SYRIA: AMERICAN ACTION FOR h A COMPLEX CRISIS Task Force 2014 University of Washington Jackson School of International Studies SYRIA: AMERICAN ACTION FOR A COMPLEX CRISIS Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies Task Force Report, Winter 2014 ________________________________________________________________________ TASK FORCE ADVISOR Denis Bašić, Ph.D. TASK FORCE EVALUATOR Frederic C. Hof __________________________ TASK FORCE MEMBERS Lily Anderson Gil Bar-Sela Kell Brauer Alexis Chouery Rebecca Donato Melanie Eng Patrick Gallagher Trenton Holmberg Veronica Jimenez Bryan Lam Daniel Maggioncalda Amanda Ramshaw Anna Rumpf Annie Wang Coordinator: Winthrop Hubbard Editor: Wanda Bertram ii The members of this Task Force wish to thank Denis Bašić, our advisor, for his constant and thorough guidance in helping develop this report to its fullest potential. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS COVER PAGE……………………………………………………………………………i CLASS LIST……………………………………………………………………………...ii DEDICATION…………………………………………………………………………...iii TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………………………...iv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY………………………………………………………………1 SECTION I: PARTIES TO THE CRISIS………………………………………………..5 United Nations Security Council Members……………………………………....6 The Russian Federation…………………………………………………..6 The People’s Republic of China…………………………………………19 The European Union……………………………………………………..30 Regional State Parties……………………………………………………………38 Turkey…………………………………………………………………....38 Lebanon…………………………………………………………………..46 Saudi Arabia……………………………………………………………...56 Israel……………………………………………………………………...64 Iran……………………………………………………………………….75 Jordan…………………………………………………………………….83 Iraq……………………………………………………………………….96 Parties Within Syria…………………………………………………………….111 The Regime and Armed Forces of Bashar al-Assad……………………111 Hezbollah……………………………………………………………….122 The National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces and the Free Syrian Army………………………………………………133 The Islamic Front……………………………………………………….141 Syrian Kurds……………………………………………………………146 The National Coordination Body for Democratic Change……………..155 The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood……………………………………….159 Designated Sunni Terrorist Groups…………………………………….166 SECTION II: POLICY DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS………………177 Emphasizing Shared Interests…………………………………………………..178 Strengthening Border Security………………………………………………….181 Implementing a Ceasefire………………………………………………………193 Establishing Transitional Government and Elections…………………………..207 CONCLUDING REMARKS…………………………………………………………...212 APPENDICES………………………………………………………………………….214 REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………………219 iv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Wanda Bertram and Winthrop Hubbard Though no complex framework is needed to gauge the grave human costs brought about by three years of conflict in Syria, the crisis itself has been driven by a complex of motivations and interests across multiple systemic levels. Beginning as a nonviolent popular movement seeking reforms to Bashar al-Assad’s authoritarian regime, Syrian protests escalated to violent means when it became clear that the government, rather than accommodating bulleted requests, would retaliate with bullets of its own. The intractability of the conflict frustrated the opposition into splitting along strategic and ideological lines. Today, the number of opposition groups in Syria allegedly exceeds 1,000, their divisions hindering outside powers from organizing an opposition front worthy of broad-based international support. Furthermore, the very support of foreign actors delegitimizes rebel groups in the eyes of many civilians, who recognize that theirs are not the most powerful interests at play in the now-international crisis. Certain opposition parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, the Syrian Kurdish people, and members of the current National Coalition, have invited international assistance in order to level the playing field against the Assad regime’s superior military assets and its support from Russia and Iran. Each of these groups must attempt to broaden its civilian support base—which demands that it make territorial gains and provide social services in a time 1 of crisis—while also negotiating with international supporters, who hesitate to provide lethal aid for diplomatic reasons or to increase non-lethal aid for fear of enabling terrorist activity. In contrast, the military and financial successes of parties aiming to establish an Islamic state in Syria—most notably the Islamic Front, ISIL and al-Nusra—have been underwritten by the wealth of private donors, mostly in the Gulf states, who seek to influence the outcome of the conflict for religious reasons. These groups by and large oppose outside intervention in the war. Their hardline ideologies lend credibility to the view that the Syrian conflict is a sectarian one, ironically dissuading outside states from supporting more moderate opposition factions, as these states do not wish to aggravate existing sectarian tensions in Lebanon and Iraq. Multilateral negotiations around the Syrian conflict have progressed at a glacial pace, not only because of the threat of sectarianism, but due to rival interests surrounding developing deals in the regional oil trade. Publicly recognizing the ongoing atrocities committed by both the Assad regime and opposition factions, the Obama Administration has expressed its wish to end Assad family rule, but wishes to see such a regime change brought about through peaceful political settlements that curb the local influence of militant Islamist groups. The U.S. has avoided unilateral military intervention in the conflict thus far so as to maintain normal diplomatic relations with Russia, China and Iran, but embraced a multilateral agreement in September 2013 to place Syrian chemical weapons under international control. Much of the American public and legislature remain opposed to intervention, recalling the legacy of turmoil left by recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the unintended escalation of NATO intervention in Libya. Taking into account the complex international and domestic implications of the Syrian crisis, this report details U.S. and foreign interests in the war and proscribes recommendations for bringing about its end. In this crisis, no broad policy strategy can claim a moral highground, 2 and it is therefore in the highest interest of the United States to negotiate a swift ceasefire in Syria, rather than empowering favored factions and thereby engaging other major powers with conflicting interests in Syria’s governance. To this end, the U.S. must approach multilateral negotiations by stressing interests common to all involved parties, be they parties within Syria, regional parties, or parties on the United Nations Security Council. This report identifies three such interests. First is curbing the growing strength of designated terrorist groups, most significantly al-Nusra and ISIL, which aim to establish an Islamic caliphate irrespective of Syria’s current borders. Second is normalizing conflicts and tensions which could destabilize the Syrian region at large, including the animosity between Saudi Arabia and Iran and potential civil war in Lebanon, Israel and Iraq. Third is halting the entrenchment of factional divisions within Syria, since resentment on all sides makes reconciliation more distant, inflating the future expenses of war for all belligerents. It is the task of the U.S. to persuade involved parties that these shared interests outweigh individual stakes in the conflict, thus brokering a ceasefire while depriving forces on the ground of the means to continue fighting. Before a ceasefire may be brokered, unofficial human and capital aid to the warring factions in Syria must cease, so as to convince these groups that they will not be able to achieve supremacy through violent action. As such, the borders of Syria’s neighbor states must be tightened to restrict the passage of jihadist fighters or materiel, while still allowing influxes of Syrian refugees. Once disempowered militarily, Syria’s domestic parties will be incentivized to either disband or come to the negotiating table, which most have been reluctant to do so far. With all local and international parties present at negotiations, a ceasefire agreement can be reached and enforced. Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and EU members must be persuaded to halt state support to their respective proxies. Though such an agreement has not yet been forthcoming, 3 it can yet be achieved, if compromises are made on all sides regarding the composition of a post- conflict Syrian regime. When the ceasefire is brokered and an end to violent action is in sight, the international community should establish buffer zones to separate armed parties with territorial assets; these zones will create temporary federal regions administered by their respective occupiers. As the federal system described above will neither represent the Syrian people’s visions of governance nor establish a central state infrastructure, this system should give way as soon as possible to a transitional government. To this end, the international community should first guide Syria’s administrative divisions in holding regional elections, and then summon elected representatives to a delegation to draft a national electoral system and constitution. Throughout this process Syria’s governing bodies will be frail, and elections will need to be monitored by UN peacekeeping forces so as to ensure fairness and prevent violence. Though Syria’s future electoral system and constitution are matters for the delegation to decide,