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Earthquake Or Underground Explosion? Experiments Help Differentiate Between Nuclear Test and Natural Events

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Earthquake Or Underground Explosion? Experiments Help Differentiate Between Nuclear Test and Natural Events Vol. 71, No. 16, August 16, 2019 Fueling Innovations 3 PONI 2019 4 Dori Ellis: Battery abuse 5 Coming home NA-50 awards 7 PAGE 8 Operation Backpack 12 Earthquake or underground explosion? Experiments help differentiate between nuclear test and natural events By Manette Newbold Fisher The dataset is massive. “It’s been called the finest explosion dataset of this type in the world,” Rob said. “We put a lot of effort into doing this correctly.” andia researchers, as part of a group of NNSA The final underground explosion in the series scientists, have wrapped up years of field ex- took place June 22. S periments to improve the United States’ abil- Explosion differences in hard, ity to differentiate earthquakes from underground soft rock explosions, key knowledge needed to advance the nation’s monitoring and verification capabilities for Phase 1 of SPE consisted of six underground detecting underground nuclear explosions. tests in granite between 2010 and 2016. Phase 2 The nine-year project, the Source Physics consisted of four underground tests in dry alluvium Experiments, was a series of underground chem- geology, or soft rock, in 2018 and 2019. The results ical high-explosive detonations at various yields from both phases will be analyzed to help deter- and different depths to improve understanding of mine how subsurface detonations in dry alluvium seismic activity around the globe. These NNSA- compare to those in hard rock. Additionally, the sponsored experiments were conducted by Sandia, SPE data can be measured against data collected Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence from historic underground nuclear tests that were Livermore National Laboratory and Mission conducted at the former Nevada Test Site. Support and Test Services LLC, which man- Depending on the experiment, up to 1,500 ages operations at the Nevada National Security sensors were set up to take measurements. These Site. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the diagnostics included infrasound, seismic, various University of Nevada, Reno, and several other borehole instruments, high-speed video, geologic laboratories and research organizations participated mapping, drone-mounted photography, distributed on various aspects of the program. fiber-optic sensing, electromagnetic signatures, Researchers think recorded data and computer gas-displacement recordings, ground-surface modeling from the experiments could make the changes from synthetic-aperture radar and lidar world safer because underground explosives (which measures distance using lasers) and others. SPE SETUP — Researchers prepare for a source physics testing would not be mistaken for earthquakes. Accelerometers were set up in multiple locations experiment at the Nevada National Security Site. The NNSA- sponsored experiments were conducted at the site by Sandia, The results will be analyzed and made available to around the explosions, along with temperature sensors and electromagnetic sensors. Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore national laboratories, many institutions, said Sandia principal investiga- as well as other laboratories and research organizations. tor and geophysicist Rob Abbott. — CONTINUED ON PAGE 11 Photo courtesy of the Nevada National Security Site From farm to computer lab Cybersecurity consortium opens doors for intern By Troy Rummler ogan Carpenter teases his co-workers when they complain about work. Growing up in rural Madison County, Virginia, he worked on a chicken Lfarm through high school and took up landscaping and painting jobs on the side. Tending poultry, performing menial labor for low wages, and being consumed daily by bugs and southern humidity, Logan decided to go to college. Now, Logan conducts cybersecurity research at Sandia. Life is good, he tells his colleagues. Work is stimulating, well-paying and indoors. The link from one job to the other was a pipeline program that connects students at historically black colleges and universities with cybersecurity internships at Sandia and Lawrence Livermore national laboratories. “There were not any other programs like this, and we spent quite a lot of time meeting with minority-serving institutions and learning what worked well and what did not,” said Dimitri Kusnezov, deputy undersecretary for artificial intelligence and technology at DOE, who led the effort to form the Consortium Enabling Cybersecurity Opportunities & Research, or CECOR. Created in 2015, the consortium has enabled Logan and others at partic- ipating institutions to come to Sandia for summer internships, gain work experience and cultivate interests and skills. “CECOR is a great way for Sandia to bring these stellar and talented students from underrepresented, minority populations to the Labs to create a workforce that approaches challenges with diverse perspectives,” said Han Lin, the program’s manager at Sandia. “Interns enter a job market rich with opportunities,” said David Martinez, Sandia’s recruiting manager. “About 300,000 unfilled cybersecurity jobs exist in the U.S., and there are approximately 2 million opportunities throughout the world.” Some interns find their best option is at Sandia, including Logan. “Looking over everything I’ve done,” Logan said, “the most pivotal part of my career was CECOR.” From farm to cables When Logan came to Sandia as a computer science major from Norfolk State University in coastal Virginia, one of the first people he met was program CAREER PATH — Logan Carpenter, left, checks in with CECOR coordinator Tommie Kuykendall during a walk around Sandia’s Albuquerque campus. Photo by Randy Montoya — CONTINUED ON PAGE 6 and signatures to develop detection capabilities LABNEWS Notes that can be deployed rapidly, used to detect a broader range of threats, and share information to behave as an intelligent network. Strategic Priority No. 4 To this end, Sandia must continue to lead the Closing the gaps in threat nation in developing capabilities to monitor activ- ities related to threats as they occur, whether that detection capabilities is cyber threats, threats to critical infrastructure (such as the energy grid) within the U.S. or threats By Doug Bruder related to the use of weapons of mass destruction Associate Labs Director for Global Security anywhere in the world. Through this priority, Sandia seeks to advance our nation’s ability to It’s tough to hide a nuclear test. detect threats before they are actualized. The array of detection methods used by the The science of detection is also evolving. For U.S. and other countries is designed to capture example, the proliferation of all sorts of sen- the flash of light, seismic signal and radioac- sors (e.g., cameras, satellites, Apple watch data, tive isotopes that are characteristic of a nuclear seismic monitors) presents opportunities and Associate Labs Director for Global Security Doug Bruder event occurring anywhere in the world. But challenges for the future of detection, as does the Photo by Randy Montoya what if the goal was to detect covert activities application of artificial intelligence and machine Lab News). We will seek to develop labo- in pursuit of a nuclear device before the test- learning to sensing technology. ratory directed research and development ing stage? What if the potential proliferant is a Sandia’s involvement in NNSA’s Low Yield proposals that address identified research rogue actor not yet on the radar? Nuclear Monitoring project is an example of needs, including proposals in support of Sandia’s Strategic Priority No. 4, Detect an ongoing research and development efforts STARCS, which seeks to advance the Threats, is aimed directly at this scenario. This to advance detection capabilities, specifi- nation’s capabilities for protecting its assets priority seeks to marshal and enhance Sandia’s cally for monitoring low-yield nuclear testing. in space from adversary attacks. This phase capabilities to develop transformational tech- Funded by NNSA’s Office of Defense Nuclear will focus on identifying research areas to nical solutions that change the playing field for Nonproliferation, LYNM also involves Los increase autonomy, reconfigurability and global monitoring and detection to be able to Alamos, Lawrence Livermore and Pacific real-time responsiveness of sensors and respond to potential threats, whether conven- Northwest national laboratories. sensor architectures. tional, nuclear, chemical, biological or cyber. Sandia’s role focuses on applying big-data ana- • Identify the requirements for the This effort seeks to identify ways that Sandia lytics to untrusted data sources to obtain actionable development of a testbed. By develop- can detect potential threats not only to the information on low-yield events. ing a synthetic environment in which to U.S., but also those that could harm our allies. evaluate sensors, architectures and analysis Deliverables for FY19-FY20 As threats evolve, so must capabilities, we hope to increase the pace of Strategic Priority No. 4 calls for the following innovation and lower risk. detection specific actions and deliverables over the next year: Existential threats to our national security — • Develop a threat detection R&D roadmap Building on the Labs’ legacy those that would cause catastrophic casual- for innovative signature-sensor-analysis In his 1961 State of the Union address, ties or dramatic changes to our way of life solutions. We need to better understand the President John F. Kennedy warned that “We — are evolving, as are the sources of threats. spectrum of threats (e.g., biological, chemical, must prevent
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