THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INDONESIA’S GLOBAL MARITIME FULCRUM VISION IN MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS UNDER JOKO WIDODO’S ADMINISTRATION IN FACING CHINA’S NINE-DASH LINE CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE (2014-2016)
By
LUKY JUNIANSYAH ID no. 016201300086
A thesis presented to the Faculty of Humanities President University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for Bachelor Degree in International Relations Major in Strategic and Defense Studies
2017
THESIS ADVISER
RECOMMENDATION LETTER
This thesis entitled ‖The Implementation of Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum Vision in Military and Political Aspects under Joko Widodo's Administration in Facing China's Nine-dash Line Claims in the South China Sea Dispute (2014-2016)‖ prepared and submitted by LukyJuniansyah in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor in the School of Humanities has been reviewed and found to have satisfied the requirements for a thesis fit to be examined. I therefore recommend this thesis for Oral Defense.
Cikarang, Indonesia, 29th May 2017
Recommended and Acknowledged by,
Drs. Teuku Rezasyah, M.A., Ph.D.
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PANEL OF EXAMINER APPROVAL SHEET
The Panel of Examiners declare that the thesis entitled ―The Implementation of Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum Vision in Military and Political Aspects under Joko Widodo's Administration in Facing China's Nine-dash Line Claims in the South China Sea Dispute (2014-2016)‖ that was submitted by Luky Juniansyah majoring in International Relations from the Faculty of Humanities was assessed and approved to have passed the Oral Examinations on 2nd June 2017
Drs. Teuku Rezasyah, M.A., Ph.D. Chair – Panel of Examiners
Dr. Phil. Reza Alexander Antonius Wattimena, S.S., M. Hum Examiner
Bustanul Arifin, BA. IR, M.A. Examiner
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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY
I declare that this thesis, titled ‖The Implementation of Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum Vision in Military and Political Aspects under Joko Widodo's Administration in Facing China's Nine-dash Line Claims in the South China Sea Dispute (2014-2016)‖ is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, an original piece of work that has not been submitted, either in whole or in part, to another university to obtain a degree.
Cikarang, Indonesia, 29th May 2017
Luky Juniansyah
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ABSTRACT
LukyJuniansyah,, 016201300001, The Implementation of Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum Vision in Military and Political Aspects under Joko Widodo's Administration in Facing China's Nine-dash Line Claims in the South China Sea Dispute (2014-2016)
Advisor: Drs. Teuku Rezasyah, M.A., Ph.D.
The South China Sea Dispute is always been an interesting topic since it has such a complex conflict among involved parties. The number of tensions and incidents in the region would become the potential threat to the future of the regional peace and stability. The existence of the United States with its rebalance policy also has brought the competition between major states is increased. The situation is not only involving the claimant states but also non-claimant state. There have been some incidents ensued between claimant state and non-claimant state. China assertiveness in claiming its nine-dash line has threaten the stability of the region. Thus, Indonesia as non-claimant state and ASEAN member states which recently has concern on maritime aspect through its vision to become Global Maritime Fulcrum has prepared the implementation of its foreign policy especially on military and political aspects. The purpose of this research is to analyze the implementation of Indonesia‘s Global Maritime Fulcrum regarding to the issue of the South China Sea dispute.
Keywords: South China Sea, China, Nine-dash Line, Foreign Policy, Global Maritime Fulcrum, Free and Active
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ABSTRAK
LukyJuniansyah,, 016201300001, The Implementation of Indonesia's Global maritime Fulcrum Vision in Military and Political Aspects under Joko Widodo's Administrations in Facing China's Nine-dash Line Claims in the South China Sea Dispute (2014-2016)
Advisor: Drs. Teuku Rezasyah, M.A., Ph.D.
Sengketa Laut Cina Selatan selalu menjadi topik yang menarik karena memiliki konflik yang kompleks antara pihak-pihak yang terlibat. Jumlah ketegangan dan insiden di wilayah ini akan menjadi potensi ancaman bagi masa depan perdamaian dan stabilitas di regional. Kehadiran Amerika Serikat dengan kebijakan keseimbangan juga telah membawa persaingan antar negara besar meningkat. Situasi ini tidak hanya melibatkan negara pengklaim tapi juga negara yang bukan pengklaim. Ada beberapa insiden yang terjadi antara negara pengklaim dan negara bukan pengklaim. Ketegasan Tiongkok dalam mengklaim garis sembilan putus-putusnya telah mengancam stabilitas kawasan ini. Dengan demikian, Indonesia sebagai negara yang bukan pengklaim dan negara anggota ASEAN yang baru-baru ini memiliki kepentingan terhadap aspek maritim melalui visinya menjadi Global Maritime Fulcrum telah mempersiapkan pelaksanaan kebijakan luar negerinya terutama dalam aspek militer dan politik. Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menganalisis implementasi visi poros maritim dunia Indonesia terkait dengan masalah perselisihan Laut Cina Selatan dalam kasus klaim Sembilan garis putus-putus Tiongkok.
Kata Kunci: Laut Tiongkok Selatan, Tiongkok, Sembilan GarisPutus-Putus, Politik Luar Negeri, Poros Maritim Dunia, Bebas danAktif
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Alhamdulillahirobbil 'aalamiin, praise to Allah SWT, because of His mercy and blessings the writer could finish this thesis. Shalawat and salam are given to Prophet Muhammad Shallalahu ‗alahiwassalam because of his guidance that brings enlightenments to our life. I would like to deliver my highest gratitude to:
1. My father, Tedi Irwanto, and my mother, Heni Hernawati they both who always support my education and motivates me to become stronger person in facing any challenges in my life. Thank you for everything Ma, Pa, I am proud to have parents like you. Thank you to my little brothers, Gilang Ilhamsyah, Daffa Dhya‘ul Haq, and my one and only little sister, Hilma Fauzyah who are always coloring my life and cheering me up in my worst situation. I would like to say thank you also to all my family, especially to my Grandma who has been living in peace there, I hope I can be the one that you are expected to be. 2. Mr. Teuku Rezasyah, M.A., Ph.D., my thesis adviser who is always be patient in guiding me to finish my thesis, only the word of "Best" that can explain who he is in my journey as bachelor student. Besides that, I also say thank to Mr. Bustanul Arifin as my second thesis advisor that always be patient in responding my inquiries and also best friend in discussion issues in International Relations. I also would like to say thank you to all International Relations lecturers especially Prof. Anak Agung Banyu Perwita that has guided me so well. Mr. Hendra Manurung as the Head of International Relations study program. 3. All of my friends in IR batch 2013. Besides that, to all Squad of Kostan Hijau Berseri (Andri, Richard, Jonathan, Achong, and Andi) who have already been my best friends for almost 4 years. Especially my roomate Danar Hafidz Wardhana as the one I could rely on. In addition also to my F-2 kostan friends
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as well who is willing to accept me in their room to live in, especially M. Akbar Charisma who is always pushing me to do my thesis. Also I would like to thank to Christoporus Rudi Dewa and his partner Dwini Fernanada. In addition, thank you to my Sundanese friend, Gilang and Edginawan Hadendi who always help me and support me as well. 4. The one who is always supporting and reminding me every day, Taufiqah Nur Hidayah. I would like to say thank you and bear in mind that I treasure you so well. You are truly my life support. 5. My best family, President University Model United Nations Club (PUMUN) that has been developed me and be the best home that I have ever lived in. My special thank you goes to Lidya who has trusted me to be given the mandate as your deputy and Secretary General of President Model United Nations. 6. Mr. Rahman Ibrahim the Deputy Assistant of sea and air border of BNPP. Thank you also to my junior Trisakti Sultan who has bridged me to meet him. Thank you to Jonathan Davy, the one who saves me from this confusion. I highly appreciate your help in giving me path to finish my thesis. Thank you also to Gabriel Partogi as the person I consult about my thesis. 7. My most important second family in President University, CHIRO FANS CLUB‖ my special thanks goes to Lanny Surya Alfiani who always support me even give me silver lining when I am stuck with any problems, and thank you for the laptop when my laptop is broken during I am doing my thesis. Maria Anggita, Mustika Nagari, Fadli Sitompul, Purti Santoso, Lutfan Hasby, Rian Akbary, Lindie Rutry, Alex Pahlevi, Didis, Tika, Alessandro Adikara, Elroy Yona, Dharma Satrya, Afdhal Aulia, and Jonathan Damanik.
Cikarang, 29th May, 2017
Luky Juniansyah
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TABLE OF CONTENT Contents THESIS ADVISER ...... ii RECOMMENDATION LETTER ...... ii PANEL OF EXAMINER APPROVAL SHEET ...... iii DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY ...... iv ABSTRACT ...... v ABSTRAK ...... vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ...... vii TABLE OF CONTENT ...... ix LIST OF FIGURE ...... xii LIST OF ACRONYMS...... xiii CHAPTER I ...... 1 INTRODUCTION ...... 1 I.1. Background of Study ...... 1 I.2. Problem Identification ...... 8 I.3. Statement of the Problem ...... 11 I.4. Research Objectives ...... 12 I.5. Significance of Study ...... 12 I.6. Theoretical Framework ...... 13 I.6.1. Neo-realism ...... 13 1.6.2. Geopolitics ...... 15 I.6.3. Foreign Policy Implementation ...... 18 I.6.4. Conceptual Framework...... 19 I.7. Scope and Limitation of the Study ...... 20 I.8. Research Methodology ...... 21 I.9. Thesis Structure ...... 22 CHAPTER II ...... 24 THE HISTORY OF SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE AND CHINA NINE- DASHED LINE CLAIM ...... 24 II.1. Overview of the South China Sea ...... 24
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II.2. The Dynamics of the South China Sea Dispute among Claimant States (1974-2016) 27 II.2.1. The South China Sea Dispute Timeline (1974-2013) ...... 28 II.2.2. The United State Existence in the South China Sea Dispute ...... 37 II.2.3. Declaration on the Conduct between China and ASEAN Countries ...... 39 II.2.4. The Current Conflict in the South China Sea (2014-2016) ...... 40 II.3. China Nine-dash Line Claims in the South China Sea ...... 43 CHAPTER III ...... 51 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDONESIA‘S FOREIGN POLICY AND INDONESIA VISION UNDER JOKO WIDODO ADMINISTRATION ...... 51 III.1.The History and the Basis of Indonesia Foreign Policy ...... 51 III.1.1. The Background of Non-Alignment Movement ...... 53 III.1.2. Free and Active Foreign Policy ...... 54 III.1.3. Wawasan Nusantara (Archipelagic Outlook) Doctrine ...... 57 III.2. Indonesia‘s Foreign Policy under Joko Widodo Administration ...... 58 III.2.1. Nawa Cita ...... 59 III.2.2. Global Maritime Fulcrum: Maritime Axis in the Asia-Pacific ...... 61 CHAPTER IV ...... 68 INDONESIA‘S GLOBAL MARITIME FULCRUM IMPLEMENTATION UNDER JOKO WIDODO‘S ADMINISTRATION IN FACING SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE IN CASE OF CHINA‘S NINE-DASH LINE CLAIMS (2014-2016) ...... 68 IV.1. Indonesia-China Bilateral Relations under Joko Widodo‘s Administration ...... 68 IV.1.1. Interaction between Indonesia-China regarding to China‘s Nine-dash Line Claims ...... 70 IV.2. Indonesia Implementation on Military Aspect ...... 74 IV.2.1. Indonesian Stance in the South China Sea Dispute According to Defence White Paper 2015 ...... 75 IV.2.2. Increasing Military Capacities ...... 76 IV.3. Indonesia Implementation on Political Aspect ...... 82 IV.3.1. Maritime Diplomacy ...... 83 IV.3.2. Workshop on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea ...... 85 IV.3.3. Indonesia‘s Active Involvement in the Regional Summit regarding to the South China Sea Issue ...... 87
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IV.4. Global Maritime Fulcrum and Free and Active as the Basis of Foreign Policy Implementation ...... 91 IV.5. The Challenges Faced by Indonesia in the Implementing of its Foreign Policy in Achieving Global Maritime Fulcrum Vision regarding to the Issue of South China Sea Dispute ...... 93 CHAPTER V ...... 94 CONCLUSION ...... 94 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 97
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LIST OF FIGURE
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework ...... 19 Figure 2. The Map of the South China Sea ...... 24 Figure 3. The Eleven-dashed Line Claims ...... 44 Figure 4. The Nine-dash Line Map ...... 46 Figure 5. The Ten-dashed Line Map ...... 46 Figure 6. Illustration of the Strategic of South China Sea ...... 49 Figure 7. Five Pillars of GMF and its Supporting Aspects ...... 64 Figure 8. The Pattern of Interaction between Indonesia-China ...... 73 Figure 9. Indonesian Army Procurement Project in 2015 ...... 77 Figure 10. Indonesian Navy Projection in 2015 ...... 78 Figure 11. Indonesian Air Force Projection in 2015 ...... 78 Figure 12. Indonesian Army Projection in 2015 ...... 79
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
DOC = Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties COC = Code of Conduct EEZ = Economic Executive Zone SOA = State Oceanic Administration SOC = State Oceanic Commission GMF = Global Maritime Fulcrum US = United States FON = Freedom of navigations KRI = Kapal Republik Indonesia USD = United States Dollar GDP = Gross Domestic Product NAM = Non-Alignment Movement NEFOs = New Emerging Forces OLDEFO = Old Established Forces GANEFO = Games of the New Emerging Forces Olympic Games CONEFO = Conference of the New Emerging Forces JAREK = Jalannya Revolusi Kita BUMN = Badan Usaha Milik Negara BASARNAS = Badan SAR Nasional RoE = Rules of Engagement BAPERNAS = Badan Perencanaan Nasional SOM = Senior Officers Meeting IUU Fishing = Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing WMP-SCS = Workshop on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea CUES = Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea
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EAS = East Asia Summit PACINDO = Pacific and Indian Oceans ASEAN = Association of South East Asian Nations
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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION
I.1. Background of Study A responsibility of states is to deliver political goods – security, health and education, economic opportunity, good governance, law and order, and fundamental infrastructure requirements (transportation and communications).1 However, the fail states would not be able to come up with those functions above. Therefore, as the function of a sovereign state, these functions will be putted into the first place to maintain their sovereignty remained uphold. In advance, these functions later on will affect the behavior of one state, in which it reflects their policies.
As this the issue discussed in this research involved states as the actor of international system, the author relates how responsibility of a state in protecting its sovereignty from external threat such as regional conflict, regional claims, and so on. Specifically, this research further discusses and explains about how Indonesia with its policy face the South China Sea dispute in the region.
According to the Bureau of hydrographic International, South China Sea known as the waters stretching from the southwest to the northeast, bordered to the south by 3 degrees south between Sumatra and Borneo and in the north bordering the Taiwan Strait on the northern tip of Taiwan to the direction coast of Fujian, China.2 Marine area covers approximately 4,000,000 km2. Bodies is composed of several
1 Potter, D. W. (2004). State Responsibility, Sovereignty, and Failed States, based on him, his paper presented to the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference University of Adelaide. Retrieved November 26, 2016, from University of Adelaide website: https://www.adelaide.edu.au/apsa/docs_papers/Others/potter.pdf. p. 2 2 Why a South China Sea Website, South China Sea Org. Retrieved from: http://www.southchinasea.org/why-a-south-china-sea-website-an-introductory-essay, accessed on November 26, 2016.
islands totaling about 170 small islands, reefs and banks. One group of islands in these waters that have abundant oil and gas reserves are Spartly and Paracel islands.
Dispute overlapping ownership of the South China Sea is not over until now. In April 2010, China actually promulgate regulations on the operation of the fleet in order to strengthen the rights of fishing in the South China Sea. The exit of the regulation clearly has tarnished the agreement that was made between China and ASEAN countries are involved in the disputed 2002 as outlined in the Declaration of Conduct.3 DOC is actually an attempt to solve the conflict overlap on the South China Sea peacefully. According to article 122 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea (The Law of the Sea Convention-1982) states that the South China Sea classified as a marine semi-enclosed surrounded by two or more states and connected with the ocean or other ocean.4 From the article shows that the South China Sea that is surrounded by more than one country allows a struggle between states to one another. There are ten coastal countries (China and Taiwan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam, the Philippines), and non-coastal state namely Laos, and dependent territory that Macau vying for ownership of the South China Sea.5
Judging from the ten countries of the coast in South China Sea, it can be said that China is the country's most visible ambitions to dominate the South China Sea. However, if viewed backward, history shows that the ownership of the oceans is in many countries such as England, France, Japan, China, and Vietnam. In the development of Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines and Taiwan also involved. South China Sea has been a lot of potential conflict. There are six coastal states involved in the conflict, namely China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam. Judging from the geographical location of the South China Sea indicates overlap the border. Because border territorial sovereignty which is owned by the state
3 Retrieved from: http://bataviase.co.id/node/354962, accessed on 20 November, 2016. 4 Article 122, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. p. 67 5Ibid. 2 overlap with regions of other countries. It is quite possible given the border regions measured from sea is more complex than with the creation of the state border on land. The difficulty of making borders from the sea not only of the territorial sea beyond that which concerns the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
In the South China Sea conflict, in addition to the tension caused by the overlapping claims between countries dispute that cannot be stopped until now,6 there were also encouraging disputes, especially regarding the relationship between the two ASEAN member countries, namely Vietnam and the Philippines with China. Philippines for example has been given various reports of violations committed by the Chinese ships passing through the waters that had been disputed, even going several incidents between Chinese patrol boats with fishing vessels Philippines. Furthermore, China also accused the erection of new installations in the disputed region and intimidating-owned Philippine oil exploration ship.
China has not exactly verbalized – in terms recognizable to ocean legal counselors or ambassadors – what its nine-dash line in the South China Sea implies.7 That vagueness leaves a lot of space for conceivable over-interpretation, especially when combined with a portion of the manuveur that China has made because of seen invasions inside the region limited by that line. At one end of the spectrum, the line could be read as a maximalist claim to sovereignty and control over all of the features, land, water, and seabed within the area bounded by the nine-dash line. This is indeed what many states fear.8 In terms of the law of the sea, this doesn‘t make much sense because it appears as a confusion of the concepts of sovereignty and
6Buszynski, Leszek (2012). The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Slaims, and U.S. – China Strategic Rivalry. The Washington Quaterly, Spring,35: 2. p. 139-156. 7 Retrieved from: http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/what-does-the-nine-dash-line-actually-mean/, accessed on November 25, 2016. 8Ibid. 3 jurisdiction – and no coordinates for islands or baselines have been provided, as is required under law.9
In 2013, the Chinese government announced a reorganization of its maritime law agencies under one governing body.10As indicated by the arrangement, the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), which at present regulates the China Marine Surveillance Branch, will have control over the Maritime Police and Border Control, the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, and the Marine Anti-Smuggling Police.11 The SOA will thus be under the locale of another body called the State Oceanic Commission (SOC). The SOC will presumably coordinate maritime operations, and in addition to potentiallybeing headed by a vice premier, it will most likely be closely linked to the Ministry of Defense and the PLA Navy.12 This rebuilding implies that the Chinese Coast Guard, the legislative body in charge of watching and observing the South China Sea, will now be under more straightforward control by the focal government. Solidifying all the diverse gatherings together under one overseeing body suggests that the legislature is setting expanding significance on South China Sea action. In the event that this new body has more noteworthy contact with the military, the new rebuilding shows the administration's aim to expand military control and vicinity on and close debated domain. The size of the Chinese Coast Guard has also been growing, as more than 30 large patrol ships and 20 patrol combatants have been added in the past three years.13
9 Tsirbas, Marina (2016). What Does the Nine-dash Line Actually Mean?.The Diplomat, June 2, 2016. Accessed on December 18, 2016. http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/what-does-the-nine-dash-line- actually-mean/ 10 Broderick, K, 2015. Chinese Activities in the South China Sea. Implication for the American Pivot to Asia, p.5-6 11 Retrieved from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/china/ccg.htm, accessed on November 25, 2016. 12 Hong, Nong (2015). "China's Maritime Law Enforcement Reform and Its Implication on the Regional Maritime Disputes." Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Accessed on November 26, 2016. http://amti.csis.org/chinas-maritime-law- enforcement-reform-and-its-implication-on-the-regional-maritime-disputes/ 13 Erickson, Andrew (2015). "How U.S. Navy Intel Sees China’s Maritime Forces." War on the Rocks. Accessed on November 26, 2016. http://warontherocks.com/2015/04/how-u-s-navy-intel-sees-chinas- maritime-forces/ 4
In accordance to the issue, Indonesia as a non-claimant state has been playing important role as mediator. Since president Soekarno era until Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia keeps its commitment to keep the peace and stability in the region, especially the South China Sea. This has been proven by Indonesia position and free and active policy based on its non-alignment movement spirit.
Indonesia‘s newly elected president, Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, promised in his election manifesto in May 2014 to: (1) focus on strengthening Indonesia‘s maritime security, (2) expand the canvas of regional diplomacy to cover the entire region of the Indo-Pacific, and (3) project the Indonesian navy as a respected regional maritime power in East Asia.14 He further announced in June 2014 that he aimed to transform Indonesia into a ―Global Maritime Fulcrum‖ (porosmaritim dunia).15 He reaffirmed his vision after being declared victorious in July 2014 and called upon all citizens to ―work together to develop Indonesia into a global maritime axis, a global civilizational hub.‖16 While taking the oath of office to become Indonesia‘s seventh president on October 20, 2014, Jokowi reiterated his call to transform Indonesia into a maritime nation and invoked the slogan of ―JalesvevaJayamahe‖ (in the ocean we triumph).17
Jokowi‘s ‗maritime fulcrum‛ recognizes Indonesia‘s geopolitical position as an archipelagic state and puts emphasis on the maritime domain as a medium for Indonesia‘s foreign and defence policy.18 Jokowi‘s foreign policy stresses on
14 Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla Vision-Mission and Action Program, (Jakarta, May 2014), http://kpu.go.id/koleksigambar/VISI_MISI_Jokowi-JK.pdf. accessed on December 10, 2016, p. 13 15 Jokowi supports Palestinian independence, Republika Online, June 23, 2014. Accessed on November 26, 2016. http://www.republika.co.id/berita/en/national-politics/14/06/23/n7m2m7-jokowi- supports-palestinian-independence 16 President-Elect Jokowi Calls for United Indonesia,‖ Tempo, July 23, 2014, accessed on December 10, 2016. http://en.tempo.co/read/news/2014/07/23/055595130/President-Elect-Jokowi-Calls-for- United-Indonesia 17 ―Jokowi‘s Inaugural Speech as Nation‘s Seventh President,‖ The Jakarta Globe, Oct 20, 2014, accessed on December 10, 2016 http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/jokowis-inaugural-speech- nations-seventh-president/ 18 Agastia, I Gusti Bagus Dharma ;Perwita, Anak Agung Banyu: Jokowi's Maritime Axis: Change and Continuity of Indonesia's Role in Indo-Pacific. In: Journal of ASEAN Studies 3 (2015) 5
Indonesia‘s vision to become a strong maritime regional power in both military and diplomacy. This platform thus admit that maritime diplomacy is vital in managing regional maritime dispute with neighbors country, keep Indonesia‘s maritime security, as well as decreasing the tensions among regional powers.19
Five pillars of Jokowi's maritime fulcrum doctrine:20
1. Reestablishing a maritime culture
2. Securing and managing maritime resources
3. Prioritizing maritime infrastructure and connectivity
4. Promoting maritime diplomacy
5. Developing Indonesia‘s maritime defence capacity.
In the practice of its foreign policy, Indonesia still keep its foreign policy principle which is ―free and active‖ foreign policy. This stance also based on Indonesia‘s history to be involved in ―Non-alignment Movement‖ as Indonesia was being the pioneer of Asia-Africa summit. This behavior of Indonesia on free and active foreign policy can be seen from the stance of Indonesia in this issue to be more neutral rather than be in one side of claimants. This condition clearly stated by Joko Widodo as the president of Indonesia."I need to declare that Indonesia is not siding with any party involved in the dispute,"21-Joko Widodo
In addition to its role, Indonesia prefer to become the mediator for the disputed states in the South China Sea. This stance as the mediator has been stated clearly by Joko
19 Agastia, I Gusti Bagus Dharma ;Perwita, Anak Agung Banyu: Jokowi's Maritime Axis: Change and Continuity of Indonesia's Role in Indo-Pacific. In: Journal of ASEAN Studies 3 (2015) 20 Ibid. 21 Jakarta Globe. Jokowi Clarifies Indonesia Still Neutral in the South China Sea Dispute. Retrieved from: http://jakartaglobe.id/news/jokowi-clarifies-indonesia-still-neutral-s-china-sea-dispute/, accessed on 26 November, 2017. 6
Widodo."If it necessary we are also ready to be a good mediator, that is what I was trying to say," –Joko Widodo22
In the development, Indonesia has just released its Global Maritime Fulcrum White Paper that finally sharpen the vision of Indonesia to become a global maritime fulcrum. Thus 53-page publication implies how much important sea, future ways of GMF as the maritime vision, and possible ways to achieve the ambitious.23
Based on GMF white paper, the archipelagic project will be enhanced by five principles: sustainable development, blue economy, integrated and transparent management, and equality. Furthermore, these five principles will be shaped by seven pillars: maritime resource management and human resource development; maritime security, defense, and law enforcement; maritime management; maritime economy; maritime environment protection and management; maritime culture; and maritime diplomacy.24 Looking to those principle and pillars of GMF, there is development on maritime diplomacy and economy as the pillars of maritime strategy. This could lead to the multilateral level especially in the South China Sea.
In addition to the practice of foreign policy, Indonesia, under Joko Widodo administration has vision of NAWA CITA.From this NAWA CITA, the main objective to be achieved is that Indonesia is consistently able to implement free and active foreign policy and its identity as a maritime country to realize a better world order, and to strive for its national interests in order to achieve Indonesia's national goals.25
22 Jakarta Globe. Jokowi Clarifies Indonesia Still Neutral in the South China Sea Dispute. Retrieved from: http://jakartaglobe.id/news/jokowi-clarifies-indonesia-still-neutral-s-china-sea-dispute/, accessed on 26 November, 2017. 23 Retrieved from: http://thediplomat.com/2016/12/indonesias-global-maritime-fulcrum-an-updated- archipelagic-outlook/, accessed on November 27, 2016. 24Ibid. 25 Kementerian LuarNegeri, (2015). RencanaStrategis 2015-2019 Kementerian LuarNegeriRepublik Indonesia. p. 35-36 7
I.2. Problem Identification China is clearly the most ambitious and assertive claimant to maritime territory in the South China Sea.26The historical background and ancient inventions are often used as an excuse for China to maintain its claim to ownership of the South China Sea.27 This is then followed up with a show of force, which tends to show its power through provocative actions against countries other claimants.28
Conflicts can be viewed from various perspectives, by looking at the background, the actors involved and their interests, as well as the intensity and breadth of the conflict areas. Looking from the background, the South China Sea conflict can be seen from a historical claim ruler ship area in the past by traditional rulers that led to claims of ownership by the next ruler of the empire or the same country. While the actors involved and the accompanying interests, some countries in the region, both of which are members of ASEAN or not, as well as countries outside the region that are having their interest. Meanwhile, looking from the intensity, conflict over the South China Sea can be categorized as a slow-intensity conflict.2930 However, developments in the future, if it cannot be managed and searched for an effective, these conflicts can be more open and widespread nature into an armed
26 Retrieved from: http://www.fpri.org/article/2000/08/slow-intensity-conflict-in-the-south-china-sea/, accessed on December 26, 2017. 27 Retrieved from: https://news.vice.com/article/beijings-claims-to-most-of-the-south-china-sea-shot- down-by-international-court, accessed on December 28, 2017. 28 Retrieved from: http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883, accessed on December 28, 2017. 29Op cit. Retrieved from: http://www.fpri.org/article/2000/08/slow-intensity-conflict-in-the-south- china-sea/, accessed on December 26, 2016. 30 Unlike low intensity conflict, slow intensity conflict entails the possibility of conventional warfighting between the regular armed forces of different states, primarily small units battling in minor and infrequent skirmishes. In addition, slow intensity conflict may involve the use of diplomatic and economic pressure and propaganda. 8 conflict between states in the region. Looking from the area of events, conflicts often arise and repeatedly occur at some point in the territorial waters and the South China Sea islands located in Southeast Asia, which is sometimes also takes place in areas that can be identified as well as the East Asian region. Thus, the conflict has been identified as a regional conflict.
The issue of South China Sea dispute that is rooted by overlapping claims towards the area of the sea by six countries bordering with South China Sea is a complex dispute that the state and regions is currently facing.31 This issue was worsening since China started to argue its ambiguous claim through of nine-dash line map. Eventually, China attached its own map of nine-dash line to the Commission on the limits of continental shelf in 2009.32 In addition, China issued its passport that is showing the illustrative map in 2012.33 In response to China claims over the nine- dash line claims map, the other claimants state of South China Sea, including Indonesia as a non-claimant state addressing their protest towards this claims of China.34
The tension among the claimant state is currently getting more complex dramatically. Ever since the land reclamation that conducted in South China Sea has developed the tension and destructed the peace, safety, and stability of the region.35 The dispute now is not only involving claimant state, but it encourages non-claimant state to state its involvement. As a non-claimant state, Indonesia has took this issue into an account.
31 ISDP. Understanding China’s Position in the South China Sea Dispute. Retrieved from: http://isdp.eu/publication/understanding-chinas-position-south-china-sea-disputes/, accessed on December 28, 2016. 32Ibid. 33 Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/23/china-passports-ownership-sea- taiwan, accessed on January 2, 2017 34 Retrieved from: http://www.dw.com/en/chinas-nine-dash-line-has-no-basis-under-international- law/a-18609290, accessed on January 2, 2017. 35Storey, Ian (2015). China’s Terraforming in the Spratlys: A Game Changer in the South China Sea?.Retrieved from: https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2015_29.pdf, accessed on January 2, 2017. 9
Indonesia who did not participate in these waters claim territory, but began "disturbed" by the Chinese issued a unilateral claim map "U" or known as Nine Dash Line issued by the Chinese government in 1993. In 2009, China re-released the latest map of the South China Sea claim. China put into map claim the Natuna waters. The problem is not only focusedto the Spratly and Paracel islands, but the impact on the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Indonesia. With the disruption of the northern islands of Natuna in the South China Sea dispute will have an impact on the security and economic stability.
On Saturday, March 19, 2016, an Indonesian Maritime Affairs and Fisheries patrol ship intercepted a Chinese trawler lowering its nets in waters at coordinates that placed it within Indonesia‘s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) north of the Natuna Islands.36 The Indonesian ship, the KP HIU 101, was operating as part of Indonesia‘s Fisheries Monitoring Task Force charged with enforcing the country‘s maritime jurisdiction.37"The 'nine-dash line' that China says marks its maritime border has no basis in any international law," -Joko Widodo38
However, Indonesia keeps insisting its status as non-claimant state of South China Sea, though the dashed line claim of China has a direct borders of Indonesia waters, surroundings Natuna Island. Jakarta has publicly said that the nine-dash line claim is not in line with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).39 This situation recently following an incident where a Chinese coast guard attempted to stop Indonesian to take down Chinese boat that had done illegal
36 Retrieved from: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/03/21/ri-confronts-china-fishing.html, accessed on January 2, 2017 37 Weatherbee, Donald E (2016). Perspective: Re-Assessing Indonesia’s Role in the South China Sea. ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, April 21, 2016. 38 Retrieved from: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-china-southchinasea- idUSKBN0MJ04320150323, accessed on January 2, 2017 39 Retrieved from: http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/indonesia-to-respond-after-south-china-sea-case- minister/, accessed on January 2, 2017 10 fishing, triggered the response of Indonesia.40 The protest has directly stressed by the ministry of foreign affairs of Indonesia, Retno Marsudi.
"We want to protest strongly and deliver a note containing the following information: first the infringement by the Chinese coastguard on Indonesian sovereign and jurisdiction rights in the Exclusive Economy Zone (EEZ) as well as in our waters," – RetnoMarsudi41
The research discussed The Implementation of Indonesia's Global maritime Fulcrum Vision in Military and Political Aspects under Joko Widodo's Administration in Facing China's Nine-dash Line Claims in the South China Sea Dispute (2014-2016) would be discussed by the author since this issue is quite interesting since the development of South China Sea dispute is getting more complex. Indonesia as a non-claimant state has a vision to manage South China Sea dispute and keep its regional stability and peace. This supported by how Indonesia put its concerns on strengthening its maritime sector by addressing Global Maritime Fulcrum vision as its maritime vision.
I.3. Statement of the Problem The focus of this thesis aimed to bring Indonesia foreign policies whilst facing South China Sea dispute that involves some claimant state. As the limitation, this thesis will address nine-dash Line claims of China in South China Sea, in which currently is being possible threat to Indonesia‘s territory. This thesis also will be focusing on the efforts that has been done by Indonesia under Joko Widodo‘s administration which is still on going. Although Indonesia is not involved as claimant states over South China Sea territory, but somehow this kind of issue will become the concern of Indonesia since the nine-dash line map of China somehow close to the border of Indonesia, especially Natuna Island that is directly facing the lines. Thus,
40Ibid. 41 Retrieved from: http://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/21/asia/indonesia-china-south-china-sea/, accessed on December 28, 2017 11 looking to those facts, the author addresses a key statement that is able to lead this thesis into achieving such exposure, that is;
How did Joko Widodo’s administration implement Indonesia’s global maritime fulcrum vision in facing China’s nine-dash line claims in the South China Sea in 2014-2016?
I.4. Research Objectives To analyze Indonesia‘s efforts in facing China nine-dash line claim in South China Sea through Indonesia‘s foreign policy under Joko Widodo‘s administration To provide the information about the South China Sea dispute generally as well as explain how South China Sea dispute and China‘s nine-dash line claims influence the policy of Indonesia To understand the dispute progress in the South China Sea
I.5. Significance of Study The study case analysis on Indonesia foreign policy in the South China Sea will describe two key points of study that may be useful to contribute to both society and academic as well. This thesis aims to explain deeply about South China Sea dispute especially the implementation of Indonesia‘s vision in order to encourage society to understand the issue
This thesis is hoped to be useful as reference for the scholars for further research as well as give new knowledge about the implementation of Indonesia‘s global maritime fulcrum vision in facing the South China Sea dispute.
12
To gives the explanation to public about how is the implementation of Indonesia‘s global maritime fulcrum vision in the case of the South China Sea dispute in the military and political aspects.
As this thesis provides deep analysis about the issue, it is hoped that it will be useful as reference and further analysis for government.
I.6. Theoretical Framework In writing this research, the author would like to bring three theories in purpose of giving sharp analysis on the issue. The author would use Neo-realism theory and focus on defensive realism as we may see the behavior of Indonesia in this issue is based on this theory. In addition to the analysis, geopolitics would be a precise tools to be related to the issue. Last but not least, as this discuss about the implementation, foreign policy implementation would be the tool to provide the analysis on implementation.
I.6.1. Neo-realism Fundamentals of the theory of neorealism actually equal to realism, but adherents of neorealism override individual analysis and state level. Neorealism reassures that the global system that can explain the reasons behind the actions taken by a country. And like realism, neorealism also believe that anarchy or absence of a central institution in the above countries is essential in order to maintain the structure of the property itself.42
”In its stress on the structure of the international system, that is, the state of anarchy among sovereign states, (neo)realism attaches little or no importance of what is going on inside states –what kind of regimes are in power, what kind of ideologies prevail, what kind of leadership is provided. According to
42 Charles W. Kegley Jr; Eugene R. Wittkopf. ―World Politics: Trend and Transformation”. 2001. (Boston: Bedford/St Martin‘s), p. 35-38 13
(neo)realists, the foreign policies of all states are basically driven by the same systemic factors –they are like so many billiard balls, obeying the same laws of political geometry and physics.” (Owen Harries, 1995, Realism in a New Era, Quadrant 39/April, p.13).
Power is also a central concept of neorealism, but not as part of their nature but rather a means for the state to survive. Originators neorealism, Kenneth N. Waltz in his Theory of International Politics (1979) explains "means themselves divided into two categories: internal effort (increasing the capability of the economy, the addition of military force, or develop better strategies) and external efforts (strengthening and enlarge the alliance or weakening the enemy) ".
Neo-realism filed by Kenneth Waltz overlook the role human nature and focus on the result of the international system. According to Waltz, the international system is composed of a large number of countries, which each trying to survive. Because the system is anarchic (i.e. no centralized authority that could protect the country from the invasion of other countries), then each country must maintain his life by his own effort. Waltz argues that these conditions will encourage countries weaker allied to offset each other (balance) and against the countries that are stronger, rather than joining (bandwagon) with the powerful countries.
Neo-realism stresses national interest as its intangible concept. National interest designed by the international system as a tool to enhance its capabilities, thus in the international system which is anarchy, state could implement the self-help system and power struggle to ensure its security. However the term of capabilities strived to military, economy, political, and sovereignty of the states. By combining both the national interests of the states and their capabilities, only then states will ensure their survival in the system—self-help system.43
43 Waltz, Kenneth N. (2000). Structural Realism After the Cold War in International Security Vol. 25 No. 1. President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. p. 5 14
In order to analyze the response of Indonesia through its foreign policy, the author would like to bring the sub perspective of neo-realism, which is defensive structural realism. Defensive structural realism developed, but is distinct, from neo- realism. Similar with neo-realism, this defensive realism perspective argues that states seeks security in an anarchic international system - the main threat to their sovereignty comes from the other state. However, in this perspective, the thing that must be highlighted is IR as tragedy, not evil: bad things happen because states are placed in difficult situation.
According to Waltz, the main goal of the state is to maintain security in an anarchical international system. In this perspective, it is not wise for a state to gain much power vis-à-vis other because the system will punish the state. Thus, looking to this perspective, Indonesia as a non-claimant state of South China Sea keeps its concern as a mediator, in addition to this, regarding to the threat of South China Sea dispute and China nine-dash line claims, Indonesia has constructed its policy in limitation to protect its sovereignty since defensive structural realism argues that prevailing technologies or geographical circumstances often favor the defense, seized the resources do not cumulate easily with those already possessed by the metropole, dominoes not fall, and power is difficult to project at a distance.
Moreover, some defensive neo-realist provide an argument about the balance and stability in the international system. In addition, based on neo-realist, to be achieving balance, country must be more defensive in pursuing its goals. Why is that? Because in a defensive position, the threats come not likely to be physical so it would also tend to be silent while if countries are offensive to achieve its goals, the possibility of conflict and war will open in width.
1.6.2. Geopolitics International relations is seen as the place where the actors are living and interacting. In addition, these actors are trying to exercise their power in specific places. Geopolitics as the lens of international relations sees that politics and power
15 can be caught from the interaction of international relations actors. Geopolitics also gives the picture of what is happening in this international environment.
Geopolitics is using its geographical location as the source of power. By this geographical location, state can maximize its natural resources in enhancing the military as well as its influence towards other states.
This reality shows that there is relativity of relationship between state and territory environment where his life or geography.44 Friedrich Ratzel considers that the natural or geographic factors will affect state policy or the state political power. Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) considers the influence of geography (shape, area, natural resources, human resources, and location) is an indicator of the growth and development of a country (a living organism).45
Geography of a country could be helpful in terms of the social, political, and economic because the location and geography is one key to building and developing the economic life of a country.
“Geopolitics is the study of the influence of geographical factors on state behaviour – how location, climate, natural resources, population, and physical terrain determine a state’s foreign policy options and its position in the hierarchy of states.” –Griffiths Martin46 Moreover, it can be taken that geopolitics is a study of geography associated with the condition of a state's foreign policy and political phenomena with the assumption that the strength of a nation depends on its territory. The main focus of geopolitical theory related to the correlation between the strength in the political
44Mercier, Guy. The Geography of Friedrich Ratzel and Paul Vidal de la Blache: A Comparative Analysis. Retrieved from: http://www.siue.edu/GEOGRAPHY/ONLINE/mercier.htm, accessed on January 4, 2017. 45Ibid. 46 Martin, Griffiths and Terry O‘Callghan, 2002, International Relations :the key concepts, Routledge: New York, p.120 16 field, the identification of the core region from an international perspective, and the relationship between sea and land capabilities possessed.47
Thus, this condition is utilized by Jokowi with the advent of the shaft maritime policy which shows the model orientation characteristic of Indonesian foreign policy in the era of Jokowi. By relying on access directly adjacent to the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean bring Indonesia Jokowi wants to restore the original identity of the archipelago with the archipelago insight into the maritime culture base is accompanied by all the maritime potential ownership to over 17,000 islands of Indonesia.48
The condition of geography Indonesia influences the concern of Indonesia policy.49 Specifically, in facing case China nine-dash line claims, Indonesia has such a benefit by implementing its geopolitics strategy. The implementation of both military in strengthening its capabilities and politically by developing its influence in ASEAN, especially with disputed country in South China Sea, will put Indonesia to maximize its geopolitics based on its interest.
In Indonesia's main concentric circle region, achieving ASEAN as a community has been a record of historical progress in ASEAN. During the period of 2015, Indonesia also continues to push for ASEAN benefits to be felt by the people. Indonesia has played important roles in ASEAN. In addition, Indonesia is also the initiator of maritime cooperation in the context of EAS by incised an important achievement with the approval of EAS Statement on Enhancing Regional Maritime Cooperation.50
47 Gearóid Ó, Tuathail, and Simon Dalby, 1998, Rethinking Geopolitics, Routledge: 11 New Fetter Lane, London. 48 Anjaiah, Veeramalla. Jokowi's Global Maritime Axis Doctrine Key to Indonesia's Future. (6 March 2017. Retrieved from: https://www.pressreader.com/indonesia/the-jakarta- post/20170306/281633895027864, accessed on January 4, 2017. 49 Supriyanto, RistianAtriandi. Developing Indonesia's Maritime Strategy under President Jokowi. (22 February 2016). Retrieved from: http://www.theasanforum.org/developing-indonesias-maritime- strategy-under-president-jokowi-1/accessed on January 5, 2017. 50 KBRI Beijing, (2016). LaporanKinerja Beijing Tahun 2015. p. 10 17
I.6.3. Foreign Policy Implementation Foreign policy is an important key of international relations as it is where the relations among state begins. Valerie Hudson (2005) stated that, ―All that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision makers acting singly or in groups.‖51However, there are several issues based on Rosenau‘s. In Rosenau‘s model, the issue areas are territorial, status, human resources, and non- human resources. In formulating a framework of research on foreign policy behavior, Michael Brecherand his colleagues adapted the concept of issue areas but introducing their own categories, which are military-security, political-diplomatic, economic- developmental, and culturalstatus with the empiric evidence that overlapping does exist.52 The issue area is determined by the substance of the policy, regardless the ulterior motive of the decision makers.53
1. Military Security
2. Political Diplomatic
3. Economic Developmental
4. Cultural Status
51 Hudson, Valerie, 2005, Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations, Blackwell Publishing: 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK. 52Brecher, Michael, Blema Steinberg, and Janice G. Stein, 1969, A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior. Journal of Conflict Resolution p. 79 53Ibid. p. 87 18
I.6.4. Conceptual Framework DEFENSIVE REALISM
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (ANARCHY)
SEEK FOR SECURITY SCS Dispute (China’s nine-dash line claims)
Global Maritime GEOPOLITICS JOKO WIDODO’S ADMINISTRATION Fulcrum
FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
MILITARY POLITICS
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework
From the figure above, it can be seen how the author would analyses this issue. The very first basic theory is neo-realism which focus to one of sub theory under neo-realist which is defensive realism. This theory will become the umbrella of other theories. From the perspective of this theory, it is believed that the behavior of actor is influenced by international structure. Specifically, the behavior of Indonesia toward this issue will be shaped by defensive realism. Furthermore, the foreign policy of Indonesia under Joko Widodo‘s administration which is influenced by geographical position of Indonesia supported by geopolitics theory. In addition, as this research focus on the implementation of Indonesia foreign policy under Joko Widodo‘s administration, the concept of foreign policy implementation would deeply
19 explain how the government implement its policy regarding to the issue discussed, specifically on military and political implementation. Thus, these theories would be in line with the analysis later in chapter 4 as the author sees that there is relevancy between the issue and the theories.
I.7. Scope and Limitation of the Study The scope and limitation of this research is divided into three. The first thing is this research will be using one level of analysis, which is state level of analysis. The writer believes that the actor is a unitary actor based on the understanding of neo- realism. It is supported in how the author focus on the analysis in how the development of state itself to face the issue.
The second thing is the focus of dimension of analysis. As what Barry Buzan has explained that there are five sectors of security, those are; economic, political, economic, environmental, and military. In regards to these five sector of security by Barry Buzan, the writer will be focusing on two sectors only which includes political and military sector, as in this issue Indonesia is focusing on both political and military effort in facing South China Sea dispute in case of China nine-dash line claims. In political aspect, Indonesia has been really active in campaigning peace and stability in the dispute region through ASEAN. This can be seen from the status Indonesia as a non-claimant state on the region. In the other hand, in purpose of protecting sovereignty, Indonesia has been concerning its decision to strengthen the military aspect in the Natuna Island as Indonesia sees South China Sea dispute and China‘s nine-dash line claim is a threat to the sovereignty as well as the stability of the region.We will relate the role of Indonesia in terms of politics and the development of its military in response to this issue.
The third is the focus of the timeframe which will be focusing on Indonesia foreign policy under Joko Widodo‘s administration. This includes as well what happened in 2014 – 2016 as the administration of Joko Widodo is still on going. During 2014 – 2016, there was a lot of events that show the development of the issue,
20 specifically what did happen at Natuna Island between Beijing and Jakarta. However, these events have such influence to Indonesia‘s action in responding this dispute. The current situation at South China Sea is somehow pushing Indonesia as a non-claimant state to address its protest to China as well as started to show its response in the region. In addition, the reason why the writer puts Joko Widodo‘s administration is because of the concern of Joko Widodo‘s administration on strengthening maritime sector as his vision in making Indonesia as global maritime fulcrum.
I.8. Research Methodology This research will be based on analytical-descriptive research by C. R. Kothari in Research Methodology: Method and Techniques (2nd Revised Edition). This research will gather the information from government official data, official report from related institution, journals from the experts, website, and news. Based on this, below is described:
―Descriptive research includes surveys and fact-finding enquiries of different kinds. The major purposes of descriptive research is description of the state of affairs as it exists at present. In social science and business research we quite often use the term Ex post facto research for descriptive research studies. The main characteristic of this method is that the researcher has no control over variables; he can only report what has happened and what is happening. Most Ex post facto research projects are used for descriptive studies in which the researcher seeks to measure such items as, for example, frequency of shopping, preferences of people, or similar data. Ex post facto studies also include attempts by researchers to discover causes even when they cannot control the variables. The methods of research utilized in descriptive research are survey methods of all kinds, including comparative and co-relational methods. In analytical research, on the other hand, the researcher has to use facts or information already available, and analyze these to make a critical evaluation of the material.”54 Therefore, through the research objectives mentioned above, the objective of this analytical-descriptive research is to deeply analyze what has Indonesia done in
54 C.R. Kothari (2004). Research Methodology: Method and Techniques (2nd Revised Edition). p. 2-3. New Delhi: New Age International (P) 21 facing South China sea dispute in case of China nine-dash line claim as Indonesia is a non-claimant state over South China sea under Joko Widodo‘s administration.
I.9. Thesis Structure CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION
In this first chapter, this thesis expects to give the highlights to the reader about the issue and purpose of the thesis beforehand. This contains essential explanation about background of the study, problem identification, statement of the problems, research question, significance of the study, theoretical framework, scope and limitation of the study, definition of terms, and thesis structure are written here. This chapter will become the basis that would determine how this thesis will address the analysis on the issue discussed.
CHAPTER II – THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE AND CHINA NINE-DASH LINE CLAIMS
In this chapter, the author would focus on the independent variable which the history of the South China Sea dispute since the first claim of China in 1947. In this chapter also the author put the dynamics in the South China Sea dispute. Due to its dynamics the existence of the U. S. in region also will be explained. In addition, this chapter also focus explain the development of China‘s nine-dash line claims that is inconsistent. As the author focus on 2014-2016, in this chapter also added the current situation as well as the numbers of the incidents in the South China Sea among the claimant states as well as Indonesia as non-claimant states.
CHAPTER III – THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDONESIA‘S FOREIGN POLICY AND INDONESIA VISION UNDER JOKO WIDODO
In this chapter, the author will be focusing on explaining the development of Indonesian foreign policy. It begins with the first basis of Indonesia‘s foreign policy
22 which is Non-Alignment Movement and Free and Active foreign Policy. In the development, Under Joko Widodo‘s administration, the author also explains his vision on Nawa Cita and its Global Maritime Fulcrum vision. In this chapter also being explained how the geographical location influence the vision of Indonesia under Joko Widodo‘s administration based on Wawasan Nusantara (Archipelagic Outlook).
CHAPTER IV – THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INDONESIA‘S GLOBAL MARITIME FULCRUM VISION ON MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS UNDER JOKO WIDODO‘S ADMINISTRATION IN FACING THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE IN CASE OF CHINA‘S NINE-DASH LINE CLAIMS (2014-2016) In this chapter, the author focus to the analysis of implementation of Indonesia‘s Global Maritime Fulcrum vision under Joko Widodo‘s administration in facing the South China Sea dispute. However, in this analysis, the author focuses on Indonesia‘s implementation on military and political aspect. In military aspect it is defined how Indonesia focus on strengthening its security in the borders and increasing military capacity as well. In the political implementation, it can be seen how Indonesia focus to be leading country in the region as well as keep peace and stability in the region. This chapter also will provide the findings of the author on the challenges that Indonesia faces regarding to the issue.
CHAPTER V – CONCLUSION
This chapter will be the last chapter that will conclude the result of this research.
23
CHAPTER II
THE HISTORY OF SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE AND CHINA NINE- DASHED LINE CLAIM In this chapter, the author would focus on the independent variable which the history of the South China Sea dispute since the first claim of China in 1947. In this chapter also the author put the dynamics in the South China Sea dispute. Due to its dynamics the existence of the U. S. in region also will be explained. In addition, this chapter also focus explain the development of China‘s nine-dash line claims that is inconsistent. As the author focus on 2014-2016, in this chapter also added the current situation as well as the numbers of the incidents in the SouthChina Sea among the claimant states as well as Indonesia as non-claimant states.
II.1. Overview of the South China Sea
Figure 2. The Map of the South China Sea55 According to the International Hydrographic Bureau the South China Sea is defined as the waters extending from the southwest to the northeast, bordering on the
55 Retrieved from: http://www.indymedia.org.nz/articles/2379, accessed on 10 March, 2017. 24
south by 3 degrees southern latitude between Sumatra and Borneo, to the north bounded by the Taiwan Strait from the northern tip of Taiwan Towards the coast of Fukien, China. The water area covers about 4,000,000 square kilometers.56 The seabed of South China from 1.7 million km2 of continental shelf that has a depth of less than 200 meters, and 2.3 million km2 of deep seabed than 200 meters. The seabed including the continental shelf is primarily in the west and south (Sunda Shelf), while the deeper parts of some areas reach more than 5000 meters (South China Basin), characterized by shallowness and coral islands.57
According to another definition the South China Sea is a Semi-enclosed sea bordering China and Taiwan to the north, west to the south bordering Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Malaysia, to the east by the Philippines and to the south by Indonesia and Malaysia Sarawak and Sabah).58 The center of the archipelago is about 400 km from Malaysia Serawak, 600 km Saigon (Vietnam), 700 km from Manila, 1,100 km from China (Hainan Island) and 1,600 km from Indonesia (Sumatra Island). With an area of about 3,000,000 sq km, in the South China Sea region, there are several islands, namely: (1) Pratas Islands, (2) Paracel Islands cluster, and (3) Spratly Islands group. In this area there is also a cluster of Scarborough corals.59
South China Sea region throughout the decade of the 90's became the most frequently highlighted security issue.60 This area is a sea basin area bounded by large and small countries such as China, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Burma, and Taiwan. In the South China Sea region there are the Spratly islands and the Paracel
56 Rosenberg, David. Why a South China Sea Website. Retrieved from: http://www.southchinasea.org/why-a-south-china-sea-website-an-introductory-essay/, accessed on March 10, 2017. 57 Robert Beckman (2013), The UN Convention of the Sea and the Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea. The American Journal of International Law. Retrieved from: https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp- content/uploads/2010/08/Beckman-THE-UN-CONVENTION-ON-THE-LAW-OF-THE-SEA-AND- THE-MARITIME-DISPUTES-IN-THE-SCS.pdf, accessed on March 10, 2017. 58Ibid. 59Ibid. 60Tomotaka Shoji (2014), The South China Sea: A View from Japan. NIDS Journal of Defense and Security. p. 127. Retrieved from: www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/2014/bulletin_e2014_7.pdf, accessed on March 10, 2017. 25 islands. But the study of the South China Sea conflict in the Spratly Islands is more prominent because it involves several countries at once. The South China Sea conflict cannot be separated from the need for very important resources such as petroleum, fish resources, to transport routes of crowded ships. Petroleum became the main target of China because since the early decade of the 90s to date China has become one of the ten largest importer countries in the world.61 This predicate automatically China should always try to get the supply of oil from abroad in sufficient quantities to keep the economy running and growing. The content of petroleum and natural gas in this region makes Chinese involvement in the South China Sea conflict becomes inevitable.62
Since this waters area has such a high potential resources and other benefits, the South China Sea had been being a disputed area which attract the other state interest to this area. In 3 September 1937, Japan showed its claim in some South China Sea islands by occupying Pratas Island. On December 1938, Japanese navy came to show the existence on Spartly Island and then invaded Hainan Island on February. The steps of Japan following Marco Polo accident on July 1937 when there was a tension between Japan Imperial and China‘s National Army. This following tension then triggered Japan to invade to China. The invasion of Japan Imperial to the South China Sea kept continuing for a decade where France‘s Indochina63 forces was showing its present in the region. Japan also conducted some surveys to some islands
61 U.S. Energy Information Administration (2015), China Overview. p. 1. Retrieved from: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ah UKEwi79pSZrNrTAhUIwI8KHf- aAFMQFgg6MAM&url=http%3A%2F%2Flarge.stanford.edu%2Fcourses%2F2016%2Fph241%2Fli- b2%2Fdocs%2Feia-china-14may15.pdf&usg=AFQjCNFeD1OmNmchA1uhcAJ91_50RTky0Q, accessed on March 10, 2017. 62Dosch, Jorn. The Spartly Islands Dispute. (18 August 2011). Retrieved from: http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=28412841, accessed on March 10, 2017. 63 Indochina, also called (until 1950) French Indochina, French IndochineFrançaise, the three states of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia formerly associated with France, first within its empire and later within the French Union. Retrieved from: https://www.britannica.com/place/Indochina, accessed on March 10, 2017. 26 then occupied the Paracels Island in 1938.64 Then in 1938, Japan occupied the islands from France then constructed submarine base at Aba Island. In addition, on 1941, with its rule, Japan putted Paracel and Spartly as part of Taiwan.65
II.2. The Dynamics of the South China Sea Dispute among Claimant States (1974-2016) The territorial dispute in the South China Sea (South China Sea, or SCS) was preceded by China's claim to the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands in 1974 and 1992.66 This is triggered by China first issued a map that includes Spratly, Paracels and Pratas Islands. In the same year China maintained its military presence in the archipelago.67 Of course, these claims soon received the response of countries whose borders are tangent in the South China Sea, particularly the ASEAN member states (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). The countries, including Vietnam, Brunei Darussalam, Philippines, and Malaysia.68
In the South China Sea there are four islands, and corals are: Paracel, Spratly, Pratas, and the Maccalesfield Bank. Although territorial disputes in the South China Sea are not limited to the two archipelagos of the Spratly and Paracel Islands (such as disputes over PhuQuac Island in the Gulf of Thailand between Cambodia and Vietnam), the multilateral claims of Spratly and Paracel are more prominent because of the intensity of the conflict. Since China's claim to the islands of the South China Sea in 1974, China regards the South China Sea as its marine sovereign territory. In 1974 when China invaded the islands of Paracel (which Vietnam claimed). In 1979,
64Timeline China’s Maritime Disputes.Retrieved for: http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/timeline- chinas-maritime-disputes/p37249, accessed on March 10, 2017. 65Wang, Joseph. If Vietnam and Philippines are as powerful as United States, would China still insist its ambitious and ridiculous claim in South China Sea?. (16 August 2016). https://www.quora.com/If- Vietnam-and-Philippines-are-as-powerful-as-United-States-would-China-still-insist-its-ambitious-and- ridiculous-claim-in-South-China-Sea, accessed on March 10, 2017. 66 Goh, Evelyn, 2005, Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies, East-West Center Washington, p. 3 67Ibid. 68 David Arase, China’s Militant Tactics in the South China Sea, East Asia Forum. Retrieved from: www.eastasiaforum.org, accessed on 11 March, 2017. 27
China and Vietnam fought fiercely on the border and the navies of both countries clashed in 1988 which claimed the sinking of Vietnamese vessels.69 In 1992, 1995, and 1997, along with the Philippines, Vietnam assumed the Spartly Islands and Paracels were part of its sovereign territory.70 The existence of Vietnam's Vietnam confrontation when oil exploration occurred in the territorial waters of the International in 1994. In 1995 Taiwan fired a Vietnamese supplying ship. In 1996 there was an armed contact between China and the Philippines. In 1998 the Philippines shot Vietnamese fishing vessels. In 2000 the Philippine soldiers fired on Chinese fishermen. In 2001 Vietnamese soldiers fired warning shots at Philippine reconnaissance planes that surrounded Spartly Island.
II.2.1. The South China Sea Dispute Timeline (1974-2013) The conflict in the South China Sea has begun since the late 19th century when Britain claimed the Spartly Islands, followed by China at the beginning of the century 20, and France around the 1930s. While the catastrophe of World War II, Japan expels France and uses the Spartly Islands as a base submarine. With the end of World War II, France again claimed the region and followed by the Philippines in need of some of the area as part of the security interests of the region. Since 1970 claim to the region is increasing rapidly in line with developments discovery and international law.
In order to summarize the dynamics that happen at the South China Sea, bellow the author would like to highlight some important events that happened at the South China Sea as the proves that this area has become a conflicted potential.
In July 1971, Taiwanese forces fired down a Philippine fishing vessels on Itu Aba.71In January 1974, there was a battle at the Paracel Island. In this case, China had
69 Goh, Evelyn, Op.Cit., p. 19 70 Ibid. p. 9 71 Park HeeKwon, "The Law of the Sea and Northeast Asia: A Challenge for Cooperation," Kluwer Law International Publisher, 2000: p. 92 Christopher C. Joyner, "The Spratly Island dispute: What role for normalizing relations between China and Taiwan?" New England Law Review, no. 3, 1998, vol. 32 28 planned this battle earlier. This operation had been issued since 1973 by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai.72 They began to train secretly around 1973 as well as increasing the security in the Chineseport of Beihai. Since then, from December, hundreds of Chinese commandos and six fishing trawlers were leaving the port. This situation kept happening for at least 10 days. In addition, some researches as well found that the Chinese fishing vessels who entered the Crescent group that had been controlled by Republic of Vietnam was increased.73It is founded from the report from China that the conflict above was caused when the Vietnamese arrested Chinese fisherman in November 1973.74
On 11 January 1974, through its Foreign Ministry, China claimed its sovereignty to Paracels and Spartlys Islands. Then the next day, Vietnam through its spokesperson rejected the claim of China. China in the end sent some ships to the area of the Robert, Duncan and Drummond Islands, and put Chinese flag on it.75 Following that incident, two Chinese fishing trawlers which were armored were seen by Vietnamese Navy AT Drummond Island supporting troops from the PLA that have occupied the island. Chinese troops were found also at Duncan Island.76
On 17 January 1974, the battle officially started after Chinese troops opened the tension by firing at the Vietnamese navy at Duncan Island. In that accident, two Vietnamese soldiers were killed, then they were retreated. Later, Vietnamese troops fired the Chinese vessels. At the end, China‘s PLAN defeated Vietnamese force, it is said also that China used airplanes to bomb Vietnamese troops on Robert, Pattle, and
72 Bill Hayton, ―The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia,‖ Yale University Press 2014: p. 73 73 Alan Dupont and Christopher G. Baker, "East Asia‘s Maritime Disputes: Fishing in Troubled Waters," The Washington Quarterly vol. 37 (1): p. 84 74 China Navy Encyclopedia, vol. 2, Beijing: Sea Tide Press, 1998: p. 1747. Cited in Bruce A. Elleman, "China's 1974 naval expedition to the Paracel Islands," in the book "Naval Power and Expeditionary Wars: Peripheral Campaigns and New Theatres of Naval Warfare," Routledge 2010: p. 145 75 Statement dated 16 January 1974 on the Communist China's violation of the Sovereignty of the RV over Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagoes. File No 4617-DII-CH, National Archives Center II, Ho Chi Minh City: ―On 11 January 1974 76 Bill Hayton, Ibid., supra note 3: p. 74 Vinh Truong. "Vietnam War: The New Legion." Volume 2. Trafford Publisher 2010: p. 471 29
Money Islands. Finally, China could overtake the islands that previously occupied by Vietnam.77
The legal arrangements in the field of the law of the sea become more apparent with the establishment of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982). UNCLOS 1982 provides a legal umbrella against the problems that arise in relation to the sea. With the UNCLOS 1982, countries have a guideline in determining the boundaries of the country, especially the boundaries of the sea. So that can be known sea territory which is in full sovereignty of a state, sea area which only apply sovereign rights of a country, and marine territory which cannot be owned by a country.
The division of marine areas according to UNCLOS 1982 consists of:
1. Internal Waters78 2. Archipelagic Waters79 3. Territorial Waters80 4. Contiguous Zone81 5. Exclusive Economic Zone82 The exclusive economic zone is a zone no more than 200 nautical miles calculated from the base line. In ZEE the state has only exclusive sovereign rights for exploration and exploitation of natural resources as well as certain 6. Continental Shelf83 7. High Seas84 8. International Sea-Bed Area85
77 Bill Hayton, Ibid., supra note 3: pp 75-76 78 Article 8 UNCLOS 1982, p. 24 79 Article 50 UNCLOS 1982, Ibid. p. 37 80 Article 3-16 UNCLOS 1982, Ibid. p. 23-26 81 Article 33 UNCLOS 1982, Ibid. p. 31 82 Article 55-75 UNCLOS 1982, Ibid. p. 40-49 83 Article 76-85 UNCLOS 1982, Ibid. p. 49-53 84 Article 86-120 UNCLOS 1982, Ibid. p. 53-63 85 Article 133-191 UNCLOS 1982, Ibid. p. 66-97 30
In addition to discussing the division of territory, UNCLOS 1982 is also discussing about closed seas or semi-closed seas. The enclosed seas or semi-enclosed seas are discussed in Chapter IX Section 122-123 of UNCLOS 1982. Article 122 states that closed seas or semi-enclosed seas constitute a bay, a basin, or a sea surrounded by two or more States and connected to other oceans or oceans by a narrow path or composed entirely or mainly of Territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone of two or more coastal States.
States adjacent to closed or semi-closed seas are encouraged to cooperate in the management of biological resources, establish policies and conduct research and environmental activities. It is also described in Article 123 of UNCLOS 1982, that countries directly bordering on closed or semi-closed seas should cooperate with each other in exercising their rights and obligations.86 States should therefore seek directly or through appropriate regional organizations to:
1. Coordinate the management, conservation, exploration and exploitation of marine biodiversity resources; 2. Coordinate the exercise of their rights and obligations with respect to the protection and maintenance of the marine environment; 3. Coordinate the wisdom of their scientific research and to jointly undertake to undertake joint scientific research programs in the region; 4. Invite, according to the need, other interested countries or international organizations to cooperate with them in further implementation of the provisions of this article.
So it can be said that for countries directly adjacent to closed seas or semi- enclosed seas have the same rights and obligations to cooperate in exploiting and protecting the closed seas or the semi-enclosed seas.
86 Article 123 UNCLOS 1982, Ibid. p. 64 31
The South China Sea is included in the semi-enclosed sea class. This means the South China Sea lies between the coastal states. The coastal countries directly adjacent to the South China Sea include: People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, and Indonesia. Therefore, the status and position of the South China Sea as a semi-enclosed sea often causes conflicts and disputes between countries directly adjacent to the South China Sea. And for that also need cooperation between coastal countries that directly border with the South China Sea.
In 1988 – 1989, there were dozens of Chinese warships conducted military exercise in the `Spartlys‘ reef. They conducted the naval exercise at Fiery Cross Reef, Cuarteron, Reef, Gaven Reef, Huges Reef, as well as Subi Reef.87 It was reported by Vietnamese media that China occupied these reefs after they successfully blocked Vietnamese transport ships to enter the area.88
The conflict of Sino89-Filipino conducted in February 1995 over Mischief Reef. China began to build some buildings and occupy Mischief Reef. The Philippines government reported that some Chinese navy supply vessels and submarine around the reef90 and attempt to drive off the Philippines vessels that came through the area.91 However, China claimed that the buildings were ―shelters for fishermen‖.
87 Sam Bateman & Ralf Emmers, ―Security and International Politics in the South China Sea: Towards a Co-operative Management Regime," Rougtledge 1 December 2008: p. 49 88 Mai Thanh Hai, "GiữTrường Sa trướcthamvọngbáquyền - Kỳ 4: Nhữngcuộcđốiđầucăngthẳng," Thanh Nien Online 24 October 2014, Retrieved from: http://www.thanhnien.com.vn/chinh-tri-xa- hoi/giu-truong-sa-truoc-thamvong-ba-quyen-ky-4-nhung-cuoc-doi-dau-cang-thang-504848.html, accessed on 20 March 2017 89 The term of Shino refers to China, history of China, Culture, or the people of China 90 US Energy Information Administration, Ibid., supra note 18: p. 122 91 "China's Military Threat Increasing," Taiwan Communiqué No. 65, April 1995 32
On 16 March 1995, there was a tension between Malaysia and China where Malaysian navy fired a Chinese fishing trawler at Serawak, on the Malaysian EEZ. In this accident, it was reported that four crew of Chinese trawlers were injured.92
In April 1997, a Chinese boats as well as two fishing vessels ordered to leave Scaborough Shoal by the Phililippines navy. The Philippines then removed Chinese markers.93 Then in January 1998 22 Chinese fishermen were caught by the Philippines navy since the Chinese fishermen were approaching Scarborough Shoal.94
In 2 February 2000, Chinese vessels was approaching Scarborough Shoal and Philippines Navy ships addressed their warning fire on them. Through its Armed Forces, Philippines stated that they were trying to contact the Chinese vessels, but due to their assertive maneuver, the Philippines gave them warning fire. Due to this incident, Beijing would send a protest on what Philippines done. In responding the protest, through its Department of Foreign Affairs, warned China to prevent their vessels to approach disputed island.95
In March 2001, in Scarborough Shoal, a gunboat was sent by the Philippines. The sending of a gunboat is an attempt of the Philippines in order to push China to construct building on the reef.96
In August 2002, a Philippines military reconnaissance aircraft was flying around Spartlys Island. Vietnamese troops then fired a warning shot to the Philippines reconnaissance aircraft.97
92 Michael Klare, ―Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict,‖ Macmillian Publisher 17 May 2001: p. 124 93 US Energy Information Administration, Ibid. p. 122 94 Michael Klare, Ibid., p. 124 95Scaborough shoal standoff: A timeline. Inquirer.net 9 May 2012 Cynthia D. Balana, "Navy ship fires warning shots," Philippine Daily Inquirer 5 February 2000 96 US Energy Information Administration, Ibid., p. 122 MalouTalosig, "Manila sends gunboat to keep China off shoal", Gulf News 29 March 2001 97 Ralf Emmers. "Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF." Routledge Publisher, 12 Nov 2012: p. 144 33
In 8 January 2005, there was an accident where Chinese fishery officers attacked a Vietnamese fishing boat in the Gulf of Tonkin, specifically in the western part of its demarcation zone.98 By this accident, Vietnam reported that there were nine fishermen get killed, eight were being captive, and two were wounded.99
On 9 July 2007, some Vietnamese fishing boats was attacked by Chinese navy ship near Spartlys Island. This accident was injuring five fishermen of Vietnam.100
On 8 March 2009, there were about five Chinese vessels that harassed US ship known as USNS Impeccable in 75 miles of southern Hainan Island in the South China Sea. These vessels of China included a naval intelligence ship, a government fisheries patrol, two small fishing trawlers, and a state oceanographic patrol vessel. By this accident, US stated that that was an increasingly aggressive conduct.101
In June 2009, there was a clash between Beijing and Jakarta in which Indonesian Navy arrested about 75 Chinese fishermen. This happened since they were caught for illegally fishing in the EEZ of Indonesia, especially in Natuna. Due to this accident, China then demanded for immediate return.102
In May to July 2010 Indonesian navy and Chinese navy captured some fishing boats for accusing them doing illegal fishing. In an accident, Indonesian navy ships detained ten Chinese fishing boats in the northern of Natuna. But it was reported that it was 200 nautical mile EEZ. Indonesia assumed that the Chinese fishing boats had encroached in a deliberate and coordinated manner. During the detention of the
98 Vietnamese fishermen killed in territory dispute. ABC News 13 January 2005 99 "PhíaTrungQuốcphảixửlýnhữngkẻbắnngưdân VN," Vietnamnet 18 January 2005 100 Boston Global Forum, Recent Trends in the South China Sea Dispute, June 2015. P. 20 101 RPentagon Says Chinese Vessels Harassed U.S. Ship. (9 March 2009). Retrieved from: http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/03/09/us.navy.china/index.html?eref=rss_us, accessed on March 12, 2017, accessed on March 12, 2017 102 Indonesia Targets Illegal Fishing. (10 December 2014). Retrieved from: http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/indonesia-targets-illegal-fishing/, accessed on March 12, 2017. 34 fishing boats, there were two armed-ship appeared before the fishing boats were released.103
In 23 June 2010, Indonesian patrol boats facing Chinese fishing vessels which accompanied by armed vessels at 65 miles northwest of Natuna. An unverified report from Japan reported that the Yuzheng-311 and some Chinese fisheries enforcement vessels had tension with Indonesian naval boat. Indonesia demanded those Chinese vessels to leave but the Yuzheng-311 refused the demand and even aim its gun on the Indonesian vessel in purpose of releasing a Chinese fishing boat that was detained. Luckily there were no shots fired since Chinese fishing boat was released.104
On 21-24 May 2011, Chinese vessels and PLAN ships were caught unloading materials for buildings near West York and Flat islands of Philippines in the disputed Spartly islands.105On 26 May 2011, a Vietnamese seismic survey ship was attacked by three surveillance ships of China in Block 148, 80 miles off the south-central coast of Vietnam from the beach town of Nha Trang. The Chinese surveillance ships cut cable of Vietnamese seismic survey ship. Vietnam claimed that they were in the territorial EEZ of Vietnam. But then, China argued that the enforcement to the Vietnamese ships was justified and asked Vietnam to stop any kind of activities as well as seek for any troubles.106
On 18 July 2012, according to Philippines DFA, China was setting up barrier in purpose of blocking Philippine ships and vessels from the shoal. Since then, ships owned by Chinese Marine Surveillance and Fisheries Law Enforcement Command
103 Alan Dupont and Christopher G. Baker. "East Asia‘s Maritime Disputes: Fishing in Troubled Waters". The Washington Quarterly 37:1 p. 86 104Budianto, Lilian. South China Sea Dispute a Potential Rift in RI - China Ties: Envoy. (25 May 2010). Retrieved from: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/05/25/south-china-sea-dispute-a- potential-rift-richina-ties-envoy.html, accessed on March 13, 2017. 105Op. cit.Boston Global Forum, Recent Trends in the South China Sea Dispute, June 2015. p. 21 106 Retrieved from: http://af.reuters.com/article/idAFL3E7GS07E20110528, accessed on March 20, 2017. 35 were observing in the disputed shoal, that kind of action forced Philippines vessels to turning away from the area.107
On 20 March 2013, an unknown Chinese vessels chased and fired flare to the Vietnamese fishing boats nearby Paracel Islands. Vietnamese stated the incident was so serious and addressed protest to the Chinese embassy at Hanoi. In responding this incident, spokesperson of Foreign Ministry of China stated that what China has done to the Vietnamese boats who were caught for working illegally in Chinese waters was legitimate and reasonable.108 Due to this incident, US state department spokesman stated that US ―strongly oppose the threat or use of force or coercion by any claimant to advance its claims in the South China Sea‖.109
On 9 May 2013, one crew member of Taiwanese fishing vessel was killed due to the incident in which a Philippines navy ship fired at them. The incident itself took place in the Balintang channel, the northern of Luzon islands as it was Philippines territorial waters. In the other hand, Taiwan claimed that the location was 180 nautical miles southeast of the southern tip of Taiwan.110
On 5 December 2013, while a Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser of US which was USS Cowpens conducted operation in international water of the South China Sea, a Chinese aircraft carrier reported to cross its bow in less than 500 yards. This situation pushed USS Cowpens to do an evasive maneuver to prevent a collision with Chinese vessels.111
107 Callar, Michaela Del. DFA: China Boats Blocking PHL Vessels from Panatag Shoal. (18 July 2012). Retrived from: http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/265889/dfa-china-boats- blocking-phl-vessels-from-panatag-shoal/story/, accessed on March 20, 2017. 108 Retrieved from: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5d14a1da-963d-11e2-9ab2- 00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=uk, accessed on March 20, 2017. 109 Patrick Ventrell. "Daily Press Briefing." U.S. Department of State 26 March 2013, accessed online at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2013/03/206703.htm#CHINA, accessed on March 20, 2017. 110 Philippines Admits Shooting of Taiwanese Fisherman. (10 May 2013). Retrieved from: http://www.dw.com/en/philippines-admits-shooting-of-taiwanese-fisherman/a-16802541, accessed on March 21, 2017. 111 Trust-building needed to Cut Gordian Knot of China-US Military Ties. (18 December 2013). Retrieved from: http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/832838.shtml, accessed on March 21, 2017 36
II.2.2. The United State Existence in the South China Sea Dispute The involvement of the United States in the South China Sea conflict has a goal that greatly affects the existence of the United States.112 This is based on geostrategic areas where the United States is strongly sustained in forging global interaction. Therefore, the United States will maintain the status of the region that is profitable for him in facilitating a variety of cross-border cooperation even its hegemony. Surely this would complicate and even eliminate access to the route for the United States if the ownership of the South China Sea is fully controlled by China.113
This is because both China and the US have a bad history in terms of cooperation and even become a very important historical record. China, which is a communist country, has an ideology that runs counter to America's liberal ideology. Therefore, this situation is a conflict that has started long ago among countries that initiate the implementation of the concept of views in the formulation of policies in order to create a just and prosperous society.114
For that purpose the United States has pursued a strategy to offset Chinese powers in the South China Sea by increasing maritime defense in Southeast Asia starting from the Philippines like ships and or submarines.115 On the other hand, the US is also observing activities that take place in the South China Sea including the construction of Chinese military facilities and infrastructure in the region. This is done by the United States as an act against Chinese behavior through unilateral domination in the South China Sea. With this the United States can directly identify
112 Michael McDevitt, (2014). The South China Sea: Assessing U.S. Policy and Options for the Future. A CNA Occasional Paper. p. 11. 113Ibid. p. 7 114 U.S.-China Relations Since 1949. Retrieved from: http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_us_china.htm, accessed on March 20, 2017. 115 Op. cit. Michael McDevitt, (2014). The South China Sea: Assessing U.S. Policy and Options for the Future. A CNA Occasional Paper. p. 88 37 any developments in the area that are likely to be used only as a place of control over the traffic on the path.116
On the other hand the United States also wants to reinforce its standing point to the South China Sea dispute region. However America will continue to assume that the South China Sea region is a part of the high seas.117 Although China will be a watchdog in the region with technological progress to be reckoned with, but in international law the region is still in disputed status. It is also to show the international community that the South China Sea is not a territory of China even though there have been various infrastructure developments by China in the region. This United States action is strongly opposed by China and even China considers it is a provocation.118
The US is clearly not involved in the dispute. However, its presence will add to the long history of conflict history in the region. On the other hand the US considers China's actions in the South China Sea have changed the status quo and heightened tensions in the region. This situation certainly creates instability in the region and will greatly affect the global economy. This is certainly as a result of the geostrategic of the region which records itself as the world's densest path.119
The US certainly has more support for reasons of involvement by countries in Southeast Asia. In a meeting between heads of state of China and the United States in March 2016, the United States revealed that its involvement in the South China Sea region was merely to ensure the presence of FON activities prevailing in the region. America also revealed that this kind of activity is a US routine as a peacekeeper of the world as a principle in foreign policy. The US has been conducting FON
116 Op. cit. Michael McDevitt, (2014). The South China Sea: Assessing U.S. Policy and Options for the Future. A CNA Occasional Paper. p. 76 117Ibid. p. 5. 118 Beech, Hannah. China Will Never Respect the U.S. Over the South China Sea. Here's Why. (8 July 2016). Time, the Souh China Sea US-UNCLOS. Retrieved from: http://time.com/4397808/south- china-sea-us-unclos/, accessed on 21 March, 2017. 119 Op. cit. Michael McDevitt, (2014). The South China Sea: Assessing U.S. Policy and Options for the Future. A CNA Occasional Paper. p. 2 38 operations since 1991 and began implementing it in the South China Sea region after one year following the US Department of Defense report. But the intensity is minimal when compared with increasing tensions in the region since 2014.120
It is also based on US needs in world oil distribution, international trade and even shipping. In the global trade of US commercial vessels wanting certainty of security to the Indian Ocean. While in the oil distribution, the US seeks the most effective sea lanes where the possibility of US-owned tankers carrying oil from the Persian Gulf takes the route of shipping through the bay of Suez into the Mediterranean continually into the Atlantic and eventually to the west coast of the United States. While the operations of the United States naval fleets more dominant in the Pacific and Indian Ocean. It cannot be denied that the two US naval bases in Guam for control of the Pacific Ocean and Diego Garcia for control in the Indian Ocean. Where the fleets can weigh up to 300,000 DWT so still rely on the South China Sea as the nearest military passageway (sealane on the military passage).121
II.2.3. Declaration on the Conduct between China and ASEAN Countries Cooperation between countries directly adjacent to the South China Sea has actually been implemented. One of the proofs of cooperation that was carried out was the signing of its "Declaration On The Conduct Of Parties In The South China Sea" in 2002.122 The Declaration On The Conduct Of Parties In The South China Sea (abbreviated DOC) Member countries of ASEAN with the People's Republic of China which contains cooperation in matters relating to the South China Sea.
120 Retrieved: https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-u-s-fon-program-in-the-south-china-sea/, accessed on 21 March, 2017. 121 S M Noor, SengketaInternasional di KawasanPerairanLaut China. Retrieved from: http://www.negarahukum.com/hukum/sengketa-internasional-di-kawasan-perairan-lautcina.html, accesed on 23 March, 2017. 122 Carlyle A. Thayer, (2013), ASEAN, China and the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. Project Muse, p. 77 39
The DOC was signed at the 8th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on November 4, 2002.123 The South China Sea problem relates to ASEAN because the countries directly bordering the South China Sea are the majority of the ASEAN member countries. So the DOC signing was done during the ASEAN Summit. As such ASEAN as an international organization becomes a mediator or intermediary in cooperation between its member countries and the People's Republic of China.124
DOC is a form of cooperation between coastal countries directly adjacent to the South China Sea. DOC contains the rights and obligations to be undertaken by the participating countries. With this DOC, it is expected the South China Sea with its status and position as a semi-closed sea, will not cause conflicts or disputes anymore. However, in reality, there are still conflicts and disputes in the South China Sea. Whereas in the DOC it has been stated that between the member countries of ASEAN and the People's Republic of China are required to realize a peaceful, friendly, and harmonious situation in the South China Sea. This is certainly the opposite of reality in the South China Sea with what is contained in the DOC.
Conflicts and disputes still being occurred in the South China Sea up until today despite the DOC signing as a form of cooperation, due to the DOC which has no binding force. DOC is only a declaration in terms of cooperation, does not contain sanctions for countries that violate. Therefore, countries like the People's Republic of China often violate the provisions of this DOC. Inside the DOC itself was mentioned about the making of Code on The Conduct (COC) which has more binding strength.
II.2.4. The Current Conflict in the South China Sea (2014-2016) As the issue of the South China Sea dispute has been getting more complex, in its development based scope and limitation, the author limit the issue as 2014 – 2016. In addition to the conflict timeline, the author also puts some tensions that involved Indonesia and China. It can be seen that the incidents in the South China Sea
123 Carlyle A. Thayer, (2013), ASEAN, China and the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. Project Muse, p. 78 124Ibid. p. 75 40 from 2012 – 2016 has been increasing and being major trends. In addition to the trend, China is also committed to strengthening and protect its interest in the South China Sea. This can be seen from the behavior of China in improving its naval capacity as well as proofing its assertiveness to other claimant states of the South China Sea.125
In 2013, the Philippines filed a complaint over Chinese claims and activities in the South China Sea to the UNCLOS Arbitration Court in The Hague, Netherlands. The Philippines accused China of interfering in its territory by fishing and reclaiming to build artificial islands.126
The Philippines argues that Chinese claims in the territorial waters of the South China Sea marked by 'nine dashed lines' or 'nine-dash-line' are in conflict with the sovereignty of the Philippines and international maritime law. The arbitral tribunal itself said the verdict they took would determine at least seven of the 15 demands filed by the Philippines. The verdict produced by five judges will determine the status of a number of areas in the South China Sea that are disputed between China and a number of Southeast Asian nations, including the Philippines. China, which claims ownership of 90% of waters territory in the South China Sea, declared not recognizing the UN Arbitration Tribunal and refused to take part.127
In fact, China is trying to persuade a number of countries to support its view that a court decision in The Hague should be rejected. China says about 60 countries have supported the position, but only some have voiced it in general. In fact, the tribunal was held under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
125 Carlyle A. Thayer, (2013), ASEAN, China and the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. Project Muse, p. 75 126International Court Ruling on China Philippines Dispute Could Be Vital. Retrieved from: http://www.voanews.com/a/international-court-ruling-on-china-philippines-dispute-could-be- vital/3352415.html, accessed on 23 March, 2017. 127Ibid. 41
(UNCLOS), signed by China and a number of Southeast Asian countries, including the Philippines.128
In related with this research, there are several developments of Incidents that violate sovereign territory, for example as the capture of Chinese fishermen when they entered the territory of 200 nautical miles of ZEE belonging to Indonesia. As in March 2016, a Chinese fishing boat was captured in the waters of ZEE Indonesia.129 At that time there was a map inside the cabin of the Chinese ship proving that the territory they were looking for was indeed the waters of ZEE Indonesia. This evidence is clear that they are violating the boundary zone of ZEE Indonesia.130
Following to this incident, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Retno Matsuri addressed protest to China:
“Indonesian government had conveyed a note of protest to the Chinese government, outlining the transgressions conducted by the coast guard vessel had violated the sovereignty and jurisdiction of Indonesian territory within the exclusive economic zone (ZEE) and continental shelf”131
In April 2016, the fishing boats of China were arrested by the Indonesians In this region, and the Indonesians burned and blew up the fishing boats of PRC and also other countries. Even later, the Chinese fishing boats were escorted by China's Coast Guard boats.132
On June 17, 2016 conflict, a Chinese coast guard ship again wanted to try his luck, to protect their fishing boats stealing fish in the Natuna Sea, Riau Islands.
128 Hague Ruling on the South China Sea. : http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/hague-ruling-on-the- south-china-sea_pksingh_140716, accessed on 23 March, 2017. 129 When China‘s far-flung fishing fleet trespasses in other nations‘ waters, Beijing has its back. (4 April 2016). Retrieved from: https://qz.com/653928/when-chinas-far-flung-fishing-fleet-trespasses-in- other-nations-waters-beijing-has-its-back/, accessed on 23 March, 2017. 130 Ibid. 131 Retrieved from: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/03/21/indonesia-protests-against-china- south-china-sea-fishing-dispute.html, accessed on 23 March, 2017. 132 Retrieved from: http://www.todayonline.com/world/asia/indonesia-blows-23-foreign-fishing-boats, accessed on 23 March, 2017. 42
Previously, tricks carrying Coast Guard ships in Natuna succeeded, at least to bluff Indonesian coast guard ships from non-military unit instead of Indonesian naval unit. But this time, their tricks did not work. Chinese Cost Guard ship with body number 3303 that tried to protect the fishing boats from China, was confronted by Navy warship, KRI Todak 631.133
Chinese Cost Guard ship 3303 finally chose to step aside from KRI Todakthat was guarding the sea front of Indonesia. Yet these two vessels had facing each other, starting whenIndonesian Navy warship KRI Imam Bonjol captured the Chinese- flagged vessel Han Tan Cou 19038, along with seven crew members. The ship is one of 12 ships that stole fish in the Natuna area. In the capture of the vessel, China Coast Guard Ship had requested that the fishing vessel Han Tan Cou be released. However, the request was ignored.134
On 23 June 2016, there was a step from the President of Indonesia Joko Widodo or known called as Jojowi who flew to Ranai to visit NatunaBesar. This visit of Joko Widodo is the first visit of president of Indonesia to the area. In his visit, he boarded the KRI Imam Bonjol. Previously known that Joko Widodo conducted a limited Cabinet meeting to discuss the defence and economic development of the area.135
II.3. China Nine-dash Line Claims in the South China Sea Under the administration of nationalist Kuomintang party, China began to mark its territorial claim on the South China Sea. This claim of China was marked by eleven-dashed line on the South China Sea map. This eleven-dashed line involved
133 Retrieved from: http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/another-chinese-fishing-boat-detained-in- indonesias-waters-in-south-china-sea-official, accessed on 24 March, 2017. 134 Retrieved from: https://en.tempo.co/read/news/2016/06/22/055782141/House-Member-Urges- Indonesian-Army-to-Remain-on-Alert, accessed on 24 March, 2017. 135 Retrieved from: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/indonesia-south-china-sea-going-it- alone, accessed on 24 March, 2017. 43 almost the entire of the South China Sea area. The claims itself included Paracel Island, Spartly Island, Pratas Island,and Macclesfield Bank. These island were basically regained by China from Japan after the WWII. In its development, in 1953, China through Chinese Communist Party as the led administration expunged the claims that included Tonkin Gulf. In addition to its removal, China rewrite and simplify the eleven-dashed line to become the nine-dash line claim. This nine-dash line claim of China is based on their historical basis of China, since then, China keeps addressing this reason for claiming its territory in the South China Sea.136
Figure 3. The Eleven-dashed Line Claims137
136 Retrieved from: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/indonesia-south-china-sea-going-it- alone, accessed on 24 March, 2017. 137 Retrieved from: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1347513-prc-img-eleven-dotted-line- 1947.html, accessed on 22 March, 2017. 44
China always uses this map above as the reason on claiming the South China Sea. The map above was created in 1947 by the Nationalist Government of China. The map included the extension of China‘s claims in the South China Sea area within eleven outlines that covered 90% of the South China Sea area. As China formed People‘s Republic of China, in 1953 China removed its claim at the Gulf of Tonkin based on its agreement with Vietnam. Since then, the eleven-dashed line decreased become nine-dash line.138
As the dashed line had changed, China kept using this nine-dash line as the main reason of China in claiming the South China Sea region. China had been using this nine-dash line map as the basis claims for a couple decades. Recently, China updated its maps of dashed line by including Taiwan, and made the maps became the ten-dashed line. However, there is no clear clarification from China whether they claim the land only of include seas as well. Since both eleven and or nine-dash line claims predated UNCLOS.139
138 Retrieved from: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1347513-prc-img-eleven-dotted-line- 1947.html, accessed on 22 March, 2017. 139 Retrieved from: http://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/line-07162015121333.html, accessed on 22 March, 2017. 45
Figure 4. The Nine-dash Line Map140
Figure 5. The Ten-dashed Line Map141
140Ibid 46
In January 2013, there was a change of China dashed line claims. This change was an addition to the dashed line become ten-dashed line claims. This additional dashed line included Taiwanese east coast to be putted in the ten-dashed line of China.142 However, from the China‘s claims that keep changing on its dashed line, we may see that there is no consistency of China, even China has not verbalized through its diplomats or sea experts what actually the dashed line means. This situation that caused an ambiguity that resulted to a lot of over-interpretation.143
As a claimant state of the South China Sea, China has its own interest why it claims its sovereignty at the South China Sea based on its claims on nine-dash line. In its implementation, China seems to seek for being a regional power by managing tension based on peaceful way. Through its vice foreign minister, Liu Zhenmin, China stated in Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference on 25 March 2016:
"The relevant disputes should be resolved peacefully through negotiation and consultation between countries directly concerned on the basis respect for historical facts and international law. And peace and stability in the South China Sea should be upheld by People's Republic of China and ASEAN countries working together"144 Thus, in achieving its national interest to become a regional power to keep its influence in the South China Sea especially, China national interest could be defined into three aspect of interests which are; Politics, Security, and Economics.
The assertiveness actions of China in the South China Sea has been being main strategy since there is pressure from other claimant states. The strategy of the assertiveness itself made China play role to become a ―charming offensive‖ in which
141Retrieved from: http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/319303/china-s-new-10-dash-line- map-eats-into-philippine-territory/story/, accessed on 22 March, 2017. 142 Retrieved from: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-10-dash-line-and-cross-strait-tensions/, accessed on 22 March, 2017. 143 Retrieved from: http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/what-does-the-nine-dash-line-actually-mean/, accessed on 22 March, 2017. 144 Liu Zheinmin Speech during Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference (2016), China remains committed to peaceful settlement of disputes in the South China Sea through negotiation and consultation. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1350776.shtml, accessed on 21 March, 2017. 47
China uses both peaceful way development and assertiveness action in implementing its national interest.145
Looking to the potential of resources, the South China Sea contains a huge natural resources that caused the South China Sea becomes a waters with a highest prospect for fishery sector. Chinese fishermen are also actively doing fishing activities in the South China Sea.146 Meanwhile, the fisheries sector of China contribute around 3% of China‘s GDP that annually worth for USD279 billion, in addition, it is known also that China has around more than 7 million fishermen with more than 450,000 fishing vessels.147
Other than resources, the South China Sea also acts as the trading access which connects the Pacific and Indian Oceans and becomes one of the busiest international trading access with 40,000 ships passing every year and also known as "the 3rd golden waterway in the world".148 In taking the advantage of South China Sea, People's Republic of China promotes the Maritime Silk Road to the ASEAN countries in order to have larger economic integration with another region and established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in supporting this program, where People's Republic of China contributed US$40 billion tosupport the member for developing infrastructure.149
Based on China‘s 12th Five-year Plan (2011-2015), it is stated that China commits to improve its infrastructure in the occupied features in the South China Sea:
145 Paul J. Leaf (2014), China charms offensive: A temporary, tactical change. http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/how-long-will-the-veneer-of-chinas-charm-offensive-last/, accessed on 21 March, 2017. 146 Dr. Su Hao (2013), Territorial Issues in Asia, Drivers, Instrument, Ways Forwards. 7th Berlin Conference on Asian Security (BCAS). p.6 147 Adam Greer (2016), The South China Sea is Really a Fishery Dispute. http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/the-south-china-sea-is-really-a-fishery-dispute/, accessed on 22 March, 2017. 148 Dr. Su Hao (2013), Territorial Issues in Asia, Drivers, Instrument, Ways Forwards. 7th Berlin Conference on Asian Security (BCAS). p.7 149DrTengJianqun, Understanding China's maritime policy-21st Century Maritime Silk Road. Australian National Security. p.53 48
"Intensify marine Shipping supervision, administration, and service, optimize the layout of the vessel traffic control system, and extend the channel of safety patrols to the exclusive economic zone and other sea areas under China's jurisdiction Purchase helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft, build patrol ships, beacon ships, and survey ships, and push forward construction of shipping support bases"150
Figure 6. Illustration of the Strategic of South China Sea151
As the South China Sea is located in a strategic location, it is known also that the South China Sea has security purposes as well. This security purposes supported by its geographical location that can give easier access for maximizing geopolitical purpose of a state. China has been doing a lot of things in maximizing the potential through reclamation and constructing some infrastructures in some reefs occupied.152 The increasing tensions among claimant states and the existence of the United States
150 PRC State Council (2011), PRC National Marine Project Development. p. 19 151J. Freedberg (2016), Chinese Scarborough Shoal Base Would Threaten Manila. http://breakingdefense.com/2016/04/chinese-scarborough-shoal-base-would-threaten-manila/, accessed on 21 March, 2017. 152 National Intelligence University (2016), Journal of Strategic Intelligence: What Caused China's Recent and Massive Land Reclamation in the South China Sea. p. 28 49 have been being the driving factor for China to prepare its military readiness in purpose of responding the potential threats.153
153Ibid. J. Freedberg (2016), Chinese Scarborough Shoal Base Would Threaten Manila. http://breakingdefense.com/2016/04/chinese-scarborough-shoal-base-would-threaten-manila/, accessed on 22 March, 2017. 50
CHAPTER III
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDONESIA’S FOREIGN POLICY AND INDONESIA VISION UNDER JOKO WIDODO ADMINISTRATION In the development of Indonesia‘s foreign policy, Indonesia still keep its foreign policy basis which is free and active foreign policy which was founded by the former leader of Indonesia. However, the foreign policy of Indonesia is also influenced by its stance as a non-alignment movement. By these principle, Indonesia prefer to be more neutral in facing the issue of the South China Sea dispute.
This chapter focuses on how the development of Indonesia‘s foreign policy is going, as we may see that the foreign policy of Indonesia on free and active remains the same up until Joko Widodo is chosen as the president of Indonesia. The history of non-alignment movement will be explained since Indonesia still keep its status on that stance. Specifically, this chapter will also discuss and explain the vision of foreign policy of Indonesia under Joko Widodo administration, especially in facing the South China Sea dispute issue in 2014-2016. In addition to this chapter, the author also will provide national interest of Indonesia in the issue of the South China Sea dispute.
III.1.The History and the Basis of Indonesia Foreign Policy A state certainly has the law, principles, ideology, and also the foundation. As a country, Indonesia has the foundations that are firmly held as the nation's role model that serves as the nation's guidance in interacting with other countries. The path of change is the ideological path that originated in the Proclamation, Pancasila June 1, 1945, and the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. The Proclamation and Pancasila of June 1, 1945 affirm our identity and identity as an independent and sovereign nation. The preamble of the 1945 Constitution clearly mandates the direction of the national objectives of the Republic of Indonesia to protect the entire
51 nation of Indonesia and the whole of Indonesia's blood sphere, to promote the common prosperity, to educate the nation and to implement the world order based on independence, eternal peace and social justice.
Based on the history, Indonesia's foreign policy has a goal to be achieved which is to maintain independence and maintain the safety of the nation; to obtain from abroad the goods necessary to enlarge the prosperity of the people; international peace; and the fraternity of all nations as the implementation of the ideals that are summed up in Pancasila.154 In its formulation, Indonesia's foreign policy has three foundations on which its main pillar stands, the three foundations are ideological, constitutional and operational.
The constitutional basis of Indonesian foreign policy is the 1945 Constitution, in which the life of the nation and the state is regulated therein and is related to the determination of Indonesian foreign policy, which means that the foreign policy run by Indonesia is nothing but one How to achieve national interest. In harmony with what the Government of the Republic of Indonesia says, that Indonesia will continue to exercise foreign policy based on its own interests and is not determined by the political flow of other states.155 This means that the articles of the 1945 Constitution which regulate the life of the nation and state provide the outline in Indonesian foreign policy. Thus, it is increasingly clear that Indonesia's foreign policy is one of the efforts to achieve Indonesia's national interests, contained in the 1945 Constitution.
Meanwhile, Pancasila as the foundation of the Republic of Indonesia is positioned as an ideological foundation in Indonesian foreign policy. Mohammad Hatta calls it one of the factors that shape Indonesia's foreign policy. The five precepts contained in the Pancasila, contains basic guidelines for the implementation of the ideal national and state life and cover all the joints of human life. Hatta further
154 Hatta, Mohammad, 1953. DasarPolitikLuarNegeriRepublik Indonesia. Jakarta, Tintamas, p. 1-31 155Ibid. 52 stated that Pancasila is one of the objective factors that influence Indonesia's foreign policy. This is because Pancasila as the state philosophy binds the entire nation of Indonesia, so that any political party or party in power in Indonesia cannot run a state politics deviating from Pancasila.156
III.1.1. The Background of Non-Alignment Movement The background of Indonesia's involvement in the Non-Aligned Movement is not a single one. The most fundamental is the "free and active" Indonesian foreign policy as mentioned above, which has been spawned since the late 40s and was established throughout the 50s. The term "free and active" according to Mr. RoeslanAbdulgani157 contains elements of "anti-colonialism, pro-independence, pro- peace, non-binding to one of the military blocs, and cooperation on the basis of peaceful co-existence". Another background is the Asian-African Movement that continues to grow and develop through Asian-African organizations in various categories (students, journalists, writers) and Asian-African meetings in Cairo, Jakarta, Conakry, etc. In all these activities Indonesia and Soekarno play an important role as a pioneer. Meanwhile, the conflict between the West Block and the Eastern Bloc increased in the late 50s. Khrushchev threatened the West Block openly and repeatedly with a nuclear weapon that he said was capable of destroying the towns in America and Europe. Concerned about this situation, the five non-aligned heads of state (Nasser, Nehru, Nkrumah, Soekarno and Tito) agreed to call for talks between Eisenhower and Khruschev through the UN forum to ease the mounting tensions.158
This appeal was conveyed by President Soekarno in his speech at the UN on 30 September 1960 entitled "To build the world anew". The fifth appeal of the head of state was ignored by the two superpowers in dispute. Thus, at Tito's initiative with Nasser, Nehru, Nkrumah and Soekarno, the first "Conference of Heads of States or
156Ibid. 157RoeslanAbdulgani is known as an important figure of the implementation of KAA Asia-Africa in Bandung in 1955. 158 Abraham, I. (2008). From Bandung to NAM: Non-Alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947–65. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 46(2), 195-219. 53
Governments of Non-Aligned Governments" was held in Belgrade on September 1-6, 1961. The conference came to be known as the birth of the NAM.159
Under the leadership of President Soekarno, Indonesia's role in NAM may be called "high profile". In addition to being founder, Sukarno was also assigned to convey the goals and results of the Non-Aligned Conference to US President Kennedy in Washington on September 12, 1961. Sukarno tried to introduce the concept of a new struggle to the Non-Aligned Movement, a concept that divided the world into two factions fighting: NEFOs (New Emerging Forces, newly independent states from the colonies of imperialist capitalist countries) and OLDEFO (Old Established Forces, imperialist capitalist countries wishing to perpetuate their dominance). Within that framework, Soekarno founded the GANEFO (Games of the New Emerging Forces) as a counter to the Olympic Games and CONEFO (Conference of the New Emerging Forces) as a UN counter. The first GANEFO was successfully held in Jakarta in November 1963. While the CONEFO which was planned to take place in late 1966 failed to be implemented because Soekarno was ousted from his position in 1965-1966. Under Soeharto's leadership, Indonesia's foreign policy orientation turned from its inclination to the Eastern Bloc to the West Block. Indonesia's role in the world's arena can be said to be "low profile". Indonesia is like withdrawing from the frenetic world problem to concentrate more on national and regional issues by co-founding ASEAN. Only after the national consolidation was sufficient, Indonesia began to re-enter the international scene, beginning with the NAM lead in 1992 which was considered successful in facilitating North-South dialogue and South-South cooperation.160
III.1.2. Free and Active Foreign Policy In the 1950s the operational basis of the principle of free and active was expanding meaning. This was stated by President Soekarno in his speech entitled
159 Kumar, R. (1997). Non-alignment policy of Indonesia. Centre for Strategic and International Studies. 160 Clark, M. (2011). Indonesia's Postcolonial Regional Imaginary: From a ‗Neutralist‘to an ‗All- Directions‘ Foreign Policy. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 12(02), 287-304. 54
"JalannyaRevolusi Kita‖ (Jarek) or in English ―The Way of Our Revolution‖ on August 17, 1960, that "Our independent, active stance should also be actively reflected in economic relations with abroad, West or East ".161 Then the essence of Indonesian foreign policy was again declared by President Soekarno in" Detailed Guidelines for the Implementation of the Political Manifesto of the Republic of Indonesia "as well as the outline of Indonesian foreign policy with the Decision of the Supreme Advisory Council. 2 / Kpts / Sd / I / 61. The core of the policy includes, among other things, the over-the-counter political nature of the Republic of Indonesia, anti-imperialism and colonialism and has the following objectives:162 (1) Serving in the struggle for Indonesia's national independence; (2) Serving in the struggle for national independence from all nations of the world; (3) Serving in the struggle to defend world peace. These three foreign policy objectives are in fact inseparable from one another, especially in their struggle to build a safe, just and prosperous world.
As revealed by Moh. Hatta in front of the Central Indonesian National Committee (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat) on the right direction for overseas results of Indonesia:
"But should we Indonesians who fight for the independence of our nation and country, only have to choose the pro-Russian or pro- American whether there is nothing we should take in the goals of our ideals? The government who argues that we should take is that we should not be objects in International political struggle, but we must remain a subject who is entitled to determine our own attitudes, have the right to fight for our own goal, namely Indonesia's independent practice.”163
161 Habib, A Hasnan. 1990. KapitaSelekta; StrategidanHubunganInternasional. Jakarta: CSIS, p. 395. 162Ibid. p. 396 163 Michael Leifer and RamlanSurbakti, (1989). PolitikLuarNegeri Indonesia. Gramedia, Jakarta. p. 30. 55
Based on the statement above that Indonesia must participate in implementing a world obligation that aspired by the Indonesian Revolution. Indonesia's foreign policy must be active not something that is expected of passive attitudes and actions. ―Active‖ here is an activity directed participate with the activities of international activities leading to the establishment of new world order. It has three basic elements of freedom, eternal peace and social justice. While ―free‖ is free to establish relationships with any country in the sense of freely determining its own attitude and decision of the decision to international problems according to their values and benefits without binding themselves to a block. The direction of foreign policy outlined by the Proclamator of Indonesia in principle does not want to be an object in the international arena. Indonesia must be a subject that can determine its own policies.
Furthermore, in order for the free and active principles to be operationalized in Indonesian foreign policy, every period of government establishes the operational basis of Indonesia's foreign policy which is constantly changing in accordance with the national interest. During the Old Order, the operational platform of Indonesia's active free foreign policy was largely expressed through the declarations and speeches of President Soekarno. Shortly after independence, the Government's Political Notice was issued on November 1, 1945, which included the following: (1) Peace politics and peaceful coexistence; (2) Politics does not interfere in the affairs of other countries; (3) Good neighbor policy and cooperation with all countries in the economic, political and other fields; (4) Politics based on the UN Charter.164 Under the Act, it is clear that the principle that Indonesia uses in its foreign policy, namely the policy of living neighborly with the countries in the region, the policy of not
164Wuryandari, Ganewati. 2016. PolitikLuarNegeri Indonesia di Tengah PusaranPolitkDomestik. Jakarta: P2P LIP, p. 29. 56 interfering in the domestic affairs of other countries and always Referring to the Charter of the United Nations in relations with other countries.165
III.1.3. Wawasan Nusantara (Archipelagic Outlook) Doctrine Constitutionally, Wawasan Nusantara was confirmed by Presidential Decree No. MPR. IV / MPR / 1973, on the State Policy of Chapter II Sub E, the Principles of Wawasan Nusantara expressed as Insight in achieving the National Development objectives are the Archipelagic Insights include:166
1. The embodiment of the Archipelago as a Political Unity in the sense of: a) That the needs of national territory with all its contents and wealth is a unity of territory, container, living space and unity of the whole nation, as well as become capital and become capital and common property of the nation; b) That the Indonesian nation, which consists of various tribes and speaks in various regional languages, embraces and believes that the various religions and beliefs of God Almighty must be a unified national unity in the widest sense; c) That psychologically, that the Indonesian people should feel one, the same destiny, one nation, and have a determination in achieving the ideals of the nation; d) That Pancasila is the only philosophy and ideology of the nation and State, which underlies, guides and directs the nation toward its goal. E. That the entire archipelago is a unity of law in the sense that there is only one law that serves the national interest. 2. Embodiment of the Archipelago as a Social and Cultural Entity in the sense of:
165Ibid. Wuryandari, Ganewati. 2016. PolitikLuarNegeri Indonesia di Tengah PusaranPolitkDomestik. p. 29. 166Presidential Decree No. MPR. IV / MPR / 1973, Chapter II Sub E. p. 7-8. 57
a) That the people of Indonesia are one, the life of the nation must be a harmonious life with the same level of community progress, equitable and balanced and the harmony of life in accordance with the progress of the nation. b) That the culture of Indonesia is essentially one, while the existing cultural patterns depict the richness of culture that became the capital and the foundation of the development of the entire nation's culture, whose results can be enjoyed by the entire nation of Indonesia. 3. Embodiment of Archipelago as one Economic unity in the sense of: a) That the wealth of the archipelago is both potential and effective is the capital and the common property of the nation, and that the necessities of everyday life should be equally available throughout the country. b) The level of economic development should be harmonious and balanced throughout the region, leaving no distinctive characteristic possessed by regions in developing its economy. 4. Embodiment of Archipelago as a Unitary and Security Unity in the sense of: a) That threat to one region is essentially a threat to all nations and countries. b) That every citizen has the same rights and obligations in the defense of the State.
III.2. Indonesia‘s Foreign Policy under Joko Widodo Administration Taking into account the main issues of the nation, the challenges of development faced and the achievements of development so far, the vision of national development for 2015-2019 is:167
“Terwujudnya Indonesia yang berdaulat, mandiri dan berkepribadian berlandaskan gotong royong”
167 Kementerian LuarNegeri, (2015). RencanaStrategis 2015-2019 Kementerian LuarNegeriRepublik Indonesia. p. 35 58
Efforts to realize this vision is through 7 Development Mission namely:168
1. Realizing national security capable of maintaining regional sovereignty, sustaining economic independence by securing maritime resources and reflecting the personality of Indonesia as an archipelagic country. 2. Creating an advanced, balanced, and democratic society based on the rule of law. 3. Realizing free-active foreign policy and strengthening identity as a maritime country. 4. Realizing the quality of human life of Indonesia is high, advanced, and prosperous. 5. Realizing a competitive nation. 6. Making Indonesia a maritime state that is independent, advanced, strong, and based on national interests. 7. Realizing a society of personality in culture.
From those efforts above, we may see that there are two points that related to the maritime interest of Indonesia. It is coined in the first and third point that Indonesia realize its vision on securing its maritime resources and strengthening the identity of as a maritime country.
III.2.1. Nawa Cita To show priority in the path of change towards a sovereign Indonesia politically, independently in the economic field, and personality in culture, nine priorities are set in the future government. The ninth priority agenda is called Nawa Cita. There are nine priorities in Nawa Cita, but in accordance to this issue there is one point in Nawa
168Ibid. Kementerian LuarNegeri, (2015). RencanaStrategis 2015-2019 Kementerian LuarNegeriRepublik Indonesia. p. 35 59
Cita. That point is Building Indonesia from the periphery by strengthening the regions and villages within the framework of the unitary state. 169
The main objective to be achieved is that Indonesia is consistently able to implement free and active foreign policy and its identity as a maritime country to realize a better world order, and to strive for its national interests in order to achieve Indonesia's national goals as measured by the following target targets:170
1. The establishment of a free and active foreign policy character of Indonesia which is based on national interests and identity as a maritime country. 2. The strengthening of maritime diplomacy to accelerate the settlement of the Indonesian border with 10 neighboring countries, ensuring the territorial integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia, maritime sovereignty and security / welfare of the islands, and securing natural resources and ZEE. 3. Increased role and contribution of Indonesia in encouraging territorial dispute settlement in the region.
In order to achieve these targets, the policy directions and strategies adopted is reorganizing Indonesia's free and active foreign policy based on national interests and identity as a maritime country by evaluating the implementation of Indonesia's foreign policy and the compilation of a blue book of diplomacy that describes external politics a free and active country based on national interests and identity as a maritime country, and implementing Law no. 17 of 1985 on the consistent adoption of the United Nations Convention on The Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).171
Indonesia focuses also on strengthening maritime diplomacy to accelerate the settlement of Indonesia's borders with 10 neighboring countries, ensuring the territorial integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia, maritime sovereignty and
169 UNDP Indonesia Country Office (2015), "Converging Development Agendas: 'NawaCita', "RPJMN', and SDGs". p. 2. 170 Kementerian Luar Negeri, (2015). Rencana Strategis 2015-2019 Kementerian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia. p. 36 171Kementerian Luar Negeri, (2015). Rencana Strategis 2015-2019 Kementerian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia. p. 36 60 security / welfare of the islands, and securing natural resources and ZEE through the implementation of maritime border negotiations and land, the implementation of the Global Maritime Fulcrum Doctrine, and the dissemination of border information including the negotiation of the radio transmission power limit agreement.172
In terms of territorial dispute, Indonesia would increase the role and contribution of Indonesia to territorial dispute settlement in the region, through the strategy of increasing the role of Indonesia in handling South China Sea dispute through ASEAN mechanism.173
In accordance to the issue, as Jokowi vision still keep its stance based on free and active foreign policy, Indonesia keep its status to be neutral in this issue. This behavior has been proven by the statement of Jokowi that "I need to declare that Indonesia is not siding with any party involved in the dispute,"174 -Joko Widodo
III.2.2. Global Maritime Fulcrum: Maritime Axis in the Asia-Pacific As Joko Widodo is chosen as a new-elected president, there is a key differences with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono‘s foreign policy concept. In his administration, during the annual ASEAN leaders‘ summit in Nay Pyi Daw on 13 November 2014, he promoted a global role concept of Indonesia what so called ―Global Maritime Fulcrum‖ vision.175 This concept is defined that Indonesia shall become the center of global maritime that bridge the Pacific to the Indian oceans, this also makes Indonesia geographically benefited as the center of the lane from the West to East Asia.176 By
172Ibid. 173Ibid. Kementerian LuarNegeri, (2015). Rencana Strategis 2015-2019 Kementerian LuarNegeriRepublik Indonesia. p.37 174 Retrieved from: http://jakartaglobe.id/news/jokowi-clarifies-indonesia-still-neutral-s-china-sea- dispute/ 175 Joko Widodo, ―PidatoPresiden RI Joko Widodo Pada KTT ke-9 Asia Timur,‖, retrieved from: http://setkab.go.id/pidato-presiden-rijoko-widodo-pada-ktt-ke-9-asia-timur-di-naypyi-taw-myanmar- 13-november-2014/, accessed on 12 May, 2017. 176Ibid. 61 addressing his vision of Global Maritime Fulcrum concept, Joko Widodo defined the five agendas to chase Indonesia as the global maritime fulcrum.177
The first agenda, Indonesia is focusing on rebuilding Indonesia‘s maritime culture. As a country consisting of 17,000 islands, Indonesia should be aware of and see the oceans as part of the nation's identity, its prosperity and its future are determined by how we manage the oceans. The second is maintaining and manage marine resources, with a focus on building marine food sovereignty through the development of the fishing industry. The third is providing priority to the development of maritime infrastructure and connectivity by constructing sea highways along the shore of Java, establish deep seaports and logistical networks as well as developing the shipping industry and maritime tourism. The forth is through maritime diplomacy, Indonesia invites other nations to cooperate in the marine field and eliminate the source of conflicts at sea, such as illegal fishing, violations of sovereignty, territorial disputes, piracy and marine pollution. And the last is Indonesia has an obligation to develop its maritime defense forces. This is necessary not only to maintain maritime sovereignty and wealth, but also as a form of our responsibility to maintain the safety of shipping and maritime security.178
The question that come up in regards to this issued discussed is how the vision of global maritime fulcrum influences Indonesia‘s relation with China? However, this maritime fulcrum policy would cause a new coherence specifically to the foreign policy practice. In accordance to the relations with China, there were notable talks between Indonesia and China on the implication of global maritime fulcrum for the relations of China. These notable talks begin to focus on the synergies between maritime fulcrum vision of Indonesia and Maritime Silk Road of China.179 These
177 Natasha Hamilton-Hart, Dave McRae, (2015) ―Indonesia: Balancing the United States and China, Aiming for Independence,‖ United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, p. 21. 178 Natasha Hamilton-Hart, Dave McRae, (2015) ―Indonesia: Balancing the United States and China, Aiming for Independence,‖ United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, p. 21. 179 ―Chronology of China‘s Belt and Road Initiative,‖ Xinhuanet, 28 March 2015. http://news.xinhuanet. com/english/2015-03/28/c_134105435.htm, accessed on 12 May, 2017. 62 policies latter will construct highway of maritime by passing the South China Sea and Indian ocean to Europe and the South Pacific. The synergies between these two policies had been agreed to be explored by both parties in purpose of developing maritime partnership.180
Indonesia will achieve its goals by focusing on the vision of Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF). By taking into account the various risks faced, various approaches need to be taken to balance the achievement of vision and possible constraints. This includes the use of maritime diplomacy in responding to security disturbances, so that the defense capability will gradually awaken. This requires strategic approaches from government to maritime threats by gathering as complete information as possible before decision making. Based on this, support from regional and multilateral cooperation ties will be very helpful in achieving Indonesia's maritime vision. Indonesia's maritime future will be visible in its ability to influence the global need to achieve safe conditions and to have a stable and sustainable trade mobility and business activity.
180 Natasha Hamilton-Hart, Dave McRae, Op.cit., p. 22 63
Figure 7. Five Pillars of GMF and its Supporting Aspects181 Based on the table above, we may see that there are five pillars of Global Maritime Fulcrum. In this issue, the author focus on 2 aspect of security namely military security and political security as these have been mentioned in the first chapter. Thus, each key point of global maritime fulcrum is defined by focus of aspects. For the fourth point which is maritime diplomacy focuses on Border negotiations; Regional and international cooperation; and Diplomacy through: culture, tourism, and youth exchange. The last point which is Build a maritime defense force focuses on integrated defense and security system: land-sea-air and sea lane / navigation and surveillance arrangements.
The most important thing is being able to ensure maritime security for stakeholders in regional and global. Indonesia needs to structuring and promoting the already-owned trading ports, in Jakarta and Surabaya and other ports as the center of global maritime activities with prospects. Enhance security and security so that
181 Deputi Bidang Kemaritiman dan Sumberdaya Alam, Kementerian Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, (2016). Optimalisasi Pemanfaatan Potensi Kelautan Menuju Terwujudnya Indonesia Sebagai PorosMaritim. p. 20. 64 various cooperation will continue and can bring benefits to Indonesia. Indonesia that carries the "Global Maritime Fulcrum" to be the forefront of Indonesia's national interests domestically and internationally. Based on this, various risks and opportunities of the maritime sector are developed with the aim of strengthening and achieving security to help shape the stability of the world. This strategy is placed on the maritime domain in the context of the problem. It is formed and done with an approach based on the goals to be achieved in the future. Finally, the governance structure will determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the Indonesian maritime sector structuring. The problems faced by the majority are threats to resources, in the form of criminality, terrorism to crimes against humanity.182 It requires strong regulation and clear international policies and comprehensive global cooperation aimed at mutual security. Maritime domains are complex in the international system, where Indonesia needs to play the role of diplomacy and the strengthening of military capability and defense industry.
Basically there is a perspective in the vision of GMF itself. This perspective defines two point aspect of GMW which are Engaging and balancing. These two point aspects are reflected into defense posture budget. The institutions related are now increasing their capabilities. It can be seen compared to the 2014 defense military increased 11%. It is predicted also it will reach 200 trillion Rupiah by 2017. This military development is implemented by strengthening Indonesia border near the South China Sea.183
III.2.2.1. Global Maritime Fulcrum Vision as Geopolitics Concept of Indonesia Accommodating the President's political pledge into a grand strategy document is one of the most common forms of state administration in democratic
182Gandarsih, Iis and Priamarizki, Adhi. (2015). Indonesia’s Maritime Doctrine and Security Concern. Indonesia Program. Policy Working Paper. RSIS. p. 5 183Institute of Defense and Strategiec Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. (2015). Indonesia Maritime Identity and Its Aspirations of Becoming Global Maritime Fulcrum. Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum Challenges and Trajectories (p. 16). Singapore: Indonesia Programme, Institute of Defense and Strategiec Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. 65 countries. Therefore, the discussion of the concept of Global Maritime Fulcrum in the RPJMN 2015-2019 document can be understood as the legitimacy of the vision of the elected President in leading the state and government during his five-year tenure.184 In the document, the concept of the Global Maritime Fulcrum contained in the vision of the elected President is placed as a national doctrine, articulated in the direction of foreign policy and strategy as follows: "Strengthening maritime diplomacy to accelerate the settlement of Indonesia's borders with 10 neighboring countries, ensuring territorial integrity of Indonesia, maritime sovereignty and security / welfare of the islands in the forefront, and securing natural resources and ZEE. 185
By looking at the direction of foreign policy contained in the RPJMN 2015- 2019 document, then the concept of Global Maritime Fulcrum can be viewed as a geopolitical concept that wants to be realized by the President. The concept of the Global Maritime Fulcrum as a geopolitical concept is reinforced by political facts in the form of President Joko Widodo's statement delivered before East Asian leaders at East Asian Summit in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, November 13, 2014, as follows:186
"...... Therefore, as a maritime country, Indonesia must affirm itself as Global Maritime Fulcrum, as a power being situated between the two oceans: the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean. Position as a Global Maritime Fulcrum opens opportunities for Indonesia to Build regional and international cooperation for the prosperity of the people ..... "
The position of the Global Maritime Fulcrum as a geopolitical concept demands the government to develop and develop elements of national power which include diplomacy, economy, politics and the defense force of the state as a unified whole and mutually supportive. This is relevant to the concept of "Trisakti" which embodies the spirit of a national struggle that encompasses three aspects of national
184Brigadier General TNI Sisriadi. (2016). Preparing Military Defense Posture in Support of Global Maritime Fulcrum. Media Informasi Kementerian PertahananWiRA March-April 2016. p.7 185 Ibid. p.7 186Witular, Rendi. Jokowi Launches Maritime Doctrine to the World. (13 November 2014). Retrieved from: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/13/jokowi-launches-maritime-doctrine-world.html 66 and state life, namely sovereign in politics, self-reliance in economy, and personality in culture. As an integral part of the governance system, the Ministry of Defense is responsible for the development of state-oriented defense forces to support the realization of the Global Maritime Fulcrum.187
187 Brigadier General TNI Sisriadi. (2016). Preparing Military Defense Posture in Support of Global Maritime Fulcrum. Media Informasi Kementerian PertahananWiRA March-April 2016. p.8 67
CHAPTER IV
INDONESIA’S GLOBAL MARITIME FULCRUM IMPLEMENTATION UNDER JOKO WIDODO’S ADMINISTRATION IN FACING SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE IN CASE OF CHINA’S NINE-DASH LINE CLAIMS (2014-2016) In this chapter, the author focuses to the analysis of foreign policy implementation of Indonesia under Joko Widodo‘s administration in facing the South China Sea dispute. However, in this analysis, the author focus on Indonesia‘s implementation on military and political aspect. In military aspect it is defined how Indonesia focus on strengthening its security in the borders and increasing military capacity as well. In the political implementation, it can be seen how Indonesia focus to be a leading country in the region and to keep peace and stability in the region.
IV.1. Indonesia-China Bilateral Relations under Joko Widodo‘s Administration The Indonesian government will certainly strengthen its bilateral relationship with the Chinese government following President Joko Widodo's visit to Beijing. During his state visit, Joko Widodo was received by Chinese People's Republic (PRC) president Xi Jinping, the two heads of state were involved in the massive talks on strengthening cooperation in the economic sector, particularly the commercial, financial, infrastructure, industrial, tourism and inter-communal sectors. 'In particular president Jokowi invited the Chinese side to further increase the flow of direct investment in various fields in Indonesia.188 Then it was also touched on the issue of the region (South China Sea) of common concern. In addition to trade cooperation up
188Soepardi, Hanni Sofia. Jokowi holds bilateral meeting with Chinese president Xi Jinping. (26 March 2016). Retrieved from: http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/98273/jokowi-holds-bilateral-meeting- with-chinese-president-xi-jinping 68 to the issue of the region, the two presidents also agreed on bilateral cooperation in order to synergize the idea of the World Maritime Poros and Maritime Silk Road Initiative of the 21st Century or known 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. The idea of the world's maritime shaft is agreed to realize maritime connectivity in the region through infrastructure development.189 Then there are 7 documents of cooperation that have been agreed by both parties between the government of Indonesia and China:190
1. MoU on Economic Cooperation between Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs of the Republic of Indonesiaand National Development and Reform Commission of PRC. 2. MoU of Industrial Development Cooperation and Infrastructure between the National Development and Reform Commission of PRC with the Minister of State-Owned Enterprises (BUMN) 3. Memorandum of Understanding between the Minister of State-Owned Enterprises and the National Development and Reform Commission of PRC for the Jakarta-Bandung Rapid Construction Project 4. MoU between the National SAR Agency (BASARNAS) of Indonesia and Minister of Transportation of China 5. Cooperation Agreement between Government of Indonesia and China for the prevention of double taxation 6. MoU between the National Space Development Institution (LAPAN) with the Chinese Space Agency 7. MoU of Cooperation between Minister of State-Owned Enterprises (BUMN) with China Development Bank Corporation (CDBC)
189Efimova, Larisa M. (2015). Indonesia’s “Maritime World Fulcrum” and China’s “Maritime Silk Road”. Retrieved from: http://www.vestnik.mgimo.ru/en/razdely/world-politics/indonesias-maritime- world-fulcrum-and-chinas-maritime-silk-road 190 Indonesia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (2016). LaporanKinerja Kementerian LuarNegeriTahun 2015, Buku II InformasiKinerja. p. 3 69
IV.1.1. Interaction between Indonesia-China regarding to China‘s Nine-dash Line Claims The interaction between Indonesia and China regarding to the China‘s nine- dash line claims has met a minor tension due to some incidents in the South China Sea especially in the Natuna Island. The incident was more to the violation of Indonesia‘s EEZ in the Natuna Island, especially the incident in March 2016.
Following to this incident, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Retno Matsuri addressed protest to China:
“Indonesian government had conveyed a note of protest to the Chinese government, outlining the transgressions conducted by the coast guard vessel had violated the sovereignty and jurisdiction of Indonesian territory within the exclusive economic zone (ZEE) and continental shelf”191
In April 2016, the fishing boats of China were arrested by the Indonesians In this region, and the Indonesians burned and blew up the fishing boats of PRC and also other countries. Even later, the Chinese fishing boats were escorted by China's Coast Guard boats.192
On June 17, 2016 conflict, a Chinese coast guard ship again wanted to try his luck, to protect their fishing boats stealing fish in the Natuna Sea, Riau Islands. Previously, tricks carrying Coast Guard ships in Natuna succeeded, at least to bluff Indonesian coast guard ships from non-military unit instead of Indonesian naval unit. But this time, their tricks did not work. Chinese Cost Guard ship with body number 3303 that tried to protect the fishing boats from China, was confronted by Navy warship, KRI Todak 631.193
191 Retrieved from: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/03/21/indonesia-protests-against-china- south-china-sea-fishing-dispute.html, accessed on 23 March, 2017. 192 Retrieved from: http://www.todayonline.com/world/asia/indonesia-blows-23-foreign-fishing-boats, accessed on 23 March, 2017. 193 Retrieved from: http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/another-chinese-fishing-boat-detained-in- indonesias-waters-in-south-china-sea-official, accessed on 24 March, 2017. 70
Chinese Cost Guard ship 3303 finally chose to step aside from KRI Todakthat was guarding the sea front of Indonesia. Yet these two vessels had facing each other, starting whenIndonesian Navy warship KRI Imam Bonjol captured the Chinese- flagged vessel Han Tan Cou 19038, along with seven crew members. The ship is one of 12 ships that stole fish in the Natuna area. In the capture of the vessel, China Coast Guard Ship had requested that the fishing vessel Han Tan Cou be released. However, the request was ignored.194
On 23 June 2016, there was a step from the President of Indonesia Joko Widodo or known called as Jojowi who flew to Ranai to visit NatunaBesar. This visit of Joko Widodo is the first visit of president of Indonesia to the area. In his visit, he boarded the KRI Imam Bonjol. Previously known that Joko Widodo conducted a limited Cabinet meeting to discuss the defence and economic development of the area.195 In response to the China‘s nine-dash line claims, Jokowi stated "The 'nine- dash line' that China says marks its maritime border has no basis in any international law,"196
In the other hand, Indonesia also actively pushing all the claimant state to implement DOC and to work hard in the arrangement of COC based on the strategic plan of Ministry of Foreign Affairs below:
“Increasing Indonesia's role in the management of regional conflicts including South China Sea disputes through ASEAN mechanisms, particularly encouraging the effective and comprehensive implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (Doc) including the
194 Retrieved from: https://en.tempo.co/read/news/2016/06/22/055782141/House-Member-Urges- Indonesian-Army-to-Remain-on-Alert, accessed on 24 March, 2017. 195 Lowy Institute. Indonesia in the South China Sea: Going It Alone. Retrieved from: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/indonesia-south-china-sea-going-it-alone, accessed on 24 March, 2017. 196 Reuters. Indonesian President Says China's Main Claim in South China Sea Has No Legal Basis. Retrieved from: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-china-southchinasea- idUSKBN0MJ04320150323, accessed on January 2, 2017 71
completion of the code of conduct in the South China Sea, as well as through Preventive diplomacy efforts.”197
As Indonesia has been being active to become the mediator on the South China Sea dispute earlier before Joko Widodo is chosen as the president of Indonesia, the behavior of Indonesia under Joko Widodo‘s administration remains the same on trying to become ―honest broker‖ in the middle of the South China Sea dispute. Despite of Indonesia government‘s concern to become an ―honest broker‖ I the middle of the South China Sea dispute, it is necessary for Indonesia to strengthening its security by expanding its military capacity as well as military presence since China is also active in showing its military presence in the region of the South China Sea. In addition to this situation, since the nine-dash line claims of China meets Indonesia‘s EEZ through the Natuna Island, Indonesia keeps its status to be neutral and prefer to maintain its relations with China. As we may perceived from the statement of Indonesian Foreign Minister, Retno Marsudi in responding this issue that “Indonesia will strive to maintain its good relation with the government of China in accordance with the International Law”.198 By this statement, it can be seen that Indonesia the stance of Indonesia is not conflicted with China in regards to the Natuna Island. But then, as Indonesia focus on strengthening its border as well as maritime aspects, Indonesia still prepare to protect its sovereignty through military advancement.199
Since Indonesia under Joko Widodo‘s administration has concern of maritime sectors, Indonesia launched its policy regarding to the protection of Indonesian territory and resources to take an action on sinking any foreign vessels that enter
197 Kementerian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia. (2015). Rencana Strategis 2015-2019. p.49 198Amindoni, A. (2016, March 22). Indonesia hopes to maintain good relations with China. Retrieved from The Jakarta Post: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/03/22/indonesia-hopes-maintain- good-relations-with-china.html 199Suryadinata, L. (23 June 2016). The Natuna‘s incident and Indonesia-China relations. Retrieved from The Strait Times: http://www.straiztstimes.com/opinion/the-natunas-incident-and-indonesia- china-relations, accessed on 26 May 2017. 72 illegally Indonesian territory especially Indonesian waters without any permission. However, this action is clearly stated by the Minister of marine and fisheries, Susi PudjiAstuti that ―This is to serve as a deterrent to others, you may go freely in the rest of the world, but once entering Indonesia, this is the consequence”.200 Thus, by facing this kind of Issue, Indonesia interaction with China focuses on cooperation as well as developing its military in the borders area, especially Natuna Island since this area is directly facing the nine-dash line claims of China.
Figure 8. The Pattern of Interaction between Indonesia-China201
As the result of the finding, by looking to the behavior of Indonesia, we can see that Indonesia and China have interaction on both cooperation and competition. As we may see from the figure above, the author draw the figure in purpose of giving the highlight on the pattern between Indonesia and China in the issue of the South China Sea dispute, specifically regarding to China‘s nine-dash line claims. Based on the figure above, the author sees that the terms of competition means that in the interaction with China, Indonesia would maintain its sovereignty in maritime territory since China‘s nine-dash line claims would potentially threaten Indonesia. But in the other hand, in the term of cooperation in this interaction, in the same time Indonesia
200 Suryadinata, L. (23 June 2016). The Natuna‘s incident and Indonesia-China relations. Retrieved from The Strait Times: http://www.straiztstimes.com/opinion/the-natunas-incident-and-indonesia- china-relations, accessed on 26 May 2017. 201 Figure was edited by the author 73 also wants to create strong cooperation with China as Indonesia adhere the concept of free and active foreign policy.
IV.2. Indonesia Implementation on Military Aspect In the implementation of military aspect, Indonesia focuses on developing its international cooperation in the field of defense. Any kind of activities related to the defense diplomacy is according to the free and active foreign policy of Indonesia in purpose of empowering the interest of the security and sovereignty of Indonesia. However the forms of diplomacy in defense will be developed through the ―shuttle defense diplomacy‖. The activity in the shuttle defense diplomacy will be implemented through opening communication with friendly countries in purpose of building a confidence building measure by promoting peace as well as dialogue in resolving the conflict.202
As the deterrence step, as Indonesia is more to be defensive rather than offensive, internally, Indonesia defense policy shaped the development of state defense posture to deal with potential threat in the region, specifically in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the north of Natuna waters. This development of military focused on increasing the capabilities of defense system primary tools or in bahasa it is called Alutsista. In addition, Indonesia is also developing defense support infrastructure in the Natuna region and its suroundings. Military defense conducts are implemented through physical presence through some operations of patrols and exercises in refers to the existing Rules of Engagement (RoE)203
As the vision of Joko Widodo to become a global maritime fulcrum, Indonesia starts the implementation on the military by building the character of the nation through the state‘s defenses and capabilities in the Natuna area. This step is being
202 Derived from Badan Nasional PengelolaPerbatasan (BNPP) Indonesia, specifically from Deputy of sea and air border. These points based on draft of National Policy on the South China Sea Issue arranged by Deputy Coordination of Indonesia's foreign policy, coordinating ministries in the fields of politics, law and security. ( September 2015) 203Ibid. 74 done in purpose of improving the sense of nationalism of the stakeholders related in strengthening Indonesia.
IV.2.1. Indonesian Stance in the South China Sea Dispute According to Defence White Paper 2015 “In the South China Sea issue, Indonesia is not a claimant state. Indonesia conduct external and internal policies to realize a peaceful regional, as well as each country's involved could refrain from any action.”204
In connection with the doctrine of the Global Maritime Fulcrum, the inclusion of projected forces in the military defense architecture has the potential to invite polemics from various circles, especially when linked with free and active foreign policy and defense doctrine / defense strategies using active defensive patterns. In this connection, military projection will be seen as an offensive action that is contrary to the doctrine / strategy of state defense. This view can be traced in the State Defense Strategy document which explains, among other things, that "..... In an active defensive pattern, the economy must be an instrument to pressure other countries that threaten Indonesia." In another part it says that, "In a defensive pattern Active, military force must be built to have adequate defensive capability to be respected by other countries. It further explained that, ―In the face of the military threats of other countries, the Indonesian nation will develop an active defense defensive strategy. One form of active defensive defense is diplomacy placement as the outermost line of state defense. War should be prevented by a political approach to domestication, which is to intensify diplomatic efforts." In general, the description can be interpreted
204 Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia, (2015). Indonesian Defence White Paper 2015. p. 4. 75 that the organization of state defense does not put forward offensive military action.205
Based the current White Paper, Indonesian defense posture development related with the defense capability of Indonesia in facing any potential threat.206 This development of defense posture also is necessary to be realized in purpose of pursuing Indonesia to become maritime regional power.207
However, the development of defense posture in Indonesia could be defined into to which is military and non-military. The focus of military defense posture are development strength, capability and the placement of Indonesia forces. In terms of non-military defense posture, this focuses on pushing the roles of ministries and related institution as the stakeholder to prepare any non-military threat.208
IV.2.2. Increasing Military Capacities Under Joko Widodo‘s administration, Indonesia has published its projection of defense posture on the National Planning and Development Bureau (BAPERNAS). This is in accordance to the decree number 175/M.PPN/HK/12/2015 about the projection of 2015-2019 plan in purpose of modernization of Indonesia armed forces (TNI) as well as National Police in pursuing MEF 2029.209
205 Brigjen TNI Sisriadi. (2016). Pengembangan Postur Pertahanan Militer Guna Mendukung Terwujudnya PorosMaritim Dunia, Media Informasi Kementerian Pertahanan WiRA Maret-April 2016. p. 14 206Defence Ministry of Indonesia. (2015). Defence White Paper. Jakarta: Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia. p.40 207Defence Ministry of Indonesia. (2015). Defence White Paper. Jakarta: Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia. p.40 208Defence Ministry of Indonesia. (2015). Defence White Paper. Jakarta: Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia. p.42 209BadanPerencanaanNasional . (2015). Keputusan Menteri Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional 76
Figure 9. Indonesian Army Procurement Project in 2015210 The projection above is based on what it has been planned by Indonesia government in purpose of improving its military capacity as part of Minimum Essential Forces (MEF) regarding to the Indonesian Department of Defense Plan of 2010-2029 Indonesian Defense Readiness.211 Below the plan of Indonesia military budget described in the tables:
210BadanPerencanaanNasional . (2015). Keputusan Menteri Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional 211 Akmal, &Pazli. (2015). Strategi Indonesia Menjaga Keamanan Wilayah Perbatasan Terkait Konflik Laut Cina Selatan pada Tahun 2009-2014. p. 7 77
Figure 10. Indonesian Navy Projection in 2015212
Figure 11. Indonesian Air Force Projection in 2015213
212 Akmal, &Pazli. (2015). Strategi Indonesia Menjaga Keamanan Wilayah Perbatasan Terkait Konflik Laut Cina Selatan pada Tahun 2009-2014. p. 7 213Ibid. 78
Figure 12. Indonesian Army Projection in 2015214
IV.2.3. Strengthening Military Capabilities in the Borders Area: Natuna Island
As it has been known, the government plans to make the Natuna Islands as the base of the state defense (base) on the outer edge. This was conveyed by President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) post-visit to the Natuna area with several ministers some time ago. The plan, the parent base will be equipped facilities fighter aircraft, warships, and cargo by the elite forces of the Navy and the Air Force. Increasing the budget is one concrete step that can be taken by the Government of Indonesia in an effort to strengthen the strength of the Indonesian military. It is to realize deterrence and to increase the bargaining power of regional and global politics in order to balance the power (balancing power), including addressing the situation in the South China Sea.215
214Akmal, &Pazli. (2015). Strategi Indonesia Menjaga Keamanan Wilayah Perbatasan Terkait Konflik Laut Cina Selatan pada Tahun 2009-2014. p. 7 215Indonesia to Build Military Bases in Natuna: Minister Ryacudu. (1 July 2016). Retrieved from: http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/105518/indonesia-to-build-military-bases-in-natuna-minister- ryacudu 79
The policy to build and strengthen military bases in the Natuna islands is a concrete step by Indonesia to anticipate the threat coming from the South China Sea conflict. Defense Minister RaymizardRaycudu said it had budgeted Rp5-6 trillion for the procurement of various military facilities in Natuna. The funds were used to build a fighter plane, submarine dock, radar procurement, submarines and warships.216
IV.2.3.1. Military Strategy of Indonesia in the Natuna Region
Military strategy of Indonesia in strengthening the outer borders of Indonesia is the projection of integrated military bases. These bases are projection for all the military instrument which is the Army, Navy, as well as Air Forces. This strategy on strengthening the outer borders of Indonesia is in accordance to the publication of Ministry of Defense of Indonesia in draft no. 125/2015 about defense policy Indonesia in 2016, as it is stated that:217
“The establishment of the development and the empowerment of the areas of defense and the establishment of the border line and the security of the land borders of Borneo through the concept of security belt and the establishment of synergy between the upper echelon through coordination and cooperation in terms of the development of infrastructure and the development of the defensive capabilities in the outer region which includes the Papua, Nusa Tenggara Region and all of the outer Island with the main priority in the Natuna”218
216Indonesia Raises Military Budget By $2.5 Billion to Fund Arms. (26 September 2015). Retrieved from: http://www.defenseworld.net/news/14167/Indonesia_Raises_Military_Budget_By__2_5_Billion_To_F und_Arms_Purchases#.WStSm8a_PDc, accessed on 26 May, 2017. 217Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia. (2015). KEBIJAKAN PERTAHANAN NEGARA TAHUN 2016. KEPUTUSAN MENTERI PERTAHANAN REPUBLIK INDONESIA NOMOR: KEP/ 1255 / M / XII / 2015. p. 17 218Ibid. p. 17 80
In the implementation, Indonesia has chosen several strategic location as the integrated military bases such as Ranai city as the strategic location for armed forces, Sungai Ulu, Cape Sekalung, Lampa Strait, Setengar City, Cape Payung, and Cape Datuk. These integrated military bases are also equipped with modern military tools in purpose of making the base strong enough.
IV.2.3.2. Military Exercise in the Border Region The exercise of the peak of the AngkasaYudha TNI Air Forces 2016 in Natuna is a regular exercise that is usually carried out by the TNI. Based on the instruction of President Joko Widodo in strategic areas, the outer islands of Indonesia, a number of strengthening will be done by the TNI, and it is done not only in Natuna area, but throughout Indonesia. The TNI Commander also stated that, maneuvering the peak training field of the Air Force on Natuna Island, Riau Islands province, one day after the 71st anniversary of TNI is a routine exercise conducted by the Air Force. Based on his statement "The exercise of AngkasaYudha 2016 is an accumulation of all the exercises that have been carried out by Indonesian Air Force units, ranging from individual level, unit, to Main Command".219
However, Indonesia in conducting exercise does not involve with any other countries. This is based on the statement of General of armed forces, GatotNurmantyo, "In the context of the South China Sea, the TNI does not exercise with any country"220. In addition, Gatot stated the reason why TNI does not exercise with other countries that "Indonesia appeals to all parties not to engage in activities that could increase instability in the South China Sea, so the TNI will not practice with any country there"221.
219Penguatan TNI Akan Dilakukan di Natuna. (7 October 2016). Retrieved from: http://www.ekspose.net/07/10/2016/nasional/penguatan-tni-akan-dilakukan-di-natuna/ 220Gumilang, Prima. TNI TakLatihanMiliterdenganAsing di Laut China Selatan. (05 October 2016). Retrieved from: http://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20161005092535-20-163372/tni-tak-latihan- militer-dengan-asing-di-laut-china-selatan/ 221Ibid. 81
In addition, the TNI Commander stated that a number of TNI strengthening will be conducted in the Natuna region, among others, the addition of TNI personnel and defense equipment. Furthermore, the TNI Commander explained that the exercise is also a manifestation of the professionalism of individuals, units and Kotama in joint operations conducted by the Joint Air Task Force (Kogasudgab).222
The exercise also carries the theme "Kogasudgab performs air operations to neutralize opponent air forces and carries out air support operations against sea forces and ground forces in order to safeguard the sovereignty of Indonesia". In a series of field maneuvers, such as: air surveillance, air combat, oppression of air opponents, strategic air attack operations, offensive airfield operations, direct air strikes, combat combat control, air shot and mortar shootings.223
IV.3. Indonesia Implementation on Political Aspect As Indonesia adapts the principle of NawaCita, it is stated in one of nine points of NawaCita that it is necessary to push the development on the outer island of Indonesia within the framework of Indonesia since Indonesia is an archipelagic country. In addition, since the geographical location of Indonesia is strategic with 2/3 of territory consists of waters, it will give benefit to Indonesia to become global maritime fulcrum.224
Constitutionally, Indonesia has such a responsibility to keep the world peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. The role of Indonesia as an ―honest broker‖ is obligating Indonesia as one of the founders of ASEAN to maintain the stability of
222Pertahanan Indonesia di Natunaakan Terus Diperkuat. (7 October 2016). Retrieved from: https://jakartagreater.com/pertahanan-indonesia-di-natuna-akan-terus-diperkuat/ 223Ibid. 224 Derived from Badan Nasional PengelolaPerbatasan (BNPP) Indonesia, specifically from Deputy of sea and air border. These points based on draft of National Policy on the South China Sea Issue arranged by Deputy Coordination of Indonesia's foreign policy, coordinating ministries in the fields of politics, law and security. ( September 2015) 82 security in the South China Sea region and prevent any kind of potential conflict from the dispute and influence from major power countries.225
Through its politics, Indonesia continues to push diplomacy efforts in handling every step of overlapping claims settlement in the South China Sea to respect the principle of UNCLOS 1982 and related international law. The status of Indonesia in the South China Sea dispute, push Indonesia to have positive role in handling the South China Sea dispute. Through ASEAN + China SOM mechanism, and pushing the claimant state on the implementation of DOC and preparation of COC.226
As China always keep its claims on the nine-dash line claims of China that covers almost 90% percent of the South China Sea area, Indonesia sees that the nine- dash line claims of China has no legal basis. This is in accordance with the submission of diplomatic note no. 480/POL-703/VII/10 to the UN in 2010 that is stating that the nine-dash line map is lacking of international legal basis, specifically in regard to UNCLOS 1982.
In the practice of foreign policy, Indonesia adheres free and active foreign policy to provide path for Indonesia as balancing power in the region in purpose of strengthening relations with other states to gain the stability in political and security.
IV.3.1. Maritime Diplomacy Maritime diplomacy is aimed at the need for another country's deterrence, which can be understood as the use of threat by one of the deterrent parties in the context of military strategy to convince others to withhold and counteract the various measures of action.227 Threats serve as a deterrent that convinces the target to not
225 Derived from Badan Nasional PengelolaPerbatasan (BNPP) Indonesia, specifically from Assistant Deputy of sea and air border. These points based on draft of National Policy on the South China Sea Issue arranged by Deputy Coordination of Indonesia's foreign policy, Coordinating Ministries in the fields of politics, law and security. ( September 2015) 226Ibid. 227 Butler. Colin J. (2005). Strategic Alliance UK, Journal, Jan – Feb Edition. Strategic Change 14. p. 20–22 83 carry out the actions they will take because of the costs and losses they will incur. In the context of international security, the deterrence effect generally refers to the threat of military retaliation directed at preventing other countries from engaging in activities that could harm the country that undertakes such deterrence policies and is generally confined to the use of nuclear weapons (the Cold War perspective). Therefore, it is necessary to implement the concept of maritime fulcrum preceding the implementation of sovereignty at sea and the completion of maritime boundaries and strengthening of defenses at sea and ensuring the deterrence effect works properly. In the context of Indonesia which owns and promotes maritime fulcrum policy is ideal to be developed as well as laying the ground of maritime diplomacy that is shown to the global.228
Strong maritime and border diplomacy is an important aspect for Indonesia as an archipelagic country with most of its territory composed of oceans. Indonesia needs to optimize the maritime potential consisting of biological and non-biological resources, maritime services and navigation lines and the enforcement of sovereignty and sovereign rights at sea. Maritime diplomacy has been carried out since the beginning when the Indonesian nation declared itself an archipelagic State. Maritime and border diplomacy becomes a priority issue in NawaCita President Jokowi whose implementation is coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Foreign policy and work programs of the Indonesia should be optimized to support the vision and mission of President Joko Widodo's government.229 Maritime and Border Diplomacy is an effort to cooperate with other countries to utilize and manage the marine resources, and provide legal certainty over the borders of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia, among others through maritime boundary negotiations, land border affirmation and border cooperation, and security cooperation Maritime, shipping safety, and marine resource management.
228 Butler. Colin J. (2005). Strategic Alliance UK, Journal, Jan – Feb Edition. Strategic Change 14. p. 20–22 229 Kementerian LuarNegeri, (2016). LaporanKinerja Kementerian LuarNegeriTahun 2015. p.45 84
The result of Indonesia maritime diplomacy in 2015:230
1. MoU on Maritime Cooperation between Indonesia and the United Kingdom 2. Development of infrastructure and connectivity. 3. Maritime Cooperation between RI and Denmark: 4. The Results of the MoU on Maritime Cooperation between Indonesia and the US 5. RI-Australia: Fighting IUU Fishing and promoting sustainable fishing practices. Strengthening cooperation and efforts in promoting responsible fishing practices and combating IUU Fishing through various capacity building and information sharing activities.
Thus as maritime diplomacy resulted into some cooperation with other states, Indonesia will increase its interest on strengthening its maritime potential. As we may see from the result of MoUs with other state that Indonesia focuses on strengthening its maritime security. The cooperation might be seen especially in fighting IUU fishing since Indonesia vision to protect its maritime resources. In relation with nine- dash line claims of China, since there were some incidents that involved both of Indonesia and China, when Chinese vessels illegally entering Indonesian waters, this become a concern of Indonesia in fighting IUU fishing. These maritime cooperation through maritime diplomacy will strengthen Indonesia‘s influence as well as capabilities in protecting its sovereignty and maritime resources.
IV.3.2. Workshop on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea The South China Sea region is an area full of potential natural resources and geographically located in strategic locations. This makes the region bordering on many countries also has high geopolitical dynamics and is vulnerable to escalating conflicts. A special mechanism and forum is needed to harmonize the interests of
230 Kementerian LuarNegeri, (2016). LaporanKinerja Kementerian LuarNegeriTahun 2015. p.46 85 various parties in the South China Sea and reduce the potential for conflict in the region.231
Indonesia through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 16-17 November 2016 held a 26th Workshop on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea. The workshop is an initiative of Indonesia to explore cooperation opportunities as well as to build Confidence Building Measures between related parties through dialogue mechanism. It is expected that strong cooperation between the parties concerned can provide concrete results for peace, stability, and prosperity in the South China Sea region.232
The 26th Anniversary of the Workshop which was held since 1990 was attended by participants from 11 participating authorities, including Brunei Darussalam, PRC, Philippines, Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore and Vietnam.
The workshop will discuss the development of several projects that have been agreed in the previous workshop, among others; Website for marine database sharing; Environmental studies in the South China Sea; Training programs for researchers and seafarers; and others. The workshop will also discuss the terms of reference for establishing information hub of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea (WMP-SCS) and Joint Development in the South China Sea. The establishment of such information hubs and Joint Development is necessary to further increase the commitment of participating authorities to the success of cooperative projects in the South China Sea region.233
Organized back-to-back, on 15 November 2016 there was also a 12th Working Group Meeting on the Study of Tides and Sea Level Change and Their
231 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The 26th Workshop on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea. (16 November 2016). Retrieved from: http://www.kemlu.go.id/id/berita/Pages/The-26th- Workshop-on-Managing-Potential-Conflict-in-the-South-China-Sea.aspx 232Ibid. 233 Salim, Tama. SCS Workshop Produces Cooperation Agreements. (18 November 2016). Retrieved from: https://www.pressreader.com/indonesia/the-jakarta-post/20161118/281951722404755 86
Impacts on Coastal Environment in the South China Sea. At this meeting, the Geospatial Information Agency, as a technical agency handling mapping surveys in Indonesia, has discussed the development of climate change impacts in the South China Sea and efforts to address them, as well as the need for data sharing mechanisms for study purposes among authorities in the South China Sea region.234
The result of this workshop focuses in pushing all the parties involved in the South China Sea dispute on the implementation of Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea. In addition, this workshop also pushed all the parties involved in the working of arranging Code of the Conduct in the South China Sea. Thus, by pushing and being the mediator of all involved parties, Indonesia would be able to secure show its important role in the region as well as protecting its national interest in keep the peace and stability in the region.235
IV.3.3. Indonesia‘s Active Involvement in the Regional Summit regarding to the South China Sea Issue In terms of political aspect, Indonesia has been active to be involved in any summits related to the South China Sea dispute. This behavior of Indonesia is clearly based on Indonesia‘s interest to keep peace and stability in the region. In addition, the activeness of Indonesia through ASEAN mechanism also in accordance to Indonesia interest to become a leading state in ASEAN.
There are several summits that conducted among ASEAN member countries and other countries especially China in discussing about maritime cooperation. Through these summits that Indonesia involved in, Indonesia shows its roles to
234Op. cit. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The 26th Workshop on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea. (16 November 2016). Retrieved from: http://www.kemlu.go.id/id/berita/Pages/The- 26th-Workshop-on-Managing-Potential-Conflict-in-the-South-China-Sea.aspx 235 The Jakarta Post, SCS Workshop Produce Cooperation Agreements. (18 November 2016). Retrieved from: https://www.pressreader.com/indonesia/the-jakarta-post/20161118/281951722404755, accessed on 26 May 2017. 87 become ―honest broker‖236 or mediator among disputed countries. Indonesia keeps its neutrality in this issue and keeps pushing the disputed countries to respect DOC that has been agreed as well as encouraging all the claimants for the working on COC.
In every involvement of summits, Indonesia has been actively promote fighting against IUU fishing. Since based on Indonesia‘s interest that Indonesia would like to protect its maritime resources from any kind of threat, especially IUU fishing. In accordance to the issue, Indonesia has been facing this IUU fishing issue with China as both Indonesia and China had some incidents in the Natuna region.
IV.3.3.1. Joint Statement of the 19th ASEAN-China Summit to Commemorate the 25th Anniversary of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations Indonesia was involved in the joint statement of the 19th ASEAN-China Summit to commemorate the 25th anniversary of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations that was held on 7 September 2016 in Lao People‘s Democratic Republic. The focus agenda was to discuss the strategic partnership between ASEAN member states and China. In accordance to the issue of the South China Sea, this summit focuses on recognizing the principles of international law, including UNCLOS 1982.237
The other agenda that is contained in this summit is the commitment of the parties involved in the South China Sea to aim for implementing the DOC and working for the adoption of COC based on consensus. In addition, it welcomes also the establishment of the Guidelines for Hotline Communications among Senior Officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of ASEAN member and China in Response to Maritime Emergencies in the Implementation of the DOC, and the
236 Honest broker means mediator. The Diplomat. No, Indonesia’s South China Sea Approach Has Not Changed. (26 March 2016). http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/no-indonesias-south-china-sea-approach- has-not-changed/, accessed on 25 May, 2017. 237 JOINT STATEMENT OF THE 19TH ASEAN-CHINA SUMMIT TO COMMEMORATE THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF ASEAN-CHINA DIALOGUE RELATIONS. p. 1. 88 adoption of a Joint Statement on the Application of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) in the South China Sea.238
Based on this summit, Indonesia also focus on pushing involved countries to implement DOC and arranging the COC in purpose of keeping the peace and stability in the region. As we may perceive that Indonesia‘s sovereignty is potentially threaten by the nine-dash line claims of China since it directly faces EEZ of Indonesia based on UNCLOS 1982.
IV.3.3.2 East Asia Summit: Statement on Enhancing Regional Maritime Cooperation Indonesia through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has demonstrated various performance achievements. One of Indonesia‘s achievement in 2015 performance is the success of Indonesia related to EAS Statement on Enhancing Regional Maritime Cooperation which has been endorsed by EAS member country leaders which contains one of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing efforts. This effort helps Indonesia in realizing its vision as a global maritime fulcrum and a more comprehensive development effort in maritime cooperation in the region.239
In Indonesia's main concentric circle region, achieving ASEAN as a community has been a record of historical progress in ASEAN. During the period of 2015 and 2016, Indonesia also continues to push for ASEAN benefits to be felt by the people. Indonesia has played important roles in ASEAN. In addition, Indonesia is also the initiator of maritime cooperation in the context of EAS by incised an important achievement with the approval of EAS Statement on Enhancing Regional Maritime Cooperation.240
Regarding to the issue of the South China Sea dispute, this EAS Summit resulted the agreement on keeping the peace, stability, security and upholding
238 JOINT STATEMENT OF THE 19TH ASEAN-CHINA SUMMIT TO COMMEMORATE THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF ASEAN-CHINA DIALOGUE RELATIONS. p. 2. 239 Indonesia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (2016). LaporanKinerja Kementerian LuarNegeriTahun 2015, Buku II InformasiKinerja. p. v. 240Ibid. p. 6. 89 freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. This is in regards to the current development in the South China Sea dispute that has shown the decreasing of trust amongst claimant parties that potentially might harm the peace and stability in the region.241
In addition to the result, EAS also fully appreciate the statement of China through its president, Xi Jin Ping to ensure that China does not aim to chase militarization in the region, especially in the South China Sea. This statement of China stated by president Xi Jin Ping during his visit to the United States of America.242
In accordance to the applicable international law and UNCLOS 1982, the participants agree on supporting ASEAN member states and China to guarantee the implementation of DOC in purpose of maintaining and enhancing mutual trust, to restraint in conducting activities, not to use force as the threat, as well as maintaining the dispute peacefully. Furthermore, the result of EAS regarding to the South China Sea dispute highly support the output of meetings that conducted by all the parties in the South China Sea, as for instance the 15th ASEAN-China Joint Working Group the 10th ASEAN-China Senior Officials Meetings (SOM) on DOC.243
As nine-dash line claims of China has no legal basis based on any international law, through this summit, Indonesia could push all involved parties especially China to respect the existing international law that rule the rights of states on its water in the South China Sea. This occasion would be able for Indonesia to secure its waters and sovereignty form any potential threat of China‘s nine-dash line claims.
241 ASEAN Secretariat. (2016). East Asia Summit Document Series 2005-2016, p. 182 242Ibid. ASEAN Secretariat. (2016). East Asia Summit Document Series 2005-2016, p. 183 243 ASEAN Secretariat. (2016). East Asia Summit Document Series 2005-2016, p. 183 90
IV.4. Global Maritime Fulcrum and Free and Active as the Basis of Foreign Policy Implementation As the idea of Indonesian GMF focuses on the strengthening maritime identity based on its principle ―Jalesveva Jayamahe” (in the ocean we triumph).244 Emphasizing the archipelagic outlook of Indonesia, President Joko Widodo concerns the waters that surrounded Indonesia as archipelagic country for its economic potential as well as national strength. As it has values on these points, it is believed that GMF would support the development of Indonesia maritime aspects in terms of connectivity and infrastructure. This doctrine reformulates of Indonesia interest to become the largest archipelagic country in which geographically located in the strategic position in the crossroads of major power states. Based on the government document, in pursuing this vision, Joko Widodo focuses on the practice of foreign policy and position in the international environment, specifically on:245
1. ―Maritime diplomacy‖ to promote the resolution of the country‘s border disputes; 2. Maintaining the country‘s territorial integrity, maritime sovereignty, safety and social welfare in its outer islands; 3. Safe guarding the national resources and exclusive economic zones (EEZ); 4. Intensifying defense diplomacy; 5. Diminishing maritime rivalries among major powers and promoting peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in the region.
Concerning on Asia-Pacific region, Indonesia GMF is targeting on Indonesia as an ―Indo-Pacific Power‖. The basis reason projection Indonesia as Indo-Pacific Power is by concerning the increasing of interconnected Pacific and Indian Oceans
244 Jokowi’s Inaugural Speech as Nation’s Seventh President, The Jakarta Globe, Oct 20, 2014, accessed on December 10, 2016 http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/jokowis-inaugural-speech- nations-seventh-president/ 245 Op. cit. Gindarsah, I., &Priamarizki, A. (2015). Indonesia‘s Maritime Doctrine and Security Concerns. RSIS Policy Report, 9. p. 2 91
(PACINDO) as the media of Indonesia foreign policy implementation. Through diplomatic efforts in the region, Indonesia focuses on policy measures below:246 1. Consolidating Indonesia‘s leadership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); 2. Strengthening the centrality and cooperation within the regional grouping; 3. Building a cohesive regional security architecture to avoid the rise of a preponderant power; 4. Deepening and developing bilateral strategic partnerships; 5. Managing the impact of regional economic integration and free trade on national economic interests; 6. Promoting comprehensive maritime cooperation.247 In related with Indonesia‘s vision under Joko Widodo administration, the development of Indonesia implementation in military aspect linked with GMF. It is related with GMF vision as it has been mentioned that the development of defense posture of Indonesia aims to fulfill its interest to become maritime regional power through the advancement of Indonesia‘s maritime power and capabilities.248
In related with Free and Active foreign policy provides space for Indonesia as a balancing power in the region to build cooperation with other countries in order to maintain conducive political and security conditions while creating a power equilibrium in the South China Sea region as well as in a global perspective. Indonesia has a constitutional obligation to maintain world peace and security including in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, Indonesia as one of the founders of ASEAN and the global maritime fulcrum is obliged to maintain the stability of security in the South China Sea region and prevent the area becoming a scene of conflict over the struggle for the influence of major powers countries.
246Op. cit.Gindarsah, I., &Priamarizki, A. (2015). Indonesia‘s Maritime Doctrine and Security Concerns. RSIS Policy Report, 9. p. 3 247 See ―Annual Press Statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Retno L.P. Marsudi,‖ (8 January 2015) Accessible at www.kemlu.go.id. 248Defence Ministry of Indonesia. (2015). Defence White Paper. Jakarta: Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia. p.107 92
IV.5. The Challenges Faced by Indonesia in the Implementing of its Foreign Policy in Achieving Global Maritime Fulcrum Vision regarding to the Issue of South China Sea Dispute Based on the author findings, it is founded that there is a gap between the foreign policy and the implementation of Indonesia‘s foreign policy on this issue of the South China Sea dispute. This gap is caused by the challenges that Indonesia is facing in this issue. The first thing that is being challenge to Indonesia is there is no existing international law that could intervene any kind of actions that the state has done, especially in this case is China‘s assertiveness in the South China Sea which claims almost 90% of the area in the South China Sea based on its historical background. The author sees that the existing international law has no power to punish any kind of violation to the international law.
In addition, it is founded also that China‘s stance in keeping its nine-dash line claims as the basis on claiming the South China Sea area has no legal basis in any international law. But then, China persists on its claim of nine-dash line claims in the South China Sea. Thus, by China‘s persistence, it would be hard to push the involved parties on the implementation of DOC and the making of COC. Furthermore, it would be a challenge also for Indonesia to push involved parties of South China Sea dispute in respecting the existing applicable international law.
Looking to the findings above, the author sees that the there is a gap between the policy and the implementation. This gap has been being the challenge to Indonesia‘s implementation. This challenge also will become a barrier to Indonesia‘s vision as a global maritime fulcrum since by this situation, Indonesia‘s sovereignty in the region.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION As China first claim on the nine-dash line map in the 1950s through its government by adapting its historical claim over the South China Sea, the situation in the South China Sea was heated among the parties that involved in the dispute. Since then, from 1947 up until now, there have been several incidents that involving claimant states over the South China Sea dispute. This however has turned the South China Sea region become a conflicted area. Although there was effort from the involved state to aim for stability in the region through Declaration on the Conduct of the parties in the South China Sea (DOC) that is adopted in 2002. In addition, the existence of the United States in the South China Sea dispute as they have interest in the South China Sea has created the competition in the South China Sea becomes more complex. This research is quite interesting due to its escalating tensions that is remaining up until now.
In related with Indonesia position, since Joko Widodo as a new-elected president of Indonesia took the office of government, under his administration based on one of the points of NawaCita, Indonesia highly putted its concern on maritime sectors as Joko Widodo‘s vision to become Global Maritime Fulcrum. The vision to become Global Maritime Fulcrum and a high concern on maritime sector are influenced by geographical location of Indonesia since Indonesia is positioned on the strategic location between two oceans. The policy practice of Indonesia is also concerning on Asia-Pacific region as the interest of Indonesia. So, Indonesia is actively showing its existence in the Asia-Pacific region.
This research has critically analyzed how Indonesia implemented its foreign policy in facing the South China Sea dispute in case of China‘s nine-dash line claims through military and political aspect. Since currently during 2014-2016 there was an escalation of tension among claimant states of the South China Sea, as well as a little
94 incident between Indonesia and China, Indonesia as a non-claimant state began to give its role. Basically, Indonesia has been being mediator since long before Joko Widodo took the government office. But then, since Indonesia‘s vision to become Global Maritime Fulcrum, Indonesia sees that this dispute in the South China Sea has been being an obstacle especially the nine-dash line claims of China that Indonesia perceived it has no legal basis in any international law especially UNCLOS 1982. As Indonesia‘s interest to keep peace and stability in the regional, Indonesia is being an ―honest broker‖ in this issue. In implementing its foreign policy in military and political aspects, Indonesia is influenced by the basis of Indonesia‘s foreign policy which is free and active foreign policy. This basis of foreign policy of Indonesia has shaped the behavior of Indonesia for being neutral in this dispute. In addition, Indonesia also is the pioneer of non-alignment movement.
In implementing its foreign policy on military aspect, looking to the behavior of Indonesia, Indonesia is more to be defensive rather than offensive, especially when linked with active free and active foreign policy and defense doctrine / defense strategies using active defensive patterns. In this connection, military projection will be seen as an offensive action that is contrary to the doctrine / strategy of state defense. It can be seen that the behavior of Indonesia in terms of military aspect is focusing on maintaining and protecting its security by strengthening the borders and increasing its defense budget. This step of Indonesia based on Indonesia military plan to pursue Minimum Essential Force (MEF) within 2024. In strengthening the borders, Indonesia has been choosing strategic location to become integrated military bases of Indonesia. From the findings we may get that Indonesia also is active in conduct military exercise in its border, especially in the Natuna through Angkasa Yudha military exercise that conducted by Indonesian Air Force.
In implementing its foreign policy on political aspect, as Indonesia adapted free and active foreign policy and non-alignment doctrine, Indonesia prefer to become neutral in this issue. It means Indonesia is not siding with any disputed
95 parties in the issue of the South China Sea dispute. This is based on Indonesia interest to seek for regional peace and security and to become leading country in ASEAN. In the practice of foreign policy, Indonesia has been actively involved in regional summit that held through ASEAN procedure that is related with the South China Sea dispute. Indonesia also has been active in pushing all the claimant state to respect the implementation of Declaration on the Conduct Parties of the South China Sea and the making of Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. In addition, Indonesia also has been active to promote fighting against IUU fishing.
As the result it is founded also that there is a gap between the foreign policy and the implementation of the foreign policy of Indonesia that is caused by the challenges that Indonesia face in facing this issue. In addition, it can be seen also that in facing this China‘s nine-dash line claims, Indonesia is more to be using soft power than hard power. It can be seen also from the activeness Indonesia in the diplomatic activities in the region. It is supported also by Indonesia defense posture which is active defensive. This active defensive means in defense posture Indonesia put diplomatic action on the frontline.
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