of their particular coalition, including opposing-advocacy coalitions and policymakers, and respond in ways that further their coalition’s agenda (Mintrom &

Norman, 2009, p. 652). One method to build and maintain a coalition is leading by example. In my research, this refers to chair-initiated reorganization or changes to agency procedure. These actions can lead to increased credibility in the policy context and can help build momentum for chair-initiated change in the future (Kotter, 1996; Quinn, 2000).

Policy entrepreneurs’ specific activities are characterized according to the theory being discussed. Based on depictions of policy entrepreneurs in the MS framework, ACF,

and P-E theory, I have created the following typology of policy contexts. Identification of each political context facilitates identification of policy-entrepreneur actions for further investigation. Regardless of the political context, it is assumed that policy entrepreneurs are always acting to (a) reinforce their policy position, (b) realign their policy position in response to opposing coalitions, or (c) promote a policy position.

In times of equilibrium, where the chairperson enjoys policy-agenda access and an apathetic or positive policy context, the chairperson’s task as a policy entrepreneur is to reinforce their own policy position. This is characterized by chairs’ use of the positive feedback system to block opposing-advocacy coalitions from gaining agenda access.

Success during these times will be evident if there is minimal or no change in the agency’s functions and operations. In times of punctuation there is the risk of an inauspicious policy window opening. An inauspicious policy window occurs when

Kingdon’s (1995) three streams join, due to the efforts of opposing-advocacy coalitions.

Here, it is the policy entrepreneur’s task to realign policy position. Success during these times will be evident if policy entrepreneurs avoid negative consequences for their agency. Although it is possible for chairs to realign their policy position without the support of the arts constituency, an additional indicator of success will be if policy entrepreneurs can do so while maintaining their coalition’s support. Regardless of the polarity of an open policy window (i.e., auspicious or inauspicious), it may be possible for chairs to promote their policy position. In the context of policy-position promotion, success will be evident if the policy entrepreneur is able to promote a new or reformulated solution to an issue that has been identified either within or outside the arts subgovernment.

Policy Entrepreneurs and Interest Groups

Policy entrepreneurs must exhibit such social acuity partly because they must interact with various groups inside and outside of government. In the context of my research, policy entrepreneurs most often address policymakers. However, policy entrepreneurs must also be able to effectively communicate effectively with administrators, artists, researchers, and the general public. Additionally, they must have a strong relationship with their associated interest groups. For the purposes of my research, an interest group is a collection of individuals and organizations that serve as “major intermediaries between the governed and the government” and attempt to influence public policy (Thomas & Hrebenar, 1999, pp. 118–119). Interest groups educate their members and the general public about issues through issue identification and definition, and represent their members to public officials with various rhetorical strategies, in hope of affecting policy decisions. Although many interest groups exist in the literature,

Americans for the Arts (AFTA), founded in 1988, is the largest interest group to address multiple facets of public arts funding. I will primarily use the work of arts-advocacy groups to evaluate the chairperson’s work as an advocate and communicator in the three streams. Analyzing messages and rhetoric used by interest groups and the chairperson will provide insight into the relationship between the chairperson and the arts constituency.

As an organized interest group, AFTA has a prominent place in the problem stream of Kingdon’s (1995) MS framework, an important role in information gathering and dissemination in Sabatier and Weible’s (2007) ACF, and a role in either maintaining equilibrium or serving as a catalyst for punctuation in Baumgartner and Jones’s (1993)

P-E theory. Kingdon (2003) argued that interest-group activities are concentrated in the policy stream, claiming that “a central interest group activity is attaching one’s own alternative to agenda items” (p. 50). This is not to say that interest groups are not involved in agenda setting as well, which is demonstrated in Table 2. The ACF does not pay particular attention to interest groups on their own, but acknowledges their importance in advocacy coalitions. As part of advocacy coalitions, interest groups can also be credited with contributions to the “substance of public policy by being significant sources of both technical and political information for policy makers” (Thomas, 1993, p. 17).

Table 2

Types of Policy Action Taken

Desired result of the arts Type of situation subgovernment Necessary action

Negative Punctuation, Stop or restrict the passage Concentrate on a particular resulting from negative of legislation point in the policy system feedback

Equilibrium, an indicator Maintain good relations Provide information and of a positive feedback with policymakers political support from system membership

Promotional, which can Achieve enactment of a Employ a broad strategy occur in either a positive- public policy that will clear all hurdles in or negative-feedback the policy system system

Promotional situations can occur either in a positive- or a negative-feedback system. In a positive-feedback system, interest groups may identify an opportunity to add to their political power or bring attention to a related policy issue. For example, if AFTA knows they are receiving positive feedback about arts education, they may take the opportunity to promote funding for arts organizations that engage in education—a different yet related issue. Baumgartner and Jones (2002) noted the “tendency for communities of like-minded interests to dominate policy-making in their areas” (p. 6).

Once these groups attain the political power to achieve favorable public policies, they become devices of positive feedback. It is at this time that interest groups expand their resources to create “systems of limited participation” or “policy monopolies” to prevent dramatic change to public policy. Effective interest groups grab the spotlight for themselves on the political stage by using tactics with proven political salience. By using arguments that have worked with other issues in the past, interest groups hope to connect with the general public as well as policymakers. When interest groups use this strategy, it often affects the way they define their issues. Policy entrepreneurs who can work effectively with interest groups are better served in the policy arena. As part of my research, I will investigate how chairs interact with, inform the rhetoric of, and appropriate the rhetoric from interest groups, particularly AFTA. Although interest groups often function in the political arena themselves, it is often the role of the chairperson to translate the desires of the interest groups to policymakers; if and how this is done will be of particular interest.

Negative punctuation results from negative feedback directed toward the interest groups’ associated governmental agency (the NEA), or their policy focus (public arts

funding). To combat damaging legislation that would restrict the NEA’s resources and authority, interest groups would encourage citizens to call their congresspersons and inform them about the importance of the arts. This is often done with rhetoric that, whether it is initiated by the chairperson or the interest group, is echoed throughout the arts constituency in the subgovernment. Equilibrium occurs in a positive feedback system, and presents an opportunity for chairs to reinforce their policy position. The chair may make minor adjustments to their problem definition to build a stronger advocacy coalition.

In this context, interest groups provide information and political support to those who are either supportive of or indifferent to the group’s interests. This is done to maintain the agenda status of public funding for the arts. In a negative feedback system, interest groups may seek to avoid additional negative feedback surrounding a certain policy issue by promoting a different policy issue. When the NEA received negative feedback due to controversial works of art, AFTA promoted the educational aspects of arts organizations to draw attention away from the issue. At the root of all interest groups, action is the need to “develop and enhance an interpersonal relationship with various participants in the political process” (Thomas, 1993, p. 28). In some cases strategies employed by interest groups align with the work of the chair, and in other cases they do not.

Interest groups act as intermediaries between interested constituents and policymakers making decisions in their focus area (Thomas & Hrebenar, 1999, pp. 118–

119). These groups often seek to influence policymakers with various types of policy action. The particular type of action taken by interest groups and policy entrepreneurs depends on their political context, as depicted below:

Policy Entrepreneurs and Rhetoric

Policy entrepreneurs also play a role in the literature on the politics of ideas and policy learning (Derthick & Quirk, 1985; Wilson, 1980). In this literature they are identified as key actors in the policy process, acting as change agents, especially in their role as communicators. ACF assumes that participants wish to translate their beliefs and values into policies (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). It is through language that policy entrepreneurs mark their policy territory and define their role in the policymaking process.

Although language plays an important role in policymaking in general, language specifically affects the three streams. In the problem stream, “language conditions political action,” shaping the “formation of intentions” and thereby shaping behavior

(Petracca, 1992, p. 4). In the policy stream, language “determines who becomes involved in the policy making process” and “conditions political relationships” (Petracca, 1992, p. 4). In the political stream, language “establishes the boundaries of legitimate policy activity and actions,” thus conditioning policy outcomes (Petracca, 1992, p. 4). Language used in the problem and policy streams influences “(1) the type of politicking which will ensue around it, (2) its chances of reaching the agenda of a particular political institution, and (3) the probability of a policy outcome favorable to advocates of the issue” (Petracca,

1992, p. 4).

Language use in the process of defining issues in the policy arena provides answers to several questions important to my investigation, detailed in Table 3

(Considine, 2005, p. 74; Heidelberg, 2009):

Table 3

Research Subquestions

What: What are the characteristics of the issue being named?

What is omitted from this formulation?

How is the inclusion of certain items be justified?

How: What are the “theories” about the issue’s causes or origins?

Whose interests benefit from the prevailing definition of the issue?

How do the titles and categories being used direct attention to solutions?

Who: For whom is the issue a concern?

Which actors are presumed to be a part of this issue and its solutions?

Policy entrepreneurs are responsible for defining issues through the use of effective rhetoric to achieve four main goals. First, an issue definition should elicit support from members of the advocacy coalition and other allies. Second, the problem definition should rhetorically exclude oppositional forces from the policymaking process; this will also present the chairperson and the NEA as actors who can effectively handle the issue. Third, the issue definition will delineate which general courses of action are appropriate, and courses of action that would be unacceptable. Finally, the issue definition should facilitate the policy entrepreneur’s work in the policy stream in which policy entrepreneurs attempt to present their solutions to the issues they defined as the best possible solutions.

Actors in the policymaking process use language to articulate their desires in the policy arena. However, the desires of advocacy coalitions often differ from those of

policymakers. In these instances, it is the task of policy entrepreneurs to translate the desires of their advocacy coalition into terms that are accessible and acceptable to policymakers. It is in this “desire brokering” on which policymakers expend a significant amount of energy through processes such as idea development, issue matching, and softening up, all of which use a particular language. During idea development it is policy entrepreneurs’ task to develop means of articulating their policy beliefs, values, and ideals in ways that are acceptable and attractive to various audiences: policymakers, members of the advocacy coalition, and the general public. Once ideas are developed, policy entrepreneurs are also responsible for matching their problem definition to issues that arise in the three streams. This matching often calls for alterations to the problem definition that require policy entrepreneurs to have both technical skill and political savvy

(Kingdon, 2003). Softening up requires that policy entrepreneurs constantly articulate their problem definitions, and the solutions that go with them, to various audiences. This articulation is done to present new ideas in a nonthreatening way and to build issue acceptance (Kingdon, 2003). Thus, when an opportunity for policy change presents itself, the policy entrepreneur can count on actors involved in the policymaking process to have some familiarity with their definition and intended solution. Overall, by investigating how NEA chairs, as policy entrepreneurs, use language in the policymaking process to promote their agency, I hope to identify ways policy entrepreneurs can manage policy change in various political contexts.

The standard wisdom among political scientists has been that “iron triangles” operate among regulatory agencies, the regulated industries, and members of Congress, all presumably with a stake in preserving regulation that protected the industries from

competition (Kingdon, 1995). Despite almost unanimous agreement among economists that such regulation was inefficient, it seemed highly unlikely that deregulation could occur. Yet between 1975 and 1980 major deregulatory changes that strongly favored competition did take place in a wide range of industries. The results are familiar to airline passengers, users of telephone service, and trucking freight shippers, among others.

Derthick and Quirk (1985) asked why this deregulation happened. How did a diffuse public interest prevail over the powerful industry and union interests that sought to preserve regulation? Why did the regulatory commissions, which were expected to be a major obstacle to deregulation, instead take the initiative on behalf of it? And why did influential members of Congress push for even greater deregulation? The authors concentrated on three cases: airlines, trucking, and telecommunications. They found important similarities among the cases and discussed the implications of these findings for two broader topics: the role that economic analysis has played in policy change, and the capacity of the American political system to transcend narrow interests.

The symbolic manifestations, purposes, and uses of politics are revealed in a provocative analysis of the institution of politics and humans as political animals (Dodd,

1994). Unlike the conventional study of politics that deals with how people get the things they want through government, Dodd (1994) concentrated on how politicians influence what they want, what they fear, and what they regard as possible. In examining politics as a symbolic form, it looks at humans and politics as reflections of each other.

In previous research, I tracked the use of cultural economic rationales employed by the NEA to secure public funding. I conducted a content and discourse analysis of appropriations hearings in House and Senate Appropriations Committees for FY 1967,

1982, and 1997 and articles from the Journal of Cultural Economics. My methodology, based on Foucault’s (1972) policy genealogy and Kingdon’s (1995) policy streams, helped explain how the NEA discusses and argues for public funding in a policy arena through the use of theories derived from cultural-economics scholarship (Heidelberg,

2009). The results show that depicting the arts as a public good was an overarching theme in the problem stream, with supporting arguments changing due to circumstances in the political or policy streams (Heidelberg, 2009). This work has implications for how arts advocates can continue define and articulate their desire for increased public funding using the work of cultural economists.

The study of public policy and the methods of policy analysis are among the most rapidly developing areas in the social sciences. Policy analysis has emerged to provide a better understanding of the policymaking process and to supply decision makers with reliable policy-relevant knowledge about pressing economic and social problems.

Presenting a broad, comprehensive perspective, the Handbook of Public Policy Analysis:

Theory, Politics, and Methods covers the historical development of policy analysis, its role in the policy process, and empirical methods (Fischer & Miller, 2006). The handbook considers the theory generated by these methods and the normative and ethical issues surrounding their practice. Written by leading experts in the field, this book

• deals with the basic origins and evolution of public policy

• examines the stages of the policy-making process

• identifies political advocacy and expertise in the policy process

• focuses on rationality in policy decision-making and the role of policy

networks and learning

• details argumentation, rhetoric, and narratives

• explores the comparative, cultural, and ethical aspects of public policy

• explains primary quantitative-oriented analytical methods employed in policy

research

• addresses the qualitative sides of policy analysis

• discusses tools used to refine policy choices, and

• traces the development of policy analysis in selected national contexts.

The Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods describes the theoretical debates that have recently defined the field, including the work of postpositivist, interpretivist, and social-constructionist scholars. This book also explores the interplay between empirical and normative analysis, a crucial issue running through contemporary debates.

The ACF was developed to provide a causal theory of the policy process that would serve as one of several alternatives to the familiar stages heuristic, with its recognized limitations. Jenkins-Smith (1994) first summarized the central features of the

ACF, including a set of underlying assumptions and specific hypotheses.

I next review the implications for the framework of six case studies by various authors dealing with Canadian education and with American transportation, telecommunications, water, environmental, and energy policy. Although generally supportive of the ACF, the case studies also suggest several revisions.

Individuals and political systems alike, Jones (2001) argued, tend to be attentive to only one issue at a time. Using numerous examples from elections, public-opinion polls, congressional deliberations, and bureaucratic decision-making, Jones showed how

shifting attentiveness can and does alter choices and political outcomes, even when underlying preferences remain relatively fixed. Individuals, for example, may initially decide to vote for a candidate because of their stand on spending but vote differently when voters learn of the candidate’s position on abortion, never really balancing the two options.

Reissued as part of the “Longman Classics in Political Science” series, Kingdon’s

(1995) renowned work features a foreword exploring the book’s historical and enduring contributions. Kingdon’s (2003) landmark work on agenda setting and policy formation is original research, drawn from interviews with people in the U.S. federal government over the course of 4 years, examining the questions of how issues get to be issues for legislators. The book grapples with the questions, How do subjects come to officials’ attention? How are the alternatives from which they choose generated? How is the governmental agenda set? Why does an idea’s time come when it does?.

Kotter (1996) examined the efforts of more than 100 companies to remake themselves into better competitors. Kotter identified the most common mistakes leaders and managers make in attempting to create change and offered an eight-step process to overcome the obstacles and carry out a firm’s agenda: establishing a greater sense of urgency, creating the guiding coalition, developing a vision and strategy, communicating the change vision, empowering others to act, creating short-term wins, consolidating gains and producing even more change, and institutionalizing new approaches in the future.

The advocacy coalition, MS, P-E theory, and epistemic-communities frameworks point to relevant processes conditioning policy stability and policy change. These

frameworks are partly overlapping, partly producing rival hypotheses, but most of all offering complementary explanations for long-term policy development (Meijerink,

2005). In a case study of Dutch coastal flooding policy 1945–2003 Meijerink (2005) illustrated how a stable “safety coalition,” closely tied to an epistemic community of civil engineers, sustained a policy monopoly established by the Ministry of Transport, Public

Works and Water Management. This coalition was responsible for the construction of the

Delta Works, a program of coastal engineering works aimed at the enclosure of most estuaries in the southwestern part of The Netherlands. Meijerink also showed how an environmentalist coalition, supported by fishermen and a newly developing ecological epistemic community, has been able to bring about major policy change by fashioning a new policy image, and exploiting a window of opportunity created by a shift of national government.

Mintrom and Norman (2009) reviewed the concept of policy entrepreneurship and its use in explaining policy change. Although the activities of policy entrepreneurs have received close attention in several studies, the concept of policy entrepreneurship has yet to be broadly integrated in analyses of policy change. To facilitate more integration of the concept, policy entrepreneurship can be understood in more encompassing theorizations of policy change: incrementalism, policy streams, institutionalism, punctuated equilibrium, and advocacy coalitions. The authors presented recent applications of policy entrepreneurship as a key explanation of policy change as models for future work.

The ACF explains policy stability, whereas the policy entrepreneurship model explains dynamic policy change (Mintrom & Vergari, 1996). Thus, augmenting the ACF with insights from the policy entrepreneurship model provides a method to explain a

common empirical phenomenon: policy stability punctuated by dynamic policy change.

This analytical strategy could be used to explore stability and change in many policy arenas.

Research concerned the use of substantive policy analysis in public policymaking

(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1988). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1988) integrated the enlightenment function of policy research into a more general model of policymaking over periods of a decade or more. The conceptual framework focuses on the belief systems of advocacy coalitions in policy subsystems as the critical vehicle for understanding the role of policy analysis in policy-oriented learning and the effect, in turn, of such learning on changes in governmental programs.

To what extent do stakeholders in a conflict over natural resources interact with actors of congruent policy core beliefs or with actors who have perceived influence? The response to this question is structured principally by the ACF questionnaire and interview data collected from stakeholders involved in California Marine Protected Area policy

(Sabatier & Weible, 2007). The findings indicated that shared beliefs are the best predictor for policy-network relationships, supporting the ACF. Perceived influence, although less important than shared beliefs, is another significant predictor.

Research on coalitions in the policy process has found evidence of both short- term and long-term coalitions. Two possible methodological reasons for the varied results are that (a) there has been little systematic longitudinal research on the topic, and

(b) most scholars have not distinguished situations where fundamental versus secondary interests are at stake. Sabatier and Weible (2007) addressed both points by first applying the ACF, which distinguishes fundamental from secondary beliefs/interests, and then

performing a quantitative analysis of the content of organizations’ testimonies regarding automotive pollution control over 26 years. Consistent with the ACF, the authors found that coalitions of interest groups, legislators, local governments, and agencies are relatively stable over time, despite two potentially disruptive events—the 1973–1974 oil embargo and the 1980 elections. In contrast, there was little support for the ACF’s hypothesis that broader beliefs will be more stable than narrower secondary beliefs. The systematic methodology enables separation of the general pattern of stability from interesting exceptions of instability.

Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework

My conceptual framework primarily draws from the three theories discussed in my literature review: Kingdon’s (2003) MS framework, Sabatier and Weible’s (2007)

ACF, and Baumgartner and Jones’s (2002) P-E theory. Theories about the actions undertaken by policy entrepreneurs also play a large part in my conceptual framework, as this theory directly relates to the role of the chairperson of the NEA in my research. The theoretical underpinning of this research is Kingdon’s MS framework. The three streams of Kingdon’s framework touch on the four steps in the policymaking process, though

Kingdon places more emphasis on problem definition and solution creation.

The MS framework describes the policymaking process as three streams depicted in Figure 1 by three arrows converging to create a policy window. The green arrow is the political stream, comprised of elements such as national mood, pressure-group campaigns, administrative and legislative turnover, and politicians’ interests. The blue arrow represents the problem stream where issue definitions are constructed. Finally, the yellow arrow represents the policy stream, where issue definitions are analyzed and reconfigured by a community of concerned issue actors. Although work in each stream was an important foundation for my investigation, I am primarily concerned with the actions and reactions of each chairperson as they work to combine streams, when the streams combine without their influence, and when the streams flow together.

Political(Stream Policy Problem(Stream Window Policy(Stream

Figure 1. Policy streams combining to create a policy window.

To experience success in the policy arena, advocacy coalitions engage in policy learning to identify areas where they can provide issue definitions, formulate issue definitions with increased chances of achieving and maintaining policy salience, and negate the claims of opposing-advocacy coalitions while simultaneously increasing their own. Policy learning often occurs in a trial and error fashion, where individuals learn from their own past successes and failures, but they may also learn from advocates in other national and policy contexts (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1988). For example, many ideas about diversified patronage come from European models of public arts funding, while discussion of the public benefits of the arts echo successful arguments made previously on behalf of public education funding. Policy learning is an integral part of investigating arts-advocacy rhetoric, as it not only informs the rhetoric and actions of the

arts-advocacy coalition, but the rhetoric and actions of the oppositional-advocacy coalition (OAC) as well.

In the original MS framework, different catalysts dictate how the streams converge. The first identifiable action that begins to draw two streams together is a convergence catalyst. This may or may not be the same as the window catalyst, the action that causes all three streams to merge. It is possible that the same action serving as the convergence catalyst may also serve as the window catalyst, but the two actions may also be distinct. A particularly resonant issue definition in the problem stream may cause policy action to begin in the political stream, combining them and paving the way for convergence with the policy stream. In contrast, turnover in the political stream may affect issue definitions in the problem stream, creating the space for these streams to converge with the policy stream. Different convergence catalysts and window catalysts create various contexts for policy entrepreneurs. The how and why of a policy-window opening dictate the specific set of policy entrepreneurial skills required to successfully navigate and manage policy change. Because the political landscape includes those who oppose the work and existence of the NEA, it is possible for two types of policy windows to open when the streams converge. If an auspicious window occurs, it places the policy entrepreneur in a place of political power that outweighs the political power of the oppositional-advocacy coalition. An inauspicious window finds the chairperson in a place where the OAC has relatively more political power.

When the convergence of the problem and policy stream serves as the window catalyst, the policy entrepreneur’s task is to work to influence the political stream. In auspicious problem/policy stream situations, where the chairperson is operating from a

position of power, they most likely play a part in the convergence of the problem and policy streams. In inauspicious situations, the chairperson is operating with a political- power deficit, either because of a lack of favor among policymakers or a power oppositional advocacy coalition. In these cases, they often do not play an active role in the convergence of the problem and policy streams (see Figure 2).

Problem(Stream Policy( Window Policy(Stream

Figure 2. Convergence of the problem and policy streams.

Regardless of whether the chairperson is operating from a place of power, when the problem and policy streams converge and acts as a window catalyst, their tasks center on creating or maintaining politically salient arguments and fostering or deepening relationships with policy makers, as identified by the red arrow in Figure 3.

Political(Stream

Problem(Stream Policy( Window Policy(Stream

Figure 3. Chairperson’s task when the problem and policy streams converge.

The convergence of the problem and political streams creates work for policy entrepreneurs in the policy stream. In an auspicious situation, policy entrepreneurs work with their advocacy coalition to garner support for arguments and programs that have already received support from policymakers in the political stream. Operating from a place of political power, policy entrepreneurs reformulate definitions successful in the problem and political streams to deepen and broaden their advocacy coalition. In inauspicious situations policy entrepreneurs must work to mobilize their advocacy coalition to redirect and refocus definitions stemming from the OAC that have gained policy salience among policymakers (see Figure 4).

Political(Stream Policy Problem(Stream Window

Figure 4. Convergence of the political and problem streams.

When the political and problem streams converge, policy entrepreneurs must focus on building, strengthening, organizing, and mobilizing their advocacy coalition in the policy stream to either maintain or redistribute political power, again, symbolized by the red arrow (in Figure 5).

Political(Stream Policy Problem(Stream Window

Policy(Stream

Figure 5. Chairperson’s task when the political and problem streams converge.

In certain inauspicious cases, instead of working in the political stream, the chairperson may try to prevent or reverse the convergence of the problem and policy streams. This can be accomplished with reformulated issue definitions and solutions (see

Figure 6).

Political(Stream Policy Window

Problem(Stream

Figure 6. Chairperson’s work to separate the political and policy streams.

The convergence of the policy and political streams creates work for policy entrepreneurs in the problem stream. In an auspicious situation, policy entrepreneurs provide issue definitions that capitalize on the advocacy coalition’s political salience with policymakers. In inauspicious situations, the policy entrepreneur provides issue definition to combat the negative impact of the oppositional advocacy coalition’s political salience with policymakers (see Figure 7).

Political(Stream

Policy( Window Policy(Stream

Figure 7. Convergence of the political and policy streams.

In both cases the policy entrepreneurs is charged with supplying politically salient issue definitions that also build, strengthen, and mobilize the advocacy coalition, indicated by the red arrow in Figure 8.

Problem(Stream

Political(Stream Policy( Window Policy(Stream

Figure 8. Chairperson’s task when the political and policy streams converge.

I assert that policy entrepreneurs use rhetoric, policy action, or a combination of the two to respond to stream convergence. This process is conducted by formulating an issue definition and an associated solution that gains dominance in the policy arena.

When the policy entrepreneur is operating from a place of political power, it is more likely that they will have the ability to create convergence catalysts by designing issue definitions in the problem stream. Policy entrepreneurs can affect the political stream by finding rationales that resonate with policymakers. In this case, with a strong advocacy coalition and support from the arts subgovernment, entrepreneurs can guide issue definition reformulation in the policy stream.

Although this research is being undertaken from the viewpoint of NEA chairpersons, it is situated in a broader political context. I have already discussed the three streams and the various ways they can converge to open policy windows. As a result of actions that occur in policy windows, authoritative decisions are made. These decisions can include many things at the policy level, but for my research the most important elements are acts, appropriations, and policy amendments. These authoritative decisions are the impetus for action in the subgovernment. The chairperson, an actor who has the ability to operate at the policy level as well as in the rest of the subgovernment, can create outcomes such as structural or programmatic decisions on behalf of the NEA and the arts-advocacy coalition. After they are made, authoritative decisions and their outcomes are then introduced to the overall subgovernment environment. Here the arts constituency and the OAC react, either positively or negatively. Finally, the authoritative decisions, outcomes, and subgovernment reactions serve as the inputs that influence and inform the three streams. Policy learning is an important factor throughout this process.

The process of policy learning occurs throughout the cycle investigated here.

Policy learning is the process of dissecting the impact of previous policy outcomes and the responses of policymakers, the issue subgovernment, and members of any opposing- advocacy coalitions. This information is digested in the subgovernment system and considered when creating or reconfiguring advocacy arguments. This process helps policy entrepreneurs decide whether to use rhetoric, action, or a combination. Far from being linear, the process of policy learning is fluid, an ongoing process of assessment and adaptation occurring as the three streams converge, while they are combined, and after their eventual separation (Sabatier & Weible, 2007).

By analyzing the processes outlined above, it is the work of this study to investigate if and how rhetoric, in the form of advocacy arguments, affects the work of policy entrepreneurs. Specifically, I seek information about how chairpersons of the NEA use and interact with advocacy rhetoric to create or manage policy change. However, it is important not to look at each chairperson’s actions in a vacuum. To fully assess each chairperson, it is necessary to understand what is happening in the subgovernment as well.

By comparing the actions of the subgovernment: policymakers, the arts constituency, and the oppositional-advocacy coalition with the actions and reactions of the chairperson, I can better assess their ability to create and manage policy change.

Typology of Rhetorical Situations

To operationalize my conceptual framework I will use it to typologize different rhetorical situations NEA chairpersons experience. Below, I outline general rhetorical situations that occur in punctuation and equilibrium. This typology serves as the outline of the cases investigated here as well as my hypotheses about each chairperson’s role as a policy entrepreneur. Each of the overall categories I am investigating are based on the theories detailed in my literature review. The policy situation categorization is derived from the MS framework; argument action is concerned with advocacy rhetoric; subgovernment impact is directly related to the ACF; policy outcomes consider the resulting advocacy rhetoric; action outcome looks at the combination of rhetoric and action specific to the chairperson’s role as policy entrepreneur, and is informed by the P-

E theory.

In times of general positivity for the arts-advocacy coalition, or for the purposes of this research, equilibrium, the chairpersons are able to reinforce their advocacy

arguments between opportunities to open auspicious policy windows. The ability to reinforce previously accepted advocacy arguments is the result of a successful positive feedback system (Baumgartner & Jones, 2002; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1988). Due to the exclusion of actors outside of the arts subgovernment and the lack of conflict-causing controversy, there is no change in the subgovernment. Because the chairperson and the issue of public arts funding are not under attack, there is no need to change the rhetoric or behavior of the chairperson, nor of the advocacy coalition. To gain additional political power, there may be changes occurring in the oppositional-advocacy coalition, but that it outside the scope of this study. Times of equilibrium may precipitate changes in preferences in the advocacy coalition because of the political power they enjoy, but my intent is to catch this information once it becomes manifest, and not in its latent form, as it would be in this instance. Reinforcement, as an argument action, results in little or no change in advocacy arguments from a rhetorical standpoint. According to P-E theory, agency action will include incremental changes designed to maintain political status

(shown in Figure 9):

Subgovernment Advocacy Agency Action Policy Situation Argument Action Impact Outcome Outcome

Minimal/no change Incremental No change within Equilibrium Reinforce in advocacy changes to maintain the subgovernment argument political standing

Figure 9. Punctuated-equilibrium theory.

As previously stated, the factors that open policy windows are pressing problems, substantial changes in the political stream, crises, and scheduled renewal of legislation

(Kingdon, 2003). Based on that assumption, auspicious policy windows may result from the chairperson using rhetoric to capitalize on pressing problems or crises that permit the agency or the issue of public arts funding to be displayed in a positive light. Chairpersons can also incorporate new policymakers into the arts subgovernment after turnover in the political stream. Any of these events will help the chairperson guide issues definitions in the problem and policy streams. Possible courses of action in an auspicious window are detailed below. When chairpersons realign an issue, they provide alternative issue definitions to policymakers and create opportunities to incorporate new constituencies into the advocacy coalition. These alternative definitions serve to prevent oppositional forces from gaining support among policymakers. How the chairperson realigns problem definitions may have two types of impacts: consensual change in the subgovernment or conflictual change to the subgovernment. In instances of consensual change, the subgovernment supports the realigned definition and advocacy arguments, and in some cases becomes more varied, providing a broader base of support. These cases present an opportunity for the entire arts-policy subgovernment to refocus advocacy efforts by altering advocacy arguments or allowing different constituencies with related policy concerns to take the rhetorical lead. When changes made in the subgovernment are conflictual, parts of the subgovernment do not agree with the actions being taken. In these cases, the changes only occur among the NEA and portions of the advocacy coalition that support the advocacy argument realignment. Here, though, because the NEA is a federal- level organization, the impact of rhetorical changes and the accompanying behavioral

changes at the agency level are seen throughout the subgovernment. In times of consensual change the action outcome will include a relatively small number of incremental changes that align with the changes in advocacy rhetoric. In times of conflictual change, a relatively larger number of incremental changes will occur as the chairperson seeks to simultaneously reward supportive constituents and appease unsupportive ones. Therefore, according to the ACF, these cases will result in a change in argument for the agency, but this will cause rifts in the subgovernment system, leaving it vulnerable to future attack (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1988, see Figure 10):

Subgovernment Advocacy Agency Action Policy Situation Argument Action Impact Outcome Outcome

Consensual change Small number of Universal change in within the incremental agency advocacy argument subgovernment changes Equilibrium Reinforce Conflictual change Changes made to Large number of within the agency’s advocacy incremental agency subgovernment arguments changes

Figure 10. Advocacy coalition framework.

From the chairperson’s perspective, inauspicious policy windows occur when the

OAC enjoys increased political power. This may be the result of legislative turnover in the political stream. The accumulation of pressing issues or a crisis that puts the NEA or the issue of public arts funding in a negative light could also diminish the chairperson’s ability to promote a preferred issue definition. Elements of an inauspicious policy window are depicted in Figure 11. When the arts subgovernment “deflects” an attack, the subgovernment alters its advocacy argument to prevent oppositional forces from opening a negative policy window. Unlike realignment, which is started internally and handled 66

with direct agency action, deflection may be initiated externally (outside the subgovernment) and is often handled with a change in rhetoric. However, it is possible for the chairperson to use a combination of rhetoric and action. Changes to the rhetoric, and the associated advocacy arguments, may be either consensual or conflictual. In consensual cases, there will be a universal alteration made to advocacy arguments throughout the subgovernment system. Conflictual changes will result in alterations in only the NEA’s advocacy arguments. In an attempt to insulate itself from further attack, the agency outcome will be paradigmatic changes to the agency. These large-scale alterations to programming, funding, and structure are externally empowered because they are being done in an attempt to mitigate damage already done outside of the advocacy coalition and the subgovernment. These changes are completed in accordance with changes in advocacy rhetoric.

Subgovernment Advocacy Agency Action Policy Situation Argument Action Impact Outcome Outcome

Consensual change Universal change within the made to advocacy Externally subgovernment arguments empowered Deflected paradigmatic changes to the Conflictual change Changes made to agency within the agency’s advocacy Inauspicious Policy subgovernment arguments Window Internally Externally induced empowered Universal change in Conceded change in the paradigmatic advocacy arguments subgovernment changes to the agency

Figure 11. Externally empowered agency changes.

When the arts subgovernment must concede, it is because it failed to prevent an opposing advocacy coalition from opening an inauspicious policy window. With concession comes externally induced changes to the subgovernment; however, due to the conciliatory nature of these actions, the paradigmatic changes are internally empowered.

This also results in universal changes to advocacy arguments to protect the arts subgovernment from future attacks, but does so after making documented attempts to appease those from the oppositional-advocacy coalition and those outside of the subgovernment. This differs from externally empowered agency changes, which are done without the political breathing room afforded a coalition that has acknowledged defeat.

All the aforementioned policy actions not only affect the rhetoric used in the arts subgovernment, but policy actions as well. Policy outcomes dictate whether the arts subgovernment, and the NEA in particular, will use rhetoric, action, or a combination of both in the future. When an auspicious policy window occurs, rhetoric can be used in lieu of action to maintain or promote favorable policy outcomes. Inauspicious policy windows require the arts subgovernment to take action, or couple their actions with changes in rhetoric, engaging in policy learning to prevent future unfavorable policy outcomes. An important theoretical tie to policy learning is the ACF, which emphasizes how actors in the subgovernment process policy-relevant information. Due to their interaction with the arts subgovernment, as well as their interaction in the broader policy context, NEA chairpersons are capable of leading the policy-learning process in the arts subgovernment.

This research is designed to investigate the chairperson’s ability to lead the policy- learning process and the arts subgovernment successfully as a policy entrepreneur.

Effective policy entrepreneurs not only drive the issue definition process, but also navigate the political processes necessary to join the three streams. A significant component of the policy entrepreneur’s task in the red arrows is working as a liaison between other members of the arts subgovernment, policymakers, and the general public.

The chairperson’s interaction with others is best depicted outside of the actual streams because without effective work outside of the streams, the chairperson’s ability to operate in the streams would be diminished.

Key Concepts

There are three key concepts in my research: policy-change management, policy entrepreneurship, and rhetorical leadership. I interpret rhetorical leadership to be the set of actions undertaken by a policy entrepreneur to procure favorable policy outcomes on a given policy issue (Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Mintrom & Vergari 1996). These actions include the construction and maintenance of advocacy messages, and the management of advocacy messages created elsewhere in the arts subgovernment. The ultimate goal of rhetorical leadership is to create a large and cohesive advocacy coalition. Rhetorical leadership occurs when the chairperson and the constituency are in rhetorical harmony, a strong indicator of a cohesive advocacy coalition. According to Sabatier and Jenkins-

Smith (1988), a cohesive advocacy coalition is a key factor in managing favorable policy outcomes and oppositional advocacy coalitions. If the chairperson’s actions and messages echo those of the advocacy coalition, or are echoed throughout the advocacy coalition, then rhetorical leadership has occurred. Conversely, if the chairperson’s actions or messages seem to stand apart from the advocacy coalition then rhetorical leadership was not as effective as it could have been.

To attempt rhetorical leadership, especially in the policy arena studied here, chairpersons must employ rhetorical strategies (Edelman 1972, 1977). It is equally important to track which rhetorical strategies each chairperson uses, and when. I assert that certain rhetorical strategies should be used in particular political contexts: if optimal rhetorical strategies are employed, then the chairperson will be able to manage policy change more effectively. If the agency is in a negative political situation, such as an inauspicious policy window, then effective policy-change management would involve preventing the inauspicious policy window from opening. In times of equilibrium or positive political situations, an effective chairperson will maintain favorable policy status or create an auspicious policy window.

My research involves ascertaining the relationships among the important elements in each case. I am specifically interested in tracking three main concepts: policy change, rhetorical leadership, and rhetorical strategies. Based on the literature about the policy process and political rhetoric, I have determined that these three concepts are the clearest indicators of the work of policy entrepreneurs. Policy entrepreneurs are constantly working to influence or manage policy change. They use rhetorical strategies and attempt rhetorical leadership to achieve their policy goals. To clarify what I hoped to accomplish with my research, I have articulated my main research questions below:

What rhetorical strategies are used by policy entrepreneurs in the policy arena?

I assert that policy entrepreneurs manage policy change through action, rhetoric, or a combination of rhetoric and action. Regardless of the way policy change is managed, rhetoric is likely to play an important role. In the arts policy context, the chairperson may choose to manage policy change with action. However, that action does not exist in a

rhetorical vacuum. Each policy action comes with rhetoric that announces and justifies the action. The arts subgovernment and the larger policy community’s reaction to the policy action and the accompanying rhetoric, impacts the chairperson’s future role and work. Through my research, I worked to discover what rhetorical strategies policy entrepreneurs use in the policy arena, and to what effect. The capacity for this research question to generate complex results led me to formulate additional, related questions to investigate. Each question addresses an integral part of the main research question.

How can changes in the political environment be predicted, anticipated, or mitigated?

I hypothesize that, through the practical application of Kingdon’s policy streams

(1995), Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s (1988) and Sabatier and Weible’s (2007) ACF, and

Baumgartner and Jones’ P-E theory (1993), changes in the political environment can be predicted and anticipated. Answering this question will combine these three theories in a way that presents a unified theory of how interested parties can predict and anticipate changes in the political environment. This question is particularly important in establishing the role and scope of the work of policy entrepreneurs.

What effect does rhetoric have on coalition building?

I hypothesize that rhetorical leadership in the policy arena has three important audiences: the agency for which the policy entrepreneur works, the associated advocacy coalition, and policymakers. At the agency level, rhetorical leadership will guide the structure, function, and specific actions of the organization. At the advocacy coalition level, rhetorical leadership will guide advocacy work. At the policy-making level, rhetorical leadership should guide policymakers into passing legislation favorable to the

policy entrepreneur, while deflecting or working against unfavorable legislation and policy action. Each of these audiences consists of potential members of the advocacy coalition. I hypothesize that whether they become active members of the coalition depends on the rhetorical leadership of the policy entrepreneur. Specifically, I hypothesize that the rhetoric used by policy entrepreneurs will dictate the size and cohesion of their advocacy coalition, as depicted in Figure 12:

3 4

1 2

Figure 12. Size and cohesion of advocacy coalition.

Less varied coalitions (squares 1 and 2). Rhetoric that is very technical and only appeals to a small portion of the general population will result in a less varied coalition comprised of one particular type of supporter. Additionally, if that technical language is not echoed throughout the coalition, then it will tend to be less cohesive (1). However, if technical rhetoric is used consistently throughout the coalition, then it will be more cohesive (2). In these cases the rhetoric, in conjunction with the small number of individuals and the relative homogeneity of those in the coalition, will keep participation numbers low.

Varied coalitions (squares 3 and 4). Rhetorical leadership that uses inclusive language and the strategic use of generally universal concepts will result in a varied coalition comprised of a variety of individuals and groups. The more cohesive coalitions tend to either have some general guidelines that promote coalition-wide use of particular rhetoric, or specific rhetoric for particular facets of the varied coalition (4). On the other hand, if coalition-wide guidelines do not exist, or specific facets of the coalition are not given as much attention as others, both in rhetoric and in action, then the coalition will be less cohesive (3).

Are certain advocacy arguments tied to specific rhetorical strategies and policy goals?

In the process of looking at the use of advocacy arguments, I will investigate potential linkages between the type of argument used and the advocacy goal. Based on both argumentation theory and the ACF specific policy contexts call for particular strategic rhetorical strategies. I will look at the use of arguments to discern any ties to rhetorical strategies and, ultimately, policy goals and policy changes.

Research Goals

Overall, I hope to develop theories that help classify political situations and the rhetorical strategies best suited to address each situation. Although each case in my collection of case studies will have different political circumstances, I hypothesize that operating in the policy arena affords certain aspects of generalizability, which I hope to discover when analyzing my smaller case studies as a complete case study of how the concept of rhetorical policy entrepreneurship has manifested itself in the NEA.

The aim of this research is to develop theory. I am interested in developing a substantive, rather than a grand theory: I do not anticipate the findings of this research to be wholly generalizable across all political situations, but my findings will have enough detail, yet enough variance, to allow them to be used to explain similar situations.

Portions of my findings, which are specific to the federal level, will be applicable to the issue of public arts funding at the state and local levels. However, I have not designed my research with the aim of being generalizable to other policy issues, such as education, healthcare, or national defense. Further analysis of my findings may result in generalizable connections between the way policy entrepreneurs manage policy change through rhetorical leadership in the arts and other policy issues. However, the appropriate mechanism to discern this particular type of generalizability is outside the scope of my research.

Chapter 3: Defining the Political Context

Prior to starting my main research, it was necessary to conduct some preliminary investigations into the work of the NEA and the role its chairpersons played since the organization’s creation. It was also necessary to acclimate myself to ways my theoretical bases would manifest themselves in the arts-policy political context. These preliminary investigations included the creation of an agency timeline and the creation of a typology of cases.

To identify and group cases of punctuation and equilibrium, I familiarized myself with the general history of the NEA. After reviewing the agency’s history, I created a timeline that placed the NEA’s history in its sociopolitical context. I plotted important events in the agency, as well as in the general arts constituency, along with information regarding party control in the House, Senate, and presidency from the time of the agency’s inception in 1965 to 2007. Collecting these disparate pieces of information in one place allowed me to gain an understanding of the political context in which each chairperson operated.

Timeline Item Rationale

To find cases where elements of the policy rhetoric typology are present, it was necessary to look at a holistic policy history of the NEA. I needed to ascertain the political and policy context in which the NEA operated. While the NEA itself does have timelines available, I needed to look at their history in conjunction with other factors that

may have affected the arts subgovernment. Accordingly, I constructed a timeline of federal public arts funding by using my conceptual framework to conduct a historical investigation. This timeline allows me to present a politically holistic view of the environment in which the NEA operated. First, I will discuss how the timeline was constructed, then provide a description of the broad categories of actors that were included.

Policy Analysis Framework and Timeline Construction

Multiple-streams framework. Based on Kingdon’s MS framework (1995), I chose to include items that may demonstrate where policy ideas originate, as well as items that may demonstrate when those ideas emerge or merge in the policy arena. To identify these items, I included indicators of Kingdon’s three streams: the problem stream, the policy stream, and the political stream. Tracking all three streams was important because it helped me identify times when they had the potential to converge. The problem stream is represented by issue indicators, focusing events, feedback, and problem load. On the timeline, information regarding issue indicators can be found in the research category as well as in the reports funded or managed by the NEA. Focusing events were tracked in two broad categories: subgovernment and policymakers. All of the focusing events that occur in the categories of arts service organizations, local arts agencies, and state arts agencies (SAAs) and regional arts organizations depict events that originated in the arts subgovernment. Although focusing events that occur at the NEA itself do impact the arts subgovernment, I consider them separately in my data. NEA focusing events are used as indicators of punctuation (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). The presidential-action and congressional-action categories represent the policymaking

community. Focusing events that occur in these two categories demonstrate policymaker exposure to issues arising from the arts subgovernment and problem load. Tracking problem load is important because the number of pressing issues on the policy agenda directly impacts the time and resources available to handle each issue (Baumgartner &

Jones, 1993).

The policy stream is where issue definitions are adjusted by a community of specialists, including researchers, agency leaders, interest groups, and congressional staff members (who work in the name of congresspersons). Through research, agency publications, and policy briefs, these actors refine issue definitions. Issue-definition alterations are important because they indicate changes in the policy environment.

Although definition alterations do not show exactly how the policy environment has changed, they do highlight times of interest for further investigation. This interest adds additional justification for the actors I have chosen to include in the timeline. Kingdon

(1995) identified scheduled renewal of enabling legislation as a time when actors can predict a policy-window opening, and I add annual appropriations hearings to the same category.

The political stream is comprised of the national mood, pressure-group campaigns, and legislative or administrative legislative turnover. This stream is represented by information regarding the opposing advocacy coalition, the party control in both houses of Congress, and committee chair terms. National mood is represented in the research category, specifically public participation in the arts and public opinion of the arts research. Public participation in the arts research identifies people in the general public who are most likely to be direct or indirect constituents of the NEA, separating them

marginally from the rest of the general public. Public opinion of the arts identifies the actual mood of the public toward the arts. A thorough investigation of how the arts- advocacy coalition and the OAC function is an important part of my research; thus, I began tracking information regarding both groups. Finally, administrative turnover, meaning a change in the chairperson at the NEA, is tracked by name. Legislative turnover in the House and Senate is tracked by political party, whereas presidential turnover is marked by name and party affiliation. I have also chosen to track turnover of Department of the Interior Appropriations Subcommittee control, as it controls annual appropriations hearings for the NEA.

Advocacy-coalition framework. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s ACF (1988) addresses aspects of solution formulation. Important considerations or suggested solutions are often identified in research publications. Research also introduces, reinforces, and alters basic issue attributes over time. Accordingly, the chairperson, as a policy entrepreneur, must identify technical information pertinent to the issue of public arts funding, and must do so in ways that benefit the NEA in the policy arena. Because the ACF assumes that such information plays an important part in the policy decision- making process, the information likewise impacts the chairperson’s task of influencing the policy decision-making process. Additionally, the general political context has significance in the ACF, as changes in the general political context often affect both problem definitions and the issue solutions presented by the subgovernment system.

Punctuated-equilibrium theory. The timeline’s main function is to assist in identifying times of punctuation and equilibrium, outlined in Baumgartner and Jones’s P-

E theory (1993). Specifically, examining all timeline groups together allows indicators of

incrementalism and changes in preferences or attentiveness to emerge. These indicators help me identify cases for further investigation. In addition to helping track indicators of incrementalism, a sign of a positive-feedback system, the timeline also helps track indicators of a negative-feedback system. Although these negative indicators often include large-scale focusing events, a key benefit of the timeline is that it also allows me to track the steady buildup of smaller-scale focusing events that also function as negative feedback.

Actors on the Timeline

To incorporate items that address each facet of my conceptual framework, it was necessary to group actors by their scope and function in the subgovernment. This grouping prevented redundancy on the timeline, and also facilitates in discussing various actors. The concept of policy subsystems or subgovernment systems, referred to throughout this research as the arts subgovernment, is a focal point of each policy- analysis theory employed in the theoretical framework. Therefore, I allowed this concept to govern which actors I included. Below, I provide descriptions for each group and explain why its members are important to this timeline and this research.

Arts-service organizations (ASOs). Arts service organizations (ASOs) are defined as “organizations that provide services and support for individuals, groups, and institutions engaged in the creation, production, distribution, and preservation of the arts and culture” (Wyszomirski & Cherbo Summer, 2001). These organizations are not actively involved in the production or presentation of art, but “help others to do so by providing information, opportunities to communication, advocacy, public education, and various forms of technical, managerial, and support services” (NEA, 1984). ASOs work

to increase the general population’s demand for artists’ work. This is important for two reasons. First, these efforts promote the financial stability and sustainability of artists and arts organizations: as ASOs’ constituents become more economically sound, their political weight may also increase. Second, increased demand and appreciation among people not primarily in the arts and cultural sector may increase the number of individuals sympathetic to the cause of artists and arts organizations. This could play an important role in the election and reelection of policymakers.

In Art in Communities: Systems of Support, Jackson (2002) outlined the following framework for comprehending the work of ASOs:

• Validation: Acknowledging the value of what artists do.

• Demand/Markets: Fostering society’s demand for artists and what they do,

and promoting the markets that translate this demand into financial

compensation.

• Material Supports: Providing access to the financial and physical resources

artists need for their work, including space, employment, health insurance,

awards, grants, and equipment.

• Training and Professional Development: Offering conventional and lifelong

learning opportunities.

• Communities and Networks: Building inward connections to other artists and

people in the cultural sector and outward connections to people not primarily

in the cultural sector.

• Information: Providing research about artists and for artists.

In a later study performed by the Boston Foundation (Wang & Nelson, 2005),

Jackson and colleagues’ (2003) framework was expanded to discuss how and why ASOs offer their services. Their outline of ASO services and the purposes for those services served as a rationale for ASOs’ inclusion on the timeline (see Table 4).

Table 4

Categories of Services Offered by Arts-Service Organizations

Advocacy & Policy-Related Action (Validation)

Avenue/Channel Subject Matter/Purpose

Studies & Research Political Monitoring

Lobbying Public policy issue identification

Representation of artists/arts organizations to Campaigns government bodies

Protests Advocacy

Challenge government actions, policies, and decisions

Education & Training (Training & Professional Development)

Avenue/Channel Subject Matter/Purpose

Workshops & Seminars Organizational Capacity-Building

Higher Education Courses Leadership & Managerial

Financial Management

Strategic Planning

Master Classes Artistic Development

Individual Technical Assistance Setting Professional Standards

Fostering Higher Quality

Information & Research (Information)

Avenue/Channel Subject Matter/Purpose

Research Studies Peer Benchmark Information

For Policymakers, Funders, and the Private Sector. Publications Provide expertise on:

Trends in the Sector

Survey of the Sector

Issues Facing the Sector

On the timeline I track the major milestones (creation dates and significant organizational changes) of various ASOs. I have also incorporated their research publications, in accordance with the ACF.

Research. The research section includes research reports originating from sources that are not directly tied to groups already represented on the timeline. This category mainly consists of foundations, but also includes researchers from a variety of academic disciplines, including communications, public policy, political science, and (cultural) economics. The lack of expressly stated rhetorical intentions for the research in this category may allow for variances in the interpretation and use of the research information by ASOs, members of government-affiliated arts agencies, chairpersons, and policymakers. Therefore, I thought it important to distinguish between sources of research reports. Research conducted and published by the NEA is under the agency category for this reason. Overall, research is an important element in this project because it addresses the identification and explanation of policy concerns. Research also demonstrates the formulation of solutions, the significance of which is highlighted in the

ACF. Certain types of research, such as public participation and public opinion surveys, are on the timeline because they provide information about public sentiment toward the

arts and public arts funding—and while public opinion may not direct public policy, it does set parameters for policy options. Research, in general, can thus inform advocates operating in the policy arena of potential avenues for success, or possible pitfalls.

Local arts agencies (LAAs). LAAs are referred to in various literatures under any of the following names:

• arts centers

• community arts agencies/councils

• cultural arts commissions

These categories suggest that there is some variation in the size and scope of these organizations in different community contexts. When the NEA was developing a community-programs initiative (NEA, 1978), they developed the following definition:

[A local arts agency is] a public or private not-for-profit organization or agency,

whose primary purpose is to provide a support system and network to develop,

deliver and sustain arts activities in the community. Its primary function is to

provide some or all of the following services: support of individual artists,

promotion of arts activities, grantmaking, space provision and central

administration services for arts organizations. A local arts agency often serves as

a forum for citizens’ opinions and acts as an advocate for public and private

support of the arts. In addition, a local arts agency may sponsor programs in

cooperation with local and neighborhood organizations, or on its own as a catalyst

for audience development and new programming. (p. 1)

LAAs provide a variety of services and programs that add value to the communities in which they operate, as well as to the overall scope of arts service on a

national level. Their programming requires LAAs to take on different roles such as coordinator, publisher, service provider, presenter, broker, advocate, and producer. As coordinators and publishers, LAAs provide opportunities for artists and arts managers to exchange information with each other. As service providers and presenters, LAAs may provide administrative and technical assistance and provide opportunities for artists to work in a variety of community venues. Serving as brokers, LAAs bring together artists, arts administrators, funders, sponsors, buyers, and organizations. Finally, LAAs act as advocates by providing information about the value of the arts to local government officials, in order to promote public support of artists and art organizations.

LAAs are included on the timeline because they are the local manifestation of arts policies that come from the state and national levels. After the NEA was banned from directly supporting individual artists, LAAs took on that responsibility. Although their respective projects too are directly linked to their specific community contexts to be a significant part of this research, it is still important to acknowledge the role LAAs play in the complete arts-policy ecological system.

State arts agencies (SAAs). SAAs were established to “complement the federal government’s programs” (Mulcahy, 2002). The increasing financial incentives to create

SAAs, stemming from the NEA, were a strong factor in the rise of SAAs in every state, the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, and Northern Mariana. SAAs serve the following purposes:

• To stimulate and encourage presentations of the performing arts and fine arts

• To encourage public interest in the arts

• To make surveys of public and private institutions engaged in artistic and

cultural activities

• To make recommendations on methods to encourage participation in and

appreciation of the arts, to meet the needs of the state

• To encourage freedom of artistic expression

SAAs are especially important to the public art-funding landscape because, over the years, they have commanded a large portion of the NEA’s budget. On the timeline, their increasing importance is demonstrated both by the actions they take and by the administrative and fiscal responsibility awarded to them by various mandates given to the

NEA. Although most SAAs enjoy an advocacy partnership with their respective state arts-advocacy groups, I decided not to include those groups on the timeline. This is mainly due to research demonstrating that “although state arts advocacy groups recognize the importance of national policies, they generally focus on state-specific issues”

(Mulcahy, 2002).

Regional arts organizations (RAOs). RAOs were created to address issues relating to access to the performing arts. Many rural areas did not have access to performing-arts presentations, which tended to occur only in major cultural centers.

Support for RAOs occurred at the federal level in 1973, when the NEA reauthorizing committee encouraged cooperation among the states. Additionally, RAOs were made eligible for federal funding. This encouraged the creation and development of seven

RAOs designed to coordinate support for the arts on a multistate basis. Although RAOs engage in various activities at the state, regional, national, and international levels, their

commitment to research, as well as to providing technical support and training programs for member SAAs, justifies including their activities on the timeline.

National Association of State Arts Agencies (NASAA). Founded in 1968,

NASAA is a nonprofit membership organization dedicated to assisting state and jurisdictional arts agencies with research, technical issues, and leadership training for

SAA executive directors. NASAA is important due to its relationship with SAAs, RAOs, and leadership at the NEA. NASAA also acts as an information clearinghouse, providing policy briefs, research reports, and data to member SAAs.

National Endowment for the Arts (NEA). As the focal point of my research, it is imperative that I track major events in the NEA’s history, including important legislation, reauthorization years, large-scale conflict and controversy, research publications, and the start of new initiatives. This overview of the agency’s activities, in conjunction with the other items on the timeline, facilitates the identification of cases that differ in political context. In addition to helping delineate cases for investigation, placing the agency’s timeline items alongside other timeline categories demonstrates the agency’s constituency and its broader political context. This complete view highlights possible indicators of ideal rhetorical strategies for further review.

Presidential action. Presidential action is an important facet of the political context. At times the President may function as an advocate of the agency, or provide means for advocacy argument construction through a presidential task force. Included in this category are instances when the President mandates actions, appoints leaders for special tasks directly related to public arts funding, and requests specific information

regarding the arts or the NEA. Instances of direct support of the agency are also noted.

These items provide insight into the support structure for the NEA in the policy arena.

House and Senate. There are two broad types of information necessary in this timeline: congressional control and congressional arts action. Congressional control relates specifically to the majorities in the House and the Senate. This information is marginally important by itself, because it indicates which party is in control of the appropriations committees at any given time. However, it also interacts with other political factors, such as the party affiliation of the President (who appoints the chairperson) or the party-control differences between the House and the Senate. Another reason it is important to track Congress is because of fluid participation in government

(Zahariadis, 2007). By tracking majority control in both houses of Congress, I can efficiently track the issue of fluid participation by demonstrating a change in the dominant governing coalition. One limitation of the timeline is that it does not show if there are ideological shifts in the major political parties. However, I acknowledge the importance of that information to my research, and explore it more thoroughly in my data analysis.

Tracking congressional action as it pertains to the arts consisted mainly of identifying proposed legislation regarding the NEA or public arts funding in general, noting the start of the Congressional Arts Caucus, and identifying Congress-mandated changes to the way the NEA operates. In addition to these items, there will be significant

Congressional representation in appropriations hearings, which are a component of my dataset.

Open opposition (from opposing advocacy coalitions). This category contains instances of open opposition to the work, or the existence of the NEA, stemming from sources not already represented on the timeline. There are significantly fewer items in this category, although there were many instances of open opposition, because opposition also occurs in the congressional category in a more standardized way. Including these items, even though few in number, was still important because it provides an indicator that there may be more oppositional arguments present in the appropriations hearings that coincide with those instances of outside opposition.

Additional political context. Items that are outside the scope of the arts subgovernment, but within the scope of the general political context, were important to track. For instance, political conflict abroad and social movements are significant because they provide a broader political context in which the arts subgovernment operated. The number of pressing policy issues at a given time will negatively impact the amount of time and resources available for all policy issues, including the arts (Cobb & Elder, 1972).

Additionally, information used in other policy areas may affect work done in the arts subgovernment. Finally, information that provides insight into ideological shifts is important: although those shifts may not occur specifically in the arts subgovernment, they may still affect it. Although many smaller ideological shifts have occurred over the years, I felt it especially important to note the “Contract with America” and “Culture War” events because they were easily identifiable due to the size and scope of the issues, and the amount of attention the events commanded.

Conclusion. By constructing a timeline based on these three policy-analysis theories, I can provide a holistic view of the social and political environment in which the

NEA operated. By incorporating elements representing the MS framework, I was able to include items that indicate the beginning phases of the policy process: issue identification and definition. The MS framework and the ACF both call for items that represent the solution-formation stage of the policy process. By incorporating items based on P-E theory, I was able to see indicators of times that may need further analysis, while also linking issue identification with the final stage of the policy process, evaluation.

Although all three theories use similar items, each provides views of policy issues at different levels. P-E theory provides the broadest view, accounting for system-level patterns surrounding a policy subsystem, and thus potentially incorporating elements from outside the specific subgovernment. The ACF provides a more narrow scope of policy changes at the subgovernment-level, while the MS framework focuses on a specific policy issue in the subgovernment.

The timeline I created also allowed me to identify factors that may have contributed to policy change in the agency. These factors include dramatic events or crises, changes in governing coalitions, and administrative and legislative turnover.

Dramatic events or crises often provided opportunities for opposing-advocacy coalitions to provide issue definitions and solutions that were detrimental to the NEA. Changes in governing coalitions provided both opportunities and obstacles. There were times when the change in governing coalition provided the agency with a more supportive President,

House, or Senate. However, there were also times when the change in governing coalition welcomed Congress members who were generally unsupportive of the NEA, or, at worst, antagonistic. Administrative turnover, which refers to NEA chairpersons, had various results throughout the timeframe. The factors that led each chairperson to various forms

of policy change are the focus of this research. Legislative turnover resulted in changes to the House and Senate appropriations committees. This turnover directly impacted the work of the chairperson in the policy arena, because advocacy work done in appropriations hearings may have been affected.

Case Identification

Overall, mapping the aforementioned factors on the timeline facilitated classification of presidential and NEA chairperson terms into categories based on the following typology of punctuation and equilibrium. Tables 5, and 6 were constructed from the literature on the MS framework, the ACF, and P-E theory.

Table 5

Punctuation

Condition Indicators Indicator placement Changes in socioeconomic Changes in problem attributes In the advocacy- conditions coalition problem stream Changes in the governing Changing sociocultural values Political stream coalition and norms Changes in the governing laws Policy decisions from other Changes in available resources Problem stream subsystems Changes in attention to the Policy stream issue Problem-load overload Lower agenda status Policy stream

Table 6

Equilibrium

Condition Indicator Indicator placement Perceptions of effective Consistent (or relatively Problem stream policies consistent) problem attributes Stable income distribution Slightly increasing FY budget Political stream levels Stable governing coalition Consistent sociocultural values In the advocacy- and norms coalition political stream Stable structure of governing Consistent mandates for Policy stream and laws agency action political stream Manageable problem load Stable agenda status Policy stream

Based on the criteria for categorizing a political context as a time of punctuation or equilibrium, I have classified the presidencies during the lifespan of the agency under review in this study (1965–2007) into cases of punctuation and equilibrium:

Conditions and events during Kennedy’s presidency were causal factors for the creation of the NEA under Johnson. The beginning of Johnson’s presidency contains focusing events that would suggest classification of Johnson’s tenure under punctuation.

Nixon’s tenure saw few focusing events. Although those events were detrimental to the general public’s opinion of the NEA, their overall impact was not significant in the short term, due to an effective negative-feedback process that the agency maintained during this time. The agency also saw a steadily increasing FY budget during Nixon’s

presidency, which had a consistently Democratic House and Senate (unchanged from the previous presidency). Therefore, Nixon’s presidency is classified as a time of equilibrium.

Ford’s presidency also saw some negative focusing events. However, these negative focusing events were coupled with the dramatic shift from Nixon’s presidency to Ford’s. Although the House and Senate control remained Democratic, and saw no significant shifts, Ford’s desire to distance from the perception of Nixon’s presidency was a critical factor in the classification of this presidency as a time of punctuation.

Carter’s presidency saw no focusing events, a steady increase in the NEA’s budget, and consistent House and Senate leadership. During this time, the NEA was able to focus its attention on internal matters and the promotion and maintenance of its advocacy coalition. Therefore, Carter’s tenure is classified as a period of equilibrium.

Reagan’s administration saw some focusing events that had a more immediate and negative impact on the agency than the negative focusing events experienced in previous administrations. Due to the short-term consequences of these focusing events, an unstable budget, and Reagan’s departure from the governing style, values, and ideals of the previous administration, this presidency is classified as a time of punctuation.

During G. H. W. Bush’s tenure, consequences of focusing events from the previous administration were coupled with a host of new focusing events. The impact of these negative focusing events was evident in the minimization of budget growth for the agency. Furthermore, instead of staying in the policy subgovernment, the focusing events that occurred during this administration drew the negative attention of opposing advocacy coalitions as well as the general public. Rather than enjoying a supportive or generally apathetic public, these focusing events began to draw out a hostile public that was

increasingly unsupportive of agency operations. As a result, this presidency is classified as a time of punctuation.

Clinton’s presidency saw the NEA under consistent attack, and with a steadily decreasing budget. Most of the focusing events during this time were negative and had significant short-term impact. In addition to the existence of negative focusing events, there was a change in the governing coalition after the start of Clinton’s presidency.

Clinton’s presidency was also one that had two different chairpersons, meaning that legislative turnover was a factor in the agency. Therefore, Clinton’s presidency is classified as a time of punctuation.

Other than the September 11th attacks, the presidency of G. W. Bush saw few focusing events that significantly impacted the arts. Due to the lack of focusing events with short-term impact, and the steadily increasing budget, the agency operated in a relatively steady political context. The governing coalition changed during G. W. Bush’s presidency, but the changes were incremental, starting in the House and later occurring in the Senate. All of these factors combined resulted in the presidency being classified as a time of equilibrium.

There are various ways that the chairperson may interact with others in the policymaking process, regardless of whether they are operating in a time of punctuation or equilibrium. However, the focus of this research is the rhetorical interactions. The chairperson acts as a rhetorical filter for the NEA, as depicted in Figure 13:

NEA

Chairperson

Arts Subgovernment General Policy Public Community

Figure 13. Role of the Chairperson of the NEA.

In instances of equilibrium, it is the chairperson’s responsibility (as the policy entrepreneur) to promote the positive feedback process by effectively navigating the problem stream and establishing dominance in the policy stream. It is then the chairperson’s task to create a policy window by coupling the problem and policy streams with the political stream.

In instances of punctuation, it is the chairperson’s responsibility to manage the problem and policy streams and mitigate the negative-feedback process (which in this study is strongly rooted in the political stream) to prevent a policy window from opening.

Knowing the general political context of each president’s term, and having a general outline for the work of the chairperson in each political context, facilitated the process of case selection for this research.

By using the timeline I was also able to identify the NEA’s policy situation at various points in time. Based on the punctuated-equilibrium literature, and on information gathered from the timeline, I was able to determine whether the NEA was 95

operating at a time of punctuation or equilibrium. Furthermore, I was able to determine the polarity of the periods of punctuation. Times where the punctuation presented opportunities for the NEA to strengthen or grow its position in the policy arena were labeled as auspicious policy windows, whereas times where the punctuation presented challenges to the autonomy, resources, or existence of the NEA were labeled inauspicious policy windows. I incorporated this information into my Political Rhetoric Typology, introduced in the Conceptual Framework chapter, to determine cases for further investigation. In all of these cases, the policy window label does not mean that the policy window definitely existed; instead, the label indicates a hypothesis. Figures 14 and 15 give the complete hypothesis: what I expect to occur based on my evaluation of the political situation. Through use of the timeline, I then identified the chairperson whose terms encountered political environments most similar to the political situations I chose as cases for this research: reinforcement and conflictual deflection.

Reinforcement. In times of equilibrium, when there are no focusing events to trigger a time of punctuation, the chairperson is able to “reinforce” advocacy arguments between opportunities to open auspicious policy windows. There will be minor changes to both the advocacy argument and the agency:

Subgovernment Advocacy Agency Action Policy Situation Argument Action Impact Outcome Outcome

Minimal/no change Incremental changes No change within the Equilibrium Reinforce in advocacy to maintain political subgovernment argument standing

Figure 14. Chairperson can reinforce arguments.

For this case, I chose to investigate Chairperson Biddle’s tenure under President

Carter. Biddle’s tenure saw no focusing events and a small/less cohesive OAC that was not openly antagonistic. Due to the lack of an oppositional-advocacy coalition, I expected

Biddle’s rhetoric to reinforce the arts subgovernment’s established issue definition and proposed solutions with minimal changes.

Deflection. When the arts subgovernment “deflects” an attack, the subgovernment alters its advocacy argument to prevent oppositional forces from opening a negative policy window. Unlike realignment, which is started internally and handled with direct agency action, deflection may be initiated externally (meaning outside the subgovernment) and is often handled with a change in rhetoric and changes to the agency.

Subgovernment Advocacy Agency Action Policy Situation Argument Action Impact Outcome Outcome

Externally Changes made to empowered Inauspicious Policy Conflictual change in Deflected agency’s advocacy paradigmatic Window the subgovernment arguments changes to the agency

Figure 15. Conflictual definition.

Conflictual deflection. While serving under G. H. W. Bush, Chairperson

Frohnmeyer saw numerous triggering events that resulted in an openly hostile political environment. Frohnmeyer attempted to deflect the effects of an OAC with a change in action and rhetoric. This deflection should result in a marked difference between the language used by the agency and that used by the arts constituency.

Conclusion. Each case is an individual study to see if the diagram holds true after investigating data from that time period. However, once all the smaller cases were complete, I created a longitudinal study about how rhetoric is used to navigate various political environments. If my hypotheses were proven accurate, then I have gained valuable information about the implications of combining theories of the policy process with the effects of rhetoric. Even if my hypotheses were proven wrong, I would have gained valuable information by comparing what actually occurs in the data with what the theories claim should occur.

Chapter 4: Establishing Arts-Advocacy Arguments

Based on information gathered for the timeline, I concluded that events occurring during the presidencies of Kennedy (1961–1963) and Johnson (1963–1969) could be collectively identified as a special case of establishing punctuation. During this time, publications, research reports, and legislative documents laid the rhetorical foundation for arguments used both for and against public arts funding. Knowledge of these arguments is an essential first step in the investigation of how chairpersons of the NEA used advocacy arguments as rhetorical leaders and policy entrepreneurs. Therefore, I conducted a historical investigation to establish the history of arts-advocacy arguments.

To conduct my preliminary analysis I chose to employ historical-research methodology. This method is beneficial to this specific research task because of its ability to help researchers relate to an understanding of past events. In addition to establishing a foundation for public arts-funding rationales, this study also provides insight into the future trends of arts advocacy at the federal level that I may have encountered in my data.

Busha and Harter outlined the steps for conducting historical research (1980, p. 91):

1. Identifying a need for certain historical knowledge

2. If appropriate, forming hypotheses that tentatively explain relationships

between historical events or factors

3. Collecting sources

4. Selecting, organizing, and analyzing the most pertinent sources and drawing

conclusions

5. Recording conclusions in a meaningful narrative

As previously mentioned, my need to understand the origins of arguments surrounding the issue of public arts funding stems from my desire to investigate how

NEA chairpersons interact with those arguments in their role as policy entrepreneurs.

Due to previous attempts to have the federal government play a purposeful role in funding arts, I developed the following hypothesis about the arguments I hoped to encounter in this investigation: After previous unsuccessful attempts at securing governmental support for the arts, arts advocates formulated advocacy arguments, in an auspicious policy environment, with enough policy salience to result in the creation of the

NEA. The final three steps of the process follow this section. First, I will introduce the players of note. These groups are important because they not only inform my preliminary analysis, but they are the main players that were the focus of the investigation and analysis for each case. After I provide an overview of each actor, I will discuss my data- selection process. I then analyze those sources by categorizing the arguments found in them. Finally, I offer a narrative of my conclusions through an analysis of the resulting legislation and the first full appropriations hearing of the NEA.

Background of Direct Government Involvement With the Arts

Attempts at establishing a federal arts council date back to 1877. Influences from

Europe encouraged arts activity in the United States, but it was funded solely through private patronage. Although there were supporters of the arts, many members of

Congress believed that the government should not have any official dealing with the arts.

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The next time the arts became a federal-level topic came in 1909, with President

Roosevelt’s executive order establishing the Council on the Fine Arts. The Council was designed to deal solely with buildings in the District of Colombia. In the following year

President Taft abolished the Council under the premise that “an act of Congress and not an Executive Order was the proper bases for establishment (Levy, 1997, pp. 41–42). Taft then pushed for the creation of a Federal Commission of Fine Arts, designed to

“concentrate on the quality of art to be supported” (emphasis in original; Zeigler, 1994, p. 4). As with the Council, the Commission of Fine Arts was primarily in word, and wholly in deed, dedicated to dealings in the nation’s capital. One of the best known examples of government involvement in the arts prior to the NEA was the Works

Progress Administration (WPA). In 1935, as part of President Roosevelt’s New Deal, the

WPA was expanded to include the Federal Art Project, the Federal Music Project, the

Federal Theatre Project, and the Federal Writers’ Project. It is important to note that, although these programs helped artists immensely, this program was not about public funding for the arts. The WPA was a program directed toward easing the burden of high employment rates across the nation and across fields of work. Under this program, the arts were not singled out as worthy of public funds. The WPA was known for works created by future leaders in the visual and performing arts, and for works of art that sparked controversy (Balfe & Wyszomirski, 1986). Until the WPA, the arts were supported by “that segment of the population interested, willing, and able to provide financial stability to the arts (Barresi & Taylor, 1984, p. 1). This created inequalities in access to training, professional development, and work for artists that would be addressed as part of the nation’s response during the Cold War.

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During the 1940s and 1950s, the State Department used the arts to marshal a

“cultural offensive” as part of the “propaganda battle against the Soviet Union” (Levy,

1997, p. 94). However, even with a request from President Truman for a report on the arts and government in 1951, the sentiments of the State Department, with regards to the usefulness of the arts, could not be reconciled with the distrust of the arts in Congress.

This distrust was the result of issues with WPA artists as well fears of communism and its ties to the arts world, which were nurtured by the House Un-American Activities

Committee and the McCarthy era (Levy, 1997; Zeigler, 1994). Meanwhile, arts consumption was growing in the United States, but was being supported by admission fees and private patronage in the form of tax-deductible donations (Mulcahy &

Wyszomirski, 1995).

Leading up to 1963, when my investigation begins, efforts to combat negative perceptions of American culture, both abroad and domestically, precipitated changes in the way the government approached its dealings with the arts. In 1958 President

Eisenhower, amid concerns of the nation’s capital being perceived as uncultured, created the National Center for the Performing Arts, which would go on to become the John F.

Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts. In 1961, when the Metropolitan Opera went on strike, President Kennedy sent Goldberg, who would go on to become a Supreme Court

Justice, to mediate. In the following year President Kennedy appointed a Presidential

Advisory Council, headed by Heckscher, a well-known businessperson and philanthropist with a profound interest in the arts. My investigation starts at this point and sets the foundation for the cases I investigate in later chapters.

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The Players

One of the reasons for conducting a preliminary investigation of advocacy arguments is to introduce the type of players I will most likely see throughout my data.

These players comprise the arts subgovernment; identification of these important players stems from the findings of the literature review and timeline chapters. Each player’s concerns, actions, and any argument preferences or rhetorical patterns will provide a baseline for comparison with future findings.

Policymakers are one large group of players in my data. I chose not to make the distinction between Republican and Democrat at the onset of my investigation because party lines are not a strong indicator of support for public arts funding. During previous attempts at establishing federal support for the arts, both Democrats and Republicans proposed legislation. Furthermore, representatives from both parties denied the passage of that legislation (Barresi & Taylor, 1984; Levy, 1997; Zeigler 1994). Policymakers are important because they are responsible for passing legislation regarding public arts funding. They are also responsible for annual appropriations hearings and reauthorization hearings. They have the ability to pave the way for public arts funding, or make the way impenetrable. During the timeframe of this investigation, policymakers were either supportive or apathetic to the issue. Although there were some policymakers who deemed public arts funding inappropriate, these voices were not strong enough to prevent he passage of legislation establishing an agency responsible for funding the arts.

Presidents are another type of player that can significantly impact public arts funding at the federal level. Their endorsement, indifference, or hostility can influence the ways other players act or react to the issue of public arts funding. In this case two

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individuals represent the role of the President. Data from 1963 include Kennedy’s endorsement of a report (Heckscher, 1963), whereas the rest of my data includes statements from Johnson, who became President after Kennedy’s assassination in

November, 1963. President Johnson was very supportive of the arts, helping to present legislation, mentioning the importance of the arts to the general public in speeches, and proposing significant increases to the NEA’s budget after its creation.

The arts constituency includes artists, arts administrators, arts scholars, arts educators, and arts patrons. Such a diverse group, comprised of many smaller groups, is bound to have different priorities, tactics, and preferences. The one unifying factor is that they favor public arts funding. This does incorporate members of the arts constituency who opposed the way that arts funding might have worked in practice, or those who had concerns about potential negative implications, but were still in favor of public arts funding as a policy priority.

The OAC is comprised of individuals against public arts funding at the federal level. This group includes artists, arts administrators and others who would otherwise belong to the arts constituency, as well as some policymakers and members of the general public. These players are important in that they have the ability to dictate the role chairpersons, as policy entrepreneurs, must play during their tenure. An apathetic OAC may allow the chairperson to work on their agenda or an agenda emerging from the advocacy coalition. An active OAC may prevent the chairperson from acting on their own agenda; forcing them to react to the agenda and actions of the OAC. They are also capable of being responsible for changes in advocacy arguments, as arguments stemming from the OAC may affect policymakers and the arts constituency.

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Data Selection

At the onset of selecting data, it was apparent that I needed sources that would include information about all of the important players mentioned in the previous section.

Because there are no standard sources where arts-advocacy arguments existed in the past,

I surveyed the literature to gather sources, which represented views from the government and from the arts constituency. I did not include primary sources from previous attempts to create a federal arts agency because their arguments did not find purchase in the policy arena. By focusing on materials from the punctuated time when the arguments were successful, I was able to gather information about arguments that did not gain political purchase in the policy arena in their successful manifestations, when these goals were achieved. Although comparison of unsuccessful and successful arguments would prove interesting, this comparison is outside the scope of this research. Instead, I focused on the first time that previously used ideation kernels were organized in a way that afforded them political salience in order to establish a baseline for advocacy arguments. This baseline creates a justifiable and manageable point of origin for comparison to the arguments presented by the NEA chairperson under investigation.

To recreate the arguments surrounding public arts funding immediately prior to and during the creation of the NEA, I used a sampling of primary and of secondary sources. When conducting a historical investigation, primary sources created during the time period under investigation are vital (Busha & Harter, 1980). These sources provide information about the ideas, culture, and language present at the start and rise of the NEA.

I reviewed the Presidential Executive Order establishing the Advisory Council on the

Arts, the hearings to establish and the enabling legislation for the NEA, a report

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Heckscher submitted to President Kennedy on the state of the arts in America, the first full appropriations hearing for the NEA, reports on the arts from two prominent foundations—the Ford Foundation and the Twentieth Century Fund—newspaper coverage of the creation and infancy of the NEA, research on federal arts funding in

America and abroad: America’s Commitment to Culture (Mulcahy & Wyszomirski,

1995), and the agency’s first three annual reports. Through my investigation of these sources, I was able to develop a typology of arguments that were used to support and oppose public arts funding during the start and infancy of the NEA. The last primary source I looked at was Baumol and Bowen’s report entitled Performing Arts: The

Economic Dilemma (1966).

This economic report was funded by the Twentieth Century Fund and, by extension, Heckscher. This book was presented to the arts world with much fanfare including a release party that was covered in the newspapers. This report encapsulates all public funding rationales I will discuss in this section, and also provided much of the numerical data used by other arts advocates of the time. Because of the report’s special nature, being both a research report and an advocacy document, I decided to investigate

Baumol and Bowen’s (1966) report independently of the other sources.

Secondary sources, those written about the period under investigation, are also important in the process of recreating a vibrant picture of the past. Although these sources were created after the events in question, they have the benefit of assessing the event in light of things that occurred before and after, in addition to the power of hindsight. I looked at these sources for additional information about the authors of the primary sources, for anecdotal information that provided insight into why a particular

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person would gravitate toward one argument or another, and for contextual information about other social issues and governmental concerns of the time.

Arguments from the arts constituency. The first portion of my advocacy argument analysis focuses on rationales coming from members of the arts constituency.

This group—artists, arts administrators, foundations, private donors, and supporters from the general public—was a diverse coalition. The breadth and depth of this coalition contributed to its ability to be a relatively organized coalition, compared to public arts- funding coalitions of the past.

Government has a role to play. Many in the arts-advocacy community agreed in some part or wholly that “the encouragement and support of national progress and scholarship in the humanities and the arts, while primarily a matter for private and local initiative, is also an appropriate matter of concern to the Federal Government” (NEA,

1966); or, simply that government had a role to play in funding the arts. Some advocates cited many examples of ways the federal government, through its policies, already impacted the arts world prior to creating the NEA, including government collections of art, art in American embassies, the construction and furnishing of public buildings, tax laws, tax deductibility of contributions to the arts, postal rates, and copyright laws

(Heckscher, 1963; Ford Foundation, 1968). Arts advocates in favor of public arts funding asserted that the federal government should move from indirect policies that impact the arts, sometimes negatively, to purposeful policies and funding that positively impact the arts.

In response to Heckscher’s report (1963), Kennedy noted that “the government surely has a significant part to play in helping establish the conditions under which art

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can flourish” (p. viii). In the primary sources investigated, “government has a role to play” was stated several times. This statement established the arts as an appropriate domain for government involvement. In the latter years under investigation (1965–1968), the argument that government has a role to play in funding the arts went from being an argument, to being assumed: “increasingly, the question has been not whether government should act but how it should act and at what level and by what principles it should shape its policy” (Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 1965, p. 112). Far from being a rationale in itself, this statement was offered as an introduction to the rest of the arguments each author provided for government intervention in the arts that follow.

Quality. Quality was one of the most ambiguous terms used when discussing the role government could play in the arts. Some supporters of public arts funding made clear distinctions about what types of art were acceptable for public funding through the use of words like excellence, professional, standards, and quality all of which were coded as

“quality.” For example, a panel meeting hosted by the Twentieth Century Fund (1966) concluded, “standards must remain a controlling factor in anything the state does in the arts” (p. 28). The Rockefeller Panel report on the performing arts (Rockefeller Brothers

Fund, 1965) made a clear distinction on the matter of quality: “We do feel it is on the professionals that we must primarily depend for the development and maintenance of high standards of artistic performance, which is a paramount concern” (p. 10). The establishment of quality as a prerequisite for public funds emerged as a response to critics.

In this regard, quality is not only a means of deciding who gets public funds, but also as a means of ensuring equality among applicants. In some cases proponents of public arts

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funding used the term excellence to invoke both of those meanings at once, such as this quote from the Rockefeller Panel report (1965, p. 45):

Perhaps an even greater danger of support by any level of government is the

encouragement of mediocrity. If public funds for the arts were spread among all

the arts organizations regardless of quality, if the making of grants to arts

organizations becomes a matter of political logrolling, then improvement in the

quality of the arts would be negligible—no matter how much is spent.

The report went on to say that for public arts funding to be successful, “we must never allow the central focus on quality to weaken or shift” (Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 1965, p. 207).

During this time frame (1963–1968), the prevalence of arguments related to quality is directly linked to the fact that the concept already existed in the two realms arts advocates were trying to bring together: policymakers and artists. Policymakers understood quality as an assessment of professionalism. Artists understood quality as a term associated with assessment of one’s artistic work. Under other circumstances two facets of the subgovernment using the same word(s) to connote different meanings could be problematic. However, both policymakers’ and artists’ understanding of their respective concepts was beneficial in that they were both used in support of public arts funding. Both facets of the subgovernment used rationales based on quality that were simultaneously similar and different enough to offer a multifaceted argument.

Furthermore, this multifaceted, multiaudience argument allowed for coalition building and strengthening by bringing together like-minded individuals who accepted both concepts due to links stemming from the concept they already subscribed to as another

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form of the argument. Across all sources, there were 59 specific references to issues of quality using the aforementioned words. The concept was used 45% of the time, in comparison to all other rationales, across all sources.

Increased demand for the arts. Increased demand for the arts across a wide demographic base was another rationale offered to encourage government funding of the arts. Heckscher (1963) noted that “recent years have witnessed in the United States a rapidly developing interest in the arts” (p. 1) In many cases, increased arts demand was tied to statistics of particular pride in the U.S. at the time. Lowry (1968) and Dorian

(1964) credited the surge in arts demand to an increase in the education levels and amount of leisure time among many middle-class Americans. The Ford Foundation

(1968) also noted the postwar argument that Americans were enjoying an increase in the amount of leisure time, which had sparked “an upsurge or boom in the cultural interests of the American public” (p. 4). In a report to President Kennedy, Heckscher (1963) claimed that this increasing interest was the result of individuals living longer and having more leisure time as a result of advances in technology. Linking arguments to past or current successes is a common strategy to increase the policy salience of an argument. By linking increased arts demand to the nation’s booming economy, growing middle class, and technological advances helped tie the idea of public arts funding to the idea of a prosperous America. The result of these statements was the implication that the demand presented a need and the space for government to intervene: “increased leisure also creates a social imperative for the development of the arts [by the federal government]”

(Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 1965, p. 7).

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Field comparisons. Field comparisons are directly linked to the rhetorical strategy of comparison. Comparison is a rhetorical strategy used to encourage listeners to apply premises accepted in one set of circumstances to a different context. To make a successful comparison argument, the two contexts under review must be made similar, if not equal. Arts advocates linked the purposes served by the arts to purposes served by activities in other fields of study and work: “An institution serving some artistic purpose is not basically different from one serving such objectives as education, health, or community welfare” (Twentieth Century Fund, 1966, p. 3). This strategy was used to promote the potential benefits of public arts funding as well as to combat fears about potential pitfalls. Arts advocates cited examples of government intervention in other policy contexts for ideas about how public arts funding could work at the federal level.

To present government involvement in the arts in the best light possible, arts advocates stuck with examples of successful government intervention in the fields of education and science: “There is no troublesome overall record of government interference in education when funds were obtained from the government. If the method works in education, we should be able to make it work also in art” (Dorian, 1964, p. 478). In the case of education, government funding ensured that the general population had access to schools.

Government funding allowed scientists the room for professional creativity, paving the way for new inventions and discoveries. Both of these outcomes were of particular interest to arts advocates who were interested in increasing access to the arts, and providing opportunities for artists to engage in creative work.

Field comparisons often accompanied other arguments, with 68% of coding occurrences coinciding with coding of another rationale. For instance, Heckscher

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combined a field comparison with comments on the values of the nation: “the predominant emphasis given to science and engineering implies a distortion of resources and values which is disturbing the academic profession throughout the country” (1963, p. 17). These sentiments were echoed in The Rockefeller Panel Report:

At a time when the United States is perforce heavily engaged at the expanding frontiers of science, as a moment when many of its best educated citizens are engaged in the massive scientific and technological effort that so characterizes our civilization, a thriving development of the arts is essential to a well and safely balanced society.

(Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 1965, p. 7)

The 1977 annual report from the NEA reported, “we do not deny science and technology its current position of national eminence and concern. But I must emphasize that, in the national interest, the arts and the humanities should be given equal consideration” (NEA, 1977). These types of field comparisons were based heavily on abstract values, as specific reasons, lacking palpable reasons why the arts should be treated equally.

Access to the arts. In the data it was argued that the arts were concentrated geographically in metropolitan areas. Lowry (1968) summed up the arguments made:

The majority [of professional artists] are concentrated geographically in two sections of the country. Their scarcity in the Southeastern, Plains, and Mountain States leaves these areas generally underdeveloped except within academic halls and in a few museum collections from the past. (p. 1)

It was also argued that the wealthy were the only individuals with consistent access to the arts. Dorian (1964) noted: “the economics of smaller communities rarely

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permit adequate support of the performing arts” (p. 473). These two issues resulted in the emergence of access arguments. The assumption with this argument was that public funds were necessary to encourage a more equal arts landscape, where all Americans have access to artists and arts organizations. Another facet of the access rationale dealt with private funding of the arts. The Ford Foundation (1968) noted that, institutionally, private arts funding tends to be divided into two extremes: “the very large and very costly and somewhat monolithic institutions on the one hand, and the diverse and sporadic and sometimes technically amateur enterprises on the other” (p. 6). The Rockefeller Panel report (Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 1965) stated: “development [of arts organizations] in the states and regions is very uneven, creating striking differences between organizations”

(p. 144). They argued that this trend, if allowed to continue unchecked, would leave certain communities without access to the arts. It was sometimes implied, and often stated that those “certain communities” that would be left without artists and arts organizations were rural and/or less affluent. In some cases both faces of the access rationale were combined to make the case that rural areas, already operating with a deficit in arts access, could not rectify the situation due to the lack of private funding. The economy of many rural areas also prevented new arts organizations from being sustained.

Arts advocates quickly established a hierarchy of goals that public funding would help to achieve with regard to access. Government funding would first assist with touring initiatives, bringing artists to areas without much previous access to the arts. Eventually, government funds could be used to help develop arts organizations across the nation, specifically in places with little or no arts currently in residence. The issue of economic access to the arts based on “income” was mentioned mainly to refute the notion of the

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arts as merely a luxury: “the panel is motivated by the conviction that the arts are not for a privileged few but for the many” (Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 1965, p. 11).

The cost disease. The cost-disease argument is one that establishes a basic premise for public arts funding: arts organizations, due to the cost of putting on shows and the increased demand for those shows, are incapable of meeting all their financial needs with earned income. This argument couples elements from increased demand arguments and quality rationales. Under the assumption that quality arts cost relatively more than amateur arts, increased audience demand for quality arts causes organizations to suffer from the cost disease in a way that would not occur if quality were not a consideration. The fundamental premise of quality was noted in multiple primary sources: “the very demands which changing public tastes have made upon established artistic institutions have strained the financial resources available to them” (Heckscher,

1963, p. 1); “in spite of the great increase of interest and participation in the arts, professional performing arts are encountering increasing financial difficulties”

(Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 1965, p. 112); “the performing arts, from the largest to smallest, regularly meet financial crises threatening their survival (Lowry, 1963, pp. 1–

2); “to be sure the performing arts rarely pay their way” (Dorian, 1964, p. 479).

The Ford Foundation’s report on their arts and humanities programs (1968) pointed to the increasing economic crisis in the visual and performing arts as a justification for their program funding. The language employed to discuss this issue used the rhetorical strategy of nature or referring to occurrences as if they were a part of nature, for example: “the essential nature of the arts” (Twentieth Century Fund, 1966, p. 5).

Although claims that arts organizations are habitually unable to meet their own financial

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needs may make the situation sound mundane, arts advocates were sure to impress upon their audiences that the situation is dire, often through use of the word crisis: “the performing arts, from the largest to the smallest, regularly meet financial crises threatening their survival” (Lowry, 1968, pp. 1–2); “the economic crisis of the arts has lasted overlong (Ford Foundation, 1968, p. 1).

Diversified patronage. Traditionally, the arts in American were paid for through private patrons, and it was something that many had come to count on. Dorian (1964) noted that “too many Americans regard private patronage as a bottomless well” (p. 254).

However, as both demand for the arts and the cost of producing the arts increased, the needs of arts organizations began to outpace the amount of money private patrons had to give. From these conditions emerged the argument that private patronage was no longer sufficient to sustain the arts on its own. In the Twentieth Century Fund (1966) meetings,

Stevens, the first chairperson of the NEA, stated, “The [National] Endowment [for the

Arts] is in business because not enough funds for the arts are coming from private sources” (p. 27). Proponents of public arts spending proposed the government step in and help fill the funding gap. Rather than suggesting that the government pay for the arts singlehandedly, it was suggested the arts become part of a diversified patronage system comprised of private patrons, foundations, and the government.

The concept of diversified patronage was a unifying argument in that it presented a clearly defined role for multiple parts of the advocacy coalition. In that same vein this argument was presented as a response to concerns that government funding would result in government-controlled art. This was a concern for both arts advocates and those opposed to public arts funding. In most cases diversified patronage was not explicitly

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stated. However, elements of the concept were mentioned to reinforce the ideational foundation: “the panel believes no form of government aid to the arts should vitiate private initiative, reduce private responsibility for direction, or hamper complete artistic freedom” (Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 1965, p. 112).

Seal of approval. Proponents of public arts funding assumed that government funds would serve as a catalyst for funds from other sources. Those against government arts funding argued that government funds would negatively impact other types of funding. Even among public arts-funding advocates, there was concern about how other potential funders would react to government involvement. This concern was voiced most often during the Foundation and the Arts meetings at the Twentieth Century Fund (1966):

“the private sector will doubtless be somewhat frightened of government involvement in the arts until there is a clearer definition of just what government is going to do” (p. 27).

Others worried about how government involvement in arts funding was already being perceived by others:

Today a new factor is tending to inhibit the foundations in their approach in the arts. This is the growing role of government. From thinking that government would never act at all in this area, we have gone to the opposite conclusion of thinking that perhaps government is going to do everything (Twentieth Century Fund, 1966, p. 3)

In response to this concern, advocates stated: “the federal government’s role in most communities can never be more than marginal and indirect” (Heckscher, 1963, p. 21). From these concerns emerged the seal-of-approval rationale.

It was suggested that the federal government, by providing funding to the arts, could serve as a seal of approval. This concept was already a part of foundation practices.

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A significant portion all of the Ford Foundation funds for the arts, which predate the first

NEA grants by roughly a decade, were matching fund awards, stipulating that recipients of foundation support must get additional funding from public and/or private sources to match funds provided by the Ford Foundation. Citing successful practices was a way to encourage support of the claims arts advocates were making. The concept was succinctly summarized by Lowry (1968, p. 19): “our investments in the arts are not so much subsidies as they are levers.” This statement responds to fears that the government would be pouring money into the arts by itself, without additional funding support coming from other sources. The “lever” of government funding was a way of presenting government funds as a way for artists and arts organization to leverage support from sources that were tentatively emerging as arts supporters, mainly foundations and corporations. This argument, in addition to addressing concerns from the opposition, also established the

NEA as an authority on which artists and arts organizations should receive financial support. Although not explicitly stated, government funds serving as a lever implied that other funding sources would view government-funding decisions as credible assessments of merit.

Baumol and Bowen. In their report Performing Arts: The Economic Dilemma,

Baumol and Bowen’s work (1966), introduced the cost disease argument to the nonprofit arts world. Although the concept existed prior to this research, the two economists coined the phrase. Cost disease denotes the phenomenon of increasing production costs and steady or decreasing private patronage, causing an income gap that prevents artists from making a living wage from their work and organizations from putting on shows of quality.

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Through an extensive investigation, which included surveying a wide variety of performing-arts organizations and artists, the authors discussed the plight of arts organizations and the detriment that the cost disease causes to communities that increasingly desire more arts exposure. Baumol and Bowen (1966) categorized the arts as a quasipublic good. This categorization means that the arts have benefits that accrue to members of the general public, regardless of their individual arts consumption. The

“quasi” portion of the term distinguishes the arts from pure public goods like air and national defense, whose benefits accrue to everyone without limitations. Under the premise that the arts are a quasipublic good, Baumol and Bowen argued that the arts are economically similar to public education. The economists noted that, in the case of education, public funds were deemed necessary, provided, and accounted for a large part of the success of public colleges and universities across the nation (Baumol & Bowen,

1966). They thus contended that the arts would also benefit greatly from public funds, while providing some of the same quasipublic benefits provided by public education.

One of Baumol and Bowen’s (1966) conclusions was that government should play a role in public-arts funding. This conclusion is not based solely on findings from their data. Because the Twentieth Century Fund and Heckscher largely funded the research and the subsequent book, it is not surprising to note the advocacy slant the authors took in their recommendations. Baumol and Bowen (1966, p. 378) stated, “the first ground for government intervention in the economy is inequality of opportunity.”

They addressed the growing disparity of professional arts across the nation, and noted that government funding could help alleviate geographic and economic discrepancies in the ability to access the arts. Although the authors provided a number of reasons for

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government intervention, most categorized under quasipublic goods, they advocated for diverse patronage, stating that most nonprofit arts organizations would need support from multiple sources to fill the growing income gaps resulting from increased demand and the inability to benefit from economies of scale that other industries had at the time. In addition to promoting diversified patronage, Baumol and Bowen noted that government funding could serve as a catalyst for this goal, citing the creation of SAAs as an example:

A number of states which might not have considered forming a state arts council

will now move in that direction in order to qualify for federal funds. … The most

interesting point to be gleaned from [this] is the evidence that community support

can be stimulated in this way. (1966, p. 351)

Baumol and Bowen’s (1966) work is significant not only because it offered hard data that supported much of what the arts-advocacy coalition had argued, but in that it incorporated all of the aforementioned rationales at some point in the study. The cost disease is the foundation of their work. During their investigation they highlighted the plight of the artist and arts organizations, issues of quality and access, and the intrinsic values of the arts (civilizing and social rationales). They also detailed the significant decline in private patronage. Inherent in their quasipublic good argument was that the masses would benefit from arts exposure, which is directly linked to the growing awareness of and demand for arts exposure. As solutions, they offered diversified patronage, in which the government plays an important role (seal of approval), and cited examples from the educational field as guides (field comparison). The authors used the reader’s adherence to all of the previous premises in their book to lead them to the conclusion that government has a role to play in public arts funding. The rhetorical

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strategy of amplification was used throughout the book in an attempt to make sure that readers were subscribing to each premise, before they reinforced that premise with the next one and ultimately reached their conclusion. The coordination of advocacy rationales, or rationale layering, is an important strategy.

National pride. Supporting the arts as a means of demonstrating national pride was a rationale offered in Dorian’s book, Commitment to Culture (1964). In this book

Dorian investigated the practice of public arts funding in Austria, Italy, France, West

Germany, and England. The author pointed out that these developed countries are competing with the United States in economic and scientific endeavors. The rationale for public arts funding stemmed from the perception that, while the United States was keeping pace with other countries economically and scientifically, that it was far behind in cultural pursuits? Comparing the U.S. system to arts funding in other countries was one way arts advocates tried to resonate with policymakers who were concerned with presenting the United States as a great nation (Barresi & Taylor, 1984; Twentieth Century

Fund, 1966). Another facet of the national pride rationale is a concern with the U.S. image abroad. Arts advocates touted public arts funding as a way to increase the image of the United States in the minds of people in other countries: “Among many other claims, the arts are said to be important to the image of the American society abroad” (Lowry,

1963, p. 2). In a report to President Kennedy, Heckscher acknowledged that “most of the great countries” provide recognition to distinguished artists (1963, p. 18). Again, although not implicitly stated, Heckscher implied that the United States must do this as well in order to be considered a truly great country. In the post WWII-era, the United

States was seen as a world leader of industry and technology. However, proponents of

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public arts funding believed that America’s image abroad would be enhanced by recognition in the arts and humanities. Advocates argued that America’s place as a powerful nation was diminished by its poorly funded cultural sector: “The pitfalls of our art life have, in fact, become a main target of our critics abroad” (Dorian, 1964, p. 482).

This type of argument resonated with policymakers who considered the Soviet Union a strong threat in many areas, including technology: “In international cultural activity the

Soviets were continuing to outperform the United States” (Levy, 1997, p. 104).

Legacy. Closely related to arguments based on national pride are arguments based on the nation’s legacy. Heckscher (1963) claimed that the United States will have its place in history judged not only by its military and economic power, but by its amount of civilization as well, presumably measured in part by artistic achievement. Arguments in this category used comparison as a main strategy. Most comparisons were to “great civilizations” such as the Greeks and Romans. These comparisons resonated with politicians, who also make frequent comparisons to the ideals of democracy stemming from the Greek civilization. Artists and many arts administrators are familiar with the art from those periods, as well as the grand tradition of support for artists. Although support in most of those civilizations was from private patrons, the comparison to civilizations that are now revered, if not romanticized, was used under the assumption that it would resonate with policymakers.

Through the process of layering, arts advocates during this timeframe created a complex network of rationales. It is important to note that quality was the most used rationale. In addition to being used by itself, it was often used as a foundational element in other rationales. Through most of the arguments advocates made, there was an

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underlying assumption that arts advocates were speaking solely about professional organizations and artists. Increased demand for the arts was tied to quality arguments, as it was implied that the increase in demand was specifically for arts of professional quality.

The cost disease was directly linked to other arguments because it was not considered a strong enough argument for public arts funding on its own, especially in an economically driven society that had experienced a steady increase in the wealth of its middle class in recent years (Barresi & Taylor, 1984). As a result, it was not the cost disease that was the primary concern, it was the impact on the ability for professional organizations to perform (quality). In addition to negatively impacting quality, the cost disease also prevented quality organizations from presenting their art to a variety of audiences across the nation. This links the cost disease directly to the rationale of access. The cost disease was also linked to increased demand, in that it prohibited organizations from meeting that demand. The connection between diversified patronage and seal of approval is partially cyclical. It was argued that diversified patronage was the best way for public arts funding to (a) not crowd out other sources of funding, (b) not be too much of a financial burden for the government, and (c) help fill the income gap resulting from increased demand and insufficient private funds. The way to encourage diversified patronage was through public funds operating as a seal of approval. In contrast, government funds operating as a seal of approval, also acting as an assessment of quality, could encourage funding from other sources such as state and local government, foundations, and the private sector.

Another way arts advocates combined rationales was a discussion of national pride and the lack of opportunities for professional artists in America due to the cost disease: “Most of these young Americans must remain abroad if they want to continue their operatic

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careers” (Dorian, 1964, p. 475). Rationales like the cost disease and were incorporated with the image abroad, especially in reference to American artists being unable to engage with other artists in the world, robbing them of the chance to enhance their skills, spark their creativity, and credit their home country by displaying their talent: “The absence of the United States from a number of international festivals had been damaging to our international posture” (Twentieth Century Fund, 1966, p. 22). Overall, arts advocates provided a variety of interwoven rationales in an attempt to build a strong case for public arts funding.

Arguments against public arts funding at the federal level. Because arguments against public arts funding are only replied to rather than explicitly stated in sources outside of the policy arena, I have chosen to focus on arguments against public arts funding coming from within the policy arena. Arguments against public arts funding prior to the timeframe of my investigation (1963–1967) included the belief that government has no role in arts funding, a distrust of artists in the McCarthy era, and apprehension over funding obscene art (Zeigler, 1994). Many politicians felt the arts did not impact the general population enough to warrant government intervention for an area where they deemed market forces the appropriate controlling mechanism. During the timeframe of this investigation the OAC, comprised of individuals who opposed the idea of public arts funding, was not a powerful political force. Instead, arguments against public arts funding were found as counterpoints, or as a part of sources including arguments in favor of public arts funding. In many cases, information about arguments against public arts funding were found when arts advocates restated them, or directly stated that the rationale they were providing was in response to an argument made against

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public arts funding. Proponents of public arts funding addressed the following concerns stemming from the OAC: government control of the arts (47%), that government funding would decrease creativity (27%), or decrease private patronage (20%), as well as the cost of public arts funding, or, the price tag (7%; see Figure 16):

3$ Government$Control$of$ the$Arts$(47%)$ Decrease$Creatibity$ 7$ (27%)$ Decrease$Private$ Patronage$(20%)$ 4$ Price$Tag$(7%)$

Figure 16. ANTI arguments: Constituency.

Although I coded for many more arguments against public arts funding including: fiscal conservatism, deference to market forces, government-funding priorities, censorship, and artistic elitism, many were not present in the data for this time frame.

This indicates that the arsenal of arguments used to prevent government funding was not extensive during this time period. Instead, arguments against public arts funding between

1963 and 1968 were relatively simple compared to the multifaceted rationales emerging from the advocacy coalition. Arts constituents’ focus on the aforementioned arguments against public arts funding was to be expect, as these are the concerns that would directly

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and significantly impact them as artists and arts administrators. Much like they did when making the case for public arts funding, arts advocates responded to concerns from the

OAC by layering their counterarguments. For example, in addressing the fear of government control, “there is no troublesome overall record of government interference in education when funds were obtained from the government. If the method works in education, we should be able to make it work also in the arts” (Dorian, 1964, p. 478).

Although the argument against public arts funding did not show up by itself, this statement indicates there was concern that government funding would precipitate government interference or control. Again, the rhetorical strategy of comparison was to use premises that were already generally accepted to ease the pathway toward the acceptance of those premises in a different context. The argument that government funding would decrease private patronage was addressed by suggestions about the role of government funding from the arts constituency: “The panel believes no form of government aid to the arts should vitiate private initiative [or] reduce private responsibility” (Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 1965, p. 113); and in a reminder of past successes: “on the contrary, the matching conditions had been made stringent in order to cause the communities to become more active rather than less” (emphasis in original;

Twentieth Century Fund, 1966, p. 14).

Rationales in the policy arena. I separated the analysis of arguments made specifically by the arts constituency (outside of the policy arena) from ones made in the policy arena to test the presumed ripple effect of arguments. When dissecting the data, differences in the ways arguments were made presented themselves. For example, cross coding for competition and comparison returned no results in the data from the arts

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constituency, whereas there were data that met criterion stemming from the policy arena

(see Figure 17).

Although the percentage of arguments that meet both of those criteria is small, ranging from 1% to 6%, the fact that this combination exists in the policy arena, and not outside of it, is significant. It suggests that arguments are bundled in different ways when they are presented to policymakers.

Figure 17. Competition and comparison in the policy arena.

Presidents. In a response to Heckscher’s (1963) report The Arts and the National

Government, Kennedy made a compound argument that included references to quality and national pride: “The quality of America’s cultural life is an element of immense importance in the scales by which our cultural worth will ultimately be weighed”

(Heckscher, 1963, p. viii); a field comparison and an endorsement for government involvement in the arts: “government surely has a significant part to play in encouraging the arts as it encourages science and learning” (p. viii); and the argument of diversified 126

patronage: “Government can never take over the role of patronage and support filled by private individuals and groups in our society” (p. viii).

President Johnson’s “Great Society” rationalized public arts funding with phrases that incorporated quality, access, and legacy: “Pursuit of artistic achievement, and making the fruits of that achievement available to all its people, is also among the hallmarks of a Great Society” (89th Congress, 1965). Although President Johnson briefly mentioned the need for artistic freedom in response to fears of government control, the

President returned to rationales of legacy, directly linked to competition and comparison with other countries:

In [passing this legislation,] we follow the example of many other nations where

government support have helped to shape great and influential artistic traditions.

… But it may well be that passage of this legislation, modest as it is, will help

secure for this Congress a sure and honored place in the story of the advance of

our civilization. (89th Congress, 1965)

Although members of the arts constituency also focused on national pride and the nation’s legacy, these issues were not as significant to them relative to the emphasis both presidents placed on these rationales. This indicates that certain arguments are perceived to be more salient in the policy community than in the arts constituency.

Hearings to establish a national foundation on the arts and humanities.

Hearings were held to determine the appropriateness and need for a National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities. Due to the testimony of various players, these hearings were coded in two separate clusters. The clusters were based on date as well as the type of

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player most often represented in each. Cluster 1 represents members of the arts constituency, whose top six rationales were the following (see Figure 18).

In comparing Figures 18 and 19, it is evident that the arts constituency and policymakers (populating Cluster 2) had different rationale priorities, however there are similarities. Financial rationales are in the top two rationales, and the mirrored grouping of legacy and national pride indicate similar usage of those rationales by both groups.

Figure 18. Arts constituency concerns at National Foundation for the Arts and Humanities hearings.

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Cluster 2 Represents Policymakers’ Top Six Rationales

Figure 19. Policymaker concerns at hearings.

During the hearings, the cost disease was used in conjunction with a disease metaphor to express the importance of an issue (Code: Disease), and the stating of premises as if though they were naturally so (Code: Nature). This cost-disease rationale and the accompanying disease rhetorical strategy were directly echoed in the work of

Baumol and Bowen (1966), which was discussed previously. The nature strategy was used to encourage policymakers to agree with the premise of the cost disease, to facilitate their adherence to the premises of federal funding that followed.

Rather than simply echoing arguments made in the arts constituency, many chose to actually cite some of the information stemming from them, especially researchers and those who created report discussing the arts and the government. Each of the following arts constituency sources were cited extensively in the hearings, and used a means of expanding an argument: The Arts and the National Government (Heckscher, 1963),

Commitment to Culture (Dorian, 1964), and the Rockefeller Panel report (89th Congress,

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1965). Although echoing arguments demonstrates adherence to the premises that are being repeated, direct quoting indicates interreliance between the multiple facets of the advocacy coalition. This interreliance manifests itself in a relatively stronger advocacy coalition.

ANTI arguments in the policy arena. In Figures 18 and 19 “ANTI” serves two purposes. It demonstrates the percentage of the hearings devoted to arguments against public arts funding combined with the percentage of time spent addressing arguments against public arts funding, as previously stated. It is important to note that, while many of the same concerns show up in the two groups, policymakers and arts constituency, their priorities differ. Although the arts constituency responded to concerns regarding governmental control, decreased creativity, decreased private patronage, and costs of funding the arts, policymakers refuted arguments against public arts funding through a wider variety of rationales. Policymakers’ more extensive arsenal of arguments stemmed from lessons learned through previous attempts at creating a federal-level agency. Arts advocates in the policy arena realized that assuaging fears about the potentially negative ramifications of public arts funding was more important to getting legislation passed than sticking solely with rationales popular among the arts constituency. This logic differs from the arts constituency who would not have had that policy knowledge or experience.

Compared to the type of ANTI arguments encountered outside of the policy arena, there were more concerns in the policy arena, expressed by arts constituents and by policymakers (see Figure 20).

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Government$Control$ 1$ (30%)$ 5$ Decreased$Creativity$ 9$ (10%)$ Decreased$Private$ Patronage$(13%)$ 4$ Price$Tag$(3%)$

1$ 3$ Previous$Arts$Funding$ 2$ (7%)$ 1$ 4$ Fiscal$Conservatism$ (3%)$

Figure 20. ANTI arguments in the policy arena.

In addition to the concern shown toward certain ANTI arguments by the arts constituency outside the policy arena, in the policy arena representatives from the arts constituency and policymakers discussed the additional issues of funding priorities (17%), the concept that the market should drive arts funding (13%), the way the arts were funded prior to government funding (7%), and concerns about censorship (3%). These concerns are more in alignment with the traditional concerns of policymakers: the role and scope of government and how to fund government initiatives. However, the fact that concerns about censorship significantly increased among policymakers and not in the arts constituency was surprising. Where the arts constituency did have concerns was with the proposal of a “loyalty oath,” a holdover from fears of communism. A loyalty oath, which artists would have to agree to prior to receiving funding, was briefly considered but quickly discarded (Barresi & Taylor, 1984): “I think artistic endeavor is not subject to these loyalty oaths and should not be subject to it” (89th Congress, 1965, p. 239).

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The National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965. This act served as the enabling legislation for the NEA. This explicit statement of the original purposes for the legislation is a summation of the arguments echoed throughout the emerging arts subgovernment. These purposes are evidence of which arguments were judged politically powerful by legislators. These purposes, in their entirety, are quoted below (National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act, 1965):

The Congress hereby finds and declares

1. that the encouragement and support of national progress and scholarship in the

humanities and the arts, while primarily a matter for private and local

initiative, is also an appropriate matter of concern to the Federal Government;

2. that a high civilization must not limit its efforts to science and technology

alone but must give full value and support to the other great branches of man’s

scholarly and cultural activity;

3. that it is necessary and appropriate for the Federal Government to complement,

assist, and add to programs for the advancement of the humanities and the arts

by local, State, regional, and private agencies and their organizations;

4. that the practice of art and the study of the humanities requires constant

dedication and devotion that, while no government can call a great artist or

scholar into existence, it is necessary and appropriate for the Federal

Government to help create and sustain not only a climate encouraging

freedom of thought, imagination, and inquiry but also the material conditions

facilitating the release of this creative talent;

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5. that the world leadership which has come to the United States cannot rest

solely upon superior power, wealth, and technology, but must be solidly

founded upon worldwide respect and admiration for the Nation’s high

qualities as a leader in the realm of ideas and of the spirit; and

6. that, in order to implement these findings, it is desirable to establish a

National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities and to strengthen the

responsibilities of the Office of Education with respect to education in the arts

and humanities.

Each of these purposes are thematically linked to the rationales used to get the issue of public arts funding to the point of legislation. The first purpose is linked to the argument that the government has a role to play in public arts funding, as well as to the argument that they should not take sole responsibility for the arts or the concept of diversified patronage. The second purpose incorporates elements of field comparisons, especially in its explicit comparison of “science and technology” to “scholarly and cultural activity.” The third premise reiterates the themes of the first premise: the federal government’s role and diversified patronage. The fourth premise incorporates elements of various arguments pertaining to pride: America’s desire to be a proud nation, and its desire to improve its image abroad. These arguments are presented in a way that constructs them as premises for the ultimate conclusion that it is necessary to establish the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities and, by extension, the NEA.

It is important to note that the purposes of the act have been altered over the years.

These changes indicate efforts to increase or maintain policy salience. In its original iteration, the purposes of the act reflect rationales found in the other primary sources I

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investigated. With the acknowledgement that private and local support is a high priority comes a statement that government has a role to play in funding the arts. The second purpose includes a reference to the civilizing impact of the arts alongside field comparisons with science and technology. The third purpose reinforces the call for diversified patronage, so that the government is not solely responsible for funding the arts and to avoid setting the stage for government control of the arts. The fourth purpose outlines the principle of diversified patronage; whereas the fifth purpose promotes creativity under the assumption that government funding will allow it to flourish. The sixth purpose includes a few rationales: field comparison, national pride, and a concern with America’s image in other countries.

Legislative hearings. Legislative hearings for the first full year of appropriations

(FY 1967) heralded the first time the NEA was championed in the policy arena as an established agency. In this setting it is common for multiple rationales to be used to increase the chances of resonating with policymakers (Kingdon, 2003; Sabatier & Weible,

2007). Figure 21 shows the most popular rationales used in the hearings by all players present.

Financial concerns of artists and arts institutions was by far the most popular rationale in the policy arena, making up 22.2% of the total arguments made in favor of public arts funding. Included in the list of financial rationales were the cost disease, economic impact, the plight of artists, the need for diversified patronage, and the seal of approval rationales (see Figure 22).

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Figure 21. Appropriations FY67, Coding by node for all players.

Figure 22. Appropriations FY67, Coding by node for artists and arts administrators.

As evidenced by the financial rationales used in the appropriations hearings, the idea of economic impact did not make its way into the policy arena as a rationale, although it was discussed in the research community subset of the arts constituency. This is primarily because this appropriation hearing predates the steps toward standardizing

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economic-impact methodology for use in states, cities, and local communities.

Additionally, the agency had not existed long enough to use the economic impact of their work in the arts as a policy salient argument. The cost disease, and the accompanying rhetorical strategies of disease and nature, which were popular during the National

Foundation on the Arts and Humanities hearings, were also popular in the appropriations hearings. However, the fact that this argument only makes up 3% of the total arguments used in favor of public arts funding demonstrates that other arguments enjoyed more frequent use during the appropriations hearings. Rationales for federal funding being used as a seal of approval and diversified patronage were used at roughly the same rate at

6.4% and 6%, respectively. This is mainly because the rationale of public funds as a catalyst for additional funding, while used as a lone rationale a few times, was often directly linked to the rationale that this catalyst was necessary to create a system of diversified patronage. The plight of artists and arts institutions was the most often-used rationale of the financially oriented arguments (9.97%). This argument was directly linked to the rhetorical strategy of decline, or stories that foretell of future decline if conditions do not change.

The idea of public funding as an essential part of a funding mix of public and private sources was discussed at length by Stevens in the FY 1967 House Appropriations

Hearings for the first full fiscal year of the NEA (1966). The premise that “traditional sources of private support are simply no longer able to sustain the arts at the level of quality which our people are more and more seeking-and will increasingly seek as the number of leisure hours grows” (Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, 1966, p. 269) was stated before Stevens made the argument that government funds would, and already had

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begun to “serve to stimulate the support of additional private resources, and private foundation giving to the arts, which Is a major objective of the legislation” (Senate

Appropriations Subcommittee, 1966, p. 270). Referencing the enabling legislation was something Stevens did multiple times during the chair’s testimony to strengthen the perception of logic in the argument: “The [enabling] legislative concept envisions a partnership between the Federal Government and private resources, State and local governments, and institutions and organization responsible for the arts and the humanities”

(Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, 1966, p. 271). As part of this legislative concept,

Stevens noted that it is government funding, which need not be extensive, that will serve as the seal of approval other patrons need: “That is why this governmental “seed money” is so essential and why it can return its investment many times over” (Senate

Appropriations Subcommittee, 1966, p. 270); Stevens went on to say that continued government support “will serve to stimulate the support of additional private resources, and private foundation giving to the arts” (Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, 1966, p. 270). At this point in the agency’s life, Stevens was also able to report evidence of the efficacy of this concept:

We believe that by May 1 of this year, which is our current deadline for State

applications, every State will apply-in a meaningful fashion-for funds under this

section. I cannot emphasize too strongly the enthusiasm manifest for this

legislation at our recent conference for the States; and, of course, it reflects the

grassroots support at a community and local level. (p. 269)

To bring in research and evidence, Stevens talked further of the plight of individual artists by providing statistics on the dire financial situation of artists. The fact

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that the statistics were gathered by the Labor Department lent credibility to Stevens’ use of information from an unbiased source. These arguments were linked with field comparisons to the way America treats individuals in the fields of science and technology.

Stevens followed this rationale to the conclusion that providing financial stability would allow artists to focus on creativity, which has a civilizing affect: “We need art as an antidote against automation. We need the aesthetic enchantment of art, its creative illumination, to counteract the push-button emptiness of our mechanized life” (House

Appropriations Subcommittee, 1966, p. 483). Again, field comparisons are implied, as are abstract values of the benefit of the arts.

The issue of quality arts options across the nation was another concern for arts advocates that was discussed in the FY 1967 Senate appropriations hearings (Senate

Appropriations Subcommittee, 1966). This concern was stated as a policy issue for the organization: “The National Council on the Arts has become increasingly concerned about the uneven distribution of the arts at the professional level throughout the country”

(Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, 1966, pp. 275–276). Stevens noted the steady decrease—or in some cases complete lack—of quality arts organizations in rural areas and it was presented as an issue that could be rectified with government funding:

“surviving institutions are restricted to serving only the largest metropolitan centers, leaving the rest of the country without performances of high standard” (Senate

Appropriations Subcommittee, 1966, p. 272). It is important to note that, at this time, the issue of quality had become ingrained in the definition of public arts funding. The fact that access to quality arts experiences is mentioned as if the quality portion was assumed indicates that the previous rhetorical strategy of associating quality with the issue of

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public arts funding was successful. Throughout statements focusing on equal arts access was an underlying assumption that Stevens was speaking specifically about professional artists and arts organizations. In this particular manifestation of the arts-equality argument, government funding was presented as a way to increase access to the arts by assisting with touring and with the creation of new organizations in rural areas: “Most of the audience will experience a professional performance for the first time in communities which have not regularly had opportunities to see or hear excellence in the arts (Senate

Appropriations Subcommittee, 1966, p. 276). During the FY 1967 appropriations hearing,

Stevens was able to demonstrate support from the general public and the arts community while simultaneously reinforcing the importance of quality: “The pilot [touring] program has been acclaimed especially at the community level and in areas where such excellence is not readily available” (Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, 1966, p. 276).

Arguments against public arts funding. Skepticism of the need for public arts funding was also present in the hearings: “I am sure you feel this program is most important to the welfare of the country. However, we got along without these funds until

1966 and the country survived” (Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, 1966, p. 300).

Although this statement suggests there was opposition to the idea of public arts funding, I did not classify this as evidence of an OAC due to the fact that this statement was made in light of a request for increased funding during the Vietnam war. The concept of fiscal priorities for the government was prominent at the time, and not an indication of hostility toward public arts funding.

In addition to reiterating facts about increasing demand for the arts and the inability of arts organizations to meet that demand due to the cost disease, Stevens

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responded with comments about the U.S. role as a leading nation: “Our claims to this leading role are judged by our cultural achievements as well as by our technological strength, armed power, and material wealth” (House Appropriations Subcommittee, 1966, p. 467). This echoes usage of legacy arguments found in the National Foundation on the

Arts and the Humanities hearings. These types of comments had proven salient with policymakers of the past (Barresi & Taylor, 1984), and spoke directly to policymakers concerned with the concept of national pride and the perception of America as a great nation (Levy, 1997).

Conclusion. This case demonstrated that, although arts advocates can include members of the arts constituency and policymakers, the rationales and rhetorical strategies they employ are not always in alignment. As the context of public arts funding impacts both groups, their arguments are similar, and may even overlap, but their rationale priorities may vary. This variation implies that instances where rationales and rationale priorities are the same throughout the advocacy coalition are the result of additional work in the coalition, presumably the work of a policy entrepreneur.

As the first chairperson of the NEA, Stevens served as the baseline for the dual role of chairperson and policy entrepreneur. Stevens had qualifications in both the arts and in the policy arena. Prior to replacing Heckscher as the President’s Consultant on the

Arts, Stevens was a theater producer with many ties to the theater and producing scene in

New York and also served as chairperson of the Kennedy Center. In addition to those credentials, Stevens was well known in the Democratic Party for his fundraising abilities

(Zeigler, 1994). Although Stevens had experience in both the arts and politics, the ability to serve as an unbiased chairperson, without any conflicts of interest, was questioned.

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Stevens’ ties to the arts world, while an asset to an understanding of their needs, was also considered a potential problem. Stevens responded to the criticism by stating that none of the chairperson’s ties to any organizations would result in a conflict of interest. Stevens then went on to reaffirm support of, and belief in, the vision of President Johnson’s administration on the arts. Questioning of both Stevens and the issue of public arts funding in general was indicative of the distrust of government involvement in the arts experienced by some in the arts constituency as well as the policy arena.

Stevens’ time as chairperson was a particular aspect of establishing punctuation.

This new role was one that took some time to navigate. Stevens’ background in the policy arena served well, but there was much policy learning that took place during the formative years of the NEA. Through discussions with staff from various government agencies, and delegating tasks like finding out federal-level mores and investigating policy-salient rationales to trusted staff (Mark, 1990), Stevens quickly learned how to navigate the policy arena in this new role. From information about Stevens, I was able to discern that professional background is important. The specifics of each chairperson’s education, experience in the arts world, geographic base, and prior experience in the policy arena played a role in both their overall abilities as a policy entrepreneur, and perceptions of their ability to achieve success in that role. Additionally, each chairperson’s reception in and ability to maneuver in the policy arena is another important factor that impacted their ability to serve as an effective policy entrepreneur.

Finally, their reception in the arts constituency, with the understanding that different facets of the arts constituency can and were likely to receive the chairperson in different ways, is an additional component of assessing their capabilities as a policy entrepreneur.

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Investigating the arguments that were prevalent at the time of the NEA’s creation was an important step in the creation of a codebook of arts-advocacy arguments.

Although other research on arts-advocacy arguments would be helpful, they may only demonstrate arguments that are prevalent at different points in time. By articulating the arguments present at the start of the organization, I am able to truly track the progression of arts-advocacy arguments from their successful origins. This preliminary analysis also taught me that the progression from the rhetorical strategy of association to the assumed incorporation of a term or rationale in an issue definition, much like in the use of the quality rationale, is subtle. It also indicates that current arguments may be comprised of more elements than is readily apparent. More current arguments may be more popular, but it is important to note that current arguments include rhetorical elements and ideational kernels from these original arguments. Knowing these original arguments will grant the ability to dissect advocacy arguments with increased precision. Additionally, this investigation has demonstrated that advocacy arguments ripple throughout the arts subgovernment, showing up in research, the nonprofit world, and the policy arena.

Although I am not concerned with where in the arts subgovernment these arguments originated, this ripple effect is a large underlying assumption of this research. Therefore, the ability to clearly see various rationales in my preliminary study has helped prepare me for further data analysis.

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Chapter 5: Methodology

Investigating Language Use Among Chairpersons of the NEA

Based on information gathered from the timeline and preliminary study, I concluded that an investigation of how NEA chairpersons use advocacy rhetoric is, in effect, a study of how language helps shape political reality. Language is a critical factor in public policymaking and issue definition, playing a critical role in “understanding, argument, and individual and group expression” (Rochefort & Cobb, 1994, p. 9).

Rochefort and Cobb (1994) categorized issue definition as policy rhetoric, stating that the purpose of issue definition is to “explain, to describe, to recommend, and, above all, to persuade” (p. 15). According to Considine (2005), policy rhetoric “acts as both a filter to remove unwanted issues and as a ladder to rank and promote some established account” of current situations (p. 74). The impact rhetoric has on policy actions and outcomes is the result of linguistically based consequences, which are created by intergroup communication in issue subgovernments (Coupland, 1998). For my research the groups involved in intergroup communication are the NEA, members of congressional appropriations committees, other members of Congress, the arts constituency, the OAC, and members of the general public. An important part of my investigation will be looking at the chairperson’s ability to manage intergroup communication and the various outcomes of each chairperson’s efforts.

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Conceptual foundations for rhetorical analysis are supported by four key premises outlined by Phillips (2002): (a) a critical approach to taken-for-granted knowledge,

(b) historical and cultural specificity, (c) links between knowledge and social purposes, and (d) a link between knowledge and social action (pp. 5–6). By investigating the ethos, pathos, and logos used by each chairperson on behalf of the NEA, I am able to critically investigate taken-for-granted knowledge in the policy arena as it pertains to the arts.

Historical and cultural specificity is imperative for understanding the rhetorical context for each chairperson. This is especially important because effective advocacy arguments will be timely and culturally relevant. Investigating the rhetorical acts of the chairperson in the policy arena will provide information about the link between knowledge (both about the arts constituency and the policy process) and the social, or this case policy- oriented, purposes. Finally, an investigation of advocacy rhetoric will demonstrate and provide additional information about the link between the knowledge provided by the rhetoric and the policy action that accompanies it.

To investigate the way each chairperson used language to promote and manage policy change, I used Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s (1969) theory of argumentation, which is “the study of the discursive techniques allowing [speakers] to induce or to increase the mind’s adherence to the theses presented for its assent” (p. 4). This theory lends itself to an investigation of the use of language in the policy arena, where strategic language use is conducted with the hopes of promoting particular policy outcomes. This approach is audience focused, with the underlying assumption that a speaker’s intent and strategy are important to examine in conjunction with an investigation of the audiences they address, and their responses. Throughout their work, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca

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referred to the person presenting the argument (in writing or orally) as the “speaker,” and those to whom the argument is addressed as the “audience.” I will adhere to that terminology throughout this discussion.

The MS framework, ACF, and P-E theory portray policy entrepreneurs as those responsible for translating the desires of a diverse set of actors in the policy subgovernment, and depict successful policy entrepreneurs as those who can align those desires in a way that allows them to achieve positive policy change (Kingdon, 2003;

Schlager, 2007; Zahariadis, 2007). This assumption directly aligns with the premise in argumentation that “a change in audience means a change in the appearance of the argumentation” as speakers seek to influence various actors in the policy process

(Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 7).

The theory of argumentation is primarily concerned with the structure of arguments, allowing the theory to be applied to the written and the spoken word. Because chairpersons of the NEA engage in many spoken and written activities on behalf of the agency, the ability to incorporate both types of rhetorical action is important.

For argumentation to occur there needs to be the “existence of a common language, of a technique allowing communication to take place” (Perelman & Olbrechts-

Tyteca, 1969, p. 15). This criteria is met in the general environment of the policy arena.

Due to cultural norms established in the past, there is a general set of rules that governs communication in the policy arena. Another condition of argumentation is that the speaker “must attach some importance to gaining the adherence of his [audience]”

(Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 16). chairpersons of the NEA are appointed by the President. Prior to assuming the role, potential chairs must have their qualifications

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evaluated. This evaluation is performed under the assumption that they have a vested interest in the arts. Once they are appointed, chairpersons, as a matter of self-interest and preservation, have a wide range of motivations for pursuing the adherence of various audiences in the pursuit of positive policy change.

For the purposes of my research, I am investigating rhetoric from a broad

Aristotelian frame of reference, using Perelman’s theory of argumentation. Aristotle is known for identifying three main facets of rhetoric: ethos, pathos, and logos. Ethos refers to the speaker’s ability to convey their authority on the topic they are discussing. This ability holds implications for whether the speaker is deemed qualified. Pathos refers to the speaker’s ability to appeal to their audience’s emotions. An emotive appeal can be accomplished through words (with metaphors, or allusions to emotion-filled situations), or with qualities such as tone of voice. Logos refers to the speaker’s ability to make appeals that appear logical to their audience. I will investigate how these three facets of rhetoric are used by policy entrepreneurs to manage policy change.

Data

Data identification and rationale. There was a set of materials that represented the groups comprising an ACF view of the policy arena: the key congressional actors in the House and Senate, the general public, the arts constituency, the chairpersons of the

NEA, and the OAC, when apparent. These materials allowed me to reconstruct a holistic view of the advocacy rhetoric, including information about the origins of and alterations to arguments for each case I investigated.

Data-selection criteria. All my data categories were chosen based on the following questions:

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• Does the material provide policy-relevant information?

• Does the material demonstrate the policy or agenda preferences or priorities of

the chair, constituency, or the opposition?

• Does the material depict sentiments of or about the chair?

Each question was chosen based on my theoretical framework. The importance of policy-relevant information stems from the ACF. As indicated by Sabatier and Jenkins-

Smith’s (1988) analysis of specialized knowledge and Baumgartner and Jones’s (1993) investigation into incrementalism and positive feedback systems, policy-relevant knowledge is used during the processes of issue identification, agenda setting, and solution formulation. Policy-relevant information, regardless of its specific source from in the subgovernment system, is used to maintain a positive-feedback system or to disrupt a negative-feedback system. Data that meet this criterion will provide insight into various issue definitions, and reveal which advocacy arguments were nonexistent, gaining momentum, or taken for granted.

Data that demonstrated the policy or agenda preferences of either the chairperson or the constituency facilitated the process of investigating how close the chairperson’s agenda and priorities were to those of the arts constituency. This data is directly related to my investigation of the chairperson’s abilities, as a rhetorical leader, to build and maintain a large and cohesive advocacy coalition.

Data that depicted chairpersons’ sentiments provided contextual information to assist in understanding chairpersons’ rationale for action and the rhetoric they used, or chairpersons’ logos. Data that depicted sentiments about chairpersons provided insight into how those from the remaining groups—the general public, arts constituency and

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policymakers—viewed the chairpersons and their actions. This effectively addresses the concept of a chairperson’s ethos.

Research

According to the ACF, research is an important part of agenda setting due to its ability to help define problems to be solved by policy initiatives. Additionally, the MS framework details the important role research plays in the process of issue definition and the identification of key terms. This type of data meets the first data-selection criterion by providing policy issue definitions and policy-action rationales. Included in this category are all research reports that provide information about the geographic, financial, and economic status of the arts. Data include research on specific artistic disciplines and artists. This type of research is important to my study because it defines the circumstance of arts practitioners and arts audiences in ways that provide technical information for advocates and policymakers.

The Constituency

General public. I used research on public opinion of and public participation in the arts to gather information about the national mood, an integral part of Kingdon’s

(2003) political stream. These two types of research provide policy-relevant information by providing information on the size and scope of the arts constituency, particularly from the view of the general public. This information is important as it can indicate motivations and rationales for chairpersons, as well as policymakers who are often concerned with the policy concerns of their constituents.

Arts-service organizations (ASOs). ASOs are a significant category because they, collectively, represent the interests of artists and of practitioners. Therefore,

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tracking the rhetorical actions of ASOs allows me to track effectively the rhetoric commonly used by many artists and practitioners. Although there are certainly artists and practitioners who are not affiliated with any sort of ASO, they are outliers and are highly unlikely to impact the rhetoric used by the larger artist and practitioner communities significantly. ASOs conduct two important functions that are relevant to my research.

These two functions, validation and information, were identified in the framework of

Jackson et al. (2003).

Validation. Jackson et al. (2003) stated that the validation functions of ASOs serve to acknowledge the value of what artists do. This statement implies that there is an established value of artists’ work. However, this is only partially true. Although there are, in fact, established values of artistic work, those values change based on advocates’ agendas and standards. Closely linked to the more descriptive work of advocacy, ASOs actively participate in defining the value of artists’ work. The definitions they provide to their respective constituents are used throughout the communities of the artists and practitioners they represent. Because field leaders and policymakers look to expert communities to provide policy-relevant material by assisting with issue definitions and value statements, this process is vital. ASOs commonly provide the aforementioned value statements and issue definitions with their research, which is included in my data.

Information. Providing research about artists and for artists is another important function of ASOs. Through the issues defined and discussed in their research, ASOs have the ability to identify issues and create issue definitions, or echo definitions created by others in the arts constituency.

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For the purposes of my research, I was specifically interested in the advocacy and policy-related actions undertaken by ASOs. Here, I am defining policy-related as information relating to the creation, maintenance, or avoidance of public legislation. This includes policy-education materials and research reports regarding policy actions or government agencies. The actions outlined in the “advocacy & policy-related action” category—studies, research, lobbying, campaigns, and protests—give ASOs an important place in my research. Additionally, the purposes stated in the “information & research” category—research and publications, place-research studies, policy publications, and newsletters with information regarding policy initiatives—are in the scope of my research.

Although many ASOs place much valuable information about arts policy and advocacy on their websites, I did not use much of that information. This is mainly because most ASOs do not date their online advocacy and policy resources, and, due to small staffs, most ASOs are unable to provide detailed archives of their online advocacy materials. Therefore, I am unable to track when many items became available, preventing me from accurately placing them in the case-study time frames. I did, however, use website information such as online toolkits, advocacy information, and policy-related newsletters that are dated, because they can be properly attributed to the appropriate time frame.

Organizations that have policy-relevant materials that meet my data criteria are the following:

• American Orchestra Symphony League

• American Folk Life Center

• American Craft Council

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• American Association of Museums

• Dance USA

• Opera America

• Theatre Communications Group

This information was used not only to investigate the rhetoric of the artist and practitioner communities, but also to track rhetorical information by organization.

Americans for the Arts and the National Assembly of State Arts Agencies.

These two service organizations are not tied to any specific arts discipline. AFTA is a national arts-advocacy organization dedicated to “representing and serving local communities and creating opportunities for every American to participate in and appreciate all forms of the arts” (para. 1). Their dedication to local arts communities stems from their creation in 1996, the result of a merger between the National Assembly of Local Arts Agencies and the American Council for the Arts. Later, in 2005, AFTA merged with Arts & Business Council, Inc., providing the organization with a broad range of views, from local to national. NASAA, founded in 1968, is the service organization for SAAs. NASAA addresses the goal of strengthening SAAs by helping them share information and resources through research and education. NASAA also represents SAAs at the federal level, “advocating for a robust public sector role in

American cultural life” (NASAA, 2011).

Both organizations produce two types of advocacy data with policy-relevant information: policy briefs and advocacy education materials. Policy briefs outline policy initiatives and actions that directly or indirectly impact the work of arts advocates. These briefs often provide information that is not easily obtainable for members of the general

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public or the arts constituency, due to the various governmental sources from which it may originate. These two organizations provide a service to their constituents by collecting and organizing this information. Policy briefs also key their constituents in to what types of issues are being discussed by the government, and may accompany specific calls for action. Advocacy-education materials provide issue definitions and specific rhetoric for articulating those definitions, and often include requests to share the information with public officials at the local or state levels. Of particular importance are calls to action requesting that constituents contact their representatives to address policies at the federal level.

Data from AFTA, included in the study are their policy briefs and Arts Advocacy

Day materials. Arts Advocacy Day is an annual event dedicated to bringing together civic and cultural organizations with grassroots arts advocates from across the country, to congregate in Washington, DC. Participants undergo brief advocacy training and are then sent to speak to their respective members of Congress to advocate for the arts and arts education. The Arts Advocacy Day materials include a PowerPoint presentation and/or a fact sheet that provides an overview of a selection of arts-advocacy arguments, and some facts and figures that support those arguments. Specific rhetoric is also provided to advocates. Data from NASAA included in the study are policy briefs and advocacy publications. These publications include time-specific information about how to make the case for public arts funding to policymakers, how to mobilize support from other arts advocates, and how to expand political influence.

The chair of the National Endowment for the Arts. To track how chairpersons of the NEA operate as policy entrepreneurs, specifically through their use of rhetoric, it is

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necessary to track their ethos and logos. These two concepts were introduced by Aristotle

(2004) in a discussion of rhetoric. Ethos refers to appeals based on the speaker’s character, emphasizing the speaker’s reputation and ability to appear knowledgeable and trustworthy. Through the establishment of the speaker’s integrity, the speaker is able to convince the audience to adhere to the speaker’s claims. Logos refers to logic-based appeals, appeals to an audience’s ability to reason, including rational statements that try to present premises that lead the audience to believe that the speaker is promoting a logical course of action. The third category in Aristotle’s original description of rhetoric, pathos (appeals to emotion), is not included here because of its extremely broad scope.

Including data that demonstrates each chairperson’s ethos is important because it provides information about the perception of the chairperson held by the other important actors in the study. The relative degrees of ethos employed, or able to be employed, by the chairperson will indicate the strength of the arts-advocacy coalition. In cases where the chairperson is perceived as knowledgeable as well as trustworthy, the advocacy coalition is likely to be more cohesive. Conversely, when the chairperson is not perceived to be knowledgeable and trustworthy, the advocacy coalition is likely to be less cohesive, as the chairperson is not likely have the strong support of the arts constituency. Below are the data types that will identify the constituents’ perceptions of the chair.

Ethos

Confirmation hearings. To track Congress’ perception of each chairperson’s ethos, I included each chairperson’s confirmation hearings. Confirmation hearings are conducted to gather information on candidates nominated by the President for federal- level positions, and provide policy-relevant information in the questions asked by

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members of Congress. These questions, directed at the candidate, outline some of the congressional concerns about broad policy issues represented by the federal-level appointment. Therefore, questions asked of a presidential nominee for the chairperson position will illuminate congressional concerns about public arts policy. These hearings also detail some of the reasons each candidate was nominated for the position by outlining some of the candidate’s qualifications. Sentiments regarding the candidate’s proposed appointment are also provided in the hearing transcripts. In addition to providing information about the chair, this data type also includes members of Congress, another type of key actor in my research.

Newspaper articles. Archived newspaper articles that directly address the actions of the chairperson were included in the dataset, because they provided information about the messages presented to the general public and to the arts constituency about the chair.

Based on media-framing literature, which discusses the impact media outlets have on opinion formation in the general public (Mutz & Soss, 1997), these articles proved to include valuable information about the chairperson’s ethos. Newspaper articles and editorials are particularly effective in placing events in the context and vernacular of their time. Because journalists and editorial commentators purposefully choose what to write about, either on their own or in conjunction with newspaper editors, this data type demonstrated the amount and type of attention given to the chair. I focused on three sources: The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Washington Times. The

New York Times was chosen because it was the official paper of record on the arts and the world surrounding them. The Washington Post was chosen for its ability with policy reporting. Finally, The Washington Times was chosen because it is the major conservative

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newspaper in Washington. It is likely that there will be polarized views of the chairperson expressed in this data type, as is common among policy entrepreneurs (Mintrom &

Norman, 2009). Tracking how the chair operates in the context of these polarized positions thus provided additional information about how they operate as policy entrepreneurs.

Logos. Tracking the logical arguments used by the chair, particularly definitions and rationales, provided information about the chairperson’s capacity to act as a rhetorical leader. For the purposes of my research, rhetorical leadership consists of investigating and using advocacy rationales, while also providing responses to criticism from oppositional forces. Rationales offered by rhetorical leaders in the policy arena must be technically feasible and include courses of action acceptable to policymakers.

Information about the chairperson’s rhetorical leadership skills are an essential part of determining the chair’s ability as a policy entrepreneur, because rhetorical leadership is a major component of policy entrepreneurship (Dorsey, 2008; Mintrom & Norman, 2009).

Annual reports. The chairperson’s statements in NEA annual reports were used to identify a portion of the chairperson’s logos. These statements provided an overview of the NEA’s work during the past fiscal year, under the chairperson’s direction. Because the chairperson’s statement is limited to a small amount of space, the issues and definitions chosen for emphasis are especially significant. Another type of data that addressed the chairperson’s logos is appropriations hearings, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

Policymakers. Members of Congress, in addition to voting for or against particular issues, express their opinions on issues in two main ways: drafting legislation

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and forming and joining advocacy coalitions. I will track these two types of activity in each case to ascertain congressperson’s sentiments toward public funding for the arts and the NEA.

Proposed legislation. After the creation of the NEA, proposed legislation from

Congress was polarizing. Some sought to refine or increase the purview of the agency.

Others proposed legislation to eliminate or significantly decrease funding for the NEA.

Investigating both types of proposed legislation allowed me to see some of the most obvious places where policy learning may have occurred. Additionally, proposed legislation that would negatively impact the agency provided a view of the OAC from the policy arena. This information is an important part of establishing the OAC in the data.

Congressional arts caucus. Congressional caucuses are “voluntary, organized associations of members of Congress, without recognition in chamber rules or line-item appropriations and that seek to play a role in the policy process” (Hammond, 2001 p. 18).

These caucuses seek to affect policy, often by contributing to the agenda-setting process by providing information to White House staff, other congresspersons, administrative departments, and independent agencies; and by serving as advocates through coalition building and developing legislation. The work of congressional caucuses is especially important as many policy issues “cut across traditional party and committee jurisdiction divisions” (Hammond, 2001, p. 19)

The Congressional Arts Caucus was founded in 1981 by Representative

Richmond. This bipartisan caucus serves as the access point for legislators interested in arts issues. The work of the caucus is important specifically because, prior to its existence, there was no “coordinating group for members on diverse and apparently unrelated arts

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issues” (Hammond, 2001, p. 20). This made it difficult for policymakers to identify and locate information regarding arts policy issues. Issues such as historic preservation are not handled in the same place as art education, and art education is often discussed in both educational circles and under NEA auspices. Additionally, issues relating to international arts issues, such as taxes for artworks, visas for visiting artists, and provisions for diplomacy involving cultural workers are under the jurisdiction of a vast variety of actors. The Arts Caucus, by raising the visibility of arts-related issues on

Capitol Hill, has corralled information regarding these seemingly disparate items and provided policymakers with a means of obtaining and disseminating that information.

Congressional Arts Caucus materials helped track the scope and rank of issues of importance to arts advocates in the House and the Senate. These materials include information on legislation that is coming up for a vote, prompts which types of activities to endorse, invites members to testify on behalf of the NEA, and provides other information regarding nonprofit arts in the United States. These documents demonstrate the issues deemed important by arts advocates in Congress. Information gleaned from these documents assisted in the establishment of the arts-constituency message, from the particular point of view of policymakers.

The Congressional Arts Caucus, like most other caucuses, distributed information through regular publications until the 104th Congress, when caucus operations were restructured (Hammond, 2001). I used the publications disseminated during the time frame of the relevant case studies in my data. Any cases after the 104th Congress used other information presented by member of the Arts Caucus, such as testimony and activities associated with arts-advocacy groups, particularly AFTA.

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Oppositional Advocacy Coalitions

A preliminary investigation of the OACs indicated that, other than legislators— whose oppositional rationales are documented in proposed legislation—these coalitions are comprised mainly of members of the general public. To express their displeasure, members of the OAC submitted newspaper commentaries, newspaper articles, and letters to members of Congress. Therefore, to track oppositional rationales, I included newspaper commentaries and articles written by those individuals. Oppositional letters to members of Congress have made their way into the appendices and the testimony transcripts of appropriations hearings, a data category discussed below.

Appropriations Hearings

Appropriations hearings provided additional rhetorical information about all of the aforementioned actors. Because the chairs and congressional representatives are always present, with representatives from the arts constituency and the OAC also likely to be present at these hearings, this was a rich data source. Each hearing was coded using coding strips. These strips allowed items to be coded in multiple ways for a variety of purposes. For example, the entire hearing was coded for the year and for the chamber (i.e.,

Senate Hearing FY 1967). Each speaker fell into a specific category (i.e., policymaker, chair, arts constituent, or OAC). Policymakers who were members of the Congressional

Arts Caucus were identified as such. Policymakers who proposed or supported legislation against the NEA were also be coded as part of the OAC. In the qualitative data-analysis software I chose to facilitate my research, these identifying codes are known as attributes.

The following attributes will be used during data analysis:

• Arts constituency: (art medium)

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o Arts service organization: (specific organization)

o Arts organization leaders

o NASAA

o AFTA

• chair

• General public

• Congressperson (House or Senate)

• OAC

• Researcher: discipline

Each representative from the arts constituency was labeled three different ways: once for their status as a member of the arts constituency, again for their general category, and once again for their particular affiliation, if they had one. For example, someone submitting a letter or speaking on behalf of Dance USA would be coded as “arts constituency/arts-service organization/Dance USA.” This is because they are representing

Dance USA, which is an ASO. I defined ASOs as part of the arts constituency for the purposes of my research. It is important to code each speaker in a way that identifies their ties to the arts community, the NEA, and the categories of importance to the research.

This form of coding allowed me to track messages that came from the arts constituency, while also tracking if particular messages, terms, or concepts were echoed in the constituency. This multilevel form of tracking also allowed me to see how many representatives from a particular portion of the arts constituency, or the OAC were present at each hearing. This type of coding accounts for the fact that individuals present in the hearings may represent more than one category of interest to my research. 159

Reauthorization hearings. Authorizing legislation for the NEA was used in the baseline rhetorical analysis for this study. Wyszomirski (1988) noted that reauthorization is related to, but decidedly different from, “the initial decision to authorize a program”

(p. 88). Although the authorization process identifies broad public policies, the reauthorization process is slightly narrower in scope, addressing decisions on public programs designed to address public policies initially addressed in the authorizing legislation. I have chosen to include transcripts from reauthorization hearings because they are noted as a “valuable source of insight into the politics and administration of public policy” (Mulcahy, 1988). Additionally, reauthorization hearings are a “forum for debating the nature of public arts policy” (Mulcahy, 1988). This is a broader view of public arts policy than that presented in appropriations hearings, which tend to focus on smaller issues and fiscal-year budgets rather than public arts funding as a whole.

Incorporating the testimony of those present, who were described by Mulcahy (1988) as

“the best organized and most politically self-conscious segments” of the arts subgovernment, added an additional layer to the information gleaned from the arts constituency’s agency documents and appropriations hearings (p. 68).

To gain additional insight into the chairs as policy entrepreneurs and rhetorical leaders, I incorporated information from biographies about their time as chairpersons of the NEA. Szczepanski (1962) defined biographical documents as texts “that represent the participation of the author in a specific social situation and his personal conception of this situation” (p. 556). Biddle and Frohnmayer have written nonfiction books about their respective tenures as NEA chairpersons. In the context of my data, these biographies were meant to highlight the chairperson’s intentions, thoughts, feelings, and perceptions

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of the various rhetorical circumstances they experienced. According to Kohli (1981), biographies are a privileged way to witness a historical or social reality (p. 64). Although

I expected some information about the chairperson’s process of rhetorical strategy construction to be provided in the rest of the data I selected to use, using the biographies added an additional element of the chairperson’s private thoughts, which would not be readily evident when they are operating in the policy arena. The reason I did not included the biographies with the rest of the data to be analyzed is because of “the literary danger inherent in this material,” described by (Ferrarotti, 1981), as the tendency to “interpret the specific biography as an absolute and irreducible destiny” (p. 19). Ferrarotti (1981) encouraged researchers using biographies to “try and connect individual biographies to the global characteristics of a precisely dated, experienced historical situation” (p. 19).

Using the biographies after the initial analysis, allowed me to add supplemental information to the stories that emerged from the aforementioned data. Investigating the biographies after the rest of the data is also a better way of illuminating any disconnections between the chairperson’s perception of the rhetorical situation and the constituency’s, without getting lost in the minor details of the research. This method helped to ensure a safe distance from the data. Although each chairperson’s particular situation was important to each specific case study, each case, and the use of life histories, did not aim at “individual particularities, but seeks to unravel what generalizable elements they [may] contain” (Kohli, 1981, p. 63).

Conclusion. All of the aforementioned data types collectively served the following purposes: (a) to demonstrate the types of advocacy argument used for and against public arts funding; (b) to provide information about how each chair, acting in the

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role as rhetorical leader, used, chose to ignore, or responded to certain advocacy arguments; and (c) to show how chairpersons’ use or avoidance of particular advocacy arguments affected their roles as policy entrepreneurs, by either increasing or decreasing the size and cohesiveness of the advocacy coalition. Each of these data types also display various types of rhetorical strategies that provided information about which strategies, arguments, or combinations of those two elements helped the chairperson succeed as a policy entrepreneur.

Codebook Construction

The resulting codebook was comprised of individual themes as the unit of analysis (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). These themes were used to create codes stemming from two broad categories: advocacy arguments and rhetorical strategies. Each of these categories was important in its own right. However, both were necessary to track the chairpersons as policy entrepreneurs and rhetorical leaders. The actual coding schema for each coding category was derived from previously related studies and theory-building works (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). After discussing the research on which the codes are based, I will discuss the methods I used to construct the codebook.

Advocacy argument codebook. The first step in developing the codebook for arguments was conducted as part of my preliminary study: examining successful arts- advocacy arguments during the creation and infancy of the NEA. These arguments, highlighted in the Establishing Framework chapter, helped establish a baseline for arts- advocacy arguments. In addition to uncovering information about arguments in favor of the NEA, the process of looking at advocacy arguments between 1962 and 1968 also helped identify arguments against public arts funding at the federal level. Knowledge of

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arguments against public arts funding, including some arguments in favor of the NEA with stipulations on actions that the NEA should and should not be authorized to make, helped recreate the policy climate public arts-funding advocates faced. These materials assisted in constructing codes for arguments against public arts funding.

After conducting my preliminary analysis, I compared my codes to those present in research conducted by others interested in arts-advocacy arguments (Strom & Cook,

2004). Strom and Cook (2004) used a codebook to conduct a content analysis of NEA appropriations hearings from 1965 to 2005. Their article noted arguments used in favor of public arts funding, with specific emphasis on arguments related to economic development. I combined elements of their codebook with information gathered from my initial investigation to establish a baseline of rationales for and against public arts funding.

Although other works discussed arguments for and against the NEA, the Strom and Cook article was most reliable in the context of my research for three main reasons. First, this research was conducted with a theoretical framework consisting mainly of Kingdon’s

(2003) concept of issue definitions. Use of issue definitions placed Strom and Cook’s work close to mine from a theoretical standpoint. Second, this work has been used by others in the field conducting work on arts-advocacy arguments for a variety of purposes

(Berkers, 2009; Toohey, 2007), lending credibility to its usefulness, and its validity in the field. Lastly, Strom and Cook’s codebook accounts for alterations in the arguments they tracked. Although these authors did not discuss why these arguments may have changed, they did note those changes when categorizing arguments over time.

The only drawback of Strom and Cook’s (2004) codebook is their focus on instrumental arguments. Instrumental arguments are those that have an easily identifiable

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outcome or result. This bias is understandable, as they were investigating arguments in the policy arena, where concrete, measurable examples are often required to convince policymakers of the benefits of a particular course of action. Intrinsic benefits are those that are inherent in the art experience that “adds value to people’s lives” (McCarthy, 2004, p. 37). Although intrinsic arguments are not likely to be used by themselves because their impact is difficult to measure, these arguments are often used in conjunction with instrumental arguments. Therefore, it is important to track these arguments as well. To account for intrinsic arguments, I used a report by the Rand Corporation, Gifts of the

Muse: Reframing the Debate about the Benefits of the Arts (McCarthy, Ondaatje, et al.,

2004). This report discussed instrumental arguments, but provided insight into the importance of intrinsic arguments to support public arts funding as well. By combining findings from previous research with findings from my preliminary investigation, I created a codebook for arts-advocacy arguments. Appendix A contains a complete list of arts-advocacy codes used in my data analysis.

Rhetorical-strategy codebook. Tracking advocacy arguments helped answer only a portion of my research question. Whereas advocacy arguments tell stories about what was said, coding rhetorical strategies tell stories about how it was said. Initial steps for creating the rhetorical-strategy codebook required an investigation of common strategies employed in policy rhetoric.

In addition to the strategic use of rhetorical devices, policy entrepreneurs also use language that is inclusive of their supporters while excluding the opposition. To increase their power in the policy arena, policy entrepreneurs must build their coalition while remaining politically salient and relevant to policymakers. This dual role makes the work

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of policy entrepreneurs not only about being a rhetorical strategist but also about maintaining the discourse of their context (the policy arena) and their subject (public arts funding; Gastil, 1992).

After creating codes based on theory documents, I incorporated a practical application of rhetorical strategy coding. In Policy Paradox, Stone (2002) demonstrated rhetorical strategies in use through case studies. First, Stone conducted an analysis that

“account[s] for where people get their images of the world” (p. xi). Second, the author

“recognizes problem statements and policy instruments as being political claims” (Stone,

2002, p. xii). Lastly, Stone used a way of analysis “equipped to recognize and formulate recurring arguments and counter-arguments” (2002, p. xii). Stone, working from a theoretical base closely aligned with my own, provided thorough investigations of symbols, the use of numbers, causes (issue definitions), interest statements, and rhetorical strategies associated with decisions. Stone’s theoretical similarities and work in other research related to mine (Bozeman, 2002; Lieberman, 2002) lent credibility to the process of incorporating coding schemas to help construct my own.

Validity. Qualitative content analysis differs from quantitative analysis in its ability to be judged based on traditional notions of validity. To address this issue, Lincoln and Guba (1985) presented criteria for evaluating interpretive research: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. Credibility refers to the “adequate representation of the constructions” of the phenomenon under study (Bradley, 1993). To achieve credibility a transparent process for data collection, coding, and drawing conclusions is necessary. Earlier in this chapter I discussed my process for data collection.

In the next section I will explain the way I used NVivo, a qualitative data-analysis

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software package, to help draw conclusions. Transferability refers to the applicability of the research hypotheses to different contexts. Transferability can be encouraged with rich descriptions of the data-analysis process. I discuss transparency and producing a fully documented research project in the NVivo section. Dependability is “the coherence of the internal process and the way the researcher accounts for changing conditions in the phenomena” (Bradley, 1993). Incorporating codes from the research of others, especially authors whose codes have been used by other researchers, increases the dependability of the coding schema. Confirmability, the “extent to which the characteristics of the data, as posited by the researcher, can be confirmed by others who read of review the research results” (Bradley, 1993, p. 437), is closely linked to replicability, which will also be discussed in the following NVivo section.

Introduction to NVivo

Conducting a study of scope can be a daunting task for a single researcher. Other studies of similar scope used a team of researchers, assistive software, or both. Due to financial constraints, it was not feasible to hire a team of research assistants to help with organizing, coding, and analyzing data. To conduct my research in a timely and efficient manner I chose to use a qualitative data-analysis software system known as NVivo.

NVivo is data-analysis software designed by QSR International, a UK-based company. Rather than being developed by individuals with no personal stake in the use of the software, producers included researchers, who used extensive feedback mechanisms to allow other qualitative researchers the space and freedom to provide detailed insights and criticisms about the software as it went through various developmental stages. NVivo is designed to support qualitative data analysis in five main ways:

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• Manage data: NVivo is commonly known for its ability to assist with the

organization of raw data files such as interviews, surveys/questionnaires, field

observations, and focus groups. Additionally, the software allows for the

organization of published research, various type of documents (including rich

text files, Word documents, and pdfs), pictures, audio recordings (such as

songs), sound bytes, and video recordings.

• Manage ideas: Bazeley (2007) noted: NVivo organize[s] and provide[s] rapid

access to conceptual and theoretical knowledge that has been generated in the

course of the study, as well as the data which supports it, while at the same

time retaining ready access to the context from which those data have come.

(p. 3)

• Search data: NVivo allows users to ask relatively simple (such as a word

frequency count) or extremely complex (such as the ideas associated with a

certain word) questions of the data. While answering whatever questions

researchers put to the data, the software retrieves all data from the project

database that contains information relevant to the query. The results of each

question are saved, facilitating further analysis of specific questions, as well

as analysis that involves a series of questions.

• Assist with visual models: Graphic models informed by NVivo help

researchers visually represent data such as the progression of ideas or

concepts as they emerge from the data and relationships between certain ideas

and concepts through the use of models and matrices.

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• Assist with data reporting: NVivo’s organizational capabilities make locating

information about and in the original data sources simple, allowing

researchers to readily recall information to assist in writing research findings.

The aforementioned uses of the software are conducted through the interaction of features specific to NVivo, outlined below:

! Node: An object in a project that represents anything users wish to reference

(e.g., a concept or idea).

! Attribute: A property assigned to nodes or documents for various variables

(e.g., gender).

! Coding: Sections of text in a document that are stored in nodes.

! Document: An editable rich text file.

! Intersection search: A type of search that finds passages in a document or

node that has all of the specified features.

! Union search: A type of search that finds passages in a document or node that

have any of the specified features.

Rationale for Choosing NVivo

My decision to use NVivo is based on application of a decision tree constructed in the literature (Auld et al., 2007). This decision tree asks questions about the amount of data, the structure of the data, and the level of analysis (from theme observation and tracking, to an in-depth investigation) the researcher envisions. My process is detailed in bold in Figure 23:

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What$is$the$ research$purpose?$

Theme$evolution$ Detailed(analysis( Do$analysis$by$ Do(analysis(using( hand$ NVivo(

Continue(to( STOP$ question(2(

Figure 23. Process for choosing NVivo.

Although part of my research resulted in information about theme evolution, the bulk of the research was focused on a detailed analysis of arts-advocacy arguments. Therefore, according to the decision tree by Auld et al., I did not need to perform my analysis by hand, and could continue to the next portion of the tree (see Figure 24):

How$much$time$will$ be$involved$to$get$a$ `inal$result?$

<$25$hours$ 25$<$60$hours$ >(60(hours( Do$analysis$by$hand$ Do$analysis$by$hand$ Do(analysis(using( unless$experienced$ with$NVivo$ or$with$NVivo$ NVivo(

Figure 24. Process of analysis in NVivo.

Knowing that this research process would be labor intensive led me to my decision to use

NVivo for my research.

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Methodological Issues

NVivo exists in the methodological realm of computer-assisted qualitative data- analysis software (CAQDAS). CAQDAS has been debated for its merits, limitations, and relative newness to researchers, dissertation committees, and thesis advisors. Bringer,

Brackenridge, and Johnston (2004) noted, “the key issue being debated is whether

CAQDAS changes the way analysis is conducted and to what extent it enhances or detracts from the quality of qualitative research” (p. 4).

Method homogeneity is a concern of qualitative researchers who fear that

CAQDAS, including NVivo, would push qualitative researchers into doing faulty quantitative analysis, or facilitate the production of qualitative research that lacks rigor.

One example is content analysis. Content analysis is a methodology that has both qualitative and quantitative facets. Qualitative researchers using NVivo to conduct content analysis may be influenced to conduct superficial quantitative content analysis, using NVivo to “transform qualitative research into a rigid, automated analysis of text”

(Bringer et al., 2004). Directly related to this issue is the fear of data loss. Qualitative researchers in the social sciences have always lauded their research methods for their richness, and their ability to paint a robust picture of the matter they are researching. Data loss due to quantification of data meant to be investigated through qualitative methods is a concern that has always been an issue, but has returned to the forefront with the debates over CAQDAS. Although quantifying data is an appropriate use of NVivo, “it becomes problematic when researchers misrepresent their analysis” (Bringer et al., 2004). Some argue that these fears are unfounded, stating that CAQDAS “serves to facilitate an accurate and transparent data analysis process whilst also providing a quick and simple

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way of counting who said what and when, which in turn, provides a reliable, general picture of the data” (Morison & Moir, 1998; Richards & Richards, 1994; Welsh, 2007, para. 4).

One of the most significant benefits of NVivo is the ability to rule out human error. Although the coding parameters are determined by humans, once that information is input into the system, there is no human error in the coding of material. This matter alone significantly increases the reliability of qualitative research projects. However, the software does not replace actual work on the part of the researcher. Although researchers may search for the number of times a word, such as “excellence,” is used in reference to the arts funded by the NEA, and receive an accurate count from the software, there is still work to be done. Although the software has the capability to search for synonyms of the word “excellence” and include (or exclude) those in the count, there are times when related concepts, such as “quality” are important. “Quality” is not a word commonly associated with synonyms for “excellence,” yet, in the context of my research, it is one.

Therefore, as the researcher, it is my responsibility to include this information in the search parameters for the software. This type of analysis can only be done by the researcher and includes a thorough reading of related literature and knowledge of the data.

Although I do understand this fully, my particular topic and data help to avoid some of this issue. Rhetoric, particularly advocacy rhetoric, is inherently repetitive. Its main goal is to infuse a small set of words with meanings that are easily recalled by politicians, media outlets, and voters. Therefore, finding those important words will be the bulk of the work. Discerning how arts advocates express themselves will be the key factors in the successful use of NVivo software. It is still important to note that searches in NVivo need

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to be “married with manual scrutiny techniques so that the date are in fact thoroughly interrogated” (Welsh, 2007, para. 7).

One shortcoming of the software is that researchers only see sorted coding segments of data, which prevents them from getting a true feel for the data. This drawback may prevent researchers from making valid inferences and conclusions. I alleviated some of this issue by obtaining personal accounts from former NEA chairs and other individuals close to the cases I have identified. In addition to inputting data from these personal accounts into NVivo, the personal experience of reading, rereading, and reviewing the data prevented me from getting lost in the data without any sense of personal “feel” for my project. The personal accounts were gathered from biographies written by the chairpersons themselves.

Although some researchers have lamented that NVivo causes a “distance” to emerge between the researcher and their data, the opposite can be true. Instead, researchers may become “too close” to their data, resulting in an endless code and retrieval cycle. Many novice researchers fall into this trap, obsessively coding the data without taking the time to reflect on what the data is actually saying. In a series of interviews with qualitative researchers, Gilbert (1999) found that there are three levels of data closeness: the tactile–digital divide, the coding trap, and the metacognitive shift. The tactile–digital divide refers to researchers who are wholly uncomfortable working with a computer screen instead of paper. These researchers are unlikely to take advantage of

NVivo or any other CAQDAS, and therefore miss out on getting “closer” to their data with the resources provided by the software program. The coding trap, which was briefly referenced earlier, refers to researchers who have gotten so close to the data they are

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unable to conduct worthwhile research, and instead offer very detailed notes about the phenomenon they are researching. The metacognitive shift happens when researchers have an appropriate amount of distance from the data. Those who experience the metacognitive shift are able to code the data, and pause to consider the information and fully analyze it. Gilbert argued that progression through these levels to the metacognitive shift occurs as researchers adapt toward more confident use of the software. Therefore, the earlier in the research process NVivo is used, the more time is allowed for the researcher to grow comfortable using the software, facilitating progression to the metacognitive shift.

One of the most important methodological issues with using NVivo is the difficulty of maintaining transparency during the research process, especially during the writing and reporting processes. Richards (2002) warned that use of CAQDAS may, and often will be questioned, and that it will be necessary for researchers using these methods to provide a detailed rationale for why and how these methods were used. In the reporting process, researchers are encouraged to “record key decisions, reflections, emergent ideas, and hunches” allowing researchers to “gain the necessary analytical distance often lacking in qualitative projects” (Gilbert, 2002; Johnston, 2006, p. 387; Seale, 2002). Due to NVivo’s multitude of available functions, it is important for researchers to note which ones were used and how (Bringer et al., 2004).

Related to the process of keeping a research journal is maintaining a detailed audit trail. The audit trail helps maintain the validity of the project, as well as facilitating the process of writing analysis for publication. Furthermore, the audit trail ensures that the

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project could be replicated by another researcher. Both the research journal and the audit trail are imperative for the successful use of NVivo.

Overall, the strongest benefits of NVivo include its ability to organize data and allow researchers to analyze data at a particular level. The importance of NVivo is that, because it facilitates organization of low- to mid-level analysis, it can “improve the rigor of the analysis process by validating (or not) some of the researcher’s own impression of the data” allowing the researcher to quickly and effectively reach a point where deeper analysis is possible (Welsh, 2007, para. 12). Welsh (2007) left researchers with the following message, resulting from the debates over the use of CAQDAS:

It is important that researchers recognize the value of both manual and electronic

tools in qualitative data analysis and management and do not reify one over the

other but instead remain open to, and make use of, the advantages of both. (para.

12)

To create coding schemas, nodes, and queries grounded in theory, I ensured I hand-coded portions of the data, rather than relying solely on NVivo.

Documenting NVivo Use

When choosing what information to include in a discussion about the use of

NVivo, Bringer et al. (2004) noted the importance of considering the audience for the research and the tasks for which the program would be used. I provided a detailed account of my decision-making process regarding whether to use NVivo. This was done to demonstrate that my choice to use the program was appropriate. Bazeley (2007) summed the main purposes for using NVivo to assist with qualitative data analysis

(pp. 2–3):

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• Manage data—to organize and keep track of the many records that go into

making a qualitative project. These might include not just raw data filed from

interviews, but also published research, other documentary sources, rough

notes and ideas jotted into memoranda, information about data sources, and

conceptual maps of transpiring in the data.

• Manage ideas—to organize and provide rapid access to conceptual and

theoretical knowledge that has been generated in the course of the study, as

well as the data that supports it, while retaining ready access to the context

from which those data have come.

• Query data—to ask simple or complex questions of the data, and have the

program retrieve from its database all information relevant to determining an

answer to those questions. Results of queries are saved to allow further

interrogation; querying or searching becomes part of an ongoing inquiry

process.

• Graphically model—to show cases, ideas, or concepts being built from the

data, and the relationships between them, and to present those ideas and

conclusions in visual displays using models and matrices.

• Report from the data—use contents of the qualitative database, including

information about and in the original data sources, the ideas and knowledge

developed from them, and the process by which these outcomes were reached.

Bringer et al. (2004) strongly encouraged a detailed account of the ways NVivo was used throughout the research process, to permit examiners without an extensive knowledge of the program to determine whether its use was proper and effective. An 175

account of my use of NVivo is a part of maintaining transparency, a necessary component of accountability. The process of setting up a project and inputting the chosen data into the program, as well as the processes of conducting searches and developing coding categories were included for each case I examined.

Each data chapter also discusses if and how coding categories evolved. These discussions include quotations from the data to demonstrate the conceptual development of the resulting categories. This is especially important because both functions assist with axial coding, an important process used to investigate and explore relationships between categories and the central theme. It is necessary to discuss the axial-coding scheme for each case because the central theme for each case will vary. An integral part of my research includes use of a codebook, which I have constructed through a preliminary analysis of rhetoric used to create the NEA, along with a review of literature that included analyses of arts-advocacy arguments and policy rhetoric. NVivo has emerged as the most effective means of applying a codebook to analyze my data.

Using NVivo I tracked advocacy arguments coming from various actors in the arts subgovernment. Although information about the structure and use of arguments for and against public arts funding is valuable to the progression of advocacy arguments, I investigated these arguments as part of a larger research agenda. Because I am specifically interested in chairpersons of the NEA as policy entrepreneurs, judging each chairperson’s ability to navigate policy entrepreneurship is the ultimate goal. To accomplish this goal, I assessed multiple sources of data.

Assessing each policy entrepreneur includes additional tasks like assessing the argument strength of the advocacy coalition, OAC, and the chair. I devised a method of

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making these assessments, which I categorized into an argument scorecard and a policy- entrepreneur scorecard. Assessing the arguments used by actors in the policy arena included answering the following questions:

• Does the argument incorporate the desires of multiple facets of the advocacy

coalition? The general public?

• Does the argument build on accepted premises?

• Is the argument used in conjunction with other arguments?

• Is the argument multifaceted? Are there subarguments?

• Does the argument address criticisms? Or concerns from the OAC?

The policy-entrepreneur scorecard consists of the following process: for each chairperson I compared argument assessments from the chair with those from the advocacy coalition to determine if the chairperson is operating in coordination with, or in opposition to, the advocacy coalition. I also compared the chairperson’s argument- response assessments to the argument assessment of the OAC. Those two comparisons allowed me to then assess the chairperson’s overall ability to respond to their specific agency and policy context. Based on my conceptual framework I concluded that effective policy entrepreneurs seek to accomplish the following:

• Broaden and/or strengthen their advocacy coalition.

• Deflect attacks from the OAC.

• Further the policy entrepreneur’s interpretation of agency goals.

With information from the argument scorecard, I assessed each chairperson based on their ability to accomplish the above tasks.

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Conclusion

In this chapter, I outlined my method of assessing chairpersons of the NEA as policy entrepreneurs. I began this assessment by tracking and assessing advocacy arguments used by members of the arts subgovernment, including the OAC. To facilitate this assessment, I used the qualitative data-analysis software, NVivo. Use of this software lessened the burden of organizing, coding, and analyzing data. After reviewing the uses of NVivo, I discussed how tracking advocacy arguments allowed me to assess the interactions between various groups in the policy arena. This assessment then allowed me to analyze each chairperson’s ability to navigate and manage those interactions in ways that further the purposes of the NEA.

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Chapter 6: Biddle—Access to the Best

This first full case study is an investigation of Biddle, third chairperson of the

NEA, as a policy entrepreneur. The analysis of this case was done with information and insight gathered from both the Timeline and Establishing Framework chapters. That information, coupled with coding categories created with the assistance of previous research (Strom & Cook, 2004) allowed me to discern the concerns of all the players involved in the issue of public arts funding during the years 1979–1981: policymakers, the arts constituency, and the chairperson, to assess Biddle’s ability to facilitate and manage policy change.

During the years investigated for this case, 1979–1981, the United States was suffering from inflation, rising unemployment, and higher taxes. These circumstances prompted those with jobs to work more hours and find additional employment, and continued the necessity for women to enter the workplace in larger numbers than previously recorded. All of this resulted in a loss of the leisure time and financial prosperity that were sources of pride during the time frame considered in the Establishing

Framework chapter.

Data Selection

To track the concerns of the arts constituency I used a collection of hearings that incorporated multiple facets of the arts constituency. These hearings were an opportunity for “artists and other persons knowledgeable about the arts to identify many of those

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issues facing the cultural life” of the nation (White House conference on the arts, 1978, p.

6). Although packaged as one source, these hearings took place throughout the country.

Additionally, there was testimony from many facets of the arts constituency, including artists, arts administrators, public arts-agency professionals, representatives from corporations, arts educators, and foundation staff, making this source rich with information from various perspectives professionally and geographically. I also investigated articles in The New York Times and The Washington Post for sentiments leading up to and during Biddle’s time as chair. Research from the arts-advocacy coalition included AFTA and public arts agencies (American Arts Alliance, 1981). AFTA provided detailed information on current public opinion on the arts as well as information on how that opinion has changed from the start of the NEA. Public arts agencies provided information about the various levels of government involvement in arts funding and offered recommendations for the NEA. This data subset satisfied requirements from the

ACF in that they provided views from all facets that comprise the arts constituency and incorporate research and technical information.

To track Biddle’s rationales, I used the chairperson’s statements from annual reports. I also used research reports stemming from the agency during Biddle’s tenure.

These sources, because they come with the authority of the agency, address both

Kingdon’s MS (1995) and the ACF’s view of research in that they provided both information for rationales and material on which to base issue definitions and solutions.

To supplement the aforementioned material, I incorporated Biddle’s biography addressing the issue of public arts funding—Our Government and the Arts: A Perspective from the Inside (1988)—into the analysis portion of this chapter. This source helped

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contextualize the information gathered from other chairperson sources as well as appropriations hearings.

Finally, to track all of the important players I analyzed appropriations hearings from FY79, FY80, and FY81. The hearings demonstrate how rationales and rhetorical strategies are used by the arts constituency, the chair, and policymakers in the policy arena. Because appropriations hearings are considered an example of an open policy window, this source satisfied my need to look at the way rationales and rhetorical strategies are employed in the context of an open policy window.

Players

During this time frame, the OAC was not an organized coalition based on the standards set by the ACF. Individuals opposed to public arts funding did not have a clearly established agenda with rhetoric separate from other groups in the arts subgovernment. In fact, much of the criticism leveled at Biddle came from supporters of public arts funding: artists, arts administrators, or policymakers who not only supported public arts funding, but Biddle as well. Therefore, criticism of Biddle and the agency will be addressed as it occurred in the data from other players, rather than under the heading of an OAC.

Presidents. This timeframe saw two distinct presidents, each of whom created vastly different rhetorical contexts for the NEA chair. The first, President Carter, was generally supportive of the arts and the NEA. Vice President Mondale, and Mondale’s spouse offered additional support from the executive branch. Although the NEA did not receive special treatment during the Carter administration, a generally supportive context did allow the chairperson to focus on other aspects of policy entrepreneurship. That

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context changed when Carter lost the 1980 reelection bid to Reagan. President Reagan quickly identified the NEA in his sweeping reforms intended to cut government spending.

This significantly altered the context in which the NEA was operating. Under Reagan, the

NEA and its chair had to fight for its continued existence.

Policymakers. Policymakers were operating in a more fiscally restrained context than policymakers in office during the creation of the NEA. Still, the beginning of

Biddle’s time as chairperson enjoyed a relatively supportive Congress. Many of the important players described in the Establishing Framework chapter were still present, creating a continuity of support in the appropriations committees. Additionally, Biddle’s longtime boss and friend, Pell, continued to chair the agency’s Senate appropriations committee. As with the presidency, the structure of Congress shifted significantly after the 1980 elections. Whereas the Democrats enjoyed a majority in the early years of

Biddle’s term, they lost their majority to the Republicans in the Senate in 1981.

The arts constituency. Between the end of the timeframe investigated for the

Establishing Framework (1967) and the start of this timeframe (1979), the arts constituency experienced a surge of professionalization. There was a strong increase in the number and substance of advocacy efforts as members of the arts constituency became familiar with operating in the policy arena. An important addition to the arts constituency during this time was the creation of NASAA. NASAA was largely responsible for the professionalization of SAAs, providing the space for agency directors to share information and best practices. This organization also served as an advocacy outlet. There were advances in discipline-based organizations as well. The existence of public funding, and the additional funds from foundations, state and local governments,

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and corporations prompted apprenticeships, new works, and other professionalization activities. Among members of the arts constituency, there was a consensus that the arts were increasing in importance across the nation, suggesting that public-awareness issues mentioned in the Establishing Framework chapter were being addressed.

The NEA. Although the NEA is represented by the chairperson, the agency has a history distinct from each chairperson that incorporates the experiences of previous chairs.

The first chairperson of the NEA, Stevens, was responsible for setting up the agency after its establishment. This required Stevens to initiate organization, because there was no precedent to follow. The agency’s small size allowed Stevens the freedom to find the agency’s footing. Hanks took on the role, expanding on the foundation built by Stevens.

Under Hanks the appropriations levels and the size of the agency, in both staff and programs, grew. These two chairpersons saw the NEA through its creation and infancy, leaving it as a fully established agency.

Hanks served a total of 8 years, during which time the agency’s appropriations increased from $8 million to $114.6 million. Hanks was commended for institutionalizing and growing the agency, but rumors suggested that Hanks wielded much more control in the National Council on the Arts and in Congress than was openly admitted (Mulcahy &

Wyszomirski, 1995). At the end of Hanks’s tenure, critics claimed Hanks had become bigger than the agency, likening Hanks to Hoover. While it was stated that Hanks had hopes of a third term as chairperson of the NEA, Pell and Brandemas (D-IN) clearly stated they would not endorse a third term for any chair. In addition, some noted it was desirable to have a Democrat at the helm of the agency during Carter’s administration.

After Carter took office, Biddle succeeded Hanks as the third chairperson of the NEA.

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Biddle inherited an institution that has grown considerably in available funds and visibility since the agency’s creation. Biddle also inherited an organization under much more scrutiny than at first.

Biddle was born to a prominent, wealthy family in Philadelphia, what many would refer to as “old money.” As a youth Biddle attended preparatory school in Rhode

Island and later attended collage at Princeton. Biddle had a classmate, Pell, at both institutions. Biddle’s professional life included time as an author, work at Fordham

University, and time as an arts administrator with the Pennsylvania Ballet. Biddle “had both political and artistic credentials” (Mulcahy & Wyszomirski, 1995, p. 155). Biddle served as Senator Pell’ s (D-RI) staff director at the Subcommittee for Education, Arts, and Humanities. In that capacity, the chair helped draft the original 1965 legislation creating both the Endowments for the Arts and the Humanities. Biddle was also intimately involved in the start of the NEA, serving briefly as NEA Deputy under Stevens and starting in 1974, as the first congressional liaison under Hanks.

In the time leading up to the nomination and subsequent confirmation hearing,

Biddle’s qualifications were met with mixed emotions. Biddle and colleagues in the policy arena saw Biddle’s background as uniquely qualified for the position. However, the term “professional arts bureaucrat” was used in a derogatory way, demonstrating disdain for what was perceived as an overpolitization of the arts. These sentiments were part of a populism/elitism debate that began under Hanks’s time as chair. During Hanks’s tenure, members of the arts constituency became concerned about the types of art being funded by the NEA. They argued that there was an elitist slant to the grants awarded.

This argument was based on the assumption that certain types of art were perceived to be

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superior to others. Members of the arts constituency worried that government funding was dictating the types of art that were considered acceptable. Proponents of the elitism argument believed clearly defined art forms were important, and that traditional aesthetic standards were the criterion to which all NEA grants should be held. Proponents of the populist side advocated for a wider notion of artistic merit, including more diverse art forms and aesthetic considerations. At a time when the populism/elitism debate was burgeoning, Biddle’s “aristocratic background,” being of the “Philadelphia Biddles”

(Allen, 1977) was considered a negative attribute by some, especially those who considered his known ally, Pell, an elitist (Richard, 1977).

Despite criticism over Biddle’s nomination from some members of the arts constituency and the general public, Biddle had support in the SAA arena. It was insinuated that the SAAs favored Biddle over Hanks because Hanks was preventing them from playing a more significant role in guiding policy (Friedman, 1977). Support from art education and arts labor organizations, while demonstrating support from the arts constituency, was also seen as the increasing “politicization” of the arts (Friedman, 1977).

Finally, Biddle did not receive an endorsement but did receive encouragement from

Stevens, the first chairperson of the NEA. Although Stevens did express concern that there was an “unfortunate drift toward bureaucracy” in the NEA and stated that Biddle may not be the person to “stop [the] drift,” Stevens criticized The New York Times for denigrating the status of the arts and the NEA and providing “justification for actions inimical to the arts” (1977). Stevens concluded with a request that everyone “give

Livingston Biddle a chance to prove what he can do … without criticizing him before he even arrives at his desk” (1977).

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Confirmation Hearing

Biddle’s confirmation hearing with the committee on human resources took place in front of a friend, Senator Pell, and others who knew Biddle through his previous work as Senator Pell’s special assistant. Although Biddle’s multifaceted experience as an artist and arts administrator was commended, it was previous work as Deputy Chair under

Stevens and as Congressional Liaison for Hanks that garnered the most praise and support. Senator Randolph noted, “you will bring to the Endowment a deep understanding of how our Government operates” (95th Congress First Session Senate

Committee on Human Resources, 1977, p. 3). The same qualifications that prompted calls of politicization from the arts constituency were lauded in the policy arena. This indicates awareness, at least on the part of the politicians in the arts subgovernment, that the role of the NEA chairperson was one that required knowledge of government norms and processes. After a chair who was not well-versed in the political realm (Stevens) and a long-time chair who had some knowledge of government inner workings but relied more on personal connections (Hanks), Biddle appeared as a nominee with firsthand knowledge of the intersection between government and the arts, who could navigate some of the recent storms suffered by the agency.

Biddle’s confirmation hearing and the press surrounding it focused on partnership

20 (33%), access 11 (18%), quality 8 (14%), government control 6 (10%), elitism/populism 6 (10%), diversified patronage 6 (10%), and public awareness 3 (5%)

(see Figure 25).

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Partnership$(20)$ 5%$ Government$Control$(6)$ 18%$ 33%$ Diversi`ied$Patronage$ (6)$ Elitism/Populism$(6)$ 14%$

Quality$(8)$ 10%$ 10%$ 10%$ Access$(11)$

Figure 25. Issues discussed at Biddle’s confirmation hearing.

Six of the seven categories can be placed into two broad groupings:

Responsibility of funding the arts and standards of grantmaking. Partnership, government control, and diversified patronage would be housed under the responsibility of the funding the arts group. These arguments all dealt with some aspect of funding responsibility. Government control and the safeguards against it were discussed as means of preventing the government from having total control of arts funding in the ideological sense. Partnerships were encouraged to ensure that multiple agencies at the federal, state, and local levels helped to fund the arts. Finally, diversified patronage was discussed as a means of spreading the responsibility across sectors.

After coding for each issue discussed during Biddle’s confirmation hearing, ideational analysis was conducted to see which rationale Biddle used for each argument.

Finally, word-frequency programming was run to see which words were used to make specific arguments (see Table 7).

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In a statement to the committee, Biddle started off by emphasizing the importance of the concept of partnerships for the agency. Biddle used the word “partnership” to build on rationales seen in the Establishing Framework chapter to adapt them to the new context of the agency. Biddle used the world to demonstrate public involvement, stressing it as “a provision basic to freedom of expression and the creative spirit of the arts” (95th Congress First Session Senate Committee on Human Resources, 1977, p. 7).

In the Establishing Framework chapter, partnership was used when discussing diversified patronage, where the government was described as a partner in a funding mix alongside private and nonprofit sources. In these hearings Biddle used partnership to refute allegations of government control of the arts. In either case, partnership was considered a powerful concept in its ability to rhetorically distance the agency and its practices from the concept of control. When partnership is used in conjunction with diversified patronage, it is done with the intent to assuage fears about government being in sole control of funding the arts. Here, Biddle used it to assuage fears of government controlling what types of art receive funding.

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Table 7

Word-Frequency Analysis of Biddle’s Confirmation Hearing

Argument Rationale Keywords

Access (18%) Everyone should have access to the Access; Availability arts

Public awareness The public should understand and Visibility; Justify (5%) appreciate what the NEA does

Government The founding principles of the NEA Politicizing; Freedom of control (10%) were designed to ensure that expression, Creative spirit government control would never of the arts occur

Diversified Government funding is supposed to Catalyst patronage (10%) generate funding from other (namely, private) sources

Partnership Partnering with other government Encourage; Unity (20%) agencies at various levels is the best way to avoid NEA control of the arts

Quality (14%) The best standard for determining Best; Development grants is quality

Elitism/populism Grants should be made to a variety of Quality; Access (10%) arts forms and artists (based on quality). The granting process should not just benefit a select few, nor should it cater solely to the general public

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To that end, Biddle reiterated the process of private citizens making decisions for how grants are awarded: “The law insures that the Endowment is guided by a council of private citizens, who, together with the private citizen panelists, form the basis of the decision making process on applications for support” (95th Congress First Session Senate

Committee on Human Resources, 1977, p. 7). Although the intended meaning of partnerships shifted from the Establishing Framework context to this context, Biddle’s discussion of diversified patronage is consistent with use of the concept in its previous iteration. Biddle touted the importance of diversified patronage, saying that the federal role is to encourage other sources of funding and support: “the Federal role is as a catalyst” (95th Congress First Session Senate Committee on Human Resources, 1977, p. 12). By repeating information, such as terms like catalyst, while adding premises, such as the partnerships as a safeguard from government control, Biddle was employing the rhetorical strategy of aggregation. Because the Congresspersons present at the hearing established themselves as allies who believed in Biddle’s abilities in the policy arena, aggregation was a particularly useful strategy. Biddle went on to discuss concerns that

“the arts may be subject to politicizing” (95th Congress First Session Senate Committee on Human Resources, 1997, p. 8). In this particular context, politicizing was equated with the thought that arts funding would only benefit elite organizations, and by extension the elite minority that could afford to attend performances at those organizations. Politicizing during this time was also related to concerns that policymakers would have undue influence on grantmaking procedures. Biddle directly addressed both manifestations of that concern by stating that, as one of the parties responsible for drafting the original legislation, Biddle was sure to include safeguards against that very concern: “I think it is

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well to stress that these matters were of deep concern years ago, that they were carefully considered in the context of a precedent-setting law, and that essential safeguards were written into that law” (95th Congress First Session Senate Committee on Human

Resources, 1977, p. 8). This demonstrates Biddle’s ability to understand and incorporate concerns of the subgovernment, as well as the ability to address those concerns prior their escalation into a crisis. When it came to the original legislation, and the intent behind it,

Biddle was operating from a place of authority. As an author of that legislation, any argument Biddle made about the legislation’s intent were going to be difficult to refute.

When asked how Biddle would take on the role of chair, Biddle noted his enthusiasm and referenced the work of two predecessors, Stevens and Hanks, in ways that portrayed their actions as successes that Biddle would continue in the name of the agency. As part of the challenges Biddle was tasked with, Senator Randolph stated that the public needs to understand the impact of the NEA’s work, and charged Biddle with

“an increasing responsibility to justify what [the NEA] is doing” (95th Congress First

Session Senate Committee on Human Resources, 1977, p. 12). Although this argument was made primarily by members of the arts constituency in the Establishing Framework case, it was now coming from policymakers. The need for the general public to value the arts and public arts funding had moved from being a concern of the arts constituency seeking public assistance, to being a concern of policymakers who wanted their general constituency to support and value the impact of public arts funding. Biddle addressed that concern by making a multifaceted argument of increased demand, layering information about increasing demand for the arts with the increasing need and importance of the agency, with numerical information on the increased number of arts institutions and

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audiences. Biddle created a clear logic path leading to a demonstrated need for the NEA:

“as these institutions grow, so do their needs grow, and so does the importance of the

National Endowment [for the Arts]” (95th Congress First Session Senate Committee on

Human Resources, 1977, p. 13).

In the confirmation hearing, while setting the stage for Biddle’s tenure as chair,

Biddle explicitly placed “emphasis on both the ‘access’ and the ‘best’” (95th Congress

First Session Senate Committee on Human Resources, 1977, p. 13). Policymaker support was evidenced when Senator Randolph (D-WV) stressed that rural areas now had access to the arts, implicitly noting that, prior to the NEA there were few arts opportunities in rural parts of the country. The implication credits the NEA with facilitating access to the arts in rural, as well as metropolitan, areas (95th Congress First Session Senate

Committee on Human Resources, 1977, p. 10).

Prior to becoming the third NEA chair, Biddle had to contend with the public perception of the nomination as well as speculation about how Biddle would act as chair.

Compared to the highly public tenure of Hanks, who was presented as polished, Biddle was sometimes portrayed as a slightly sloppy person who did not fit with most people’s notions of a Washington insider: “a man no one could ever pick out in a crowd” (Allen,

1977, para. 3). However, given a background in the policy arena, it was implied that

Biddle could be successful with Congress, perhaps more so than predecessors. Indeed,

Hanks’s ties to policymakers were always stronger with President Nixon than Congress, especially near the end of Hanks’s tenure. Biddle deflected criticism about the nomination and charges of politicization with facts about the NEA’s enabling legislation and Biddle’s plans for the agency. By staying above the fray, Biddle demonstrated

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communications savvy in times of potential crisis, a skill Biddle would use at crucial times during Biddle’s tenure as chair.

Tenure overview. Immediately after taking on the role of chair, Biddle began to make changes, restructuring the agency, naming three deputy chairs for

Intergovernmental Activities, Policy and Planning, and Programs, and placed a 5-year limit on the amount of time program directors could serve. Previously, there was only one deputy chairman and unlimited terms of service for program directors. Biddle shifted the agency into a discipline-based structure, and created programs for Folk Arts, the Office of Minority Concerns, and an Office for Special Constituencies. Biddle also formalized the role of the National Council on the Arts and created smaller committees for specialized tasks. The justification for these changes focused on the desire to stay current with trends in the field, and to avoid any one person from becoming the “face” of the agency. These actions were in direct opposition to the tenure of Hanks, who was criticized for becoming bigger than the organization itself. The changes Biddle made to the agency were in alignment with the things discussed in the confirmation hearing.

Biddle sought to create a more transparent agency, which directly relates to Biddle’s political savvy. The chair also sought to create an agency that was more inclusive

(access).

During Biddle’s tenure, Biddle benefitted from an alliance with Vice President

Mondale’s spouse, who was a champion of the arts, affectionately known as “Joan of Art.”

Mondale used the position to become a formidable lobbyist for artists and arts organizations. Between Biddle, “Joan of Art,” and a generally supportive Congress, the

NEA saw appropriations increase as shown in Table 8.

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Table 8

Appropriation Increases by Year

Fiscal year Appropriation amount

FY78 $123,850,000

FY79 $149,585,000

FY80 $154,610,000

FY81 $158,795,000

Note. Adapted from NEA Appropriations History, by National Endowment for the Arts, 2011, retrieved from http://www.nea.gov/about/Budget/AppropriationsHistory.html

Due to previous experience in the policy arena, Biddle was well versed in communicating with Congress (Mulcahy & Wyszomirski, 1995; Zeigler, 1994). Biddle did, however, experience some difficulty when Representative Yates (D-IL), became chair of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on the Interior and Related Agencies

(the congressional subcommittee responsible for the NEA’s annual appropriation). Upon becoming chair, Yates authorized an investigation of the agency and its application review process. Unbeknown to Representative Yates, staff members released a scathing report of the agency (Biddle, 1988). This was especially surprising to Biddle, because

Yates was a known supporter of the NEA. Although Biddle responded to the report in writing, according to the behavioral norms of the policy arena, Yates buried the report with the acknowledgement that attacking the agency was not what was intended (Zeigler,

1994). This example demonstrates that, although the agency did have room to improve, it still enjoyed strong support with congressional members of the arts advocacy coalition.

In the latter years of Biddle’s tenure, there was a change in agency context when

Reagan became President. Running on a platform of fiscal conservatism, Reagan made 194

calls to eliminate the politicization of the arts that had presumably taken place under

Carter. This situation presented Biddle with a new administration to navigate.

Additionally, long-time supporters in Congress such as Senators Pell (D-RI) and Javits

(R-NY), as well as Representatives Thompson (D-NJ) and Brademas (D-IN) were no longer in the position to help the agency. Having lost their reelection bids Senator Pell lost the chair of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee when Republicans won the majority in the Senate. President Reagan appointed a task force to help diffuse the outcry caused by the attempt to completely defund the NEA. It is important to note that Hanks was included on this task force. Biddle, with the help of the generally supportive task force, was able to weather proposed budget cuts of 50%, minimizing the damage to only a 10% cut for FY82: $143,456,000 (NEA). Despite drastic changes to the policy context near the end of Biddle’s time as chair, the majority of the chair’s work was spent putting

Biddle’s slogan, “access to the best,” into practice. At the conclusion of Biddle’s tenure, it was the commitment to access, “encouraging arts in rural and nonmetropolitan areas” that was honored as noted by policymakers like Representative Murtha (D-PA; 1981).

Concerns of the Arts Subgovernment

The arts constituency. There were many issues of importance to individual artists, arts administrators, and arts educators, as well as members of the general public.

The data stemming from the arts constituency focused on access (31%), increased demand (21%), government control of the arts (18%), economic impact (15%), quality

(8%), and art education (7%; see Figure 26).

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60$

50$ 48$

40$ 33$

30$ 28$ 23$

20$ 12$ 11$ 10$

0$ Access$(31%)$ Increased$ Government$ Economic$ Quality$(8%)$Art$Education$ Demand$ Control$of$the$Impact$(15%)$ (7%)$ (21%)$ Arts$(18%)$

Figure 26. Concerns of the arts constituency while Biddle was chair.

After coding the data for the specific arguments used, I was then able to conduct word-frequency investigations for each category to see which words, or rhetorical indicators, were more frequently used to discuss each issue (see Table 9).

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Table 9

Word-Frequency Investigations by Category

Argument Keywords

Access Access(ability); Rural;

Increased Demand Increases; Demand; Needs

Government control of the arts Politicization; Bureaucracy

Economic impact Generating; Creates

Quality Quality; Standard

Art education No Key Words

Access. This time frame (1979–1981) ushered an increase in the number of arguments under the umbrella of access. The issue of access was addressed many different ways in the arts constituency. The most common form of access arguments were geographic, as in the Establishing Framework time frame. However, the issue of minority access to the arts, as well as different levels of access to NEA funds, also became a part of the access discussion. The Americans and the Arts (1981) report not only identified information about people who were already engaged with the arts, they also discovered that many individuals without easy access to the arts would attend if accessibility were increased. The desire for more arts in more areas was expressed throughout the report, demonstrating that, although geographic access was previously an issue, it had not been satisfactorily addressed according to arts audiences. A Foundation Grant Coordinator expressed that: “programs of the NEA have not really filtered down to the small towns” and that “larger institutions [have not] fully explored or kept up support of arts outreach 197

to the small towns” (White House conference on the arts, 1978, p. 12). A southwest artist noted, the “Southwest [has been] given little money for the arts, and one consequence is that the East Coast is too little aware of the art and culture of the Southwest” (White

House conference on the arts, 1978, pp. 9–10). Not only does this speak to concerns of geographic access, it also highlights another issue of access: access to NEA funding.

Additional sections of the Americans and the Arts (1981) report noted that responses from arts audiences “swept away the conventional insight that art was the exclusive domain of an elite minority” (p. i). The survey also found that the number of people who thought the arts were for everyone (59%) was an increase over the number of people that felt that way in 1975 (48%), providing evidence that public perception of the arts was changing. This is linked to the issue of economic access to the arts, as the elite minority referenced were wealthy patrons. Although views about the elite nature of the arts was changing among arts audiences, it was still a significant concern among artists and arts organizations that worried about how elitism was affecting funding decisions at the NEA. This concern demonstrates a division in the arts constituency between those who produced and presented the arts and arts audiences. This dichotomy may be because the two groups were addressing slightly different issues. Whereas arts audiences were concerned about economic access to performances and arts experiences, artists and arts administrators were concerned about the particular types of art being funded and presented. There was some concern that only larger arts institutions were being funded by the NEA in its early years. This was also noted by the chairperson of Concerned Citizens for the Arts of New York State who stated, “support should not discriminate between large and small, for all arts activities are affected by the same forces. Problems are the

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same everywhere” (White House conference on the arts, 1978, p. 18), and the Manager of

Miami Beach Symphony: “[There is a] developing problem of funding being given only to larger institutions” (White House conference on the arts, 1978, p. 21). This trend was also being noted at the state level where, “very like the [NEA], the greater portion of funds generally are awarded to established arts institutions” (American Arts Alliance,

1981, p. 7). In addition to being related to access, this issue was directly related to the elitism/populism debate that was occurring in the arts constituency prior to this time frame.

Backas, Executive Director of American Arts Alliance, wanted clarification on what was meant by access: “the distinction should be made between making art more accessible by making it available to as many people as possible, and watering it down”

(White House conference on the arts, 1978, p. 12). Access across different minority groups was another facet of access discussed in the arts constituency. Executive Director of the National Italian American Foundation noted the “immense ethnic diversity in the

United States” and lamented that “sources of funding and power have largely ignored the richness of that cultural diversity” (White House conference on the arts, 1978, p. 23). The president of the Women’s Caucus for Art also noted accessibility issues for women in the arts regarding funding (White House conference on the arts, 1978, p. 25). Another subgroup in the arts constituency impacted by the issue of access to NEA funding was individual artists. Among artists and arts administrators, opinions about the appropriateness of funding individual artists varied. However, the general public had a more concrete opinion. They felt that it was the not the government’s place to provide financial assistance to individual artists. Between 59% and 61% of those surveyed

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believed that corporations and other sources outside of government should support individual artists, whereas government funds should be used to support arts organizations

(Americans and the Arts, 1981). This was another indication of different priorities among subgroups in the arts constituency (see Table 10).

Table 10

Biddle Case, Arts Constituency: Access Argument Scorecard

Does the argument address the Yes: artists and arts administrators want to reach wider concerns of multiple parts of the audiences, and audiences (the general public) want access advocacy coalition? The general to a variety of arts experiences; supportive policymakers public? want arts access for their constituents

Does the argument address Not applicable at this time concerns in the OAC?

Does the argument have Yes: this argument was linked to increased demand for connections with other arguments? the arts, and discussions of quality, both of which were Politically salient arguments? politically salient in the Establishing Framework

Is the argument multifaceted? Are Yes: geographic access, racial access, economic access there subsections of the rationale?

Based on the argument scorecard, access is a strong rationale that had the potential to be politically salient, used throughout the advocacy coalition.

Increased demand. Despite decreases in leisure time and disposable income arts participation, performance and attendance steadily increased (Americans and the Arts,

1981). Although information about arts attendance and participation were provided quantitatively in the Americans and the Arts (1981) report, other members of the arts 200

constituency noted trends in the field qualitatively from personal experiences as artists, arts administrators, and arts educators. A museum director in Dallas noted, “increased activity demands more funding as expenses grow” (White House conference on the arts,

1978, p. 8). These types of rationales employed two main rhetorical strategies: 50% of the time an increased demand argument was used, stated as a story of decline, where arts institutions were presented as declining in their ability to provide services. The other 50% of increased demand rationales were attached to stories of illusion, the strategy that presents stories of success as illusions that mask the real hardships being faced. The increase in demand was presented as appearing great; a good thing that indicated the growing support of the arts in public life, but that it was actually turning out to have a negative impact on arts institutions because funding levels did not match the money required to meet those demands. Both rhetorical strategies positioned arts organizations as successful entities because more people wanted to have arts experiences through them.

Each rhetorical strategy linked arguments about increased demand to other rationales (see

Figure 27).

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Figure 27. Increased demand rationales.

Table 11

Biddle Case, Arts Constituency: Increased Demand Argument Scorecard

Does the argument address the Yes: this argument discussed the burden placed on concerns of multiple parts of the artists and arts organizations and links these to advocacy coalition? The general desires of arts audiences (the general public); public? additionally, supportive policymakers would want to help address the desires of their constituency Does the argument address Not applicable concerns in the OAC? Does the argument have Yes: this argument was often linked to the cost connections with other disease, an argument that was successful in the arguments? Politically salient Establishing Framework, and had become a arguments? foundational premise by the time Biddle’s tenure started Is the argument multifaceted? No: this argument was a single rationale that did not Are there subsections of the have subsections rationale?

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Based on the argument scorecard, increased demand was a relatively strong argument that could prove salient in the policy arena. However, because this argument was not multifaceted, it would most likely need to be used in conjunction with other arguments to avoid overusing the single rationale. This detracts from the overall strength of this rationale.

Government control of the arts. Growing concern over government control of the arts was apparent from different facets of the arts constituency. Although the language changed from government control to politicization the sentiment remained consistent. One thing that did change about this argument was the people making it. In the Establishing Framework, concern about government control stemmed primarily from actual artists. Leading up to and during Biddle’s time as chair, the scope of this issue was widened to other parts of the arts constituency. Arts advocates pressed for a system of checks and balances, stemming from repurposed rationales for diversified patronage seen in the Establishing Framework: the fact that “checks and balances [are] needed with increased government support” (White House conference on the arts, 1978, p. 33) was brought up by arts administrators. That majority (58%) of advocates discussing this issue retained familiar arguments, placing government funds in a three-sector funding system consisting of government, private patronage, and foundations. Denman, a banker from

Dallas, stated, “better cooperation between the public and private sectors will keep the arts from being overly bureaucratized” (White House conference on the arts, 1978, p. 11).

Comments reminiscent of earlier rationales for diversified patronage, but with slight alterations were also used: “The government must be a junior partner in financial support of culture, otherwise we run the risk of more government control” (White House

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conference on the arts, 1978, p. 42). Note the use of the word “more” in the previous quotation, the speaker felt that there already was some element of government control of the arts taking place. While the three-sector structure was more familiar in that it had been part of the argument arsenal longer, other advocates envisioned a relatively newer concept of checks and balances that was concentrated in a system of public arts agencies.

Some members of the arts constituency suggested that the majority of funding decisions should be left to communities that have intimate knowledge of their constituencies and their needs: “a central belief of state, regional, and local arts agencies is that the primary responsibility for the support of the arts belongs with the public” (American Arts

Alliance, 1981, p. 15). Endorsement of one agency practice purported to guard against government control, the peer-panel review, was supported among members of the arts constituency but not unanimously (White House conference on the arts, 1978; see Table

12).

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Table 12

Biddle Case, Arts Constituency: Government Control of the Arts Argument Scorecard

Does the argument address the No: This issue was confined to artists and arts concerns of multiple parts of the administrators; the general public was not concerned advocacy coalition? The general with this issue public?

Does the argument address Not applicable concerns in the OAC?

Does the argument have Yes: This argument was expressed in the connections with previous Establishing Framework in data from the policy arguments? Politically salient arena. In this case it was often linked to the need for arguments? diversified patronage, an argument with proven political salience

Is the argument multifaceted? No: This argument was only concerned with Are there subsections of the government control of the arts rationale?

Based on the argument scorecard, government control of the arts was a limited argument that did not include enough of the advocacy coalition to be a strong argument in the policy arena. However, this argument’s links to diversified patronage could have allowed it to be a subargument for diversified patronage, if this argument had not become a foundational premise between the Establishing Framework and this timeframe.

Economic impact. The idea that arts spending could multiply to increase revenues for local communities was recognized as an important piece of information to present to policymakers. Although the number of economic-impact studies at the time

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was only 28 (American Council for the Arts, 1980, p. 66–67), it was clear that states and communities were realizing the power of these studies in gathering initial support and additional funding from state and local governments and foundations. Throughout the arts constituency it was noted that public arts funding could, and often did, serve as a catalyst for support from the private sector. The role of public arts funding was discussed by arts advocates as “one of the most effective methods of generating private support for the arts”

(American Arts Alliance, 1981, p. 9). Furthermore, the NEA made creating a model for conducting economic impact studies a research priority in the organization. However, in their first iterations as spoken rationales, economic-impact arguments were very similar no matter who in the arts constituency was making them. A number was stated as the amount of money put into the arts in a certain area, and then a new, always larger number was provided as the amount of revenue generated by the arts. Parker, representing museums in Dallas, TX, closed a statement with a discussion of the “ripple effect” in the city of Dallas (American Council for the Arts in Education, 1978, p. 9). Another aspect of economic impact was the argument that a vibrant cultural life could attract workers to specific communities. This was especially important to cities that had seen their populations decrease as they searched for ways to encourage people to move back to the city from the suburbs (see Table 13). Based on the argument scorecard, economic impact was a strong argument that had proven its ability to be salient among policymakers, foundations, and corporate sponsors.

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Table 13

Biddle Case, Arts Constituency: Economic-Impact Argument Scorecard

Does the argument address the Yes: this argument incorporates the work of artists concerns of multiple parts of the and arts administrators, while also including advocacy coalition? The general policymakers and the general public by discussing public? the impact on the larger community

Does the argument address Not applicable concerns in the OAC?

Does the argument have Yes: Economic impact was discussed in Baumol connections with previous and Bowen’s work (1966) in the Establishing arguments? Politically salient Framework. This argument was increasingly arguments? popular among policymakers, and therefore was being given much attention among arts administrators

Is the argument multifaceted? Are Yes: This argument incorporated subarguments for there subsections of the rationale? local business as well as for communities looking to revitalize and increase their number of residents

Quality. Quality was mentioned as a point of contention and confusion among members of the arts constituency. Some wondered if it was necessary to “balance artistic quality with public service” (White House conference on the arts, 1978, p. 25), because public funding came from tax dollars. This consideration demonstrates linkages to some of the rationales expressed in Baumol and Bowen’s work (1966), discussed in the

Establishing Framework, which claimed the arts are a quasipublic good that has the potential to benefit the general public. The need to have programs funded with taxpayer dollars accruing benefits to the general public is an offshoot of the quasipublic good 207

argument. The broad and complex question, “how does quality relate to public funding in a democratic society (White House conference on the arts, 1978, p. 41) was also raised.

Some questioned whether the search for quality art was a synonym for “elitism,” and, if so, was that something bad that should be avoided? (White House conference on the arts,

1978, p. 35). This discussion of quality indicates confusion over the populism/elitism debate that was taking place in the arts subgovernment. Although the terms “elitism” and

“populism” were frequently used, they were used abstractly. Abstract values allow for multiple meanings in use. These varied uses left room for confusion in the arts constituency over the actual issue. There was also confusion over whether quality was somehow at the heart of arts funding. Finally, amid the confusion were requests for a

“definition of quality in the arts” (White House conference on the arts, 1978, p. 56).

In addition to confusion about the issue of quality, members of the arts constituency were also confused about the role of public funding and what public funds should be used to emphasize. Although some touted the emphasis placed on quality, others worried that government involvement “might mean that art will be pressed into service to solve social problems” (White House conference on the arts, 1978, p. 12).

Differing opinions about how the arts should be supported by the government, and to what end: excellence or social impact (expressed as mutually exclusive rationales for support) divided advocates (White House conference on the arts, 1978). Government support arguments demonstrated an obvious departure from discussions of quality during the Establishing Framework timeframe, where quality was presented as both a prerequisite for, and the goal of public arts funding.

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Table 14

Biddle Case, Arts Constituency: Quality-Argument Scorecard

Does the argument address the Yes: Although this argument was a concern for concerns of multiple parts of the artists and arts administrators, this argument was advocacy coalition? The general divisive in the constituency public?

Does the argument address Not Applicable concerns in the OAC?

Does the argument have Yes: This argument, while a slight departure from connections with previous previous uses, did contain two ideational elements arguments? Politically salient from arguments regarding quality seen in the arguments? Establishing Framework chapter

Is the argument multifaceted? Yes: There were subsections of this rationale, but Are there subsections of the these subsections were based on differing rationale? interpretations and opinions about the issue

Based on the argument, scorecard quality was not a politically salient argument, although it could be a strong argument based on its divisive nature. This argument could be a potential problem in the arts constituency, undoing some of the work done previously and by other arguments to build and strengthen the advocacy coalition.

Art education. Art education can be a very broad category, including the education of future professional artists as well as general arts education in public school, where the purpose is general appreciation and basic skill building. Unlike the other categories, this rationale did not have any specific rhetorical indicators. Instead, art education was discussed by expressing its important in schools or for artists. In the data

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stemming from the arts constituency, it was the latter notion of art education that was discussed. There was a call from arts advocates to have art be “an integral and important part of the regular curriculum” in public schools (Americans and the Arts, 1981, p. 5).

The majority (75%) of the public surveyed in the Americans and the Arts (1981) study believed that courses in the arts should be “paid for by the school system as part of the regular school budget” (p. 19). An interest in arts education was also discussed by arts administrators, particularly those working in museum settings, who were interested in taking a more direct approach in providing arts education, and encouraging the NEA to do the same (White House conference on the arts, 1978, p. 21). Although arts education was a concern for arts audiences, mainly the general public, and a small subsection of arts administrators, it was not a primary concern among the arts constituency in its entirety.

Based on the argument scorecard, art education was not a strong rationale. Although there was potential for it to be salient among policymakers, due to its connection to members of the general public, it lacked the strength of other arguments made during this time.

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Table 15

Biddle Case, Arts Constituency: Art Education Argument Scorecard

Does the argument address the No: This argument was limited to specific artists, concerns of multiple parts of the arts administrators, and interested members of the advocacy coalition? The general general public. This was not a concern throughout public? the arts constituency

Does the argument address Not Applicable concerns in the OAC?

Does the argument have No: Ideational kernels related to arts education were connections with previous mentioned in the Establishing Framework, but they arguments? Politically salient were dedicated to the training and arguments? professionalization of artists

Is the argument multifaceted? Yes: This argument could be made for professional Are there subsections of the artists or for members of the general public, rationale? although the argument was not used in a multifaceted way during this timeframe

Additional note. One common concern of the arts constituency was the need for information. This need manifested in repeated requests for research funding and initiatives to allow artists and arts administrators to have more thorough knowledge of the type and number of people attending performances and viewings, the amount of money spent on particular arts activities, best practices for arts administrators, the ability to track the economic impact of arts institutions, and the type and scope of arts education activities throughout the nation. Although these requests do not fall into any of my coding categories, these requests indicate an awareness of the importance of technical

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information to help guide the development of best practices. They also demonstrate an advocacy coalition that understands the need for information that can strengthen advocacy arguments to potential funders, including policymakers.

Advocacy-Coalition Strength At the Start of Biddle’s Tenure

Based on their respective data, Table 16 shows Biddle and the arts constituency’s rationale preferences at the start of Biddle’s tenure.

Table 16

Biddle and Arts Constituency’s Rationale Preferences

Rationale rank Biddle Arts constituency

1st Partnership (33%) Access (31%)

2nd Access (18%) Increased demand (21%)

3rd Quality (14%) Government control (18%)

4th Government control Economic impact (10%) (15%)

Concerns about government control were discussed far more in Biddle’s confirmation than among the arts constituency. During the hearing, diversified patronage

(10%), partnership (33%), and the actual governmental control category (10%) all addressed the issue of government control and associated concerns, comprising 53% of all concerns. In contrast, government control was only 18% of the total arguments among

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the arts constituency. This is particularly interesting when compared to the Establishing

Framework case, where government control was a concern stemming primarily from the arts constituency. Although public access was a concern for Biddle and the members of

Congress present at Biddle’s confirmation hearing, it was a significant concern in the arts constituency. In addition to discussing access (31%), the arts constituency also discussed increased demand (21%), both categories that deal with the general public. Combined, those two categories comprise 52% of the arts constituency’s concerns.

Despite criticism of Biddle’s nomination, which highlighted potential fissures between the chairperson and the arts constituency, this list of concerns does demonstrate a relatively cohesive advocacy coalition with the potential to grow stronger, depending on actions of the chairperson and the response of the arts constituency, and vice versa.

Rationales Used by the Chair

Throughout Biddle’s tenure, Biddle’s arguments focused on three central rationales: access, quality, and diversified patronage. In data sources that were the domain of the chair, NEA annual reports, these issues were evenly discussed: access

(30%), quality (29%), and diversified patronage (26%). An additional research source from the agency (NEA, 1981), discussed economic impact at length, accounting for 15% of the total number of rationales made by or through the chair (see Figure 28).

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Rationales(Used(by(the(Chairman(((

Access$(30%)$ 16$ 32$ Quality$(29%)$

28$ Diversi`ied$Patronage$ (26%)$

31$ Economic$Impact$(15%)$

Figure 28. Rationales used by the chairman during his tenure.

With language taken from the confirmation hearing (95th Congress First Session

Senate Committee on Human Resources, 1977), Biddle took many opportunities to reiterate the main purposes of the legislation creating the NEA. As the creator of that legislation, Biddle was able to assert authority on the matter of the legislation’s intent:

I have watched very closely over many years and with great delight the steady growth and maturation of the state agencies since I first had the opportunity to draft the language that established the basis for a partnership, in the legislation we began preparing in the Senate in the early 1960s. (NEA, 1978, p. 2)

As special assistant to Senator Claiborne Pell from 1963 to 1965, I helped draft the legislation establishing the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities. As chairman of the NEA, I am now in the process of turning those carefully worded phrases into goals, programs, and accomplishments. (NEA, 1979, p. 2)

The arts have a central, fundamental importance to our daily lives,” those phrases were presented to the Congress in 1963—the year I came to Washington to work for 214

Senator Claiborne Pell and began preparing legislation to establish a federal arts program.

(NEA, 1980, p. 2)

These statements, in addition to Biddle’s multifaceted experience as an artist, administrator, and in the policy arena were used to steadily build on Biddle’s ethos throughout the arts subgovernment.

As stated in both the nomination hearings and Biddle’s biography, Biddle focused on quality and access with the phrase “access to the best” present in the chairperson’s statement of each annual report released by the NEA during Biddle’s tenure. In the confirmation hearing, Biddle focused on access from a geographic viewpoint. This had proven salient in the past, as congresspersons from across the nation could point to something the NEA had done in their state that had made constituents happy (Zeigler,

1994). Geographic rationales were the most common form of access argument in the

Establishing Framework. Biddle’s experience working under Stevens during the timeframe of the Establishing Framework meant that Biddle knew about the political saliency of this particular argument. When chair, Biddle began to incorporate race and income into access arguments (Biddle, 1988). This argument expansion also occurred in the arts constituency (American Council for the Arts in Education, 1978). Because access was originally introduced as an abstract value, specific arguments could shift from a geographic focus, seen in the Establishing Framework, to race and income, without losing support, because the premises for each iteration of the access argument were the same.

In three research reports released by the NEA during Biddle’s tenure, demographics of artists were discussed. Much as stated in the ACF, research was used to

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help formulate issue definitions. Stemming from this research was information regarding women and minority artists. Their plights were highlighted much in the way that the economic plight of all artists was discussed in the Establishing Framework. The limited earning abilities and access to showcase their arts experienced by women and minority artists became a new facet of the access argument. This emphasis mirrored growing concern from subsections of the arts constituency. For example, Biddle endured criticism from special groups such as a task force on Hispanic American arts and other minority groups that felt they “deserved more attention from the Endowment” (Hall, 1979). The availability of concrete research highlighting the problem assisted in the creation of a new Department of Minority Affairs in the agency. This new department demonstrated

Biddle’s commitment to the issue definitions being employed.

The second half of Biddle’s slogan “access to the best” dealt directly with quality.

In the Establishing Framework, the concept of the best was being established in connection with words like professional and excellence. When Biddle began using the concept in the policy arena, particularly the FY79 appropriations hearings, “the best” was most often directly tied to quality: “The test all applicants for Endowment support must meet [is] quality” (NEA Annual Report, 1978, p. 2). Although the concept of quality was considered an abstract value during the Establishing Framework, it was more so during this timeframe. Although quality was often mentioned, it was never explicitly defined. A lack of accompanying rhetoric like professional, which was present during the

Establishing Framework timeframe, indicates that the use of the concept quality was supposed to be understood by members of the arts subgovernment without further explanation. This is also demonstrated by the quality being seldom used as a singular

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rationale. Instead, it was used as a foundational premise. This indicates that the argument was successful in the time between the Establishing Framework and the start of Biddle’s tenure.

Throughout Biddle’s tenure, Biddle stressed the importance of “partnerships” between public and private sectors. Although Biddle focused on actual partnerships in the confirmation hearings, while chair, Biddle’s mention of partnerships was more in alignment with diversified patronage, and was therefore coded that way. Instead of being solely about percentages contributed to funding the arts, diversified patronage was also used to discuss advocacy-coalition building. In seeking out partnerships with various agencies, both in and outside of the government, Biddle was trying to build a broader, more cohesive coalition. When meeting with arts constituents that year, Biddle assured them that their concerns about interagency cooperation were being taken seriously. This was especially important because interagency cooperation was a concern voiced by artists and business supporters of the arts in New York City (American Council for the Arts in

Education, 1978). Biddle stated that in the “restructuring of the NEA,” a task initiated early in Biddle’s tenure, “high priority is being placed on intergovernmental affairs”

(White House conference on the arts, 1978, p. 12).

Biddle categorized much concern from the arts constituency (those who supported and criticized Biddle), as a “quest for unity” (NEA, 1978, p. 2), and then went on to detail new structural changes in the way the agency operated to address past relationship issues with SAAs; feelings of disenfranchisement from state, community, and neighborhood arts groups; and coordination with other federal agencies (NEA, 1978, p. 2). Biddle’s plan to strengthen the NEA’s relationship with the states included the establishment of a special

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committee of the National Council on the Arts to work directly with the state leadership.

Establishment of the new committee demonstrated that the faith placed in Biddle by SAA leaders and NASAA when they supported Biddle nomination as chairperson was well placed. Near the beginning of Biddle’s tenure, Biddle began directly addressing the arts constituency: “unless we ‘get our act together’—as artists, administrators, patrons, and appreciators—we will fail by a long distance to fulfill our potential strength—and it is immense if it is accomplished by unity” (NEA, 1978, p. 3). Biddle understood the political power the arts constituency, as part of the larger arts advocacy coalition, was capable of wielding. Still dealing with charges of government control of the arts, Biddle was sure to clarify that by unity, Biddle did not mean uniformity (NEA, 1978, p. 3).

Although it was not often discussed by the chairperson in data attributed solely to

Biddle, a research report entitled Economic Impact of Art and Cultural Institutions (1981) discussed the growing popularity of economic-impact studies and their significance at various levels of government. This report provided information regarding audience spending, cultural tourism, and the direct and secondary impact of arts spending in various cities. In this study, economic-impact studies are claimed to be a way to increase funding support from business leaders: “Economic impact studies can tell business owners that they are investing wisely” (Economic Impact of Art and Cultural Institutions,

1981, p. 11), foundations, and policymakers: “They are an effective consciousness- raising tool, because they alert government, foundations, and the general community to the arts” (Economic Impact of Art and Cultural Institutions, 1981, p. 11). The implication that economic-impact studies could be used to create policy-salient arguments was clear

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throughout the report. This information directly linked Biddle’s concept of partnerships to actions in the research community and the general arts constituency.

Strength of the Advocacy Coalition During Biddle’s Tenure

As chairperson, Biddle focused arguments in the narrow framework of “access to the best.” Other arguments were presented as part of meeting that goal. Although their respective arguments do not match up entirely, it is evident that Biddle’s rationales as chairperson are more closely aligned to the arts constituency’s than they were at first (see

Table 17).

Table 17

Biddle and Arts Constituency’s Later Rationale Preferences

Rationale rank Biddle Arts constituency

1st Access (30%) Access (31%)

2nd Quality (29%) Increased demand (21%)

3rd Diversified Government control of the patronage (26%) arts (18%)

4th Economic impact Economic impact (15%) (15%)

Rationales In the Policy Arena

In FY79, there were a total of 258 arguments used to advocate for the NEA and public arts funding. The following rationale categories were represented: Access: 82

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(31%), Quality: 76 (29%), Increased Demand (9%), Diversified Patronage 46 (17%),

Government Control 30 (11%), Legacy 5 (2%), and Art Education 3 (1%; see Figure 29).

90$ 82$ 76$ 80$ 70$ 60$ 46$ 50$ 40$ 30$ 30$ 16$ 20$ 5$ 3$ 10$ 0$ Access$ Quality$ Increased$ Diversi`ied$ Government$Legacy$(5%)$ Art$ (31%)$ (29%)$ Demand$ Patronage$ Control$ Education$ (9%)$ (17%)$ (11%)$ (1%)$

Figure 29. Arguments used in the policy arena FY 79.

It is important to note the significant decrease in the total number of rationales used that occurred between the Establishing Framework and this timeframe This is due to the fact that other rationales seen in the Establishing Framework, such as the social impact of the arts, came to be used as foundational premises of the rationales mentioned above. Table

18 shows the top three rationales used by the main groups in the policy arena during

FY79:

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Table 18

Top Three Rationales Used by the Main Groups in the Policy Arena, FY79

Actor Top three rationales

Chair Access Quality Diversified patronage

Arts constituency Diversified Access Increased demand patronage

Policymakers are not listed in this chart because their comments were limited to questions asked to clarify information regarding specific programs or processes and expressing support for programs that have impacted their constituents. What is significant about the policymakers that were present was their attitude. They were jovial, made jokes with each other and Biddle, and demonstrated their ease with Biddle by bringing up their previous knowledge of or experience with him.

As with the arguments they used outside of the policy arena, the concerns of the chairperson and the arts constituency overlapped. The chairperson’s top three rationales in the policy arena were consistent with Biddle’s most used rationales outside of the policy arena: access, quality, diversified patronage, and economic impact. However, the arts constituency’s top three rationales outside of the policy arena were different from their rationale preferences in the policy arena. The rationales most used outside the policy arena were access, increased demand, and government control. These changed to diversified patronage, access, and increased demand once they entered the policy arena.

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This change in rationale preference demonstrates a shift in priorities based on the rhetorical context.

During the FY79 hearings, previous agency action was touted as successful, a rhetorical strategy that is designed to not only encourage more of the same action, but to also establish previous actions as a foundational premise on which additional arguments can be built. Biddle used this strategy to discuss the success of various NEA programs as well as the agency’s ability to generate matching funds, proving that the rationale of diversified patronage was viable in practice as well as theory. Success showed up as part of diversified patronage, access, and increased demand. This strategy was most often coupled with the strategy of illusion, claiming that, although the NEA has had much success, there was still additional work to be done.

FY80

In FY80, there were a total of 276 arguments. The following rationale categories were present: Access: 85 (31%), Quality: 79 (29%), Diversified Patronage 62 (23%),

Increased Demand: 15 (5%), Legacy: 4(1%), Government Control of the Arts: 25 (9%), and Financial Conservatism: 6 (2%, see Figure 30).

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85$ 90$ 79$ 80$ 70$ 62$ 60$ 50$ 40$ 30$ 25$ 20$ 15$ 6$ 10$ 4$ 0$

Figure 30. Arguments used in the policy arena FY80.

These hearings saw the emergence of an argument against public arts funding: financial concerns. Amid growing financial concerns throughout the federal government, increasing inflation, and an ongoing recession, putting government funds toward the arts was questioned. Table 19 shows the top three rationales used by the main groups in the policy arena during FY80:

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Table 19

Top Three Rationales Used by the Main Groups in the Policy Arena, FY80

Actor Top rationales

Chair Access Diversified Quality patronage

Arts constituency Diversified Access Government control patronage

Policymakers Quality Access Fiscal conservatism

Although the chairperson and the arts constituency were still in alignment on the issues of access and diversified patronage, they did experience a difference of opinion on the issue of quality and government control. Biddle stuck with the motto “access to the best,” resulting in a focus on quality. The growing concerns in the arts constituency regarding government control did make their way to the policy arena in FY81.

Policymakers, who were more vocal in these hearings than the previous year, focused on issues of quality as they pertained to grantees. They were also concerned with geographic access, providing praise to the agency for its work in bringing the arts to their constituencies and encouraging further efforts. Finally, due to the financial constraints of the federal government, there were some comments about the funding practices of the organization, and questions as to whether the organization could run on less money. It is important to note, though, that these arguments were not a demonstration of open opposition. Instead, these comments were made in a way that demonstrated policymakers’ commitment to fiscal responsibility.

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FY81

In FY81 there were a total of 262 arguments. The following rationale categories were represented: Access: 83 (31%), Quality: 76 (29%), Increased Demand: 58 (22%),

Financial Need: 21 (8%), Diversified Patronage: 17 (7%), and Financial Conservatism: 7

(3%; see Figure 31):

90$ 83$ 76$ 80$ 70$ 58$ 60$ 50$ 40$ 30$ 21$ 17$ 20$ 7$ 10$ 0$

Figure 31. Arguments used in the policy arena FY81.

This year saw similar concern among the three groups represented (see Table 20).

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Table 20

Top Three Rationales Used by the Main Groups in the Policy Arena, FY81

Actor Top rationales

Chair Increased demand Access Quality

Arts constituency Financial Need Access Quality

Policymakers Access Quality Financial Conservatism

During these hearings, policymakers continued to use comments focused on fiscal responsibility and conservatism, while continuing to laud the agency for providing the arts to their various constituencies. The chairperson and the arts constituency continued to parallel each other’s arguments in the policy arena. Biddle did choose to focus on increased demand, due to growing budgetary concerns. Biddle wanted to impress on policymakers that increasing demand for the arts required a lot of work on the part of the agency to fund and administer grants and programs. The arts constituency, much like policymakers, were feeling the effects of the recession. Therefore, the top rationale for this group was financial plight. Establishing the financial situation of artists and arts organizations as a crisis was the rhetorical strategy employed by members of the arts constituency present at the hearings.

FY82

In FY82 there were a total of 113 arguments spread across three rationale categories: Diversified Patronage: 57 (50%), Quality: 23 (21%), and Access: 33 (29%; see Figure 32).

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60$ 57$

50$

40$ 33$ 30$ 23$ 20$

10$

0$ Diversi`ied$Patronage$ Quality$(21%)$ Access$(29%)$ (50%)$

Figure 32. Arguments used in the policy arena FY82.

FY82 was a unique year. After winning the election, President Reagan’s administration took office and proposed a 50% cut to the NEA. Biddle was able, through a variety of tactics, to stave off such drastic cuts to the agency. One tactic was presenting a unified front. All three groups focused on the same three rationales: diversified patronage, quality, and access.

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Table 21

Top Three Rationales Used by the Main Groups in the Policy Arena, FY82

Actor Top rationales

Chair Diversified Access Quality patronage

Arts constituency Access Diversified Quality patronage

Policymakers Diversified Access Quality patronage

The connection between the three groups in the policy arena is evidenced by the overlapping rationales. Biddle, who had been touted as politically savvy during the confirmation hearings, chose to focus on arguments with proven political salience.

Biddle’s arguments, and the order in which they were emphasized were in alignment with policymakers. Due to the proposed cuts, the most prevalent rhetorical strategy was stories of decline. In addition to stories of past successes were stories warning of the decline that would accompany the proposed cuts.

Policy-arena conclusion. Aside from arts constituency’s use of the government control rationale, arguments used in the policy arena were politically salient, according to the argument scorecard for each rationale, discussed earlier in this chapter. The rationales were primarily focused on access and quality, the two rationales identified by Biddle as the two most important during the confirmation hearing. Despite slight differences in argument preference, the chair, Arts Constituency, And Policymakers were relatively

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unified in the rationales they chose to use, and the strategies of decline and illusion used to present those rationales.

Policy Change-Management Assessment

Policy situation. When first assessing the cases I would investigate, I categorized

Biddle’s tenure as one of equilibrium. This categorization was based on information from the timeline as well as general information available prior to my in-depth investigation. I hypothesized that Biddle’s actions, and the resulting advocacy arguments would be as shown in Figure 33.

Subgovernment Advocacy Agency Action Policy Situation Argument Action Impact Outcome Outcome

Minimal/no change Incremental changes No change within Equilibrium Reinforce in advocacy to maintain political the subgovernment argument standing

Figure 33. Hypothesized timeline of Biddle’s actions.

When preparing remarks for the confirmation hearing, Biddle felt that charges of elitism needed to be addressed. Biddle (1988) identified these charges as a significant concern among members of the arts constituency. Biddle believed that Hanks did much for the agency and the case of public funding for the arts during Hanks’s tenure. However,

Biddle noted that the arts world had some serious problems that Biddle hoped to address as chair of the agency. Based on the charges of elitism and Biddle’s progression past the advocacy points of Hanks, I reassessed my initial categorization of Biddle’s tenure as one of equilibrium. Biddle acknowledged that “most of the difficulties [during Biddle’s term as chair] and their results flowed out of the past, gathering force” (Biddle, 1988, p. 368).

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What Biddle is describing is the accumulation of smaller issues into pressing issues, one of the criteria of a policy window opening. As to the polarity of that policy window: although critics existed, they were primarily in the arts constituency. The lack of an established, cohesive OAC led me to categorize Biddle’s tenure as an auspicious policy window, based on the criteria detailed in my Conceptual Framework. Biddle’s changes to the agency indicated a departure from the way the agency had been run by Biddle’s predecessor; this removed Biddle from a place of reinforcement. Instead, due to the need to address charges of politicizing the arts and of the populism/elitism debate, Biddle was engaged in realignment. This altered my hypothesis about what would occur in the arts subgovernment, shown in Figure 34.

Subgovernment Advocacy Agency Action Policy Situation Argument Action Impact Outcome Outcome

Consensual change Small number of Auspicious Policy Universal change in Realigned within the incremental agency Window advocacy argument subgovernment changes

Figure 34. Amended hypothesized timeline of Biddle’s actions.

Argument Action

Biddle employed a combination of coordinating rhetoric and action. As a new chair, as charges of elitism were leveled against Biddle and the agency, Biddle introduced the phrase “access to the best” and coordinated actions as chairperson to be in accordance with this phrase. This realignment of argument was coupled with policy action as Biddle began taking steps to reorganize the agency in an effort to improve “efficiency and accountability” in the process of providing quality arts experiences to each citizen. 230

In the biography of the arts policy years, Our Government and the Arts (1988),

Biddle foreshadowed a significant issue in a discussion about backlash from nominations for the Humanities Endowment, which preceded Biddle’s own nomination by months:

“For the first time two words, allegedly opposite, appeared in assessments of the situation: elitism and populism” (p. 332). In a personal analysis of those two words,

Biddle equated populism “with efforts to undermine excellence through infusions of mediocrity,” and elitism with “an espousal of quality and excellence” (1988, p. 322).

Biddle’s definition of elitism aligned with one of the goals for the chair’s tenure, referenced in the nomination hearing as “access to the best.” Unfortunately, this definition of elitism was not in alignment with the way critics used it to signify

“snobbism and special privilege … suggest[ing] conspiracy and unearned advantage”

(Kramer, 1977). There was a definitional battle taking place between the organized arts community and the nascent opposition over whether elitism was good or bad. Biddle asserted that elitism was a synonym for “the best” and was, therefore, good. Biddle also took steps to increase the agency’s populist activities to safeguard himself and the agency from additional attack.

At the start of Biddle’s tenure, a small advocacy coalition consisted of SAA leaders, art educators, and friends in Congress. Although this did account for support in the arts constituency and among policymakers, there were others in the subgovernment, especially in the arts constituency, that Biddle had to win over, especially minority artists and members of the business community. After listening to the concerns of minority leaders from the Black and Hispanic communities, Biddle’s creation of the NEA’s Office of Minority Affairs was a means to address the concerns of those communities in

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representation and support. Biddle also created an Office of Special Constituencies that primarily addressed older generations and those with physical and mental handicaps;

Biddle was also able to strengthen relations with the business community.

In the early years, Biddle acknowledged a tendency to fund larger arts institutions, partially because they were big institutions and agency leaders had faith that they had the capability to raise the required matching funds and partially because they were institutions of high quality that other organizations could use as an example (1988).

Biddle also acknowledged that, to increase accessibility and permit smaller organizations the room to grow and increase in excellence, grants would have to be more evenly distributed between larger and smaller organizations.

As part of restructuring the agency, Biddle created three deputy chairs, when there was previously only one, and placed a 5-year limit on the amount of time program directors could serve. Biddle likened the innovation necessary in the arts to the innovation required in the agency to prevent stagnation. Some charged Biddle with

“eliminating those with whom [Biddle] disagreed,” but Biddle determined that if a program, or even the agency either “depended on one individual, or was perceived to depend on one person, it was time for a change” (1988, pp. 383–384). This stance could be considered a demonstration of policy learning, as Biddle was aware of the perception of Hanks and Hanks’s perceived power over the agency (Phillips, 1977). Biddle saw, firsthand, the negative implications of that perception in Congress. Biddle was also aware of the confusion among members of the National Council on the Arts based on personal relationships with members and the policymakers who interacted with Chairperson Hanks.

That may be one of the main reasons Biddle also clarified the role of the National

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Council on the Arts, formalizing the Council for the first time since the agency’s inception. Biddle’s focus on the role that the National Council played in the grantmaking process realigned the charges of elitism into Biddle’s argument about the original intent of the enabling legislation.

Biddle also sought to build and strengthen the advocacy coalition with

“partnerships.” In addition to the Office of Minority Affairs and an Office of Special

Constituencies, Biddle built relationships with other federal agencies such as the

Department of Housing and Urban Development, broadening and deepening the arts- advocacy coalition. This was a realignment of the residual policies and perceptions from

Hanks’ tenure, which left many thinking that the NEA was a lone agency in the federal government, acting with a more centralized power structure than was comfortable for some members of Congress (Zeigler, 1994). One of Biddle’s most important partnerships was with Vice President Mondale’s spouse, who was an avid arts supporter and advocated strongly alongside Biddle. This strong personal and professional relationship proved valuable during Biddle’s tenure, due to the powerful position Mondale held as chair of the Federal Council on the Arts & Humanities, an interagency council designed to foster partnerships between federal agencies and department (Biddle, 1988; Zeigler,

1994).

Another partnership Biddle sought was with business professionals and the corporate world. During Hanks’ time as chair, Hanks asked Biddle to assist in securing business support for funding. Biddle recalled that Hanks’s approach was not popular: “It was a well attended session, but it was not particularly congenial. I could see that the idea of corporations pooling their giving to the arts [as Hanks had suggested] had touched a

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raw nerve” (Biddle, 1988, p. 441). Biddle demonstrated yet another instance of policy learning by significantly altering the chair’s approach to the business sector. Biddle’s method “brought more and more rewards to the endowment, but it took many months and lots of effort” (Biddle, 1988, p. 442).

Diversified patronage. Throughout Biddle’s tenure, the chair maintained that public funding of the arts was to be done in a marginal capacity to allow states and local communities to guide funds and direct the way they were spent, in accordance with the wishes of each distinct community. Biddle assured members of the arts constituency and the general public that public funding of the arts was not synonymous with government control. Members of the arts constituency charged and the NEA with politicizing the arts, especially during Biddle’s nomination and the beginning of Biddle’s tenure, “pressures concerning politicization of the arts are coming not from Congress, but from the constituencies, speaking in their own interests” (American Council for the Arts in

Education, 1978, p. 71). Biddle rhetorically situated the issue of politicization among members of the arts constituency who were trying to promote the interests of their own particular groups and programs, rather than the promoting the arts as a whole. The role and practices of the NEA were also important to both the arts constituency and the chair.

From the arts constituency came a call for a “full evaluation of the NEA, exploring priorities and practices” (American Council for the Arts in Education, 1978, p. 46).

Biddle made this a top priority as chair, setting about reorganizing the agency very soon after being sworn in.

Economic impact. Like the previous chairperson, Hanks, Biddle often discussed the many benefits of the arts, “touting them as magnets for tourism, as special educators,

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as vital elements in reviving urban areas, and a sources of economic activity” (Mulcahy

& Wyszomirski, 1995, p. 156). It was made clear in the nomination hearing that Biddle would have to make a case for the arts even more than previous chairs had done, as questions about public arts funding were on policymaker’s radar (95th Congress First

Session Senate Committee on Human Resources, 1977). The report, Selected

Characteristics of Artists (NEA, 1978) helped to simultaneously provide information on both the impact of artists’ work as well as their inability to work under the same conditions as most Americans. This helped negate the perception of artists living richly on funds from private patrons and public dollars, a perception that upset the arts constituency. Negating misconceptions about the lives and economic status of artists was in alignment with Biddle’s desire to make a case for public funding of the arts that would meet the approval of the general public.

In the later portion of Biddle’s tenure, the NEA released Economic Impact of Arts and Cultural Institutions (1981), a collection of case studies from cities throughout the

Midwest. In addition to demonstrating the economic impact of the arts, these studies provided local communities with a guide they could use to plan their own studies.

Although some state and local governments had already begun to conduct economic studies, this research report did address a need identified by the arts constituency: the need for information and guidance. When discussing these studies in the FY79 appropriations hearings, Biddle received support from policymakers who were eager to have studies conducted in their own districts.

Access. The role of the government to ensure access to the arts was a consistent part of Biddle’s tenure, as Biddle anticipated at the onset. NEA reports Minorities and

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Women in the Arts (NEA, 1978), Artists Compared by Age, Sex, and Earnings (NEA,

1980a), and The Arts and the Older American (1980b) confirmed concerns stemming from the arts constituency about the lack of equal access to the arts, not only from an audience standpoint, but from the perspective of the artists. These reports were coupled with the creation of agency Departments of Minority Affairs and Special Constituencies in partnership with minority, disability, and social-services agencies inside and outside of the government. Biddle also increased money available for promoting arts-organization development in rural areas to increase the quality of available arts activities; initiatives designed to bring the arts to underprivileged areas, touring to communities with limited access to arts organizations.

Art education. The findings of the education task force were introduced in the budget justification for FY80. The task force was designed to look at a variety of issues dealing with the education of artists and arts educators. It was recommended that the

NEA foster and increase partnerships with the U.S. Office of Education, the National

Endowment for the Humanities, the National Institute of Education, and other governmental and private agencies and organizations. Although the bulk of this task force was concerned with training artists, this task force advanced the general perception that art education in schools was going to be another area where the NEA was going to increase its efforts. This turned out to be true in Biddle’s dealings with members of the constituency dedicated to this issue. However, this was not as large a concern as issues faced by the individual artist and arts organizations. Biddle’s responses and policies regarding arts education in schools was proportional to the concern shown this issue in the arts constituency.

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Subgovernment Impact

Although the start of Biddle’s tenure was not supported throughout the subgovernment, the chair did start with allies in the policy arena and specific areas of the arts constituency. Whether the subgovernment was pleased with or apathetic to Biddle’s work was difficult to discern at the beginning of Biddle’s time as chair. This was due, in part, to the length and formative impact of Hank’s time as chair. Many in the arts constituency had little sense of anyone other Hanks as chair. What is clear is the lack of openly negative comments and actions in the data after Biddle had the opportunity to address questions surrounding changes to the agency and plans to make alliances with other governmental agencies and businesses. The data, which demonstrate a convergence of advocacy rationales in the policy arena, suggests that Biddle’s attempts at making connections with the arts constituency were successful, and that relationships with policymakers were strengthened during Biddle’s time as chair. The partnerships Biddle formed, and Biddle’s dedication to preventing fractures in the arts constituency based on self-interest, served to strengthen the coalition and broaden its base of support.

When faced with difficult decisions regarding NEA grantees and public opinion,

Biddle made definitive decisions and stuck with them. The first such situation Biddle describes dealt with a piece of art in a public space that was not immediately appreciated by the community. Rather than acquiesce to calls for the piece to be removed, Biddle coordinated talk-back sessions with the artist. Biddle was convinced that the piece was of quality, and thought the potentially controversial situation could be mitigated by allowing the public access to the artist. Biddle did not always side with the artist. Biddle’s removal of a controversial grant even after it had been approved by the National Council on the

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Arts did spark some criticism from the arts constituency. However, Biddle’s firm stance on the issue, and unapologetic response to what the chair felt was the right decision and duty as chairperson quickly quelled the issue. When asked about the issue, Biddle made sure to remind members of the arts constituency that Biddle envisioned the role as chair as one answering to them as well as the general public (Biddle, 1988).

Advocacy Outcome

Biddle openly addressed criticism by directly refuting negative claims or responding in both word and action to the claims while crediting various members of the arts constituency for their work and feedback. This exemplified the often-mentioned sense of partnership. When dealing specifically with the arts constituency, Biddle focused comments on messages about how the arts world needed to avoid fragmentation, the

“narrow self-interest of an organization, a discipline, or a cause” and “unite” (NEA, 1979, p. 2). This was a different approach from that of Hanks, who supported the organization and mobilization of each art field individually, but did not place emphasis on a cohesive constituency. Unfortunately, Biddle felt that efforts at coalition building were being undermined by negativity stemming from the arts constituency (Biddle, 1988). For example, “access to the best” was Biddle’s attempt to resolve the elitism/populism debate: “Access was the populist side of the coin, elitism the other—but elitism in its best sense, not as exclusivity, but as the selection of excellence” (Biddle, 1988, p. 359).

Although quality or debates about quality were present in both Biddle’s and the arts constituency’s concerns outside the policy arena, Biddle’s definition of and concern with quality did not resonate throughout the arts constituency in the policy arena, which was still confused by what defined quality.

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Policy-entrepreneur scorecard. Developed from the conceptual framework, the policy-entrepreneur scorecard consists of the following benchmarks:

• Broaden and/or strengthen their advocacy coalition or success in the coalition

• Deflect attacks from the OAC or success in the OAC

• Furthering the policy entrepreneur’s interpretation of agency goals or success

in the policy arena

Based on the policy-entrepreneur scorecard, Biddle’s time as a policy entrepreneur was successful on all three counts. In the role, Biddle broadened and strengthened the advocacy coalition. Biddle’s commitment to fulfilling the purposes outlined in the legislation Biddle penned to establish the NEA was a guiding force behind the chair’s actions. Biddle grew the advocacy coalition with internal changes to the agency—its structure and its processes—as well as external efforts with the type of partnerships Biddle renewed or sought out while chair.

Second, Biddle was successful in deflecting attacks on the agency such as the

Yates Report and the proposed Reagan cuts. Biddle was able to navigate both situations with a combination of coalition support and savvy policy-arena action. In the Yates case, it was Yates who personally shelved the report in support of Biddle; during the proposed cuts from the Reagan administration, it was the President’s own task force, comprised of artists and government insiders, that supported Biddle and the agency. In both cases,

Biddle met the challenge with a methodical, logos approach: Biddle prepared a long report addressing each of the concerns in the Yates report, even though that response was unnecessary; when facing the Reagan cuts, Biddle prepared a diminished budget, but coupled it with rhetoric expressing how catastrophic those cuts would be to the arts world, 239

and the negative publicity the new administration would receive if the drastic cuts actually went through. Finally, Biddle’s commitment to providing access to the best was a personal interpretation of the agency’s goals. Based on the three aforementioned benchmarks, Biddle’s time as chairperson and, by extension, a policy entrepreneur was successful from an agency and coalition perspective.

Agency Outcome

During this timeframe the NEA was awarded the appropriations shown in Table

22. Although there was a drop in the appropriation level between FY81 and FY82, the

NEA was able to avoid a 50% budget cut proposed by the Reagan administration.

Table 22

Appropriation Awarded to the National Endowment for the Arts

Fiscal year Appropriation amount

FY79 $149,585,000

FY80 $154,610,000

FY81 $158,795,000

FY82 $143,456,000

Note. Adapted from NEA Appropriations History, by National Endowment for the Arts, 2011, retrieved from http://www.nea.gov/about/Budget/AppropriationsHistory.html

The agency itself saw the addition of three deputy chairs, hired to provide division of labor in the agency, and to avoid any one person from accumulating too much power

(Biddle, 1988). There were other constituent-specific programs added to the agency, discussed previously in this chapter, that were designed to increase access to the arts for various constituencies previously underrepresented. The National Council on the Arts 240

helped streamline the NEA’s work, and assisted in assuaging fears of control in the policy arena, whose concerns stemmed primarily from Hanks’s tenure and perceived influence over the Council and the executive branch.

The most significant management task in the subgovernment was Biddle’s handling of the proposed Reagan cuts. After hearing about the proposed cuts, Biddle requested guidance from the Office of Management and Budget to try and gain additional insight into why the cuts where being proposed. It was clear that many programs were undergoing proposed budget cuts, however, it appeared that the NEA was being disproportionately targeted. Biddle quickly assessed the situation: “We were not engaged now with a sympathetic and excellently informed congressional chairman. We were dealing with an issue. We had to combat it” (Biddle, 1988, p. 493). Knowing the norms of the policy arena helped Biddle navigate this issue effectively. With the staff, Biddle developed a budget that demonstrated the significant impact the proposed cuts would make. Biddle proposed the largest cuts to popular programs that enjoyed bipartisan support in Congress. Biddle coupled this action with arguments from agency directors, policymakers, and the arts constituency focused on the importance of diversified patronage. This argument illustrated the fact that significant cuts to NEA funding would result in a decrease in matching funds and support from other levels of government, foundations, and corporate sponsors. When presented to the Presidential Task Force on the Arts and Humanities, Biddle responded to their inquiries by reiterating the arguments that had proven salient in the past: access, quality, and partnerships, especially diversified patronage. In the end, the Task Force did not endorse the proposed cuts. They did, however, endorse the practices of the agency and the National Council on the Arts.

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Additionally, Biddle’s allies in the policy arena were successful in making their case for public arts funding. The resulting cuts to the agency budget were limited to 10% (Biddle,

1988).

Conclusion

Over the course of a few years, Biddle saw a convergence of concerns that Biddle expressed and the ones expressed by the arts constituency in the policy arena. Overall,

Biddle’s tenure saw a universal change in the advocacy argument. Tactics to strengthen the coalition were successful in the broadest sense of the term. There were no major fissures in the arts constituency at the end of Biddle’s tenure, despite evidence that cracks existed at the beginning of Biddle’s time as chair. Additionally attempts to significantly diminish the budget and political power of the agency were unsuccessful. Agency changes dedicated to building the coalition coupled with the political circumstances to create a more cohesive arts constituency means that Biddle’s tenure ended with a stronger and more diverse advocacy coalition than at its start. This meets the aforementioned criteria of a successful policy entrepreneur.

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Chapter 7: Frohnmayer—The Perfect Storm

The second case study is an investigation of Frohnmayer, the fifth chair of the

NEA, as a policy entrepreneur. The analysis of this case was conducted with knowledge gained from both the Establishing Framework and the Biddle case about the various rationales and players involved in public arts funding in the policy arena. The significant difference between this case and the previous two is the existence of a broad, cohesive

OAC. Furthermore, this case saw more cohesive subgroups in the arts subgovernment.

Whereas previous cases saw specialized concerns in subgroups, such as agency or race divisions in the arts constituency, this case saw the emergence of issues that served to encourage cohesion among arts subgovernment subgroups.

During the years investigated for this case, 1989–1992, the government executed military operations in Panama and in the Persian Gulf. Other international events were the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and dissolution of the Soviet Union 2 years thereafter.

Domestically, President G. H. W. Bush was forced to deal with large deficits that remained from the Reagan presidency. Bush also passed legislation in favor of

Americans with Disabilities and Immigrants in 1990. Although the threat of communism receded, other issues such as unemployment, government spending, and increasing poverty rates were significant domestic concerns.

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Data Selection

To track the rationales used by Frohnmayer, I analyzed the confirmation hearing and annual reports issued during Frohnmayer’s tenure. I also incorporated research reports from the NEA during Frohnmayer’s time as chair: The Audience for American Art

Museums (1991a); Expanding the Audience for the Performing Arts (1991b);

Participation in the Arts by Blacks and Whites (1990b); and Who Reads Literature: The

Future of the United States as a Nation of Readers (1990c). These reports demonstrate the issues that were important at the agency during this timeframe. Frohnmayer’s personal account of time at the NEA, Leaving Town Alive: Confessions of an Arts

Warrior (1993), provided additional insight into actions during Frohnmayer’s time as chair.

Newspaper coverage was particularly important during this case because issues related to the agency were not relegated to just the arts section, as was the case in previous investigations. Because the general public was involved, newspaper coverage of

NEA operations, the chair’s actions, and the reactions of the arts constituency, the general public and the OAC involvement were more extensive than newspaper coverage during the Biddle case. Another source for tracking the arts constituency and the OAC is Culture

Wars: Documents from the Recent Controversies in the Arts (1992). This source was particularly rich. It included interviews, personal letters between members of the arts subgovernment, editorials from newspapers I would not have otherwise been able to access, print advertisements by various members of the subgovernment, and pictures of art made in response to the various controversies taking place during that timeframe.

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To track how all the important groups act, react, and interact in the policy arena, I analyzed appropriations hearings for the 2 years Frohnmayer was a part of the proceedings, FY91 and FY92. In 1990, an Independent Commission was charged with reviewing and assessing the work of the agency; this report was also included. In addition to the 1990 Reauthorization Hearings, where Frohnmayer, members of Congress, and representatives from arts institutions and the OAC discussed renewal of the NEA, I also analyzed hearings the following year, 1991, on the effects of changes mandated as a result of the reauthorization hearings.

Players

President. During the presidency of G. H. W. Bush, the preference was to address foreign policy rather than domestic policy. Furthermore, President Bush had many pressing concerns during the term in office. These issues, which included both foreign and domestic crises resulted in issue crowding (Kingdon, 1995) for the President. The

President was not considered a strong ally, nor a powerful opponent of the arts.

Policymakers. Policymakers were clearly marked as those who were part of the advocacy coalition and those who were part of the OAC. Advocates continued to work in the policy arena to support the NEA and to mitigate potential negative action from the

OAC. This was the first time that apathy toward public arts funding was not permitted among policymakers. Due to the increasing power of the OAC, many policymakers who did not act in strong support of the agency were persuaded to join the OAC.

Arts constituency. In the Establishing Framework the arts constituency was concerned with the issue of censorship and government control of the arts. However, during the Establishing Framework and the Biddle cases, those concerns did not increase

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to the level of controversy. The arts constituency ultimately worked together as a relatively cohesive unit in both cases, and did not openly break from the agency or the chair. Two galvanizing events occurred prior to Frohnmayer becoming chair of the agency. One was when a gallery set to show work from Mapplethorpe, a controversial artist, canceled the show unexpectedly amid pressure from an increasingly powerful OAC.

The second was work from another artist, Serrano, whose work entitled Piss Christ sparked controversy with the religious right. Artists, a portion of the arts constituency, organized and protested. They were joined by other portions of the arts constituency, but the majority of protestors were artists. Throughout this case the arts constituency was not unified.

Oppositional Advocacy Coalition. The OAC included influential leaders from various religious organizations, who mobilized members of the general public and members of Congress in both the House and the Senate. Prior to the exhibition of the controversial artwork, Wildmon, Executive Director of the American Family Association left the church to pursue a morality crusade against the media. Wildmon used letter- writing strategies and boycotts to demonstrate displeasure with things deemed immoral.

In the Senate, D’Amato (R-NY) and Helms (R-NC) coordinated efforts to get 39 Senators to sign a letter to the NEA expressing their outrage over Serrano’s work. In the House of

Representatives Armey (R-TX) enlisted the support of 107 Congressmen to sign a letter denouncing the Serrano grant and warning the Endowment about the next stop of the

Mapplethorpe exhibition, Washington, DC. Robertson, a televangelist and presidential candidate, enlisted the Christian Coalition to hold demonstrations and paid for a full-page newspaper ad encouraging Congress to deny the NEA reauthorization. Some Republican

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congresspersons called for the NEA to be abolished. Senator Helms went as far as to propose the Helms Amendment, which limited the types of art that could be funded and sought to marry the concepts of obscenity with indecency. This is significant in that the former is not protected by the First Amendment, while the latter is. Marrying them could lead to them being considered one in the same, and therefore not protected under the First

Amendment. Throughout this case, the OAC gained both strength and momentum. The

American Family Association was joined by the Southern Baptist Convention, the Eagle

Forum, Concerned Women for America, and the 700 Club in their attacks on the agency and on any supporters of the agency in Congress.

Agency context. It was at this time that the tipping point of controversy occurred.

Although some controversial grants existed in the NEA’s history, they were handled relatively quickly, either by diffusion, as seen in the Biddle case, or by focusing on the number of successes the agency had enjoyed over the years. In Frohnmayer’s nomination hearing Senator Pell noted, “controversies have been few and far between, and each time, the Endowment has emerged unscathed, if not strengthened (Frohnmayer Confirmation,

1989, p. 3). Even those in the policy arena were unaware of the impact this particular time of controversy would have on the agency and the question of public arts funding in general. There were instances in the past when NEA grant-funded art was deemed offensive to some members of the general public. However, in this particular context there were a series of controversial grants in quick succession, accompanied by a large, organized OAC. The agency was under attack from the political right and conservatives in Congress. The political far right, which enjoyed some popularity and power during the

1980s, was now declining due to a lack of unity and the NEA was a prime unifying target.

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Following Stevens and Hanks’ work to get the agency up and running, Biddle reorganized the agency to improve efficiency and transparency. Biddle also helped the agency weather its first onslaught of political attack in the form of a task force and a proposed 50% budget cut. Biddle was succeeded by Hodsoll, a “career bureaucrat”

(Mulcahy & Wyszomirski, 1995, p. 157) who centralized the role of the chair, taking a much more active role in the selection of grant recipients than predecessors. Hodsoll also increased the level of documentation for decisions. Hodsoll’s tenure was considered a successful one, relatively free of political controversy (Mulcahy & Wyszomirski, 1995) with cuts from FY81 and FY82 that were restored by FY84. After Hodsoll’s departure in early 1989, the deputy for programs, Southern, became action chair. During Southern’s time as acting chair, the work of two artists, Serrano and Mapplethorpe, caused controversy.

Although the grants that indirectly supported two separate shows in which each artist was showcased were handled during Hodsoll’s tenure, the controversy did not start until after Hodsoll left the position. The Serrano work Piss Christ was a photograph of a plastic crucifix submerged in a container filled with urine. Speculation about exactly how news of this work spread is not definite. However, news reached Wildmon, Executive

Director of the American Family Association, who was outraged. At a tour of a separate exhibition, work of Mapplethorpe caused controversy. Mapplethorpe, more commonly known for portraits and work with flowers had also taken photos depicting the life of homosexual men in New York. These photos included sexually charged photographs that outraged the more conservative portions of the general public as well as the Christian

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Right. When scheduled stops for the exhibition were suddenly canceled, artists and arts advocates protested.

The aftermath of these events were calls for the abolishment of the agency from some conservative members of Congress. Despite those calls, the agency was able to continue its work with a $45,000 cut to their budget. These cuts, known as the Stenholm amendment, were the exact amount of the two grants involved in the Serrano and

Mapplethorpe controversies. Although the entirety of these controversial events, from the granting of funds to the actual exhibition and initial backlash, occurred prior to

Frohnmayer taking on the role of chair, the respective controversies caused by the NEA’s indirect funding connection to the work of Serrano and Mapplethorpe significantly impacted Frohnmayer’s time as chair from the moment of nomination. This was compounded by the fact that other cases of controversial grants arose early during

Frohnmayer’s tenure.

The chair. Frohnmayer was born into a prominent family in the State of Oregon with a tradition of public service. Although Frohnmayer’s father was a lawyer,

Frohnmayer fought to avoid simply following in his footsteps. Prior to eventually earning a law degree and practicing in Oregon, Frohnmayer attempted to become a doctor, earned a degree in theology, and served as a naval office in Vietnam. Frohnmayer’s brother was a well-known lawyer, acting as a professor prior to becoming attorney general.

Prior to being nominated for the NEA in 1989, Frohnmayer was on the short list of candidates for the position in 1980, but Hodsoll was chosen instead. Frohnmayer learned from the experience, and when the opportunity presented itself again,

Frohnmayer pursued it diligently. In addition to experience as a lawyer, Frohnmayer also

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served at the Oregon Arts Commission for 8 years, 4 of those as chair. Additionally,

Frohnmayer served as a peer reviewer for the NEA. Leading up to the nomination in

1989, Frohnmayer was relatively unknown on the East Coast. The same journalistic speculation that correctly guessed Hank’s successor in the Biddle case could not correctly identify Hodsoll’s successor. Most of the newspaper speculation focused on well-known individuals from the East Coast. This was an understandable assumption. Each of the previous chairpersons was well-known in either elite artistic circles in the Northeast, or as a Washington insider: “Never during the course of the journalistic speculation prior to the announcement was my name mentioned in any newspaper (Frohnmayer, 1993, p. 13)

Frohnmayer conducted the vetting process in relative obscurity, until the nomination leaked days before the official announcement. Unlike the previous case, where Biddle’s nomination was met with criticism and charges of elitism, Frohnmayer’s case was met with enthusiasm in the press (Gamarekian, 1989).

Confirmation Hearing

Of 78 total arguments, the rationales shown in Figure 35 were present during

Frohnmayer’s confirmation hearings: access 24% (19), intrinsic value 15% (12), artists’ rights 4% (3), economic impact 5% (4), partnerships 9% (7), diversified patronage 8% (6), seal of approval 3% (2), accountability 22% (17), art education 10% (8).

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7$ Intrinsic$Bene`its$(15%)$ 12$ 4$ Diversi`ied$Patronage$(8%)$

Seal$of$Approval$(3%)$ 6$ Accountability$(22%)$ 2$ Artists'$Rights$(4%)$ 19$ Art$Education$(10%)$

Access$(24%)$ 17$ Economic$Impact$(5%)$ 8$ 3$ Partnerships$(9%)$

Figure 35. Issues discussed at Frohnmayer’ confirmation hearing.

A word-frequency investigation of each category resulted in additional information regarding the common words used to express each rationale (see Table 23).

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Table 23

Common Words Used to Express Each Rationale

Argument Rationale Keywords

Access All citizens should have access to (various New audiences; availability; forms of) the arts culturally diverse

Intrinsic Value There are many intangible benefits that Civilizing; culturally result from arts exposure illiterate

Artists’ Rights Artists have the right to produce what they Creative; creative freedom; want integrity;

Diversified The NEA is part of a larger funding Cooperation; partnership Patronage structure for the arts

Seal of Approval NEA funding decisions serve as an Leadership; judgment example for other funding institutions

Art Education The NEA must provide funding for arts Catalyst; civilizing education because it is not a priority elsewhere

Economic Impact Arts activity results in additional economic Impact activity in local communities

Partnerships The NEA is operating in cooperation with Dialogue; interchange other institutions

Accountability The NEA must be accountable to multiple Public support; trust; constituencies justify; oversight

Frohnmayer’s nomination hearing included many comments about the candidate’s theological and legal training, seen as an asset when considering the nomination. This type of background had proven useful during Biddle’s tenure and was stated by members of Congress as a demonstration of Frohnmayer’s ethos. Frohnmayer’s was portrayed by 252

supporters as someone with a “reconciling personality” (Frohnmayer Confirmation

Hearing, 1989, p. 6) with the “uncanny ability to defuse to rather than fan controversy”

(p. 8). Given the current circumstances of the NEA, these qualities were what the agency needed to quickly diffuse the situation. When asked about what role was envisioned for the agency, Frohnmayer reinforced the notion of helping repair the arts-advocacy coalition (Frohnmayer Confirmation Hearing, 1989, pp. 11–12):

It would be my hope that the National Endowment for the Arts is a place where

dialogue and interchange can take place with the states, the local and the regional

institutions, with individual artists, with the major institutions that have become,

because of their excellence over the years, a part of our national heritage, and with

smaller arts organizations which are often in the best position to reach rural and

culturally diverse communities, and with all those who have concerns, hopes or

aspirations for the arts in this nation.

It is important to note that this approach excludes tactics to address the growing

OAC, nor does it include congressional allies. Arts advocates in the policy arena wanted a quick resolution to the issues that had plagued the organization in recent months. It was also the desire of the G. H. W. Bush administration, which did not want the controversy to escalate. It is important to note that Frohnmayer received the highest praise from policymakers regarding the perceived ability to navigate and diffuse the situation. When asked about the balance between “federal oversight and federal intrusion” (Frohnmayer

Confirmation Hearing, 1989, p. 13) Frohnmayer’s response was vague. This may have been purposeful, but the committee did not understand the response, and so they asked for clarification. It appeared that Frohnmayer, focused heavily on the legal jargon, had

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trouble making the kind of clear, seemingly definitive statements the committee wanted.

Upon further questioning, Frohnmayer’s feelings about the soundness of the enabling legislation emerged. The members of Congress that were present agreed with this sentiment. With the soundness of the enabling legislation established, discussion turned to the implementation of that legislation: “The events of recent months, while being blown out of proportion, have centered attention on the most sensitive and critical area of the Endowment’s operation, the peer panel review process” (Frohnmayer Confirmation

Hearing, 1989, p. 2).

The issue of controversial grants turned to discussion about how Frohnmayer proposed to navigate the line between oversight and intrusion, especially with regard to the panel-review process: Do you have some ideas about how you preserve the basic integrity of the Endowment and yet avoid future controversies without the restraints of censorship? (Frohnmayer Confirmation Hearing, 1989, p. 24). Members of Congress who were present used the word oversight to connote accountability to taxpayers. Intrusion was used in lieu of government control or censorship, both concerns during Biddle’s tenure. Maintaining the integrity of the agency was also important, as policymakers did not want to promote government control at the expense of artistic freedom. This issue was an underlying theme throughout the hearing. Regardless of the rationale being used, or the specific matter being discussed, a member of Congress always brought the conversation back to the issue of NEA processes and accountability to the public. The fact that the agency was under attack by the OAC and members of the general public were mentioned on 20 separate occasions throughout the hearing. From “recent

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unpleasantness” (p. 1), to “controversy” (p. 38), the publicity concerning Serrano and

Mapplethorpe was in the forefront of policymaker’s minds.

Aside from discussing the interrelated issues of artistic freedom and agency accountability, Frohnmayer outlined areas of focus during his tenure as chair: art education, leadership, and multicultural and rural delivery. Frohnmayer discussed an interest in increasing the amount of input the agency had on art-education curricula, as well as the training and evaluation of art educators; also, Frohnmayer planned to increase the artist-residency program. Similar to Biddle’s desire for more interagency cooperation,

Frohnmayer’s focus on leadership was stated as a way of increasing work with other federal agencies to help make the case for public funding of the arts. As someone from outside the east-coast arts corridor, Frohnmayer understandably focused on increasing arts accessibility in rural areas. The candidate also expressed a desire to increase the amount of multicultural arts across the nation. These two issues addressed a longstanding concern of access to the arts, both geographically and culturally. Finally, Frohnmayer shared the desire to further the role of the NEA as a seal of approval by increasing awareness of the private-citizen aspect of grant judgment.

During the confirmation hearing, Frohnmayer championed art education, believing the NEA should play “an aggressive role” (Frohnmayer Confirmation Hearing,

1989, p. 38) in arts education. Serving as a “catalyst,” the NEA should encourage other federal agencies to help make art education an integral part of general education.

Frohnmayer sought to align the issue of art education with the issue of general education:

“This administration has declared, and I believe all Americans can agree, that an educated populace should be a first order of priority (Frohnmayer Confirmation Hearing,

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1989, pp. 13–14). This statement linked Frohnmayer’s plans to a successful aspect of former chair Hodsoll, as well as to the executive branch, who had also identified education as a means of addressing poverty and unemployment. Frohnmayer based this endorsement of art-education initiatives on various intrinsic arguments for public arts funding. The intrinsic value most frequently aligned with art education was the civilizing affect of the arts. To further tie the issue of general education to art education,

Frohnmayer discussed “cultural illiteracy” and lamented the impact this might have on society and future generations. This argument was not made in a way that would align it with previous legacy arguments from the Establishing Framework.

Building on the work of predecessors, Frohnmayer used ideas that had been explicitly expressed and cultivated in the past as foundational premises. Concepts like the cost disease and diversified patronage, as those concepts were expressed in the

Establishing Framework, were said in passing: “Nonprofit arts have never been, and probably never will be, self-supporting, [therefore] we must seek more successful cooperation and partnership between public support and private money” (Frohnmayer

Confirmation Hearing, 1989, p. 15). While discussing the issues throughout this section,

Frohnmayer used artistic excellence as a justification for public funding of the arts. What was new was Frohnmayer’s use of artistic excellence as a justification for art that may be considered obscene by some. Although it could be argued that Biddle may have had some of the ideational kernels behind this logic of argument, it was not clearly articulated during Biddle’s tenure.

By the end of the confirmation hearing, policymakers’ confidence in Frohnmayer was apparent. Also made clear was policymakers’ assessment of the policy context in

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which they were operating. They fully understood the extent of the controversy in which the agency was currently embroiled, and they identified traits they thought would be best suited to “lead the Arts Endowment past the current controversy” (Frohnmayer

Confirmation Hearing, 1989, p. 2); “the arts in American will face many serious challenges in the years ahead. If we are to meet them successfully, it is imperative that we have a strong leader” (Frohnmayer Confirmation Hearing, 1989, p. 2).

Tenure Overview

Although the Serrano and Mapplethorpe controversies were funded and occurred prior to the start of Frohnmayer’s term, they became the start of a series of controversies that would control the time of the chair. Also, in June of 1990, an Independent

Commission began reviewing the NEA’s granting procedures. This commission was designed to help navigate the agency through the upcoming reauthorization process, in light of the controversies that occurred prior to the start of Frohnmayer’s tenure. In response to controversy over proposed cuts to the agency, and as a demonstration of presidential deflection, the commission was legislated in September 1989 to help assuage growing concern about the agency among the general public and the OAC, which was steadily growing.

Upon being confirmed as chair, Frohnmayer found the NEA disjointed and its staff low on morale. Attempts to hire staff members of Frohnmayer’s own choosing were met with admonishment or silence from presidential personnel (Frohnmayer, 1993), and the chair struggled to understand agency practices and governmental norms. Soon after joining the NEA, Frohnmayer dealt with another controversy. In light of the Serrano and

Mapplethorpe grants, Frohnmayer was reluctant to fan the flames. Therefore, after

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hearing about a show to be held by Artists Space, a lower Manhattan gallery focusing on emerging artists that would include an inflammatory catalog attacking political figures and containing nude photos with potentially problematic postures. Frohnmayer attempted to retract NEA funding, engaging the agency in another controversy. Representatives from Artists Space spoke of freedom of expression. Instead of quelling the issue,

Frohnmayer’s attempt to retract the grant alienated the agency from artists and the arts constituency. This resulted in an artist, the famed composer and conductor Bernstein, refusing the National Medal of Arts in protest. Afterward, Frohnmayer made the rounds in the evangelical community and among other religious groups explaining that the agency was not in the habit of supporting pornography. Further controversy resulted from another artist, Sprinkle who claimed that a show that reenacted a gynecological examination, was government funded. Although the NEA did not fund that show, detractors of the agency used the show and Sprinkle’s comments to add to the agency’s problems.

In addition to dealing with artistic controversies, Frohnmayer spent most of the time as chair dealing with the ramifications of the Helms amendment. Although the

Helms amendment itself was not passed, language from that amendment was adopted into the NEA granting terms and conditions. The language, which prevented the agency from providing funds

to promote, disseminate or produce materials which … may be considered

obscene, including depictions of sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the sexual

exploitation of children, or individuals engaged in sex acts and which, when taken

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as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value

(Frohnmayer, 1993, p. 133) was considered a loyalty oath among artists. As a result, 17 artists refused grants from the agency. Although some of them ended up accepting their grants, the fact that they initially refused them was what garnered media attention.

To compound the already mounting issues in 1990, Frohnmayer took the brunt of the issue when four individual artist grants that had been approved by the peer-review process, known as the NEA Four, filed lawsuits against Frohnmayer. Although they won back their grants in a lower court, the case made its way to the Supreme Court where

Frohnmayer’s decision was upheld. The Supreme Court ruled that the NEA could, and should, consider decency standards when making granting decisions.

The agency continued to combat an increasingly powerful OAC, and, with the help of the Independent Commission, managed to navigate reauthorization despite attacks from both the arts constituency and the OAC. The 1990 reauthorization process resulted in four significant changes to the agency and the way it conducted business (Effect of

Last Year’s NEA Reauthorization Process, 1991). First, grant reviewers were supposed to assess grant applications through a lens of general-decency standards. Second, the percentage of NEA funds required to be set aside for state and local arts organizations was increased to total 35% to be passed along in FY93. Third, of any funds for the organization over $175 million, 50 cents of each dollar must go toward education. Finally, the peer-review process was altered to make panels more representative and to address charges of elitism among panelists.

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After the reauthorization, other skirmishes between the agency, the OAC, and artists ensued. Amid other conflict in the agency, Frohnmayer considered resigning, and discussed this intention with then President Bush. However, in the end, the skills that had received praise during the confirmation hearing did not prove to be adequate tools to face the growing challenges to the agency. Furthermore, the ethos that arts advocates in

Congress created for Frohnmayer did not actually manifest in practice. Frohnmayer was forced to resign after 2 years as chair.

Concerns of the Arts Subgovernment

The arts constituency. The arts constituency focused mainly on three arguments that suggest unity due to the concentration of argument type. However, unlike previous cases, the arts constituency was severely fractured. Some arts-constituency concerns were important to artists, whereas other concerns were primarily expressed by arts administrators, art educators, and general arts advocates. Data stemming from the arts constituency included 172 total arguments, a number that reflects increased media attention and more opportunities to make arguments. Those arguments focused on the following concerns: censorship (43%), artistic freedom (48%), and access (23%; see

Figure 36).

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90$ 84$

80$ 75$

70$

60$

50$

40$

30$

20$ 13$ 10$

0$ Access$(23%)$ Artistic$Freedom$(48%)$ Anti

Figure 36. Arts constituency concerns during Frohnmayer’s tenure.

Word frequency queries provided insight into the rhetorical indicators of each argument. However, it is important to note that the frequencies of words or phrases dropped significantly from the previous cases to this one. This indicates a lack of coherence among the arts constituency in their attempts to justify or simply discuss issues related to public funding of the arts. Nevertheless, some indicators did emerge (see Table

24).

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Table 24

Indicators

Argument Keywords

Anticensorship Control; Restrict;

Artistic Freedom Freedom; Creativity; Right

Access Economic, Ethnic

Data stemming from the artist faction of the arts constituency focused on censorship and artistic freedom. These two issues are related, but different. Artists arguing their right to receive funding for their work, regardless of the subject matter or execution of their work, discussed artistic freedom. Artists concerned with NEA granting procedures talked about censorship, a different way of expressing concern about government control that proved to be much more heated than previous discussions about this issue in both the Establishing Framework and Biddle cases.

Anticensorship. Censorship concerns existed in each attempt to reauthorize the

NEA and since its creation. Although some artists were not supportive of government involvement in arts funding during the time of the Establishing Framework case and the

Biddle case for this reason, they were not in the majority, nor were they organized or vocal in ways that drew the attention of the media or public officials. This changed in the time leading up to and during Frohnmayer’s tenure. Artists connected the issue of funding to censorship in ways that had not been done previously. In the past, government involvement and funding of the arts was discussed as the means through which censorship would occur. Now, arts constituents were saying that the lack of government

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funding would effectively result in censorship: “It is true that withholding of subsidy is not necessarily the same as censorship. But … even without official censorship, the effect could be the same” (Bolton, 1992, p. 165).

Some arts advocates made censorship arguments tied to freedom of speech. These advocates tended to be from specialized professions, mainly lawyers. These arguments were strategic and methodical, as demonstrated by a Harvard law scholar (Bolton, 1992, p. 212):

A nation that has long distrusted loyalty oaths should not be quick to impose

conformity oaths. We have long resisted [censorship] on the grounds that [it]

exerts an intolerable chilling effect. An artist who receives a check in the mail

with a hit list of forbidden ideas attached will forego too much valuable and

innovative expression or fear it will come too close to the line.

The legal committee of the Independent Commission made similar arguments.

Other portions of the arts constituency, such as the Advocacy Committee of the

Association for Independent Film and Video equated the obscenity language added to

NEA granting procedures with censorship. This organization created information for their members highlighting this particular facet of the censorship issue and the various ways to address the issue with policymakers. They offered specific rationales for why the government should permit taxpayer money to be used for art some may find offensive

(Bolton, 1992, p. 207):

The obscenity language is especially objectionable because it intrudes non-artistic

judgment into the grant-making process for the first time in the Endowment’s

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history. This is the road that inevitably leads to banning of movies and books and

other, cruder forms of censorship.

Censorship was portrayed as a negative catalyst that would quell artist creativity, resulting in further censorship issues. This often tied directly into arguments about artistic freedom (see Table 25).

Table 25

Frohnmayer Case, Arts Constituency: Anticensorship Argument Scorecard

Does the argument address the No: This argument was different depending on the subset of the concerns of multiple parts of advocacy coalition. Artists did not want to be censored and the advocacy coalition? The were sensitive to the possibility of being directed away from general public? certain topics. Arts administrators were concerned with their public grants being threatened, types of art they were highly unlikely to present. Finally, the issue is not immediately relevant to the general public.

Does the argument address Yes: this argument addresses the OAC’s wish to prevent the concerns in the OAC? display and dissemination of certain types of art.

Does the argument have No: while this argument was present in both the Establishing connections with other Framework and the Biddle case, it existed in a general sense, arguments? Politically salient without specific incident or context prior to this case. During arguments? this time frame, many of the arguments related to anticensorship were not politically salient.

Is the argument multifaceted? No. Are there subsections of the rationale?

Note. OAC = opposition-advocacy coalition.

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Based on the argument scorecard, anticensorship arguments are weak. The issue was the primary concern of artists, whereas arts administrators were concerned with the potential funding ramifications certain sectors might have for the entire arts constituency.

Furthermore, this argument does not immediately concern the general public, a significant factor during this timeframe. Although anticensorship arguments addressed concerns from the OAC it did not answer those concerns with a concerted effort of organized arguments and consistent rhetoric, and failed to tie in politically salient arguments.

Artistic freedom. Artists were concerned about artistic freedom, with regard to their eligibility for NEA grants. This was demonstrated by the exchange between

Frohnmayer and Wyatt, Executive Director of Artists Space. In a letter, Frohnmayer discussed the content of the show and stated: “on this basis, I believe that the

Endowment’s funds may not be used to exhibit or publish this materials” (Bolton, 1992, p. 126). Wyatt responded, “I am writing to inform you that our Board has met and voted unanimously not to relinquish the funds” (Bolton, 1992, p. 126). This incident demonstrated that, although Artists Space enjoyed the ability to do what they wished with their show, they also expected to remain eligible for funds from the NEA. Heartney, an art critic, discussed this dilemma (Bolton, 1992, p. 147):

The current controversies represent the explosion of tensions long existing

between the art world and society at large, tensions which originate in the

contradictions inherent in wanting to have it both ways—to be allowed total

artistic freedom (which generally translates into contempt for the philistine

public) while enjoying public support for the arts.

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Although not explicitly stated, many of the arguments stemming from the arts constituency regarding artistic freedom were linked to intrinsic value arguments. This was mainly demonstrated in the fact that the rationale behind why artistic freedom was important was always vague: “To limit that creative spirit in the name of public sensibility is to deny to society one of its most significant resources” (Bolton, 1992, p. 157). This argument was often used by artists. In contrast, many arts administrators understood the need to market their arts activities and were more concerned with granting decisions than with the actual artistic-freedom argument (see Table 26).

Table 26

Frohnmayer Case, Arts Constituency: Artistic Freedom Argument Scorecard

Does the argument address the Yes: artists and arts administrators had come to count on some concerns of multiple parts of public support and wanted to continue receiving that support the advocacy coalition? The regardless of their particular artistic activity. This issue was general public? important to the general public, whose tax dollars played a large part in the issue, symbolically if not financially.

Does the argument address Yes: this argument spoke to the concern of fiscal responsibility concerns in the OAC? stemming from the OAC.

Does the argument have No: This argument is linked to the aforementioned connections with other anticensorship argument as well as intrinsic-value arguments. arguments? Politically salient However, because censorship of specific types of art was being arguments? hotly contested in the policy arena, it was not politically salient. Intrinsic arguments, while not contested in the policy arena were rarely used on their own.

Is the argument multifaceted? No: the listed ramifications for the loss of artistic freedom were Are there subsections of the multifaceted, but the argument itself was not. rationale?

Note. OAC = opposition-advocacy coalition. 266

Based on the argument scorecard this was a relatively strong argument without the benefit of a strong foundation. It included multiple portions of the arts constituency and addresses a concern of the OAC, but it was not a multifaceted argument with clearly identifiable language connected to other politically salient arguments.

Access. Access arguments were another way the arts constituency demonstrated their lack of cohesion. Artists of color and female artists were still dealing with issues of inequality discussed in research from the Biddle case. A poster directed at Senator Helms highlighted the issues of access discussed in the arts constituency (Bolton, 1992, p. 313):

The number of blacks at an art opening is about the same as at one of your garden

parties; most art collectors, like most successful artists, are white males; women

artists have their place: after all, they earn less than 1/3 of what male artists earn;

museums are separate but equal. No female black painter or sculptor has been in a

Whitney Biennial since 1973. Instead, they can show at the Studio Museum in

Harlem or the Women’s Museum in Washington; the sexual imagery in most

respected works of art is the expression of wholesome heterosexual males.

Although these issues were added to the concerns of artistic freedom and censorship, they were not part of the media cycle surrounding the arts world at the time.

Therefore, these issues did not make it to the mainstream. The general public was absent in this matter. This is a marked difference from the way the issue of access was conceived in both the Establishing Framework and Biddle chapters (see Table 27).

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Table 27

Frohnmayer Case, Arts Constituency: Access Argument Scorecard

Does the argument address the No: this particular iteration of this argument was limited concerns of multiple parts of the to artists and arts administrators. advocacy coalition? The general public?

Does the argument address concerns No: the OAC was not concerned with access in any of its in the OAC? iterations, including this one.

Does the argument have connections No: this argument was related to arguments about the with other arguments? Politically plight of artists and access to NEA funding from the salient arguments? Biddle case, but the argument was not a priority in the past and was not politically salient during this timeframe.

Is the argument multifaceted? Are Yes: while the overall argument is about minority races, there subsections of the rationale? there are multiple minority groups that were specifically mentioned.

Note. OAC = opposition-advocacy coalition; NEA = National Endowment for the Arts.

Based on the argument scorecard, the access argument was not strong. Because this argument did not address the entire arts constituency, and was not a pressing issue for the general public, it did not lend itself to being used by multiple facets of the arts subgovernment. Furthermore, although this had been a concern of the arts constituency in the past, this issue was less prominent during this time frame.

Conclusion. Portions of the arts constituency were far more politically savvy than some of the artist factions. Organizations like the Association for Independent Film and

Video called for organized campaigns for public arts funding throughout the artistic controversies. In accordance with best practices from the ACF they encouraged an approach based on logic and technical information, such as public support of arts research 268

(Bolton, 1992, p. 206). Other arts advocates called on the general public to review the legislation being proposed and methodically outlined the detriment that censorship would cause. However, artists targeting specific members of Congress and the OAC were granted more attention from other portions of the arts subgovernment.

Overall the arguments stemming from the arts constituency were neither cohesive nor strong, according to the argument scorecards. These arguments only took into account the desires of artists and arts organizations to the exclusion, and often alienation of members of the general public. The number of controversial artworks and their media coverage, coupled with these arguments, shifted the way the general public felt about artists and public arts funding. While previous cases saw some concern over the actual work of artists, these feelings were largely limited to members of Congress. During the two previous cases the general public was either supportive or apathetic. This was no longer the case. At a time of heightened public attention, the agency was not making it a point to make any arguments to the general public about their most popular benefit, access.

Advocacy Coalition Strength at the Start of Frohnmayer’s Tenure

Based on their respective data, Table 28 shows Frohnmayer’s and the Arts

Constituency’s rationale preferences at the start of Frohnmayer’s tenure.

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Table 28

Frohnmayer’s and the Arts Constituency’s Rationale Preferences

Rationale rank John Frohnmayer Arts constituency

1st Access Artistic Freedom (geographic)

2nd Accountability Anticensorship

3rd Intrinsic Value Access (female & minority artists)

Although access showed up as one of the top three rationales from Frohnmayer and from the arts constituency, they each focused on different aspects of the access argument. Frohnmayer was concerned with rural access, evidenced by multiple examples about the arts in Oregon, whereas the arts constituency focused on access to NEA funding for women and minorities. Otherwise, the concerns of the chair did not match those of the arts constituency at the start of this tenure. There was the potential for overlap with intrinsic value and artistic freedom, as parts of the arts constituency based their artistic-freedom argument on intrinsic values, but the connection was not explicit.

This type of disjointed advocacy coalition left room for the OAC to gain momentum and popularity (Sabatier & Weible, 2007).

Oppositional Advocacy Coalition (OAC). Of 200 total arguments, the OAC focused on three rationales: accountability (36%), bad art (35%), and no need (16%; see

Figure 37).

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80$ 73$ 70$ 70$

60$

50$

40$ 33$ 30$

20$

10$

0$ Accountability$(36%)$ Bad$Art$(35%)$ No$Need$(16%)$

Figure 37. Concern of the opposition-advocacy coalition during Frohnmayer’s tenure as chair.

The arguments from the OAC had the word indicators shown in Table 29, which were consistent across individuals and sources.

Table 29

Word Indicators From the Opposition-Advocacy Coalition

Argument Keywords

Accountability Accountable; Taxpayers; the public;

Bad Art Obscene; Pornography; Offensive

No Need The market; Compete

Bad art. The OAC argued that the NEA was in the business of funding bad art, or art they deemed obscene or blasphemous. Given the controversy over the work of

Serrano and Mapplethorpe, arguments about immorality and pornography were directly

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linked to specific works of art. This argument was often used in direct correspondence with the general public, such as the Christian Coalition, letting people know about the

“vile content of [their] tax funded material” (Bolton, 1992, p. 123); and “photographs too vulgar to print” (Bolton, 1992, p. 124). The American Family Association discussed

“pornographic, anti-Christian ‘works of art’” (Bolton, 1992, p. 150). In most cases this argument was used in conjunction with the accountability argument. This is because, by itself, this argument could sound more like a description or foundation on which other arguments could be built. This was a direct challenge to longstanding values of quality and seal of approval (see Table 30).

Table 30

Frohnmayer Case, Opposition-Advocacy Coalition: Bad Art Argument Scorecard

Does the argument address the No: The argument was designed to address the OAC, but it concerns of multiple parts of the did resonate with some members of the general public. advocacy coalition? The general public? Does the argument address Yes: The argument that the NEA is funding bad art is a concerns in the OAC? direct response to the NEA argument that its funding decisions are based on quality. Does the argument have Yes: This argument was directly linked to accountability connections with other arguments. The question of quality was politically salient arguments? Politically salient during this time frame. arguments? Is the argument multifaceted? Are Yes: Bad art encompassed a variety of explanations, from there subsections of the rationale? religious based arguments (blasphemy) and decency (pornography), to issues with very broad appeal (child exploitation). Note. OAC = opposition-advocacy coalition; NEA = National Endowment for the Arts. 272

Based on the argument scorecard the bad-art argument is very strong. In addition to combating claims from the NEA about their commitment to funding quality art, the OAC used a variety of definitions to categorize art funded by the NEA as bad. This paved the way for accountability arguments.

Accountability. Members of the OAC concentrated many of their arguments on taxpayer accountability. It is important to note that this argument is an alternative way of addressing the general public, reframing them as taxpayers rather than arts audiences (see

Table 31). This argument was directly linked to the premise that the NEA was funding bad art. The argument focused on the fact that public money should not be used to fund bad art. This argument often painted the artists as the root of the problem, and the NEA as enablers: “The NEA makes the grants available to members of the arts community and they are free to spend the tax funds without accountability to anyone for how the money is spent” (Bolton, 1992, p. 150).

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Table 31

Frohnmayer Case, Opposition-Advocacy Coalition: Accountability Argument Scorecard

Does the argument address the Yes: This argument does address the concerns of some concerns of multiple parts of the conservative members of Congress. This argument also advocacy coalition? The general addresses the general public. public?

Does the argument address concerns Yes: The chair and members of Congress who supported in the OAC? the NEA were also discussing accountability. However, the OAC talked about how the NEA was not maintaining accountability.

Does the argument have connections Yes: This argument was based on the premise that the with other arguments? Politically NEA was funding bad art. At a time when public outcry salient arguments? over some controversial art was being discussed in the policy arena, this argument had political salience.

Is the argument multifaceted? Are No: This argument was focused solely on taxpayer there subsections of the rationale? accountability.

Note. OAC = opposition-advocacy coalition; NEA = National Endowment for the Arts.

Based on the argument scorecard, accountability was a strong argument. Although the

OAC did not try to incorporate other members of the arts subgovernment, they focused their efforts on the general public to strengthen their base of support and to influence policymakers who were dependent on the general public for votes.

No need. The OAC called on an argument seen in the Establishing Framework to complete their campaign against public arts funding (see Table 32). OAC members stated that artists were not special, and that they should have to compete in the marketplace like all other members of society: “Artists such as Serrano and Mapplethorpe will still be free to produce their ‘art,’ but not with the tax dollars of truck drivers, brick masons,

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carpenters, and factor workers who must compete in the marketplace” (Bolton, 1992, p. 72).

Table 32

Frohnmayer Case, Opposition-Advocacy Coalition: No Need Argument Scorecard

Does the argument address the No: This argument is not concerned with including multiple concerns of multiple parts of facets of the arts subgovernment, but it does address the general the advocacy coalition? The public. general public?

Does the argument address Yes: Some arts advocates were concerned with the “special concerns in the OAC? status” artists appeared to enjoy. Although they did not argue that artists should have to compete in the marketplace, this does take a concern from the opposition and build on it in a way that resonated with the general public.

Does the argument have No; Yes: This argument was not directly linked to other connections with other arguments in use at the time, but it does connect to arguments arguments? Politically salient against public arts funding that were present in the policy arena arguments? during the Establishing Framework case.

Is the argument multifaceted? No: This argument was focused solely on artists’ need to Are there subsections of the compete in the marketplace like other citizens. rationale?

Note. OAC = opposition-advocacy coalition.

Based on the argument scorecard, this argument was weaker than the other two employed by the OAC during this timeframe. This could explain why it was used far less than the other two rationales. This argument did not have many discussion points to accompany it.

Conclusion. The OAC rallied around the bad-art argument and furthered their argument by stating that public dollars should not be used to support obscene or offensive

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art. Arguing for artists to be held accountable to taxpayers was an argument designed to bring additional members of the general public into the OAC. The OAC also resurrected arguments from the Establishing Framework that placed the arts in a market context.

Arguing that artists should be able to make a living working in the same capitalist structure in which business operates played into the growing fiscal conservatism among the general public. Overall, the OAC presented a unified set of argument with consistent language. Although their arguments were not designed to win over members of the arts constituency, they were able to reach some members of Congress and increase their political power with the support of congressional allies.

Rationales Used During the Chair’s Tenure

In the data source that belonged solely to the chair, NEA Annual Reports,

Frohnmayer made a total of 76 arguments in support of the agency, using a variety of rationales (see Figure 38): access 24 (32%), intrinsic values 25 (33%), art education 10

(13%), quality 8 (10%), industry comparison 4 (5%), economic impact 2 (3%), and the

U.S. image abroad 3 (4%).

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2$ 3$ Access$(32%)$ 4$ Intrinsic$Value$(33%)$ 8$ 24$ Art$Education$(13%)$

Quality$(10%)$ 10$ Economic$Impact$(5%)$

Industry$Comparison$ (3%)$ 25$ Image$Abroad$(4%)$

Figure 38. Rationales used during the chair’s tenure.

Frohnmayer focused much time in the annual reports touting the previous successes of the agency: support for individual artists was confirmed in an extraordinary way in early 1990. All of the 1990 Pulitzer Prize winners in the arts fields were assisted by the Endowment earlier in their careers (NEA, 1989, p. vi). Each of Frohnmayer’s arguments included the agency’s past achievements and tied them to arguments about the agency’s commitment to quality. This appeared to be a much safer argument than to argue the artistic merits and quality of art that was currently under attack in the OAC.

Frohnmayer spent the majority (78%) of time as chair discussing issues that directly impacted artists and arts audiences: access (32%), intrinsic value (33%), and art education (13%). These three arguments presented the agency as an organization designed to serve both the artists and the general public; an idea that was pressed on

Frohnmayer in the confirmation hearings. When discussing access, Frohnmayer discussed the number of communities the NEA was able to reach with a variety of arts programming: “Twenty-five years ago there was no National Endowment for the Arts,

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most quality arts organizations were clustered in New York City and a few other metropolitan areas” (NEA, 1990, p. 6). The research sources from the agency during this time also focused on the audience for the arts: The Audience for American Art Museums

(1991a); Expanding the Audience for the Performing Arts (1991b); and Participation in the Arts by Blacks and Whites (1990b). Frohnmayer addressed the multicultural aspect of access by mentioning the various artists and types of art supported in the name of diversity and being inclusive (NEA, 1990b). Frohnmayer employed intrinsic values of the arts arguments with a variety of subarguments to reinforce the broader argument about the often immeasurable benefits of the arts. Although intrinsic arguments were present in both the Establishing Framework and Biddle chapters, they were rarely used on their own.

Frohnmayer, however, often combined multiple iterations of the same argument: “the arts help children to understand civilization, try various approaches to problem-solving, use intuition as well as reason, and develop the discipline required for success in life” (NEA,

1989, p. vii). Art education, the issue most dear to Frohnmayer (1993), was discussed as a concern with the general public, meaning the arts in schools. In the Establishing

Framework chapter, art education was discussed as an artists’ issue. During the Biddle case, both types of art education—for the general public and for the professionalization of artists—were discussed. Here, the issue again shifted to be solely about the general public.

Although the U.S. image abroad was not discussed often, it was used in conjunction with other rationales such as the intrinsic values of the arts and industry comparison: “Our wealth and position in the world depends as much upon our reverence for ideals and free expression as they do upon technology and material wealth” (NEA,

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1989, p. vii). This kind of argument layering was last seen in the Establishing Framework chapter (see Table 33).

Table 33

Strength of the Advocacy Coalition During Frohnmayer’s Tenure

Rationale rank John Frohnmayer Arts constituency

1st Intrinsic Value Artistic Freedom

2nd Access Anti-Censorship

3rd Art Education Access

In this case the focus of the arts constituency was much narrower than

Frohnmayer’s; they only had three main arguments, whereas the chair made seven different arguments. The only commonality between these two portions of the advocacy coalition is access. However, arts advocates focused on access in the form of access to funding and support for women and minority artists. Frohnmayer focused on public access to the arts from both a geographic and multicultural perspective, which aligned with the way access was discussed when Biddle was chair. This lack of common arguments and lack of cohesion, even when the same argument category was used, suggests a fragmented coalition.

In comparison the arguments and actions from both Frohnmayer and the arts constituency the OAC appeared organized and consistent. The OAC used complimentary rationales. Regardless of whether the OAC’s arguments were based on accurate facts, they appeared to build a methodical case, supplemented with the fears some members of

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the general public held regarding the moral decay of society. Admittedly, a few individuals speaking on behalf of the group as a whole helped maintain the consistency of their arguments.

Rationales In The Policy Arena

In FY91, there were a total of 184 arguments used to discuss the NEA and public arts funding. The following rationale categories were represented: Access: 14 (8%),

Quality: 60 (33%), Censorship 26 (14%), Accountability (Taxpayer) 67 (36%), Legacy 3

(2%), and Art Education 6 (3%; see Figure 39).

80$ 67$ 70$ 60$ 60$ 50$ 40$ 26$ 30$ 14$ 20$ 8$ 6$ 10$ 3$ 0$

Figure 39. FY91 arguments. Table 34 shows the top three rationales used by the main groups in the policy arena during FY91.

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Table 34

Top Three Rationales Used by the Main Groups FY91

Actor Top three rationales

Chairman Access Accountability Quality

Arts Constituency Censorship Access Artistic Freedom

OAC Accountability Quality N/A

Policymakers Accountability Censorship Access

During the FY91 Appropriations Hearings, controversies resulting from the actions of members from the arts constituency, namely artists, and the organized OAC were at the forefront of the agenda. Issues directly related to funding controversies

Quality (33%), Censorship (14%), Accountability (36%), and Artistic Freedom (4%) made up 77% of the total arguments discussed during the hearings.

Policymakers, the OAC, and the arts constituency were all primarily concerned with issues related to arts funding controversies: censorship and accountability. The arts constituency, despite deep fractures in their coalition, was able to demonstrate some cohesiveness in the policy arena. This was particularly noticeable in light of their differing opinions outside of the policy arena. Frohnmayer, however, focused energy on access arguments. Although the chair did address the funding controversies, particularly through the use of accountability and quality arguments, they were fewer in number than the arguments regarding geographic and cultural access to the arts. This demonstrates a disconnection from the rest of the arts subgovernment, whose concerns converged on the issues at the heart of the current controversy.

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In the policy arena, Frohnmayer changed terms from access to inclusiveness. The ideational kernels that comprised the elements Frohnmayer identified under inclusiveness are strongly related to those that comprised many facets of access arguments seen in the

Establishing Framework and Biddle cases. There is no direct, clearly identifiable reason for the rhetorical shift away from the word access. As discussed in previous cases, both the concept and the term were politically salient and enjoyed success in all facets of the arts subgovernment.

Reauthorization

FY92. In FY92, there were a total of 140 arguments used to discuss the NEA and public arts funding. The following rationale categories were represented: Accountability

40 (28%); Access 36 (26%); Quality 28 (20%); Seal of Approval 14 (10%); Economic

Impact 10 (7%); Economic Plight 7 (5%); Artistic Freedom 5 (4%; see Figure 40).

45$ 40$ 40$ 36$ 35$ 28$ 30$ 25$ 20$ 14$ 15$ 10$ 10$ 7$ 5$ 5$ 0$

Figure 40. FY92 arguments.

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Table 35 shows the top three rationales used by the main groups in the policy arena during FY92.

Table 35

Top Three Rationales Use by the Main Groups FY92

Actor Top three rationales

Chairman Accountability Quality Access (cultural & geographic)

Arts Constituency -0- -0- -0-

OAC -0- -0- -0-

Policymakers Accountability Access (geographic) Art Education

Unlike the other hearings investigated throughout this study, these hearings did not have representation from the arts constituency, nor the OAC. There are some potential explanations for the absence of one or both groups. One reason the OAC might have been missing from these hearings is that FY92 was an election year. Buchanan challenged incumbent president Bush in the spring primaries. It was on this stage, much larger and more public than an appropriations hearing, that the topic of the culture wars,

NEA funding choices, and Bush’s support of the agency were discussed. It appears that the OAC shifted the argument from the subgovernment to a larger arena that was much more visible to the general public. As a result of moving the issue out of the specialized environment, it may have no longer been necessary to ensure a strong presence in the specialized issue community. The OAC turned public arts funding into an election issue,

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directing the comments to the president and policymakers up for reelection, shifting away from Frohnmayer, the agency, and the arts constituency.

Another factor, one that may provide a rationale for the absence of the arts constituency, stems from the reauthorization. These hearings were significantly focused on how the agency was adjusting to the mandates resulting from the reauthorization hearings. Rather than being a recap of the agency’s actions and choices the previous year, coupled with future projections and budget justification, as is the normally the case, these hearings were more about how the agency was changing its operating procedures. Far from a traditional appropriations hearing, these hearings saw many more questions about how the agency planned on changing and evolving in order to distance itself from past controversies while preventing future ones. This focus would largely negate the need for artists and arts administrators, whose purpose in previous hearings was to provide supplemental information about the impact of the agency during the past year. Because this was not the focus of these hearings, their presence was not absolutely necessary.

Furthermore, policymakers who were supportive of the agency may have wanted these hearings, which were tied to such a controversial issue and governmental agency, to be out of the public eye. This may have prompted them to avoid the additional publicity that would have come with a testimony from artists and members of the arts constituency.

All parties involved were concerned with the postreauthorization agency. Many questions regarding how the reauthorization process, and the OAC sponsored attacks on the agency that preceded the reauthorization, were discussed throughout the hearings.

The questions primarily concerned changes to the structure and autonomy of the agency in light of both the recent controversies and mandates that were part of the

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reauthorization legislation. One way that the postauthorization agency was discussed was with the reemergence of partnership discussions. However, unlike previous iterations of partnership arguments seen in the Establishing Framework and Biddle cases, this discussion was not based on any rationale; it was based on rationalizing the mandated redistribution of a portion of funding to SAAs. There was an increase from 20% of the agency’s budget to 35% of the agency’s budget dedicated for redistribution, a demonstration of lost political control and agency autonomy.

Although Frohnmayer and policymakers share accountability as the top thing they discussed, this fact is guided by the policymakers. When possible, Frohnmayer directed the conversation toward subjects like art education and intrinsic rationales why the arts are important and continue to deserve public funding. The reason Frohnmayer’s top rationale is accountability is because he was forced to respond to multiple questions about the agency’s measures to ensure accountability in the future.

These hearings, in the way that Frohnmayer was addressed, and in the way that

Frohnmayer responded to questions from policymakers, appeared to be a more relaxed environment than previous public appearances and hearings during this chair’s tenure.

This was reinforced by Frohnmayer himself, who had contemplated resigning prior to these hearings, but reconsidered largely due to the chair’s reception at these hearings.

Unfortunately, they lulled the chair into a false sense of security about the way

Frohnmayer was assessed by policymakers, the OAC, and the arts constituency

(Frohnmayer, 1993).

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Policy Change Management Assessment

Subgovernment Advocacy Agency Action Policy Situation Argument Action Impact Outcome Outcome

Conflicting Changes made to Externally induced Inauspicious Policy Deflect change in the agency's advocacy changes to the Window subgovernment arguments agency

Figure 41. Policy change management assessment.

Policy situation. By all accounts, Frohnmayer inherited a difficult situation as chair. Grant decisions and controversies that occurred prior to Frohnmayer’s nomination created an inauspicious policy window. This particular inauspicious policy window was compounded by openly hostile pieces of the arts subgovernment that were antagonizing each other.

The portion of the advocacy coalition housed in the government understood the political climate, and did have an idea of the personality traits they thought would help diffuse the situation. During confirmation hearings, members of Congress focused on

Frohnmayer’s calming personality traits. They also placed emphasis on the habit of trying to reach resolutions based on mutual understanding. Frohnmayer was touted as someone from outside the District of Columbia who had a fresh perspective.

Argument action. Frohnmayer employed a combination of action and rhetoric.

However, the rhetoric and the actions that accompanied it were not a coordinated effort.

Frohnmayer’s rhetoric focused on rational explanations, whereas the chair’s actions were mainly reactionary. According to statements made in the confirmation hearing and

Frohnmayer’s book, the chair wished to focus on the issue of art education. However,

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Frohnmayer was not permitted much time to devote to personal desires for the agency.

Instead, the majority of the chair’s time was spent reacting to crises created by the OAC or stemming from events occurring in the arts constituency. However, it is important to note that, rather than follow the outlined course above, Frohnmayer’s policy situation and subsequent considerations diverged and converged at the end points shown in Figure 41 with the a different path in the middle, as demonstrated in Figure 42.

Subgovernment Advocacy Agency Action Policy Situation Argument Action Impact Outcome Outcome

Conflicting Changes made to Externally induced Inauspicious Policy Deflect change in the agency's advocacy changes to the Window subgovernment arguments agency

Disparate Issue Fissures within the Definitions & Avoid subgovernment Advocacy Arguments

Figure 42. Policy change.

The rhetorical strategy most often employed by Frohnmayer was success stories.

In annual reports, as well as when addressing policymakers in the policy arena,

Frohnmayer made frequent mention of the agency’s past successes. When discussing controversies that would define the chair’s tenure, Frohnmayer used success stories in an attempt to lessen the political strength of grants used by the OAC to attack the agency.

Based on the data, it was difficult to clearly define the type of argument action

Frohnmayer employed. At times the chair appeared to be making attempts to deflect attacks. For example, Frohnmayer consistently drew the conversation to art education and the desire to see access to the arts continue to increase during the nomination hearing, even though controversy over some NEA policies were already a prominent concern among policymakers. At other times, it appeared that Frohnmayer was conceding, as 287

during the Arts Space incident. Even Frohnmayer admitted often being unsure of how to handle difficult situations (Frohnmayer, 1993). Frohnmayer did offer responses to the

OAC’s charges against the agency, but they were not received well outside of the policy arena. Arguments from the chair and the logic-based arguments from subsections of the arts constituency were undermined by the emotional responses of many artists and arts administrators, prior to being combatted by the OAC.

Frohnmayer's amazement with the way Washington operated, the inability to hire people who were familiar (people without Washington connections), and a growing disillusionment with people's lack of candor and honesty in the policy arena were chronicled in the autobiography (Frohnmayer, 1993). Frohnmayer's naiveté was quickly identified by others, such as Southern and Biddle, who offered help to learn the

Washington system (Zeigler, 1994). The data did not detail why Frohnmayer did not accept their offer. However, an unsuccessful meeting with Stevens early in Frohnmayer’s tenure suggests that Frohnmayer also became disillusioned with the agency a few months after taking on the role of chair.

Subgovernment impact. The overall subgovernment impact was fragmentation.

In the Establishing Framework and Biddle chapters, the lack of a strong, organized OAC permitted the space for most of the active subgovernments of that time to be relatively cohesive and self-sufficient. In contrast, this case saw an arts subgovernment with a variety of disparate concerns and priorities. In the arts constituency artists were primarily concerned with artistic freedom and the ability to receive grant funds regardless of how the general public perceived their art. Arts administrators and others working in and representing arts institutions wanted to avoid losing grant funding and support from the

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general public based on the actions of some artists. This division went unresolved at the time Frohnmayer left the agency. The emergence of an OAC confounded issues by assisting in dividing the arts constituency from a previously supportive policymaker base.

As with the arts constituency fragmentation, these issues were not resolved at the time of

Frohnmayer’s resignation.

Advocacy outcome. Arts advocates in the policy arena thought that

Frohnmayer’s background in both religion and law would be useful in combating attacks from the religious right and conservative policymakers. In theory, this could have been true, if the perception of Frohnmayer as a theologian and legal mind were more dominant than the perception of this chair as a naive outsider. The inability to pick a definitive side prevented Frohnmayer from forming alliances with either. This, in turn, prohibited the chair from organizing a successful defense against further attacks from the OAC, or antagonistic or retaliatory actions from the arts constituency. As a result, Frohnmayer’s rhetoric and actions were not supported throughout the arts constituency. It is difficult to classify the advocacy outcome as a change in advocacy argument from inside the agency, because they were unable to promote advocacy arguments at all. Instead, agency efforts were spent defending the agency and public arts funding. Defensively making a case for public arts funding in the face of potential agency elimination is distinctly different from proactively making a case for the arts to increase or strengthen an existing advocacy coalition. However, when afforded the opportunity to speak of something other than the artistic freedom/obscene art controversy, Frohnmayer did put forth some advocacy arguments, mainly about geographic access and art education, the two arguments that

Frohnmayer identified as rationale preferences in the confirmation hearing. The

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arguments were unable to generate noticeable support due to the arts subgovernment's preoccupation with the current conflict. This resulted in changes to the agency's advocacy arguments, which were not seen in the arts subgovernment.

Policy-entrepreneur scorecard. Developed from the conceptual framework, the policy-entrepreneur scorecard consists of the following benchmarks:

• Broaden and/or strengthen their advocacy coalition or success in the coalition

• Deflect attacks from the OAC or success in the OAC

• Furthering the policy entrepreneur’s interpretation of agency goals or success

in the policy arena

Based on the policy-entrepreneur scorecard, Frohnmayer was not a successful policy entrepreneur. Due to the inner turmoil in the arts constituency, compounded by some of Frohnmayer’s own actions and decisions, the chair was unable to either build or strengthen the advocacy coalition: “having made the decision to reject the four performance artists, I became the object of the vitriol of both the left and the right”

(Frohnmayer, 1993, p. 178). Frohnmayer was also unable to further the goal for the agency. Frohnmayer sought to increase art education throughout the nation, and there were additional funds appropriated to artist-in-residence programs and state-arts-agency education programs, but Frohnmayer failed to articulate the impact of these initiatives in either the policy arena or in the agency’s annual report in ways that would suggest definitive success in this area. Unlike the previous chair, who clearly articulated how goals were achieved to provide access to the best, Frohnmayer discussed the programs and the money spent on education in the same manner used to discuss all of the other initiatives undertaken by the agency. This indicates Frohynmayer did not think that it was 290

a personal success on behalf of the agency. If Frohnmayer did feel that efforts to champion art education were successful then, as a successful policy entrepreneur operating in a hostile environment, Frohnmayer should have focused more attention on successes. Finally, Frohnmayer was unable to successfully deflect attacks from the OAC.

This is mainly due to the fact that Frohnmayer’s main argument tactic was avoidance.

When possible, Frohnmayer avoided the topic of the various artistic controversies and the

OAC’s growing power. Deflection was a strategy Frohnmayer realized with hindsight, not while acting as chair (Frohnmayer, 1993).

Overall, the subgovernment was openly hostile to Frohnmayer throughout this chair’s tenure. Rather than having the ability to create a larger coalition in the arts constituency as a result of a crisis created by an OAC, Frohnmayer suffered hostilities from the arts constituency. It could be argued that the findings of the Independent

Commission were one of the few exceptions. However, the findings were supportive of the agency, not Frohnmayer specifically. In their recommendations, the Independent

Commission indirectly criticized Frohnmayer by suggesting a stronger role for the chair.

Frohnmayer’s lack of success as a policy entrepreneur was particularly surprising to policymakers who were optimistic about Frohnmayer’s perceived skillset, which were touted throughout his confirmation hearing. Policymakers assumed that Frohnmayer’s background in law and theology would make this chair particularly apt at dealing with the growing OAC. Previous arts experience led policymakers to believe Frohnmayer could provide the arts constituency with leadership and guide them toward a more unified voice.

The flaw in their assumptions about Frohnmayer’s skillset and the impact they would

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have at the agency stemmed from Frohnmayer’s inability to navigate the policy arena and the Washington scene.

Agency action outcome. As a result of the NEA 4 case, which resulted in a

Supreme Court ruling, the agency was restricted from giving out any additional grants to individual artists. From the agency’s and arts constituent’s vantage point, this was not an optimal resolution to censorship concerns that had persisted since the agency’s creation.

This decision did provide some additional operational autonomy to SAAs who now had an increased responsibility to serve the needs of individual artists. This outcome was due, in part, to a demonstrated fracture within the arts constituency. SAA leaders called for more autonomy, and for a restriction in the autonomy of the NEA (Gamarekian, 1990b).

The agency was provided with the appropriations shown in Table 36 (NEA, 2011).

Table 36

National Endowment for the Arts Appropriations

Fiscal year Appropriations amount

FY89 $169,090,000

FY90 $171,255,000

FY91 $174,080,737

Frohnmayer’s lack of success in the policy arena would normally result in dire consequences for the agency. However, an alternative to Frohnmayer’s leadership presented itself with the Independent Commission. This group provided some of the characteristics of a successful policy entrepreneur by giving support with technical

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information, unwavering advocacy arguments, and by using the support of policymakers and portions of the arts constituency they represented. The presence of the Independent

Commission, especially during this time of controversy for the agency, helped ward off some of the more detrimental consequences of Frohnmayer’s action and argument choices.

Conclusion

Frohnmayer’s early shift away from the politically salient rhetorical indicator access was a stark departure from the way the literature describes successful rhetoric in the policy arena. Shifting away from a concept or a term with a successful history was not a politically effective choice. Although the concept Frohnmayer expressed with the term inclusiveness was, in many ways, conceptually identical to the concepts expressed by access; the change in terminology does detract from conceptual adherence among multiple facets of the arts subgovernment. In another departure from what is generally understood as politically savvy, Frohnmayer based some rationales on arguments that had not been proven to be politically salient over time. For example, Frohnmayer’s accountability argument, trying to demonstrate the bargain taxpayers are receiving, had not been used before and was a rhetorical risk, especially since Frohnmayer used it in the policy arena during a time when policymakers were deeply concerned with accountability because it was impacting their personal careers. Although none of the policymakers attacked the chair for this rationale, this demonstrates that Frohnmayer often used arguments without a strong rhetorical foundation. Although this could be the way that newer politically savvy arguments are created, that outcome was highly unlikely during a time of controversy.

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As much as members of the arts constituency and the general public expressed some concern over what they saw as political nominations such as Hanks, and even expressed dismay at "insiders" such as Biddle and Hodsoll, it became clear that an

"insider" was required to manage the forces of Congress and the arts constituency.

Frohnmayer was an “outsider” in two very important ways. This chair lacked experience in Washington and was not well-versed, perhaps not even fully aware, of the nuances of

Washington politics. Frohnmayer also lacked any connection to the east-coast arts world which, regardless of the spread of the arts across the country, was still a powerhouse of artistic activity, high-profile artists, and powerful arts organizations. Frohnmayer's naiveté was quickly identified by others, such as Southern and Biddle, who offered to help him learn the Washington system (Zeigler, 1994). Frohnmayer did not take them up on their offer, and there was no data to suggest why. Frohnmayer’s predecessors had intimate knowledge of one, if not both, realms. Frohnmayer was at a disadvantage from the moment of initiation as chair. Frohnmayer's amazement with the way Washington operated, the inability to hire people who were familiar (people without Washington connections), and the growing disillusionment with people’s lack of candor and honesty in the policy arena were chronicled in the autobiography of the time as chair (Frohnmayer,

1993). These factors, coupled with the controversy that existed prior to Frohnmayer’s tenure, and continuing throughout it, contributed significantly to Frohnmayer’s difficulties with a large portion of the arts constituency and the OAC. This case was particularly insightful in that it demonstrated the important role each chair’s ethos, or background, can play.

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Conclusion

This research was conducted to build and refine a theory-based process designed to assess agency leaders’ capacity as policy entrepreneurs. This process was based on three theories from public policy and the theory of argumentation. To assess effective policy entrepreneurship, I followed the following steps:

1. Established the political context of the NEA immediately prior to and during

each chairperson’s tenure

2. Established the rationales used outside of the policy arena by each group in

the arts subgovernment based on the argument scorecard

a. The arts constituency

b. The OAC

c. The chair of the NEA

d. Policymakers

3. Established the strength of the advocacy coalition by comparing the rationales

used by the arts constituency and the chair at the start of the chair’s tenure

4. Tracked the rationales used by each group in the arts subgovernment in the

policy arena

Based on the information gathered in those four steps, I then investigated the way each chairperson worked to

1. Achieve the goals of the agency, as they interpreted them

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2. Build a strong advocacy coalition with the arts constituency and arts

advocates in the policy arena

3. Address concerns of the OAC; or prevent the OAC from taking operational

autonomy, political power, and resources away from the agency

This investigation was successful in that the steps I took did provide the information necessary to make an informed assessment of each chair’s ability as a policy entrepreneur. This led to additional insight about policy entrepreneurs in general. Rather than relying solely on appropriation amounts, or agency popularity among policymakers—both indicators used to measure successful political strategies—my assessment provides a more complete picture. By incorporating all facets of the arts subgovernment, my assessment acknowledges that agency leaders do not operate in a vacuum. They must operate in their specific political context, which includes OACs of varying strengths, policy arenas that house amenable or hostile policymakers, and a supportive or antagonistic advocacy coalition. My assessment takes into account those possibilities and includes the means of gathering information about and identifying various political contexts. According to my assessment tool, policy entrepreneurs can have varying degrees of success as agency leaders, coalition organizers, or oppositional strategists. They can be successful coalition organizers, with rationales and tactics that create a broad and strong advocacy coalition. They can be successful oppositional respondents, managing to avoid or mitigate the damage caused by an OAC. They can also be successful agency leaders, achieving their agency goals.

The application of my assessment tool to the policy issue of federal arts funding was also a success in that it provided different insights into each chair’s tenure. In my

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investigation of Biddle, I was able to discern that the political context was different from what might be assumed based on what secondary sources wrote about Biddle’s time as chair. Many sources discussed Biddle as merely Hanks’s successor. My investigation uncovered the fact that Hanks left the Endowment in a place of less power, both with the arts constituency and with policymakers, than is commonly reported. Hanks’s success was specifically with specific facets of the arts constituency and with the executive branch of the federal government. Although it is not explicitly stated in any of the secondary sources I reviewed, they all acknowledged that various levels of success do exist.

My research demonstrated a way to systematically investigate and prove what some in the field have already taken for granted. Other researchers’ assessments of Hanks, and the lack of nuance regarding discussions of Hanks’s success, led to an initial misdiagnosis of Biddle’s case. Although Biddle did not have to deal with the same openly hostile arts subgovernment as the subsequent chairs, it was necessary to navigate a wary arts constituency and a policy arena with some alienated policymakers. Biddle, through a combination of inclusive rhetoric and action, was able to win over the arts constituency while originally perceived as an elitist. Through changes to the agency,

Biddle was able to demonstrate commitment to multiple subgroups in the arts constituency while also achieving a personal goal for the agency: access to the best.

Because there was no organized OAC, there was no data to assess how Biddle might have handled arguments stemming from them. However, based on the two areas that I was able to assess, Biddle was a largely successful policy entrepreneur. Biddle’s work in the arts constituency and with other federal agencies ensured a broad and cohesive arts

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constituency. Additionally, the agency achieved goals by reaching new audiences and including minority groups in the agency and in the granting process. By acknowledging and allowing for multiple types and degrees of success, my tool proved some of its worth when it forced me to reassess Biddle’s case, prompting me to change it from an equilibrium policy context to one of an auspicious policy window.

Frohnmayer’s time as chair was notorious due to the appearance that the chair was unable to gain allies anywhere in the arts subgovernment. My investigation uncovered that this was not actually the case, although Frohnmayer was not aware of this.

There were smaller portions of the arts subgovernment, far less vocal than those who did not like Frohnmayer, who agreed with many of the chair’s choices regarding the granting procedures at the agency. These were mostly other lawyers and the advocacy subgroup of the arts constituency. Where a majority of the arts constituency found fault with

Frohnmayer was in the delivery of decisions. The chairperson appeared to waffle on many decisions, leaving much room for members of the arts constituency to doubt them.

This is further evidenced when compared to the instance during the Biddle case when Biddle denied a grant to an artist whose application had been reviewed by the peer panel. Biddle made a definitive decision based on the content of the artwork, and did not waver when questioned about the grant. While Biddle did take some criticism from the arts constituency, it was short-lived. In this particular case, information about the different types of success provided additional insight into exactly why Frohnmayer was considered so unsuccessful. Although the analysis did not serve to change the perception of Frohnmayer as an agency leader and policy entrepreneur, it did offer additional understanding of what happens when agency leaders are ineffective.

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The process of conducting the research, although it was predetermined by the conceptual framework and methodology, was unique each time. The Biddle case was rich with data from primary and secondary sources. This is partially due to the amount of time that has passed since Biddle’s tenure, and partially due to the fact that the number of different players and their amount of activity in and around the issue of public arts funding was less. This made it possible to locate and use sources that represent all of the players present in a robust way. However, Frohnmayer’s case included a significantly larger number of players and agendas than Biddle’s. In Frohnmayer’s case it was difficult to find sources that provided a complete view of all the actors involved. Although there were sources that allowed me to account for those players, they were snapshots when I would have preferred to take a more longitudinal approach. There were also some recordkeeping issues that significantly impacted my ability to gather as many sources as I would have liked. The lack of documents and sources from artists and the arts constituency has been lamented among arts administration researchers and educators, and while I anticipated these issues, I was nonetheless hindered by the extent of the recordkeeping issues in arts organizations. Further investigation into this issue revealed that many of the resources I sought were part of private collections of individuals involved with the arts organizations at the time. If I continue with this research, I will secure resources to locate and investigate these sources. Although I do not think they would significantly alter my analysis, I do think that the sources are worth incorporating to ensure a thorough investigation and to provide the most complete picture of the context and the players as possible.

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I found the combined use of the MS framework, the ACF, and the P-E theory helpful in hypothesizing the rhetorical context of each chair’s tenure. While each of these theories has stood alone in other policy analyses and investigations, I found that their combination created a more fine-tuned lens than any one of the theories alone. Kingdon’s policy window helped me conceptualize the scope of my research and identify players who required a thorough investigation. Knowing which groups of players I needed to understand to make an assessment of each chair was an important preliminary step. P-E theory was also useful in the hypothesis phase of my research, helping me identify indicators of the various types of policy windows. The assumption of a policy window, regardless of its polarity, was helpful in identifying data types and sources to examine.

Additional information that would provide insight into each chair’s ability as a policy entrepreneur came from the ACF. Its focus on technical information, which I interpreted as information stemming from the specialized communities in the coalition, helped guide me to look at sources that represented multiple facets of the advocacy coalition prior to their presence in the policy arena. This later proved to be an important step in my assessment process, which yielded useful information about the potential for advocacy coalitions to change their arguments based on whether they were in the policy arena.

Information about the behavior of advocacy coalitions, both independently of and in conjunction with policy entrepreneurs, was a purposeful side effect of my investigation.

It may appear, based on the way my data chapters unfold, that the ACF was the most important theory in my research. Although it was the one that I spent the most time grappling with, it was a microcosm of a larger context in which each chair had to operate.

Operating solely with the ACF would have left me without a structure in which to place

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the information I gained through its use. Without the MS framework, and P-E theory to guide my use of the MS Framework, my analysis would have been incomplete. At best, my assessment of each chair would have been made without a true understanding of their particular policy context. At worst, my assessment would have missed information about subgovernment groups, particularly the ways they acted and reacted to each chair’s actions.

Using the three aforementioned theories to construct a timeline of events ties to arts policy at the federal level was a significant part of my preliminary research. Because the theories I used as the foundation of my research are dependent upon events and their context, it was important to identify, examine, and record those events. My timeline allowed me to accomplish those tasks while also creating a reference point that allowed me keep the theories I employed in focus while conducting my analysis. This timeline, created by the collection of theoretically informed indicators allowed me to identify cases to investigate, construct hypotheses regarding those cases, and verify my data analysis processes.

My research has shown that rhetorical indicators play a significant role in conceptual adherence among multiple facets of the arts subgovernment. Having a consistent set of terminology allows adherence to conceptual frameworks over time, contributing to the strengthening and deepening of advocacy coalitions. Abrupt changes to terminology, regardless of whether there are changes to the concepts the changed terms are meant express, can result in intercoalition confusion. This directly relates to previous research indicating that consistent terminology is an important part of coalition building and the political salience of various issue definitions. I was, however, surprised to find

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that there were not significant alterations made to the conceptual foundation of many rationales. Based on the MS Framework and ACF discussion of language, I expected the concepts to evolve over time, after additional information was gained and rationale use was assessed. However, the concepts stayed relatively the same in each of the cases I investigated. What did change were the examples that were used. Access, which was always a multifaceted argument, was used mainly to discuss geographic access in the

Establishing Framework; in the Biddle case it was also used to discuss multicultural access. Later, in the Frohnmayer case the concept was used in those two ways. This was an unexpected testament to the incrementalism discussed in P-E theory.

Although these cases did provide information about the importance of the rhetoric used, these cases did not tell me much about the variety of rhetorical strategies possible in the policy arena, as suggested by the theory of argumentation. Although the Establishing

Framework case saw a diverse set of rhetorical strategies, the cases I investigated saw only three rhetorical strategies: success, decline, and illusion. This may be the result of the type of policy I investigated. The activities of the NEA are categorized as distributive policies. I hypothesized that rhetorical strategies employed in the policy arena would be largely influenced by the type of rationale being used. Although this was the case in instances like the cost disease, after the period of establishing punctuation, the type of rhetorical strategies used remained consistent. Although the rhetorical strategy investigation was helpful to my overall process, I did not find nearly as many rhetorical strategies present as I anticipated. Although there were some present in the Establishing

Framework, there were far fewer in the rest of the cases. The main strategies were success, illusion, and decline. The literature regarding argumentation and political

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symbols prepared me to encounter more strategies than I found. This may be indicative of the data sources I reviewed. Appropriations and Reauthorization Hearings seem to be where the three aforementioned strategies would be prominent, but I did not think I would find they were the only ones used. Additional case investigations may provide additional information regarding the type and frequency of different rhetorical strategies based on the particular political context of the different chairs.

Individually, both chairs were provided with a robust analysis of their tenure.

Biddle received little or no formal preparation during the time leading up to the confirmation hearing and during Biddle’s tenure. It could be argued that this was because

Biddle was very familiar with the job, having served in various capacities in the agency since its creation, and because the chair was well versed in operating in the policy arena.

Frohnmayer, given a background in law and experience with public arts agencies in addition to serving on NEA peer-review panels, may have been mistaken for someone that did not need extensive preparation and support. In fact, most the language surrounding Frohnmayer’s nomination and confirmation hearings suggests that others involved assumed that the candidate already had the knowledge base and the personality traits to handle the complex situation at the Endowment alone. However, Frohnmayer would have been well served by some preparation in the way that Washington politics worked at the agency level. I would argue that many of the interagency issues that plagued the chair’s tenure could have been avoided with some additional guidance.

Frohnmayer’s personal account suggests little forewarning that moves in the agency may be the wrong ones or dealing with federal employees in a different way may be more effective; Frohnmayer was always chastised after a mistake was made public.

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Taken together, the two case studies do raise some additional questions for investigation. Based on a comparison of the Biddle and Frohnmayer cases, how important is the general public to the significance, or size, of a policy window? In Biddle’s case, there was some turmoil in the arts constituency regarding the NEA’s granting processes.

Although there was an open policy window, and Biddle did address those concerns, policymakers were not concerned. The number of people Biddle had to answer to was relatively small and specialized. In Frohnmayer’s case the general public was involved.

Although the concerns about funding choices and the panel-review process were present during Biddle, they were not a pressing concern among policymakers until the OAC emerged alongside unhappy members of the general public. This suggests that policy change is more about responding to a larger-scale crisis than it is about self-regulation in advocacy coalitions. However, further investigation of this concern could provide interesting results. For example, concerns over censorship and the “appropriate types of art for government funding” were a concern in the arts constituency in the time leading up to the creation of the NEA, and remained a concern during both the Establishing

Framework and Biddle cases. If this issue was addressed when it was only a concern in the arts constituency, perhaps the space for the controversy, which reached its peak during the Frohnmayer case, would not have existed in the same way. In addition to causing rifts among arts advocates, a condition that encourages actions among OACs, it could be argued that this concern may have been better addressed by a smaller portion of the arts subgovernment, as the ACF indicates.

304

Future Research

Although investigating each Chairman individually was insightful, the true strength of my research and its ability to apply to a broader context is in the comparison of cases. It is through comparing the similarities and investigating the stark differences between each case that a guide for policy entrepreneurship can emerge. In the future, each chair of the NEA should be assessed individually and then those cases should be grouped by political context. This would provide a wealth of knowledge with regard to best practices at the agency level, and for policy entrepreneurs in general.

Another important avenue for future research would be a thorough investigation of the rationales used in the policy arena. My research was based on the premise that rationale use and the language used to express those rationales could provide insight into issues other than advocacy rhetoric. Therefore, I am sure there is additional information to be learned by investigating how arguments changed or remained constant over time.

Although rationale tracking was a piece of my research, it was not the main focus.

Additional research with rationale tracking and language use as the primary concern should be undertaken. The information gained from such research could help arts advocates craft rationales in the future. My research did demonstrate that the way rationales are expressed does matter. Part of advocacy-coalition building is consistent rationale and language use so that advocates have the ability to follow the rationales and add strength to the rhetoric through repetition. Further research into this topic could provide other demonstrations of rationale best practices.

The total number of rationales discussed between Biddle and Frohnmayer suggests that the number of rationales used is an indicator of success in the policy arena.

305

In comparison, the case with fewer overall types of rationale used saw more success than the case with a broader representation of arguments. This dovetails with wisdom shared by Eldeman (1977a) and Kingdon (2003) about the need for simple arguments that are easy to reinforce through repetition in the policy arena. Keeping track of multiple rationales would be more difficult for policymakers who are already dealing with deficits of time and issue attention. This, of course, comes with the caveat that those few arguments are politically salient and part of a cohesive message echoed throughout the advocacy coalition. This is not to say that this factor is an issue of causation rather than correlation, but this is an area where further research could be useful for advocates of various policy issues who operate in the policy arena.

Additional research can also be conducted into other actors and their role as policy entrepreneurs. Although agency leaders are important, and their positions lend themselves to being investigated as policy entrepreneurs, the literature clearly states that anyone can operate as a policy entrepreneur. Although an investigation into other actors’ work as policy entrepreneurs may require my assessment tool to be reimagined, this would be a worthwhile research project that could be useful in providing a more vivid picture of policy entrepreneurship in the government.

Keeping my assessment tool and process intact, it would beneficial if research investigating agency leaders outside of the arts was conducted. This would test the utility of my conceptual framework outside of the arts context and potentially demonstrate its use in a broader public-policy context. Any changes that would need to be made to the assessment tool to apply it to a different policy issue would also provide information about the specific political context of public arts funding at the federal level.

306

Another research project that could be undertaken with my assessment tool is an investigation of state arts agency executive directors as policy entrepreneurs. The similarity in structure and process for many of the nation’s state arts agencies means that many of these agency leaders operate in a similar context to NEA chairpersons, but at the state level. An investigation similar to the one I have conducted at the federal level would provide depth to the understanding of arts policy by adding the state component to the picture.

This research has provided valuable information about the way that policy entrepreneurs act and interact within their advocacy coalition, in response to the OAC, and while operating within the policy arena. While further research is suggested in order to have a more complete picture of policy entrepreneurship at the federal level, and within the policy issue of public arts funding, my work has laid a strong foundation.

307

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322

Appendix A: Codes

323

Code( Description( PRO( Arguments(in(favor(of(public(arts(funding( (INSTR( (Instrumental(Arguments( Rationales(for(public(arts(funding(that(include(countable/measurable( elements/outcomes( (INTRINSIC( (Intrinsic(Arguments( Rationales(for(public(arts(funding(that(do(not(have(countable/measurable( elements/outcomes( (PRIDE( (National(Pride( a.)(The(arts(are(a(source(of(national(pride( ( b.)(The(U.S.(doesn't(want(to(be(shamed(by(other(nations(with(greater(cultural( investment( (ABROAD( (U.S.(Image(Abroad( a.)(The(arts(will(help(improve(the(U.S.'s(image(abroad( ( b.)(The(U.S.(is(in(a(cultural(competition(with(other(nations( (TRADITION( (American(Tradition( a.)(The(U.S.(has(a(long(tradition(of(supporting(cultural/intellectual(pursuits( ( b.)(Want(to(ensure(cultural(traditions(continue(for(future(generations( (CREATE( (Creativity( Government(funds(will(help(stimulate(creativity( (CIVILIZING( (Civilizing(Impact( a.)(Arts(provide(counterweight(to(militarism(&(materialism( ( b.)(Arts(improve(quality(of(life( ( c.)(Arts(are(a(source(of(spiritual(and(emotional(satisfaction( (COMP( (Industry(Comparison( a.)(National(commitment(to(art(should(equal(commitment(to(other(fields( ( b.)(The(arts(should(be(funded(in(the(same(manner(as(other(fields( (COST(DIS( (Cost(Disease( a.)(As(demand(for(the(arts(increases,(so(do(the(costs(of(production(resulting(in(an( increasing(income(gap( ( b.)(By(their(nature(the(arts,(and(arts(institutions(cannot(be(selfRsustaining( (SEAL( (Seal(of(Approval( Federal(funds(are(necessary(to(encourage(private(patrons,(foundation,(business( sponsors,(and(other(levels(of(government(to(provide(funding( (DIV(PAT( (Diversified(Patronage( The(federal(government(is(a(necessary(part(of(a(funding(mix(consisting(of(private( patrons,(foundations,(the(government(and(corporate(sponsors( (SOC( (Social(Impact( SOC(ED:(The(arts(result(in(improved(educational(outcomes( ( SOC(ISS:(The(arts(are(a(way(of(addressing/preventing(negative(social(issues( ( SOC(ID:(The(arts(build(identity(at(the(personal(&(community(levels( ( SOC(CAP:(The(arts(increase(social(capital( ( SOC(EMP:(The(arts(increase(empathy(for(individuals(from(different(backgrounds( (EXCELL( (Excellence( a.)(America(deserves(great(art( ( b.)(Government(funding(is(necessary(to(increase(the(number(of( excellent/professional/legitimate(artists(and(arts(organizations( ( ( 324

Code( Description( ECON(IMP( Economic(Impact( Investment(in(the(arts(generates(other(economic(benefits(to(the(community( (ECON(OPP( (Economic(Opportunity( a.)(Government(funding(is(necessary(for(professional(artists(to(make(a(living(doing( their(art( ( b.)(Government(funding(is(necessary(to(ensure(that(minority(artists(receive(the( same(opportunities(to(produce(art( (ACCESS(( (Access(to(the(Arts( a.)(Only(government(investment(will(provide(adequate(access(across(the(following( categories:( ( Access(1:(Geographic(location( ( Access(2:(Race/Ethnic(Background( ( Access(3:(SocioReconomic(class( ( Access(4:(Physical((dis)ability( (SUCCESS( (Success(of(the(Agency( a.)(Specific(accomplishments(of(the(National(Endowment(for(the(Arts( ( b.)(Accomplishments(of(specific(projects(funding(wholly,(or(in(part,(by(the( National(Endowment(for(the(Arts( (ANTI( (Arguments(against(public(arts(funding( (XDIV(PAT( (Decrease(in(Diverse(Patronage( Government(involvement(in(the(arts(will(discourage(funding(for(the(arts(from( other(sources( (XCREATE( (Decrease(in(Creativity( Government(involvement(in(the(arts(will(restrict(creativity( (CENSOR( (Censorship( Government(involvement(in(the(arts(will(lead(to(censorship(of(artists( (BUDGET( (Budgetary(Concerns( a.)(Fiscal(conservatism:(discouraging(the(growth(of(the(federal(government( ( b.)(The(Government(cannot(afford(new(commitments( ( c.)(The(Government(has(more(important(fiscal(priorities( (UNAMER( (Not(an(American(Tradition( a.)(Little(evidence(of(public(support(for(the(arts(in(the(nation's(history( ( b.)(Arts(support(is(not(mentioned(in(the(constitution( ( c.)(Arts(funding(is(not(the(government's(responsibility( (BAD(ART(( (Bad(Art( a.)(What(the(government(wants(to(fund(is("bad(art"( ( b.)(It's(too(difficult(to(define(what("good(art"(is,(therefore(the(government( shouldn't(fund(one(artists(over(another( ( c.)(Criticism(of(specific(funding(recipients( ( d.)(The(quality(of(arts(and(culture(hasn't(improved(since(federal(funding(began( (OBSCENE( (Obscene(or(Offensive(Art( Taxpayer(dollars(should(not(fund(obscene(or(offensive(art( ( (

325

Code( Description( ELITE( Elitism( a.)(Only(a(small(elite(consume(the(arts,(so(support(for(the(arts(only(aids(a(small( segment(of(the(population( ( b.)(The(National(Endowment(for(the(Arts(only(supports(a(particular(type(of( art/artist( ( c.)(The(arts(are(only(funded(in(large,(metropolitan(areas( (NO(NEED( (No(Need(for(Government(Funding( a.)(Private(support(should(be(sufficient( ( b.)(Artists(in(the(past(survived(without(government(funding( (

326

Appendix B: Strategies

327

Code Description STO Stories Retelling a series of events with emphasis on particular elements of the story STO DEC Story of Decline Description of how conditions are getting worse STO STY Stymied Progress Stories Stories that discuss a stagnation in positive progress STO ILL Story of Change as an Illusion Stories that acknowledge the perception of change, but offer reasons why the situation is actually unchanged STO HELPLESS Story of helplessness Story that present a previously helpless situation alongside proposed methods for intervention STO CONSP Story of Conspiracy Where oppositional forces are portrayed as uncompromising conspirators against the proposed cause METAPHOR Metaphor The act of drawing a comparison between two different policy problems META ORG Organism Metaphor The assertion that the situation is like a living organism META NAT LAW Natural Law Metaphor Claims that there are natural limits on the amount of change that can occur with little or no intervention META MACH Machine Metaphor Arguments that focus on keeping the government running like a machine META TOOL USE Tools in Use Metaphors that imply use of specific policies or tools that will prevent future harm META TOOL AVD Tools to Avoid Metaphors that imply avoidance of specific policies or tools will prevent future harm META CONTAIN Containers Metaphors premised on the idea of a fixed space or amount of resources META DISEASE Where issues are likened to diseases that will spread without intervention SYN Synecdoche Figure of speech where parts are used to represent a whole SYN HORROR Horror Where individuals pick a particularly offensive incident to represent all cases SYN GRAIL Holy Grail Where one example of extreme success is presented as the common occurrence AMBIG Ambiguity The use of statements and experiences that have more than one meaning AMB INAD CAUSE Inadvertent Cause Inadvertent causes of problems defined in the policy arena AMB INT COND Intervening conditions Intervening conditions from other policies AMB SIDE EFFECT Side Effects Side effects from natural conditions of the policy issue AMB SLIP SLOPE Slippery Slope A policy issues is presented as not inherently bad, but as the probable cause for future harm VALUE Values Moral principles and beliefs ABST VAL Abstract Value A value that is broadly defined to create consensus CONC VAL Concrete Value A value that belongs to a specific group based on ideology, class, gender, or race 328

Code Description ISS DEF Issue Definition A definition of a policy issue ISS DEF AMP Amplification Process of repeating attributes while periodically providing additional information ISS DEF AGG Aggregation Where policy attributes are enumerated, then synthesized ISS DEF SYN Synonymy The same idea is repeated with different words ISS DEF LIA Liaison The speaker attempts to afford their conclusion the same adherence granted to some of their premises ISS DEF DISS Dissociation The separation of argument elements that are traditionally linked together CONT DEF Contextual Definition Defining context specific terms of a policy definition CONT DEF NORM Normative Definition Definition that prescribed the usage of the term CONT DEF DESC Descriptive Definition Definition that indicates normal usage CONT DEF COND Condensed Definition Definition that demonstrates the essential elements of the descriptive definition CONT DEF COM Complex Definition Definition that combines the normative, descriptive, and condensed definition TRANS Transitivity Assertion that if a relationship exists between the first term and a second, and between the second term and a third, then the same relationship exists between the first and the third terms FOIL Foiling A comparison designed to make a clear distinction between the "best" and "worst" items

329

Appendix C: Timeline

330

Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

Arts Service Opera Michael ACA Business Organizations America is Newton, ED publishes Volunteers for founded of the St. information the Arts is Louis Arts & on presidential created Education candidates' Council, with positions on support from the arts Rep. James

331 Symington

(D-MO), successfully lobbies the IRS to change tax forms to include "certain cultural organizations"

331

Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

in the list of groups to which gifts are deductible.

Research American and The Arts: the Arts I, a Years of survey of Development, public opinion Time of 332 toward the Decision, a

arts, is report on the released two-day symposium celebrating the NEA's 10th anniversary is published by the Lyndon B. Johnson

332

Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas; Americans and the Arts II is released 333 Local Arts LAAs begin to The The

Agencies focus on Comprehensiv Bicentennial (LAA) artists-in- e Employment results in a school and Training focus on local residencies Act (P.L. 93- arts activities, instead of the 203), enacted initiatives, and former to train infrastructure emphasis on workers and lecture- provide them demonstration with jobs in

333

Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

s and public service, assembly enabled many programs local arts agencies to hire staff for the first time

State Arts First time all Mid-America RAOs are First year all South Arts is New England Agencies 55 eligible Arts Alliance made eligible 50 states, created Foundation 334 (SAA) & state and is established for funding D.C., Guam, for the Arts is

Regional Arts jurisdictional American established Organizations arts agencies Samoa, Puerto (RAO) are receiving Rico and the Basic State Virgin Islands Grants had an SAA in operation for a full year; Western State Arts

334

Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

Federation is established; Reauthorizatio n mandates that 20% of NEA funds go directly to SAAs and

335 RAOs;

NASAA is incorporated (September 12)

National Living Stage Full programs The agency is Writer Erica National Challenge Endowment controversy are established reauthorized; Jong Council on the Grant program for the Arts for opera and the acknowledges Arts approves is established; (NEA) jazz; Nancy Endowment the NEA in the first Employment Hanks publishes her book that program and

335

Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

announces Museums deals with budget for the Unemploymen rotating panel USA, the first sexual issues NEA's t of Artists: members comprehensiv Research 1970-1975 is system e statistical Division released study of the nation's museums

Appropriation 9,055,000 16,420,000 31,480,000 40,857,000 64,025,000 80,142,000 Transition 336 ($) Qtr.:

87,455,000; 35,301,000

Chairman Nancy Hanks

President Richard Nixon Gerald Ford

House Control

Senate Control

American Demonstration Demonstration Vietnam War Vietnam War War Powers Vietnam War s against s against Act; Vietnam 336

Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

Context Vietnam War; Vietnam War; War Hippie Vietnam War Movement; Vietnam War 337

337

Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

Congressional American Action Folk Life Center is created by Congress; Congressman John Brandemas

338 (D-IN) and

Senator Pell are chief congressional supporters of the NEA reauthorizatio n; Congress institutes the Institute of

338

Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

Museum Services; National Council Members now require Senate confirmation

339

Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

Presidential President asks President Action Congress to addresses the reauthorize Associated the Councils of Endowment the Arts for another meeting in three years Washington D.C. (May);

340 President

directs all federal agencies and executive departments to see how the arts can benefit their programs and

340

Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

how their programs might assist artists

341

Appendix D: Data by Case

342

Establishing Case of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson

• The Ford Foundation. (1968). Humanities and the arts programs, 1968 (pp. 1-21). New York, NY: The Ford Foundation. • Twentieth Century Fund. (1966). Foundations and the arts: A Report of series of meetings held at the Twentieth Century Fund. New York, NY: Twentieth Century Fund. • Dorian, F. (1964). Commitment to culture. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. • Heckscher, A. (1963). The Arts and the national government: Report to the President. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. • Baumol, W. J., & Bowen, W. G. (1966). Performing arts: The Economic dilemma. New York, NY: Twentieth Century Fund. • Establishing legislation for the National Endowment for the Arts • Appropriations Hearings for FYs 1966 and 1967

Livingston Biddle’s tenure under Jimmy Carter

• Americans and the Arts III • Appropriations Hearings • Artists Compared by Age, Sex, and Earnings in 1970 and 1976 (1980) • Minorities and Women in the Arts: 1970 (1979) • Audience Studies of the Performing Arts and Museums: A Critical Review (1978) • Biddle Confirmation Hearings

343 • Economic Impact of Arts and Cultural Institutions: A Model for Assessment and a Case Study in Baltimore (1977) • Articles and Op-ed pieces from the New York Times and Washington Post • National Endowment for the Arts Annual Reports • Our government and the arts: A Perspective from the inside (1988) – Biddle’s Book • Reauthorization Hearings • Selected Characteristics of Artists: 1970 (1978) • The State Arts Agencies in 1974: All Present and Accounted For (1978) • To Survey American Crafts: A Planning Study (1977) • Understanding the Employment of Actors (1977) • Where Artists Live: 1970 (1977)

John Frohnmayer’s tenure under George H.W. Bush

• Appropriations Hearings • The Audience for American Art Museums (1991) • Frohnmayer’s Confirmation Hearings • Expanding the Audience for the Performing Arts (1991) • H.R. 2788 • Leaving Town Alive: Confessions on an Arts Warrior (1993) – Frohnmayer’s Book • Participation in the Arts by Blacks and Whites (1990) • Reauthorization Hearings • National Endowment for the Arts Annual Reports • Articles and Op-ed pieces from the New York Times and Washington Post • Who Reads Literature: The Future of the United States as a Nation of Readers (1990) ! 343