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(CPC) Outreach Journal #1103 USAF Counterproliferation Center (CPC) Outreach Journal Issue No. 1103, 21 February 2014 Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal! As part of the CPC’s mission to develop Air Force, DoD, and other USG leaders to advance the state of knowledge, policy, and practices within strategic defense issues involving nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, we offer the government and civilian community a source of contemporary discussions on unconventional weapons. These discussions include news articles, papers, and other information sources that address issues pertinent to the U.S. national security community. It is our hope that this information resources will help enhance the overall awareness of these important national security issues and lead to the further discussion of options for dealing with the potential use of unconventional weapons. The CPC is seeking submissions for its annual General Charles A. Horner award, which honors the best original writing on issues relating to Air Force counter-WMD and nuclear enterprise operations. The deadline for submissions is March 31, 2014. For more information, please visit our web-site. The following news articles, papers, and other information sources do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the Air University, U.S. Air Force, or Department of Defense. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved. FEATURED ITEM: RAND Corporation Monograph, “The Future of the U.S. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Force.” By Lauren Caston, Robert S. Leonard, Christopher A. Mouton, Chad J. R. Ohlandt, S. Craig Moore, Raymond E. Conley and Glenn Buchan; 184 pages, Feb 2014. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/MG1200/MG1210/RAND_MG1210.pdf In the lead-up to the Air Force Ground Based Strategic Deterrent Analysis of Alternatives, RAND was asked to examine and assess possible intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) alternatives against the current Minuteman III system and to provide insights into the potential impact of further force reductions. The researchers developed a framework consisting of five categories — basing, propulsion, boost, reentry, and payload — to characterize alternative classes of ICBM and to assess the survivability and effectiveness of possible alternatives. Using existing cost analyses and cost data from historical ICBM programs, they derived likely cost bounds on alternative classes of ICBM systems. Finally, they developed force reduction scenarios, examined their impacts on several key nuclear specialty career fields to understand the implications of reductions on the current organizational structure, and compared sustainment and requirement profiles within the various reduction scenarios. Outreach Journal Feedback or sign-up request: [email protected] Return to Top U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS 1. Could Nuclear Bombs Be Best Defense Against Asteroids? 2. AETC Commander: Changes Coming to Nuclear Missile Officer Training U.S. COUNTER-WMD 1. USS Donald Cook Prepares for First Ballistic Missile Defense Patrol HOMELAND SECURITY/THE AMERICAS 1. Kerry Tells Indonesia: Climate Change is a 'Weapon of Mass Destruction' 2. 3 Peace Activists Sentenced for Breaking into Nuclear Site ASIA/PACIFIC 1. China's DF-25 Medium-Range Ballistic Missile Revealed 2. China Questions Japan on Weapons Grade Plutonium 3. Japan Secretly Developing Nuclear Weapons: Yazhou Zhoukan 4. Hainan's Yalong Bay: China's New Nuclear Submarine Base Issue No.1103, 21 February 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama 5. S. Korea Seeks Cyber Weapons to Target North Korea’s Nukes 6. S. Korea, China Agree to Deepen Cooperation to Denuclearize N. Korea EUROPE/RUSSIA 1. Russia to Set Up Arctic Military Command by 2015 MIDDLE EAST 1. Iranian Multi-Warhead Missile Seen as 'Extremely Unlikely' 2. Senior MP Terms Defense Program "Iran's Red Line" in N. Talks 3. Iran: Nuclear Talks to Focus on Centrifuges, Reactors 4. Iran's Khamenei Says He's Not Optimistic on Nuclear Talks 5. Report: White House Considering New Military Options in Syria 6. Iran Rejects U.S. Call for Inclusion of Missile Program in Nuclear Talks 7. Iran’s Nuclear Spokesman: Agreement Possible in 6 Months, if U.S. Shows Good Will 8. Iran, World Powers to Meet again on March 17 9. Iran’s Nuclear Energy Only Subject of Talks: Zarif 10. Iran Uranium Stockpile Falls 18% in Months Following Deal Start 11. IAEA Says Iran Secretly Working to Put Nukes on Mid-Range Missile 12. Syria to Miss Chemical Destruction Deadline INDIA/PAKISTAN 1. Journalist-Turned-Militant Khurasani Wants to Seize Nukes, Topple Govt 2. Night Trial of Agni-I Missile Put Off 3. Nuke Programme ‘Central’ to Pakistan’s Defence: Army Chief COMMENTARY 1. Compensate Missileers, Reassess ICBM Mission 2. US Missile Shield: ‘Russian Bear Sleeping with One Eye Open’ 3. Cheap and Dirty Bombs 4. Time to Sign a Super New START 5. The End of the New ICBM 6. Japan's Dangerous Obsession 7. Iran Has the Bomb CBS News.com Could Nuclear Bombs Be Best Defense Against Asteroids? February 18, 2014 Nearly a year after a meteor unexpectedly exploded in the skies over Chelyabinsk, Russia, wreaking millions of dollars in damage and more than 1,200 injuries, a team of scientists says there is a way to destroy these life- threatening asteroids before they break into the Earth's atmosphere. The solution, they say, is using nuclear bombs. They believe the weapons could safely destroy nearly any asteroid, even when there is minimal warning time, Space.com reported. The report coincides with another close call, the fly-by of an asteroid the size of three football fields which streaked past Earth Monday night at speeds of about 27,000 miles per hour. It came within about 2.1 million miles, a relatively small distance in galactic terms. The latest research on combatting the threat of an asteroid impact was presented at the 2014 NASA Innovative Advanced Conepts (NIAC) meeting on Feb. 6 by Dr. Bong Wie, director of the Asteroid Research Deflection Center Issue No.1103, 21 February 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 2 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama (ADRC) at Iowa State University. The presentation came just shy of the one-year anniversary of the Chelyabinsk event. On Feb. 15, 2013, a previously undetected 65-foot-wide meteor exploded in the skies over the Russian town. It glowed at 30 times the brightness of the sun and caused a shock wave that damaged buildings and shattered glass dozens of miles away. "A couple of years ago, I had to use the dinosaur example to justify our research," Wie said. "Now, that's no more — we had this major event." Wie and his team say it's only a matter of time before another asteroid makes its way into the Earth's atmosphere. To prepare for these threats, they are creating a concept spacecraft called the Hypervelocity Asteroid Intercept Vehicle (HAIV). The plan calls for the HAIV to intercept an asteroid in deep space. Once within range, it would send a kinetic impactor into the asteroid to carve out a crater. One millisecond later, the nuclear bomb would land in the crater and detonate, tearing the space rock apart. Detonating in a crater, rather than on the surface, increases the force by as much as 20 times, Wie explained. According to computer simulations Wie's team created, destroying a 1,000-foot-wide asteroid with about 30 days warning would result in less than 0.1 percent of the fragments actually striking Earth. "We would have a heavy meteor shower, or maybe 100 Chelyabinsk meteor events," Wie said. The effects would be minimal compared to the potential devastation caused by a 1,000-foot-wide asteroid striking Earth. If it hit, the single impact would be about 150,000 times stronger than the power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. The HAIV would be coupled with an advanced asteroid-warning system. He suggested the University of Hawaii's Asteroid Terrestial-impact Last Alert System (ATLAS). ATLAS warns of 26-foot-wide asteroids 24 hours in advance, 148-foot-wide asteroids one week early, and 459-foot asteroids three weeks early. UH scientists expect ATLAS to be operational by 2015. http://www.cbsnews.com/news/nuclear-bombs-could-be-best-defense-against-asteroids/ Return to Top Air Force Times.com AETC Commander: Changes Coming to Nuclear Missile Officer Training By STEPHEN LOSEY, Staff Writer February 20, 2014 ORLANDO — The Air Force will make changes to how it trains its nuclear missileers in light of a widespread cheating scandal, the head of the Air Education and Training Command said Thursday. “This isn’t just Air Force Global Strike Command’s problem,” Gen. Robin Rand told reporters at the Air Force Association’s Air Warfare Symposium. “I take it very seriously. Every officer that’s in the missile career field was trained by who? Air Education and Training Command.” Rand said AETC is already reviewing how it trains missileers in light of the cheating scandal, that has entangled 92 officers at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont., and sidelined almost one-fifth of the entire intercontinental ballistic missile officer corps. “Any time there’s challenges in the Air Force, it behooves us to look at what we’re doing at the entry levels, at the pipelines,” Rand said. Issue No.1103, 21 February 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 3 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama But Rand said that before AETC can prepare specific training reforms, the Defense Department must first finish its sweeping review of the intercontinental ballistic missile force, and Air Force Secretary Deborah James and Global Strike Commander Lt.
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