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This document consists of 1 page Cnpy No. /of 150 Serios A RADIOLOGICAL IVA RFLRE STAFF STUDY JUNE - AUGUST 1948 COIJTElJTS Agenda Tho RV Program - Becommondntions and Conclusions Appendix A - Factors Determining Choico of Radiation for IU Appendix B - Physiological Dosage Rcquiromonts for Internal and Extornal Irradiation Appondix C - Production of Ihdionctioo lhtorials I Appendix D - Contamination Requirements for hdiological Vfarfaro 3' I, ... Appendix E - Shielding lcquirommts for Air Deliver?, L, Appendix F - Munitions for hdiologiccl ';Iarfnre Appondix G - ihndiological Dofanso Appendix H - U-235 E:c;,ondituro for hdiolosical Warfaro (Top Socrot) - On file in Division of Llilitary Application, AEC Appendix I - Seaurity Clnssification of klndiological 'Uarfnro Apponndix J - Evaluation of Rndioloyicnl ',Jarfaro (Top Secret) - On filo in Division of liilitary Applicntion, LEC Appondix K - Racommcndctions for Pcrmnnont Program t 1837bb . 931131 - 37 .I Joi:it .W - AEC Panel on Radiological Warfare Agenda for Meeting of August 29, 1948 9:OO A.M., Room 213 Public Health Building l9Ol Constitution Ave., IW 0900 Panel convenos. Approval of minutes of previous meeting. Outlino of the work of the Comrnissio~~’~€UT Staff during June - August l9f+E. I200 Recess for Lunch. hlembors afforded opportunity to study Appendices portaining to Staff Is recon:mendations and conclusions. 1600 Panel reconvenes. Discuss ion. Executive session to vote formal recommendations et the call of the Chairnian. .m 931131- 44 .. , ... I__I-- 'rogram, June - hup,ust 194 .. .... .. .. .~. -.A"-_ The Joint Panel on Radio1.ogical Warfare has been requested by the Atomib Energy Cornmission and by the Iiatiorml Eilitary Establishment to rake 8 survey of the possibilities of radiological warfare and to make reconmendations as to feasibility with a view to tke pdssible inauguration of a program on this subject. The objective of the AEC !"lashington Staff has been to accumulate data and to pre'pare a report which would serve as a basis for making the aforementioned recomondations. Much of the information necessary for makinp, recommendations was not available at the beginning of the surnn..er, parts are still not available. On the other hand the picture has now been considerably clarified and it is not believed that further infcrmntion v:culd materially chenge the situation as regards the next fe:v years. Recommendations concerning the desirability of instituting an extcnsjve prosrnm on radiologic31 warEnre must be based on the following points: 1) Dosngcs requircd to produce vnrious physiological effects; 2) The deKrees of contamination which must be achieved so that persons occupying an fires will rcceived dosages sufficient to producc effects of niilitory value; 3) the present and poter,tial productive cnpocity for radio:~ctivi.c lcmants suitablc for rndiclogicnl warfare; 4,) the status of thc developecnt of munitions cnd othor dovicc's suitnble for nchieving the dcsired contaminaticn either on cnomy tarKcts or on nrcns for which cvacuntion by friendly troops is plonned; 5) thc possibility of using these dcvi ccs in worfarc; 6) thc status of protcctivc! and dccontnminntion mcnswcs. Data for points l), Z), and 3) arc essential to provide an sstjrpate as to whether or not the cmount of rnsterial which could be made nveilnblc is sufficient to be of imnortnnoc in a militnry sense. Under point 2) it is essential to includc probability factors since no dcvicc could ~verbe developed which would cnsurc uniform contamination. Errors of aiming and logistics providc still furthcr fcotors, often difficult to assess, by which the desired. amount must be multiplied to give thc ornount which must be produccd to providc on the cv-rngc thc contcmin2tion of unit crca. Thc:s;! factors cunnot bc estimated with high precision and no attempt has bccn nude to include them quantitntivcly in the roport. It is evidcnt, hov:cver, thot productive ccpncity is at prcscnt mcirginal, i.0. it is by no mcc-ns certair. that unless productive cnpncity can be expanded an extensive program on offensi-e radiological wnrfsre would be warranted. Even 7 with the potential productive capacity which could bc visunlized for tho rcla- tively long range future it is ncccssory to i..:cognizc that radiological warfare would have to be confined to highly irr,portnnt t-rgets nnd that the nrcas which could bc contaniinntcd would prob3bly not be decisive in n militnry sensz. Thc disscrninntion problem hns occupied the attention of thc Staff to 0 grcntcr dcgrcc than any othzr sincle phssc of the prosram. The solution of this problem sntisfactory to the militnry will be very difficult, but the obvious lincs of nppronch ~GVCbear, indicated by the results prosciitcd by various cooperoti!ig cgcncics. It is evident thot an cxtcnsive dcvclopmcnt r.nd ficld , testin: program is nccossnry beforc n satisfactory dcvicc would emerge. The use of radiological wirfarr: to contamirntc limited areas which or:! to be avncuatcd by friccdly troops is undoubtedly fcnsible but will be considerably complicatpd by the problems of logistics. If ccrtein areas or0 to bo subject to a planned evacuation as soon as hostilities start the logistic problems could bc solved, but random rind unpremeditatod use rfter the start of hostilities v;ould bc of doubtful vnluc in view of the mnny problcms which would hnvo to be solvod. -._____._ . .. .. - ._ .- - ... - . ... , .. ,, I183I88 .! Extcrsive stiidics could bo rnodc for decontnrnineting arcns which heve beon contnminatod by methods visualized for use by the 6il.itary Estoblishrnont of tho Unitod States, but if usc of this typc of warfare by n potc1:ticl eneniy is feared the studios must bo comprchensivc enough to cover 011 othor mothods which he might use. For the moment this problem is probnbly not urgont, but an orderly prop-nm is essentinl. Pcrsounel protcction fnlls in thrcc cotcgories: 1) Prc- vcntion of the zntry of redionctivc substonccs into the body (mnsks, clothing, otc.; 2) Evncuttion of porsor.ni.1 not csscntinl to dccontnmination ni;d proper cor') of personnel who must ivork in thc urea to prcvcnt ovorexposure; 3) Decon- tnrniration. Thc first of thofie thrcc mottnrs is in gocd shcpc! and the cffactive- ness of tho devices depi.nds, in roelity, on sufficient det?ctirlg dovicFs being nonilable to provide ndequntc vrcrning of dncgcr. The sooorid is n mtter of cnroful plnnning by ci-~iliendcfcnse ogoncic-s and is the subjact today of careful study. The third j.s diffioult. It hos nlrocdy bccn the subject of extensive study by the Navy nnd by tho agencies of the Atcrnic EnorEy Commission. Furthcr rvork is nuedod. The Staff hos found it neccssnry to obtain dntn from various sources and is very appr:.ciativc of the cxccllent cooperction it has received both from instollctions and cgencics of thc Armod Scrviccs nnd of tho Atomic Energy Comr.ission. Sow of tho pcrtincnt Jotn are ns follows: 1) Probcblc dose rc- quircd for scrious physiologiczl effects on pmn. The groups at the University of Rochastcr, thc University of Cillifornie, ond thc Univcrsity of Chicago have bean vory helpful in this connection; 2) The dosege VS. distnnce curve for c point scurcc of a gemme cmitter. The effect of scuttcrcd rndiation was unknown ocd could r;ot bo cnlculatod with cartciinty. The Ook Ridso 14::tional Laborntories hevo bocn very cooperativo in 3btoining thcso rl!ita nnd in cclrryirp, out p. tcst with sources distributed on a crid to oscertcin whcthcr area dosa:;es could be' ' cnlculatod qunntitntively from or.lucs for point sourccs; 3) The effect of gcmm rcdintion on high ~~pl~siv~s,dctmrtors, fiizes, ctc. Iriforrnntion of this type would bc essential if cny muniticr. were to be IlcvelnpeC which would involve burs tcrs, ejection ch?.r,?c-s, proximity fuzes, ctc. Thc Los Alamcs Labc,rntory, the Oak Ridgo l.iati3r.01 Lnbcrntsry, tho Nntioxr.1 Bureau of Stfindcrds, tho Chcnical 'flnrfe.rc Cc?nt,?r, urd P.berzlccn Proviny, Ground r.11 al3od in obtaining vnrious p3rts of this informotion; 4) Trcscnt :$r~i pctsntial prcductiv? copacity. The Oak Ridgo iqr!ti;nnl Lnbor".t.ry end the G:.wrnl Eloctric Crmpar:y, IInnf3rrl Engineer 'Jxks furnishzd ect3 nxl pcrfxmcd colculntisrs cn theso mcttors; 5) Rnrfinti3n scnttcr- ing, shiol3ir.g, ond muniti::ns rcquirom,-nts nore bnscl 5n dctn suppliod by tha Onk Ridgo Iietionol Lnboratnry. The uid furnished by tho Rand Project 16s nls:, incnluablc; 6) Munitions dovclopment. l'hs Army Chcmicel Center and the Chemical Ccrps instollctisn at Cornp Dotrick desorva pcrticular crodit f3r cnrrying forxsrj a difficult program un-ler high prizrity; 7) Dccmtnrnirrotion. The hrmy Chemj.cel Ccntcr and the Nnvy instclloticc et Iiuntcr's Point cerriod cut sevcrol tests dosigned to show the effectivpness of cosily svnileblo mcthcds; R) The Armod Forces Spocinl Wonpons Prajoct focilitnto2 c,>utccts with the Armed Services 6x1 rvorkod intimtcly with the Stcff, ir. tho prenerotion cf this Report nnd its Append ices. The rccxnrr,en3?ti3,ns tc thc Pancl by the Staff wore the subject of long discussion 0.d cf uanninous ngrocrnont. The figures for dcssge, while subject to considoroblo unccrtair,tics, \&,illprobably r,$t be chnngo.3 by future work oncugh to ivarrcnt serious rcvisipn of the cstimete of rnjiclcgicel vmrfere capsbilities. The factor most npt t3 chongo during the next few yeers is the Q'btitUdo tovmrd methods of dolivery. Prescnt thinking by tho Air F'crce is 13- confined almost solely to high altitude niissions, c1thour;h an occnsional low altitude mission is possible for short clistonces (not t:, excsed 700 miles). Tho cost of high altitude missions is ccntinuF.lly increasing nn:j it is impzssiblo to predict what the situction ;?.ill b:? in five to toi ycgrs. hay &roIJp charged with the responsibility jf Idevolopii:=, disserninstion dovioes must keep abrccst cf chanring attitudcs c.n this subject.