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PRT Interview United States Institute of Peace Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Iraq/Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons Learned INTERVIEW #84 Interviewed by: Vince Valle Interview date: September 15, 2010 Copyright 2010 USIP & ADST INTERVIEW SYNOPSIS Participant’s Understanding of the PRT Mission Interviewee worked for the U.S. Agency for International Development at two District Support Teams (DSTs) in Afghanistan from August 2009 to August 2010. He served for three months in Garmsir at Helmand province and then for nine months at Delaram in Nimruz province. He received little guidance in pre-deployment training about the mission of DSTs. His goals at both sites were economic development and creation of sustainable jobs. At Delaram he also focused on governance. Relationship with Local Nationals Observations: The relationship with local nationals, particularly the district governor, was excellent. The team also worked well with the executive committee of the community council. Insights: U.S Marine and Army female engagement teams were an effective means of bypassing Afghan protectiveness about their women and establish relations with them. Lessons: It is best not to try and tell Afghans what to build, but instead to play an advisory role for them. Ask them for a list of prioritized projects and fund those. Did the PRT Achieve its Mission? (Impact) Observations: From the development side, the PRT largely achieved its mission. Establishing a public health clinic was the interviewee’s most important achievement. The team also initiated a cash-for-cleanup program and refurbished a bazaar and a school. Insights: Using people nominated by the district governor for projects worked well, even if politics may have been involved in choosing them. Relying on a local-hire engineer to determine requirements for projects allowed for an efficient allocation of resources. Lessons: More people should be working in the districts in the southern provinces. The U.S. 1 military leadership needs to instruct its battalion commanders to make a priority of supporting civilians doing development work. Overall Strategy for Accomplishing the PRT Mission (Planning) Observations: The approach was to be a low-key supporter and adviser to the local government and to help Afghan partners look good. The team looked for ways to improve infrastructure to help people in ways that the Taliban could not. There was not any meaningful planning with higher levels at the DST. Planning and coordination with the military was good. There were no International Organizations or Non-Governmental Organizations with which to coordinate. Planning with the community council executive committee was frequent and close. Insights: The U.S. should increase the civilian presence in Nimruz province in order to build up capacity and enable a turnover to the Afghans. There is too little understanding at the embassy in Kabul about what is needed in the field. Lessons: If the regimental commander sees a need to have a political adviser, it is better to first assign that person out in the field at DST for six months to get a feel for how the district works. One has to be ready to let the Afghans fail so that they learn from their mistakes. Daily morning meetings with the civil affairs group military person greatly facilitated coordination with the military. Daily meetings with the governor and frequent meetings with other Afghans facilitated situational awareness. Interviewee received only State Department training. USAID-specific training on its programs and implementing partners would have been very helpful. Pre- deployment training should also incorporate more language instruction. Having civilians who have served in Afghanistan brief trainees at Camp Atterbury was very effective. What Worked Well and What Did Not? (Operations) Observations: The Interagency Provincial Authority (IPA) at the embassy, which is supposed to support PRTs and DSTs, in fact provided very little support. Garmsir was a focus of USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) but, because interviewee was not a member of OTI, the office was reluctant to fund his project proposals. Much U.S. military CERP (Commanders Emergency Response Program) funding was wasted on ill-planned projects. For example, schools and clinics were built which the Afghan government lacked the ability to operate. Insights: The bureaucracy at Embassy Kabul should have more confidence in people in the field and be more willing to release project funds to them. It is important is to have good unclassified and classified communications systems. The U.S. military is too prone to building things without checking with locals and without assessing whether the projects were sustainable. Lessons: Civilians going to PRTs and DSTs in kinetic areas should be trained in the use of firearms and given a weapon when going outside the wire. This increases force protection. DSTs should have their own security movement teams. Inexperienced people need more guidance as to how to work with the military and navigate the various USAID programs. Briefing of personnel by USAID staff in Washington needs to be better. 2 THE INTERVIEW Q: Where did you serve? A: I served for a year in Afghanistan. In my first three months, I set up the District Stabilization Team in Garmsir. Q: In Garmsir. Where is that? A: Garmsir is in Helmand Province. It’s just south of Lashkar Gah, which is the provincial capital. If you look at Helmand Province, they have what they call the green zone, which is the area along the Helmand River, because it’s the only irrigation in the area. So you have Lashkar Gah, and then you had Dwyer, which was a Marine military base. Then Garmsir which was a district center. I was with a battalion of Marines at their FOB (Forward Operating Base). South of that down the Helmand River, and there was another Marine base down there. When I got there, there was a gentleman who was a British stabilization advisor (StabAd). He had been there about a year. The Marines landed on July 2, and had a big fight with the Taliban and folks down there. They basically took over from the British. Up to that time, the British had had one company in Garmsir, at what they called Forward Operating Base Delhi. Because they had such limited resources, they couldn’t push out and stabilize the area. When the Marines came in, they came in with a full battalion. They put the company headquarters and security team and motorized armored recon at the FOB, and then they put a company down in Mian Poshteh a company in, I’m trying to get my names right here. There was a FOB at Fox, and Koshtay and Mian Poshteh. They are three fairly large villages, and the idea was that if you looked at a map, USAID had come there in the 1950’s and built an extensive canal system that came off the Helmand River. So you had a main canal and it branched into secondary canals and there were all the lateral canals which provided the irrigation. If you look at the map and the way it looks like a snake, the snake’s head is the district center, and then it narrows down into another larger village with a small scattering of rural areas along the way. The idea was to secure key points, if you aspire to the oil spot theory, where you secure points and then try to move and coalesce them. The problem there was, and it was a problem I saw everywhere, that there were just not enough resources. The companies in these areas would run platoons on patrols, but they never really secured the areas between the FOBs, so you still had Taliban traffic and planting of IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) along roads and canals. When I got down there, there was this British StabAd, and he had set up a pretty good relationship with the district governor. Q: Your position was? A: I was a field program officer with USAID. Q: Which entails? 3 A: Basically you would operate either at a PRT or as I was very happy to be, at the district level, because I still believe that is where the war is going to be won. Q: So that is more at the local level? A: Right. So when you look at a province, you have a provincial capital like Lashkar Gah. There was a PRT there run by a British officer, but we had Americans: USAID, Department of Agriculture, and State Department personnel as part of that PRT, along with the security element. When you get down to the district centers, that is where you set up the District Stabilization Teams, the DSTs. The PRTs are the province, and the DSTs are the district level. I was at the district level, so I got to know the district governor (DG) very well. He had set up a community council with 30 seats, and I think about 15 of them were unfilled, only because people in the southern part of the district were unwilling to serve because of security issues. So you had the snake’s head, which was really the district center, the bazaar, bridges and main roads that headed up to Dwyer, which were fairly secure. We had more visitors that you can shake a stick at come through there. Senators, other generals, all the CODELs (Congressional delegations) and everybody would walk around the bazaar with no body armor to show the security. Q: Helmand is a pretty hot province. A: Yes, things have stepped up a lot since I left, because when the Marines came in July 2, they were in a big firefight for about two weeks. Q: From when to when were you in that location? A: I was in Garmsir from August ’09 until the end of October of 2009.
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