China's Role in the Chemical and Biological Disarmament Regimes

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China's Role in the Chemical and Biological Disarmament Regimes ERIC CRODDY China’s Role in the Chemical and Biological Disarmament Regimes ERIC CRODDY Eric Croddy is a Senior Research Associate at the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. He is the author of Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen (New York: Copernicus Books, 2001). odern China has been linked with the prolif- least—and with considerable diplomatic effort—China eration of nuclear, chemical, and missile weap- broadcasts its commitment to both the CWC and the Mons technology to states of proliferation con- BWC. cern, and its compliance with arms control and disarma- Few unclassified publications analyze the role that CBW ment is seen as key to the effectiveness of weapons of have played in Chinese military strategy, nor is much in- 1 mass destruction (WMD) nonproliferation efforts. In this formation available on Beijing’s approach to negotiating context, the answer to Gerald Segal’s question, “Does CBW disarmament treaties. This is not surprising: China 2 China really matter?” is most definitely, “Yes.” In the is an extremely difficult subject for study where sensitive realm of chemical and biological weapons (CBW), military matters are concerned. A 1998 report by Dr. Bates Beijing’s role is closely linked to its view of the multilat- Gill, Case Study 6: People’s Republic of China, published eral disarmament regimes for CBW, namely the Chemi- by the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, cal Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and was the first to seriously address the issue of China and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and of related mul- CBW proliferation. This article, while asking some intrigu- tilateral export control efforts. These views, in turn, de- ing questions, had no references to the Chinese literature pend on how CBW figure in China’s tactical and strategic on the subject of CBW itself. Gill concluded that posture, which includes a declared nuclear weapons (NW) given China’s overall industrial capacity, China capability and a strategic missile force. Where CBW pro- probably has the capability of producing CBW liferation is concerned, the key question today is not agents and may have weaponized this capabil- whether China matters, but whether the Chinese govern- ity. At present, however, neither open-source ment is serious about eliminating both chemical and bio- information nor broader contextual analysis can logical weapons—it maintains it never developed the confidently confirm that China has an offensive latter—and preventing the proliferation of CBW-related CBW program or would seriously contemplate technology. China has been an active participant (at least activating that option for use in wartime.3 in the last two decades) in both chemical and biological disarmament and arms control negotiations. Outwardly at Of the few Chinese books written on the subject of arms control within recent years, Major General Pan 16 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2002 ERIC CRODDY Zhenqiang’s, International Disarmament and Arms Con- ment of “gas producing shells” in August 1921. The war- trol, probably best reflects basic attitudes and beliefs among lord Wu Peifu, however, condemned CW as “inhumane.”6 security analysts and members of the Chinese arms con- Despite repeated clashes among warring factions dur- 4 trol community. For the book’s chapters on chemical and ing China’s turbulent Republican period, there are no con- biological arms control, Major General Pan enlisted con- firmed reports of chemical warfare during this period in tributions from Yu Zhongzhou, a chemical weapons (CW) China’s history. There is also no evidence that the Soviet specialist, and Li Yimin, a biological weapons (BW) spe- Union assisted the armies of the Kuomintang (National- cialist. In a conversation with the author in spring 2001, ists) or the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with CW- General Pan indicated that his book was already out of related training or equipment. It is quite possible, however, date when it was published in 1996. Even so, Interna- that knowledge gained by Soviet-German cooperation in tional Disarmament and Arms Control appears to pro- CW technology from the 1920s to the early 1930s may vide an accurate reflection of how Chinese decisionmakers have found its way into Chinese hands. currently view CBW disarmament issues. Other writings that have appeared before or since do not contradict the The first use of CW in Asia is believed to have taken assertions or attitudes found in Pan’s volume. More re- place in 1930 in Wushe, a mountainous area in central cently, Dr. Liu Huaqiu, a leading Chinese scholar, edited Taiwan. Defeated by the Japanese in 1895, China’s an encyclopedic volume on arms control.5 The two chap- Manchu rulers were forced to cede the provincial island ters on CBW arms control, largely written by Yu of Taiwan to Japan. During Japan’s colonization of the Zhongzhou, Li Weimin (CW), and Li Yimin (BW), pro- island, brutal pacification campaigns were waged against vide more detail on China’s role in negotiation and com- local indigenous groups, particularly during the years 1910- pliance issues, but for the most part are largely derivative 1914.7 Local tribes, including those in Wushe, revolted of Pan’s earlier volume. against the Japanese. Historians believe that in 1930, Ja- pan used chloracetophenone (CN)8 while crushing the Drawing on these two books, as well as a variety of rebellion led by tribal leader Mona Rudo.9 This particular other Chinese written sources and interviews with gov- engagement might have been part of the experimental use ernment officials and academics in the People’s Republic of CW by the Japanese on Taiwan between 1930 and of China (PRC) and Taiwan, this article examines what is 1941.10 After Japan’s surrender in 1945, the Kuomintang known of past Chinese activities involving CBW and Garrison Command took control of former Japanese mili- China’s current involvement in the CBW disarmament tary facilities, including a “large chemical weapons facil- regimes. The article concludes with some policy recom- ity in northern Taiwan.”11 It is not known what stocks of mendations for the U.S. government. CW were found when Nationalist soldiers arrived at the plant. CHINA AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS Beginning in 1937, the Japanese army employed a wide range of CW agents during its invasion of China. Quoting History of Chinese Interest in Chemical Warfare an “authoritative Soviet source,” a Chinese book by China’s involvement with chemical warfare preceded People’s Liberation Army (PLA) specialists in chemical the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949. With the defense claims that “during its war in China, the Japanese advances in modern chemical industry and the birth of army had prepared 25% of their artillery shells to be chemi- organic chemistry in the late 19th century, it was prob- cal munitions, while 30% of its aerial ordnance was chemi- ably inevitable that CW would appear on the battlefields cal bombs.”12 Another source tallies 10,000 deaths and of World War I. During the 1920s, the Chinese warlords 80,000 wounded as a result of Japanese CW use.13 Ac- Zhao Hengti, Cao Kun, Feng Yuxiang, and Zhang Zuolin cording to a third source, from July 18, 1937, to May 8, all expressed interest in purchasing or enlisting European 1945, Japan carried out 1,059 chemical attacks in China, firms to help manufacture CW agents. Zhang Zuolin re- including the use of the CW agents diphenylchloroarsine, portedly contracted with the German firm Witte for the diphenylcyanoarsine, chloracetophenone (CN), chloropi- construction of a CW production facility, in Shenyang, crin, hydrogen cyanide, phosgene, mustard, and lewisite.14 and hired Russian and German chemical engineers to over- While it is difficult to evaluate the extent of Japanese see the manufacture of mustard, phosgene, and chlorine. use of CW in China, it would appear that mainland sources Zhao Hengti also took delivery of a relatively small ship- exaggerate the overall importance of such warfare in The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2002 17 ERIC CRODDY Japan’s success against Kuomintang armies during this One gets the sense that, when looking back to the Ko- period. Japanese soldiers, especially those serving in China, rean War, Chinese leaders often make oblique references were highly disciplined, well equipped, ruthless, and had to the CW allegations. For example, current PRC Chair- a well-organized command structure. The latter qualities man Jiang Zemin has stated that during the Korean War, did not exist among the Chinese resistance, which was “the United States threw in nearly two million troops, and already fractured by a rivalry between the Kuomintang except for nuclear, employed all of the most advanced (KMT) forces led by Chiang Kaishek and the CCP forces weapons.”22 An article in the October 2000 issue of China led by Mao Zedong. While the use of CW might have National Defense Journal (Zhongguo Guofangbao) used assisted the Japanese in some battles, it is difficult to con- essentially the same language: “except for nuclear weap- clude that it played a decisive role in the Sino-Japanese ons, all modern weapons were used.”23 In Korean War war of 1937-1945. Although the Chinese are bitterly in- retrospectives intended for Chinese consumption, one finds dignant over Japan’s use of CW, they also place some of that the CW charges are repeated with specifics. Among the obloquy on the United States. One Chinese source other books on the topic, International Disarmament and notes that despite President Roosevelt’s warning to Japan Arms Control, published in 1996 by the Chinese National in 1942 concerning their use of such weapons against Defense University Press, also mentions the use of CW China, the United States never took measures to retaliate during the Korean War: “Since the end of WWI, chemi- in kind.15 cal weapons have been frequently used throughout re- From 1940 to 1945, Kaishek and the KMT operated a gional and armed conflicts.
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