Factional Dynamics Within Boko Haram Omar S Mahmood and Ndubuisi Christian Ani
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Factional Dynamics within Boko Haram Omar S Mahmood and Ndubuisi Christian Ani ISS RESEARCH REPORT July 2018 Factional Dynamics within Boko Haram ISS Research report Omar S Mahmood and Ndubuisi Christian Ani July 2018 The report, at the request of USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives, is an initiative to provide research and advocacy aimed at increasing awareness and debate on the evolution of violent extremist organizations in Lake Chad basin. USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives funded specific sections of the report. The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives or the United States Government. Contents Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................................2 Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................................3 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................5 Methodology ...........................................................................................................................................5 The Evolution of Boko Haram ....................................................................................................................6 Boko Haram in the Region .......................................................................................................................6 The Split .................................................................................................................................................... 10 Timing ................................................................................................................................................... 10 Reasons ................................................................................................................................................ 11 Factional Relations ................................................................................................................................... 15 Command Structures ............................................................................................................................ 16 Splinter Movements ............................................................................................................................... 17 Attack Patterns ......................................................................................................................................... 19 JAS: Suicide Attacks and Civilian Targeting............................................................................................ 19 ISIS-WA: Assaults on Security Forces ....................................................................................................21 Geographic Areas of Operation ..............................................................................................................22 JAS Locations .......................................................................................................................................22 ISIS-WA Locations ................................................................................................................................. 24 Outlier Incidents .................................................................................................................................... 24 Recruitment & Popularity .........................................................................................................................26 Guidelines vs Reality ..............................................................................................................................27 Limited Prospects of Popular Support ...................................................................................................28 Lack of Choice ......................................................................................................................................29 Financing .................................................................................................................................................. 31 Extortion of Local Population ................................................................................................................. 31 Engagement in Local Trade ................................................................................................................... 31 Kidnapping for Ransom .........................................................................................................................32 Illicit Trafficking ......................................................................................................................................33 External Links ...........................................................................................................................................34 Conclusion: ISIS-WA as a Long-Term Concern ......................................................................................36 Recommendations ...................................................................................................................................38 For National Actors ................................................................................................................................38 For the US and International Partners ....................................................................................................38 Endnotes ...................................................................................................................................................39 ISS RESEARCH REPORT 1 Acknowledgements The ISS would like to thank Dr. Christian Pout and Le Centre Africain d’Etudes Internationales Diplomatiques Economiques et Stratégiques (CEIDES) for their field work in northern Cameroon. Dr. Ousman Ramadani Zakaria of the Centre Tchadien des Etudes Strategiques et Analyses Perspectives (CETES) also provided an indispensable contribution into dynamics in Chad. In addition, the ISS reserves special thanks to Timothy Ali Yohanna of Grassroots Researchers Association (GRA) for his invaluable support during field research in Nigeria. Without his dedicated assistance, many key interviews would not have been possible. The ISS would also like to thank Chitra Nagarajan and Abdul Kader Naino for reviewing an earlier draft of these reports. Their critiques and suggestions greatly enhanced the content. 2 FACTIONAL DYNAMICS WITHIN BOKO HARAM Executive Summary This report, produced by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), is the first in a two-part study examining current dynamics with regards to violent extremist organisations (VEOs) operating in the Lake Chad region (Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger). The report examines factionalism within Boko Haram, while the accompanying report profiles current responses and challenges. In August 2016, Boko Haram officially split into two groups – Islamic State-West Africa (ISIS-WA), led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi, and Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS), led by long-time militant Abubakar Shekau. The rupture occurred after some militants opposed to the continuation of Shekau’s rule secured the support of Islamic State, replacing him with al-Barnawi. Shekau rejected the demotion, and instead began commanding a faction comprised of fighters loyal to him. The roots of the rupture have been present for some time, and revolve around a few key concerns: Shekau’s dictatorial leadership style, a need to revive the movement during a period of territorial loss, and most pertinently, a debate over who is an acceptable target of the group’s violence. In particular, ISIS- WA and JAS differ ideologically in terms of whether Muslim civilians can and should be targeted. JAS has argued that anyone who does not actively support the group is essentially a government collaborator, and thus is worthy of attack. ISIS-WA holds a stricter view with regards to Muslim civilian targeting and has advocated shifting the locus of violence back towards government forces and installations instead. The divergent paths each group has taken in the nearly two years since their split can be traced back to this ideological divide. JAS has been responsible for a wave of suicide attacks, frequently deploying female and child bombers, against civilian soft targets in the region. ISIS-WA has on the other hand preferred to engage in less frequent but more large-scale assaults primarily targeting military structures. Both conduct violence outside this dichotomy, while it is also likely that some militants do not fully subscribe to either faction – but this overall trend explains a significant proportion of attack patterns in the Lake Chad region since 2016. The factions themselves have largely ignored each other since the split, both in terms of messaging and violence, though sporadic clashes have occurred. Geographically JAS remains confined to south-central Borno around the Sambisa Forest, and along the Cameroonian border. ISIS-WA initially established a stronghold in Lake Chad and along the Niger border, but has subsequently expanded southwards, now with a presence in Yobe State and parts of south-central Borno as well. The enlarged areas of influence place the factions in a few areas of general overlap, but the situation remains fluid, as both adjust to continued military pressure.