EU-US Cooperation in Crisis Management

Chapter 3 EU-U.S. Cooperation in Crisis Management: Transatlantic Approaches and Future Trajectories

Eva Gross

Nonetheless, despite the frequent emphasis on Introduction the complementarity of transatlantic efforts, U.S. and EU approaches to crisis management Crisis management, particularly its civilian differ in important respects. They are also at aspects, has been a growth area for the EU’s in- different stages of institutional development. ternational engagement. The U.S. also increas- Talk of increasing EU-U.S. cooperation thus ingly invests in its civilian crisis management risks creating unrealistic expectations that capabilities. In light of converging strategic could in turn negatively affect EU-U.S. security interests and geographical areas of engagement, cooperation in the future. A stocktaking of EU current and future engagement is likely to take and U.S. capabilities and approaches to crisis place in similar theatres that range from the management is, therefore, in order. Balkans to sub-Saharan Africa and Afghanistan. This chapter outlines a number of points that The case for transatlantic—understood in this ought to be taken into consideration when context as EU-US rather than NATO —coop- thinking through the potential of future EU- eration is strong. In a number of instances it U.S. cooperation in conflict prevention, crisis has already begun. U.S. personnel participate management, and post-conflict reconstruction. in the EU’s crisis missions EULEX Kosovo and They include respective institutional frame- EUSEC RD CONGO in the Democratic Re- works; values and strategic objectives for crisis public of Congo (DRC). EU-U.S. security co- management; experience with crisis manage- operation in crisis management thus occupies a ment in practice, including the recruiting, firm place on the political agenda. staffing and training of mission personnel; the broader political framework in which crisis Developing further ideas and strategies for missions are embedded; and the institutional EU-U.S. cooperation is welcome for a number limitations facing EU-U.S. cooperation in of reasons. These include the need to address terms of their exclusive focus on the civilian as- common security threats; the EU’s profile as pects of conflict prevention and crisis manage- a security actor and the implications for the ment. Based on this analysis the chapter closes transatlantic partnership; but also the need to with a number of policy recommendations for pool resources in lean economic times and con- future cooperation. current global power shifts that could challenge the transatlantic monopoly on the provision of security. Increasing cooperation in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction thus represents a small but important piece of the larger framework of transatlantic relations. 38 Preventing Conflict, Managing Crisis: European and American Perspectives EU-U.S. Cooperation in Crisis Management: Transatlantic Approaches and Future Trajectories 39

state personnel, is to help bring coherence to Emerging Transatlantic Structures: An EU foreign relations and to represent the EU Overview externally. This section outlines the respective institu- Brussels-based institutions and political lead- tional set-ups in the EU and the U.S., as well ership form an increasingly important part in as the current transatlantic framework for the the planning, oversight and overall decision- institutionalization of EU-U.S. cooperation. making of EU crisis management. The EU Despite the concurrent focus on the develop- High Representative for Foreign and Security ment of civilian crisis management instru- Policy, a post currently occupied by Catherine ments there are important differences in EU Ashton, oversees all CSDP institutions and and U.S. institutional frameworks and overall agencies. Double-hatted as Vice-President of approaches towards conflict prevention and the Commission, the post thus combines the crisis management. The current framework for EU’s financial, political and crisis manage- cooperation needs to evolve further if institu- ment instruments. Institutional changes as a tionalized cooperation is to be able to address result of the Lisbon Treaty notwithstanding, the challenges discussed in the remainder of however, decision-making in EU CSDP re- this paper. Given that EU-U.S. cooperation to mains intergovernmental. CSDP structures date focuses on civilian crisis management, the crucially depend on EU member states for the following sections in this chapter limit their launch of civilian and military missions, stra- discussion of the institutional set-up of crisis tegic oversight, and the contribution of per- management in the EU and the U.S. to their sonnel to individual European crisis missions.1 civilian aspects. The Political and Security Committee (PSC), which consists of member states representa- tives at the ambassadorial level and is chaired The EU by EEAS official Olof Skoog, represents a key decision-making forum that provides strategic Whereas conflict prevention formed part of oversight and guidance of existing missions. the EU’s emerging foreign policy posture after the end of the Cold War, it was not until the Since the launch of the first operation in 2003 1998 Franco-British summit at St. Malo that the EU has conducted 28 missions, the ma- the question of a European defense policy, and jority of them civilian.2 The civilian aspect the development of military and eventually of CSDP, which had not been part of the also civilian crisis management instruments, rationale to develop CSDP in the first place arose in earnest. Over the past decade the (rather, the original intention was to develop EU has gained significant experience in crisis and strengthen European military capabilities) management and post-conflict reconstruc- not only broke new ground in terms of EU tion, to which the 2003 European Security foreign and security policy. It has also become Strategy (ESS) provides a strategic roadmap. the major growth area for CSDP. Activities The EU pursues conflict prevention and crisis undertaken range from police and justice management policies through its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), which is 1 For an in-depth analysis of CSDP see Grevi, G., Helly, D. and Keohane, D., European Security and an integral part of the EU Common Foreign Defense Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009) (Paris: EU and Security Policy (CFSP). Finally, the Euro- Institute for Security Studies, 2009). pean External Action Service (EEAS), which 2 CSDP Map: Mission Chart (Brussels: International combines Council, Commission and member Security and Information Service (ISIS) Europe, 2011). Available at: http://www.csdpmap.eu/mission-chart 38 Preventing Conflict, Managing Crisis: European and American Perspectives EU-U.S. Cooperation in Crisis Management: Transatlantic Approaches and Future Trajectories 39

reform to border management, integrated rule of government’ approaches as a guiding of law and security sector reform operations paradigm have sparked a debate over civil- throughout the globe. Financial resources ian capabilities and their place in the foreign available include the CFSP budget and mem- policy toolbox. There is mounting evidence ber state contribution of mission personnel. of an elite consensus across government agen- The planning and management of missions is cies that civilian capabilities constitute an carried out through the Civilian Planning and important instrument in U.S. foreign policy. Conduct Capability (CPCC) in the Council. This is evident from the emphasis on ‘smart power’ and the need to elevate diplomacy and Many CSDP missions are embedded in a development alongside defense; the Quadren- broader political framework, such as the Euro- nial Diplomacy and Development Review pean Neighborhood Policy (ENP) or the EU (QDDR) that seeks to redefine development accession framework in the case of the Bal- and diplomacy to strengthen U.S. ‘civilian kans; whereas others emphasize EU coopera- power;’ and the frequent emphasis on the part tion and support of UN as well as cooperation of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of with U.S./NATO structures in sub-Saharan Defense on the importance of civilian capa- Africa and Afghanistan, respectively. A small bilities to complement military engagement.3 number of missions, finally, represent stand- alone EU initiatives and/or highlight the EU’s Beyond formulating strategic goals and objec- overall value-added to crisis management, tives in civil-military relations, the U.S. has such as the Monitoring Missions in Aceh, In- also taken steps to develop civilian capabilities donesia in 2005 and Georgia in 2008. within the State Department. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has deployed civilian police ad- visors in a number of post-conflict and crisis The U.S. settings. Furthermore, the creation of the of- fice of the Coordinator for Reconstruction In contrast to the EU, where the development and Stabilization (S/CRS) in 2004—which of civilian capabilities has received significant has been elevated to the level of Bureau as a attention over the past decade, the increas- result of the QDDR—was to strengthen inter- ing engagement with civilian capabilities in nal coordination. the U.S. arose out of the demand for civilian contributions on the part of the military as S/CRS holds a key role in coordinating ci- a result of the experience in Afghanistan and vilian reconstruction tasks and capabilities Iraq. Institutional developments take place in through its close partnership with USAID a political context where the military, rather and its emphasis on planning and technical than diplomatic or development actors, repre- expertise that goes beyond a traditional State sents the predominant institution in terms of Department/diplomatic profile. S/CRS is to international engagement, public support, and act as a ‘force multiplier’ rather than as a sepa- financial clout. The debate over civilian -ca rate effort and is, essentially, a consultative pabilities in Washington, therefore, has a dif- arrangement that can support the efforts by ferent constituency, and has reflects different regional bureaus in specific conflict prevention strategic and operational priorities than those or crisis settings. Tasks include early warning, held by Brussels and EU member states. planning, lessons learnt and best practices,

Operational requirements in the field and 3 See Clinton H., “Leading Through Civilian Power: Redefining American Diplomacy and Development,” the emergence of ‘comprehensive’ and ‘whole Foreign Affairs, November —December 2010. 40 Preventing Conflict, Managing Crisis: European and American Perspectives EU-U.S. Cooperation in Crisis Management: Transatlantic Approaches and Future Trajectories 41

but also crisis response strategy and integrated value added of S/CRS but also greater buy-in resource management. The 2008 Reconstruc- on the part of the administration and State tion and Stabilization Civilian Management Department structures. At the same time, the Act further provided the authority to develop results of the 2010 mid-term elections and on- the Civilian Response Corps (CRC).4 going budget disputes suggest that the cross- government support that has emerged over the The CRC represents a further step towards past five years in favor of S/CRS and ‘civilian making available the necessary personnel for power’ more generally will not result in added, post-conflict reconstruction activities. The -ac but rather in reduced, financial contributions.6 tive (250 personnel) and standby (2000 per- This will limit the scope and range of U.S. sonnel) components include personnel from contributions to civilian reconstruction—and eight departments and agencies with appropri- suggests that the U.S., in light of the current ate civilian expertise; and the third consisting economic and political climate and the result- of personnel from the private sector as well as ing funding decisions, is unlikely to build up a state and local government with expertise not large civilian capability. available in the federal government.5 By the end of 2010 the ranks of the CRC numbered Still, when it comes to EU-U.S. cooperation, around 1200. the approach towards civilian reconstruction adopted on the part of the U.S. through S/ Initial experiences with S/CRS revealed chal- CRS resonates with that of the EU. U.S. ex- lenges in creating buy-in on the part of the pertise differs from that of the EU in a num- broader State Department bureaucracy. In ber of aspects, but this could allow for a pro- addition, Congressional backing was severely ductive division of labor and synergy in areas limited, and it was not until 2009 that the where both engage. Strengthening and further S/CRS received directly appropriated fund- institutionalizing cooperation would lead to ing. Financial allocations increased from $45 more frequent joint engagement—and as a re- million in FY 2009 and $323 million in FY sult also more effective cooperation in pursuit 2010, most of which was allocated for the of shared policy goals. Institutionally, S/CRS CRC. This has further delayed the S/CRS as- emphasizes international partnerships with a suming greater responsibility in post-conflict view to establishing a community of practice reconstruction. to deepen cooperation between its main international partners, including the EU. EU-U.S. The QDDR and the broader context of an cooperation is circumscribed by an existing emphasis on ‘smart power’ and a ‘whole of and slowly evolving institutional framework government’ approach suggest a cementing of that is analyzed in the next section. views in favor of civilian capabilities as part of the broader U.S. foreign policy toolbox. EU-U.S. Cooperation in Crisis Management: The elevation of S/CRS to a bureau through Towards a Workable Framework the QDDR also suggests recognition of the

4 Serwer, D. and Chabalowski, M., “US-EU Within the framework of increasing U.S. ca- Cooperation in Managing and Resolving Conflicts,” pabilities and also increasing interest in this in Hamilton, D. ed., Shoulder to Shoulder: Forging a particular policy field, EU-U.S. cooperation Strategic U.S.-EU Partnership (Washington, DC: John has steadily evolved. Along with an increas- Hopkins University Center for Transatlantic Relations 2010), pp. 283-292. ing focus on stabilization and reconstruction 5 See Civilian Response Corps Today: Fact Sheet. U.S. 6 See “Beyond the Water’s Edge,” The Economist, Department of State, 2010. January 15, 2011, p. 44. 40 Preventing Conflict, Managing Crisis: European and American Perspectives EU-U.S. Cooperation in Crisis Management: Transatlantic Approaches and Future Trajectories 41

on the part of the U.S. administration as of of planning and assessment tools; initiate a 2004 came increasing emphasis on dialogue dialogue on crisis prevention; and observe with the UN, NATO but also the EU Council and participate in pre-deployment training Secretariat and the Commission. The exact programs.8 parameters of EU-U.S. cooperation were only slowly arrived at. This was mainly on account The Belgian EU Presidency during the second of differences over whether or not to highlight half of 2010 subsequently undertook work the EU’s civilian contributions or acknowl- towards a Framework Agreement on EU-U.S. edge the civil-military foundations of EU cooperation in crisis management. Signature crisis management. It was not until December of the May 31, 2011 Framework Agreement 2007 that the two sides agreed on a Work Plan on U.S. participation in EU crisis manage- for U.S.-EU Technical Dialogue and Increased ment operations formalizes U.S. contributions Cooperation in Crisis Management and Conflict to EU missions, the parameters of which had Prevention. Intended to create a relationship to previously been negotiated on a case by case develop and improve respective EU and U.S. basis.9 approaches, the Work Plan identified several areas for cooperation that have since been put This arrangement is to foster burden sharing 7 into practice. Following the 2008 signature in crisis management operations. It could over of a security agreement on the exchange of time also contribute to the establishment of classified information, the two sides exchange mutual best practices and lessons learned in country watch lists and can jointly consider a EU-U.S. cooperation—even if the EU-U.S. range of options, including the coordination agreement covers the participation of U.S. of responses. A second area of cooperation staff in CSDP missions only, rather than con- concerns an exchange of best practices, lessons stituting a reciprocal relationship. Building the learned and planning exercises as a means to capacity of third parties, including the African progress towards further cooperation. Union and United Nations constitutes an ad- ditional focal area for transatlantic coopera- While the 2007 Work Plan constitutes a solid tion. An emphasis on other multilateral actors basis for cooperation, there was a clear sense is important also because it highlights that that more could be done to improve coordi- discussions over EU-U.S. cooperation do not nation and cooperation. A review of achieve- take place in an institutional vacuum. ments highlighted several areas of further exploration in U.S.-EU cooperation in crisis management. The ongoing EU-U.S. dialogue was generally judged productive, and ongoing crisis management missions continued to provide real-world opportunities for operational coordination. At the same time, there was a clearly perceived need for more strategic dialogue in the pre-conflict state—specifi- 8 Derived from conversations with U.S., EU member state and EU officials, 2010. cally collaboration on conflict prevention and 9 European Union. “Framework Agreement between mission planning. Further suggestions for co- the United States of America and the European Union operation included to exchange civilian crisis on the participation of the United States of America management planners; explore interoperability in European Union crisis management operations.” Official Journal of the European UnionL 143/2. Brussels, 7 See Serar, A., “Tackling Today’s Complex Crises: EU- 31 May 2011. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ US Cooperation in Civilian Crisis Management,” EU LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:143:0002:00 Diplomacy Papers 4/2009, Bruges, College of Europe. 05:EN:PDF 42 Preventing Conflict, Managing Crisis: European and American Perspectives EU-U.S. Cooperation in Crisis Management: Transatlantic Approaches and Future Trajectories 43

an example for a conflict setting where civilian The Strategic and Operational contributions have tended to be subsumed Limits of Cooperation by military efforts and efforts at coordinating civilian activities have only slowly evolved.10 The developments sketched out in the previ- Drawing on EU experience in crisis manage- ous section point towards an increasing will- ment, the example of Bosnia, where the EU ingness and an increasing ability to cooper- concurrently conducted a civilian and a mili- ate —both in terms of diminishing political tary CSDP operation, shows the difficulty in reservations as well as operational capacities asserting civilian lead in light of the military’s and experiences. At the same time, there re- organizational culture but also in case overlap- main limitations to EU-U.S. cooperation in ping mandates that do not specify a clear de- crisis management in the framework of S/ lineation of lead responsibility.11 CRS and elsewhere. These relate to the scope of possible conflict intervention activities, as These experiences raise questions as to the well as the size of a potential joint mission delineation between military, police and other and its envisioned political and operational security functions—particularly in the latter impact. The restriction of cooperation to the phases of intervention that relies not so much domain of civilian crisis management presents on military but on forces that include police, the first limitation for EU-U.S. cooperation; border/customs, and judicial specialists.12 The the institutional limitations inherent in the question of civil-military relations —under- EU-NATO relationship, another. Taken to- stood both in the sense of space for civilian gether, they suggest that in the contemporary actors; but also the space for those tasked with political and economic climate EU-U.S. co- civilian control to determine the political and operation will be small in scale and limited to operational course of action, and concurrently conflict prevention and long-term, structural for the civilian crisis missions to gain opera- peacebuilding. tional space in a post-conflict scenario —is a function both of political priorities, appropri- Civil-Military Cooperation: the Missing ate planning, but also size of bureaucracy and Dimension available (and appropriately trained) staff.

Depending on the stage of the conflict cycle in which EU-U.S. cooperation is to take place, an exclusive focus on the civilian aspects of conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction can have signifi- 10 See Gross, E, “Towards a comprehensive approach? The EU’s contribution to Security Sector Reform (SSR) cant implications not just for the geographic in Afghanistan,” Security and Peace Vol. 28, Issue 4 reach, the visibility, but also the success of (2010), pp. 227-232. any individual or joint EU-U.S. interven- 11 See Leakey, D, “ESDP and Civil/Military tion. Particularly in the post-conflict phase, Cooperation: Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2005,” in where close coordination with the military Deighton, A. and Maurer, V. (eds.), Securing Europe? is required but a civilian lead is essential for Implementing the European Security Strategy. Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik Nr. 77 (Zurich: Swiss the transition to civilian oversight, operat- Federal Institute of Technology, 2006), pp. 59-68. ing exclusively on civilian activities without 12 See Penksa, S., “Security governance, complex a political and/or operational link to military peace support operations and the blurring of civil- structures has negative implications for effec- military tasks,” in Daase, C. and Friesendorf, C. (eds.), tive coordination. Afghanistan could count as Rethinking Security Governance: The problem of unintend- ed consequences (London, Routledge 2010), pp. 39-61. 42 Preventing Conflict, Managing Crisis: European and American Perspectives EU-U.S. Cooperation in Crisis Management: Transatlantic Approaches and Future Trajectories 43

Managing, Sidestepping or Confronting EU- effect on EU-U.S. cooperation in crisis man- NATO Relations? agement. NATO enlarging its toolbox could potentially compete with EU capabilities, but also with the current scope of EU-U.S. co- The scope but also the future potential for operation. It is too soon to draw conclusions, EU-U.S. cooperation also raises the question but the acquisition of civilian capabilities by of when this cooperation touches on NATO NATO could have several effects, including and the military contributions to crisis man- relegating EU-U.S. cooperation to geographi- agement. The EU’s emphasis on the civil-mil- cally uncontested areas, and restricting EU- itary nature of its crisis management instru- U.S. cooperation to civilian aspects of crisis ment has conflicted with the U.S. emphasis management on a permanent basis. on the EU’s civilian contributions in the past—thereby creating or perhaps reinforcing a de facto transatlantic division of labor. This delayed formal agreement cooperation between the EU-U.S. prior to 2007.13 The End Goal of Crisis Management At present, the political constellations have Discussions over the institutional and op- shifted—the ‘NATO first’ mentality is no erational limitations of EU-U.S. coopera- longer as prevalent among U.S. policy makers, tion also raise the question of what goal both although remnants thereof continue to exist, sides wish to pursue when it comes to crisis but remains a question of political influence. management. Two potential models include The EU has come to be regarded as a poten- crisis management in the true sense of the tial partner for NATO as well, particularly term—that is, timely intervention at the onset through its financial instruments. NATO’s of a crisis or just after its conclusion to help intention, voiced at the 2010 Lisbon summit, the transition to a post-conflict, institution- to develop its own civilian capabilities present building stage; or a long-term structural ap- has added potential for overlap but also fric- proach of conflict prevention that engages in tion in transatlantic cooperation. The 2010 third countries over a longer period of time in Strategic Concept explicitly states NATO’s pursuit of concurrent operational and political aim to ‘form an appropriate but modest civil- goals. ian crisis management capability (…) to plan, employ and coordinate civilian activities.’ The paradigm in which crisis response takes The document also mentions training civilian place, therefore, ought to be considered and specialists, as well as the enhancement of ‘in- specified to frame current or future EU-U.S. tegrated civilian-military planning throughout co-operation. If the capability for immediate the crisis spectrum.’14 crisis response constitutes a potential goal for EU-U.S. cooperation, there should be a dis- This poses the question of overlap between EU cussion over the direction in which such crisis and NATO competences, and their potential response is to evolve—with a view to reaching 13 See Korski, D., “Preventing Crises and Managing a consensus over end goals, as well as the bal- Conflicts: U.S.-EU Cooperation,” In Hamilton, D. ance between conflict prevention and crisis (ed.), op. cit. 4. response component. What sort of coopera- 14 See NATO, Active Engagement, Modern Defense: tion both sides are able to engage in will also Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The determine the modus of response—and the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. effectiveness of EU-U.S. cooperation in inter- Lisbon, 19 November 2010. Accessible via: http://www. nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf national security. 44 Preventing Conflict, Managing Crisis: European and American Perspectives EU-U.S. Cooperation in Crisis Management: Transatlantic Approaches and Future Trajectories 45

The emphasis on civilian missions, also in view of the size and function of respective Recruiting Practices and Respective EU and U.S. missions launched, suggests that EU-U.S. Staff Profiles EU-U.S. cooperation will be limited to small missions whose mandates are conservatively For the U.S., funding delays to date have prescribed. EULEX Kosovo, with 1900 inter- curtailed the size of the CRC. This limits national staff foreseen, represents the largest U.S. ability to engage in crisis response, and integrated rule of law mission conducted by implies a continued reliance on contractors the EU—but its size is the exception rather particularly for large-scale civilian missions. than the rule. The size of other civilian mis- In the case of the EU, on the other hand, sions have ranged from 10 (EUJUST Themis the demand for staffing CSDP missions far in Georgia) to 540 (EUPM in Bosnia). These exceeds the availability of appropriate staff. missions may thus play an important part in Unlike in the U.S., making staff available also supporting larger peace-building efforts on the relies on member state contributions—and in part of the international community, but they many instances, such as in the case of EUPOL normally do not constitute a large-scale con- Afghanistan, member states have been reluc- tribution to post-crisis intervention. Similarly, tant to equip individual EU missions with the on the U.S. side, the S/CRS focuses on short- appropriate staff. Furthermore, the tasks to term interventions. Given these precedents it be undertaken in civilian crisis management is likely that future EU-U.S. cooperation will have become increasingly complex as the EU follow similar patterns of mission size and expands the profile of missions to be under- activities. This means that, in order to achieve taken, and thus require increasingly staff with mission objectives and to maximize overall specialized professional skills and profiles. policy impact, both partners have to engage not only in a strategic dialogue on the desired There is also a transatlantic difference in how end state of crisis intervention in general, but staff is identified, recruited and trained: the also of the broader policy framework for im- U.S. draws on personnel from individual fed- pacting the political direction of the specific eral agencies and departments including the crisis intervention. treasury, commerce as well as USAID; the EU relies on staff on secondment for member states’ interior and justice (and in some cases also defense) ministries. The need to internally Staffing Matters coordinate domestic bureaucratic politics further complicates the staffing of international The definition of the operational and strategic missions. goals of crisis management has implications for the skills required of civilian staff —as For joint EU-U.S. operation, the question of well as the numbers of staff that needs to be what kind of staff is to undertake certain tasks made available in order to carry out ongoing matters. Whereas the EU sends national po- and future cooperation. Both the EU, and of lice and justice experts, the U.S. relies on staff late also the U.S., have gone to great lengths from a number of federal agencies, not all of to identify, train and eventually also deploy which have extensive international experience civilian experts for individual crisis missions. or deploying abroad. In addition, the U.S. Both sides have also found this a challenging also uses private firms for implementation endeavor, albeit for different reasons. that recruit, train and deploy staff under U.S. Government direction. The focus of staffing for post-conflict reconstruction is, therefore, 44 Preventing Conflict, Managing Crisis: European and American Perspectives EU-U.S. Cooperation in Crisis Management: Transatlantic Approaches and Future Trajectories 45

slightly different and not easily reconciled— and has implications for the kind of expertise Conclusion: Limitations and the U.S. can contribute to EU missions. Enablers for EU-U.S. Cooperation in Crisis Management This chapter has attempted to sketch the Training Matters state of play of EU-U.S. cooperation in crisis management, compare respective approaches The difference in recruiting patterns and avail- and states of institutional development, and able skills raises the issue of training—but also highlight possible points of divergence but the recognition that EU and U.S. personnel also convergence. It has argued that, in order will not necessarily be able to effectively work for the EU and the U.S. to maximize future together in every instance except for where security cooperation, a number of factors are tasks are compatible with respective staffing important. practices and available expertise. The need for effective training applies not only to U.S.- First, there is a need for a strategic discussion EU joint endeavors but also to each actor about where cooperation ought to be headed. individually. In the EU, training standards in 15 This means that work on the technical and respective member states vary considerably. operational aspects of EU-U.S. cooperation in Member states also maintain their national crisis missions needs to be complemented by approaches to training, which can lead to strategic engagement on the part of respective duplication and makes the establishment of EU and U.S. political leadership. Such an en- a ‘European’ training standard difficult. To gagement is necessary to define the parameters be fair, efforts to streamline training practices of cooperation but also to set strategic, politi- have taken place although the EU remains cal and operational priorities in international some ways away from developing a common crisis management. approach to training—and not all member states contribute equally to the EU’s civilian Second, while the inter-institutional competi- missions. On the U.S. side, staff training has tion that has marked EU-NATO relations for been taking more seriously. But, like in the most of the first decade of CSDP has given EU, making available mission personnel who way to pragmatism, there remains a risk of are not deployed on a regular basis, and who duplication of efforts. This reinforces the need need to be released from their regular work for a strategic discussion over transatlantic se- duties, entails its own set of difficulties. As curity needs and the best way to meet them. for EU-U.S. cooperation in providing training, joint training is advancing with the U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP) and the Center for Third, in order to make civilian reconstruc- International Peace Operations (ZIF) in Ger- tion efforts visible and credible, policy makers many increasingly working together. on both sides of the Atlantic must make an effort to recruit, train and deploy appropriately trained staff to missions that are carefully planned and have a mandate suited to the conflict in which they are to intervene so as to make an impact in the field. Only by dem- onstrating the added value of civilian instru- 15 See Korski, D. and Gowan, R., Can the EU Rebuild Failing States? A Review of Europe’s Civilian Capacities ments will future EU-U.S. cooperation in the (London: European Council of Foreign Relations, field be possible—and sustainable. 2009). 46 Preventing Conflict, Managing Crisis: European and American Perspectives EU-U.S. Cooperation in Crisis Management: Transatlantic Approaches and Future Trajectories PB

Fourth and finally, the threat emanating from instruments and cooperation. The effects of weak or failing states will continue to face the the financial crisis are already being felt in international community for some time to national budgets, and this will inevitably af- come. Assisting other countries in establishing fect how much money can be spent on crisis the rule of law as part of a broader approach response and long-term engagement in peace- towards conflict prevention and crisis manage- building and post-conflict reconstruction. ment will thus remain a policy goal that the Work toward increasing cooperation and en- transatlantic policy community will have to hancing capacity along the lines suggested in meet in the future. There is simply no other this chapter would make security cooperation option than to proceed to optimize respective more effective.