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THE NEWSLETIER OF THE FORUM ON PHYSICS AND SOCIETY Septemfjer 1986 TABLE OF CONTENTS TWO FORUM SESSIONS ON SDI . ••••.. ••• •• • • 2 The Strategic Defense Initiative by Simon P. Worden. • •• ••• •• • • 2 The OT A Report on Ballistic Missile Defense I: Technologies by Anthony Fainberg . .•••••••••••• 3 OTA's Report on Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies II: Future Research Options by Gerald L. Epstein. ••••••••••• 4 SDI and the Universities by Vera Kistiakowsky . .• • • • • • • • • • 5 SOVIET ACADEMY AND NRDC SIGN SEISMIC VERIFICATION AGREEMENT .............................. 6 "Davids and Goliath:" How Physics Applied to Energy Efficiency Has Saved 100 Power Plants and 1 Alaska Pipeline by Arthur H. Rosenfeld. • • • • • • • • 8 SALT Compliance and the Future of Arms Control by Leo Sartori. ......... 9 Storing the World's Spent Nuclear Fuel: A Nonproliferation Initiative by Jack N. Barkenbus, Alvin M Weinberg, and Marcelo Alonso. ..••• 11 Nuclear War Education Conference by Robert Ehrlich. •• • •• • • • • 12 PHYSICS & SOCIETY EDITORSIllP: Application Accepted ................................................. 13 AAAS Arms Control Colloquium December 4-5 in D.C. ...... .. ... •• 13 Book Reviews: Courses on Arms Race by Michael Harrison. .. •.. • •• • • 13 Optimized Domestic Solar Hot Water System by John E. Poling ...........................................u.... 14 New Education/POPA Position at APS-NY . ••••••••••••• 15 NEW BOOK ON CIVIL DEFENSE edited by John Dowling and Evans Harrell ..................................... 15 Minutes or the Executive Committee or the Forum on Physics and Society by Peter Zimmerman . ••••• • • • • • • .• 16 FORUM NEWS ...........................................................................••••••••••• 17 PHYSICS AND SOCIETY is a quarterly newsletter of the Forum on Physics and Society, a division of the American Physical Society. The newsletter is distributed free to members of the Forum and also to physics libraries upon request. It presents news of the Forum and of the American Physical Society (335 East 45th Street, New York, NY 10017) and provides a medium for Forum members to exchange ideas. PHYSICS AND SOCIETY also presents articles and letters on the scientific and economic health of the physics community; on the relations of physics and the physics community to govemment and to society, and the social responsibilities of sclentlsts. Contributions should be sent to the Editor: Dave Hafemeister, Physics Department, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, CA 93407,805-546-2205 . •••••••••••••••••••••••• • • BULK RATE • Pliysics andSociety • U.S. Postage : 'Editor: t]Jave 9lafomeister : PAID : 'Editorial fifssistant: CyntJii,a :McLin : San Luis Obispo, CA •••••••••••••••••••••••• Permit No. 280 Forum on Physics and Society Physics Department California Polytechnic State University San Luis Obispo, CA 93407 TWO FORUM SESSIONS ON SDI A dozen speakers discussed the Strategic Defense Initiative at two Forum sponsored sessions in Washington, D.C., organized by Aviva Brecher, Mike Casper, and Peter Zimmerman. (See Physics Today, page 83-84, June, 1986.) Because of the great interest in this issue, P & S is publishing the summaries of the talks by the following speakers: Lt. Col. Simon P. Worden, Special Assistant to the Director of the SDIO; Anthony Fainberg and Gerald L. Epstein, who participated in the Office of Technology Assessment report, BALLISTIC MISSILE I TECHNOLOOIES; and Vera Kistiakowsky, Physics Department, MIT. THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE by sm is developing concepts for an initial layered defense shich Simon P. Worden, Special Assistant to tbe might be deployable in the 1990's and effective against current Director, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. and possible numerical increases in Soviet threats. To deter Soviet countermeasures and induce acceptance of a cooperative In order to understand the progress and content of the transition to defense-reliant deterrence for both sides, the sm Strategic Defense Initiative (sm) it is necessary to place the must also prove that cost-effective enhancements can be made to program in its strategic context There are three basic deterrent strategic defenses to counter "responsive" threats specifically strategies, Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), retaliation-based designed to defeat defenses. military strategies, and defense-reliant deterrence. The role of strategic defenses differs greatly in each. If the sm is successful in demonstrating the strategic and economic futility of countermeasures to strategic defenses, the MAD relys on the threat of retaliation against an agressor's United States believes that the Soviet Union will join in a society. Analyses done in the early 1960's concluded that roughly cooperative transition to defense-reliant strategies. Should this 1000 warheads would be sufficient to insure catastrophic damage occur, the defenses actually deployed in the context of negotiated to an aggressor's society. In the MAD context, the addition of offensive reduclions may be far more modest that worse-case defenses is generally undesirable unless those defenses are nearly scenarios. perfect against essentially all nuclear threats. The SOl is IlQ1 predicated upon such a mission. Strategic missile defense system would have three principal elements: weapons, sensors, and battle management. The SDI is Retaliation-based military strategies, and not MAD, have pursuing candidates and plans major experiments for each function long been the basis of the U.S. deterrent. The United States seeks for each phase of a ballistic missile's flight: boost and post to maintain sufficient survivable offensive forces which can, after boost phase. midcourse phase, and terminal phase. The suffering an initial offensive strike, retaliate against the experiments are IlQ1 system prototypes, rather they are in general aggressor's ~ forces and capabilities. The retaliation must sub-scale but sufficient to prove feasibility that full scale elements be sufficiently credible to convince an aggressor that the final can be constructed, Since they do not have system capability, outcome of an attack and counters trike would be a worse miltary except for some of the ground-based elements, all of the situation than before hostilties began. Since the Soviet Union experiments are compliant with the 1972 ABM Treaty. has several thousand military targets, this strategy demands many thousands of survivable nuclear warheads in the U.S. arsenal. Sensor options for initial systems fall into three categories. Defenses can contribute in this strategy by protecting retaliatory Infrared sensors carried on both high and low-altitude satellites forces. However, the addition of defenses by an aggressor as well could detect, track, and identify boosters, post-boost vehicles, may more than counteract the positive impact of defenses of warheads, decoys and debris in space. Experiments are scheduled retaliatory forces. for the early 1990's to validate this technology. Experiments beginning in the late 1980's with an airborne sensor platform The sm is based on defense-reliant deterrence. In this - the Airborne Optical Adjunct - will show the potential of infrared approach the defenses themselves are the primary deterrent, and sensors carried on high altitude unmanned aircraft to perform the not retaliatory forces. By constructing defenses, the United States ballistic missile sensor functions in late midcourse phase. Target would seek to progressively deny .the Soviet Union, as well as the tracking and identification for terminal phase might be shared United States and other nuclear powers would fmd that their between airborne optical sensors and ground-based imaging radar nuclear offensive forces have no military utility, It is not the systems. The latter will be demonstrated in the early 1990's. defense of retaliatory forces which would deter, but the absence of credible military reasons for attacking. Homing non-nuclear kinetic energy interceptors provide weapons options for all defensive phases. Small interceptor To move the United States toward a defense-reliant strategy, rockets might be carried a few each on hundreds of modest the sm seeks to prove that defense can be built which are satellites (lOOkg or less) to perform intercept during boost, post survivable, capable of denying Soviet offensive strategy, and boost and midcourse phases. Similar technology interceptors "cost-effective" in the sense that the Soviets would not conclude could be launched from the ground for late midcourse intercept. that they could add offensive forces or develop new offensive Homing terminal interceptors, capable of endo-atmospheric capabilities to preserve their offensive targeting strategy. The intercept would perform during terminal phase. mYSICS flI.9.£'D SOCI'Erzty; 'lloCume 15, 9{jtmber 3/4 September 1986 Page 2 Much public controversy SUITOlmds the battle management THE OTA REPORT ON BALLISTIC MISSILE problem. Critics have correctly estimated the difficulty in DEFENSE I: TECHNOLOGIES by Anthony producing a ten-million line computer program. However. these Fainberg, International Security and Commerce pessimistic estimates are predicated on a centrally-controlled Program, Office of Technology Assessment. battle management system where all weapons and sensors ~ under positive control of a central manager. A far less stressmg Last September, the Congressional Office of Technology and more survivable approach is a distributed system in which Assessment released